Konflikti Kiinan merellä

Varjag on laskenut ankkurinsa Manilaan hyvän tahdon vierailulla. Aika on otollinen, sillä Filippiinien viime vuonna valtaan noussut presidentti Rodrigo Duterte on innokas luomaan suhteita Filippiinien ennen kaihtamaan Venäjään.

– Venäläiset ovat kanssani, joten en pelkää, hän sanoi vieraillessaan laivalla viikonloppuna. Hän ojensi venäläisvieraiden kanssa nyrkkinsä tyypilliseen merkkitervehdykseensä.
http://yle.fi/uutiset/3-9577256

Venäjälle aseman vahvistaminen Tyynellämerellä on tärkeä, vaikka sen Tyynenmeren laivaston voima ja maan vaikutusvalta alueella on paljon pienempi kuin Yhdysvalloilla ja Kiinalla. Venäjä kuitenkin on hitaasti uudistamassa Tyynenmeren laivastonsa aluksia.

Pohjois-Korean sotatoimien uhka ei ole yhdentekevä Venäjällekään. Varjag-aluksen ja Tyynenmeren joukkojen tukikohta Vladivostok on vain noin sadan kilometin päässä Pohjois-Korean rajalta.

Varjag-ohjusristeilijä liikkuu nyt parin kuukauden ajan Etelä-Kiinan merellä, jonka omistuksesta Kiina kiistelee merta ympäröivien maiden kanssa.
 
Near constant patrols by China’s coastguard at Luconia Shoals off the coast of Malaysia are a signal from Beijing that it plans to maintain a maritime presence within its contested claim to most of the South China Sea, analysts say.

Three different Chinese vessels were patrolling regularly in the first two months of this year near the shoals, some 1,600km from China but only 145km north of Borneo, according to data from the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI).

A report by AMTI said there was nothing unusual about China’s heavy coastguard presence at the shoals this year. It said up to 11 coastguard vessels, including a 5,000-tonne ship, have been in regular rotation in these waters since early last year.

Administered by Malaysia, the shoals are also claimed by the mainland and by Taiwan. The coastguard presence there “speaks to Beijing’s determination to establish administrative control throughout the nine-dash line”, the report said.

Beijing claims almost 90 per cent of the waters of the South China Sea, based on a map from 1953 that demarcates this region with a nine-dash line.

The AMTI report said the Chinese activity at the shoals had not attracted much media attention. It added that the coastguard vessels left the contested waters in late 2015, right before Malaysia hosted two high-profile summits, but returned soon after.
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/dipl...oastguard-staking-claim-contested-reefs-south

Malaysian Foreign Minister Anifah Aman said last month that Kuala Lumpur did not acknowledge Beijing’s nine-dash line. These South China Sea claims were also denied by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague last July.

Still, the presence of Chinese vessels at Luconia Shoals was “Beijing’s way of reminding Malaysia that it is determined to exercise jurisdictional control within the nine-dash line”, said Ian Storey, a senior fellow at Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

THE CHINESE Foreign Ministry has “lodged representations” with its counterparts in Manila after a delegation of Philippine defence and military staff paid a visit to the disputed Spratly island of Thitu on Friday.

In a statement on the ministry’s website, spokesman Lu Kang said the visit runs counter to a consensus agreement between both the Chinese and Philippine leadership to deal with the South China Sea dispute in an amicable manner.

He said the Chinese side was “gravely concerned” and “dissatisfied” with the development, and therefore decided to raise alarm to its counterparts in Manila.

“We hope that the Philippine side could cherish the hard-won sound momentum of development the bilateral relations are experiencing, faithfully follow the consensus reached between the two leadership, maintain general peace and stability in the South China Sea, and promote the sound and steady development of China-Philippine relations,” he said.
https://asiancorrespondent.com/2017...ppine-militarys-visit-south-china-sea-island/
 
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An aerial view of China occupied Subi Reef at Spratly Islands in disputed South China Sea April 21, 2017. REUTERS/Francis Malasig/Pool
 
China has launched its first domestically built aircraft carrier, which will join an existing one bought secondhand from Ukraine, amid rising tensions over North Korea and worries about Beijing’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.

State media said the carrier, designed in China and built in the north-east port of Dalian, was not expected to enter service until 2020.

The announcement by the official Xinhua news agency had been well flagged as foreign military analysts and Chinese media have for months published satellite images, photographs and news stories about the second carrier’s development. China confirmed its existence in late 2015.

Its launch follows China’s celebration on Sunday of the 68th birthday of the founding of the Chinese navy, and it comes amid renewed tensions between North Korea and the United States over Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programmes.

China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, was bought as an incomplete Soviet vessel, the Varyag. It was towed to China and refitted, undertaking its first sea trials in 2011 and since then taking part in patrols of the South China Sea.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...-aircraft-carrier-that-is-first-built-at-home
 
Uuden lentotukialuksen komentosilta eroaa ainakin ulkonäöltään merkittävästi edellisestä. Kuten julkaistut specsit,mutta niistähän ei oikeasti tiedä.

so-far-little-is-known-of-chinas-new-carrier-which-is-known-only-as-the-type-001a-it-will-take-years-of-sea-trials-and-practice-to-develop-it-into-a-fully-functioning-carrier-as-it-stands-there-are-most-likely-us-navy-pilots-with-about-as-many-carrier-landings-and-takeoffs-as-the-entire-chinese-navy.jpg


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Uuden lentotukialuksen komentosilta eroaa ainakin ulkonäöltään merkittävästi edellisestä. Kuten julkaistut specsit,mutta niistähän ei oikeasti tiedä.

so-far-little-is-known-of-chinas-new-carrier-which-is-known-only-as-the-type-001a-it-will-take-years-of-sea-trials-and-practice-to-develop-it-into-a-fully-functioning-carrier-as-it-stands-there-are-most-likely-us-navy-pilots-with-about-as-many-carrier-landings-and-takeoffs-as-the-entire-chinese-navy.jpg


the-liaonings-particulars-and-capabilities-sound-impressive.jpg


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Aika laillahan tuo Kuznetsovilta muuten näyttää... eivätkä edes ydinkäyttöistä tehneet.
 
Tällä hetkellä Kiinan laivaston ensisijainen tehtävä on hankkia kyky murtautua ulos ensimmäisen saarijonon luomasta häkistä (Etelä-Koreasta kaakkois-Aasiaan jne.) ja lopuksi toimia pitkin Tyyntämerta. Heidän on turha ruveta rakentamaan mitään ihmeellisempää vielä tässä vaiheessa, kunhan vain pystyvät projisoimaan voimaa lähinaapureihin. Toisaalta, kykyä rakentaa ydinkäyttöistä lentotukialusta ei välttämättä ole...

Mitä tulee teknologiseen kehitykseen muuten, Kiina keskittyy assymmetrisiin kykyihin. Voi mennä jonkin aikaa kunnes konventionaaliset kyvyt ovat lähellä modernia. Heillähän ei ollut edes kykyä yhteisoperaatiohin eri aselajien välillä aina vuoteen 2016 saakka.
 
Discussion about the South China Sea now and throughout the year among the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) leaders may spawn a framework code of conduct by June, to be refined later in the year or from 2018. The code of conduct – broadly a set of rules aimed at heading off mishaps in disputed waters – has eluded Asia since parties signed an initial Declaration of Conduct in 2002 to kick off negotiations a full-on code.

Once the deal happens, Vietnam will be the biggest loser.

The ASEAN member with an extra hefty South China Sea claim will want a code of conduct or whatever it is to cover the Paracel Islands. But China has controlled those 130 features southwest of Hong Kong since a brief battle in 1974 with what was then South Vietnam. Modern Vietnam still claims what it lost.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphj...-conduct-in-the-south-china-sea/#7362cb8062a0

“No one can force China out of the Paracels,” says Carl Thayer, emeritus professor of politics at The University of New South Wales in Australia. "The most you could hope for is if Vietnam took arbitral action," such as a petition with the world court in The Hague, he adds.

Vietnam happens to be trying to get along better with China on its own despite centuries of land and sea disputes. Anti-Chinese sentiment still runs high among Vietnamese people, but the government in Hanoi is talking with Beijing outside the ASEAN context about the maritime issue while enjoying economic benefits such as cheap imports and a flood of Chinese tourists. China may eventually face pressure from the U.S. government over its past decade of maritime expansion, including artificial islands ready for combat aircraft and radar systems. For now it can pacify otherwise restive Southeast Asian claimants one-on-one by offering aid and investment. The other claimants are Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines.

Vietnam’s ASEAN colleagues, which are meeting for four days in the Philippines through Saturday, probably won’t push China over the Paracels even if Vietnam tries to. ASEAN counts staunchly pro-China Cambodia and Laos among its members. This year’s chair, the Philippines, has set aside its maritime disputes with China, too. ASEAN as a whole usually pursues deals that elevate its unity rather than risking rifts among them or with other countries.

Lack of a Paracels clause in an eventual code of conduct will give China more sway over those islets where it has already built a small city plus military infrastructure.

“I don’t think China will want to have that in the code of conduct, because I think for China the Paracels is a bilateral issue between itself and Vietnam, and I would even go further to say some of the ASEAN states may not want to be part of it because they would see the Paracels as an unnecessary complicating factor,” said Collin Koh, maritime security research fellow at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.
 
“I will skip the arbitral ruling. It is not an issue here in the ASEAN,” Duterte said. “Code of Conduct, maybe. But arbitral, it’s only between China and the Philippines. So I’ll skip that. But the Code of Conduct at sea is another story.”

He stressed that the discussions on the code of conduct would not dwell on who has sovereignty over which area.

“Those are theories which you are dreaming (about). That’s really the Obama style. All dreams,” the President said, referring to former US president Barack Obama, who had criticized his war on drugs.

“You go into reality. Who will dare pressure? Who can pressure China? US? Katagal na niyang construction na ’yan (Those construction activities have been going on for so long). There (were) so many photos and pictures published four years ago,” he added.

Duterte said the US – with its formidable military – could have stopped China’s construction activities in the South China Sea but it did not. China’s artificial islands in disputed waters are now military outposts, complete with airstrips, radar stations and weapons system.

“Eh bakit nila pinayagan ’yan na ganon na tapos tayo itutulak nilang arbitration, arbitration? Gusto nila mag-suicide tayo. Masyado kayong bilib sa Amerika eh (Why did they allow it to happen and then ask us to push for arbitration? They want us to commit suicide. You admire America too much),” he added.
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/04/28/1694628/pressure-china-scs-youre-dreaming-rody
 
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Erinomainen artikkeli itäisestä kiinan merestä ja sen tilanteesta.

With each passing year, the frequency of dangerous interactions between the two sides’ maritime and air forces grows. It is an incremental game of chicken, in which Beijing adds pressure bit by bit on Japan’s administrative control of waters and airspace over the East China Sea, while Tokyo remains determined not to cede that control.

An accidental collision could quickly spiral into a crisis. And even though both sides continue to use coast guard vessels as the primary actors around the Senkakus, Japan finds itself at a greater disadvantage year-by-year. Sooner or later, the law enforcement standoff over administrative control of the waters around the islands is likely to evolve into a naval standoff. As a result, China is not the only one seeking to change the game. In the face of steadily increasing Chinese pressure, Japan is taking steps to bolster its defense and coast guard capabilities in the Southwest Islands—those territories nearest to the Senkakus.

Tokyo does not release complete details on its forces in the Southwest Islands, but news reports and government documents provide a good overview of major existing facilities and planned upgrades. As expected, those facilities are geared toward island defense, air, naval, and coast guard capabilities, radar and signals intelligence, and air and missile defense.
https://amti.csis.org/playing-chicken-east-china-sea/
 
WASHINGTON — Six weeks ago, the United States Pacific Command requested permission from senior American officials for a United States warship to sail within 12 nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal, a disputed reef in the South China Sea that is claimed by the Philippines and China.

The Navy had good reason to think the request would be granted. During last year’s campaign, Donald J. Trump labeled President Barack Obama as weak in defending international waters in the South China Sea, where Beijing has started a sharp military buildup to reclaim land, install runways and haul equipment onto reefs and shoals it claims as its own. Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, during his confirmation hearing in January, called for China to be denied access to the artificial islands. And foreign policy experts and Asia watchers braced for a return to routine Navy patrols within China’s self-proclaimed territorial waters, something Mr. Obama allowed sparingly.

But instead, the Pacific Command request — and two others by the Navy in February — was turned down by top Pentagon officials before it even made it to President Trump’s desk. More than 100 days into the Trump presidency, no American Navy ship has gone within 12 miles of any of the disputed islands in the South China Sea, Defense Department officials said.

The decision not to challenge China’s territorial claims represents a remarkable deference toward Beijing from an administration that is increasingly turning toward President Xi Jinping for help amid the escalating crisis in the Korean Peninsula. It remained unclear on Tuesday whether it was Defense Secretary Jim Mattis; Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or one of their deputies who turned down the three requests. Defense officials said the White House was not involved.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/...-sea.html?smid=tw-nytimesworld&smtyp=cur&_r=0
 
To say that Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s chairman’s statement issued on April 29 following the 30th ASEAN Summit in Manila was a little soft on China “would be an understatement,” a Philippine diplomat told me hours after its release. One would be hard-pressed to disagree. Virtually all language that could be deemed critical of Beijing’s South China Sea assertiveness was removed – leaving out the same words that Philippine diplomats once fought for and remaining silent on the same actions that continue to undermine Manila’s own interests. And as if to add insult to injury, he repeated his refrain that pressuring China on the South China Sea issue would be unproductive and visited Chinese warships docked in his hometown after the statement was issued.

With this episode, Duterte has unquestionably dealt ASEAN a major blow on the South China Sea, even though that was both far from surprising as well as much less dramatic than the headlines might suggest. Actions like these have serious implications, not just for the Philippines, but for the region and even outside actors like the United States. That said, though the incident does deserve attention, it should not obscure the more enduring challenges on the South China Sea that existed before Duterte came to power and will likely continue to bedevil actors for years to come.
http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/the-truth-about-dutertes-asean-south-china-sea-blow/
 
Kiina on mielenkiintoinen valtio. Miljardin ihmisen jättiläinen mutta ilmeisesti jo niin suuri että yhtenäisyyden tunne ei nouse älyttömyyksiin. Peking käyttää myös "kovaa valtaa" valtiovallan ylläpidossa. Kiinan historiaa värittää tuhannet sodat ja taistelut ja aika monesti on rajat siirtyneet niin sisällä kuin ulkonakin.

Vietnam(tai maita jotka muodostaa sen nykyään) on ollut kiinalaisten hallinnassa yhteensä tuhannen vuoden ajan. Ensimmäinen historian kirjoihin merkitty kiinalaisten meno nykyiseen Vietnamiin tapahtui 214aee ja 208eaa silloinen Qin dynastian keisari perusti kaupungin 10km päähän siitä missä Hanoi nykyään on. Vuonna 109eaa Han dynastia valtaa Nanyuen(silloinen Vietnam) ja alkaa ensimmäinen kiinalaisten valtakausi. Vuonna 40 Trungin siskokset nostattaa kapinan ja ajaavat kiinalaiset karkuun. Vuonna 43 kiinalaiset palaa armeijan kanssa. Siskosten armeija häviää taistelun ja toinen kiinalaisten valtakausi alkaa. Taru kertoo että enimmäkseen naisista koostuva armeija juoksi häpeissään pois kun kiinalaiset sotilaat ilmestyi munasillaan taistelukentälle.. :D Liekkö se jo ropakantaa.

Kiinalla on pitkä historia muidenkin valtioiden kanssa.
 
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Reactions: ctg
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TEL AVIV, Israel — Imagery captured Monday from an ImageSat International (ISI) Eros B satellite indicates Chinese preparations for new land-based missile installations on an increasingly strategic island base in the South China Sea.

The high-resolution imagery, shown here for the first time, reveals recent changes in the layout of the People’s Liberation Army’s Yulin Naval Base at the tip of Hainan Island in the disputed South China Sea. In less than two months, the PLA deployed multiple missile launchers on the western side of the base, deployments that ISI imagery analyst Amit Gur has concluded are anti-ship missiles.

“The direction in which the launchers are facing leads us to believe these are shore-to-ship missiles,” Gur told Defense News.
http://www.defensenews.com/articles/satellite-images-reveal-chinese-expansion-in-south-china-sea

The U.S. Navy will still challenge claims by nations like China to exclusive access in the South China Sea, Pacific Fleet Commander Scott Swift said, insisting a hiatus in “freedom of navigation” patrols doesn’t mean the disputed waterway is a lower priority for the Trump presidency.

“We just went through a change in administration,” Admiral Swift said on Monday at a briefing in Singapore. “I am not surprised that process has continued in a dialogue as the new administration gets its feet on the ground and determines where would be appropriate to take advantage of these opportunities and where we may want to wait.”

“We just present the opportunities when we have a ship in the area and there is an area of interest,” he said, adding that the Navy continues to propose such operations. There’s been "no change in policy” toward the region under Donald Trump, he said.
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/...test-beijing-s-reef-claims-in-south-china-sea
 
Territorial disputes in the South China Sea do not require any “push” from the United States to be resolved as the country has no national interests in the region, says a former US Senate foreign policy adviser.

James George Jatars made the remarks in a Tuesday interview with Press TV while discussing the US Navy’s resumption of the so-called Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the volatile sea.

US Pacific Fleet Commander Scott Swift insisted at a briefing in Singapore on Monday that there is "no change in policy” towards the region under the administration of President Donald Trump; therefore, the US would restart the FONOPs to challenge China’s claim of exclusive access.

China claims most of the strategic waterway, through which trillions of dollars in trade pass annually. The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei also have overlapping claims with Beijing.

“There’s no particular reason why the United States should be vindicating the claims of any country in the South China Sea, which really does not concern us,” said the Washington-based analyst.

Jatras added that countries engaged in the dispute “can work out their concerns with the Chinese without being pushed by Washington to assume a more belligerent stance.”
http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2017/05/10/521279/S-China-Sea-resolution-needs-no-US-push
 
Laitan tänne koska uskon että monia näistä ottaa yhteen jos konflikti kiinan merelle kuumenee.

 
Laitan tänne koska uskon että monia näistä ottaa yhteen jos konflikti kiinan merelle kuumenee.

Mitähän tässä oli? Video on nimittäin nyt jo poistettu.
 
Kiina on asentanut kiistellyille Spratlysaarille Etelä-Kiinan merellä kiinalaisen Norincon valmistamia raketinheittimiä, kertoo Kiinan valtion pyörittämä Defence Times -lehti uutistoimisto Reutersin mukaan.

55-millinen CS/AR-1 -raketinheitin on kehitetty merisodankäynnin tarpeisiin ja sitä voidaan käyttää esimerkiksi aluksen puolustustehtävissä. Defence Timesin mukaan järjestelmä kykenee etsimään ja tunnistamaan erityisesti vihollissukeltajat sekä hyökkäämään niitä vastaan raketein.

Tarkkaa ajankohtaa asejärjestelmän asentamisesta ei ole tiedossa, mutta sen kerrotaan olevan vastaus vuoden 2014 tapahtumiin. Tuolloin paljastui, että vietnamilaiset sukeltajat olivat asentaneet valtavan määrän verkkoja alueen vesille.
http://yle.fi/uutiset/3-9616829
 
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