Coffee Man
Respected Leader
On sekin mahdollista että kokki teki katoamistempun isäntänsä käskystä. Jokseenkin varmaa kuitenkin on että Putinin kokista emme tämän jälkeen kuule yhtään mitään ikinä milloinkaan
Sanavalmis Muurinen
Kenraali
Tässä vielä Hesarin juttu S-400:n tuhoamisesta Krimillä. Olennaisin tässä:
Venäjän ulkoministeriö julkaisi ennen iskua 360-asteisia panoraamakuvia Krimin läntisimmistä osista kertoakseen alueen soveltuvuudesta turisteille. Ilmatorjuntajärjestelmä näkyi kuvissa.
www.hs.fi
Venäjän ulkoministeriö julkaisi ennen iskua 360-asteisia panoraamakuvia Krimin läntisimmistä osista kertoakseen alueen soveltuvuudesta turisteille. Ilmatorjuntajärjestelmä näkyi kuvissa.
Venäjän hyökkäys | Ukraina sanoo tuhonneensa venäläisen ilmatorjuntajärjestelmän – sijainti paljastui venäläiseltä matkailusivustolta
Ukraina kertoi iskun kohdistuneen keskiviikkona Krimin niemimaalla sijaitsevaan ilmatorjuntajärjestelmään.
www.hs.fi
Lisää spekulaatiota prigon kuoleman varalle olevasta wagnerin kill switch -suunnitelmasta.
Ruohonjuuriryssät ovat poliittisesti laiskoja opportunisteja. Harvoin vaivautuvat barrikadeille. wagnerilaiset ovat kuitenkin tainneet olla ryssäksi epätavallisen omistautuneita ja uskollisia firmalleen.
Vaikea uskoa juhannuksen toisintoa. Mutta olisiko siellä vaikka turhautuneita pyromaaneja
--
In case of Prigozhin's death, the PMC "Wagner" has developed a plan of action, which is launched immediately, reports the pro-Kremlin Readovka. The mechanism is introduced automatically, what it consists of - it is unknown. The publication's source says that in any case, it will be "very bad news".SRC: liveukraine_media
Tätä odotellessa
Nazi-ryssälässä ollaan hermot kireällä.
Pinnan alla taitaa kuohua ja korkki voi poksahtaa milloin hyvänsä.
Kovasti pamputtaja- ja voimaministeriöiden porukkaa liikkeellä.
Viimeksi muokattu:
fade
Eversti
Ukraine — Victory Is Closer Than You Think
Ukraine’s counteroffensive is making substantial progress. Russia’s generals will know this, even if the West doesn’t.
The bleakness of the Western commentariat’s recent output is striking — Ukraine’s counteroffensive has made little progress, they say. Major US news outlets cite intelligence agencies opining that things are “grim” and that hopes are fading that Ukraine can reach its (supposed) objective of Melitopol, more than 50 miles away.
This is simply wrong. Intelligence analysts may look at the map of Southern Ukraine and see distances; military planners will apply the military math and see something very different. They know that to crush the Russian army and strangle the troops in frontline fortifications, they don’t need to advance 50 miles. 10 miles will do it.
Why? Because although it would be great if Ukrainian troops broke through to the shores of the Sea of Azov, they do not have to. Instead, they can achieve a significant operational outcome by bringing Russia’s ground line of communication (GLOC) under their guns.
On or around August 22, Ukraine’s troops liberated the village of Robotyne, some 90km (around 55 miles) from the Sea of Azov, a major accomplishment given the enormous efforts of the Russian invaders to fortify and hold it.
From here, the Ukrainians need to advance by a further 10–15 km (7–10 miles), in order to range their guns on Russia’s east-west transport routes that are critical to the ability of its army and armed forces to fight. If Ukraine can interdict these road and rail links, it’s very hard to see how the Russian army can continue to fight.
This will not be easy, but it’s reasonable to think it will happen. This will be achieved using its indirect capability — first the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), whose reach is about 80km-90km, and later its 155 mm artillery with a range of over 40km. These are hugely more capable than Ukraine’s pre-war 152mm Soviet-style artillery that have a range of only 17–20 km.
Russia’s GLOC does not run along the sands of the Azov Sea’s shores but rather inland and, therefore, closer to Ukraine’s advances. The M14 highway running east-west, and largely parallel to the coastline, is about 7km–10km from the shore. Nearby is the broader logistics corridor where the Russians place supply and ammunition dumps, fuel storage, higher-echelon command posts, reserve units, and logistic railheads.
This logistics corridor becomes increasingly narrow for every inch the Ukrainians liberate. Once the Russian assets mentioned above are within Ukrainian MLRS reach, the Russian senior leadership will have an almost impossible choice to make — will they be able to sustain operations west of Melitopol when every aspect of their fighting effort is under fire?
As winter approaches, the logistic situation west of Melitopol is likely to get worse and worse. As occurred on the western bank of the River Dnieper last fall, even Vladimir Putin will be forced to acknowledge reality – he can fight on and risk mass troop surrenders, or pull back. Either way, the so-called land bridge from Russia to Crimea will be snapped.
So Russian commanders will not think they have 90km of space to play with behind their backs. Their only consolation is that the Ukrainians can’t place MLRS artillery at the forward edge of the battle area; these units are extremely valuable and must be used from safer positions 10km–15km behind the frontline.
The bleakness of the Western commentariat’s recent output is striking — Ukraine’s counteroffensive has made little progress, they say. Major US news outlets cite intelligence agencies opining that things are “grim” and that hopes are fading that Ukraine can reach its (supposed) objective of Melitopol, more than 50 miles away.
This is simply wrong. Intelligence analysts may look at the map of Southern Ukraine and see distances; military planners will apply the military math and see something very different. They know that to crush the Russian army and strangle the troops in frontline fortifications, they don’t need to advance 50 miles. 10 miles will do it.
Why? Because although it would be great if Ukrainian troops broke through to the shores of the Sea of Azov, they do not have to. Instead, they can achieve a significant operational outcome by bringing Russia’s ground line of communication (GLOC) under their guns.
On or around August 22, Ukraine’s troops liberated the village of Robotyne, some 90km (around 55 miles) from the Sea of Azov, a major accomplishment given the enormous efforts of the Russian invaders to fortify and hold it.
From here, the Ukrainians need to advance by a further 10–15 km (7–10 miles), in order to range their guns on Russia’s east-west transport routes that are critical to the ability of its army and armed forces to fight. If Ukraine can interdict these road and rail links, it’s very hard to see how the Russian army can continue to fight.
This will not be easy, but it’s reasonable to think it will happen. This will be achieved using its indirect capability — first the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), whose reach is about 80km-90km, and later its 155 mm artillery with a range of over 40km. These are hugely more capable than Ukraine’s pre-war 152mm Soviet-style artillery that have a range of only 17–20 km.
Russia’s GLOC does not run along the sands of the Azov Sea’s shores but rather inland and, therefore, closer to Ukraine’s advances. The M14 highway running east-west, and largely parallel to the coastline, is about 7km–10km from the shore. Nearby is the broader logistics corridor where the Russians place supply and ammunition dumps, fuel storage, higher-echelon command posts, reserve units, and logistic railheads.
This logistics corridor becomes increasingly narrow for every inch the Ukrainians liberate. Once the Russian assets mentioned above are within Ukrainian MLRS reach, the Russian senior leadership will have an almost impossible choice to make — will they be able to sustain operations west of Melitopol when every aspect of their fighting effort is under fire?
As winter approaches, the logistic situation west of Melitopol is likely to get worse and worse. As occurred on the western bank of the River Dnieper last fall, even Vladimir Putin will be forced to acknowledge reality – he can fight on and risk mass troop surrenders, or pull back. Either way, the so-called land bridge from Russia to Crimea will be snapped.
So Russian commanders will not think they have 90km of space to play with behind their backs. Their only consolation is that the Ukrainians can’t place MLRS artillery at the forward edge of the battle area; these units are extremely valuable and must be used from safer positions 10km–15km behind the frontline.
5900GLX
Alikersantti
Tutkailin tuossa lentohistoriaa (ADS-B exchange) Moskovan alueelta ja silmiin pisti toinen samanlainen Wagnerin kone (Kone1), joka lähti hieman ennen tätä tonttiin tullutta (Kone2) Moskovasta kohti Pietaria. En vielä törmännyt että olisi kiinnitetty missään huomiota tähän. Tämä K1 oli aloittanut lähestymisen Pietariin Vnukovon kentälle samoihin aikoihin kun toinen (K2) lähti Moskovasta. K1 laskeutui samoihin aikoihin Pietariin kun toinen kone putosi (~15:20UTC)
Litteinä screenshotit sekalaisessa järjestyksessä..
Liitteet
Viimeksi muokattu:
Defmon hieman kyseenalaistaa tätä näkemystä.Venäjän armeijan uusi huoli: Ponttonisillat eivät kestä
Venäjän armeijan uusi huoli: Ponttonisillat eivät kestä
Sotilaslogistiikkaa ei tule aliarvioida. Tämä uutinen havainnollistaa, miksi.www.kauppalehti.fi
tankki-tapsa
Eversti
Ei varmasti tapahtunut ilman putlerin hyväksyntää, tuskin ilman suoraa käskyäkään.
Paska aamu. Alkoo eilen väsyttämään aikaisin niin kovasti että oli pakko mennä aikaisin nukkumaan ja mielessäni mietin että aamullakin herään laitan kahvit tippumaan ja katson Moskovan palavan vankereiden toimesta ja juon kultamitali kahvit Wilman kunniaksi mut ei onnistunut kumpikaan
Josko se Robotyne olisi vihdoin vapaa
...niin edessä olisi alamäkeä
...ja Tokmakissa kannattaa laittaa kypärä päähän.
Ja tänään on Ukrainan itsenäisyyspäivä
Kuunnellaan sen kunniaksi Mattia ja Teppoa.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=Xc9HX_eN5gE
...niin edessä olisi alamäkeä
...ja Tokmakissa kannattaa laittaa kypärä päähän.
Ja tänään on Ukrainan itsenäisyyspäivä
Kuunnellaan sen kunniaksi Mattia ja Teppoa. https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=Xc9HX_eN5gE
skärdis
Greatest Leader
Venäjällä ei kymmenen miehen henki paina yhtään missään. Ei tarvitse miettiä mitään tuollaisia järjestelyitä, vaikka haluttaisiin jotain lavastaa.
ajs178
Respected Leader
Selittää myös, miksi voitiin olla varmoja, että Prigo oli koneessa: ei tarvinnut kuin seurata häntä kokouspaikalta kentälle.
Budanovin haastattelun mukaan yhteensä -4 pommikonetta viimeaikaisissa iskuissa lentokentille.
In addition, in the interview, the head of the GUR noted that after the recent strikes on the Russian airfields "Soltsi" and "Shaykovka", two Tu-22M3 strategic bombers were disabled, and two more were completely destroyed. In total, Russia currently uses 436 aircraft against Ukraine.
In addition, in the interview, the head of the GUR noted that after the recent strikes on the Russian airfields "Soltsi" and "Shaykovka", two Tu-22M3 strategic bombers were disabled, and two more were completely destroyed. In total, Russia currently uses 436 aircraft against Ukraine.
