To establish a common communications architecture, the easiest solution to enable MN Fire Support was the use of NATO encryption keys. NATO encrypted radio frequencies enabled the FSE to create a MN Fires net and cut down on how many nets the FSE would have to monitor in the exercise. The FSE was able to tie in the Norwegian and Lithuanian observer teams with NATO encrypted radios but had to use Tactical Voice Bridges (TVB) to tie in the Dutch PzH2000 platoon.
The Dutch were limited on frequencies they could monitor as a platoon sized element that could still maintain internal radio encryption. Using the TVB, the FSE was able to tether the Dutch platoon into the main NATO encrypted Fires net. Having all assets on the same net cluttered the net quickly. To mitigate confusion, the FSE kept all Mortar assets on a separate net to ensure the correct fire missions were going to the correct assets without confusing each other. By separating the sensors and shooters, the FSE lost time in the kill chain, but was value added because the FSE could better validate fire missions, control who the priority for fires was, and send on call targets to assets that were not in use by the main effort.
The Croatians had a radio system that was not built for a TVB and could not accept NATO encryption. For that barrier, there really were few solutions other than handing over a radio, and in our instance, we were given a friendly radio with which to relay from the observer to Croatian and US mortars. Croatian handheld radios could not range the 82mm mortars approximately four kilometers away. To fix this, the US 120mm Mortars co-located with the Croatian platoon to tether them into the NATO net, and the handheld radio was used to receive missions from the dismounted observation post. This became a procedural advantage for the Croatian mortar platoon as they received instruction on firing mortars at night from the US platoon.
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