Irak

Soldierblue kirjoitti:
Sitä minäkin mietin, eikö kaikki tiet ole suljettu sinne? ja miten ne mahtuu sen pieneen paikkaan? onko ne "pakkade som sardiner i en burk" :D

"pakattu kun sardiinit purkissa"
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Voi tietenkin olla mahdollista, että sinne on jätetty joitakin teitä joita pitkin voi kuljettaa tavaraa sisään ja ulos, mutta kaikki kulkijat ja tavarat tarkastetaan.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
USA:n suorittaman Irakin surge -operaation 10 -vuotispäivän kunniaksi on julkaistu panfletti, jonka voi ladata netistä. Tosin linkki ei äsken toiminut. http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/078/78-1/index.html

Tässä panfletista:

Army marks 10th anniversary of 'surge' in Iraq
By Gary SheftickApril 26, 2017

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1 / 1 Show Caption + Gen. David Petraeus (second from left, commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, walks through the Al Shurja Market in eastern Baghdad on March 11, 2007, accompanied by an Iraqi division commander, staff and journalists. (Photo Credit: Department of Defense) VIEW ORIGINAL
WASHINGTON (Army News Service) -- Ten years ago this month, the fourth of five "surge" brigades arrived in Iraq as part of a new strategy to quell sectarian violence and try to bring a measure of stability to the country.

The surge was launched in response to deteriorating conditions in Iraq. An insurgency continued to hamper U.S. efforts to rebuild the nation's infrastructure. In addition, escalating violence between Sunni and Shi'ite militants was killing up to 3,000 Iraqis per month.

After some debate about how to boost security, President George W. Bush decided in early 2007 to deploy an additional 30,000 troops to Iraq and to extend units already there. He also appointed a new commander, Gen. David Petraeus.

To explain the surge, this month the U.S. Army Center for Military History released a 96-page pamphlet titled "The Surge, 2007-2008." Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser at CMH spent much of the past year researching and writing this operational history, also available online.

"We wanted to provide a broad overview in an easily digestible form," Schlosser said.

The pamphlet portrays the surge as effective in reducing violence across Iraq as Soldiers moved out of large bases to live alongside Iraqis in joint security stations and combat outposts. It also credits operational success partly to "the awakening" or reconciliation of many Sunni tribes who grew tired of Al Qaeda's violence and decided to cooperate with the coalition.

The beginning of the surge, Schlosser pointed out, was also a test of the Army's new modular brigade combat teams.

BCT TRANSFORMATION

"The surge was one of the Army's first major campaigns in which its new modular force was put to the test on a large scale," Schlosser wrote.

The Army had been restructuring its line brigades into autonomous BCTs that could deploy alone. Each division stood up a fourth brigade. Then support elements were taken from division or corps level and assigned permanently to the BCTs. This enabled a "plug and play" concept in which a brigade could be plucked from one division and assigned to a different division when deployed. That's exactly what happened with the surge.

The 2nd BCT, 82nd Airborne Division was the first of the five surge brigades to deploy. It was assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad. So was the 4th BCT, 1st Infantry Division.

In April 2007, the 4th BCT, 2ID deployed and was assigned to a new Multi-National Division-Center, to clear the belt north of Baghdad and Diyala Province. It was the first Stryker brigade to deploy with all 10 variants of the Stryker combat vehicle. Its top enlisted Soldier was Command Sgt. Maj. John Troxell, now the senior enlisted advisor to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

NEW OIF COMMANDER

When Petraeus assumed command of Multi-National Force-Iraq on Feb. 11, 2007, he already had considerable experience in the country. He had commanded the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in Mosul and northern Iraq in 2003, just after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The next year he became the first commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq as MNSTC-I was stood up to train Iraqi security forces.

In 2005, he returned to the U.S. to command the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. There he published a new counterinsurgency field manual and infused full-spectrum operations into the Command and General Staff College curriculum. That, according to Schlosser, contributed to his selection as the new commander in Iraq to lead the surge.

Two months earlier in December, the III Corps headquarters rotated to Iraq and Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno took over as commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq. He had also served in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 as commander of the 4th Infantry Division.

Responsibility for Operation Iraqi Freedom and the surge fell under both headquarters. Petraeus' MNF-I was responsible for overseeing the multi-nation coalition, coordinating with the Iraqi government and setting overall strategy. Odierno's MNC-I was responsible for translating that strategy into combat operations.

LIVING AMONG IRAQIS

Until the surge, U.S. forces would often clear areas and then move on to another neighborhood. Insurgent forces would often move back in when the coalition departed, because, Schlosser said, MNC-I didn't have enough manpower to both occupy sectors and go on the offensive. In addition, U.S. troops were usually garrisoned miles away from Iraqi population centers in large forward operating bases such as Camp Victory.

When the surge brigades began arriving in country, more manpower was available.

"Having that extra manpower allowed Petraeus and Odierno to keep the troops there in the heavy urban areas," Schlosser said.

Units began leaving the FOBs to live in joint security stations inside Iraqi cities. This full-time presence emboldened more locals to cooperate with coalition forces against insurgents without fear of reprisal.

"All the troops there served as a symbol that the U.S. was there for the long haul," Schlosser said.

The new approach also allowed U.S. troops to gain a better sense of the local society and understand the communities they were securing, he wrote.

This approach wasn't entirely new, Schlosser pointed out. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, commanded by Col. H.R. McMaster, (now the national security advisor) had cleared and secured the northern city of Tall Afar in 2005 by stationing his Soldiers inside populated areas. The coalition, however, had never implemented this type of strategy on such a large scale until the surge, Schlosser wrote.

FARDH AL QANOON

Baghdad was considered a center of gravity for the surge. Leaders figured if violence couldn't be stopped in the capital, what chance did the Iraqi government have of maintaining stability across the nation.

Three days after assuming command, Petraeus signed an order for Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon, loosely translated from Arabic as "Enforcing the Law" in Baghdad. The operation was led by the 1st Cavalry Division.

"Methodical and persistent patrolling through heavily populated areas was the hallmark of Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon," Schlosser wrote.

"Joint" was the operative word in the joint security stations, he pointed out, because U.S. troops lived alongside Iraqi forces.

Securing the belts around Baghdad was also important, Schlosser said, because both Sunni insurgents and Shi'ite militias had safe houses there and routes that they used to travel into the capital.

Two surge brigades from the 3rd Infantry Division were assigned to MND-Center to do this: the 2nd and 3rd BCTs. Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch of the 3rd ID was made commander of MND-C and he set up headquarters to the south of Baghdad.

The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit also joined the surge to work the belts around Baghdad and Al Anbar.

THE AWAKENING

Al Anbar is the western desert of Iraq and there Col. Sean B. MacFarland's 1st BCT, 1st Armored Division patrolled Ar Ramadi. The unit had been eliciting the help of local Sunni tribal leaders who had grown weary of Al Qaeda's threats and violence.

Petraeus saw a model there for counter-insurgency throughout the country. He encouraged reconciliation with Sunni tribes who may have formerly sided with insurgents. In the area north of Baghdad and Diyala Province, many Sunni tribesmen began working with the coalition, sometimes to the chagrin of the Iraqi Shi'ite government, Schlosser said.

These efforts, though, helped clear most of the insurgents out of Baghdad and surrounding areas for a time. The surge aimed to provide space and time to help the Iraqi people take control of their own destiny and begin the process of reconciliation, rebuilding, and self- government, Schlosser said.

"It was a tactical and operational success," he said about the surge. "Strategically, it's a little mixed."

One of the strategic objectives of the surge was to give the Iraqi government some "breathing room," he said.

That breathing room came with a cost of about 1,200 American lives and about 8,000 wounded U.S. service members over the two years of the surge.

While the surge did reduce the level of violence, the Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki failed to take advantage of that breathing room, Schlosser said. It failed to sustain long-lasting stability and reconciliation.

The surge pamphlet was printed as part of the CMH commemorative campaign series and it's the first one published about Operation Iraqi Freedom.

"This was the first step in part of a larger series that we're working on," Schlosser said, explaining that the Center for Military History is working on operational summaries and narrative histories that will be part of a "Tan Book Series" featuring operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Copies of the pamphlet can be downloaded at the Center of Military History's website: http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/078/78-1/index.html.

Instructions for ordering a hard copy of the publication can be found at: http://www.history.army.mil/catalog/order/ordering.html./QUOTE]

https://www.army.mil/article/186745?g
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SJ kirjoitti:
Venäläiset harrastaa noita, niillä on luultavasti jokaista PST-ohjusta myös tuollaisella kärjellä ihan vain siksi, että toisinaan vastapuolella ei ole tankkeja mitä ampua PST ohjuksilla.
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Miten se toimii? amputaanko panssaria vastaan ja siiten se painoaalto tappaa miehistön vaunun sisällä?
 
Very Quietly, Israel and Iraqi Kurdistan Build Ties

One of the Middle East’s most important relationships is barely understood and largely kept hush-hush.

Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the removal of Saddam Hussein, Israel and Iraq’s autonomous Kurdish region have steadily converged toward one another, despite their official stance that there are no such relations. In reality, their forbidden friendship is purposefully opaque due to lack of formal ties between Tel Aviv and Baghdad—and has frequently circumvented such diplomatic protocols.

The friendship carries mutual benefits. For Israel, advocating for Iraqi Kurdish independence enhances the Jewish state’s regional interests by strengthening its political and military leverage against regional adversaries—namely Iran—also unpopular among many in Iraq’s Kurdish region, and certainly those in the governing Kurdistan Democratic Party.

For the Kurdistan Regional Government, additional regional support is crucial—flanked by politically adversarial Kurds in Syria, ISIS’ brutality, an uncertain and unstable Iraq, and a somewhat tolerable if not unfriendly Iran, the KRG needs support wherever it can find it. Indirect relations with Israel strengthens Iraqi Kurds’ political aspirations and may help stabilize their ruptured, faltering economy.

Over the last two years, several Israeli military and political officials have voiced support for Kurdish independence, including former ambassador to the U.N. Ron Prosor, justice minister Ayelet Shaked, and the late president and prime minister Shimon Peres, who spoke in favor of Kurdsduring his official meeting with former U.S. Pres. Barack Obama in June 2014, praising their “de facto state and democracy.”

Shortly after ISIS occupied Mosul in June 2014, and only days after Peres’ pronouncement, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for Iraqi Kurdish independence in his speech at Tel Aviv University’s annual Institute for National Security Studies conference.

“It is upon us to support the international efforts to … support the Kurds’ aspiration for independence,” he said, adding they “have proven political commitment and political moderation, and they’re also worthy of their own political independence.”

The declarations have extended to vocal support for the Iraqi-Kurdish war with ISIS. Addressing the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington in March 2016, Israel Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon expressed that “Kurds so far demonstrated that they have the capability to fight Da’esh [ISIS], and [Israel] will support them.”

Additionally, Israeli officials are laying the groundwork for further engagement with their regional neighbor and ostensible ally. In early 2016, Israeli Knesset member Ksenia Svetlova announced to the Kurdish diaspora Ziv magazine that she is chairing what is effectively the “Kurdish Caucus” in Israel’s parliament.

“We are currently working on a project that would include academic exchange as well as cooperation in the field of sports,” she said, adding that such collaboration will also include working together “against common enemies and in the fields of agriculture, high-tech, and education.”

However, though Kurdish authorities welcome political support from nearly anywhere, the KRG remains vague about its indirect relations with Israel since it does not seek to jeopardize crucial economic or political relations with its immediate neighbors, primarily Iran, nor much-needed investment from Gulf countries.

Thus, Israeli-Kurdish relations have proceeded with caution. In October 2015, KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani appointed Sherzad Mamsani the first Representative for Jewish Affairs in the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs. Mamsani was tasked with securing the rights and advocating for the minuscule crypto-Jewish Benjew community in Kurdistan as well as acting as a cultural liaison between Kurdistan and the broader Jewish world. However, due to unclear reasons, Mamsani was temporarily “suspended” from his office.

As part of a newfound focus on Jewish programming, three major Kurdish networks—KurdistanTV, Rudaw and Kurdistan24—all closely affiliated with the KDP—surprised many by broadcasting various interviews and programs about Israeli-Kurds, with one station even broadcasting coverage of Israel’s contentious 2015 election. Israeli television channel I24 also secured an interview with Pres. Masoud Barzani in late 2015—the first time an Israeli media outlet managed to speak with the KRG leader.

Beyond the political rhetoric and television programming, while Israeli political pronouncements are clearly welcome, material support has been significant but almost entirely limited to economics.

Shocking many regional observers, the Financial Times brought to light that during summer 2015, Israel imported via sea nearly 77 percent of its oil from the KRG, worth an estimated $1 billion, or one-third of total KRG oil exports. According to the report, such trade was conducted through secretive pre-pay deals brokered by some of the world’s largest oil trading companies—and to Washington’s great displeasure.

Despite the reports, officials from both countries preferred to keep these details under wraps. KRG Minister of Natural Resources Ashti Hawrami denied selling oil to Israel “directly or indirectly,” while Israel cited its policy not to comment on energy imports to private refineries.

Furthermore, at least three American and Canadian-born Jews—all Israeli citizens and former Israel Defense Forces soldiers—joined different Kurdish forces in their fight against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Largely symbolic rather than representative, these individuals professing humanitarian desires have different motivations for such dramatic volunteerism and have urged the world to act more earnestly on Kurds’ behalf across their convulsive, unstable region.

Overall, these events, while perhaps limited in impact and scope, suggest a general openness toward layered, substantive relations that may pave the way to more direct, concrete and lasting engagement in the future. Both Israel and the KRG could benefit tremendously should they continue to prioritize constructive and diverse avenues through which to nurture and maintain either direct or indirect relations.
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Linkki: http://warisboring.com/very-quietly-israel-and-iraqi-kurdistan-build-ties/
 
Interaktiivinen 360-ast video Mosulin yläpuolelta Irakin taisteluhelikopterin kyydissä.

 
aj77 kirjoitti:
Irakin pojat syyllistyy sotarikoksiin ihan ruutiinilla

https://twitter.com/x/status/867760534048866306
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Yllätys.
Syksyllä katselin dokumenttia Afganistanista, jossa hallituksen palkkaama pyssymiesten johtaja kertoi, että "Ne sanoo meille, että ketään ei saa kiduttaa! Häh? Eilenkin saatiin kaksi tyyppiä kiinni, joilta kysyttiin, onko ne ampuneet meitä. Ensin ne kielsivät, mutta kun kyseltiin paremmin, niin myönsivät. Jos ei saisi kiduttaa, niin ei nekään olis tunnustaneet!"
Taitaa valitettavasti olla enempi sääntö kuin poikkeus ns. länsimaiden ulkopuolella, että pyssymiehellä on totaalinen valta ympäröiviin ihmisiin. Meille se on niin käsittämätöntä, kun Skandinaviassa kruunu alkoi saada väkivaltamonopolia 1600-luvulla ja keskisessä Euroopassa 1700-luvulla.
 
Melko tuoretta juttua Mosulin tilanteesta.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37702442

ISIS:n "taistelijoita" uskotaan olevan enää muutama sata vanhaan kaupunkiin saarrettuna.

Mosulin täydellinen vapauttaminen tulee olemaan helvetin iso juttu, eikä se enää ole kaukana. Optimistinen toive: voi jopa tuoda hivenen yhtenäisyyden tunnetta Irakin eri kansanryhmille. Pessimistinen näkemys: kun yhteinen vihollinen on kukistettu, niin tartutaan taas lähimpään kurkkuun.
 
Toisaalla USA on myöntänyt että maaliskuussa 105 siviiliä kuoli kun ISISin hallussaan pitämä talo räjähti ilmapommituksen seurauksena.
Tietenkään ei tiedetty että talossa sijaitsi IS-miesten räjähteitä, mutta tässä nyt näkyy täsmäaseiden mukanaan tuoma tietynlainen perussotataidon rappeutuminen. Talossa oli ollut muutama ISISin tarkka-ampuja, jonka seurauksena irakilaiset joukot olivat pyytäneet ilmatukea. Mielestäni talon putsaamisen muutamasta vihollisesta nyt ei pitäisi kuitenkaan vaatia lentopommitusta kaikkine oheisriskeineen etenkin alueella jossa on runsaasti omia siviilejä.
 
fulcrum kirjoitti:
Toisaalla USA on myöntänyt että maaliskuussa 105 siviiliä kuoli kun ISISin hallussaan pitämä talo räjähti ilmapommituksen seurauksena.
Tietenkään ei tiedetty että talossa sijaitsi IS-miesten räjähteitä, mutta tässä nyt näkyy täsmäaseiden mukanaan tuoma tietynlainen perussotataidon rappeutuminen. Talossa oli ollut muutama ISISin tarkka-ampuja, jonka seurauksena irakilaiset joukot olivat pyytäneet ilmatukea. Mielestäni talon putsaamisen muutamasta vihollisesta nyt ei pitäisi kuitenkaan vaatia lentopommitusta kaikkine oheisriskeineen etenkin alueella jossa on runsaasti omia siviilejä.
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Ottaen huomioon miten kulutavaa tuo sodankäynti on tuolla ollut, niin en oikein voi heitä syyttääkään ilmatuen kutsumisesta. Tuo on myös jälleen yksi tapaus jossa tulee esille se, että yksittäisen pommin tai ohjuksen hinnan vertaaminen sen tuhoaman maalin hintaan on yleensä typerää. Nuo muutama tarkka-ampujaa jos pidättelevät jonkun yksikön tehtävää, niin sillä voi olla suurempiakin vaikutuksia isommalla karttapöydällä ja vaikka ei olisikaan, niin sen pidätellyn yksikön hyökkäys voi silti kärsiä huomattaviakin tappioita, jos hommaa ei hoidella nopsaan. Ja jos tehtävää joudutaan yrittämään useammin kuin kerran, niin paskempi homma. Etenkin jos se ilmatukena lentävä kone joutuu vaikka dumppaamaan sen pommin johonkin, kun sellaisen kanssa ei voi laskeutua.
 
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