Antares
Respected Leader
Se olisi muistutus venäläisille siitä, miksi he "tarvitsevat" Putinia ja tämän koplaa. Juuri sopivasti ennen "presidentinvaaleja" eli 15.3.2024.
Jos vastuu vieritettäisiin Ukrainan niskaan, se olisi samalla yksi keino lisää mustamaalata Ukrainaa ja lietsoa vihaa sitä kohtaan. Voisi lisätä vapaaehtoisten intoa liittyä sotaan.
Lisäksi se voisi toimia "perusteena" uudelle mobilisaatiokierrokselle. Tällaisen iskun jälkeen sen voisi kenties toteuttaa "virallisesti" eikä tarvittaisi ns. varjomobilisaatiota.
Samoin kansa voisi olla valmiimpi hyväksymään tiukemmat taloudelliset toimet kuten erilaisten etuuksien rajoitukset ja leikkaukset sekä veronkorotukset - kaikki tietysti sodan nimissä.
Joten onhan tässä nähtävissä useitakin perusteluita, miksi tällaiselle "terrori-iskulle" olisi tilausta Putinin taholta.
Toisaalta terrori-iskuja on tehty eri aikoina ja eri maissa monesta eri syystä ja monen eri toimijan toteuttamina. En siis tarkoita että tämä on 100% FSB:n toteuttama, JOS jotain tapahtuu - kommentoin vain että tietty logiikka sille on, jos he ovat asialla.
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MUOKKAUS: lainaan spoilerin taakse Radio Free Europe artikkelin joka julkaistiin hieman ennen Moskovan "terroripommitusten" 20-vuotispäivää, jos aihe ei ole jollekin tuttu ja kiinnostaa lukea siitä lisää (artikkeli julkaistu 7.8.2019): LÄHDE
Two Decades On, Smoldering Questions About The Russian President's Vault To Power
August 07, 201910:44 GMT
- By Mike Eckel
https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-russia-president-1999-chechnya-apartment-bombings/30097551.html
10:44 GMT
Russian President Vladimir Putin with his Belarusian and Ukrainian counterparts, Alyaksandr Lukashenka (left) and Leonid Kuchma, at a service marking the defeat of Nazi Germany near the southern Russian town of Prokhorovka in May 2000.
One month after then-President Boris Yeltsin plucked a security agency official named Vladimir Putin from obscurity and made him prime minister, an explosion leveled a nine-story apartment building on Moscow’s outskirts.
The predawn blast on September 9, 1999, reduced the building to a smoking pile of rubble, killing more than 100. A second building, less than 6 kilometers away, was rocked by an explosion on September 13, killing 119.
Days earlier, a car bomb exploded in a small town bordering the war-ravaged region of Chechnya, where reignited fighting was already spilling into neighboring regions. That blast, outside the apartment building in the town of Buynaksk, killed dozens.
It was followed seven days later by a truck bomb that destroyed a nine-story building in another southern city, Volgodonsk, killing 17.
On September 23, Putin asserted terrorists in Chechnya were to blame and ordered a massive air campaign within the North Caucasus region. When asked a day later about the campaign targeting what he called terrorists, Putin responded with the phrase that inaugurated his rise to preeminence.
“We will pursue them everywhere,” he said, using a crude slang expression. “Excuse me for saying so: We’ll catch them in the toilet. We’ll wipe them out in the outhouse.”
The statement became a Putin catchphrase, and set the tone for the 20 years of rule that followed.
“Yes, it’s one of Putin’s original sins,” said Sergei Kovalyov, a former lawmaker and rights activist who headed a commission that investigated the bombings in the early 2000s.
The bombings, and the fear they provoked, “were advantageous,” he told RFE/RL. “At the time, it was advantageous for him to take control of the country, and to introduce force into the Caucasus, in Chechnya in particular.”
Yeltsin and his officials had already endorsed Putin, who was tapped a year earlier to head the country’s main security and intelligence agency, the FSB, and also served as secretary of the Security Council.
Rescuers and firefighters work at the site of a massive explosion that destroyed a nine-story apartment building in the southeastern part of Moscow in September 1999.
In announcing he was elevating a relatively obscure FSB officer to be his head of government, Yeltsin also endorsed him for the presidency, just months ahead of the election.
“I have decided to now name the person who is, in my opinion, able to consolidate society and, drawing support from the broadest political forces, to ensure the continuation of reforms in Russia,” Yeltsin said in a televised speech on August 9, 1999. "He will be able to unite around himself those who are to renew Great Russia in the new 21st century.”
On December 31, 1999, Yeltsin had resigned and named Putin acting president.
By then, the second war to ravage Chechnya in a decade was raging.
A Highly Qualified Partner
Russia under Yeltsin was reeling.
A year prior to Putin’s ascendance, the country had defaulted on its debts, sending the value of the ruble plummeting and wiping out bank balance sheets and international confidence in Yeltsin's fiscal policies, not to mention the savings of many Russians -- for the second time in a decade.
Yeltsin’s health was increasingly precarious, with reports of his heavy drinking and having undergone at least one round of heart surgery. His family, including his daughter and son-in-law, were dogged by corruption allegations. Yeltsin advisers feared that declining popularity would hurt his allies in December parliamentary elections, never mind the presidential election the following July.
And in Chechnya, five years after the end of the first full-scale war, the region was all but lawless, and a growing number of radicalized fighters from abroad were traveling there to join the fighting.
On August 7, a group of fighters, led by the notorious Chechen commander Shamil Basayev and a Jordanian radical named Ibn Khattab, crossed from Chechnya into neighboring Daghestan and declared holy war. Regional police units, and local villagers, led the response, with little help from better-equipped federal forces; refugees flooded neighboring regions.
Two days later, Yeltsin dismissed his government and named Putin prime minister -- the fourth prime minister of Yeltsin’s tenure.
Putin, who was a KGB officer stationed in East Germany at the time of the Soviet collapse, had served as a mid-level official in the St. Petersburg city government in the early 1990s. He had scant government or leadership experience, no national profile, and no real constituency or base of support among Russians.
In a phone call weeks later with then-U.S. President Bill Clinton, with whom he was on good terms, Yeltsin gave personal assurances.
“I am sure you will find him to be a highly qualified partner," Yeltsin said, according to transcripts released by Clinton’s official presidential library.
On September 4, with fighting escalating in Daghestan and along the border with Chechnya, the first of four explosions targeting apartment buildings went off: a car bomb outside a five-story building housing relatives of Russian military personnel in Buynaksk, Daghestan. Sixty-two people died.
The bombing -- the first of its sort in post-Soviet Russia -- drew wide attention. But for many Russians, it was seen as merely a spillover of the violence already afflicting a distant region.
Putin shakes hands with workers during a visit to an oil and gas field in Surgut, Siberia, in March 2000.
Five days later, just after midnight, an explosion rocked a nine-story building located along a leafy bend in the Moscow River just a 30-minute drive from the Kremlin. More than 100 apartments were destroyed. In all, 106 people were killed.
Russians were stunned. Yeltsin ordered a search of thousands of apartments buildings in the city for other possible explosive devices.
Putin declared September 13 a day of national mourning. At around 5 a.m. that same day, another explosion went off in the basement of a brick, eight-story apartment building on Moscow’s Kashirskoye Highway, about 6 kilometers south of the previous blast. A total of 119 people were killed.
Three days later, a fourth apartment building was flattened when a truck bomb exploded before dawn in the southern city of Volodonsk. Seventeen people died.
Together, the bombings panicked the country, and added to further doubts about Yeltsin’s leadership. A growing number of Russian security officials publicly accused Chechen terrorists.
On September 23, during a trip to the Kazakh capital of Astana, Putin vowed to take an unflinching line against what he called “bandits” -- even when they were in the toilet.
'Sugar Sacks' In A Basement
The day before Putin’s “outhouse” comment, on September 22, another incident occurred at an apartment building in the western city of Ryazan.
Two men driving a car with Moscow license plates were spotted carrying sacks into the basement of the building. Police and bomb-disposal experts swarmed the area, discovering they contained a military-grade explosive, and had a detonator and a timer set for 5:30 a.m.
Putin that evening praised the work of investigators for thwarting what appeared to be another bombing attempt.
The next day, three FSB officers were arrested by police in Ryazan and held on suspicion of planting the sacks. But Putin’s successor at the FSB, Nikolai Patrushev, declared that the Ryazan incident had, in fact, been a training exercise, and he apologized for scaring an already edgy populace.
"It was not an explosion somebody foiled; it was a security training exercise. The sacks contained only sugar. There were no explosives inside," Patrushev said.
A week later, Putin announced plans for a land invasion of Chechnya using Russian Army units. Russia’s air force began using fuel-air bombs, highly destructive weaponry that rights activists say are often used indiscriminately, killing civilians and fighters alike.
By February 2, just over a month after Putin became acting president, and nearly five months after being named prime minister, the Russian Army entered the Chechen capital, Grozny.
The following month, Putin won 53 percent of the vote in the snap presidential election, his first electoral victory.
The official government investigation into the bombings, concluded in 2002, blamed Chechen militants for the attacks.
Independent journalists, researchers, even lawmakers conducted their own investigations and found holes in official statements, including what Kovalyov said was the FSB’s shifting explanations for different evidence that emerged.
The fact that the Putin government never allowed a thorough and public investigation, which fully debunked the suspicions surrounding the bombings, was itself problematic, he said.
“A competent, conscientious government should conduct a wide and public investigation in a case like this, with such serious suspicions,” Kovalyov said. “In this case, there’s been nothing of the sort.”
Kovalyov’s own commission was stymied in its efforts, when Russian security agents began harassing staff members. Its chief investigator, lawyer Mikhail Trepashkin, was arrested and convicted by a military court for allegedly revealing state secrets. He spent four years in prison. Reporter Yury Shchekochikhin, who also worked for the commission, died after what his relatives believed was a poisoning.
Another investigation was conducted by Aleksandr Litvinenko, a former FSB officer, who worked with historian Yury Felshtinsky and published their initial conclusions in 2001, in the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta.
Funded by the exiled Russian billionaire Boris Berezovsky, the findings were compiled into a book called Blowing Up Russia, published in English in 2007, the year after Litvinenko died in London after being poisoned with a highly radioactive substance.
Felshtinsky, who now lives much of the time in the United States, said he believed the bombings were engineered by Russian security agencies to justify a new war in Chechnya, and to help bolster Putin’s credibility as a law-and-order leader.
“In 2000, it was clear that the FSB blew up the buildings in order to declare war on the Chechen Republic, and this would result with Vladimir Putin being elected a tough leader,” he told RFE/RL.
“After 20 years, nothing has come out that has gone against the narrative,” Felshtinsky said. “Nothing has come out that actually goes against this theory. And a lot has come out that, in fact, supports the theory.”
John Dunlop, a scholar with Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and author of a 2012 book about the bombings, agreed that Putin’s rise was cemented by the bombings, and set the tone for his leadership: steely, sober, decisive.
“That narrative, of course, serves to glorify Putin,” he said. "And he is, of course, still in power.”
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Two Decades On, Smoldering Questions About The Russian President's Vault To Power
August 07, 201910:44 GMT
- By Mike Eckel
Russian President Vladimir Putin with his Belarusian and Ukrainian counterparts, Alyaksandr Lukashenka (left) and Leonid Kuchma, at a service marking the defeat of Nazi Germany near the southern Russian town of Prokhorovka in May 2000.
One month after then-President Boris Yeltsin plucked a security agency official named Vladimir Putin from obscurity and made him prime minister, an explosion leveled a nine-story apartment building on Moscow’s outskirts.
The predawn blast on September 9, 1999, reduced the building to a smoking pile of rubble, killing more than 100. A second building, less than 6 kilometers away, was rocked by an explosion on September 13, killing 119.
Days earlier, a car bomb exploded in a small town bordering the war-ravaged region of Chechnya, where reignited fighting was already spilling into neighboring regions. That blast, outside the apartment building in the town of Buynaksk, killed dozens.
It was followed seven days later by a truck bomb that destroyed a nine-story building in another southern city, Volgodonsk, killing 17.
On September 23, Putin asserted terrorists in Chechnya were to blame and ordered a massive air campaign within the North Caucasus region. When asked a day later about the campaign targeting what he called terrorists, Putin responded with the phrase that inaugurated his rise to preeminence.
“We will pursue them everywhere,” he said, using a crude slang expression. “Excuse me for saying so: We’ll catch them in the toilet. We’ll wipe them out in the outhouse.”
The statement became a Putin catchphrase, and set the tone for the 20 years of rule that followed.
“Yes, it’s one of Putin’s original sins,” said Sergei Kovalyov, a former lawmaker and rights activist who headed a commission that investigated the bombings in the early 2000s.
The bombings, and the fear they provoked, “were advantageous,” he told RFE/RL. “At the time, it was advantageous for him to take control of the country, and to introduce force into the Caucasus, in Chechnya in particular.”
Yeltsin and his officials had already endorsed Putin, who was tapped a year earlier to head the country’s main security and intelligence agency, the FSB, and also served as secretary of the Security Council.
Rescuers and firefighters work at the site of a massive explosion that destroyed a nine-story apartment building in the southeastern part of Moscow in September 1999.
In announcing he was elevating a relatively obscure FSB officer to be his head of government, Yeltsin also endorsed him for the presidency, just months ahead of the election.
“I have decided to now name the person who is, in my opinion, able to consolidate society and, drawing support from the broadest political forces, to ensure the continuation of reforms in Russia,” Yeltsin said in a televised speech on August 9, 1999. "He will be able to unite around himself those who are to renew Great Russia in the new 21st century.”
On December 31, 1999, Yeltsin had resigned and named Putin acting president.
By then, the second war to ravage Chechnya in a decade was raging.
A Highly Qualified Partner
Russia under Yeltsin was reeling.
A year prior to Putin’s ascendance, the country had defaulted on its debts, sending the value of the ruble plummeting and wiping out bank balance sheets and international confidence in Yeltsin's fiscal policies, not to mention the savings of many Russians -- for the second time in a decade.
Yeltsin’s health was increasingly precarious, with reports of his heavy drinking and having undergone at least one round of heart surgery. His family, including his daughter and son-in-law, were dogged by corruption allegations. Yeltsin advisers feared that declining popularity would hurt his allies in December parliamentary elections, never mind the presidential election the following July.
And in Chechnya, five years after the end of the first full-scale war, the region was all but lawless, and a growing number of radicalized fighters from abroad were traveling there to join the fighting.
On August 7, a group of fighters, led by the notorious Chechen commander Shamil Basayev and a Jordanian radical named Ibn Khattab, crossed from Chechnya into neighboring Daghestan and declared holy war. Regional police units, and local villagers, led the response, with little help from better-equipped federal forces; refugees flooded neighboring regions.
Two days later, Yeltsin dismissed his government and named Putin prime minister -- the fourth prime minister of Yeltsin’s tenure.
Putin, who was a KGB officer stationed in East Germany at the time of the Soviet collapse, had served as a mid-level official in the St. Petersburg city government in the early 1990s. He had scant government or leadership experience, no national profile, and no real constituency or base of support among Russians.
In a phone call weeks later with then-U.S. President Bill Clinton, with whom he was on good terms, Yeltsin gave personal assurances.
“I am sure you will find him to be a highly qualified partner," Yeltsin said, according to transcripts released by Clinton’s official presidential library.
On September 4, with fighting escalating in Daghestan and along the border with Chechnya, the first of four explosions targeting apartment buildings went off: a car bomb outside a five-story building housing relatives of Russian military personnel in Buynaksk, Daghestan. Sixty-two people died.
The bombing -- the first of its sort in post-Soviet Russia -- drew wide attention. But for many Russians, it was seen as merely a spillover of the violence already afflicting a distant region.
Putin shakes hands with workers during a visit to an oil and gas field in Surgut, Siberia, in March 2000.
Five days later, just after midnight, an explosion rocked a nine-story building located along a leafy bend in the Moscow River just a 30-minute drive from the Kremlin. More than 100 apartments were destroyed. In all, 106 people were killed.
Russians were stunned. Yeltsin ordered a search of thousands of apartments buildings in the city for other possible explosive devices.
Putin declared September 13 a day of national mourning. At around 5 a.m. that same day, another explosion went off in the basement of a brick, eight-story apartment building on Moscow’s Kashirskoye Highway, about 6 kilometers south of the previous blast. A total of 119 people were killed.
Three days later, a fourth apartment building was flattened when a truck bomb exploded before dawn in the southern city of Volodonsk. Seventeen people died.
Together, the bombings panicked the country, and added to further doubts about Yeltsin’s leadership. A growing number of Russian security officials publicly accused Chechen terrorists.
On September 23, during a trip to the Kazakh capital of Astana, Putin vowed to take an unflinching line against what he called “bandits” -- even when they were in the toilet.
'Sugar Sacks' In A Basement
The day before Putin’s “outhouse” comment, on September 22, another incident occurred at an apartment building in the western city of Ryazan.
Two men driving a car with Moscow license plates were spotted carrying sacks into the basement of the building. Police and bomb-disposal experts swarmed the area, discovering they contained a military-grade explosive, and had a detonator and a timer set for 5:30 a.m.
Putin that evening praised the work of investigators for thwarting what appeared to be another bombing attempt.
The next day, three FSB officers were arrested by police in Ryazan and held on suspicion of planting the sacks. But Putin’s successor at the FSB, Nikolai Patrushev, declared that the Ryazan incident had, in fact, been a training exercise, and he apologized for scaring an already edgy populace.
"It was not an explosion somebody foiled; it was a security training exercise. The sacks contained only sugar. There were no explosives inside," Patrushev said.
A week later, Putin announced plans for a land invasion of Chechnya using Russian Army units. Russia’s air force began using fuel-air bombs, highly destructive weaponry that rights activists say are often used indiscriminately, killing civilians and fighters alike.
By February 2, just over a month after Putin became acting president, and nearly five months after being named prime minister, the Russian Army entered the Chechen capital, Grozny.
The following month, Putin won 53 percent of the vote in the snap presidential election, his first electoral victory.
The official government investigation into the bombings, concluded in 2002, blamed Chechen militants for the attacks.
Independent journalists, researchers, even lawmakers conducted their own investigations and found holes in official statements, including what Kovalyov said was the FSB’s shifting explanations for different evidence that emerged.
The fact that the Putin government never allowed a thorough and public investigation, which fully debunked the suspicions surrounding the bombings, was itself problematic, he said.
“A competent, conscientious government should conduct a wide and public investigation in a case like this, with such serious suspicions,” Kovalyov said. “In this case, there’s been nothing of the sort.”
Kovalyov’s own commission was stymied in its efforts, when Russian security agents began harassing staff members. Its chief investigator, lawyer Mikhail Trepashkin, was arrested and convicted by a military court for allegedly revealing state secrets. He spent four years in prison. Reporter Yury Shchekochikhin, who also worked for the commission, died after what his relatives believed was a poisoning.
Another investigation was conducted by Aleksandr Litvinenko, a former FSB officer, who worked with historian Yury Felshtinsky and published their initial conclusions in 2001, in the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta.
Funded by the exiled Russian billionaire Boris Berezovsky, the findings were compiled into a book called Blowing Up Russia, published in English in 2007, the year after Litvinenko died in London after being poisoned with a highly radioactive substance.
Felshtinsky, who now lives much of the time in the United States, said he believed the bombings were engineered by Russian security agencies to justify a new war in Chechnya, and to help bolster Putin’s credibility as a law-and-order leader.
“In 2000, it was clear that the FSB blew up the buildings in order to declare war on the Chechen Republic, and this would result with Vladimir Putin being elected a tough leader,” he told RFE/RL.
“After 20 years, nothing has come out that has gone against the narrative,” Felshtinsky said. “Nothing has come out that actually goes against this theory. And a lot has come out that, in fact, supports the theory.”
John Dunlop, a scholar with Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and author of a 2012 book about the bombings, agreed that Putin’s rise was cemented by the bombings, and set the tone for his leadership: steely, sober, decisive.
“That narrative, of course, serves to glorify Putin,” he said. "And he is, of course, still in power.”
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Mike Eckel
Mike Eckel is a senior correspondent reporting on political and economic developments in Russia, Ukraine, and around the former Soviet Union, as well as news involving cybercrime and espionage. He's reported on the ground on Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the wars in Chechnya and Georgia, and the 2004 Beslan hostage crisis, as well as the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Lahtinen
Kapteeni
Olen itse myös pohdiskellut tätä terrorikorttia, jolla varmistetaan putinin suosio ja asema. Toki sillä voidaan perustella uudet liikekannallepanot, mutta sillä voidaan myös perustella vetäytyminen Ukrainasta. Toki tämän mahdollisuus on pieni, mutta ei suinkaan olematon. Eli, ideana olisi se, että luodaan uusi sisäinen uhka, joka oikeuttaa kiristämään hallinnon otetta ja samalla nykyinen sota voidaan ns. puskea takavasemmalle piiloon, kun kansalle saadaan median kautta uutta mietittävää ja sota voidaan ”unohtaa”.
Ja milloin tällainen isku voisi tapahtua? Se voisi hyvinkin olla juuri viikko ennen vaaleja, jotta seuravana viikon aikana nähdään, miten putinin johtamille ”vastatoimilla” koko venäjä pelastetaan.
Joten, periaatteessa hyvin mielenkiitoinen viikonloppu tulossa.
Poteropio
Kersantti
WSJ
Vivian Salama
Almost as soon as he began his speech, President Biden called upon Congress to continue supporting Ukraine so it can defend itself against Russian aggression, warning: “if anyone in this room thinks Putin will stop at Ukraine, I assure you he will not.” The Senate recently passed a foreign-aid package that included billions of dollars in new funding for Kyiv. But its path in the GOP-controlled House is uncertain. "Ukraine can stop Putin if we stand with Ukraine," he said.
Biden recognized the newest members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including Finland, which joined the alliance last year, and Sweden – whose membership was being finalized this week and said that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plans had backfired, instead prompting new countries to join forces against Moscow.
Biden Calls for Action on Ukraine Aid
ByVivian Salama
Almost as soon as he began his speech, President Biden called upon Congress to continue supporting Ukraine so it can defend itself against Russian aggression, warning: “if anyone in this room thinks Putin will stop at Ukraine, I assure you he will not.” The Senate recently passed a foreign-aid package that included billions of dollars in new funding for Kyiv. But its path in the GOP-controlled House is uncertain. "Ukraine can stop Putin if we stand with Ukraine," he said.
Biden recognized the newest members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including Finland, which joined the alliance last year, and Sweden – whose membership was being finalized this week and said that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plans had backfired, instead prompting new countries to join forces against Moscow.
Ukrainan käyttämä 60 mm kranaatinheitinmiina M768A1, varustettuna sähkömekaanisella sytyttimellä M734... Kuvassa kädessä on jo kohtuukokoinen arpi...
Amerikkalainen 60 mm kranaatinheitinmiina M768A1, joka on varustettu sähkömekaanisella sytyttimellä M734, jota Ukrainan armeija käyttää M734 koostuu kahdesta osasta: etäisyysmittari, joka on Doppler-tutka; kahden mekaanisen laitteen lohko, joista toinen on iskun yhteydessä aktivoituva sähköinen inertiakytkin ja toinen mekaaninen sytytin viiveellä. Sytyttimessä on 4 toimintatapaa: PRX (Proximity) — miinan räjäyttäminen 1-4 metrin (3-13 jalan) korkeudella maasta; NSB (Near Surface Burst) — miinan räjäyttäminen 0-1 metrin (0-3 jalan) korkeudella maasta; IMP (Impact) — räjähdys kosketuksessa kohteen kanssa; DLY (Delay) — viivästyy 0,05 sekuntia aktivoinnista. Tila valitaan manuaalisesti. Tätä varten on tarpeen kääntää blasterin yläosaa myötäpäivään, kunnes halutun tilan merkki siinä on linjassa (kuva 2). Kolme tilaa PRX, NSB ja IMP ovat sähköisiä. DLY-tila on täysin mekaaninen. Elektroniikka tarjoaa automaattisesti kaskadiredundanssin alenevassa järjestyksessä valitun tilan epäonnistuessa.
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kusiainen
Kapteeni
Venäjän vetäytyminen Ukrainasta yhden terrori-iskun varjolla? Saisi olla jo 9/11-tasoinen isku, että menee kansalle läpi. Tai menee jos menee, mutta vaikutus jää olemattomaksi. Ja sen iskun jälkeen pitää jollekin kostaa, mutta kenelle?
Spekuloida aina voi ja juuri siihen tämä foorumi on tarkoitettu. Epätodennäköisilläkin mahdollisuuksillakin spekulointi on mehukasta, enkä missään nimessä lyttää yhtään skenaariota.
Näkisin silti, että 99% mahdollisuus sille, että Putin paukauttaa pommin, jotta ihmiset muistaa käydä äänestämässä. Näin naapurissa.
Putinxyjlo
Eversti
Siirtymä Ukrainalaisten terrorisoinnista oman kansan massamurhaan moskovan kaduilla oli yllättävän lyhyt ja helppo - sanoi mestari strategisti kun vaaleihin valmistui
Putinxyjlo
Eversti
HARMia ryzzälle.
ak.tied
Respected Leader
Paljon ollut puhetta viime aikoina ryssän läpimurrosta, jo ennen Avdiivkan menetystä monet tätä povailivat. Ammuspula jne.
Nyt on Ukraina kuitenkin aloittanut linnoittamisen, näennäisesti aika myöhään. Se kyllä omalta osaltaan viittaisi siihen, että valmistautuvat vahvaan puolutustusvaiheeseen ja vetäytymään enemmänkin. Aloitehan on ryssällä ollut kyllä jo pitkään, vaikka Ukraina on näyttäviä tappioita onnistunut tuottamaan. Jotenkin näyttää siltä, että komentajan vaihduttua alkoi puolustustaisteluun valmistautuminen ihan levelillä.
Tänään IL:ssä oli Kastehelmen moitteita Ukrainalle siitä, että panostavat vahvasti Hersonin ja Dneprin länsipuolenkin linnoittamiseen vaikka siihen ei hänen mielestään ole mitään syytä, koska siinä on iso joki. Pointti tässä ei ole se onko Kastehelmi oikeassa vai väärässä, vaan se mihin Ukraina varautuu. Näköjään varautuvat tuollaiseen ryssä kohti Kiovaa ja Odessaa tyyppiseen puskuun, koska linnoittavat tuntuvasti takalinjaa Dneprin länsipuolellekin.
Toki tässä on sekin mahdollisuus, että ryssä etenee takaisin Dneprille ja homma jämähtää sitten molemmin puolin siihen. And then what?
Onko Macronin raja nyt tuossa Dneprissä ja antamalla punaisia linjoja sen ylittämisestä de facto varaudutaan tilanteeseen, jossa ryssän saavuttaessa Dneprin aletaan Ukrainaa painostamaan rauhaan ja sanotaan ryssälle, että saatte luvan tyytyä tähän.
Antares
Respected Leader
Samaa mieltä: temppu ei olisi sodasta irtaantumiseksi vaan oman suosion kasvattamiseksi ja samalla hankittaisiin kansan tuki "mille tahansa toimille".
Oman kansan tappaminen "terrori-iskujen" avulla toimi vuonna 1999, joten miksei sama hyväksi havaittu kaava toimisi myös vuonna 2024?
Vuonna 1999 se nosti venäläisille täysin tuntemattoman ja harmaan "KGB-virkamiehen" (joka oli silloin vasta pääministeri) koko kansan sankariksi ja seuraavaksi presidentiksi. Yeltsin oli tietysti valinnut Putinin seuraajakseen hetki ennen pommi-iskuja, mutta Venäjän ns. vahva mies luotiin niiden avulla. Viralliset presidentinvaalit tapahtuivat seuraavana vuonna eli 2000 ja pappa on ollut vallassa siitä asti.
Kuka toimi FSB:n johtajana "terrori-iskujen" aikaan vuonna 1999? Eräs Nikolai Patrushev, sama mies joka on ollut Putinin rinnalla koko tämän valtakauden ja väitetysti oli myös vahvasti osallisena Ukrainan sodan aloittamisessa.
MUTTA katsellaan, katsellaan. Ehkä mitään ei tapahdu ja lopputulos on "paljon melua tyhjästä". Ei olisi sekään ensimmäinen kerta tämän sodan aikana.
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Lahtinen
Kapteeni
Puhdasta spekulointia ja ajatuksilla leikkimistähän tämä on. Mutta venäjän tilanne ei ole missään mielessä hyvä, ja aika ei käy venäjän eduksi. Joten, kyllä varmasti kremlissä kehitellään eri suunnitelmia, jolla venäjä saadaan ulos tästä sodasta, ilman että hallinto joutuu siitä tilille. Joten, ei uusi sisäinen uhka mitenkään mahdoton ajatus ole.
Se, millainen uhka kansalla saadaan myytyä, se on sitten eri asia. Sen pitää olla jotain 9/11:stä isompi ja sen pitää koskettaa koko kansaa. Toisaalta Toinen Tšetšenian sota saatiin perusteltua niillä kerrostalopommeilla, joissa kuoli 300 venäläistä siviiliä, joten nykyiselle hallinnolle ei varmaan ole mikään ongelma järjestää jotain, jossa kuolee esim. tuhansia venäläisiä siviilejä.
Hyvä esimerkki voisi olla vaikka kaasuisku, esim. lentokentälle tai sitten jononkin isoon yleisötapahtumaan. Mutta, tärkeintä olisi nimenomaan se, että saadaan jotain uutta uutisoitavaa, jolla sota voidaan painaa sivuun. Ja lisäksi tarvitaan jokin uusi uhka, jolla putinin valta ja toimet voidaan perustella.
Ja ehkä venäläiset ovat jo niin kyllästyneitä tähän sotaan, että tuollainen kollektiivinen valhe menee läpi ja puolen vuoden päästä kukaan ei edes halua tietää, mikä Ukrainan sota oli. Kaikki tietää, että homma on täyttä valhetta, mutta koska kaikki haluavat uskoa siihen, niin se menee läpi.
StepanRudanskij
Respected Leader
Niin, samaa kansaahan ne mestaristrategistin mukaankin ovat.
Mielenkiintoinen yksityiskohta: Miksi pilvisyys vähentää liitopommien käyttöä? Pommi itsessään ei pilveä pelkää. Pudotus tapahtuu korkealta, joten lentämisenkään ei pitäisi olla vaarallista edes nollanäkyvyydellä. Paitsi jos ryssältä on instrumenttilentämiseen kykenevät lentäjät loppu? Tuntuisi oudolta että merkittäviä määriä lentosuoritteita edelleen kyettäisiin lentämään jos kuitenkin ihan perusasioihin kuuluvaa lentotapaa hanskaavia pilotteja ei olisi. Viimeiseksi ajatukseksi minun mielessäni nousee maalittaminen. Pilvisyys haittaa droneilla lentämistä ja maalien löytämistä. Eli venäläisillä ei liene kykyä paikantaa maaleja muilla keinoin, kuten joukkojen mukana kulkevien ilmatulenjohtajien avulla.
Ennen vaihdosta kuului väitteitä, että Syrskyi olisi sotilaiden hengistä välittämättä aggressiivista hyökkäystä suoraan päin ajava komentaja. Nyt näytöt ovat kyllä aivan päinvastaiset. Uskallankin väittää, että tuo hänen arvostelunsa oli venäjän esille nostamaa mustamaalausta, jolla pitkitettiin komentajan vaihdosta mahdollisimman kauan. Olisiko Avdiivka kyetty pitämään, jos komentaja olisi vaihdettu heti kun siitä ensimmäisen kerran kuultiin julkisuudessa? Nyt menetettiin monta kuukautta, missä ajassa olisi voitu tehdä paljon puolustusasemien parantamista ja käyttää joukkoja toisella tavalla.
taantumu
Kenraali
Belgorodin alueella kaksi kuoli ja yksi loukkaantui droonihyökkäyksessä. Kyseessä oli mahdollisesti linnoitusten rakennusryhmä sillä kylästä jossa isku tapahtui on alle 5 km rajalle ja kaivinkoneen mainitaan vaurioituneen. Uutisessa ei myöskään mainita uhrien olleen siviilejä.
https://tass.ru/proisshestviya/20188905
Antares
Respected Leader
En muista, kuka kommentoi tuota että pilvisyys oli este tai vaikutin ohjautuvien liitopommien käytölle (olisikohan ollut Alexander Kovalenko?).
Pommi itsessään ohjautuu siihen ohjelmoituihin koordinaatteihin (tai niiden seudulle), joten sen toimintaan pilvinen keli ei vaikuta.
Oletan / arvaan että pilvisyys vaikuttaa joko hävittäjän toimintaan tai sitten maalien etsintään ja/tai iskun vaikutusten arviointiin - ei tässä ole oikein muita vaihtoehtoja.
Tämä toki sillä oletuksella että kommentti pilvisten päivien vaikutuksesta pitää paikkansa.
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MUOKKAUS: en onnistunut (toistaiseksi) löytämään lähdettä tuolle väitteelleni, mikä sai epäilemään että muistanko väärin. Lisään tähän ketjuun lähteen, jos löydän sellaisen mutta parasta kohdella tuota kirjoitustani "epävarmana muisteluna".
TOINEN MUOKKAUS: löysin eräänlaisen lähteen väitteelleni, se löytyy tästä viestistä: LINKKI - lyhyesti: Kovalenkon mukaan joulukuussa 2023 "sää" olisi vaikuttanut ohjautuvien liitopommien käyttöön ainakin kahtena päivänä - ei siis pelkkä "pilvisyys" itsessään.
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