ELSO (elektroninen sodankäynti) radiotaajuuksilla: radiotiedustelu, taajuushäirintä, EMP etc
- Viestiketjun aloittaja Pyllyvaltteri
- Aloitus PVM
Laitan tänne koska kyseessä on proof-of-concept.
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer...tempts-to-confuse-facial-recognition-software
Professor Nick Colosimo: Atmospheric Lens
BlackFox
Ylipäällikkö
ELECTRONIC WARFARE · RUSSIA
The tactics of Russian EW formations in the battle of Debaltsevo. “IP” Analytics
January 22, 2017Joel Harding
Anonymous expert analysis and reporting on Russian EW
The principal message is that the US late Cold War era policy of using any and every radio-frequency emission an enemy makes to geolocate and ident assets have been absorbed and implemented by the Russians, with a particular focus on exploitation of an opponent’s civil assets like cellphones, WiFi etc. for psywar/IW, EW and simple targeting and kill assessment. All spelled out below.
If it works for the Russians, the Chinese will emulate it exactly.
Punchline is simple, practice EMCON/LPI/LPD or travel home in a bodybag.
http://sprotyv.info/ru/news/kiev/taktika-rossiyskih-grupp-reb-v-boyah-za-debalcevo-analitika
The tactics of Russian EW formations in the battle of Debaltsevo. “IP” Analytics
05/01/2017 – 11:00
Debaltsevo in Donbas – a traffic node of the Donetsk coal region. The city is located on the outskirts of Luhansk region has an excellent transport infrastructure, through it passes the majority of goods from this territory.
First, in 2015 the Kremlin was important to take control of the center. Direct evidence that were open declarations of President Vladimir Putin’s Russia (02.17.2015), where he openly expressed his confidence in mastering the “militia” of the area. In addition, the Russian leader called on Ukrainian military leadership to dispose lay down their arms and to save people from death.
The tactical situation around Debaltsevo created a deep ledge on one side of which are divisions of Donetsk terrorists reinforcement of regular troops of Russia, and on the other – ATO forces. By the middle of February 2015 the situation on the line of contact escalated, the Russian regular troops came close to the front line and began to impose fighting, trying to take in the Ukrainian units into envelopment and destroy them.
In this situation, the role of electronic warfare has been leading among other types of combat support. As in previous cases, the basis of electronic warfare systems were enhanced maneuverability and Group CPC EW troops of the Russian army.
A comprehensive technical monitoring group provides EW planning data center on electronic environment in the region. In addition to assessing EWw defences their funds in their range of tasks included the collection of data and the initial assessment of electronic environment. It should be noted that the CTC experts groups who have worked in the occupied regions of Ukraine have already acquired some experience and have studied the tactics of application of radio Ukrainian forces ATO.
Manoeuvring EW group in this period significantly expanded its capabilities.
Conducting military operations in the tactical area of approximately 50 × 30 km has created ideal conditions for the organization of bases for DF [Direction Finding / Geolocation] VHF and HF bands. For the technical implementation of this plan DF device used automated jamming stations. Typically, DF Base organized 2-3 jammers on armoured vehicles (R-378BMV, 330BMV P, P-934BMV , R-330ZH). The presence of the enemy DF platforms allowed him to constantly monitor the electronic environment, and create interference on detection if necessary. That is to say, in this case, electronic warfare was organized by the classical scheme of constructing order of battle group maneuver with the implementation of the algorithm of the automated cycle “radio-survey – jamming – intelligence analyis”.
Among other things, with the help of special software systems that have been used by Russian groups EW carried out a mass mailing of SMS-messages on personal mobile phones servicemen and their families. As we previously reported , similar methods of electronic warfare have been designed to create psychological pressure on the morale of the personnel of the forces ATO.
In addition, the bending positions of Ukrainian troops in Debaltsevo allowed the Russian military component EW effectively apply a set of portable radio RP-377UVM2 “Lesochek”, which could generate a barrage of interference in a small area.
It should be noted that, as in previous clashes in the Donbas, Russian military experts used the suppression of mobile GSM-communication signal delivered by the transmitter operators aerodynamically “Leer-3” interference on unmanned aerial vehicles such as “Orlan”.
However, radiation from mobile phones were widely used to cue enemy artillery to them. With the help of special software systems EW RF numbers of mobile phones Ukrainian servicemen have been identified with their owners. Being in the defense area of military units and equipment easily identified and in accordance with the determined further battle tactics. Apparently, for this reason, the enemy artillery accuracy was high – more than 50% of the Ukrainian armored vehicles at the final stage of the battle were either destroyed or put out of action. Unfortunately, the ATO forces did not use the experience from previous errors in Ilovaysk during the summer campaign, which gave advantages to the enemy in the conduct of electronic warfare.
With renewed vigor turned bck to radio-disinformtion using individual mobile phone via SMS-service. According to eyewitnesses , “the SMS could be sent by a ” faked “base station, which was located approximately within a radius of 1 km from the subscriber. This station takes bearings included all GSM transceivers (mobiles) in this area creates a mass mailing messages prepared in advance.
***
Thus, participating in the battles on the side of the “L-DNR” Russian troops are widely used power tools and electronic warfare as an element of combat support. According to the testimony of many witnesses, radio in the area of conducting battles in np Debaltsevo often violated. On many memories from open sources, commanders of their units in the manual often take into account the lack of / unreliable radio communications. Often, parts management and departments was carried out by using other forms of communication.
En lukennut ihan koko juttua kiireestä johtuen mutta laitoin sen tänne koska tuskin muuten muistan ja voi jotain kiinnostaa.
Arvioikaa itse onko sivu luotettava: https://toinformistoinfluence.com/2...ons-in-the-battle-of-debaltsevo-ip-analytics/
The tactics of Russian EW formations in the battle of Debaltsevo. “IP” Analytics
January 22, 2017Joel Harding
Anonymous expert analysis and reporting on Russian EWThe principal message is that the US late Cold War era policy of using any and every radio-frequency emission an enemy makes to geolocate and ident assets have been absorbed and implemented by the Russians, with a particular focus on exploitation of an opponent’s civil assets like cellphones, WiFi etc. for psywar/IW, EW and simple targeting and kill assessment. All spelled out below.
If it works for the Russians, the Chinese will emulate it exactly.
Punchline is simple, practice EMCON/LPI/LPD or travel home in a bodybag.
http://sprotyv.info/ru/news/kiev/taktika-rossiyskih-grupp-reb-v-boyah-za-debalcevo-analitika
The tactics of Russian EW formations in the battle of Debaltsevo. “IP” Analytics
05/01/2017 – 11:00
Debaltsevo in Donbas – a traffic node of the Donetsk coal region. The city is located on the outskirts of Luhansk region has an excellent transport infrastructure, through it passes the majority of goods from this territory.
First, in 2015 the Kremlin was important to take control of the center. Direct evidence that were open declarations of President Vladimir Putin’s Russia (02.17.2015), where he openly expressed his confidence in mastering the “militia” of the area. In addition, the Russian leader called on Ukrainian military leadership to dispose lay down their arms and to save people from death.
The tactical situation around Debaltsevo created a deep ledge on one side of which are divisions of Donetsk terrorists reinforcement of regular troops of Russia, and on the other – ATO forces. By the middle of February 2015 the situation on the line of contact escalated, the Russian regular troops came close to the front line and began to impose fighting, trying to take in the Ukrainian units into envelopment and destroy them.
In this situation, the role of electronic warfare has been leading among other types of combat support. As in previous cases, the basis of electronic warfare systems were enhanced maneuverability and Group CPC EW troops of the Russian army.
A comprehensive technical monitoring group provides EW planning data center on electronic environment in the region. In addition to assessing EWw defences their funds in their range of tasks included the collection of data and the initial assessment of electronic environment. It should be noted that the CTC experts groups who have worked in the occupied regions of Ukraine have already acquired some experience and have studied the tactics of application of radio Ukrainian forces ATO.
Manoeuvring EW group in this period significantly expanded its capabilities.
Conducting military operations in the tactical area of approximately 50 × 30 km has created ideal conditions for the organization of bases for DF [Direction Finding / Geolocation] VHF and HF bands. For the technical implementation of this plan DF device used automated jamming stations. Typically, DF Base organized 2-3 jammers on armoured vehicles (R-378BMV, 330BMV P, P-934BMV , R-330ZH). The presence of the enemy DF platforms allowed him to constantly monitor the electronic environment, and create interference on detection if necessary. That is to say, in this case, electronic warfare was organized by the classical scheme of constructing order of battle group maneuver with the implementation of the algorithm of the automated cycle “radio-survey – jamming – intelligence analyis”.
Among other things, with the help of special software systems that have been used by Russian groups EW carried out a mass mailing of SMS-messages on personal mobile phones servicemen and their families. As we previously reported , similar methods of electronic warfare have been designed to create psychological pressure on the morale of the personnel of the forces ATO.
In addition, the bending positions of Ukrainian troops in Debaltsevo allowed the Russian military component EW effectively apply a set of portable radio RP-377UVM2 “Lesochek”, which could generate a barrage of interference in a small area.
It should be noted that, as in previous clashes in the Donbas, Russian military experts used the suppression of mobile GSM-communication signal delivered by the transmitter operators aerodynamically “Leer-3” interference on unmanned aerial vehicles such as “Orlan”.
However, radiation from mobile phones were widely used to cue enemy artillery to them. With the help of special software systems EW RF numbers of mobile phones Ukrainian servicemen have been identified with their owners. Being in the defense area of military units and equipment easily identified and in accordance with the determined further battle tactics. Apparently, for this reason, the enemy artillery accuracy was high – more than 50% of the Ukrainian armored vehicles at the final stage of the battle were either destroyed or put out of action. Unfortunately, the ATO forces did not use the experience from previous errors in Ilovaysk during the summer campaign, which gave advantages to the enemy in the conduct of electronic warfare.
With renewed vigor turned bck to radio-disinformtion using individual mobile phone via SMS-service. According to eyewitnesses , “the SMS could be sent by a ” faked “base station, which was located approximately within a radius of 1 km from the subscriber. This station takes bearings included all GSM transceivers (mobiles) in this area creates a mass mailing messages prepared in advance.
***
Thus, participating in the battles on the side of the “L-DNR” Russian troops are widely used power tools and electronic warfare as an element of combat support. According to the testimony of many witnesses, radio in the area of conducting battles in np Debaltsevo often violated. On many memories from open sources, commanders of their units in the manual often take into account the lack of / unreliable radio communications. Often, parts management and departments was carried out by using other forms of communication.
En lukennut ihan koko juttua kiireestä johtuen mutta laitoin sen tänne koska tuskin muuten muistan ja voi jotain kiinnostaa.
Arvioikaa itse onko sivu luotettava: https://toinformistoinfluence.com/2...ons-in-the-battle-of-debaltsevo-ip-analytics/
Viimeksi muokattu:
BlackFox
Ylipäällikkö
Phones cut in eastern Ukraine as rebels seize firms
An armed man stands guard during the visit of head of the separatist self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic Alexander Zakharchenko (not pictured) to the Yuzovsky metallurgical plant in Donetsk, Ukraine, March 1, 2017. REUTERS/Alexander Ermochenko
A fifth of a million phone users in Ukraine's rebel-controlled eastern city of Donetsk were cut off from the rest of the country on Wednesday after armed men took over the offices and equipment of the main fixed-line telecoms company, its director said.
Pro-Russian separatists had warned they would seize businesses in areas they control unless the Ukrainian government ends a rail blockade that has halted coal shipments from rebel territory.
The blockade and the rebel retaliation have highlighted the mutual economic dependence between the two sides, despite three years of simmering military conflict in which more than 10,000 people have been killed.
As a result of the takeover of its premises, Ukrtelecom director Mikhail Shuranov said "the company has cut off the Donetsk sector from the national network".
He said on Facebook: "Around 200,000 of our citizens have lost a means of communication."
Separatist leader Alexander Zakharchenko said rebels were following through on their ultimatum because Ukraine had not lifted the blockade.
"Today since midnight companies have been being taken under external control," separatist website DAN quoted him as saying.
Ukrtelecom is part of a financial and industrial group owned by Ukraine's richest businessman Rinat Akhmetov, whose power-generating and steelmaking businesses on both sides of the eastern front line have already been hit by the blockade's squeeze on coal supplies.
On an official visit to Kiev, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson joined his Ukrainian counterpart in condemning the separatists' latest acts.
"This expropriation, like the annexation of Crimea, like other aspects of the behavior that has been encouraged by the Russians, is unacceptable, it must stop," Johnson said.
RELATED COVERAGE
Both the Ukrainian authorities and separatist officials have warned of economic fallout from the blockade. Separatists say local industrial firms are suffering, while Ukraine says the country could be hit by rolling blackouts and lost foreign export income of up to $2 billion.
Russia said the rebels' move to take control of the companies on its territory was partly understandable because the blockade had put the separatists in "an even more difficult situation".
"The steps made by the administrations of these regions, ... can be understood to a degree," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told journalists.
A humanitarian group funded by Akhmetov that has been a major supplier of aid to conflict-hit areas also said on Wednesday it had been forced to halt operations in rebel-held areas after distribution points were blocked by armed men.
In rebel-held Donetsk, a Reuters witness saw one police car parked near the fund's distribution center at a football arena. Signs on the building's doors said the center was not operating and the entrances had been sealed with papers carrying official-looking stamps, but there was no armed presence.
Ukraine's largest private power and coal producer, DTEK, which is also part of Akhmetov's business empire, said the management of its operations in separatist-held territory had not been taken over.
It was not immediately clear if or how other Ukraine-registered businesses operating in separatist territory had been affected.
(Reporting by Pavel Polityuk and Alessandra Prentice in Kiev, Reuters reporter in Donetsk,; Additional reporting by Aleksandar Vasovic in Moscow; Writing by Alessandra Prentice; Editing by Mark Trevelyan)
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-donetsk-idUSKBN1684QX
An armed man stands guard during the visit of head of the separatist self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic Alexander Zakharchenko (not pictured) to the Yuzovsky metallurgical plant in Donetsk, Ukraine, March 1, 2017. REUTERS/Alexander Ermochenko
A fifth of a million phone users in Ukraine's rebel-controlled eastern city of Donetsk were cut off from the rest of the country on Wednesday after armed men took over the offices and equipment of the main fixed-line telecoms company, its director said.
Pro-Russian separatists had warned they would seize businesses in areas they control unless the Ukrainian government ends a rail blockade that has halted coal shipments from rebel territory.
The blockade and the rebel retaliation have highlighted the mutual economic dependence between the two sides, despite three years of simmering military conflict in which more than 10,000 people have been killed.
As a result of the takeover of its premises, Ukrtelecom director Mikhail Shuranov said "the company has cut off the Donetsk sector from the national network".
He said on Facebook: "Around 200,000 of our citizens have lost a means of communication."
Separatist leader Alexander Zakharchenko said rebels were following through on their ultimatum because Ukraine had not lifted the blockade.
"Today since midnight companies have been being taken under external control," separatist website DAN quoted him as saying.
Ukrtelecom is part of a financial and industrial group owned by Ukraine's richest businessman Rinat Akhmetov, whose power-generating and steelmaking businesses on both sides of the eastern front line have already been hit by the blockade's squeeze on coal supplies.
On an official visit to Kiev, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson joined his Ukrainian counterpart in condemning the separatists' latest acts.
"This expropriation, like the annexation of Crimea, like other aspects of the behavior that has been encouraged by the Russians, is unacceptable, it must stop," Johnson said.
RELATED COVERAGE
Both the Ukrainian authorities and separatist officials have warned of economic fallout from the blockade. Separatists say local industrial firms are suffering, while Ukraine says the country could be hit by rolling blackouts and lost foreign export income of up to $2 billion.
Russia said the rebels' move to take control of the companies on its territory was partly understandable because the blockade had put the separatists in "an even more difficult situation".
"The steps made by the administrations of these regions, ... can be understood to a degree," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told journalists.
A humanitarian group funded by Akhmetov that has been a major supplier of aid to conflict-hit areas also said on Wednesday it had been forced to halt operations in rebel-held areas after distribution points were blocked by armed men.
In rebel-held Donetsk, a Reuters witness saw one police car parked near the fund's distribution center at a football arena. Signs on the building's doors said the center was not operating and the entrances had been sealed with papers carrying official-looking stamps, but there was no armed presence.
Ukraine's largest private power and coal producer, DTEK, which is also part of Akhmetov's business empire, said the management of its operations in separatist-held territory had not been taken over.
It was not immediately clear if or how other Ukraine-registered businesses operating in separatist territory had been affected.
(Reporting by Pavel Polityuk and Alessandra Prentice in Kiev, Reuters reporter in Donetsk,; Additional reporting by Aleksandar Vasovic in Moscow; Writing by Alessandra Prentice; Editing by Mark Trevelyan)
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-donetsk-idUSKBN1684QX
JR49
Respected Leader
Tähän ei voi kyllin varautua henkisesti, vaikka pitäisi jo olla kaikilla tiedossa.
Jos pilliin vihellettäisiin, jokaisen reserviläisen pitää ohjeistaa perheensä ja sukulaisensa tämän varalta.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE · RUSSIA
The tactics of Russian EW formations in the battle of Debaltsevo. “IP” Analytics
January 22, 2017Joel Harding
The principal message is that the US late Cold War era policy of using any and every radio-frequency emission an enemy makes to geolocate and ident assets have been absorbed and implemented by the Russians, with a particular focus on exploitation of an opponent’s civil assets like cellphones, WiFi etc. for psywar/IW, EW and simple targeting and kill assessment. All spelled out below.
If it works for the Russians, the Chinese will emulate it exactly.
Punchline is simple, practice EMCON/LPI/LPD or travel home in a bodybag.
http://sprotyv.info/ru/news/kiev/taktika-rossiyskih-grupp-reb-v-boyah-za-debalcevo-analitika
The tactics of Russian EW formations in the battle of Debaltsevo. “IP” Analytics
05/01/2017 – 11:00
Debaltsevo in Donbas – a traffic node of the Donetsk coal region. The city is located on the outskirts of Luhansk region has an excellent transport infrastructure, through it passes the majority of goods from this territory.
First, in 2015 the Kremlin was important to take control of the center. Direct evidence that were open declarations of President Vladimir Putin’s Russia (02.17.2015), where he openly expressed his confidence in mastering the “militia” of the area. In addition, the Russian leader called on Ukrainian military leadership to dispose lay down their arms and to save people from death.
The tactical situation around Debaltsevo created a deep ledge on one side of which are divisions of Donetsk terrorists reinforcement of regular troops of Russia, and on the other – ATO forces. By the middle of February 2015 the situation on the line of contact escalated, the Russian regular troops came close to the front line and began to impose fighting, trying to take in the Ukrainian units into envelopment and destroy them.
In this situation, the role of electronic warfare has been leading among other types of combat support. As in previous cases, the basis of electronic warfare systems were enhanced maneuverability and Group CPC EW troops of the Russian army.
A comprehensive technical monitoring group provides EW planning data center on electronic environment in the region. In addition to assessing EWw defences their funds in their range of tasks included the collection of data and the initial assessment of electronic environment. It should be noted that the CTC experts groups who have worked in the occupied regions of Ukraine have already acquired some experience and have studied the tactics of application of radio Ukrainian forces ATO.
Manoeuvring EW group in this period significantly expanded its capabilities.
Conducting military operations in the tactical area of approximately 50 × 30 km has created ideal conditions for the organization of bases for DF [Direction Finding / Geolocation] VHF and HF bands. For the technical implementation of this plan DF device used automated jamming stations. Typically, DF Base organized 2-3 jammers on armoured vehicles (R-378BMV, 330BMV P, P-934BMV , R-330ZH). The presence of the enemy DF platforms allowed him to constantly monitor the electronic environment, and create interference on detection if necessary. That is to say, in this case, electronic warfare was organized by the classical scheme of constructing order of battle group maneuver with the implementation of the algorithm of the automated cycle “radio-survey – jamming – intelligence analyis”.
Among other things, with the help of special software systems that have been used by Russian groups EW carried out a mass mailing of SMS-messages on personal mobile phones servicemen and their families. As we previously reported , similar methods of electronic warfare have been designed to create psychological pressure on the morale of the personnel of the forces ATO.
In addition, the bending positions of Ukrainian troops in Debaltsevo allowed the Russian military component EW effectively apply a set of portable radio RP-377UVM2 “Lesochek”, which could generate a barrage of interference in a small area.
It should be noted that, as in previous clashes in the Donbas, Russian military experts used the suppression of mobile GSM-communication signal delivered by the transmitter operators aerodynamically “Leer-3” interference on unmanned aerial vehicles such as “Orlan”.
However, radiation from mobile phones were widely used to cue enemy artillery to them. With the help of special software systems EW RF numbers of mobile phones Ukrainian servicemen have been identified with their owners. Being in the defense area of military units and equipment easily identified and in accordance with the determined further battle tactics. Apparently, for this reason, the enemy artillery accuracy was high – more than 50% of the Ukrainian armored vehicles at the final stage of the battle were either destroyed or put out of action. Unfortunately, the ATO forces did not use the experience from previous errors in Ilovaysk during the summer campaign, which gave advantages to the enemy in the conduct of electronic warfare.
With renewed vigor turned bck to radio-disinformtion using individual mobile phone via SMS-service. According to eyewitnesses , “the SMS could be sent by a ” faked “base station, which was located approximately within a radius of 1 km from the subscriber. This station takes bearings included all GSM transceivers (mobiles) in this area creates a mass mailing messages prepared in advance.
***
Thus, participating in the battles on the side of the “L-DNR” Russian troops are widely used power tools and electronic warfare as an element of combat support. According to the testimony of many witnesses, radio in the area of conducting battles in np Debaltsevo often violated. On many memories from open sources, commanders of their units in the manual often take into account the lack of / unreliable radio communications. Often, parts management and departments was carried out by using other forms of communication.
En lukennut ihan koko juttua kiireestä johtuen mutta laitoin sen tänne koska tuskin muuten muistan ja voi jotain kiinnostaa.
Arvioikaa itse onko sivu luotettava: https://toinformistoinfluence.com/2...ons-in-the-battle-of-debaltsevo-ip-analytics/
Tuohon artikkeliin liittyen tuli mieleen jotakin: Olisiko mahdollista kehittää jonkinlainen aplikaatio noille älykännyköille, joka osaisi tunnistaa tuollaisen valetukiaseman ja varoittaisi sellaisen läsnäolosta? Siis oletan, että tuollaisella tukiasemalla olisi suhteellisen lyhyt kantama, koska suuret lähetystehot havaittaisiin kaukaa ja vastatoimet olisivat nopeat. Ja lennokissa oleva tukiasema on muutenkin rajallinen kantamaltaan, toisaalta tarvitseeko sen sitten kantaakaan, kun se on lennokin kyydissä. Ja tämä aplikaatio toimisi puhelimen ollessa offline -tilassa, joskin tietenkin puhelin kuulostelisi tukiasemia koko ajan. Mahdollinen tälläinen puhelin voisi olla myös aktiivisena, jos sitä olisi tarkoitus käyttää jonkinlaisena syöttinä viholliselle, mutta silloin se ei voisi oikein varoittaa ketään mistään, kun kukaan ei oikein voi olla tuollaisen puhelimen lähettyvillä.
Tuossa kantamassa on muitakin rajoituksia kuin lähetysteho. Esim. GSM-puhelin ei toimi lainkaan, jos se on yli 30 km tukiasemasta oli kenttä sitten kuinka voimakas tahansa. Syynä on kommunikaatiorytmitykselle varattu aikaikkuna. Tuon 30 km jälkeen vastaamisen aikaviive on liian suuri, eikä puhelin enää kytkeydy verkkoon.
BlackFox
Ylipäällikkö
Kyllä sotatilassa ne puhelimet kannattaa jättää ihan vain kotiin, ei sen tarvi olla edes valetukiasema että tietoihin päästään kiinne.
Norjassakin kielettiin matkapuhelimet ja sosiaalinen media seuraavassa isossa sotaharjoituksessa.
Puhelimet on helvetillinen riski ottaa sotaan mukaan.
Ainoastaan sellaiset hätävara puhelimet mukaan mitkä joukkueen johtaja antaa, ne on tarkistettu ja niihen on ladattu omat spessu softat jos tälläisiä käytetään.
Puhelimet luonnollisesti ovat joukkueenjohtajan hallussa.
Norjassakin kielettiin matkapuhelimet ja sosiaalinen media seuraavassa isossa sotaharjoituksessa.
Puhelimet on helvetillinen riski ottaa sotaan mukaan.
Ainoastaan sellaiset hätävara puhelimet mukaan mitkä joukkueen johtaja antaa, ne on tarkistettu ja niihen on ladattu omat spessu softat jos tälläisiä käytetään.
Puhelimet luonnollisesti ovat joukkueenjohtajan hallussa.
JR49
Respected Leader
Itse olen aina ajatellut kommunikoivani ihan perinteisen kenttäpostin välityksellä. Puhelin on riski.
Mutta läheisten puhelimiin voi tulla viholliselta kaikenlaista kamaa, sitä asiaa ei ole turhan paljon pidetty esillä.
Asioissa on puolensa.
Päällä olevan kännykän voi helposti paikantaa ja niin ollen myös paljastaa ryhmitysalueet missä on paljon aktiivisuutta. Toisaaltaan Ukrainan kaltaisissa sodissa hommien mennessä vituiksi se kännykkä voi olla ainoa viestiyhteys. Ukrainassa kännykät toimii (löytää kentät) yleensä läpi rintamalinjan, mutta se ei lienee ole yhteensattuma tai vihollisen kyvyttömyyttä häiritä GSM liikennettä, vaan johtuu ennemminkin siitä että molemmat osapuolet (Venäjä ja Ukraina) seuraa toistensa viestiliikennettä.
Kännykkä on ihan ok. olla mukana taistelutoimissa akku irroitettuna (akun ollessa kiinni puhelimen voi paikantaa vaikka se ei olisikaan päällä), mutta sen aikansakuluksi pläräämistä tulee välttää ja ainakin pidättäytyä viestimästä sillä mitään turvallisuutta vaarantavaa tietoa jos ei ole aivan pakko sen kakan osuttua oikein kunnolla tuullettimeen.
Sotaharjoituksissa kännykkä kiellolla nähtävästi haetaan autenttisuutta ja halutaan näyttää Jade Muumille se miltä tuntuu kun on tunninkin pois sosiaalisen median ääreltä.
BlackFox
Ylipäällikkö
Se vain tuppaa menemään niin että kun on 300 miestä ja ne ovat eristyksissä vaikkapa 40 päivää perheistään niin porukka alkaa kummasti laittaa viestiä vaikka ei olisi lupaa ja asettavat koko joukon vaaraan. Kännykän tietoihin päästään kiinne, mikrofoniin, kameraan, sijaintiin jne Ei kaikkia puhelimia tietystikkään seurata mutta minun joukossa ei laskettaisi ainakaan tuurin varaan, ne puhelimet mitä käytettäisiin olisi ne nollattu, johtajan vastuulla, salauksella esim tekstiviestille, kamera irrottettuna, speciaali softa sisällä ja mikrofoni irrotettuna.
Jenkkien tutkimuksissa suurin "radiosingaali" ei tullutkaan johtamisjärjestelmien lähettyviltä tai viestilaitteiden ympäriltä vaan joukkojen maijoitusalueilta vaikka sotilaita oli kieletty puhelimen käyttäminen.
Benelli
Respected Leader
Pois päältä ja lentokonetilassa olevia puhelimia ei voi paikantaa ellei näitä olla jo hakkeroitu jolloin ne vain näyttävät olevan pois päältä/lentokonetilassa.
Ilman yhteyksiäkin näistä voi olla huomattavaa hyötyä kuten raivaajien toimintaa helpottaa jos kohteesta on valokuvia.
vlad
Respected Leader
Ukrainassa on venäläisten toimesta lähetetty rintamalla olevien ukrainalaissotilaiden kännyköihin propagandaviestejä, mietinpä vaan, että millainen vaikutus sellaisilla olisi lähetettynä kotirintamalle joko kohdennetusti (sotilaiden omaisille) tai massana suurelle joukolle vastaanottajia. Millainen vaikutus sillä on omaisiin, jos saa "viranomaistaholta" (eli venäläisiltä) huolestuttavia tietoja rintamalta? Etenkin jos se koskee läheistä rintamalla, epävarmuus voi kaltava mieltä jollei päivään pariin saa varmistusta asialle - siitä huolimatta, että kyse on propagandasta.
Millainen vaikutus kotirintamaan olisi päivittäisillä ja jatkuvilla propagandaviesteillä, jotka lähetään "viranomaisten" nimissä? Tai saadaanko sellaisilla riittävä hyöty (niin paljon "altistuneita", että he ryhtyvät resonoimaan tarinaa eteenpäin)?
vlad
Selusta-alueilla on joka tapauksessa sellainen määrä GSM liikennettä (jos mastot on toiminnassa), että ei riko palleja ja tst-tehtävien GSM käytännön kuvasin jo edellä.
Lisäksi "sota opettaa", eli viimeistään ryhmäkuri kyllä pitää huolen kännyköiden käytön operaatioturvallisuudesta kun huomataan että niiden räpläämisellä ja vastoinkäymisillä on syy-yhteys. Sotatoimialueella toiminen ei perustu demokratiaan, tai siihen että tehdään kivasti ettei tule tyhmimmällekään pahamieli.
Jos haluaa olla täysin varma GSM viestinnän turvallisuudesta, niin silloin täytyy kerätä puhelimet pois, mutta silloin voi myös tulla sekin hetki eteen että toivoo olleensa tekemättä sitä. Isoin ongelma GSM kurin pettäessä on se, että sitä joutuu käymään sotaansa apinalauman keskellä jossa selvästikään kaikki ei pidä hengissä kotiin selviämistä yhtä tärkeänä kuin some-päivittelyään.
Norjalaiset ovat kieltäneet kännykän mukaanottamisen harjoitukseen.
https://forsvaretsforum.no/mobilforbud-jointviking
https://forsvaretsforum.no/mobilforbud-jointviking
Usko pois, kyllä voi ja paikannetaan.
Puhelin on yhteydessä mastoon, oli siinä virrat päällä tai ei. Ainoa tapa estää tuo on ottaa puhelin virrattomaksi irroittamalla akku.
Benelli
Respected Leader
Ei ole fyysisesti mahdollista jos virta ei kulje. Osaa puhelimista ei vain saa sammutettua ilman akun irrottamista.
vessaharjamies
Kapteeni
Jos tunnet tätä teknistä puolta enemmän niin voisitko vähän avata tätä väitettä eli selittää tarkemmin miten tämä yhteydenpito käytännössä tapahtuu. Nykyäänhän näissä on kuitenkin kohtuullisen monimutkaiset käyttöjärjestelmät ja toimivuus vaatii yleensä, että ne on bootattu "työpöydälle". Tai näin minä ainakin olen ymmärtänyt. Eri asia olisi tietysti asentaa puhelimeen haittaohjelma joka antaa käyttäjän ymmärtää, että puhelin on sammutettu, vaikka komponentit pysyisivätkin päällä näyttöä lukuun ottamatta.