https://publicintelligence.net/aowg-threats-baltic-states/
Ambiguous Threats and External Influences in the Baltic State
Jännittävän perusteellinen raportti, jossa haarukoidaan mitä Venäjä hakee Baltiasta.
Intron mukaan lähinnä vipuvartta Naton kampeamiseen raiteiltaan.
Johtopäätöksiä mahdollisista skenaarioista:
"The first scenario is a deliberate and sudden Russian conventional attack on the Baltic States, and possibly Gotland Island, with the goal to seize and occupy these lands. This could take place under the guise of a snap check or other large-scale exercise. Several days before he assumed the chairmanship of the NATO Military Committee in June 2015, Czech General Petr Pavel said that Russia could occupy the Baltic States in two days.1"
"The second scenario involves another Article V situation, but one in which Russia would conduct a more limited incursion. Among the justifications Moscow presented for its interventions in Georgia and Ukraine was the protection of its compatriot population"
"The third scenario takes place along similar lines. Russia could conduct limited artillery or air strikes, even a raid, and claim the operation was necessary either to protect compatriots or to defend against aggression. This differs from the second scenario in that it would not present the Alliance with the need to liberate these states, as Russian forces would no longer be present."
"The fourth scenario involves cyber attacks or Russian intelligence and/or special operations forces in the Baltic States but in such a way that a definitive link to Moscow could not be established (this likely takes place already). High-profile incidents would demonstrate Russia’s agency in the Baltic States but would be insufficient to start a war. For instance, many of the instigators and organizers of the protests and violence during the 2007 Bronze Soldier incident have been charged and tried in court but only with crimes related to property damage, disorderly conduct, and assault."
"The fifth and final scenario is a perpetuation of the status quo until one or both sides could no longer take part. In other words, this would be a continuation of power politics that stops short of open hostilities. Russia would continue to employ non-military means of coercion as well as aggressive military posturing via exercises and close encounters. NATO would continue its reassurance measures and proceed with the RAP, and sanctions would endure. Though this might not qualify as a new Cold War, it would at least result in an extended period of heightened tensions"
Tekijöinä Asymmetric Operations Working Group, Asymmetric Warfare Group, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory
Ambiguous Threats and External Influences in the Baltic State
Jännittävän perusteellinen raportti, jossa haarukoidaan mitä Venäjä hakee Baltiasta.
Intron mukaan lähinnä vipuvartta Naton kampeamiseen raiteiltaan.
Johtopäätöksiä mahdollisista skenaarioista:
"The first scenario is a deliberate and sudden Russian conventional attack on the Baltic States, and possibly Gotland Island, with the goal to seize and occupy these lands. This could take place under the guise of a snap check or other large-scale exercise. Several days before he assumed the chairmanship of the NATO Military Committee in June 2015, Czech General Petr Pavel said that Russia could occupy the Baltic States in two days.1"
"The second scenario involves another Article V situation, but one in which Russia would conduct a more limited incursion. Among the justifications Moscow presented for its interventions in Georgia and Ukraine was the protection of its compatriot population"
"The third scenario takes place along similar lines. Russia could conduct limited artillery or air strikes, even a raid, and claim the operation was necessary either to protect compatriots or to defend against aggression. This differs from the second scenario in that it would not present the Alliance with the need to liberate these states, as Russian forces would no longer be present."
"The fourth scenario involves cyber attacks or Russian intelligence and/or special operations forces in the Baltic States but in such a way that a definitive link to Moscow could not be established (this likely takes place already). High-profile incidents would demonstrate Russia’s agency in the Baltic States but would be insufficient to start a war. For instance, many of the instigators and organizers of the protests and violence during the 2007 Bronze Soldier incident have been charged and tried in court but only with crimes related to property damage, disorderly conduct, and assault."
"The fifth and final scenario is a perpetuation of the status quo until one or both sides could no longer take part. In other words, this would be a continuation of power politics that stops short of open hostilities. Russia would continue to employ non-military means of coercion as well as aggressive military posturing via exercises and close encounters. NATO would continue its reassurance measures and proceed with the RAP, and sanctions would endure. Though this might not qualify as a new Cold War, it would at least result in an extended period of heightened tensions"
Tekijöinä Asymmetric Operations Working Group, Asymmetric Warfare Group, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory