Ryssät ovat ennenkin lähteneet vapaaehtoisesti kun sota on alkanut maistua tarpeeksi hapokkaalta. Eikä nytkään näytä siltä, että heillä olisi meno muuttumassa helpommaksi on sitten kyse rintamalla tapahtuvasta taistelusta, miehitettyjen alueiden kontrolloinnista tai esimerkiksi taloudesta, jonka pitäisi pyörittää sotakonetta. Afgaanien tappiot olivat moninkertaisia ryssiin verrattuna, mutta niin ne vain kairasivat häpeällisen tappion joka lopulta vauhditti NL hajoamistakin. Kotirintamalla kyettiin valehtelemaan muutama vuosi, mutta lopulta totuus valkenee tyhmimmän ryssän kallossakin, se on vain todella pitkä tie. Sen vuoksi nuo tuotantolinjojen lisäämiset, vaikka tulisivat vasta 2026-2027 ovat ensiarvoisen tärkeitä.
Causes of withdrawal
Some of the causes of the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan leading to the Afghanistan regime's eventual defeat include[206]
The Soviet Army of 1980 was trained and equipped for large scale, conventional warfare in Central Europe against a similar opponent, i.e., it used armored and motor-rifle formations. This was notably ineffective against small scale guerrilla groups using hit-and-run tactics in the rough terrain of Afghanistan. Also, the Soviet Army's large formations were not mobile enough to engage small groups of Mujahideen fighters that easily merged back into the terrain.[206] The set strategy also meant that troops were discouraged from "tactical initiative", essential in counter insurgency, because it "tended to upset operational timing".[207]
The Soviets used large-scale offensives against Mujahideen strongholds, such as in the Panjshir Valley, which temporarily cleared those sectors and killed many civilians in addition to enemy combatants. The biggest shortcoming here, though, was the fact that once the Soviets engaged the enemy with force, they failed to hold the ground, as they withdrew once their operation was completed. The killing of civilians further alienated the population from the Soviets, with bad long-term effects.[206]
The Soviets did not have enough men to fight a counter-insurgency war (COIN),[207] and their troops had low morale. The peak number of Soviet troops during the war was 115,000, but the bulk of these troops were conscripts, which led to poor combat performance in their Motor-Rifle Formations. However, the Soviets did have their elite infantry units, such as the famed Spetsnaz, the VDV, and their recon infantry. The problem with their elite units was not combat effectiveness, but that there were not enough of them and that they were employed incorrectly.[206]
Intelligence gathering, essential for successful COIN, was inadequate. The Soviets overly relied on less-than-accurate aerial recon and radio intercepts rather than their recon infantry and special forces. Although their special forces and recon infantry units performed very well in combat against the Mujahideen, they would have better served in intelligence gathering.[206]
The concept of a "war of national liberation" against a Soviet-sponsored "revolutionary" regime was so alien to the Soviet dogma that the leadership could not "come to grips" with it. This led to, among other things, a suppression by the Soviet media for several years of the truth about how bad the war was going, which caused a backlash when it was unable to hide it further.[207]
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