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Taas toisaalta Ukraina on oikeasti käyttänyt saamaansa kalustoa sekä omaa vanhaa kalustoaan erittäin säästeliäästi, edelleen on paljon T-64:ia liikkeellä ja jopa ne harvinaiset T-84 Oplotit, edelleen on kaikki HIMARSit ja M270 toiminnassa, edelleen on valtaosa lännen luovuttamista tykeistä toiminnassa ja niitä pyritään suojaamaan kaikin mahdollisin keinoin. Lentokoneita on pidetty ilmassa todella vaikeasta tilanteesta huolimatta. Ei kannata kirjoittajasta vetää johtopäätöksiä vaan katsoa mitä siellä on oikeasti tapahtunut ja millainen tulos saavutettu lahjoitetulla kalustolla.
Viesti ehkä enemmänkin on, että eivät tee huollon monimutkaisuudesta laajalla kalustokirjolla ongelmaa vaan sitä voi murehtia sodan päättymisen jälkeen. Prioriteetit on oikein, ensin pitää voittaa ryssät, sen jälkeen voi miettiä kalustokirjon haittapuolia.
Ennemminkin voisi todeta, että jos nykyisellä kalustolla olisi suunnattomia vaikeuksia huollon järjestämisessä niin ei ehkä olisi järkeä lisätä sinne sekaan laajaa kirjoa länsimaisia tankkeja sekä muuta liikkuvaa monimutkaista vehjettä, mutta kun sellaista ongelmaa ei ole ollut niin ei sitä keksimälläkään tule.
Tässäkin asiassa tulos puhuu puolestaan eikä kannata kirjoitteluille laittaa liikaa painoarvoa. Ryssät hylkäävät kalustoa joka on siinä kunnossa, että ei liiku ja ukrainalaiset palauttavat niitä toimintakuntoinen. Eihän sen näin pitäisi olla kun toinen on tankkien suurvalta. Tai kuvittelee olevansa.
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hyvis
Majuri
Maallikon silmiin näyttää puppugeneraattorin luomalta. Vaikkapa 33 mekanisoidun pataljoonien kaluson suhde näyttää omituiselta.Kohta lähtee
Muoks viserrys ei näy, entäpä kuva siinä / Thomas C Theiner
https://twitter.com/noclador
Tuntematonpotila$
Kersantti
tämä perustuu jenkkien vuodettuihin asiakirjoihin joten lieneekin aika lähellä totuutta.
Panssari Salama
Respected Leader
Tuo vitjan kirjoittajan kommenttihan kalustokirjosta liittyi myös hänen huomioonsa mm. Israelin käymistä kahdesta sodasta, jossa AIVAN KAIKKI kalusto valjastettiin rintamalle. Myöhemmin sitten standartoitiin mitä voitiin.
Antares
Respected Leader
Toinen improvisoitu miinojen raivain, tosin video ei kerro mitä tapahtuu kun miina löytyy. Oletan että "raivain" menee aika huonoon kuntoon, tosin pyöräkuormaaja säästynee. Jos toimii tosiaan kauko-ohjauksella, kuten twiitissä kirjoitetaan niin ainakin kuljettaja lienee turvassa.
Toki tarkoitukseen suunniteltu raivain on varmasti parempi, mutta jos sellaista ei löydy takataskusta niin tämä on varmasti parempi kuin ei mitään.
An impromptu remote-controlled demining vehicle with which Ukrainian farmers clear their land. Created on the basis of an old tractor.
I never cease to be amazed at the ingenuity of Ukrainians
Toki tarkoitukseen suunniteltu raivain on varmasti parempi, mutta jos sellaista ei löydy takataskusta niin tämä on varmasti parempi kuin ei mitään.
An impromptu remote-controlled demining vehicle with which Ukrainian farmers clear their land. Created on the basis of an old tractor.
I never cease to be amazed at the ingenuity of Ukrainians
Antares
Respected Leader
Yhdysvallat ei osta enempää Switchblade 300 droneja, mutta on tilannut raskaampia Switchblade 600 droneja Ukrainalle (verrattavissa Lancetiin). Switchblade 300 droneista on kirjoitettu sodan aikana että vastaisi teholtaan 40mm kranaattia, joten sirpalevaikutus ei yllä kovin kauas ja tehoaa tietysti vain panssaroimattomiin maaleihin. On myös kuulunut huhuja että eivät sietäisi kovin hyvin elektronista häirintää, mutta tälle ei tietysti ole varmaa vahvistusta. Kun muistetaan kaikki ne kranaatteja pudottavat dronet, joita Ukrainalla on käytössään, niin ehkä tämä ei tuonut merkittävää lisää - toisin kuin monikopteri, Switchblade 300 ei kykene "laskeutumaan" vaan se pitää "käyttää", kun se on ammuttu taivaalle.
Artikkelissa ei tarjota parempia perusteluita tälle muutokselle, ovat tilanneet Switchblade 300 yli kymmenen vuoden ajan. Arvauksia tietysti on, erikoisjoukot käyttivät näitä mm. Afganistanissa mutta se operaatio on takanapäin. Ehkä on ns. väärä työkalu Ukrainan käymään sotaan.
US stops buying Switchblade 300 Kamikaze Drones, but has ordered Switchblade 600s for Ukraine
Ukraine has received over 700 Switchblade 300s with a 10km range and grenade-sized warheads.
Switchblade 600s are a major improvement with a 50km range and Javelin-sized warheads
LÄHDE: https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/04/the-u-s-army-wont-buy-anymore-switchblade-300-kamikaze-drones/
Artikkelissa ei tarjota parempia perusteluita tälle muutokselle, ovat tilanneet Switchblade 300 yli kymmenen vuoden ajan. Arvauksia tietysti on, erikoisjoukot käyttivät näitä mm. Afganistanissa mutta se operaatio on takanapäin. Ehkä on ns. väärä työkalu Ukrainan käymään sotaan.
US stops buying Switchblade 300 Kamikaze Drones, but has ordered Switchblade 600s for Ukraine
Ukraine has received over 700 Switchblade 300s with a 10km range and grenade-sized warheads.
Switchblade 600s are a major improvement with a 50km range and Javelin-sized warheads
LÄHDE: https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/04/the-u-s-army-wont-buy-anymore-switchblade-300-kamikaze-drones/
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/04/the-u-s-army-wont-buy-anymore-switchblade-300-kamikaze-drones/
By David Hambling
Published 1 hour ago
Switchblade drone. Image Credit: Industry handout.
In a surprise move, the U.S. Army has decided not to buy more Switchblade 300 kamikaze drones.
Switchblade Drone. Image Credit: Industry Handout.
The DoD has supplied over 700 of the portable loitering munitions to Ukraine from existing stocks. This would normally lead to an increased annual purchase in this year’s Army budget for LMAMS (Lethal Miniature Aerial Missile System), which the Switchblade falls under, to make up for the munitions transferred shortfall.
Instead, the Army’s recent Missiles Procurement budget states that “LMAMS has no FY 2024 funding.”
The Army acquired 900 Switchblade 300s in the 2022 budget and 525 in 2023. They were bought at a similar rate in previous years – dating back to its introduction in 2012 – so the sudden end looks like a change.
The Switchblade 300 is supplied in a carrying tube that is also the launcher, weighing about five pounds.
It is launched by compressed gas, the wings unfold and an electric motor propels the drone at up to 100 mph, sending back video to the operator so targets can be identified.
The Switchblade 300 is essentially a long-range, silent, precise sniper rifle – with the ability to cancel the attack at the last second, when necessary, when the operator gets a close look at the target.
The Switchblade range is made by drone builders AeroVironment, Inc, with some of the technology from its highly successful hand-launched RQ-10 Raven tactical observation drones, which were a huge hit with the U.S. military in the early 2000s, giving squad commanders the ability to see over the next hill for the first time. The Raven soon became the most numerous drone in U.S. service, but several operators noted the frustration of being able to see insurgents planting bombs, setting up mortars, or even firing at U.S. forces without being able to do anything about it. Hence the development of a strike capability.
Initially used by Special Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Switchblade was reportedly highly successful at hitting fleeting high-value targets, a term usually applied to insurgent or terrorist leadership. It was nicknamed the ‘flying shotgun’ for the tight pattern of shrapnel produced by its grenade-sized warhead, which could destroy a pickup truck or engage a group of individuals in the open or the occupants of a single room.
Its precision and small warhead size, as well as wave-off capability, meant the Switchblade could be used when the rules of engagement prohibited Javelins or other weapons with greater potential for collateral damage.
However, virtually no details of Switchblade use in action have ever been released – until Ukraine. Strict operational security means that the weapon, while not actually classified, is cloaked in mystery.
We have more information and more videos of the Switchblade 300 in Ukraine, where the response has been lukewarm.
This is a different type of war, and the key targets are Russian tanks, air defenses, and artillery for which the anti-personnel Switchblade 300 is unsuited.
A larger version, the Switchblade 600, was promised to Ukraine last year and small numbers have reportedly arrived in the last few weeks. This version was launched as a private venture and has not yet been acquired by the U.S. military. The upsized loitering munition boasts longer range and a more powerful warhead capable of destroying armored vehicles.
But this may be the end of the line for the Switchblade 300. A U.S. Army spokesperson would not comment on whether the program was being terminated, telling us only that “The Lethal Miniature Aerial Missile System (LMAMS) has satisfied the Department of Defense fielding and replenishment requirements” and declined to make further comment.
The issue may be the cost of such munitions compared to commercial competition.
In the 2022 budget, the cost for a single all-up round – the airframe, sensors, integrated guidance, warhead, data link, and launcher – was $58,063. In the 2023 budget it was $52,914. There is a belief that this is the cost for 10 Switchblades; there is no foundation for this myth.
This cost does not include additional elements like the guidance unit, which comes in at around $30,000, or fielding costs, spares, support, training rounds and simulators. Divide the total cost of the program by the number of rounds and the figure may be more like $80k a shot.
Switchblade drone that is used by Ukraine’s forces against Russia. Image Credit: Industry handout.
These prices are not high by military standards – one Javelin round is $184,455 in the current budget – but they are off the scale for the commercial drone world. The cost of the Switchblade 600 is not known but it will be significantly higher than the 300.
Since July, Ukrainian forces have been adapting small quadcopter racing drones as weapons, fitting them with extra batteries and warheads. Though tiny, these improvised loitering munitions are able to carry anti-tank grenades or RPG warheads, and have racked up an impressive number of kills of Russian vehicles and positions. They are now being produced in increasing numbers. Known as FPV (First person View) kamikaze drones, they cost around $700 or less to produce – one Russian source estimated that the parts cost little more than $200. Fundraisers like NAFO and Serhii Sternenko have been able to supply hundreds and sales of special packs of Ukrainian rock salt have reportedly raised funds for more than 2,000 FPV kamikazes.
Some sources suggest that Ukraine is acquiring tens of thousands of FPV kamikaze drones. Russian forces have also started building their own FPV drones, but this appears to be on a smaller scale.
The rapid evolution of drone warfare has not gone unnoticed. In February 2022, the U.S. Army issued a notice requesting sources to supply Switchblade 300s, possibly indicating a desire to find something more economical.
Switchblade Drone. Image Credit: Manufacturer Handout.
In November 2022 the Army issued a Request for Information (RFI) on loitering munitions, referencing the conflict in Ukraine, which “has clearly demonstrated the ability of unmanned systems at increasingly lower echelons of employment” in particular “ to deliver lethal effects.” In other words, providing individual foot soldiers with lethal, long-range precision attack drones.
AeroVironment would not comment on the Army’s decision not to buy Switchblade 300s this year, but noted that it had responded to the RFI.
Historically, the military has always had new technology first, and many modern electronics including digital computers, microprocessors, and the Internet itself have roots in military programs.
However, the rapid rise of consumer electronics and, in particular, smartphones has eroded this supremacy. The big green boxes of military electronics have lost ground to slick, modern consumer tech.
Chinese company DJI launched DJI’s Phantom 1 quadcopter in 2013, initiating a drone revolution and starting a whole new industry. Volumes of millions of units means DJI can produce sophisticated, easy-to-use designs at low cost, evolving at the pace of consumer electronics with a new generation every year or two rather than the slower rate of military programs where generations typically take years. The result has been highly capable drones capable of military missions at meager cost.
Consumer technology cannot offer anything as sophisticated as the Switchblade with its terminal guidance software, thermal imaging, secure digital communications, and robust tube carrier/launcher. But the larger warhead and the power of sheer numbers are significant.
In the future, we may see a U.S. Army equipped with a mixture of types of drones, with high-end, high-tech loitering munitions like Switchblades for demanding missions, accompanied by a mass of low-cost kamikazes distributed by the thousand and allowing every squad to engage targets out of sight from miles away.
The technology is there, but avoiding the exponential cost growth endemic to military programs may be the biggest challenge.
The U.S. Army Won’t Buy Anymore Switchblade 300 Kamikaze Drones
A U.S. Army spokesperson would not comment on whether the program was being terminated, telling us only that “The Lethal Miniature Aerial Missile System (LMAMS) has satisfied the Department of Defense fielding and replenishment requirements” and declined to make further comment.
By David Hambling
Published 1 hour ago
Switchblade drone. Image Credit: Industry handout.
In a surprise move, the U.S. Army has decided not to buy more Switchblade 300 kamikaze drones.
Switchblade Drone. Image Credit: Industry Handout.
The DoD has supplied over 700 of the portable loitering munitions to Ukraine from existing stocks. This would normally lead to an increased annual purchase in this year’s Army budget for LMAMS (Lethal Miniature Aerial Missile System), which the Switchblade falls under, to make up for the munitions transferred shortfall.
Instead, the Army’s recent Missiles Procurement budget states that “LMAMS has no FY 2024 funding.”
The Army acquired 900 Switchblade 300s in the 2022 budget and 525 in 2023. They were bought at a similar rate in previous years – dating back to its introduction in 2012 – so the sudden end looks like a change.
Switchblade 300: Portable Precision
The Switchblade 300 is supplied in a carrying tube that is also the launcher, weighing about five pounds.
It is launched by compressed gas, the wings unfold and an electric motor propels the drone at up to 100 mph, sending back video to the operator so targets can be identified.
The Switchblade 300 is essentially a long-range, silent, precise sniper rifle – with the ability to cancel the attack at the last second, when necessary, when the operator gets a close look at the target.
The Switchblade range is made by drone builders AeroVironment, Inc, with some of the technology from its highly successful hand-launched RQ-10 Raven tactical observation drones, which were a huge hit with the U.S. military in the early 2000s, giving squad commanders the ability to see over the next hill for the first time. The Raven soon became the most numerous drone in U.S. service, but several operators noted the frustration of being able to see insurgents planting bombs, setting up mortars, or even firing at U.S. forces without being able to do anything about it. Hence the development of a strike capability.
Initially used by Special Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Switchblade was reportedly highly successful at hitting fleeting high-value targets, a term usually applied to insurgent or terrorist leadership. It was nicknamed the ‘flying shotgun’ for the tight pattern of shrapnel produced by its grenade-sized warhead, which could destroy a pickup truck or engage a group of individuals in the open or the occupants of a single room.
Its precision and small warhead size, as well as wave-off capability, meant the Switchblade could be used when the rules of engagement prohibited Javelins or other weapons with greater potential for collateral damage.
However, virtually no details of Switchblade use in action have ever been released – until Ukraine. Strict operational security means that the weapon, while not actually classified, is cloaked in mystery.
The Wrong Tool for the Job?
We have more information and more videos of the Switchblade 300 in Ukraine, where the response has been lukewarm.
This is a different type of war, and the key targets are Russian tanks, air defenses, and artillery for which the anti-personnel Switchblade 300 is unsuited.
A larger version, the Switchblade 600, was promised to Ukraine last year and small numbers have reportedly arrived in the last few weeks. This version was launched as a private venture and has not yet been acquired by the U.S. military. The upsized loitering munition boasts longer range and a more powerful warhead capable of destroying armored vehicles.
But this may be the end of the line for the Switchblade 300. A U.S. Army spokesperson would not comment on whether the program was being terminated, telling us only that “The Lethal Miniature Aerial Missile System (LMAMS) has satisfied the Department of Defense fielding and replenishment requirements” and declined to make further comment.
The issue may be the cost of such munitions compared to commercial competition.
Capability – at a Price
In the 2022 budget, the cost for a single all-up round – the airframe, sensors, integrated guidance, warhead, data link, and launcher – was $58,063. In the 2023 budget it was $52,914. There is a belief that this is the cost for 10 Switchblades; there is no foundation for this myth.
This cost does not include additional elements like the guidance unit, which comes in at around $30,000, or fielding costs, spares, support, training rounds and simulators. Divide the total cost of the program by the number of rounds and the figure may be more like $80k a shot.
Switchblade drone that is used by Ukraine’s forces against Russia. Image Credit: Industry handout.
These prices are not high by military standards – one Javelin round is $184,455 in the current budget – but they are off the scale for the commercial drone world. The cost of the Switchblade 600 is not known but it will be significantly higher than the 300.
Since July, Ukrainian forces have been adapting small quadcopter racing drones as weapons, fitting them with extra batteries and warheads. Though tiny, these improvised loitering munitions are able to carry anti-tank grenades or RPG warheads, and have racked up an impressive number of kills of Russian vehicles and positions. They are now being produced in increasing numbers. Known as FPV (First person View) kamikaze drones, they cost around $700 or less to produce – one Russian source estimated that the parts cost little more than $200. Fundraisers like NAFO and Serhii Sternenko have been able to supply hundreds and sales of special packs of Ukrainian rock salt have reportedly raised funds for more than 2,000 FPV kamikazes.
Some sources suggest that Ukraine is acquiring tens of thousands of FPV kamikaze drones. Russian forces have also started building their own FPV drones, but this appears to be on a smaller scale.
The rapid evolution of drone warfare has not gone unnoticed. In February 2022, the U.S. Army issued a notice requesting sources to supply Switchblade 300s, possibly indicating a desire to find something more economical.
Switchblade Drone. Image Credit: Manufacturer Handout.
In November 2022 the Army issued a Request for Information (RFI) on loitering munitions, referencing the conflict in Ukraine, which “has clearly demonstrated the ability of unmanned systems at increasingly lower echelons of employment” in particular “ to deliver lethal effects.” In other words, providing individual foot soldiers with lethal, long-range precision attack drones.
AeroVironment would not comment on the Army’s decision not to buy Switchblade 300s this year, but noted that it had responded to the RFI.
The Military Vs. Commercial Technology Race
Historically, the military has always had new technology first, and many modern electronics including digital computers, microprocessors, and the Internet itself have roots in military programs.
However, the rapid rise of consumer electronics and, in particular, smartphones has eroded this supremacy. The big green boxes of military electronics have lost ground to slick, modern consumer tech.
Chinese company DJI launched DJI’s Phantom 1 quadcopter in 2013, initiating a drone revolution and starting a whole new industry. Volumes of millions of units means DJI can produce sophisticated, easy-to-use designs at low cost, evolving at the pace of consumer electronics with a new generation every year or two rather than the slower rate of military programs where generations typically take years. The result has been highly capable drones capable of military missions at meager cost.
Consumer technology cannot offer anything as sophisticated as the Switchblade with its terminal guidance software, thermal imaging, secure digital communications, and robust tube carrier/launcher. But the larger warhead and the power of sheer numbers are significant.
In the future, we may see a U.S. Army equipped with a mixture of types of drones, with high-end, high-tech loitering munitions like Switchblades for demanding missions, accompanied by a mass of low-cost kamikazes distributed by the thousand and allowing every squad to engage targets out of sight from miles away.
The technology is there, but avoiding the exponential cost growth endemic to military programs may be the biggest challenge.
Expert Biography
David Hambling is a London-based journalist, author and consultant specializing in defense technology with over 20 years of experience. He writes for Aviation Week, Forbes, The Economist, New Scientist, Popular Mechanics, WIRED and others. His books include “Weapons Grade: How Modern Warfare Gave Birth to Our High-tech World” (2005) and “Swarm Troopers: How small drones will conquer the world” (2015). He has been closely watching the continued evolution of small military drones. Follow him @David_Hambling.
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YliKoo
Greatest Leader
Ehtii islamisoitua ennen kuin demokratisoitua.
Antares
Respected Leader
Tokmakissa paukkunut taas, twiitin mukaan voisi olla jopa 12 osumaa. Tärkeä rauteteiden läpikulkukaupunki ja kuten kartasta nähdään, myös tärkeä maanteiden solmukohta. Ryssä on kaivanut kaupungin ympäristöön erilaisia puolustusasemia ja arvatenkin miinoittanut myös paljon.
Sinänsä en ihmettele, Ukraina on iskenyt Tokmakiin koko sodan ajan ja tuhonnut myös paljon ilmatorjuntakalustoa sen ympäristössä.
Explosions in Tokmak. Local report 12 arrivals!
Sinänsä en ihmettele, Ukraina on iskenyt Tokmakiin koko sodan ajan ja tuhonnut myös paljon ilmatorjuntakalustoa sen ympäristössä.
Explosions in Tokmak. Local report 12 arrivals!
Jahas, loppumattomat Armata lautat ovat lähteneet liikkeelle:
www.savonsanomat.fi
Ennen 24.2.2022 nämä olivat tulossa Suomeenkin putinistien sotafantasioissa sen jälkeen kun Suomen puolustusvoimat oli lamautettu Iskandereilla ja ilmavoimat ammuttu alas kaiken tappavan S-400 ohjuskuplan alla. Hassuja oli ajat, tosin osa uskoo näihin vieläkin
Venäläismedia: Venäjä lähettänyt kehittyneimpiä panssarivaunujaan Ukrainaan
Venäjän valtio-omisteisen uutistoimisto RIA Novostin mukaan Venäjä on lähettänyt Ukrainan taistelukentille kehittyneimpiä T-14 Armata -panssarivaunujaan.
www.savonsanomat.fi
Ennen 24.2.2022 nämä olivat tulossa Suomeenkin putinistien sotafantasioissa sen jälkeen kun Suomen puolustusvoimat oli lamautettu Iskandereilla ja ilmavoimat ammuttu alas kaiken tappavan S-400 ohjuskuplan alla. Hassuja oli ajat, tosin osa uskoo näihin vieläkin
Jahas, loppumattomat Armata lautat ovat lähteneet liikkeelle:
Venäläismedia: Venäjä lähettänyt kehittyneimpiä panssarivaunujaan Ukrainaan
Venäjän valtio-omisteisen uutistoimisto RIA Novostin mukaan Venäjä on lähettänyt Ukrainan taistelukentille kehittyneimpiä T-14 Armata -panssarivaunujaan.
Ennen 24.2.2022 nämä olivat tulossa Suomeenkin putinistien sotafantasioissa sen jälkeen kun Suomen puolustusvoimat oli lamautettu Iskandereilla ja ilmavoimat ammuttu alas kaiken tappavan S-400 ohjuskuplan alla. Hassuja oli ajat, tosin osa uskoo näihin vieläkin
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Huolto- ja pioneeriosat myös puuttuvat kokonaan. Voi tietysti olla tarkoituksella jätetty kaavioista pois, mutta ei se tuon ammattimaisuutta ja uskottavuutta lisää lainkaan.
Armata – the story is over » Wavell Room
The Russian Armata is over. This article looks at why Russia's latest tank is dead in the water. What do you think?
wavellroom.com
Tällainen saatu kiinni. Onkohan ainostaan jäävuoren huippu? No yksi kerrallaan pikku hiljaa jäävät kiinni.
Se isoin risteysasema on Novobohdanivkassa (tjsp) vähän Tokmakista länteen päin. Siinä kohtaavat radat pohjoisesta Zaporitsiasta, idästä Donetskista, etelästä Melitopolista (ja Krimiltä) sekä lännestä Nova Kakhovkasta. Tokmakista itään on myös risteysasema, josta lähtee rata etelään Berdjanskiin.