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Oletteko tutustuneet tähän kaveriin....Edward Luttwak

Viestiketju osiossa 'Taktiikka ja strategia' , aloittaja Bushmaster, 27.06.2015.

  1. Bushmaster

    Bushmaster Ylipäällikkö Lahjoittaja

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    ....jos ette niin nyt on siihen mahdollisuus muutamalla linkillä pääsee hyvään alkuun :)


    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Luttwak

    Edward Luttwak

    Edward Nicolae Luttwak (born November 4, 1942) is an American military strategist, political scientist, and historian who has published works on military strategy, history, andinternational relations. He also provides consulting services to governments and international enterprises including various branches of the U.S. government and the U.S. military.

    2012 - Master Class - Professor Edward Luttwak


    Tomorrow's Wars -- No Longer Science Fiction - Professor Edward Luttwak



     
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  3. magitsu

    magitsu Majuri

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    The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire kuulostaa mielenkiintoiselta kirjalta. Lähtökohtaisesti vähän vierastan 70-vuotiaan kykyä nähdä tulevaisuutta siinä missä historiaa.

    Ekaa videota jaksoin pinnistellä 8min. Äärimmäisen kuivakka.

    Kakkosvideossa oli parempi veto. Jo minuutin sisään ok havainto, että nykyään sodat kuten Afganistan, Irak ja Israel-Hizbollah alkaa high techilla (stealth jne.), jatkuu medium techillä (tankit ja rauta kohdealuelle puolustusasemiin) ja käy vakavaksi low techilla (jalkaväki).
    En osta selitystä. Kaikilla tasoilla on teknologia korkealla nykyään. Intensiteetti on vain erilainen ja länsimaat välttelevät tappioita low-intensity conflicteissa suurella rahankäytöllä. Jalkoja maassa -vaiheessa se ei enää niin helposti onnistu. Luttwak oli wiki-sivunsa mukaan jo väärässä vastaavissa julkisissa arvioissaan Persianlahden sodan aikana.

    Sitten väittää, että ainoa syy miksi konventionaaliset suursodat eivät tapahdu on ydinaseet ja näiden rajoittamiseen pyrkivät joko höperöitä tai naiiveja. Varmaan totta, että siksi ei homma ryöstäydy käsistä. Mutta eiköhän rajoittamisella ja kokonaan poistamisella on eroa... ja yleistymisen estämisellä.

    Vähän jäi kuva vittumaisesta vanhasta ukosta, jolla on turhan suoraviivaisia mielipiteitä. Hiukan epäkunnioittava asenne yleisöään kohtaan. Yllättävän tunnepohjaista ilmaisua eikä ole tarkat faktat hallussa.

    Luttwakin mielestä esim. JSF on marginal improvement of classic platform. Rohkenen olla eri mieltä. Varmaan olisi pitänyt loikata suoraan lentäviin lautasiin? Siinä oli kyllä oikeassa, että todella suuria parannuksia tulee puolustus/ilmailusektorin ulkopuolelta. Ehkä ne suurimmat. Mutta kannattaa ehkä ottaa huomioon kuinka paljon rahaa esim. ICT:hen käytetään.
    Paras havainto oli tuo, että vain 3% mil-ind complexin R&D:stä olisi non-platform spendingia.
    Kuulosti loppujen lopuksi vain siltä, että https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareton_periaate pätee myös tässä aiheessa.

    Kannattaa katsoa alemman 9:18-loppuun. Tiivistää Snowden-juttua hyvin ja samalla todella provosoivasti.
     
    Viimeksi muokattu: 27.06.2015
  4. Obelix

    Obelix Alokas

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    siinäpä on vaikuttava CV kaverilla (Edward Luttwak)... Miten mahtaa olla "vittumainen vanha ukko ect".? Tuskin sellaista kaveria pyydettäisiin luennoimaan maapallon valtioiden päämiehille ja sotilasjohtajille...vai pyydettäsiinkö?

    Näin lyhyen tutustumisen jälkeen molempien juttuihin mitä laudalla on esillä, rankkaisin tuon Luttwakin kuitenkin asiapitoisemmaksi sekä uotettavammaksi kuin magitsun "syväluotaavan analyysin"....
     
    Bushmaster tykkäsi tästä.
  5. Bushmaster

    Bushmaster Ylipäällikkö Lahjoittaja

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    Tässä vielä yksi..hyvin mielenkiintoinen pätkä
    (jos on kiinostunut aiheesta eikä miehen tyyli ota päähän)

    Prof. Edward N. Luttwak speaking at the 14th Annual Herzliya Conference


    Julkaistu 8.6.2014
    Strategy in face of regional and global transformations:
    Senior strategists assess new challenges
     
    magitsu tykkäsi tästä.
  6. magitsu

    magitsu Majuri

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    Sellainen mielikuva vaan jäi.

    Kun keskustelupalstalla ollaan niin voisitko ottaa kantaa johonkin noista havainnoista mitä videoista löysit? Mikä näkökanta oli hyvä?

    Kolmosvideo oli huikeasti parempi kuin kaksi edellistä. Hyviä havaintoja Kiinan vastaisen Tyynimeren koalition noususta ja Venäjän strategisista kyvyistä vs. Kiinan kyvyttömyydestä. Sekä EU-päiden täydestä näkymättömyydestä Krimin pöydissä. Siellä ovat olleet vain Merkel, Hollande ja Cameron. Sekä etenkin se, että Kiinan asevoimilla on suuri intressi pitää kiistanalaisia kysymyksiä yllä, jotta raha virtaisi omaan laariin. Saaret laivastolle, intialainen maakunta armeijalle.
    Intelligent people doing stupid things todellakin.
     
    Viimeksi muokattu: 28.06.2015
    Bushmaster tykkäsi tästä.
  7. Bushmaster

    Bushmaster Ylipäällikkö Lahjoittaja

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    Vaikka et kysymystä minulle esitänytkään niin haluan kuitenkin laittaa jotain omista ajatuksistani mikä Edward Luttwakin jutuissa kiinostaa/viehätää..

    Ensinnäkin mies on lähtöisin hyvin hankalista oloista..eli elämänkokemusta löytyy. On hyvin kielitaitoinen sekä sivistynyt. On kirjoittanut "vallankumouksen käsikirjan" ja monta muutakin opusta.
    Lisäksi tämä mies on ollut niin monessa mukana että tuskinpa kaveri näihin piireihin ilman todellista substanssia olisi koskaan noussut. Ai niin ja mies on itsekin ollut sodassa taistelukentällä...

    He has served as a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the United States Department of State, the United States Navy, United States Army, United States Air Force, and several NATO defense ministries. Working for OSD/Net Assessment, he co-developed the current maneuver-warfare concept, working for TRADOC, he introduced the "operational level of war" concept into U.S. Army doctrine, wrote the first manual for the Joint Special Operations Agency, and co-developed the Rapid-Deployment Force concept (later U.S. Central Command) for the Office of the Secretary of Defense International Security Affairs.

    Mielestäni tämän kaverin sanomaa kannattaa ihan tavallisen "nojatuoli srteginkin" kuunella/tutustua..On syvällistä juttua jonka esittää sujuvasti sekä ymmärrettävästi ja minusta ihan hauskastikin...hyvin rönsyilevää mutta aiheeseen liittyvää kerrontaa, joka kertoo miten monella tasolla Luttwak jutujaan miettii...

    Tässä näin niiku hätäseen heitettynä muutama juttu..
     
  8. magitsu

    magitsu Majuri

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    Jes. Ymmärrän kyllä.
    Mutta miksi Luttwakin elämäkerta kiinnostaa niin paljon kun noissa videoissa on ajatuksia, joihin tarttua ja joista keskustella?
    Sillä elämänkerralla on merkitystä lähinnä hänelle itselleen. Noilla ajatuksilla voisi olla laajemmin.

    Kolmosvideossa toivottavasti Luttwak oli väärässä EU:n osalta. Ei tosin hääppöiseltä ole näyttänyt viime aikoina. Nyt sitä testataan Kreikassa ja Krimillä.

    Kantaako EU:n integraation idea jos sen ydinviesti "peace in our time" osoittautuu palturiksi?
     
  9. Bushmaster

    Bushmaster Ylipäällikkö Lahjoittaja

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    Ihmisen elämän kokemus /historia kertoo millaisesta kaverista on loppupelissä kysmys ja nuo videot vahvistavat ukon kyvyt ja millaisissa sfääreissä ajatukset liikuvat..

    ....Tuskin kantaa..EU on kuin tyhjä tynnyri joka kumisee kovaa kun kylkeen hakataan... Lisäksi EU:n jäsenvaltioiden välinen koheesio on talkkijauhon luokkaa ja EU:n päätöksenteoko kyvystä en ees viitsi mitää kirjoittaa...perusta sitten yhtenäinen liittovaltio jolla on armeija .... :) Buahhaaa

    EU olisi parhaimmillaan itsenäisten valtioiden ja kansallisten valuuttojen välinen vapaakauppa alue
     
    Viimeksi muokattu: 28.06.2015
    Stagideus tykkäsi tästä.
  10. Bushmaster

    Bushmaster Ylipäällikkö Lahjoittaja

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    https://www.foreignaffairs.com/authors/edward-n-luttwak

    https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1999-07-01/give-war-chance

    http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114664/syria-ed-luttwak-says-give-civil-war-chance

    By Edward N. Luttwak
    Download Article
    PREMATURE PEACEMAKING

    An unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. This can happen when all belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively. Either way the key is that the fighting must continue until a resolution is reached. War brings peace only after passing a culminating phase of violence. Hopes of military success must fade for accommodation to become more attractive than further combat.

    Since the establishment of the United Nations and the enshrinement of great-power politics in its Security Council, however, wars among lesser powers have rarely been allowed to run their natural course. Instead, they have typically been interrupted early on, before they could burn themselves out and establish the preconditions for a lasting settlement. Cease-fires and armistices have frequently been imposed under the aegis of the Security Council in order to halt fighting. NATO's intervention in the Kosovo crisis follows this pattern.

    But a cease-fire tends to arrest war-induced exhaustion and lets belligerents reconstitute and rearm their forces. It intensifies and prolongs the struggle once the cease-fire ends -- and it does usually end. This was true of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, which might have come to closure in a matter of weeks if two cease-fires ordained by the Security Council had not let the combatants recuperate. It has recently been true in the Balkans. Imposed cease-fires frequently interrupted the fighting between Serbs and Croats in Krajina, between the forces of the rump Yugoslav federation and the Croat army, and between the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia. Each time, the opponents used the pause to recruit, train, and equip additional forces for further combat, prolonging the war and widening the scope of its killing and destruction. Imposed armistices, meanwhile -- again, unless followed by negotiated peace accords -- artificially freeze conflict and perpetuate a state of war indefinitely by shielding the weaker side from the consequences of refusing to make concessions for peace.

    The Cold War provided compelling justification for such behavior by the two superpowers, which sometimes collaborated in coercing less-powerful belligerents to avoid being drawn into their conflicts and clashing directly. Although imposed cease-fires ultimately did increase the total quantity of warfare among the lesser powers, and armistices did perpetuate states of war, both outcomes were clearly lesser evils (from a global point of view) than the possibility of nuclear war. But today, neither Americans nor Russians are inclined to intervene competitively in the wars of lesser powers, so the unfortunate consequences of interrupting war persist while no greater danger is averted. It might be best for all parties to let minor wars burn themselves out.

    THE PROBLEMS OF PEACEKEEPERS

    Today cease-fires and armistices are imposed on lesser powers by multilateral agreement -- not to avoid great-power competition but for essentially disinterested and indeed frivolous motives, such as television audiences' revulsion at harrowing scenes of war. But this, perversely, can systematically prevent the transformation of war into peace. The Dayton accords are typical of the genre: they have condemned Bosnia to remain divided into three rival armed camps, with combat suspended momentarily but a state of hostility prolonged indefinitely. Since no side is threatened by defeat and loss, none has a sufficient incentive to negotiate a lasting settlement; because no path to peace is even visible, the dominant priority is to prepare for future war rather than to reconstruct devastated economies and ravaged societies. Uninterrupted war would certainly have caused further suffering and led to an unjust outcome from one perspective or another, but it would also have led to a more stable situation that would have let the postwar era truly begin. Peace takes hold only when war is truly over.

    A variety of multilateral organizations now make it their business to intervene in other peoples' wars. The defining characteristic of these entities is that they insert themselves in war situations while refusing to engage in combat. In the long run this only adds to the damage. If the United Nations helped the strong defeat the weak faster and more decisively, it would actually enhance the peacemaking potential of war. But the first priority of U.N. peacekeeping contingents is to avoid casualties among their own personnel. Unit commanders therefore habitually appease the locally stronger force, accepting its dictates and tolerating its abuses. This appeasement is not strategically purposeful, as siding with the stronger power overall would be; rather, it merely reflects the determination of each U.N. unit to avoid confrontation. The final result is to prevent the emergence of a coherent outcome, which requires an imbalance of strength sufficient to end the fighting.

    Peacekeepers chary of violence are also unable to effectively protect civilians who are caught up in the fighting or deliberately attacked. At best, U.N. peacekeeping forces have been passive spectators to outrages and massacres, as in Bosnia and Rwanda; at worst, they collaborate with it, as Dutch U.N. troops did in the fall of Srebenica by helping the Bosnian Serbs separate the men of military age from the rest of the population.

    The very presence of U.N. forces, meanwhile, inhibits the normal remedy of endangered civilians, which is to escape from the combat zone. Deluded into thinking that they will be protected, civilians in danger remain in place until it is too late to flee. During the 1992-94 siege of Sarajevo, appeasement interacted with the pretense of protection in an especially perverse manner: U.N. personnel inspected outgoing flights to prevent the escape of Sarajevo civilians in obedience to a cease-fire agreement negotiated with the locally dominant Bosnian Serbs -- who habitually violated that deal. The more sensible, realistic response to a raging war would have been for the Muslims to either flee the city or drive the Serbs out.


    Institutions such as the European Union, the Western European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe lack even the U.N.'s rudimentary command structure and personnel, yet they too now seek to intervene in warlike situations, with predictable consequences. Bereft of forces even theoretically capable of combat, they satisfy the interventionist urges of member states (or their own institutional ambitions) by sending unarmed or lightly armed "observer" missions, which have the same problems as U.N. peacekeeping missions, only more so.

    Military organizations such as NATO or the West African Peacekeeping Force (ECOMOG, recently at work in Sierra Leone) are capable of stopping warfare. Their interventions still have the destructive consequence of prolonging the state of war, but they can at least protect civilians from its consequences. Even that often fails to happen, however, because multinational military commands engaged in disinterested interventions tend to avoid any risk of combat, thereby limiting their effectiveness. U.S. troops in Bosnia, for example, repeatedly failed to arrest known war criminals passing through their checkpoints lest this provoke confrontation.

    Multinational commands, moreover, find it difficult to control the quality and conduct of member states' troops, which can reduce the performance of all forces involved to the lowest common denominator. This was true of otherwise fine British troops in Bosnia and of the Nigerian marines in Sierra Leone. The phenomenon of troop degradation can rarely be detected by external observers, although its consequences are abundantly visible in the litter of dead, mutilated, raped, and tortured victims that attends such interventions. The true state of affairs is illuminated by the rare exception, such as the vigorous Danish tank battalion in Bosnia that replied to any attack on it by firing back in full force, quickly stopping the fighting.

    THE FIRST "POST-HEROIC" WAR

    All prior examples of disinterested warfare and its crippling limitations, however, have been cast into shadow by NATO's current intervention against Serbia for the sake of Kosovo. The alliance has relied on airpower alone to minimize the risk of NATO casualties, bombing targets in Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo for weeks without losing a single pilot. This seemingly miraculous immunity from Yugoslav anti-aircraft guns and missiles was achieved by multiple layers of precautions. First, for all the noise and imagery suggestive of a massive operation, very few strike sorties were actually flown during the first few weeks. That reduced the risks to pilots and aircraft but of course also limited the scope of the bombing to a mere fraction of NATO's potential. Second, the air campaign targeted air-defense systems first and foremost, minimizing present and future allied casualties, though at the price of very limited destruction and the loss of any shock effect. Third, NATO avoided most anti-aircraft weapons by releasing munitions not from optimal altitudes but from an ultra-safe 15,000 feet or more. Fourth, the alliance greatly restricted its operations in less-than-perfect weather conditions. NATO officials complained that dense clouds were impeding the bombing campaign, often limiting nightly operations to a few cruise-missile strikes against fixed targets of known location. In truth, what the cloud ceiling prohibited was not all bombing -- low-altitude attacks could easily have taken place -- but rather perfectly safe bombing.

    On the ground far beneath the high-flying planes, small groups of Serb soldiers and police in armored vehicles were terrorizing hundreds of thousands of Albanian Kosovars. NATO has a panoply of aircraft designed for finding and destroying such vehicles. All its major powers have anti-tank helicopters, some equipped to operate without base support. But no country offered to send them into Kosovo when the ethnic cleansing began -- after all, they might have been shot down. When U.S. Apache helicopters based in Germany were finally ordered to Albania, in spite of the vast expenditure devoted to their instantaneous "readiness" over the years, they required more than three weeks of "predeployment preparations" to make the journey. Six weeks into the war, the Apaches had yet to fly their first mission, although two had already crashed during training. More than mere bureaucratic foot-dragging was responsible for this inordinate delay: the U.S. Army insisted that the Apaches could not operate on their own, but would need the support of heavy rocket barrages to suppress Serb anti-aircraft weapons. This created a much larger logistical load than the Apaches alone, and an additional, evidently welcome delay.

    Even before the Apache saga began, NATO already had aircraft deployed on Italian bases that could have done the job just as well: U.S. a-10 "Warthogs" built around their powerful 30 mm antitank guns and British Royal Air Force Harriers ideal for low-altitude bombing at close range. Neither was employed, again because it could not be done in perfect safety. In the calculus of the NATO democracies, the immediate possibility of saving thousands of Albanians from massacre and hundreds of thousands from deportation was obviously not worth the lives of a few pilots. That may reflect unavoidable political reality, but it demonstrates how even a large-scale disinterested intervention can fail to achieve its ostensibly humanitarian aim. It is worth wondering whether the Kosovars would have been better off had NATO simply done nothing.

    REFUGEE NATIONS

    The most disinterested of all interventions in war -- and the most destructive -- are humanitarian relief activities. The largest and most protracted is the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). It was built on the model of its predecessor, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA), which operated displaced-persons' camps in Europe immediately after World War II. The UNRWA was established immediately after the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war to feed, shelter, educate, and provide health services for Arab refugees who had fled Israeli zones in the former territory of Palestine.

    By keeping refugees alive in spartan conditions that encouraged their rapid emigration or local resettlement, the UNRRA's camps in Europe had assuaged postwar resentments and helped disperse revanchist concentrations of national groups. But UNRWA camps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip provided on the whole a higher standard of living than most Arab villagers had previously enjoyed, with a more varied diet, organized schooling, superior medical care, and no backbreaking labor in stony fields. They had, therefore, the opposite effect, becoming desirable homes rather than eagerly abandoned transit camps. With the encouragement of several Arab countries, the UNRWA turned escaping civilians into lifelong refugees who gave birth to refugee children, who have in turn had refugee children of their own.

    During its half-century of operation, the UNRWA has thus perpetuated a Palestinian refugee nation, preserving its resentments in as fresh a condition as they were in 1948 and keeping the first bloom of revanchist emotion intact. By its very existence, the UNRWA dissuades integration into local society and inhibits emigration. The concentration of Palestinians in the camps, moreover, has facilitated the voluntary or forced enlistment of refugee youths by armed organizations that fight both Israel and each other. The UNRWA has contributed to a half-century of Arab-Israeli violence and still retards the advent of peace.

    If each European war had been attended by its own postwar unRwa, today's Europe would be filled with giant camps for millions of descendants of uprooted Gallo-Romans, abandoned Vandals, defeated Burgundians, and misplaced Visigoths -- not to speak of more recent refugee nations such as post-1945 Sudeten Germans (three million of whom were expelled from Czechoslovakia in 1945). Such a Europe would have remained a mosaic of warring tribes, undigested and unreconciled in their separate feeding camps. It might have assuaged consciences to help each one at each remove, but it would have led to permanent instability and violence.

    The UNRWA has counterparts elsewhere, such as the Cambodian camps along the Thai border, which incidentally provided safe havens for the mass-murdering Khmer Rouge. But because the United Nations is limited by stingy national contributions, these camps' sabotage of peace is at least localized.

    That is not true of the proliferating, feverishly competitive nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that now aid war refugees. Like any other institution, these NGOs are interested in perpetuating themselves, which means that their first priority is to attract charitable contributions by being seen to be active in high-visibility situations. Only the most dramatic natural disasters attract any significant mass-media attention, and then only briefly; soon after an earthquake or flood, the cameras depart. War refugees, by contrast, can win sustained press coverage if kept concentrated in reasonably accessible camps. Regular warfare among well-developed countries is rare and offers few opportunities for such NGOs, so they focus their efforts on aiding refugees in the poorest parts of the world. This ensures that the food, shelter, and health care offered -- although abysmal by Western standards -- exceeds what is locally available to non-refugees. The consequences are entirely predictable. Among many examples, the huge refugee camps along the Democratic Republic of Congo's border with Rwanda stand out. They sustain a Hutu nation that would otherwise have been dispersed, making the consolidation of Rwanda impossible and providing a base for radicals to launch more Tutsi-killing raids across the border. Humanitarian intervention has worsened the chances of a stable, long-term resolution of the tensions in Rwanda.



    LEARN MORE HERE
    To keep refugee nations intact and preserve their resentments forever is bad enough, but inserting material aid into ongoing conflicts is even worse. Many NGOs that operate in an odor of sanctity routinely supply active combatants. Defenseless, they cannot exclude armed warriors from their feeding stations, clinics, and shelters. Since refugees are presumptively on the losing side, the warriors among them are usually in retreat. By intervening to help, NGOs systematically impede the progress of their enemies toward a decisive victory that could end the war. Sometimes NGOs, impartial to a fault, even help both sides, thus preventing mutual exhaustion and a resulting settlement. And in some extreme cases, such as Somalia, NGOs even pay protection money to local war bands, which use those funds to buy arms. Those NGOs are therefore helping prolong the warfare whose consequences they ostensibly seek to mitigate.

    make war to make peace

    Too many wars nowadays become endemic conflicts that never end because the transformative effects of both decisive victory and exhaustion are blocked by outside intervention. Unlike the ancient problem of war, however, the compounding of its evils by disinterested interventions is a new malpractice that could be curtailed. Policy elites should actively resist the emotional impulse to intervene in other peoples' wars -- not because they are indifferent to human suffering but precisely because they care about it and want to facilitate the advent of peace. The United States should dissuade multilateral interventions instead of leading them. New rules should be established for U.N. refugee relief activities to ensure that immediate succor is swiftly followed by repatriation, local absorption, or emigration, ruling out the establishment of permanent refugee camps. And although it may not be possible to constrain interventionist NGOs, they should at least be neither officially encouraged nor funded. Underlying these seemingly perverse measures would be a true appreciation of war's paradoxical logic and a commitment to let it serve its sole useful function: to bring peace.
     
  11. Tacitus

    Tacitus Luutnantti BAN

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    Pahoittelen aiempaa kielenkäyttöäni.
     
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  12. Bushmaster

    Bushmaster Ylipäällikkö Lahjoittaja

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    jaa...jos nyt olen paskaa kirjoittanut niin pahoittelen..mutta muistan jossain tästä lukeneeni/kuulleeni enkä nyt muista mistä lähteestä? Mutta kun tämä aihe tuli esille niin palataan asiaan kun saan kaivettua arkistoista(jos saan kaivettua ja löydän) esille lähteen...
     
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  13. Tacitus

    Tacitus Luutnantti BAN

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    Ei se nyt varmaan hänen uskottavuutensa kannalta niin olennainen pointti ole. Pahoittelen aiempaa viestiäni.
     
  14. Bushmaster

    Bushmaster Ylipäällikkö Lahjoittaja

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    No Problemos :)

    itse asiassa löysin sen jutun ja nyt vaan varmistan että olen ymmrtänyt Luttwakin puheen oikein ...kopsaan sen tänne oli lopputulos millainen tahansa, koska se juttu kannattaa kuunnella joka tapauksessa :)


    No niin tätä ollaan ja olen kuuneltu mutta päätäkää itse mitä Luttwak sanoo alkaen kohdasta min.2.50-3.00

    Miehen taustaa ajatellen en usko että edes haluaa avata menneisyyttään / kokemuksiaan kovinkaan paljon (eikä niistä juuri mitään kerrotakaan vaikka on hyvin tuottoisa julkaisia /kirjoittaja) koska on ollut erikoisjoukkojen, tiedusteluviranomaisten ect kanssa paljonkin tekemisissä... eli tästä pätkästä ymmärsin että taistelukokemusta miehellä olisi? Mutta nyt en ole enää ihan varma..?

    Kelpaako vastaus? :)

    Edward Luttwak at Creative Innovation 2010 - "How war can bring peace"
     
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  15. ajs178

    ajs178 Kapteeni

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    Mielenkiintoisia ajatuksia kaverilla. Olin itse asiassa jo itsekseni pohtinut saman tyyppisiä asioita, mutta tämä heppu saa ne jäsenneltyä yhdenmukaisesti. Omat pohdintani lähtivät Syyrian tilanteesta, jossa nähdäkseni kävi niin, että kun Assad alkoi päästä niskan päälle, niin USA alkoi aseistaa kapinallisia ja nyt ollaan tilanteessa, jossa tappaminen jatkuu tasaväkisenä loputtomiin. Jos taas Assadin olisi annettu voittaa, tai vaikka tuettu vahvempana osapuolena voittoon, niin Syyriassa olisi jo rauha ja jälleenrakennus käynnissä, pakolaiset palaamassa, jne.
     
    Bushmaster tykkäsi tästä.
  16. ajs178

    ajs178 Kapteeni

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    Toisaalta taas Suomen tilanteessa, jos sovelletaan näitä ajatuksia, niin Suomea ei olisi saanut auttaa sodassa Neuvostoliittoa vastaan, koska nopeampi rauha ja vähemmän uhreja olisi tullut, jos NL:n olisi annettu jyrätä Suomi mahdollisimman nopeasti.

    Lutwak ei ota huomioon sitä, että suurin osa uhreista tulee ehkä vasta rauhan tultua etnisissä puhdistuksissa, jne. eikä konfliktin aikana.
     
  17. Bushmaster

    Bushmaster Ylipäällikkö Lahjoittaja

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    Taitaa se ottaa :)
     
    Lone Soldier tykkäsi tästä.
  18. Bushmaster

    Bushmaster Ylipäällikkö Lahjoittaja

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  19. Bushmaster

    Bushmaster Ylipäällikkö Lahjoittaja

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  20. Sardaukar

    Sardaukar Ylipäällikkö

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    Tuttuja juttuja.

    Kannattaa lukea hepun kirja joka on suomennettukin, nimeltään "Vallankaappauksen käsikirja". :)
     

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