Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Ukrainalle 6 kpl lisää NASAMS -järjestelmiä.

Koko 3 miljardin taalan paketti:
  • Six additional National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) with additional munitions for NASAMS;
  • Up to 245,000 rounds of 155mm artillery ammunition;
  • Up to 65,000 rounds of 120mm mortar ammunition;
  • Up to 24 counter-artillery radars;
  • Puma Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and support equipment for Scan Eagle UAS systems;
  • VAMPIRE Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems;
  • Laser-guided rocket systems;
  • Funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment.
The United States has committed more than $13.5 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since January 2021. In total, the United States has committed more than $15.5 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since 2014.




"Up to 65,000 rounds of 120mm mortar ammunition"
Näillä saa jo rapsakkaa vaikutusta - 120mm putkiakin taitaa olla jo riittävä määrä paikalla.
 
A detailed plan has been drawn up by Russia to disconnect Europe’s largest nuclear plant from Ukraine’s power grid, risking a catastrophic failure of its cooling systems, the Guardian has been told.

World leaders have called for the Zaporizhzhia site to be demilitarised after footage emerged of Russian army vehicles inside the plant, and have previously warned Russia against cutting it off from the Ukrainian grid and connecting it up to the Russian power network.

But Petro Kotin, the head of Ukraine’s atomic energy company, told the Guardian in an interview that Russian engineers had already drawn up a blueprint for a switch on the grounds of emergency planning should fighting sever remaining power connections.

“They presented [the plan] to [workers at] the plant, and the plant [workers] presented it to us. The precondition for this plan was heavy damage of all lines which connect Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant to the Ukrainian system,” Kotin said in an interview on Ukraine’s independence day on Wednesday, with the country mostly locked down because of the threat of Russian attacks.

He fears that Russia’s military is now targeting those connections to make the emergency scenario a reality. Both Ukraine and Russia have accused each other of shelling the site.

“They just started doing that, they starting all the shelling, just to take out these lines,” Kotin said.
Other threats to nuclear security at the plant include vehicles packed so tightly into turbine halls that firefighters would struggle to access them if a fire broke out, and a campaign of terror against workers who have chosen to stay at the frontline plant.

One was beaten to death, and another so severely injured that he needed three months to recover. More than 200 have been detained, Kotin said.

The plant’s electricity connections are already in a critical situation, with three of the four main lines connecting it to Ukraine’s grid broken during the war, and two of the three back-up lines connecting it to a conventional power plant also down, he said.
 
At least 22 people have been killed and 50 wounded in a Russian rocket strike on a Ukrainian railway station, as the country marked six months since Moscow’s invasion on a sombre independence day overshadowed by warnings of further “brutal” attacks.

Addressing the UN late on Wednesday, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, said the rockets struck a train in a station in the town of Chaplyne, about 145km (90 miles) west of Donetsk in eastern Ukraine.

“Rescuers are working, but, unfortunately, the death toll could increase,” Zelenskiy said.

An 11-year-old child died in the attack, said Kirill Timoshenko, deputy head of Ukraine’s presidential administration, in a message on his Telegram channel.
 
Teen poikkeuksen tässä, kun lisään tänne ryssän foorumin tavallista paskasisältöä. Älkää katsoko jos haluatte säilyttää mielenrauhanne.

Tätä juhlitaan suurena voittona siellä tänään. :poop::mad:

MOSCOW, August 25 - RIA Novosti. The Russian military destroyed a Ukrainian military train at a railway station in the Dnepropetrovsk region, the Ministry of Defense reported.
"As a result of a direct hit by an Iskander missile on a military echelon at the Chaplino railway station in the Dnepropetrovsk region, more than 200 servicemen of the reserve of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and ten units of military equipment were destroyed, en route to the combat zone in Donbass," the report says.








Tästä siis oikeasti kyse:

 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Britain is importing no energy from Russia for the first time on record after trade between the two countries collapsed after the Kremlin ordered invasion of Ukraine in February.

Figures from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) released six months after the start of the war found that in June the UK’s imports from Russia were down by 97% and stood at only £33m as sanctions took effect.
Imports of other Russian goods – including vodka – have also been wiped out in the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine. Bans were announced on a range of Russian products including iron and steel, silver, gold, wood products and high-end goods, and high additional tariffs on other items.

Exports from the UK to Russia also fell sharply but to a lesser extent than imports because some goods – such as pharmaceutical products – were exempt from the sanctions regime imposed after the invasion on 24 February.
 

Tästä tulee kyllä huikeita kirjoja ja elokuvia. Kunhan vain hollywood tekisi niistä niin realistisia, että elokuvat ja kirjat kielletään ryssälässä, jolloin niistä tulee sata kertaa houkuttelevampia.
 
Ryssän salaiset ninja-taktiikat ovat niin salaisia että mieluummin häviävät suuren sodan kuin paljastavat "todelliset kykynsä" - eivät voi uskoa että "Suuren ja Mahtavan" armeija ei todellisuudessa ole hyvä.


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Eläkkeellä olevan tykistöupseerin ajatuksia, nämä Israelista:


The anomaly of artillery usage in the Russia-Ukraine war | Opinion​

Guest author, former IDF artillery officer Zvi Koretzki, says that “the obligation to end the war lies with the stronger side and when it doesn’t, we will see a massive use of artillery that allows both sides to appear as if they are doing ‘something’, while not serving any real goal”

IsraelDefense | 22/08/2022

I will start with stating that in this article I will criticize the use of artillery in this war, by both sides, but will not support either side of this conflict. Being a military officer for many years, I believe a war is (sometimes) a necessary evil and all sides should make sure it is as short as possible and try to minimize casualties, military and civilian alike.

Since the start of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine we have witnessed massive usage of ATGMs and artillery. Talking about artillery, we saw many western countries send massive supply of artillery platforms into Ukraine, following their request and due to shortage in artillery ammunition.

Ukraine’s military is currently using almost all the available types of NATO 155mm artillery guns and the HIMARS as a guided rocket system. And the role of artillery is highlighted and praised by the Ukrainian army.

Observing the massive use of artillery in the invasion, I remembered an old article I wrote in 2014 about one of the IDF operations in the Gaza strip and the massive use of artillery in the 2nd Lebanon war in 2006, declaring that massive use of fires is not necessarily a sign of good practice but rather a sign of misuse of military power.

During the 2nd Lebanon war in 2006, the IDF fired more artillery shells then during the First Lebanon war. In 2006 there was a massive use of artillery, although the IDF maneuvered only a few kilometers with three divisions versus 1982, when they made it all the way to Lebanon’s capital city Beirut, more than 60 km away, using five divisions.

This phenomenon of using massive amounts of artillery, is visible in every armed conflict that doesn’t involve, determine and objective directed maneuvers. To explain this phenomenon, we need to understand why armies are maneuvering and what they are trying to achieve while using their forces.

There are two main conditions that can lead a country to utilizing military power. First, when trying to achieve a diplomatic/policy goal and second, when protecting their country from someone else that is trying to achieve his goals – a combination of Clausewitz's "War is the continuation of policy with other means" and Patton's "The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other bastard die for his".

If we take this to the current war, we can say that the Russians sent their army in order to achieve some diplomatic/policy goal that was not achievable via talks and negotiations and the Ukrainians sent their army in order to prevent the Russians from achieving these goals.

As we can understand from reports and media, the next thing that happened was, that the Russian army tried to achieve its mission, the Ukrainian army defended its territory. But without any will or power to win this battle, the war entered a stage where it treaded water and where armies on both sides didn’t have a plan on how to win their mission and an attrition war started, resulting with firing of ten of thousands of shells by both sides

At this stage armies don’t maneuver and if they do, it is minimal, close range and short maneuvers, mainly to destroy micro-tactical threats and to flex their muscles.

Because nothing happens in the battlefield at this stage, the vacuum, crated by the non-maneuvering forces, is filled with non-line-of-sight artillery fire.

The ease of using this and the low personal risk while using artillery, leads to inefficient and sometimes wasteful use of this fire. In some places it even leads to expressive use of fires (the use of artillery fire, or military force, not in order to achieve a military mission in an instrumental way but rather as a way to express anger or national feelings).

I am not referring to an individual soldier firing around but to a political decision to "do something" in retaliation or an act of governments needing to present some "we are doing something in retaliation for this terror attack" while not really trying to achieve something productive with this show of force.

Now let’s talk about the moral side. I am sure it will sound strange to many readers, but one of the moral missions of the strong side in a war is to win the war and dictate the losing side the terms of surrender.

Fighting LICs (low intensity conflicts) with terror organizations in the last decades have faded this insight. If the strong side doesn’t use its power to end the war, be assured that the weak side will make sure it goes on forever... and wars that go on forever are a bad thing because they prolong suffering and lead to the loss of lives on both sides.

Therefore, the obligation to end the war lies with the stronger side and when it doesn’t do it, we will see massive use of artillery that allows both sides to look as if they are “doing something”, while not serving any real goal.

And now for artillery. The main use of artillery should be to supply close support for the maneuvering element and to destroy targets that are supporting the ability of the enemy to control and support these maneuvers.

When there is no maneuvering, the artillery becomes the only thing that an army can do in order to look as if he is doing something- it is cheap, easy to use, doesn’t risk lives… a perfect weapon for a lazy warlord.

We can understand the massive use of artillery in the Russia-Ukraine war as follows:
  1. The Russians have no will to end this war - although it's their moral obligation.
  2. The Ukrainians cannot defeat the Russians.
  3. Becoming an attrition war, RIU sees massive use of inefficient artillery fire used, partly, as an expressive use of military force.
  4. The continuous flow of artillery platforms and ammunition will prolong the RIU and provide the armies with the ability to display an irrelevant use of force and continue a never-ending attrition war.
If the Ukrainians have a plan on how to emerge victorious from this war, I suggest they execute it – for if they don’t, we must remember that the Russians have way more artillery and ammunition so that continuation of the war will result in more flattened cities – not sure it will be a victory even if the Russian will end up leaving Ukraine.

One final point. War is a tragedy. I would be happier if the West had been supplying the Ukrainians more maneuvering platforms, allowing them to counterattack and end the war, and then, artillery platforms to support these maneuvering efforts. Being an artillery officer, I think we should look at this massive use of artillery as it is, a massive ineffective use of this capability.

The now-cheering artillery officers that are rebuilding their confidence in long range, statistic fire, should be careful in implementing RIU artillery lessons for it will, eventually, rebound on them, when everybody will discover that this massive use of artillery gave birth to a colossal nothing.

Written by Zvi Koretzki, a former IDF artillery officer
 
Ryssän salaiset ninja-taktiikat ovat niin salaisia että mieluummin häviävät suuren sodan kuin paljastavat "todelliset kykynsä" - eivät voi uskoa että "Suuren ja Mahtavan" armeija ei todellisuudessa ole hyvä.


-

Eläkkeellä olevan tykistöupseerin ajatuksia, nämä Israelista:


The anomaly of artillery usage in the Russia-Ukraine war | Opinion​

Guest author, former IDF artillery officer Zvi Koretzki, says that “the obligation to end the war lies with the stronger side and when it doesn’t, we will see a massive use of artillery that allows both sides to appear as if they are doing ‘something’, while not serving any real goal”

IsraelDefense | 22/08/2022

I will start with stating that in this article I will criticize the use of artillery in this war, by both sides, but will not support either side of this conflict. Being a military officer for many years, I believe a war is (sometimes) a necessary evil and all sides should make sure it is as short as possible and try to minimize casualties, military and civilian alike.

Since the start of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine we have witnessed massive usage of ATGMs and artillery. Talking about artillery, we saw many western countries send massive supply of artillery platforms into Ukraine, following their request and due to shortage in artillery ammunition.

Ukraine’s military is currently using almost all the available types of NATO 155mm artillery guns and the HIMARS as a guided rocket system. And the role of artillery is highlighted and praised by the Ukrainian army.

Observing the massive use of artillery in the invasion, I remembered an old article I wrote in 2014 about one of the IDF operations in the Gaza strip and the massive use of artillery in the 2nd Lebanon war in 2006, declaring that massive use of fires is not necessarily a sign of good practice but rather a sign of misuse of military power.

During the 2nd Lebanon war in 2006, the IDF fired more artillery shells then during the First Lebanon war. In 2006 there was a massive use of artillery, although the IDF maneuvered only a few kilometers with three divisions versus 1982, when they made it all the way to Lebanon’s capital city Beirut, more than 60 km away, using five divisions.

This phenomenon of using massive amounts of artillery, is visible in every armed conflict that doesn’t involve, determine and objective directed maneuvers. To explain this phenomenon, we need to understand why armies are maneuvering and what they are trying to achieve while using their forces.

There are two main conditions that can lead a country to utilizing military power. First, when trying to achieve a diplomatic/policy goal and second, when protecting their country from someone else that is trying to achieve his goals – a combination of Clausewitz's "War is the continuation of policy with other means" and Patton's "The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other bastard die for his".

If we take this to the current war, we can say that the Russians sent their army in order to achieve some diplomatic/policy goal that was not achievable via talks and negotiations and the Ukrainians sent their army in order to prevent the Russians from achieving these goals.

As we can understand from reports and media, the next thing that happened was, that the Russian army tried to achieve its mission, the Ukrainian army defended its territory. But without any will or power to win this battle, the war entered a stage where it treaded water and where armies on both sides didn’t have a plan on how to win their mission and an attrition war started, resulting with firing of ten of thousands of shells by both sides

At this stage armies don’t maneuver and if they do, it is minimal, close range and short maneuvers, mainly to destroy micro-tactical threats and to flex their muscles.

Because nothing happens in the battlefield at this stage, the vacuum, crated by the non-maneuvering forces, is filled with non-line-of-sight artillery fire.

The ease of using this and the low personal risk while using artillery, leads to inefficient and sometimes wasteful use of this fire. In some places it even leads to expressive use of fires (the use of artillery fire, or military force, not in order to achieve a military mission in an instrumental way but rather as a way to express anger or national feelings).

I am not referring to an individual soldier firing around but to a political decision to "do something" in retaliation or an act of governments needing to present some "we are doing something in retaliation for this terror attack" while not really trying to achieve something productive with this show of force.

Now let’s talk about the moral side. I am sure it will sound strange to many readers, but one of the moral missions of the strong side in a war is to win the war and dictate the losing side the terms of surrender.

Fighting LICs (low intensity conflicts) with terror organizations in the last decades have faded this insight. If the strong side doesn’t use its power to end the war, be assured that the weak side will make sure it goes on forever... and wars that go on forever are a bad thing because they prolong suffering and lead to the loss of lives on both sides.

Therefore, the obligation to end the war lies with the stronger side and when it doesn’t do it, we will see massive use of artillery that allows both sides to look as if they are “doing something”, while not serving any real goal.

And now for artillery. The main use of artillery should be to supply close support for the maneuvering element and to destroy targets that are supporting the ability of the enemy to control and support these maneuvers.

When there is no maneuvering, the artillery becomes the only thing that an army can do in order to look as if he is doing something- it is cheap, easy to use, doesn’t risk lives… a perfect weapon for a lazy warlord.

We can understand the massive use of artillery in the Russia-Ukraine war as follows:
  1. The Russians have no will to end this war - although it's their moral obligation.
  2. The Ukrainians cannot defeat the Russians.
  3. Becoming an attrition war, RIU sees massive use of inefficient artillery fire used, partly, as an expressive use of military force.
  4. The continuous flow of artillery platforms and ammunition will prolong the RIU and provide the armies with the ability to display an irrelevant use of force and continue a never-ending attrition war.
If the Ukrainians have a plan on how to emerge victorious from this war, I suggest they execute it – for if they don’t, we must remember that the Russians have way more artillery and ammunition so that continuation of the war will result in more flattened cities – not sure it will be a victory even if the Russian will end up leaving Ukraine.

One final point. War is a tragedy. I would be happier if the West had been supplying the Ukrainians more maneuvering platforms, allowing them to counterattack and end the war, and then, artillery platforms to support these maneuvering efforts. Being an artillery officer, I think we should look at this massive use of artillery as it is, a massive ineffective use of this capability.

The now-cheering artillery officers that are rebuilding their confidence in long range, statistic fire, should be careful in implementing RIU artillery lessons for it will, eventually, rebound on them, when everybody will discover that this massive use of artillery gave birth to a colossal nothing.

Written by Zvi Koretzki, a former IDF artillery officer
Olipa yksisilmäinen artikkeli: tykistöupseerin mielestä Venäjä voittaa sodan, koska sillä on enemmän tykistöä.

Tulee mieleen sotilasasiantuntija Rob Leen arvio helmikuun lopulta, miten Ukrainan ilmavoimat kestää noin 45 minuuttia sotaa Venäjää vastaan, mitä ilmeisemmin koska Venäjällä piti olla niin kauheesti kaikkee:

 
Käyttäjän johnadoe linkittämässä artikkelissa oli muotoiltu näin (Stars & Stripes -sivun jakama alunperin Washington Postin artikkeli): LINKKI

After six months, Ukraine has lost some 9,000 troops in all and seen more than 7,000 troops go missing, according to official Ukrainian statements, though the numbers could be higher. Russia has lost more than 15,000 troops, according to comments in late July by the head of the CIA, who said it was difficult to ascertain an exact number.

Suuri määrä kadonneita, arvatenkin osa on jäänyt vangeiksi mutta voidaan varmasti olettaa että näistä suuri määrä on myös kuolleita. Mikä määrä, en osaa sanoa, mutta pahimmillaan voisi olla jopa suurin osa. Jos näin olisi, kuolleita voisi olla jopa 16 000. Sodan aikana on nähty useita arvioita, tämä on yksi lisää niiden joukkoon.

Venäläiset lähteet puhuu 8000 ukrainalaisesta sotavangista. Paha sanoa mikä on oikea määrä, niitähän palauteltiin puolin ja toisin... ja sitten mikä on sotavanki kun ei ole sotaakaan...
 
Olipa yksisilmäinen artikkeli: tykistöupseerin mielestä Venäjä voittaa sodan, koska sillä on enemmän tykistöä.

Tulee mieleen sotilasasiantuntija Rob Leen arvio helmikuun lopulta, miten Ukrainan ilmavoimat kestää noin 45 minuuttia sotaa Venäjää vastaan, mitä ilmeisemmin koska Venäjällä piti olla niin kauheesti kaikkee:


Luen tuota niin, että artikkelin johtopäätökset perustuvat siihen että molemmat osapuolet käyttävät tykistöä massiivisesti ilman näkyviä tuloksia rintaman muutoksissa. Siitä seuraavat nuo johtopäätökset, mitä hän on tehnyt eli Venäjällä ei ole tahtoa / kykyä voittaa sotaa vaikka on "vahvempi" mutta Ukrainalla on sama tilanne (muuten nähtäisiin vastahyökkäys ja muutos rintamalla).

Tuossa on varmasti se perä että tykistö on laiskan komentajan ase: sen käytöllä ei riskeerata juuri mitään ja näyttää siltä että tehdään kovasti asioita, mutta jos se ei realisoidu menestyksiin taistelukentällä, niin se on tehotonta ja tyhmää tykistön käyttöä. Toisaalta jos "heikompi" osapuoli pedättelee "vahvempaa" paikallaan, niin onko se tehotonta?

Enpä tiedä, monessa analyysissä tuntuu olevan raskas noja nopeaan sodan voittamisen suuntaan.

Puoli vuotta on kuitenkin lyhyt aika kun katsoo menneitä sotia, tosin Israelin sodat ovat yleensä olleet lyhyitä (ehkä tämä näkyy hänen ajattelussa?). Lyhyt, nopeasti voitettu sota on tietysti "tehokasta" mutta Israel ei ole hyvin pitkään aikaan sotinut suurta sotaa aidosti kyvykästä vastustajaa vastaan. 1973 taitaa olla viimeinen, en laske 1982 kampanjaa "suureksi sodaksi". En ehkä vertaisi 1973 sodan arabiarmeijoita Venäjän armeijaan Ukrainassa, vaikka toisaalta heidän suorituskyky on ollut melko heikko. Rintaman pituus Ukrainassa on selvästi suurempi kuin Israelin sodissa, mikä pakottaa jakamaan voimat ja siten "tehokkuus" kärsii. Israelin sodissa oli myös aina vahvasti läsnä Yhdysvallat ja Neuvostoliitto, joilla oli vahva intressi saada sota loppumaan nopeasti - eli heidän kannanotot vaikuttivat taistelukentän tilanteisiin, yksi esimerkki on Yhdysvaltain ilmoitus tuesta Egyptin piiritetylle 3. armeijalle jos Israel jatkaisi sitä vastaan hyökkäämistä 1973. Se esti 3. armeijan tuhoamisen ja samalla Egyptin nöyryyttämisen (enemmän kuin mitä oli jo tapahtunut kun sodan suunta kääntyi).

Mielestäni useat esimerkit "nopeasta" sodasta sisältävät yhtä paljon omien joukkojen kyvykkyyttä kuin vastustajan heikkoa suorituskykyä tai kokonaan puuttuvaa taistelumotivaatiota. Irakin sodan 2003 aktiivinen taisteluvaihe kesti viisi viikkoa, mutta sekin olisi voitu hoitaa nopeammin jos Yhdysvalloilla olisi ollut suurempi määrä joukkoja. Irakilaisten taisteluhalu oli hyvin pieni, joten "hidas sota" kertoi enemmän varovaisuudesta hyökkääjän osalta kuin mistään muusta. Ehkä tämä Ukrainan sota on ensimmäinen suuri sota pitkään aikaan jossa hyökkääjän ja puolustajan kyvykkyys on suunnilleen tasavertainen? Ehkä puheet tehottomuudesta kertovat enemmän siitä ettei tällaista sotaa ole nähty pitkään aikaan? Siksi odotetaan että toinen osapuoli olisi selvästi tehokkaampi tai parempi ja siksi voittaisi sodan nopeasti? Korean sota oli hyvin tasavertainen vaikka sisälsikin monta eri vaihetta ja se kesti yli kolme vuotta. Lopputulos oli suunnilleen samat asemat kuin mitkä olivat sodan alussa vaikka rintamalinja liikkui sodan aikana molempiin suuntiin hyvin pitkiä matkoja.

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Toomas Ilves ei säästele sanojaan hänen kokemuksista tiettyjen Suomen poliitikkojen osalta:


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Viimeksi muokattu:
Venäläiset lähteet puhuu 8000 ukrainalaisesta sotavangista. Paha sanoa mikä on oikea määrä, niitähän palauteltiin puolin ja toisin... ja sitten mikä on sotavanki kun ei ole sotaakaan...

Minä olen perinteisesti laskenut "kadonneet" kaatuneiksi ellei saada toisenlaista tietoa. Sotavangeista käydään yleensä neuvotteluja, joten voisi kuvitella että molemmat osapuolet tietävät ketkä ovat jääneet vangeiksi. Näin siis olettaen että vangeista neuvotellaan eikä vain suljeta vankileireille "odottamaan tuomiota".

Toki osa "kadonneista" voi olla rintamakarkureita tai muuten eksyneitä, näitä on joka sodassa väistämättä jokin määrä.

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En ole koskaan vieraillut Ukrainassa, Puolan on läheisin maa. Osaako kukaan sanoa, missä vaiheessa ja kuinka raskaita syyssateita kannattaa odottaa? Rospuutto tuskin on niin paha kuin mitä keväällä lumien sulamisen takia, mutta sateet ovat väistämättä osa syksyä. Tarkoittaa pehmenevää maaperää mikä puolestaan rajoittaa ajoneuvojen liikkumista. Jossain vaiheessa tämäkin tulee ajankohtaiseksi - tosin myöhemmin maa jäätyy ja alkaa taas kantamaan, silloin punnitaan halukkuus ja kyky hyökätä kylmässä.

Autumn in the Donbass is inevitable, Comrade Shoigu


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Viimeksi muokattu:
TikTokkereita Donetskissa, arviolta Marinkan / Piskyn suunnalla. Kirjoittajan mukaan siirrot donetskin suunnalle näillä lihapaloilla indikoisivat ryssän yritystä edetä alueella.
Tsetseenejä suunnalla Pisky tai Marinka. Kuten olen sanonut, venäläiset ovat siirtäneet Akhmatin, Kadyroviittien, Wagnerin ja SOF:n jäseniä Donetskin alueelle, mikä on selvä merkki hyökkäysyrityksestä.

Piskyn suunnalla ainakin taistellaan edelleen.

Jo oli aika että nämäkin vihdoin poistuivat espanjan maaperältä ja suuntasivat itään.
 
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