pitkäpyssy
Kersantti
Eikös tuo dronen räjähdyksen vaikutus ole vain parempi, jos se räjähtää metrin ennen kohdetta?
Keir Giles tunnistaa myös valtavan kaksoisstandardin lännen toiminnassa suhteessa Ukrainaan ja Israeliin.
Yhdysvallat ampuu alas Israelin puolesta lennokkeja, mutta ei tee näin Ukrainan puolesta, koska kyseessä olisi "eskaloiva" toimenpide. Kehtaa kuitenkin kritisoida Ukrainaa öljynjalostamohyökkäyksistä... nallekarkit eivät nyt mene tasan.
Yhdysvallat ampuu alas Israelin puolesta lennokkeja, mutta ei tee näin Ukrainan puolesta, koska kyseessä olisi "eskaloiva" toimenpide. Kehtaa kuitenkin kritisoida Ukrainaa öljynjalostamohyökkäyksistä... nallekarkit eivät nyt mene tasan.
Lisää jenkkien kaksoisstandardeista, yllättäen Israelin tukipakettia kiirehditäänkin nyt kongressin alahuoneessa. Toivoa sopii että se on edelleen se sama, mihin on liitetty Ukrainan rahoitus samaan pakettiin. Asiaa käsitellään jo ensi viikon aikana.
thehill.com
House changes schedule to consider Israel legislation next week
The House of Representatives will change its schedule to consider legislation to support Israel in light of Iran’s Saturday attack and to hold Tehran accountable, House Majority Leader Steve Scalis…
thehill.com
Kilroy
Kersantti
Lisää jenkkien kaksoisstandardeista, yllättäen Israelin tukipakettia kiirehditäänkin nyt kongressin alahuoneessa. Toivoa sopii että se on edelleen se sama, mihin on liitetty Ukrainan rahoitus samaan pakettiin. Asiaa käsitellään jo ensi viikon aikana.
House changes schedule to consider Israel legislation next week
The House of Representatives will change its schedule to consider legislation to support Israel in light of Iran’s Saturday attack and to hold Tehran accountable, House Majority Leader Steve Scalis…
Jenkeissä varsinkin reppulien puolella Israelin kannattajilla on niin paljon sanavaltaa että siinä jää magailijat paitsioon.. kunhan demokraatit pitävät huolta että Ukraina ja Israel ovat samassa paketissa niin menevät heittämällä läpi.
OXPAHA
Eversti
USAn ja Israelin suhde vs USAn ja Ukrainan suhde on aivan erilainen. USA on Israelin golem, Ukraina ei edes USAn Mini-Me. Tai jos Mad Max III on tuttu, USA on Blaster ja Israel Master.
Ikävä totuus on että hädänalainen Ukraina on pelkkä pelinappula. Vaikea hyväksyä, mutta USAn luonne on aika erilainen kuin me toivoisimme. Pitää vain uskoa ja toivoa että hallinnon väristä huolimatta maan todellinen hallinto haluaa pitää kiinni geopoliittisesta hegemoniastaan. Itse kyllä uskon että pitää. Pelin vuoksi se vain maksaa enemmän ja enemmän ukrinalaisia henkiä.
Ikävä totuus on että hädänalainen Ukraina on pelkkä pelinappula. Vaikea hyväksyä, mutta USAn luonne on aika erilainen kuin me toivoisimme. Pitää vain uskoa ja toivoa että hallinnon väristä huolimatta maan todellinen hallinto haluaa pitää kiinni geopoliittisesta hegemoniastaan. Itse kyllä uskon että pitää. Pelin vuoksi se vain maksaa enemmän ja enemmän ukrinalaisia henkiä.
ido59
Majuri
Ukrainan ilmavoimalla on yhä kyky, vaikka F-16 odotellaankin. Eilen tehneet onnistuneen iskun ilmasta ryssän ryhmitys- ja komentopaikkaan Luhanskissa. lähde
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ryssä on antanut tavoitteen, että Chasiv Yar pitäisi saada ennen ryssälän voitonta päivää 9. toukokuuta. lähde
On 13 April, two explosions were heard in the Russian-occupied city of Luhansk, with photos and videos of smoke over the city emerging online.
"Having held the pause [needed to keep relevant information from the Russians – ed], I would like to thank the pilots of the Air Force for a successful, and most importantly, an effective strike on an enemy facility in Luhansk Oblast on 13 April 2024.
The Ukrainian pilots did an excellent job and returned to base.
There will be more such strikes on the enemy's rear when Ukraine receives more missiles from our Western partners."
- Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk, Commander of Ukraine’s Air Force
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ryssä on antanut tavoitteen, että Chasiv Yar pitäisi saada ennen ryssälän voitonta päivää 9. toukokuuta. lähde
ido59
Majuri
Hämmentäviä uutisia Ranskasta:
kyselytutkimuksen mukaan puolet Ranskan 18-25v nuorisosta olisi valmis sotimaan Ukrainassa.
"Jos Ranskan puolustus on välttämätön sodassa Ukrainassa, olisitko halukas liittymään?"
51% vastasi myöntävästi: 17% vahvan myöntävästi ja 34% todennäköisesti.
31% kannattaa rankalaisjoukkoja Ukrainaan.
edit: Tutkimuksen kyselyt on tehty jo ennen Macronin väläyttämää mahdollisuutta rankalaisjoukoista. Liekö paikallinen mielipideilmasto ollut Macronin tiedossa ja selkänojana.
kyselytutkimuksen mukaan puolet Ranskan 18-25v nuorisosta olisi valmis sotimaan Ukrainassa.
"Jos Ranskan puolustus on välttämätön sodassa Ukrainassa, olisitko halukas liittymään?"
51% vastasi myöntävästi: 17% vahvan myöntävästi ja 34% todennäköisesti.
31% kannattaa rankalaisjoukkoja Ukrainaan.
edit: Tutkimuksen kyselyt on tehty jo ennen Macronin väläyttämää mahdollisuutta rankalaisjoukoista. Liekö paikallinen mielipideilmasto ollut Macronin tiedossa ja selkänojana.
Half of the French youth would be willing to enlist in the military and fight on the territory of Ukraine if it were necessary to defend France's interests.
Source: Le Parisien, citing the results of a study conducted by the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM) and the Directorate-General for International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS), as reported by European Pravda
IRSEM and DGRIS are entities within the French Defence Ministry structure. The study’s results were published on 12 April, and the data was collected many months before.
The research was led by Anne Muxel who analysed a series of surveys, including a questionnaire conducted by Ipsos among 2,300 French people aged 18-25 in the summer of 2023.
Among the questions was: "If France's defence required its participation in the war in Ukraine, would you be willing to join to defend your country?" 51% of respondents, including both boys and girls, answered affirmatively, with 17% giving a very confident response and 34% answering "probably yes".
In a question not mentioning Ukraine, 57% of respondents expressed readiness to take up arms to defend France in the event of war.
About a third of respondents, 31%, are supportive of potential French military involvement in the war on Ukraine's side, whereas this figure is 17% among the 50+ age group.
62% of respondents believe it would be appropriate to reinstate compulsory military service, which France abolished in 1997.
French media note that data collection took place long before President Emmanuel Macron publicly stated that he does not rule out involving Western allies in Ukraine, sparking heated discussions and public objections from most European capitals.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Venom_Snake
Kersantti
Siinä on kyllä varmaankin aika tekemätön paikka saada näitä taistelukuntoon.
Rantojen mies
Kenraali
Onhan tämä tilanne ihan perseestä ja perverssi. Kansalaiset lännessä yrittää pitää lahjoituksin rintamaa pystyssä, kun vallanpitäjät kaivaa nenää ja myötäilee ryssää.
-TripleX-
Ylipäällikkö
Aika kyseenalainen on tuo BTR-82:n antama suoja. Tiedä kumpi on parempi, Desert Cross vai tuo. Kumpikin muistuttaa laajennettua itsemurhaa.
Ryssien vastatykistötutka ottaa osumaa. Näyttää minusta, että tykin ammuksia satelee harvakseen ympäristöön. Maa on jo todella vihreä huhtikuussa.
Ryssien vastatykistötutka ottaa osumaa. Näyttää minusta, että tykin ammuksia satelee harvakseen ympäristöön. Maa on jo todella vihreä huhtikuussa.
Viimeksi muokattu:
WardLittell
Kapteeni
Kommentti: Iran ja Venäjä ovat samaa pahan akselia – joko Yhdysvaltain maga-republikaanitkin tajuaisivat sen?
Tuki Israelille ja Ukrainalle voitaisiin hyväksyä käytännössä maanantaina, kirjoittaa Ilta-Sanomien ulkomaanuutisten tuottaja Jari Alenius.
www.is.fi
Jokohan alkaa mennä jakeluun Magarepu tampioille, että samaa akselia ovat
. Nyt jumaliste päätöksiä ja nopeasti, historia ei tule antamaan anteeksi, jos taas tämäkin sössitään!OstarinSpaceman
Alokas
Hmm... tätä sivua ei ole olemassa. Kokeile muulla haulla.
StepanRudanskij
Respected Leader
Nämä "raa'at" filminpätkät lähtee aika helposti ja nopeesti X:stä sensuurin karvaisiin kouriin.
missileman
Kenraali
Aika nuivaahan se Israelin apu Ukrainalle on ollut. Ymmärtää kyllä, heidän tilanteen, mutta kuitenkin kyse on siitä että ei ole haluttu mennä osapuoleksi venäjää vastaan. Iso venäläisvähemmistö varmaan osasyynä
Antares
Respected Leader
Ukrainalainen OSINT-ryhmä vishun_military on julkaissut tuoreen katsauksen ryssän varastotukikohtien ja armored repair plant pajojen (BTRZ) tilanteesta.
https://t.me/vishun_military/4038
Telegram-linkin takaa löytyy suora linkki pidempään artikkeliin (artikkeli julkaistu 11.4.2024) - artikkeli on pitkä ja suosittelen lukemaan sen mutta en lainaa sitä kokonaisuudessaan spoilerin taakse vaan jätän pois sotaa edeltävien numeroiden lähteiden selityksen sekä varastotukikohtien ja BTRZ-pajojen tarkemmat tarkastelut ja uusien kuvien vertailun vanhojen kanssa - ne ovat mielenkiintoisia mutta sama data on nähtävissä lainaamistani taulukoista (lihavoinnit alkuperäisen artikkelin ja tämä on konekäännös englanniksi):
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Tiedoksi myös että vishun_military on jakanut (ainakin osan) hankkimistaan tuoreemmista satelliittikuvista Jompy-nimisen twitter-tilin kanssa. Hän on laskenut yhdessä high_marsed ja CovertCabal -nimisten twitter-tilien kanssa ryssän varastotukikohtien ajoneuvojen määriä jo pidemmän aikaa.
Jompy kommentoikin että hän tulee julkaisemaan oman analyysinsä saamiensa kuvien perusteella eli pyrkii laskemaan niissä näkyvät ajoneuvot sekä tunnistamaan ne: LÄHDE
As for future content, I have already counted Vishun's footage of the 22nd, 111th and 1295th with their consent, although it's not clear if I'll have access to footage of other bases they bought. If that's not the case, I have a short thread explaining some things about storage bases in the works. And after that... well, not sure, I'm waiting to get the greenlight to post the updated AFV numbers.
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Tässä myös toinen vishun_military OSINT-ryhmän tuore julkaisu (julkaistu 14.4.2024):
https://t.me/vishun_military/4039
Analysis of the tank grouping of the Russian Armed Forces.
In this small article, we decided to make assumptions about the composition of the tank troops of the Russian army (in regular formations) based on the data on destroyed tanks from warsposting.
According to our calculations, the tanks in service with units of the Russian army (excluding BZVT) can be distributed as follows:
– 76% T-72/T-80 (+-2)
– 10% T-90 (+- 2%)
– 5% T -64 (+-2%)
– 9% T-62 (+-2%)
More detailed analysis here:
https://www.vishchun.com/post/sklad_tankovykh_viisk_zs_rf
t.me/vishun_military/4039
2.6Kviewsedited
Apr 14 at 09:44
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MUOKKAUS: jos lukee spoilerin taakse lainaamastani vishun_military artikkelista varastotukikohtien panssarivaunujen määrät (taulukko) niin kyseisestä määrästä tunnistettujen vaunujen määrät olivat:
650 kpl T-80UD (ei ole selvää, onko jokin osa tästä määrästä T-80U vaunuja)
120 kpl T-80BV
850 kpl T-72 perheen vaunuja
740 kpl T-62/T-55 perheiden vaunuja
Näiden summa on 2 360 kpl kun varastotukikohtien "käyttökelpoiseksi arvioitujen" panssarivaunujen määrä on 3 150 kpl.
ELI olisivat kyenneet tunnistamaan noin 75% käyttökelpoiseksi arvioimistaan varastotukikohdissa olevista panssarivaunuista.
JOS heidän tunnistuksensa on oikein, iso kysymysmerkki ovat T-80UD vaunut ja niiden aktivointi, koska ryssällä ei ole tietysti kykyä valmistaa niiden moottoreita (eikä ole koskaan ollutkaan koska nämä on valmistettu Kharkovan tehtaalla Ukrainassa). Toki vaunun alkuperäinen moottori voi olla vaihdettavissa T-72 vaunun diesel-moottoriin tai T-80 perheen vaunujen kaasuturbiinimoottoriin, mutta tämä lienee helpommin sanottu kuin tehty.
Jokunen kuukausi sitten nähtiin videokuvaa T-80UD panssarivaunuista junan kyydissä Venäjällä, joten kenties heillä on jonkinlainen suunnitelma näiden käytölle, mutta suuri määrä näitä vaunuja varastotukikohdissa kertoo myös siitä että näitä ei ole aktivoitu toistaiseksi (syystä tai toisesta). JOS ne olisivat olleet helposti aktivoitavissa, ryssä olisi varmasti ottanut ne käyttöön jo sodan kahden ensimmäisen vuoden aikana.
JOS oletetaan että näitä vaunuja ei kyettäisi aktivoimaan, silloin "käyttökelpoiseksi arvioitujen" panssarivaunujen määrä onkin 2 500 kpl ja tästä määrästä:
120 kpl T-80BV
850 kpl T-72 perheen vaunuja
740 kpl T-62/T-55 perheiden vaunuja
Näiden summa on 1 710 kpl.
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MUOKKAUS: olen pohdiskellut toisessa ketjussa T-80UD vaunujen valmistusmäärää (LINKKI) ja yhden lähteen mukaan Kharkovan tehdas olisi valmistanut 715 kpl T-80UD panssarivaunuja aikavälillä 1985-1992.
Mikhail Zhirokhovin mukaan Ukrainalle jäi Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen 248 kpl T-80 perheen vaunuja joista 60 kpl oli T-80UD.
Ilmeisesti tästä määrästä 35 kpl myytiin Pakistanille (muutostöiden jälkeen) ja niiden lisäksi Ukraina valmisti 285 kpl T-80UD vaunuja uustuotantona 1990-lopulla ja 2000-luvun alussa (kokonaismäärä 320 kpl oli toimitettu vuonna 2002).
ELI täten ryssälle jäi 655 kpl T-80UD panssarivaunuja, olettaen tietysti että muille Neuvostoliitosta irtaantuneille maille ei jäänyt yhtäkään (en nyt äkkiseltään muista, olisiko jäänyt ja vaikka olisikin, olisivatko ne päätyneet myöhemmin Venäjälle).
Joka tapauksessa vishun_military arvioima määrä täsmää sen kanssa mikä määrä T-80UD vaunuja ryssällä pitäisi olla - tosin olisin olettanut että osa niistä olisi romutettu jo aikaa sitten. Kenties vishun_military numero sisältää myös pienemmän määrän ryssän aktiivijoukkojen käytöstä poistuneita T-80U vaunuja?
Tämä määrä voisi olla noin 190 kpl, koska heille jäi T-80U vaunuja "noin 400 kpl" Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen ja 1990-luvulla sekä 2000-luvun alussa tapahtuneiden muutaman T-80U vientikauppojen jälkeen. Ryssän aktiivijoukoilla puolestaan oli 188 kpl T-80U ja T-80UE-1 vaunuja ennen Ukrainaan hyökkäämistä eli suunnilleen vastaava määrä oli varastotukikohdissa odottamassa peruskorjausta / romutusta - olettaen tietysti ettei osaa näistä vaunuista oltu romutettu jo aikaisemmin.
Täten JOS vishun_military tunnistuksessa olisi kyse T-80UD / T-80U vaunuista JA jos ryssällä olisi tuollainen 190 kpl T-80U vaunuja varastotukikohdissa, niin silloin T-80UD varastovaunujen määräksi saadaan 650 - 190 = 460 kpl.
https://t.me/vishun_military/4038
Do you want to know how many and which tanks are left in Russia as of the first quarter of 2024? What is the recovery and production potential of enemy tanks? What are our prospects?
To answer these questions, Resurgam, the Military Seer, and Mortis Aeterna have created a joint research collaboration. We acquired the latest satellite imagery that was available, did the math, processed the research of others, and created our own collective conclusions.
If you liked the results of our cooperation, be sure to write about it in the comments so that we know the need.
You can get acquainted with the full results of the study on the website https://vishchun.com/post/pidrakhunok_ta_analiz_tankovoho_potentsialu_moskovii_na_pochatku_2024
A version is also available at the Printing House https://drukarnia.com.ua/articles/pidrakhunok-ta-analiz-tankovogo-potentialu-moskoviyi-na-pochatku-2024-r-kTiKd
Summary (very short, the main text reveals more questions)
Our calculation showed that within 5-7 months, the central bases of the tank reserve were emptied by almost 400 units. tanks
The average rate of depletion of bases is 44-75 units. month. This rate makes it possible to cover current losses, but its stability throughout 2023 and early 2024 (and other factors, which are detailed in the text) indicates that the "ceiling of scaling" of production/modernization/recovery of tanks has been reached.
The rate of deconservation has slightly decreased compared to 2022/23, but our observations indicate that the reason is primarily a decrease in the quality of equipment being deconserved, which forces tank repair plants to spend more time and resources per unit of equipment.
An analysis of the main armored factories showed a large overcrowding of sites, which indicates the overload of these factories (and not only).
In the studied area, we covered up to 95% of the main places where "enemy tank reserves" could be stored. Our calculation showed that 3,150 tanks at the central bases of the tank reserve and 1,300-1,500 tanks at the waiting areas and near the workshops of the main armored repair plants remain suitable for deconservation/restoration.
Our calculation was as conservative as possible and we covered everything that could even "hypothetically" be recovered. But the technical condition of the 3,150 units that remain at the bases is very different and often very questionable. Tanks from the 1311 base remain the most suitable for restoration.
This amount of the enemy should be enough to support the restoration of tanks without interruption until the beginning of 2026.
Against the background of other information, we singled out three main scenarios of depletion of the enemy's tank reserves
• "optimistic" — 12-18 months;
• "moderate" — 18-24 months
• "pessimistic" — more than 24 months.
t.me/vishun_military/4038
8.3Kviewsedited
Apr 11 at 19:02
To answer these questions, Resurgam, the Military Seer, and Mortis Aeterna have created a joint research collaboration. We acquired the latest satellite imagery that was available, did the math, processed the research of others, and created our own collective conclusions.If you liked the results of our cooperation, be sure to write about it in the comments so that we know the need.
You can get acquainted with the full results of the study on the website
https://vishchun.com/post/pidrakhunok_ta_analiz_tankovoho_potentsialu_moskovii_na_pochatku_2024A version is also available at the Printing House
https://drukarnia.com.ua/articles/pidrakhunok-ta-analiz-tankovogo-potentialu-moskoviyi-na-pochatku-2024-r-kTiKdSummary (very short, the main text reveals more questions)
Our calculation showed that within 5-7 months, the central bases of the tank reserve were emptied by almost 400 units. tanks The average rate of depletion of bases is 44-75 units. month. This rate makes it possible to cover current losses, but its stability throughout 2023 and early 2024 (and other factors, which are detailed in the text) indicates that the "ceiling of scaling" of production/modernization/recovery of tanks has been reached. The rate of deconservation has slightly decreased compared to 2022/23, but our observations indicate that the reason is primarily a decrease in the quality of equipment being deconserved, which forces tank repair plants to spend more time and resources per unit of equipment. An analysis of the main armored factories showed a large overcrowding of sites, which indicates the overload of these factories (and not only). In the studied area, we covered up to 95% of the main places where "enemy tank reserves" could be stored. Our calculation showed that 3,150 tanks at the central bases of the tank reserve and 1,300-1,500 tanks at the waiting areas and near the workshops of the main armored repair plants remain suitable for deconservation/restoration.Our calculation was as conservative as possible and we covered everything that could even "hypothetically" be recovered. But the technical condition of the 3,150 units that remain at the bases is very different and often very questionable. Tanks from the 1311 base remain the most suitable for restoration.
This amount of the enemy should be enough to support the restoration of tanks without interruption until the beginning of 2026.Against the background of other information, we singled out three main scenarios of depletion of the enemy's tank reserves
• "optimistic" — 12-18 months;
• "moderate" — 18-24 months
• "pessimistic" — more than 24 months.
t.me/vishun_military/4038
8.3Kviewsedited
Apr 11 at 19:02
Telegram-linkin takaa löytyy suora linkki pidempään artikkeliin (artikkeli julkaistu 11.4.2024) - artikkeli on pitkä ja suosittelen lukemaan sen mutta en lainaa sitä kokonaisuudessaan spoilerin taakse vaan jätän pois sotaa edeltävien numeroiden lähteiden selityksen sekä varastotukikohtien ja BTRZ-pajojen tarkemmat tarkastelut ja uusien kuvien vertailun vanhojen kanssa - ne ovat mielenkiintoisia mutta sama data on nähtävissä lainaamistani taulukoista (lihavoinnit alkuperäisen artikkelin ja tämä on konekäännös englanniksi):
1. Summarized conclusions (brief content)
The study was prepared and implemented by the collaboration of the platforms Resurgam , Military Fortune Teller and Mortis Aeterna .
Our calculation showed that within 5-7 months, the central bases of the tank reserve were emptied by almost 400 tanks.
The average rate of depletion of bases is up to 70 units per month. This rate makes it possible to cover current losses, but its stability throughout 2023 and early 2024 (and other factors, which are detailed in the text) indicates that the "ceiling of scaling" of production/modernization/recovery of tanks has been reached.
An analysis of the main armored factories showed a large overcrowding of sites, which indicates the overload of these factories, and not only that.
In the studied area, we covered up to 95% of the main places where "enemy tank reserves" could be stored. Our calculation showed that 3,150 tanks at the central bases of the tank reserve and 1,300-1,500 tanks at the waiting areas and near the workshops of the main armored repair plants remain suitable for deconservation/restoration.
This amount of the enemy should be enough to support the restoration of tanks without interruption until the beginning of 2026.
Against the background of other information, we singled out three main scenarios for the depletion of the enemy's tank reserves: "optimistic" - 12-18 months; "moderate" - 18-24 months and "pessimistic" - more than 24 months.
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2.2 Counting the number of tanks at the central bases of the tank reserve
Tanks without turrets and tanks in disposal areas, which are almost completely disassembled for spare parts and are not even eligible as "donors" for spare parts, were not taken into account at the storage bases. Our conservative calculation gave the following results, which we summarized in a comparison table
Bases without recent images are marked with asterisks *.
Due to possible errors, the number of "good" tanks at these bases may fluctuate around 3050-3250 units.
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2.3 Counting of tanks at the waiting areas of the main armored tank repair plants
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2.4 Conclusion from the calculation of CBRT and BTRZ
In total, there are 3,050-3,250 "good tanks" at the bases (although the issue of their quality is also debatable, but we remind you that our calculation is as conservative as possible towards the "worst" option for us) + 1,300-1,500 tanks are waiting at factories for restoration/modernization or use in as a spare parts donor. These tanks are in very different conditions, but we took them into account.
So, counting almost all the main places (up to 95%) of the potential concentration of the enemy's tank reserve, it is possible to call a figure of 4300-4750 tanks that can potentially be restored or used as donors. At other small bases, there are almost no tanks left, or they are counted in units.
In general, the resource of 4300-4650 tanks with the current rate of losses is enough for Moscow to provide uninterrupted repair and recovery of losses for 2-2.5 years. Potentially by early 2026.
Another question is that we say 2-2.5 years with the condition of using reserves at 0, but the key is the "recovery pace" because for a long time the main tank repair plants have huge queues due to the inability to quickly restore the tanks placed for restoration. Each subsequent time, the de-conserved tanks will leave in a worse condition, which will require more time and components to restore them.
Therefore, the production capacity of armored tank repair plants will determine the pace of tank recovery and production, and, therefore, its depletion.
What we will talk about in the next chapter.
3. The main questions to which we were looking for answers
3.1 What do Western analysts say about Moscow's recovery/production of tanks?
The biggest problem in the context of Western analyst estimates of tank recovery/production rates is that they do not articulate the difference, so most claim that Russia is "producing" 100 tanks per month, which is not true.
According to Andrii Tarasenko, Moscow is able to "produce from scratch" approximately 60 T-90M tanks per year. For example, as of September 2023, UVZ was working on the production of the 192nd tank out of the 270 units ordered under the contract in the period 2017-2021.
To the credit of the Ministry of Defense of Great Britain, in its updates, mentioning the figure of "100 tanks per month", the Ministry of Defense uses the verb "generate", i.e. "generates" - in this way, both produced, modernized and decommissioned tanks are taken into account defects, but did not undergo modernization before being sent to the front.
Pavel Luzin can be considered a "conditionally Western" analyst, since he works at the Western think-tank The Jamestown Foundation. So he estimated the "production" (that is, "from scratch" and deep modernization) of tanks in Moscow at a maximum of 200 units per year (15-20 per month "from scratch").
Our research has revealed that the rate of de-conservation of tanks is approximately 77 units per month over the past 5 months. Maybe a little more, a little less depending on the month and the exact date of the picture. If we add 15-20 produced from scratch to the 77 de-canned tanks, then we arrive at an approximate rate of 100 tanks per month, as stated by Western intelligence and researchers. Only the share of truly new (produced) is only 1/5 - everything else is reserves from storage bases, which also have their limits.
3.2 What is the potential of this recovery/production? What is the ceiling of this recovery and what factors (production, human, technological) does this recovery rely on?
Taking into account long-term observations, assessment of rates, analysis of not one, not two, and even not three studies, we come to the conclusion that the potential for increasing the production of new tanks has already reached its scaling peak, even despite the available financial resources for this scaling.
For example, in 2021, according to Andrii Tarasenko's calculations, Moscow managed to produce 80 T-90M tanks - this is taking into account the available warehouse stocks of components, which were partly exported and which were purchased under three-year programs. Therefore, now (relatively speaking) the main Western components were purchased not as part of "parallel imports", but were already available thanks to the corresponding stock of components, which was created for 2022-2024/25 under contracts even before February 24. Now this stock is being actively depleted due to the need to massively modernize and raise tanks from storage bases. As these reserves are exhausted, the key issue will not be the circumvention of sanctions, but the time required to ensure this circumvention and the expenditure of additional financial resources to ensure this circumvention.
Despite the increase in the production of machine tools from 5458 units. in 2021 to 7,743 units. for January-September 2023 and transfer of production to 3-4 variable forms, we are skeptical about the further scaling of the potential of modernization of equipment. Collectively, we come to the conclusion that, as of now, Muscovy has probably reached the "production ceiling".
The "production ceiling" rests on a number of factors:
And here it is worth mentioning once again one already mentioned detail, that our calculation recorded the approximate rate of depletion of storage bases at 77 tanks per month (average value). This roughly correlates with what the Covert Cabal tracked in their research throughout 2023. That is, approximately the same pace is maintained at the beginning of 2024. It can be assumed that where Moscow scales the production/restoration of tanks there is a "negative compensation" with the need to restore tanks from storage bases that are already in a worse condition. Therefore, the number remains plus or minus in one corridor.
3.3 Has the pace of production expansion/restoration reached its ceiling in Moscow?
Let's detail the answer again, in our collective opinion, the pace of production/decommissioning and restoration of tanks has reached its ceiling and will continue to decline, since the Russians have already mostly deconserved tanks in the "best" condition. In principle, tanks of even 4-5 categories that can be classified as "scrap" are subject to restoration and potential modernization - it's only a matter of time and capabilities, which depend on a large number of factors, including the availability of components and the real possibility of their production.
Our estimates, in principle, even do not contradict the data of the Muscovites themselves about 1,200-1,500 "manufactured" tanks for 2023, only if we consider that "manufactured" includes: both newly manufactured, and de-conserved, and modernized, and those already visited the battlefield, suffered damage there and were repaired in one of the factories - or even in field workshops.
3.4 Why is the key thing now not how many tanks are still on the bases, but how quickly the Moscow Military Industry is able to raise them? Is it so?
In fact, the key question is whether the Muscovites will receive armored vehicles from their allies, primarily the DPRK and Iran, as well as the PRC (which is less likely, but such a prospect cannot be dismissed). If we put this question in parentheses, then what is important is not so much the rate of recovery of tanks per se, but the comparison of the rate of recovery with the current losses at the front. For example, the Australian YouTuber Perun once published a video, the text translation of which can be viewed at the link , in which he noted that under the best possible conditions, quote: " If you can't recover losses quickly enough - under such a scenario, the army can hypothetically fight until the difference between losses and the combination of production and recovery will not be sufficient to dilute the active combat power of the army and render it incapacitated .
If the Russians produce new equipment at a rate that will exceed the rate of losses - for example, under conditions of an armistice or freezing of the conflict, or simply an insufficient number of weapons in the Armed Forces - then the Moscow army will actually be able to update and modernize online. But this is in the case of an adequate assessment of one's own capabilities by the enemy's military leadership.
Although recent months and attempts at "banzai attacks" gave Moscow certain territorial gains, they were incomparable with the losses for the sake of these gains. Such "zeal" can be explained by "political motives": to achieve a result before the elections, then to make the most of the exhaustion of the Armed Forces against the background of the Americans' partner negligence, to achieve as many territorial gains as possible with the conviction that Moscow will be able to freeze the conflict from the US elections.
4. Scenarios of depletion of enemy tank reserves
Based on the collected information, we can build basic scenarios for the depletion of Moscow.
Optimistic (12-18 months). Depletion of tank reserves by increasing the intensity of battles.
Visually confirmed losses of enemy tanks in 2023 amount to 866 units. These are visually confirmed, let's add at least 30% (most conservatively) that were not recorded on the open Internet and we will get 1125 tanks were lost during 2023. That is, the average loss rate is 93 units. month. That is, now the production/restoration of tanks from scratch covers this need with its 100 units. per month, which was discussed earlier. As of now, the actual number of tanks involved in Ukraine is from 2,200 to 2,500 units. That is, in order for the rate of losses to reduce the available combat capability, it is necessary that the monthly losses of the enemy in tanks are at the level of 160-170 units. Then the balance between losses and production for 12-18 months will lead to a critical loss of combat capability of the units, because according to the roster there should be 4,300 tanks, but in fact there will be only ¼ of them.
Moderate (18-24 months). Depletion of the main reserves of tanks at storage bases. The intensity is maintained, Muscovy is able to restore its own losses by attracting reserves from storage bases, restoration, cannibalism. As it was stated, at this rate (actually as it is now), provided there is no external aid (in the form of the transfer of tanks and spare parts for them), Moscow can hold out until the beginning of 2026. After that, it will be able to replenish the losses only through real production "from scratch", which satisfies only 1/5 of the actual needs of the front.
Pessimistic (over 26 months). Muscovy will begin receiving direct deliveries of heavy weapons in the form of tanks from Iran, the DPRK, and possibly China. This option requires separate consideration, as it includes a whole set of factors: from the political readiness of these countries to the actual number of combat-ready tanks and their types.
As of now, in the contexts in which we are now, we are inclined to the "moderate" option, which states that by the beginning of 2026, Moscow will be able to maintain the necessary level of combat capability of its tank units.
The study was prepared and implemented by the collaboration of the platforms Resurgam , Military Fortune Teller and Mortis Aeterna .
Our calculation showed that within 5-7 months, the central bases of the tank reserve were emptied by almost 400 tanks.
The average rate of depletion of bases is up to 70 units per month. This rate makes it possible to cover current losses, but its stability throughout 2023 and early 2024 (and other factors, which are detailed in the text) indicates that the "ceiling of scaling" of production/modernization/recovery of tanks has been reached.
An analysis of the main armored factories showed a large overcrowding of sites, which indicates the overload of these factories, and not only that.
In the studied area, we covered up to 95% of the main places where "enemy tank reserves" could be stored. Our calculation showed that 3,150 tanks at the central bases of the tank reserve and 1,300-1,500 tanks at the waiting areas and near the workshops of the main armored repair plants remain suitable for deconservation/restoration.
This amount of the enemy should be enough to support the restoration of tanks without interruption until the beginning of 2026.
Against the background of other information, we singled out three main scenarios for the depletion of the enemy's tank reserves: "optimistic" - 12-18 months; "moderate" - 18-24 months and "pessimistic" - more than 24 months.
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2.2 Counting the number of tanks at the central bases of the tank reserve
Tanks without turrets and tanks in disposal areas, which are almost completely disassembled for spare parts and are not even eligible as "donors" for spare parts, were not taken into account at the storage bases. Our conservative calculation gave the following results, which we summarized in a comparison table
Bases without recent images are marked with asterisks *.
Due to possible errors, the number of "good" tanks at these bases may fluctuate around 3050-3250 units.
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2.3 Counting of tanks at the waiting areas of the main armored tank repair plants
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2.4 Conclusion from the calculation of CBRT and BTRZ
In total, there are 3,050-3,250 "good tanks" at the bases (although the issue of their quality is also debatable, but we remind you that our calculation is as conservative as possible towards the "worst" option for us) + 1,300-1,500 tanks are waiting at factories for restoration/modernization or use in as a spare parts donor. These tanks are in very different conditions, but we took them into account.
So, counting almost all the main places (up to 95%) of the potential concentration of the enemy's tank reserve, it is possible to call a figure of 4300-4750 tanks that can potentially be restored or used as donors. At other small bases, there are almost no tanks left, or they are counted in units.
In general, the resource of 4300-4650 tanks with the current rate of losses is enough for Moscow to provide uninterrupted repair and recovery of losses for 2-2.5 years. Potentially by early 2026.
Another question is that we say 2-2.5 years with the condition of using reserves at 0, but the key is the "recovery pace" because for a long time the main tank repair plants have huge queues due to the inability to quickly restore the tanks placed for restoration. Each subsequent time, the de-conserved tanks will leave in a worse condition, which will require more time and components to restore them.
Therefore, the production capacity of armored tank repair plants will determine the pace of tank recovery and production, and, therefore, its depletion.
What we will talk about in the next chapter.
3. The main questions to which we were looking for answers
3.1 What do Western analysts say about Moscow's recovery/production of tanks?
The biggest problem in the context of Western analyst estimates of tank recovery/production rates is that they do not articulate the difference, so most claim that Russia is "producing" 100 tanks per month, which is not true.
According to Andrii Tarasenko, Moscow is able to "produce from scratch" approximately 60 T-90M tanks per year. For example, as of September 2023, UVZ was working on the production of the 192nd tank out of the 270 units ordered under the contract in the period 2017-2021.
To the credit of the Ministry of Defense of Great Britain, in its updates, mentioning the figure of "100 tanks per month", the Ministry of Defense uses the verb "generate", i.e. "generates" - in this way, both produced, modernized and decommissioned tanks are taken into account defects, but did not undergo modernization before being sent to the front.
Pavel Luzin can be considered a "conditionally Western" analyst, since he works at the Western think-tank The Jamestown Foundation. So he estimated the "production" (that is, "from scratch" and deep modernization) of tanks in Moscow at a maximum of 200 units per year (15-20 per month "from scratch").
Our research has revealed that the rate of de-conservation of tanks is approximately 77 units per month over the past 5 months. Maybe a little more, a little less depending on the month and the exact date of the picture. If we add 15-20 produced from scratch to the 77 de-canned tanks, then we arrive at an approximate rate of 100 tanks per month, as stated by Western intelligence and researchers. Only the share of truly new (produced) is only 1/5 - everything else is reserves from storage bases, which also have their limits.
3.2 What is the potential of this recovery/production? What is the ceiling of this recovery and what factors (production, human, technological) does this recovery rely on?
Taking into account long-term observations, assessment of rates, analysis of not one, not two, and even not three studies, we come to the conclusion that the potential for increasing the production of new tanks has already reached its scaling peak, even despite the available financial resources for this scaling.
For example, in 2021, according to Andrii Tarasenko's calculations, Moscow managed to produce 80 T-90M tanks - this is taking into account the available warehouse stocks of components, which were partly exported and which were purchased under three-year programs. Therefore, now (relatively speaking) the main Western components were purchased not as part of "parallel imports", but were already available thanks to the corresponding stock of components, which was created for 2022-2024/25 under contracts even before February 24. Now this stock is being actively depleted due to the need to massively modernize and raise tanks from storage bases. As these reserves are exhausted, the key issue will not be the circumvention of sanctions, but the time required to ensure this circumvention and the expenditure of additional financial resources to ensure this circumvention.
Despite the increase in the production of machine tools from 5458 units. in 2021 to 7,743 units. for January-September 2023 and transfer of production to 3-4 variable forms, we are skeptical about the further scaling of the potential of modernization of equipment. Collectively, we come to the conclusion that, as of now, Muscovy has probably reached the "production ceiling".
The "production ceiling" rests on a number of factors:
- Employment in the military industry is no longer growing , although production is limited by a chronic shortage of workers.
- Due to the increased wear and tear of the equipment due to the increase - or, more precisely, the return of production rates to the indicator of 2015-2017.
- An increase in labor hours on the product due to a lack of Western components, spending more time on their import substitution or the use of parallel import methods to circumvent sanctions.
And here it is worth mentioning once again one already mentioned detail, that our calculation recorded the approximate rate of depletion of storage bases at 77 tanks per month (average value). This roughly correlates with what the Covert Cabal tracked in their research throughout 2023. That is, approximately the same pace is maintained at the beginning of 2024. It can be assumed that where Moscow scales the production/restoration of tanks there is a "negative compensation" with the need to restore tanks from storage bases that are already in a worse condition. Therefore, the number remains plus or minus in one corridor.
3.3 Has the pace of production expansion/restoration reached its ceiling in Moscow?
Let's detail the answer again, in our collective opinion, the pace of production/decommissioning and restoration of tanks has reached its ceiling and will continue to decline, since the Russians have already mostly deconserved tanks in the "best" condition. In principle, tanks of even 4-5 categories that can be classified as "scrap" are subject to restoration and potential modernization - it's only a matter of time and capabilities, which depend on a large number of factors, including the availability of components and the real possibility of their production.
Our estimates, in principle, even do not contradict the data of the Muscovites themselves about 1,200-1,500 "manufactured" tanks for 2023, only if we consider that "manufactured" includes: both newly manufactured, and de-conserved, and modernized, and those already visited the battlefield, suffered damage there and were repaired in one of the factories - or even in field workshops.
3.4 Why is the key thing now not how many tanks are still on the bases, but how quickly the Moscow Military Industry is able to raise them? Is it so?
In fact, the key question is whether the Muscovites will receive armored vehicles from their allies, primarily the DPRK and Iran, as well as the PRC (which is less likely, but such a prospect cannot be dismissed). If we put this question in parentheses, then what is important is not so much the rate of recovery of tanks per se, but the comparison of the rate of recovery with the current losses at the front. For example, the Australian YouTuber Perun once published a video, the text translation of which can be viewed at the link , in which he noted that under the best possible conditions, quote: " If you can't recover losses quickly enough - under such a scenario, the army can hypothetically fight until the difference between losses and the combination of production and recovery will not be sufficient to dilute the active combat power of the army and render it incapacitated .
If the Russians produce new equipment at a rate that will exceed the rate of losses - for example, under conditions of an armistice or freezing of the conflict, or simply an insufficient number of weapons in the Armed Forces - then the Moscow army will actually be able to update and modernize online. But this is in the case of an adequate assessment of one's own capabilities by the enemy's military leadership.
Although recent months and attempts at "banzai attacks" gave Moscow certain territorial gains, they were incomparable with the losses for the sake of these gains. Such "zeal" can be explained by "political motives": to achieve a result before the elections, then to make the most of the exhaustion of the Armed Forces against the background of the Americans' partner negligence, to achieve as many territorial gains as possible with the conviction that Moscow will be able to freeze the conflict from the US elections.
4. Scenarios of depletion of enemy tank reserves
Based on the collected information, we can build basic scenarios for the depletion of Moscow.
Optimistic (12-18 months). Depletion of tank reserves by increasing the intensity of battles.
Visually confirmed losses of enemy tanks in 2023 amount to 866 units. These are visually confirmed, let's add at least 30% (most conservatively) that were not recorded on the open Internet and we will get 1125 tanks were lost during 2023. That is, the average loss rate is 93 units. month. That is, now the production/restoration of tanks from scratch covers this need with its 100 units. per month, which was discussed earlier. As of now, the actual number of tanks involved in Ukraine is from 2,200 to 2,500 units. That is, in order for the rate of losses to reduce the available combat capability, it is necessary that the monthly losses of the enemy in tanks are at the level of 160-170 units. Then the balance between losses and production for 12-18 months will lead to a critical loss of combat capability of the units, because according to the roster there should be 4,300 tanks, but in fact there will be only ¼ of them.
Moderate (18-24 months). Depletion of the main reserves of tanks at storage bases. The intensity is maintained, Muscovy is able to restore its own losses by attracting reserves from storage bases, restoration, cannibalism. As it was stated, at this rate (actually as it is now), provided there is no external aid (in the form of the transfer of tanks and spare parts for them), Moscow can hold out until the beginning of 2026. After that, it will be able to replenish the losses only through real production "from scratch", which satisfies only 1/5 of the actual needs of the front.
Pessimistic (over 26 months). Muscovy will begin receiving direct deliveries of heavy weapons in the form of tanks from Iran, the DPRK, and possibly China. This option requires separate consideration, as it includes a whole set of factors: from the political readiness of these countries to the actual number of combat-ready tanks and their types.
As of now, in the contexts in which we are now, we are inclined to the "moderate" option, which states that by the beginning of 2026, Moscow will be able to maintain the necessary level of combat capability of its tank units.
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Tiedoksi myös että vishun_military on jakanut (ainakin osan) hankkimistaan tuoreemmista satelliittikuvista Jompy-nimisen twitter-tilin kanssa. Hän on laskenut yhdessä high_marsed ja CovertCabal -nimisten twitter-tilien kanssa ryssän varastotukikohtien ajoneuvojen määriä jo pidemmän aikaa.
Jompy kommentoikin että hän tulee julkaisemaan oman analyysinsä saamiensa kuvien perusteella eli pyrkii laskemaan niissä näkyvät ajoneuvot sekä tunnistamaan ne: LÄHDE
As for future content, I have already counted Vishun's footage of the 22nd, 111th and 1295th with their consent, although it's not clear if I'll have access to footage of other bases they bought. If that's not the case, I have a short thread explaining some things about storage bases in the works. And after that... well, not sure, I'm waiting to get the greenlight to post the updated AFV numbers.
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Tässä myös toinen vishun_military OSINT-ryhmän tuore julkaisu (julkaistu 14.4.2024):
https://t.me/vishun_military/4039
Analysis of the tank grouping of the Russian Armed Forces.
In this small article, we decided to make assumptions about the composition of the tank troops of the Russian army (in regular formations) based on the data on destroyed tanks from warsposting.
According to our calculations, the tanks in service with units of the Russian army (excluding BZVT) can be distributed as follows:
– 76% T-72/T-80 (+-2)
– 10% T-90 (+- 2%)
– 5% T -64 (+-2%)
– 9% T-62 (+-2%)
More detailed analysis here:
https://www.vishchun.com/post/sklad_tankovykh_viisk_zs_rf
t.me/vishun_military/4039
2.6Kviewsedited
Apr 14 at 09:44
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MUOKKAUS: jos lukee spoilerin taakse lainaamastani vishun_military artikkelista varastotukikohtien panssarivaunujen määrät (taulukko) niin kyseisestä määrästä tunnistettujen vaunujen määrät olivat:
650 kpl T-80UD (ei ole selvää, onko jokin osa tästä määrästä T-80U vaunuja)
120 kpl T-80BV
850 kpl T-72 perheen vaunuja
740 kpl T-62/T-55 perheiden vaunuja
Näiden summa on 2 360 kpl kun varastotukikohtien "käyttökelpoiseksi arvioitujen" panssarivaunujen määrä on 3 150 kpl.
ELI olisivat kyenneet tunnistamaan noin 75% käyttökelpoiseksi arvioimistaan varastotukikohdissa olevista panssarivaunuista.
JOS heidän tunnistuksensa on oikein, iso kysymysmerkki ovat T-80UD vaunut ja niiden aktivointi, koska ryssällä ei ole tietysti kykyä valmistaa niiden moottoreita (eikä ole koskaan ollutkaan koska nämä on valmistettu Kharkovan tehtaalla Ukrainassa). Toki vaunun alkuperäinen moottori voi olla vaihdettavissa T-72 vaunun diesel-moottoriin tai T-80 perheen vaunujen kaasuturbiinimoottoriin, mutta tämä lienee helpommin sanottu kuin tehty.
Jokunen kuukausi sitten nähtiin videokuvaa T-80UD panssarivaunuista junan kyydissä Venäjällä, joten kenties heillä on jonkinlainen suunnitelma näiden käytölle, mutta suuri määrä näitä vaunuja varastotukikohdissa kertoo myös siitä että näitä ei ole aktivoitu toistaiseksi (syystä tai toisesta). JOS ne olisivat olleet helposti aktivoitavissa, ryssä olisi varmasti ottanut ne käyttöön jo sodan kahden ensimmäisen vuoden aikana.
JOS oletetaan että näitä vaunuja ei kyettäisi aktivoimaan, silloin "käyttökelpoiseksi arvioitujen" panssarivaunujen määrä onkin 2 500 kpl ja tästä määrästä:
120 kpl T-80BV
850 kpl T-72 perheen vaunuja
740 kpl T-62/T-55 perheiden vaunuja
Näiden summa on 1 710 kpl.
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MUOKKAUS: olen pohdiskellut toisessa ketjussa T-80UD vaunujen valmistusmäärää (LINKKI) ja yhden lähteen mukaan Kharkovan tehdas olisi valmistanut 715 kpl T-80UD panssarivaunuja aikavälillä 1985-1992.
Mikhail Zhirokhovin mukaan Ukrainalle jäi Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen 248 kpl T-80 perheen vaunuja joista 60 kpl oli T-80UD.
Ilmeisesti tästä määrästä 35 kpl myytiin Pakistanille (muutostöiden jälkeen) ja niiden lisäksi Ukraina valmisti 285 kpl T-80UD vaunuja uustuotantona 1990-lopulla ja 2000-luvun alussa (kokonaismäärä 320 kpl oli toimitettu vuonna 2002).
ELI täten ryssälle jäi 655 kpl T-80UD panssarivaunuja, olettaen tietysti että muille Neuvostoliitosta irtaantuneille maille ei jäänyt yhtäkään (en nyt äkkiseltään muista, olisiko jäänyt ja vaikka olisikin, olisivatko ne päätyneet myöhemmin Venäjälle).
Joka tapauksessa vishun_military arvioima määrä täsmää sen kanssa mikä määrä T-80UD vaunuja ryssällä pitäisi olla - tosin olisin olettanut että osa niistä olisi romutettu jo aikaa sitten. Kenties vishun_military numero sisältää myös pienemmän määrän ryssän aktiivijoukkojen käytöstä poistuneita T-80U vaunuja?
Tämä määrä voisi olla noin 190 kpl, koska heille jäi T-80U vaunuja "noin 400 kpl" Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen ja 1990-luvulla sekä 2000-luvun alussa tapahtuneiden muutaman T-80U vientikauppojen jälkeen. Ryssän aktiivijoukoilla puolestaan oli 188 kpl T-80U ja T-80UE-1 vaunuja ennen Ukrainaan hyökkäämistä eli suunnilleen vastaava määrä oli varastotukikohdissa odottamassa peruskorjausta / romutusta - olettaen tietysti ettei osaa näistä vaunuista oltu romutettu jo aikaisemmin.
Täten JOS vishun_military tunnistuksessa olisi kyse T-80UD / T-80U vaunuista JA jos ryssällä olisi tuollainen 190 kpl T-80U vaunuja varastotukikohdissa, niin silloin T-80UD varastovaunujen määräksi saadaan 650 - 190 = 460 kpl.
Viimeksi muokattu: