missileman
Kenraali
Avdiivka direction. One of the regular night raids on orc positions by "bombing" the 36th Independent Marine Brigade and the 503rd Separate Marine Battalion
missileman
Kenraali
Fragment of one of the sections of defensive fortifications built/built by the occupiers in the rear areas of the occupied territory in the southern direction, far from the line of clashes
Antares
Respected Leader
Täsmennän hieman sitä mitä hän sanoi ensiapupakkauksista, Javelineista ja muusta länsiavusta (jotka tosiaan olivat varastoissa lukkojen takana ihan viime hetkeen asti, olettaen että puhuu totta).
Hodges ihmetteli asiaa johon ukrainalaiset kolleegat sanoivat, että heidän suurin pelko oli, että jos tavaraa jaetaan eri joukoille, sitä voi "kadota vääriin käsiin" minkä jälkeen länsimaat saattavat syyttää Ukrainaa "kontrollin pettämisestä". Tämän jälkeen voisi käydä niin ettei lisäapua saada "koska Ukraina ei kykene hallitsemaan sitä".
Tästähän ryssä ja heidän kätyrinsä ovat syyttäneet Ukrainaa koko sodan ajan: epäonnistunut maa josta vuotaa raskasta aseistusta hallitsemattomasti mm. eri terroristijärjestöille, rikosjengeille jne.
Kun Hodgesilta kysyttiin tuossa haastattelussa, millainen luotto hänellä on siihen että Ukraina kykenee ohjaamaan Yhdysvaltain merkittävän aseavun oikein, hänen vastaus oli 100%. Hän käytti esimerkkinä tästä tiukasta kontrollista tuota yllä kuvailtua. Lisäksi Yhdysvaltain suurlähetystö on ollut tarkkailemassa aseavun koordinointia koko sodan ajan joten kyse ei ole hallitsemattomasta aseiden tuuppaamisesta mustaan aukkoon.
Viimeksi muokattu:
missileman
Kenraali
Def Monin kartta venäjän vahvuuksista rintamalla, varmaan jo jaettukin. Kokonaismäärä vaikuttaa pieneltä ja pataljoonien koot pieniä, hankala sanoa todenperäisyydestä 
on tuossa mainintaa että koskee vaan taktisia ryhmittymiä,.
on tuossa mainintaa että koskee vaan taktisia ryhmittymiä,.
IT-nörtti
Luutnantti
Eikös tuossa sopparissa hinnat ole tuhansia dollareita? Eli tutkan hinta 5 500 000 USD / kpl ja 3 kpl tutkia yhteensä 16 500 000 USD?
StepanRudanskij
Respected Leader
No shit...
Antares
Respected Leader
Def Monin kartta venäjän vahvuuksista rintamalla, varmaan jo jaettukin. Kokonaismäärä vaikuttaa pieneltä ja pataljoonien koot pieniä, hankala sanoa todenperäisyydestä
Tämä kartta on koostettu "vuodon" tietojen pohjalta, joten on 6-7 viikkoa vanhaa, kuten hän kirjoittaakin viestissään.
Jos katsoo "soldiers per kilometre" niin Bakhmut ja Kharkovan rintama ovat selvästi tiheämmin miehitettyjä, yli kaksi kertaa suurempi tiheys kuin muilla rintamille. Khersonin suunnassa tiheys on selvästi pienin, tosin siinä on Dnipro-joki välissä:
Tässä puhutaan "maneuvering battalion" joukoista, kokonaismääräksi laskettu 139 500. Toisinaan nähty arvioita, että Venäjällä voisi olla Ukrainassa jopa 400 000 sotilasta / mobikkia, mutta vaikea sanoa olisiko todellinen määrä näin suuri.
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Tuota voi halutessaan verrata Jominin arvioon joukkojen määristä, tosin tämä on tuore julkaisu / arvio ja tuo ylläoleva perustuu 6-7 viikkoa vanhoihin tietoihin ("vuoto" lähteenä, joten luotettavuus kyseenalainen).
Jomini arvioi vahvuudet seuraavasti ("BTGs of Bn equivalents"), merkitsin sulkuihin minun arvion siitä, mitkä seudut ovat ko. "sotilasläänin" vastuulla:
South (Khersonin suunta) = noin 21
East (Melitopol, Zaporitzzja) = noin 36
Center (Donetsk, Bakhmut) = noin 67
West (Kharkova) = noin 56
Piirsin nämä karkeasti Jominin kartan päälle, hänen tarkemman karttansa saa auki alla olevasta twitter-viestistä:
Viimeksi muokattu:
Kyllä, mutta Pesonen oli laittanut kuinka hinta ja arvo olisivat per kappale ja jättänyt ne viimeiset 3 nollaa pois. Eli siksi sitä oikolukemista peräänkuulutettiin (ymmärtääkseni)
Antares
Respected Leader
Pekka Toverin ajatuksia T-54/T-55 vaunuista:
T-55 koulutettuna voi todeta, että jopa paikalta ammuttaessa saumat pärjätä Leopard 2:a vastaan ovat olemattomat.
Optiikka on heikko, ei laser-etäisyysmittaria, ei pimeänäkökykyä, huono a-tarvike, heikko panssarointi...
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Hän viittaa Forbesin artikkeliin, oletan että tämä on voinut olla täällä jo aikaisemmin mutta laitetaan varalta artikkelin teksti spoilerin taakse (julkaistu 7.4.2023):
Forbes Staff
I write about ships, planes, tanks, drones, missiles and satellites.
Follow
75
Apr 7, 2023,07:54pm EDT
Soviet T-55 tanks in Poland during the 1981 martial-law crisis. WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
Having lost at least 2,000 tanks in its 14-month wider war on Ukraine, and struggling to source the high-tech components its needs to build new tanks, Russia has been pulling out of long-term storage hundreds of 60-year-old T-62s and 70-year-old T-55s. Tanks that were obsolete decades ago.
A 41-ton T-62 with its 115-millimeter smoothbore gun, or a 40-ton T-55 with its 100-millimeter rifled gun, isn’t just easier for Russian industry to restore than a newer T-90 or T-72 is—after all, the T-62 or T-55 requires fewer ball bearings and electronic components. The older tank also is easier for its crew to operate.
That has training implications. "The crews prepare for them [the T-55s and T-62s] in a shorter timeframe," Ukrainian commentator Oleksandr Kovalenko said.
The T-55 and T-62 are from a generation of Soviet tanks before the introduction of automatic gun-loaders, sophisticated fire-controls and crew layouts that allow a gunner and commander independently to search for targets.
The upside is that a four-person crew could learn to operate its old tank fast—as in, after just a few weeks of training. The downside, of course, is that the crew still is riding in an obsolete tank. A T-55 or T-62 is easier to use because it’s old, crude tech.
Old, crude tech that might not last long in combat—and which might end up getting new tankers killed faster.
Still, the Russians seem to appreciate the old tanks’ less demanding training requirement. After all, many of those 2,000 tanks they’ve lost in Ukraine took their crews with them when they blew up. It’s possible thousands of experienced Russian tankers have died in the wider war; replacing them might be as difficult as replacing their tanks is.
Kovalenko noted Russia’s growing shortage of good tank crews when he tracked a batch of a dozen restored T-72s, T-80s and T-90s reaching a Russian army motorized unit near Svatove in eastern Ukraine. "The most interesting thing is that there are no crews in the unit who can operate these tanks," Kovalenko said.
Assigning new crews to old tanks might seem like a solution to this problem. In reality, it’s a short-term expedient—and a self-defeating one, at that.
It’s possible to upgrade the optics in a T-55 or T-62 by swapping out the 70-year-old TSh 2-22 gunner’s sight for a 1PN96MT-02 analog sight that, while not as sophisticated as the state-of-the-art Sosna-U digital sight is, at least is new and reliable. It also is possible to boost an older tank’s protection by bolting reactive armor blocks onto the hull and turret.
But there’s very little Russian industry can do to improve a T-55 or T-62’s main gun, internal layout or turret-hull integration. And all are problematic.
“The T-62's most significant weakness is its slow rate of fire,” the U.S. Army explained in a 1979 bulletin. Where the crew of a Ukrainian T-64, Leopard 2 or M-1 can fire 10 or even 12 rounds a minute, a T-55 or T-62 crew might manage three or four rounds a minute.
The reasons are myriad. “The ammunition is inconveniently stored for rapid loading,” according to the U.S. Army bulletin. “Under certain conditions, the gun must be elevated before the loader can place a new round in the breech. The automatic ejection system requires six seconds to complete a cycle.”
While the T-55 and T-62 suffer other limitations—slow turret-traverse mechanisms, for instance—the lethargic rate of fire is one constraint that’s bound to get a lot of Russian tankers killed in direct clashes with the Ukrainians.
During the pivotal battle around Chernihiv in north-central Ukraine in the spring of 2022, the Ukrainian 1st Tank Brigade hid its T-64s in the forests around the city. When Russian tanks rolled past, the T-64 crews opened fire.
“Better crew training combined with short-ranged engagements where their armament was competitive, and the faster autoloader on the T-64, allowed Ukrainian tank crews to achieve significant damage against surprised Russian units,” analysts Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Jack Watling, Oleksandr Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds explained in a study for the Royal United Services Institute in London.
As T-55s and T-62s replace T-72s in Russian formations, the Ukrainians’ gunnery advantage only will grow.
But comparing an old Russian tank to a newer Ukrainian tank really is missing the point. The Kremlin’s tank-crew crisis is a reminder that, in warfare, people matter more than machines do. Rushing new tankers through a short training course in order to squeeze them into old T-55s and T-62s and speed those tanks to the front line might create an impression of Russian strength. But it won’t win battles.
Because those crews—tank commanders, or TCs, especially—will lack experience. “It is ... important that deciders in crews and platoons (TCs and platoon leaders) have the necessary experience to allow them to react to rapidly changing future battlefields,” Billy Burnside noted in a 1979 study for the U.S. Army.
In ‘solving’ their tanker-shortage by equipping crews with obsolete tanks, the Russians might end up creating an even deeper tanker shortage—by getting a bunch of four-man T-55 and T-62 crews killed in lopsided fights with better-equipped, better-trained Ukrainian forces.
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David Axe
Follow
I'm a journalist, author and filmmaker based in Columbia, South Carolina.
T-55 koulutettuna voi todeta, että jopa paikalta ammuttaessa saumat pärjätä Leopard 2:a vastaan ovat olemattomat.
Optiikka on heikko, ei laser-etäisyysmittaria, ei pimeänäkökykyä, huono a-tarvike, heikko panssarointi...
-
Hän viittaa Forbesin artikkeliin, oletan että tämä on voinut olla täällä jo aikaisemmin mutta laitetaan varalta artikkelin teksti spoilerin taakse (julkaistu 7.4.2023):
The Russians Aren’t Just Running Out Of Tanks—They’re Running Out Of Tank Crews, Too. And It’s Going To Get Worse.
The Russians Aren’t Just Running Out Of Tanks—They’re Running Out Of Tank Crews, Too. And It’s Going To Get Worse.
David AxeForbes Staff
I write about ships, planes, tanks, drones, missiles and satellites.
Follow
75
Apr 7, 2023,07:54pm EDT
Soviet T-55 tanks in Poland during the 1981 martial-law crisis. WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
Having lost at least 2,000 tanks in its 14-month wider war on Ukraine, and struggling to source the high-tech components its needs to build new tanks, Russia has been pulling out of long-term storage hundreds of 60-year-old T-62s and 70-year-old T-55s. Tanks that were obsolete decades ago.
A 41-ton T-62 with its 115-millimeter smoothbore gun, or a 40-ton T-55 with its 100-millimeter rifled gun, isn’t just easier for Russian industry to restore than a newer T-90 or T-72 is—after all, the T-62 or T-55 requires fewer ball bearings and electronic components. The older tank also is easier for its crew to operate.
That has training implications. "The crews prepare for them [the T-55s and T-62s] in a shorter timeframe," Ukrainian commentator Oleksandr Kovalenko said.
The T-55 and T-62 are from a generation of Soviet tanks before the introduction of automatic gun-loaders, sophisticated fire-controls and crew layouts that allow a gunner and commander independently to search for targets.
The upside is that a four-person crew could learn to operate its old tank fast—as in, after just a few weeks of training. The downside, of course, is that the crew still is riding in an obsolete tank. A T-55 or T-62 is easier to use because it’s old, crude tech.
Old, crude tech that might not last long in combat—and which might end up getting new tankers killed faster.
Still, the Russians seem to appreciate the old tanks’ less demanding training requirement. After all, many of those 2,000 tanks they’ve lost in Ukraine took their crews with them when they blew up. It’s possible thousands of experienced Russian tankers have died in the wider war; replacing them might be as difficult as replacing their tanks is.
Kovalenko noted Russia’s growing shortage of good tank crews when he tracked a batch of a dozen restored T-72s, T-80s and T-90s reaching a Russian army motorized unit near Svatove in eastern Ukraine. "The most interesting thing is that there are no crews in the unit who can operate these tanks," Kovalenko said.
Assigning new crews to old tanks might seem like a solution to this problem. In reality, it’s a short-term expedient—and a self-defeating one, at that.
It’s possible to upgrade the optics in a T-55 or T-62 by swapping out the 70-year-old TSh 2-22 gunner’s sight for a 1PN96MT-02 analog sight that, while not as sophisticated as the state-of-the-art Sosna-U digital sight is, at least is new and reliable. It also is possible to boost an older tank’s protection by bolting reactive armor blocks onto the hull and turret.
But there’s very little Russian industry can do to improve a T-55 or T-62’s main gun, internal layout or turret-hull integration. And all are problematic.
“The T-62's most significant weakness is its slow rate of fire,” the U.S. Army explained in a 1979 bulletin. Where the crew of a Ukrainian T-64, Leopard 2 or M-1 can fire 10 or even 12 rounds a minute, a T-55 or T-62 crew might manage three or four rounds a minute.
The reasons are myriad. “The ammunition is inconveniently stored for rapid loading,” according to the U.S. Army bulletin. “Under certain conditions, the gun must be elevated before the loader can place a new round in the breech. The automatic ejection system requires six seconds to complete a cycle.”
While the T-55 and T-62 suffer other limitations—slow turret-traverse mechanisms, for instance—the lethargic rate of fire is one constraint that’s bound to get a lot of Russian tankers killed in direct clashes with the Ukrainians.
During the pivotal battle around Chernihiv in north-central Ukraine in the spring of 2022, the Ukrainian 1st Tank Brigade hid its T-64s in the forests around the city. When Russian tanks rolled past, the T-64 crews opened fire.
“Better crew training combined with short-ranged engagements where their armament was competitive, and the faster autoloader on the T-64, allowed Ukrainian tank crews to achieve significant damage against surprised Russian units,” analysts Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Jack Watling, Oleksandr Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds explained in a study for the Royal United Services Institute in London.
As T-55s and T-62s replace T-72s in Russian formations, the Ukrainians’ gunnery advantage only will grow.
But comparing an old Russian tank to a newer Ukrainian tank really is missing the point. The Kremlin’s tank-crew crisis is a reminder that, in warfare, people matter more than machines do. Rushing new tankers through a short training course in order to squeeze them into old T-55s and T-62s and speed those tanks to the front line might create an impression of Russian strength. But it won’t win battles.
Because those crews—tank commanders, or TCs, especially—will lack experience. “It is ... important that deciders in crews and platoons (TCs and platoon leaders) have the necessary experience to allow them to react to rapidly changing future battlefields,” Billy Burnside noted in a 1979 study for the U.S. Army.
In ‘solving’ their tanker-shortage by equipping crews with obsolete tanks, the Russians might end up creating an even deeper tanker shortage—by getting a bunch of four-man T-55 and T-62 crews killed in lopsided fights with better-equipped, better-trained Ukrainian forces.
-
Follow me on Twitter. Check out my website or some of my other work here. Send me a secure tip.
David Axe
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I'm a journalist, author and filmmaker based in Columbia, South Carolina.
Omnipotentti
Kapteeni
Ei tahti päätä huimaa. tuo on puolitoista promillea siepatuista.Tällä viikolla saatiin 31 siepattua lasta palautettua Ukrainaan Venäjältä
31 Venäjälle siepattua lasta pelastettiin takaisin Ukrainaan
Ukrainan arvion mukaan lähes 19 500 lasta on viety väkisin Venäjälle yli vuoden kestäneen hyökkäyssodan aikana.www.is.fi
Antares
Respected Leader
Vaikea nähdä eroa Wagnerin eli Venäjän ja ISIS:n elukoiden välillä:
Wagner forces displayed a head on a stick in Bakhmut today. These people are as brutal as ISIS and should be treated in exactly the same way.
In other, related news, several AFU soldiers were found beheaded by Wagner near Bakhmut today. This is who these people are and they're extremely proud of it
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Liettuan mielestä Ukraina tulisi kutsua NATO:n jäseneksi, parlamentti äänesti asiasta ja tulos oli yksimielinen:
Lithuanian Parliament @LRSeimas unanimously approved resolution on key goals before Vilnius @NATO
Summit: https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAP/6c8785d0d3ac11ed9b3c9397e1236c2a
Key goal of the whole Lithuanian nation from today is formal invitation of Ukraine to become NATO member in Vilnius @r_stefanchuk
@DmytroKuleba
Wagner forces displayed a head on a stick in Bakhmut today. These people are as brutal as ISIS and should be treated in exactly the same way.
In other, related news, several AFU soldiers were found beheaded by Wagner near Bakhmut today. This is who these people are and they're extremely proud of it
-
Liettuan mielestä Ukraina tulisi kutsua NATO:n jäseneksi, parlamentti äänesti asiasta ja tulos oli yksimielinen:
Lithuanian Parliament @LRSeimas unanimously approved resolution on key goals before Vilnius @NATO
Summit: https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAP/6c8785d0d3ac11ed9b3c9397e1236c2a
Key goal of the whole Lithuanian nation from today is formal invitation of Ukraine to become NATO member in Vilnius @r_stefanchuk
@DmytroKuleba
Antares
Respected Leader
Mi-8 ja Mi-24 helikopterien operointia "hajautetuilta kentiltä" eli suomeksi sanottuna niityiltä ja pelloilta (mikä vain kantaakaan polttoaineauton, arvatenkin - tai ainakin sen on päästävä tarpeeksi lähelle mitä lie peltoautotietä pitkin):
Ukrainian Mi-8 and Mi-24 gunship operations with the 12th Army Aviation Brigade, including the loading of B8-V20A rocket pods with unguided S-8 80mm rockets at a forward airstrip in the east.
Distributed operations have been incredibly valuable for the Ukrainian Army Aviation brigades, allowing their Mi-8s and Mi-24s to operate away from potential Russian strike targets.
Poor Russian ISR has almost certainly helped their overall survival as well.
These forward airstrips are remarkably simple, effectively just a few transport vehicles, a fuel tanker, and an empty field.
Ukrainian Mi-8 and Mi-24 gunship operations with the 12th Army Aviation Brigade, including the loading of B8-V20A rocket pods with unguided S-8 80mm rockets at a forward airstrip in the east.
Distributed operations have been incredibly valuable for the Ukrainian Army Aviation brigades, allowing their Mi-8s and Mi-24s to operate away from potential Russian strike targets.
Poor Russian ISR has almost certainly helped their overall survival as well.
These forward airstrips are remarkably simple, effectively just a few transport vehicles, a fuel tanker, and an empty field.
Sextiettan
Kapteeni
Sama pätee kaikissa huonosti johdetuissa organisatioissa. Muutamat YT:t nähtynä ja niissäkin ammutaan itseään jalkaan, mutta numerot on kohdillaan...
Antares
Respected Leader
Tämä kartta on koostettu "vuodon" tietojen pohjalta, joten on 6-7 viikkoa vanhaa, kuten hän kirjoittaakin viestissään.
Jos katsoo "soldiers per kilometre" niin Bakhmut ja Kharkovan rintama ovat selvästi tiheämmin miehitettyjä, yli kaksi kertaa suurempi tiheys kuin muilla rintamille. Khersonin suunnassa tiheys on selvästi pienin, tosin siinä on Dnipro-joki välissä:
Tässä puhutaan "maneuvering battalion" joukoista, kokonaismääräksi laskettu 139 500. Toisinaan nähty arvioita, että Venäjällä voisi olla Ukrainassa jopa 400 000 sotilasta / mobikkia, mutta vaikea sanoa olisiko todellinen määrä näin suuri.
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Tuota voi halutessaan verrata Jominin arvioon joukkojen määristä, tosin tämä on tuore julkaisu / arvio ja tuo ylläoleva perustuu 6-7 viikkoa vanhoihin tietoihin ("vuoto" lähteenä, joten luotettavuus kyseenalainen).
Jomini arvioi vahvuudet seuraavasti ("BTGs of Bn equivalents"), merkitsin sulkuihin minun arvion siitä, mitkä seudut ovat ko. "sotilasläänin" vastuulla:
South (Khersonin suunta) = noin 21
East (Melitopol, Zaporitzzja) = noin 36
Center (Donetsk, Bakhmut) = noin 67
West (Kharkova) = noin 56
Piirsin nämä karkeasti Jominin kartan päälle, hänen tarkemman karttansa saa auki alla olevasta twitter-viestistä:
Katso liite: 76636
Vertasin pikaisesti "vuodon" ja Jominin arvioita joukkojen vahvuuksista eri sektoreilla:
Toki rajanveto ei ole näissä täysin sama, laskin "vuodon" tiedoista Donetskin ja Bakhmutin numerot yhteen jotta ollaan lähempänä Jominin jakolinjoja.
Lisäksi pitää muistaa että "vuodon" numerot ovat 6-7 viikkoa vanhat, kun taas Jominin arvio on tuore. Toisaalta Jomini arvioi tietonsa avoimista lähteistä, mikä vaikeuttaa arvion tekoa.
Joka tapauksessa sanoisin että %-osuuden eri sektoreilla osuvat hämmästyttävän lähelle toisiaan, vaikka kokonaismäärissä on suuri ero. Harkovan sektorilla olisi "vuodon" mukaan määrällisesti suurin osa lasketuista joukoista, tosin rintamalinjan pituuden takia joukkojen tiheys on tietysti pienempi kuin Bakhmutin seudulla.
Jominin arviossa nämä kaksi sektoria vaihtavat paikkaa myös kokonaismäärien osalta, tosin tässäkin rajanveto voi vaikuttaa paljon: tiedetään että ryssä on sijoittanut paljon joukkoja Kreminnan korkeudelle. Meneekö Jominin arvion "rajalinja" tämän alueen pohjois- vai eteläpuolelta eli kumpaan "sektoriin" nämä joukot lasketaan?
