Neuvostoliiton ja Varsovan liiton (sekä muiden) tuotantomääristä

Edellisen viestin lainaus jatkuu:

Reading the diary entries of the former chief engineer of UVZ Mikhail Tarasovich Shpak, you involuntarily feel the excitement of the author, who talks about the unsuccessful attempts of Uralvagonzavod to draw the attention of military circles of foreign countries to Nizhny Tagil tanks.

Here are some entries from his diary for 1992:

October 15: "N.A. Zhuravlev (First Deputy Head of the Moscow State Technical University - Ed.) instructed V.B. Domnina (Head of the 47th VP of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. - Ed.) to send the T-72S tank to an exhibition in the UAE. So our hope collapsed to show the T-90 to the world, to argue face-to-face with the T-80 (to measure achievements)."

October 28: “... by telegram, the customer gave the go-ahead for the participation of our T-72S tank in demonstration demonstrations in Beijing (PRC).”

December: “The struggle for the participation of the T-90 at the exhibition in the UAE continued (V.I. Potkin in the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense, General Director ... in the Department of Defense Arms Industries) ...” [31].

The military circles of foreign countries were aware that Russia adopted a single main tank T-90. Therefore, the participation of the T-72s tank at international arms exhibitions and tender tests did not arouse much interest among specialists.

These include:

- demonstration of T-80U and T-72S tanks in China in 1993;
- tender tests of two T-80U and one T-72S tanks in India in 1993;
- Demonstration of T-80U and T-72S tanks at the international exhibition of arms, military equipment and defense technologies IDEX in Abu Dhabi in 1995;
- tender tests of two T-80U and one T-72S tanks in Syria in 1992-1993 [31].

Despite the superiority of the T-72S tank in comparison with the T-72M1 tanks by 1.59 times and the positive results of the T-72s tests in 1993 in the most difficult climatic conditions of India at an air temperature reaching 57°C, (the T-80U tank did not stand the test), this country did not intend to acquire it and continued the serial production of T-72M1 tanks.

Even earlier, in 1988, an attempt by Uralvagonzavod to negotiate with Kuwait on the transfer of a batch of T-72S (T-72SK) tanks also did not bring success.

A repeated attempt to draw attention to the T-72S tank by the Indian military delegation, which arrived at Uralvagonzavod at the end of 1993 to get acquainted with the special equipment manufactured by the plant, was also unsuccessful.

IN AND. Potkin attached great importance to the participation of Uralvagonzavod tanks in these international events, sending the best design bureau specialists there, as a rule, to the positions of his deputies (N.A. Molodnyakova, A.S. Shelgachev, Yu.N. Neugebauer).

I have been on such business trips myself many times (in China, Abu Dhabi, India). In 1992, on behalf of the Department of Defense Industry, Potkin was to travel to Pakistan to discuss with the country's military leadership the issue of supplying a batch of T-72S tanks. But official Delhi delivered a tough ultimatum: either Russia refuses to participate in the Pakistani contract, or India freezes the Indian-Russian program of military-technical cooperation, which was estimated at 2.0-2.5 billion dollars [31, 64]. The business trip was cancelled.

Therefore, the victorious reports of supporters of the Kharkov T-80UD (T-84) tank circulating in the media and the Internet about winning the Pakistani tender (with a tacit hint to the reader about Russia's participation in this tender) have no basis. Only Ukraine participated in this “tender”. For several years, Pakistan has been seeking a positive decision from the Russian government on applications for the supply of domestic tanks to this country. When this was denied to Pakistan for political reasons, it was forced to apply for help to Ukraine, rightly believing that the combat characteristics of the T-80UD (T-84) should be close to the characteristics of Russian tanks.

"Pakistan, which has spoiled relations with Western arms suppliers because of its nuclear program, acquired the T-80UD solely because no one else was selling third-generation tanks to it. Here is both the beginning and the end of Ukrainian success” [65].

Despite the dependence of Ukraine on Russia in the supply of many critical components for the assembly of T-80UD tanks and the unresolved issue with Russia, Pakistan agreed to conclude a contract with Ukraine. In many ways, this decision was influenced by the fact that the price of the T-80UD tank was set lower than the Russian T-90S tank by 40%, and the importer's guarantee to resolve the issue with the supply of components and spare parts in a positive way [66].

By the way, what prevented Ukraine from being the first to offer its services to India before signing a contract with Pakistan?

Special attention to V.I. Potkin paid attention to the participation of UVZ tanks at the international exhibition of arms, military equipment and defense technologies IDEX in Abu Dhabi. This exposition is held in the Emirati capital once every two years, since 1993, and is one of the most representative arms exhibitions in the world.

Bloody wars that have been going on for many years in the Arab countries of the Middle East arouse great interest at the exhibition in the samples of weapons and military equipment presented by specialists from these wealthy countries.

During IDEX, multimillion-dollar contracts are concluded for the supply of military equipment and the modernization of weapons.

Russia has been a constant participant of IDEX exhibitions since 1993. Until 2000, the Russian exposition was organized by FSUE Rosoboronexport>>*.

Meanwhile, Moscow officials stubbornly continued not to allow the T-90S tank to be shown at exhibitions. And their attempts to secure a major contract for the production of an export batch of T-80U tanks invariably ended in failure. It is useful to remind readers that “the rumors persistently circulating in the Western press about the sale in 1995 of 150-200 T-80U to China turned out to be incorrect. The Chinese got acquainted with these vehicles, for which there are even photographic documents, but they refused to purchase ... An important factor was the development of the tank, which had advanced far in the PRC, based on the documentation for the T-72 received from Eastern Europe” [65].

In 1997, the T-90S tank first appeared at the international arms exhibition in Abu Dhabi, but N.A. Rosvooruzhenie did not give Molodnyakov permission to fly out of Moscow until the very beginning of the opening of the exhibition. This almost led to the disruption of the demonstration of the T-90 tank.

It should be noted that the energetic assistance of the new head of the GABTU S.A. began with this exhibition. Maev to the efforts of Uralvagonzavod and UKBTM in promoting the T-90S tank to India.

The exposition of the T-90S tank was visited by representatives of many countries, including India. The Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army spent several days studying the design differences between this tank and the T-72M1, which is in service with the national army, and, apparently, showed him respect.

In 1997-1999, the Indian military repeatedly visited Moscow, the 38th Research Institute of the RF Ministry of Defense, Uralvagonzavod and the NTIIM training ground in Nizhny Tagil. Indian specialists studied the technological readiness of UVZ to fulfill the upcoming large order of T-90S tanks, in-depth assessed the combat qualities of the tank at military training grounds, and formed requirements for the appearance of the tank with UKBTM.

Meetings were held in June and November 1998 to discuss the performance characteristics of the T-90S tank. The meeting in Moscow, held on November 12, 1998, ended with the signing of the "Minutes of discussion of the comparative characteristics of the T-90S". The Indian military delegation was headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Lieutenant General Mehta. One of his key questions was to obtain information from representatives of UVZ and UKBTM (V.B. Domnin and N.A. Molodnyakov) on the status of work on the 1000 hp engine.

* By the end of the 1990s, two state intermediaries for the special exporter, FSUE State Company Rosvooruzhenie and FSUE Promeksport, operated in Russia. As part of the reform of the system of military-technical cooperation between Russia and foreign states, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1834 dated November 4, 2000 created a single state intermediary for the export-import of military products FSUE Rosoboronexport. - Ed.

In his response to N.A. Molodnyakov said: “The engine has already passed the state stage of testing. It was tested in strictly defined test parameters in all weather conditions.”

The meeting ended with the approval of the following main components of the T-90S tank and performance characteristics different from the T-72M1:

- reinforced onboard gearboxes;
- new power plant cooling system (fan, radiators);
- new system of exhaust gases from the engine;
- modified configuration of the roof over the engine; - modernized gun 2A46M with improved ballistic characteristics sticks in a design that ensures the replacement of the barrel without rolling out the gun from the turret;
- an electro-optical gunner's night sight with an increased target identification range of the "tank" type up to 1500 m;
- the maximum firing range of a tank guided missile (TUR) 5000 m instead of 4000 m;
- a two-plane armament stabilizer that provides firing of the TUR when the tank is moving;
- autonomous closed remote-controlled anti-aircraft machine gun installation;
- reinforced undercarriage with a caterpillar track with a parallel RMSH, which allows the installation of "asphalt shoes";
- reinforced combined armor protection of the frontal part of the tank; - reduction of ammunition by two shots due to the greater amount of equipment placed in the fighting compartment.

The superiority of the modernized T-90S tank in comparison with the T-72M1 tank mass-produced in India was 2.1 times.

The text of the protocol ended with an optimistic entry:

"Both sides agreed that the Russian side would send a delegation to Delhi on November 30, 1998 to discuss and sign a contract for the supply of T-90S tanks to India" [52].

By the specified date, a military-industrial delegation of Russia arrived in the capital of India, Delhi, which included representatives of the Russian Armed Forces, the Ministry of Economy, the head of the GABTU of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation S.A. Maev, General Director of Uralvagonzavod N.A. Malykh, chief designer of the Ural Design Bureau of Transport Engineering V.I. Potkin.

The intention of the Russian delegation was to formally discuss and sign the contract in accordance with the agreed minutes of the meeting dated November 12, 1998.

However, a detailed speech by V.I. Potkin about the structural changes made to the design of the T-90S tank, which led to a significant increase in the combat qualities of the tank, was met by Indian military specialists with icy indifference.

And the next day, with all their behavior, the quasi-buyers of the T-90S tank emphasized that they were not interested in this tank at all.

A dramatic situation arose in which the failure of further negotiations between the Russian delegation and the Indian military leadership on the signing of a contract clearly loomed.

Vladimir Ivanovich was not a naive person. He knew that the meeting would be followed by questions about the state of work at UKBTM on testing the most important systems and components of a new generation tank - the SLA and the power plant with a thousand horsepower diesel engine. And such work has already been deployed in the design bureau and was carried out in a busy mode around the clock. But in the process of design and development tests of these complex experimental designs, the end of the work was not in sight. However, Potkin could not even imagine that the Indian side would refuse the terms of the contract, worked out at the Moscow meeting on November 12. After painful reflections and discussions of the current situation with N.A. Malykh and S.A. Maev, Vladimir Ivanovich made a firm decision to offer the Indian military a new composition of the modernized T-90S tank. Having received the consent of his members of the delegation to this, he announced at the next meeting that the Russian side wants to propose to the Indian side a modernized T-90S tank in a new configuration...

This news was greeted with great approval by all the Indian specialists present. The Indian side put forward a proposal to test in the Thar desert three modernized T-90S tanks in a new configuration in May-June 1999 (the hottest time of the year) in the amount of 2000 km with continuous marches with firing in the amount of one hundred and fifty shots, including ten TUR shots. Tests should be carried out by trained Indian crews, mainly officers with experience in operating T-72 tanks. These conditions were accepted by the Russian side.

Upon arrival in Nizhny Tagil, N.A. Malykh and V.I. Potkin had a huge work to mobilize the teams of their own and related enterprises to fulfill their obligations. This time, of course, took away some of the health of many people and, at least, added gray hair and wrinkles to them. Just six months after the mentioned meeting with the Indian military leadership in Delhi in November-December 1998, it was required to ensure that suppliers comply with regulatory documents to ensure specified technical characteristics.

A struggle broke out between subcontractors to obtain a part of the proposed contract. As always, traditionally, Moscow officials, who manage the armored industry, actively interfered with UKBTM in carrying out work, patronizing the enterprise, which completely failed to create the most important component of the tank. As a result, two thousand-horsepower engines and three control systems from different manufacturers were simultaneously forced to test at UKBTM. Each of these five components of the tank differed from the other competitor in design, required re-arrangement for its placement of neighboring assembly units...

On April 6, 1999, the first stage of the contract was signed, providing for the testing of three T-90S tanks in India, which differed in their configuration in accordance with the customer's wishes. The fate of the subsequent stages of the agreement depended on the test results.

Tanks were equipped with three variants of the FCS with different gunner's night sights: the Buran serial image intensifier tube and the Nocturne thermal imaging sights developed by the Krasnogorsk optical-mechanical plant. Zverev, and <<ESSA>> joint French-Belarusian production. The tanks were distinguished by the presence or absence of the Shtora-1 optical-electronic suppression system, which provides all-round protection for the vehicle from being hit by guided missiles of anti-tank systems with infrared or laser guidance systems. Two vehicles had cast turrets, and one was made by welding rolled armor plates. A welded turret with equal armor protection with a cast turret had a lower mass and a slightly increased internal volume. All tanks were equipped with a reinforced undercarriage and a power plant with a thousand-horsepower engine. IN AND. Potkin, on a competitive basis, chose the V-92S2 diesel engine of the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant for installation in the tank. In the process of bench and sea trials of prototypes of the KD-34 diesel engine manufactured by the Barnaultransmash plant, several resource failures occurred. At the same time, similar tests of the B-92С2 engine confirmed the indicators specified in the TOR, including reliability. But the choice of the engine was not easy for Vladimir Ivanovich, since the total amount of testing of prototypes of the B-92С2 diesel engine was insufficient for complete confidence in its reliability.

There was a certain risk for Uralvagonzavod, since the new engine was not tested in fifty-degree heat.

The end of production and technological testing at the T-90S tank factory was very stressful. The deadlines for obtaining purchased components were missed. The former branch of the Leningrad Kirov Plant in Tikhvin did not give up the tracks, demanding cash payment. Krasnogorsk Optical and Mechanical Plant named after S.A. Zverev disrupted the delivery of the sight to the third machine. There were comments on the operation of the B-92C2 engines during stationary and run technological tests (oil leakage along the mating surfaces of the compressor), a large amount of work on debugging the control system on three machines was not completed.

To complete the work in the assembly shop "130", round-the-clock duty of the designers of UKBTM, technologists of the plant was organized. Operations were carried out with the participation of the chief designer V.I. Potkin and his deputies, heads of workshops and specialists of the plant, representatives of allied enterprises.

Uralvagonzavod and UKBTM began preparing a joint brigade of specialists for a trip to India to participate in training Indian crews in the operation of tanks, preparing vehicles in order to confirm their combat characteristics and monitor the progress of tests.

On May 17, 1999, two An-124 Ruslan aircraft with three T-90S tanks were preparing to fly to India from the Koltsovo airport.

On May 13, refusing to go to the hospital due to poor health, Vladimir Ivanovich Potkin died in his office.

Not for a single minute, while in the post of chief designer, Vladimir Ivanovich did not forget that he was a representative of a special officer caste of people. And these people, taking the oath of allegiance to the Fatherland, were always ready sacrifice your life to him.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Mielenkiintoinen lista Nizhny Tagilin tehtaan suunnitteluosaston projekteista. Listalle annettu nimi:

SAMPLES AND PROJECTS OF TANKS, BATTLE, ENGINEERING AND SPECIAL VEHICLES ON THEIR BASIS, DEVELOPED BY UKBTM JSC AND MASTERED IN SERIAL PRODUCTION WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF ITS SPECIALISTS IN 1941-2016.

Tuo ei suoraan sano, onko kyseessä täydellinen lista kaikista kokeellisista JA sarjatuotantoon päätyneistä malleista mutta minun silmäyksellä näyttäisi siltä, että voisi hyvinkin olla kattava kokoelma. Taulukossa on 198 riviä, joista valtaosa on "experienced" eli "experimental" eli kokeellisia vaunuja. Rajasin alle lainatun listan ensimmäiseen T-72 malliin. Poimin tähän listaan ainoastaan ne vaunutyypit, jotka on merkitty "serial" tai "small series" tai "small batch", ainoa poikkeus on "PRODUCT 172M-1" with kdz vuodelta 1981. Päätin lisätä sen tähän joukkoon, kaikki muut ovat enemmän tai vähemmän sarjatuotantoon otettuja malleja. HUOM: kokeellisten vaunujen joukossa on muitakin hyvin mielenkiintoisia tapauksia, joista päätyi usein jotain ominaisuuksia myöhemmin sarjatuotantoon otettuihin vaunuihin.

Kuten tavallista, UVZ:n vaunukohtaisista valmistusmääristä ei ole juurikaan tietoa. Toki heidän arkistoista löytyy tämä tieto, mutta jättävät tarkoituksella kertomatta. Pari poikkeusta löytyy: T-72K vuodelta 1974, "PRODUCT 637" vuodelta 1980 ja T-72S vuodelta 1987.

Kopioin alle käännöksen vaunulle annetusta kuvauksesta mutta jätin pois "suorituskykyarvot" jotka oli merkitty usean kohdalle: pituus, paino jne.

Kirja on osa venäläisen panssarivaunuvalmistuksen historiaa käsittelevää sarjaa (UVZ on yksi julkaisijoista) joten tässä mielessä luulisi, että olisi pyrkimystä tarkkuuteen silloin kuin salaaminen antaa sille tilaa.

Lähde:

УКБТМ 75 лет тагильской школе танкостроения- Д. Г. КОЛМАКОВ, С. В. УСТЯНЦЕВ - 2017

UKBTM 75 years of the Tagil school of tank building - D. G. Kolmakov, S. V. Ustyantsev – 2017

Seuraava teksti on käännetty kirjan sivulta 168-203, konekäännös joten käännösvirheiden tai outojen sanavalintojen mahdollisuus on ilmeinen.

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T-72 ("PRODUCT 172")

1973

Adopted by the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 554-172 of August 7, 1973 and the order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR of December 15, 1975. UVZ has been mass-produced since 1974.

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T-72K ("PRODUCT 172MK")

1974

Commander's modification of the T-72 tank. It differed from the T-72 tank in the installation of additional means of communication, navigation equipment, a charging unit and a reduced ammunition load. Adopted by SA. Serially produced by Uralvagonzavod from 1975 to 1981. A total of 526 KOB T-72K tanks were manufactured, including 106 for export.

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BREM-1 ("PRODUCT 608")

1975

Armored recovery vehicle based on the T-72 tank. Developed by KBTM (Omsk) in 1970-1973 according to the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of July 8, 1970. Adopted by the SA by order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR of June 13, 1975. Serial production of BREM-1 was transferred to UVZ by the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of June 27, 1977. UKBTM JSC provided adaptation of the developed design documentation for UVZ technology, as well as design support for serial production of products at UVZ. The pilot batch of 5 BREM-1 was manufactured in 1985. It is in service with the Russian army and a number of foreign countries. For the period from 1985 to 1990 UVZ produced 342 BREM-1.

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T-72 obr. 1975

1975

Development of the T-72 tank. It differed from the serial T-72 produced in 1974, including a new turret (172.10.026sb-2), the installation of a 12.7 mm NSV anti-aircraft machine gun and a new commander's hatch.

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uts 172

1975

A set of training equipment for the T-72 tank, developed under the Bastion theme. It included a training stand (UDS-172), an automatic loader stand (SAZ-172) and stands from a set of training equipment (UK-172L and UK-172U). In 1975, a prototype of the UTS 172 set passed factory tests and was recommended for participation in military trials. Later it was adopted by the SA. UDS, SAZ and UK were mass-produced by Uralvagonzavod from 1976 to 1984

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T-72 obr. 1976

1976

Development of the T-72 tank. Differed from the serial T-72 produced in 1975, including the transfer of the L-2AG illuminator to the right side of the frontal projection of the tower, a new fire extinguishing composition in the PPO system (freon 114B2).

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T-54M ("PRODUCT 137M")

1977

Upgraded version of the T-54 tank. Adopted by order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR of March 18, 1977. The T-54M tank differed from the base vehicle by the use of units, systems and instruments developed for the T-55. The main measures in the design of the tank were implemented at the BTRZ of the USSR Ministry of Defense in 1977-1981 during the overhaul.

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T-54MK

1977

Command modification of the T-54M tank. It differed from the T-72 tank in the installation of additional means of communication, navigation equipment, a charging unit and a reduced ammunition load. Adopted by SA. The main measures in the design of the tank were implemented at the BTRZ of the USSR Ministry of Defense during the overhaul

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T-72 obr. 1978

1978

Development of the T-72 tank. It differed from the serial T-72 of earlier releases, including a new turret (since July 1978), the installation of a TPN-3 gunner's sight, an L-4A infrared illuminator (instead of the TPN-1-49 sight and L-2AG illuminator, respectively), increased ammunition and a modified installation of the engine oil filter.

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T-72 ("PRODUCT 172M-E, -E1, -E2")

1978

Export version of the T-72 tank. Developed on the basis of a joint decision of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Defense, the GKES and the State Planning Committee of the USSR dated January 13, 1978. It was exported to various countries of the world. Until now, it is in service with the armies of many foreign countries and is actively used in combat operations in Syria, Iraq and Libya.

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T-72 obr. 1979

1979

Further development of the T-72 tank. It differed from the serial T-72 produced in the first half of 1978 by installing a new turret (172.10.073sb. from July 1, 1978) and a nose assembly with an increased level of protection, a new TPN-3-49 gunner's sight, an L-4A illuminator, and a setting system smoke screen (902), solid side rubber-fabric screens instead of sectional ones, two additional cases on the tank turret for laying the OP-2 A powder fire extinguisher

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T-72A ("PRODUCT 172M-1")

1979

Modification of the T-72 tank. Developed in accordance with the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of December 16, 1976. Adopted by the SA by order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR of June 22, 1979. In the process of mass production, the T-72A was repeatedly upgraded. Various means of protection were tested on it, including the “Cape” radio-absorbing material.

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"PRODUCT 637"

1980

The chassis of the IMR-2 (2M) engineering barrier vehicle developed by KBTM (Omsk) as part of the Robot R&D and adopted by the SA in 1980. Serial production of the IMR-2 chassis has been carried out since 1982 (according to other sources - since 1984) by Uralvagonzavod. UKBTM JSC provided the adaptation of the developed design documentation for the UVZ technology, as well as design support for serial production of the IMR-2 (2M) chassis at UVZ. For the period from 1982 to 1990. UVZ produced 659 chassis “Product 637”

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T-72AK ("PRODUCT 172MK-1")

1980

Command modification of the T-72A tank. It differed from the T-72A tank in the installation of additional means of communication, navigation equipment, a charging unit and a reduced ammunition load. It was adopted by the SA and mass-produced by UVZ

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T-72M ("PRODUCT 172M-E3, -E4")

1981

Export version of the T-72A tank. The licensed production of this tank was mastered with the active and direct participation of specialists from UKBTM and Uralvagonzavod in Poland and Czechoslovakia. The first batch of licensed T-72M tanks (in the E3 modification) was manufactured in Czechoslovakia in 1981, and in Poland in 1982.

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T-72MK ("PRODUCT 172MK-E3, -E4")

1981

Commander's modification of the T-72M tank. It differed from the T-72M tank in the installation of additional communications equipment, navigation equipment, a charging unit and a reduced ammunition load.

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T-72A obr. 1981

1981

Further development of the T-72A tank. T-72A mod. 1981 differed from the earlier T-72A, including the installation of the 2A46M gun (instead of 2A46), the 1A40 sighting system (instead of TPD-K1), the gunner's sight TPN-3-49 (instead of TPN-1-49) and the searchlight L- 4A (instead of L-2AGM), torsion shafts of the undercarriage of increased energy intensity, a new driver's seat with an increased level of mine resistance.

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"PRODUCT 172M-1" with KDZ

(huom. dynaamisen suojauksen nimi venäjäksi on Динамическая защита (ДЗ) joka kääntyy usein Dynamic protection (DZ). комплекса динамической защиты (КДЗ) «Контакт» puolestaan kääntyy muotoon dynamic protection complex (KDZ) "Kontakt". Tästä syystä käännöksissä näkee usein KDZ, mutta toisinaan VDZ. Korjasin tähän viestiin kaikki nämä muotoon KDZ, mutta toisinaan käännöskone kääntää miten haluaa)

1981

A prototype of the T-72A tank with a hinged dynamic protection system (KDZ) "Contact". In the period from November 25 to December 31, 1981, it passed state tests on the territory of the NIIBT test site, based on the results of which it was recommended for adoption. After some refinement, the T-72A tank with KDZ was adopted by the SA under the name T-72AV tank. Equipping tanks with dynamic protection systems was carried out at the BTRZ of the USSR Ministry of Defense

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T-72A obr. 1983

1983

Further development of the T-72A tank. T-72A mod. 1983 differed from the T-72A mod. 1979, including the installation of the 1440 sighting system (instead of the TPD-K1 sight-device), elements of anti-radiation protection (overlays "undercut" and "undercut") outside and inside the tower and hull, additional spare parts box on the tank turret (left).

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T-62M ("PRODUCT 160")

1983

A variant of the deep modernization of the T-62 tank. The modernization was carried out in accordance with the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated July 25, 1981 (according to other sources, on the basis of a joint order of the Minister of Defense, ministers of the defense industry and ministers of other industrial ministries dated April 3, 1979 and the order of the Minister of Defense Industry dated April 7, 1981). February 1979). Adopted by the SA by the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of April 6, 1983. The T-62M tank differed from the serial T-62 tank by reinforced hull and turret armor, increased mine resistance, a more powerful engine, the installation of the 9K116-1 Sheksna guided weapon system with a guided missile firing range of 4000 m, 115 mm smooth-bore gun - a launcher (OPU), a new gunner's sight, PU smoke grenades, rubber-fabric screens on the fenders. The main measures in the design of the tank were implemented at the BTRZ of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the 80-90s years of the last century during a major overhaul.

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T-62M1

1983

A variant of the deep modernization of the T-62 tank. Modernization was carried out in accordance with the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of July 25, 1981. Adopted by the SA by the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of April 6, 1983. The main activities of the tank design were implemented at the BTRZ of the USSR Ministry of Defense during the overhaul. The T-62M1 tank differed from the T-62M in the absence of the 9K116-1 Sheksna guided weapon system.

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"PRODUCT 166MK"

1983

Commander's modification of the modernized T-62M tank, which differed from it by the installation of additional communications equipment, navigation equipment and reduced ammunition load.

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T-72M1 ("PRODUCT 172M-E5, -E6")

1983

Further development of the T-72M tank. It was exported according to the order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of October 21, 1983. Licensed production of this tank with the direct and active participation of specialists from UKBTM and Uralvagonzavod was mastered in Poland, Czechoslovakia and India.

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T-72M1K ("PRODUCT 172MK-E5, -E6")

1983

Command modification of the T-72M1 tank. Supplied for export. Licensed production of this tank with the direct and active participation of specialists from UKBTM and Uralvagonzavod was mastered in Poland, Czechoslovakia and India. It differed from the T-72M1 tank in the installation of additional communications equipment, navigation equipment and a reduced ammunition load.

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T-72B ("PRODUCT 184")

1984

Tank T-72B with a complex built-in dynamic protection (KDZ)

Adopted by the SA by the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of November 27, 1984. Serial production at UVZ since December 1984. The T-72B tank was also mass-produced by ChTZ (Chelyabinsk). The T-72B is equipped, among other things, with a new sighting system, a 2A46M cannon, a 9k120 Svir guided weapon system, a 242-2 weapon stabilizer, a hinged reactive armor (NDZ), a B-84M engine, an improved undercarriage, a new air cleaner ( with an increased number of cyclones).

Since March 1989, a complex of built-in reactive armor has been installed on the turret, upper front part of the hull and fenders. T-72B is in service research institutes of the Russian army and the armies of a number of foreign countries. (sanoisin että hieman erikoisesti eivät kirjoita erikseen T-72B obr 1989 mallista, mutta käsittelevät aikaisempia sanoisin kevyemmin muokattuja T-72 malleja erikseen - hieman erikoista, mutta syystä tai toisesta eivät koe että Kontakt-1 siirtyminen Kontakt-5 suojaukseen ei oli niin merkittävä asia).

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T-72B1 ("PRODUCT 184-1")

1984

Developed by the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of July 5, 1981. Adopted by the SA by the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of November 27, 1984. The T-72B1 tank differs from the T-72B in the installation of the 2A46 gun, the gunner's sight TPN-3 and the absence of the KUV 9K120 Svir. Serial production at UVZ since 1984. The T-72B1 tank is in service with the Russian army and the armies of a number of foreign countries.

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T-72BK ("PRODUCT 184K")

1985

Command modification of the T-72B tank. It differed from the line tank in the installation of additional means of communication, navigation equipment, a charging unit and a reduced ammunition load. Adopted by SA and mass-produced by UVZ

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T-72B1K ("PRODUCT 184 K-1")

1985

Command modification of the T-72B1 tank. The installation differed from the linear tank some additional means of communication, an auxiliary power unit and a reduced ammunition load.

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T-72S

1987

Export modification of the T-72B tank. Licensed production of this tank with the direct and active participation of specialists from UKBTM, Uralvagonzavod and UNTC was developed in the 1990s in Iran. In total, according to some reports, a little more than 400 T-72S tanks were manufactured.

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T-72SK

1987

Command modification of the T-72S tank. It differed from the line tank by the installation of additional means of communication, an auxiliary power unit and a reduced ammunition load.

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T-72SM ("PRODUCT 188-1")

1987

An improved T-72B tank, developed as part of the “Improvement-72B” design project and equipped, among other things, with a KDZ, a TSHU-1 optoelectronic suppression system, a 140-1 sighting system, a 2A46M cannon and a B-84-1 engine. In experimental development, he received the index "product 188-1". In 1989, two prototypes of the tank passed state tests. The tank "product 188-1" was adopted by the Russian army by a decree of the government of the Russian Federation of October 5, 1992 (order of the Minister of Defense of April 28, 1993) under the name "tank T-72BM". However, this tank was not mass-produced.

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TCB 172S

1991

Training aids for the T-72S (172M-E8) tank. The composition of the TCB 172S includes training stands of the tank and the fighting compartment, sets of training classes and stands, as well as educational and technical posters

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T-90 ("PRODUCT 188")

1992

Adopted by the Russian Army by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of October 5, 1992 (Order of the Minister of Defense of April 28, 1993). In December of the same year, an initial batch of tanks was made. Serial production was carried out at JSC NPK Uralvagonzavod in the period from 1993 to 1995. The T-90 was the first mass-produced tank equipped with the OEP TShU-1 complex.

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T-90S ("PRODUCT 188-31")

1992

Export version of the T-90 tank. Approved for export by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of October 5, 1992. However, the T-90S in this configuration was not mass-produced and was not exported.

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T-90K ("PRODUCT 188K»)

1994

Command tank developed as part of the Sambuk R&D. During development, it received the designation "product 188K". The prototype commander's tank differed from the T-90 line tank, including the installation of the TO1-PO2T complex, which included, among other things, the domestic Agava-2 thermal imaging sight, additional communications equipment, navigation equipment, a charging unit, as well as a reduced ammunition load. Work on the creation of a command tank was carried out on the basis of the Order of the State Military-Industrial Commission dated April 4, 1991, within the framework of the Sambuk R&D. In the period from December 7, 1992 to April 2, 1993, the prototype of the 188k product tank passed state (acceptance) tests, according to the results of which it was recommended for adoption and mass production. The T-90K tank was adopted by the Russian Army by order of the Minister of Defense of June 3, 1994. In the 2000s, a small batch of T-90K tanks was manufactured, but the vehicle was not mass-produced.

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T-72A (5) WITH GRID SCREENS

1996

A variant of additional equipment in the troops of T-72A (B) tanks against HEAT lattice screens that protect the side and aft projections of the hull and turret from HEAT melee weapons (RPGs). The modification was developed by JSC UKBTM together with JSC Research Institute of Steel in March 1995 based on the results of the combat use of T-72 tanks during the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya. Screens made according to the developed documentation were installed on tanks at the locations of Russian troops in Chechnya.

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Uts 188C

2000

Training aids (UTS) for the T-90S tank. Developed on the basis of the decision of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation of November 7, 2000 as part of the Breter-188 R&D. The UTS 188C includes training stands of the tank and the fighting compartment, sets of training classes and stands, as well as educational and technical posters. In 2000, OAO UKBTM manufactured, according to the developed design documentation, a training stand for a tank (UDS 188C) and a fighting compartment (UDS-B 188C) for training the first Indian crews of the T-90S tank in the training center of the RF Ministry of Defense (Solnechnogorsk )

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BMPT ("PRODUCT 199") - small series

2000

An example of a new type of tracked combat vehicles is the highly protected tank support combat vehicle (BMPT). It was developed as part of the R&D “Frame-99” on the basis of the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 1999 and the decision of the head of the GABTU of the same year. The initial version of the vehicle was made in the form of a running model on July 5, 2000 and was first shown at the UEA-2000 arms exhibition, held from July 11 to 14, 2000 in Nizhny Tagil. Later, during the R&D, the equipment of the BMPT changed significantly and the final appearance of the vehicle was implemented in a model that was first shown at the REA-2002 weapons exhibition in Nizhny Tagil in July 2002. In total, two BMPT prototypes were manufactured, which successfully passed state tests in June 2005 - April 2006. Based on the results of the tests, the BMPT was recommended for adoption and mass production. However, this combat vehicle has not yet been adopted by the Russian army. Nevertheless, JSC NPK Uralvagonzavod in 2011, in accordance with the concluded contract, manufactured and delivered a batch of BMPTs to the armed forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which are currently in operation. In subsequent years, the BMPT was repeatedly demonstrated at various exhibitions of Armaments and was used to test advanced systems. In December 2012, UKBTM JSC was awarded the annual National Prize “Golden Idea” for the development of BMPT in the nomination “For Contribution to the Development of Military Products”.

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T-90S

2000

Further development of the T-90S tank of the 1994 model. A characteristic (distinctive from the T-90S model of 1994) feature of the machine is the presence of a welded turret, a more modern fire control system and a B-92C2 engine with a capacity of 1000 hp. With. The configuration of the T-90S tank can vary depending on the wishes of customers. Between 2000 and 2013, the T-90S was successfully tested in a number of countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. T-90S tanks are in service with 5 countries, of which in one country (India) these combat vehicles are manufactured under license with the assistance of JSC UKBTM specialists.

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BMR-EMA ("PRODUCT 197A")

2003

Further development of the BMR-3M as part of the Vepr R&D. A prototype of the BMR was manufactured in 2003, passed the PI, and a year later it successfully passed state tests, the results of which were recommended for adoption into service. Since 2016, within the framework of the state defense order, JSC NPK Uralvagonzavod has begun serial production of the BMR-3MA for the Russian army.

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T-72BA ("PRODUCT 184A")

2005

Modification of the T-72B tank. The tank "product 184A" was developed as part of the Motobol R&D. Adopted by the Russian Army by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of April 16, 2005 under the name T-72BA tank. Serially underwent modernization in the process of overhaul at the production facilities of YB3.

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T-90A ("PRODUCT 188A1")

2005

Modification of the T-90 tank. The tank "object 188A1" was developed as part of the development work "Motobol". Adopted by the Russian Army by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of April 16, 2005 under the name “T-90A tank”. Starting from 2006, the T-90A was equipped with the ESSA gunner's thermal imaging sight instead of the optoelectronic TPN-4-49. Serial production was carried out at JSC NPK Uralvagonzavod from 2004 to 2010. In 2015, the T-90A tank was included in the list of the most modern main battle tanks, prepared by the American research corporation RAND.

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"PRODUCT 172M2A"

2009

Tank T-72M1, modernized in the interests of the armed forces of one of the foreign customers. The “Izdeliye 172M2A” tank differed from the base product by the installation of a modernized FCS, including the “Sosna” multi-channel gunner’s sight, a remote-controlled machine-gun mount, and a curtain-laying system. Modernization of a batch of vehicles was carried out in accordance with a contract signed in 2009 and was carried out with the participation of specialists from JSC "NPK Uralvagonzavod", including JSC UKBTM, at the customer's site. The contract is currently completed

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"PRODUCT 172M2L"

2009

T-72M, upgraded in the interests of the armed forces of Libya. A sample of the modernized tank, manufactured with the participation of specialists from JSC NPK Uralvagonzavod, including JSC UKBTM, has successfully passed tests on the territory of this country. In April 2009, a contract was signed for the modernization of T-72M/MK tanks.

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T-90S TANK CHASSIS

2011

The chassis of the T-90S tank, modified for the installation of the combat module of the TOS-1A heavy flamethrower system. This chassis is used for the final assembly of BM TOS-1A at OAO KBTM (Omsk) in the presence of contracts with foreign customers. The chassis of the T-90S tank has been mass-produced by JSC NPK Uralvagonzavod since 2011

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T-72B3 ("PRODUCT 184-2")

2012

A variant of the modernization of the T-72B (B1) tank during a major overhaul. The T-72B3 tank was adopted by the Russian Army by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation dated October 19, 2012. On the base product, during the overhaul, a part of the measures worked out on the prototype of the product 184M tank was implemented. Serial production has been carried out at JSC NPK Uralvagonzavod since 2012 and at Omsktransmash since 2013.

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"PRODUCT 184-4"

2014

A variant of the further development of the T-72B3 tank. The sample of the modernized tank differs from the base product in a number of measures, including the installation of a commander's panoramic instrument and the V-92S2F engine with a power of 1130 hp. With. JSC NPK Uralvagonzavod produced a batch of vehicles according to the design documentation developed in 2014, of which several tanks took part in the Biathlon-2014 international military competition, demonstrating high technical characteristics and providing the Russian team with an honorable first place.

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"PRODUCT 188M"

2016

A variant of the modernization of the T-90 tank, developed by UKBTM JSC as part of the Proryv-3 R&D in the interests of the Russian army. A set of measures was implemented on the product, which made it possible to significantly increase, in comparison with the base product, security, firepower, crew capabilities for searching, detecting and destroying targets, survivability, command controllability and mobility. The izdeliye 188M tank is equipped with a new turret with an aft armored module, which houses part of the main ammunition load, an all-day automated control system, a new generation of dynamic protection, a new cannon, modern means of communication, a more powerful engine, etc

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T-72B3 WITH ADDITIONAL PROTECTION

2016

Modernization of the T-72B3 tank, the second stage - further development of the T-72B3 tank in terms of installing additional protective equipment.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
UVZ:n T-72 modernisointiprojekteista 1990-luvulla ja 2000-luvun alussa, sekä kotimaan markkinoille että vientiin tarjotuista:

Lähde:

УКБТМ 75 лет тагильской школе танкостроения- Д. Г. КОЛМАКОВ, С. В. УСТЯНЦЕВ – 2017

UKBTM 75 years of the Tagil school of tank building - D. G. Kolmakov, S. V. Ustyantsev – 2017

Seuraava teksti on käännetty kirjan sivulta 136-142, konekäännös joten käännösvirheiden tai outojen sanavalintojen mahdollisuus on ilmeinen.

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T-72 MODERNIZATIONS: PROJECTS

The need to modernize Soviet-era T-72 tanks has always been recognized at UKBTM. Several such projects were developed back in the early 1990s, but did not find application - the Russian army did not have neither the means nor the desire to do so. Nevertheless, in order to gain experience, UKBTM and Uralvagonzavod undertook the restoration of the “seventy twos” that had exhausted their resources. The first 10 T-72B and T-72B1 machines were overhauled in 1992, and similar work continued in subsequent years. It turned out that the manufacturing plant is able to ensure that the quality of the recovery of the tank is incomparably higher than the army tank repair enterprises. In 1999, 30 tanks were repaired [23].

By the 2000s, the problem was not only ripe, but was becoming urgent. According to media reports, in 2004 about 9,000 tanks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, that is, almost half of the total number, needed major repairs [24].

At the same time, it was believed in Nizhny Tagil that old vehicles should not only be restored, but brought up to the level of the most powerful representatives of the T-90A and T-90S tank family. As a result, a multi-level modernization system appeared, to some extent applicable to all T-72 tanks and bringing their TTX closer to the T-90. The list and cost of activities are different, but the results obtained are quite comparable. Of course, the modernization of the T-72B obr 1989 is much easier and cheaper than the T-72A obr 1979, but UKBTM and Uralvagonzavod are equally ready to solve both problems, depending on the wishes and financial capabilities of the customer. In any case, the modernization programs proposed by Tagil residents “seventy Twos” are more than expedient, based on the “cost-effectiveness” criterion.

Back in the 1990s, the Motobol development work began, with the aim of modernizing the previously manufactured T-72B and T-90 tanks [25].

In the early 2000s, UKBTM, together with Uralvagonzavod, developed and manufactured a modernized version of the T-72 tank as part of the Proryv R&D project. The machine has literally changed, becoming in most of its characteristics comparable to the best foreign models. This was achieved by installing the 2A46M gun, an improved fire control system, including the Sosna-U multi-channel gunner’s sight (PNM), an upgraded two-plane weapon stabilizer, an electronic digital ballistic computer, a complex guided weapons (KUV) of the "Reflex" type with a missile firing range of up to 5000 meters, improved sensor equipment. The protection was enhanced by installing remote sensing on the turret and body of the product. The tank was also equipped with modern means of navigation communication, including satellite. Despite the increased weight, the mobility of the product even slightly increased due to the installation of the B-92S2 engine with a power of 1000 hp. At the same time, at the request of the customer, it was possible to install a less powerful B-84MS engine. At the same time, the survivability of the product was increased by installing a high-speed PPO system.

In this guise, the modernized tank was presented to specialists and guests of the REA-2002 arms exhibition, held in July 2002 in Nizhny Tagil. Subsequently, all these measures were offered to potential customers for implementation on all modifications of the T-72 family in full or in part [26].

Among other things, the Arena-E active protection complex was installed. Developed by the Kolomna Design Bureau of Mechanical Engineering, KAZ is capable of hitting with special fragmentation ammunition all projectiles aimed at a tank with relatively low flight speeds (rockets, grenade launcher charges, cumulative and high-explosive fragmentation projectiles). The system protects three projections of the tank's forehead and sides, but in principle it is possible to create all-round protection. Arena's reaction time is 0.05 seconds! [27].

The KAZ “Arena” of the Kolomna Design Bureau was first presented to the general public on the T-80UM-1 “Bars” tank during the 1997 Omsk Armaments Exhibition. However, journalists had the opportunity to see it in action back in 1995 at the Kubinka training ground. After the first unsuccessful battles for our armored vehicles in Chechnya, the designers demonstrated its real security, including the possibility of active protection. The tank was shot at with ATGMs and grenade launchers. Not a single ammunition reached the armor, all of them were hit 6-7 meters from the side of the vehicle. Judging by the context of the source, the active protection complex was installed on the T-72 tank. To the logical question, where was all this at the time when our tanks were burning on the streets of Grozny, the head of the Main Armored Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of that time, General A. Galkin, answered as follows: “In order for such protection to be put on each combat vehicle. Well, in Chechnya, you need money. And we don't have them."

And, finally, in 2006, within the framework of the Rogatka-1 development project, UKBTM completed another project for the comprehensive modernization of T-72B / T-72B1 tanks for the Russian army. On a modernized machine, called "object 184M”, many solutions were implemented that were tested on the T-90 and T-90S tanks: the 2A46M-5 cannon, an automatic loader with the possibility of using advanced long-aspect BPS, MTO with the V-92S2 engine. Something new and original appeared: an improved universal dynamic protection in block design (the “Relic” theme), the Sosna-U FCS, basically unified with the more advanced Kalina FCS (we will talk about it later), but without the commander's panoramic sight, and retaining the 140-1 sight as a backup. The tank is also equipped with a rear-view camera, a radio station with a digital communication channel, a satellite navigation system, equipment for integration into the unit’s automated control system, an electromagnetic explosion protection system, an auxiliary power plant, a new combined (day-night) mechanical - driver [29].

However, at first, a more modest “budget” version of the T-72BA went into action. These tanks were adopted by the Russian Army by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 435 dated April 16, 2005. According to the open press, in 2005, 17 tanks were upgraded to the T-72BA level, in 2006 - already 139 vehicles [30].

An indicative fact: at the joint exercise “Peace mission” in 2010, modernized Russian T-72BA tanks, which did not have a thermal imaging sight, fired at night much more accurately than the latest Chinese MBT “Type-99G”, despite the presence they have the latest Western thermal imager [31].

At the end of 2011, for the first time, information appeared in the open press about another variant of the modernization of the T-72B tank for the Russian army - the T-72B3 model. Unlike its predecessor, the T-72BA, its FCS includes a Russian-Belarusian Sosna-U combined thermal imaging sight, the same as that included in the Kalina FCS of the T-90MS tank. It allows you to detect targets at night and during the day with poor visibility at ranges up to 5 km. The tank is equipped with a target tracking machine. The T-72B3 was put into service by order of the Minister of Defense No. 3232 dated November 19, 2012 [32].


MODERNIZATION OF T-72 ABROAD

The modernization experience accumulated by UKBTM made it possible to offer foreign owners of T-72 tanks a variety of options for improving combat vehicles - based on the needs and budget of the customer.

In the second half of 2003, India carried out tender tests of options for upgrading the OMS of T-72 tanks, which at that time formed the basis of the armored forces of this country. In addition to Russia, a number of foreign firms with extensive experience in this field took part in the tests. Among them were, for example, such firms as ELOP (Israel), SAGEM (France) and KMDB (Ukraine). UKBTM participated in these tests jointly with the Belarusian company Peleng, offering the Indian side options with the Sosna-U and ESSA-72 fire control systems, which included, among other things, different sights for gunners, multi-channel and thermal imaging, respectively. actually. Some time was spent on retrofitting the tanks allocated by the Indian side and training the crews. Tests of modernized products were carried out in a desert area at an air temperature of 30-35 degrees during the day and 20-25 degrees at night, wind and periodic dust storms. Indian crews without any problems mastered or how to work with these systems. Feedback from the crews and Indian specialists about the Sosna-U and ESSA-72 FCS was unambiguously positive. Tests carried out by the customer with the active participation of a team of specialists from UKBTM, headed by Deputy Chief Designer A. L. Terlikov, in various meteorological and topographic conditions, when firing all types of ammunition, from a place and on the move, day and night showed a high level of efficiency and sophistication of the Sosna-U and ESSA-72 control systems. In most of the exercises performed, superiority over competitor systems was proven [33].

Another country where the modernized T-72 passed comprehensive tests was an old and traditional customer - Algeria. In 2006, the Algerian Defense Ministry announced and held an absentee tender for the modernization of tanks of the T-72 type with the participation of leading developers of tank control systems - Ukraine, South Africa and others. under the auspices of JSC "Rosoboron-export" it was decided to participate in this tender. In the same 2006, in the shortest possible time, according to the documentation developed by UKBTM and using the modernization kit, the product was finalized and tested on the customer's territory. From FSUE UKBTM, the tank was upgraded and tested by Deputy Chief Designer A.L. Terlikov (team leader), A. Yu. Tushin, A.M. Zaitsev and V.P. Dyukov. The Russian project surpassed its competitors in all respects, which ultimately influenced the positive decision of the customer to conclude a contract in May 2008 for the comprehensive modernization of T-72 tanks in this country. It should be noted the great role in the preparation of this contract of the head of the department of export-import relations A.V. Tarantin and the chief specialist of UKBTM V.T. Yurinov, as well as the heads of the team of Russian specialists A.A. Anan'eva, V.A. Pavlov and V.A. Georginov, who made a great contribution to the organization of the fulfillment of both the contract itself and the creation of a favorable psychological climate among specialists [34].

Interest in the modernization of tanks of the T-72M (M1) type and their commander modifications with the performance of work on the national territory was shown by another state of North Africa - Libya. To make the Russian proposal more convincing, specialists from UKBTM and Uralvagonzavod assisted in the manufacture in this country in 2008 of a prototype of a modernized tank that successfully passed demonstration tests. In 2009, based on the results of tests and negotiations with Libya, a contract was signed to modernize a batch of tanks. However, subsequent events in this country, which led to bloodshed and chaos, did not allow the implementation of these agreements in practice [35].

It should be noted that the proposals for the modernization of tanks of the T-72 type, coming from the UKBTM, took a variety of forms. For example, for the first time in the 75-year history of the Design Bureau, in the early 2000s, a joint project with Serbia was successfully implemented to create a modernized M-84AB tank in the interests of a third country. As a result of the implemented measures, the prototype of the modernized tank, which received the name M-84AB1, in terms of its military-technical level came close to the T-90S tank. In the first half of 2004 in the cities of Belgrade and Cacak, including

Using the UKBTM design documentation and using the modernization kit, the turret, tank chassis and final assembly of the product were successfully completed. In the same year, the M-84AB1 tank was also successfully tested in Serbia, and at the end of 2005 on the customer's territory. From UKBTM, Deputy Chief Designer N.A. Molodnyakov (team leader), M.V. Baranov, V.V. Vasev, V.P. Dyukov, S.M. Kurochkin. Unfortunately, due to a number of reasons, this project did not receive its further development. But there is reason to hope that this project will still be implemented in the foreseeable future [36].

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Mielenkiintoinen lista Nizhny Tagilin tehtaan suunnitteluosaston projekteista. Listalle annettu nimi:

SAMPLES AND PROJECTS OF TANKS, BATTLE, ENGINEERING AND SPECIAL VEHICLES ON THEIR BASIS, DEVELOPED BY UKBTM JSC AND MASTERED IN SERIAL PRODUCTION WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF ITS SPECIALISTS IN 1941-2016.

Tuo ei suoraan sano, onko kyseessä täydellinen lista kaikista kokeellisista JA sarjatuotantoon päätyneistä malleista mutta minun silmäyksellä näyttäisi siltä, että voisi hyvinkin olla kattava kokoelma. Taulukossa on 198 riviä, joista valtaosa on "experienced" eli "experimental" eli kokeellisia vaunuja. Rajasin alle lainatun listan aikavälille 1990 - 2022 ja poimin tähän listaan ainoastaan "experimental" nimetyt vaunut (jätin pois erilaiset engineering-vaunut).

Kopioin alle käännöksen vaunulle annetusta kuvauksesta mutta jätin pois "suorituskykyarvot" jotka oli merkitty usean kohdalle: pituus, paino jne.

Kirja on osa venäläisen panssarivaunuvalmistuksen historiaa käsittelevää sarjaa (UVZ on yksi julkaisijoista) joten tässä mielessä luulisi, että olisi pyrkimystä tarkkuuteen silloin kuin salaaminen antaa sille tilaa.

Lähde:

УКБТМ 75 лет тагильской школе танкостроения- Д. Г. КОЛМАКОВ, С. В. УСТЯНЦЕВ - 2017

UKBTM 75 years of the Tagil school of tank building - D. G. Kolmakov, S. V. Ustyantsev – 2017

Seuraava teksti on käännetty kirjan sivulta 168-203, konekäännös joten käännösvirheiden tai outojen sanavalintojen mahdollisuus on ilmeinen.

T-72A (5) WITH GRID SCREENS

1996

A variant of additional equipment in the troops of T-72A (B) tanks against HEAT lattice screens that protect the side and aft projections of the hull and turret from HEAT melee weapons (RPGs). The modification was developed by JSC UKBTM together with JSC Research Institute of Steel in March 1995 based on the results of the combat use of T-72 tanks during the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya. Screens made according to the developed documentation were installed on tanks at the locations of Russian troops in Chechnya.

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"PRODUCT 184. C B-92S1"

1995

A prototype of the T-72B tank with a V-92S1 engine developed by ChTZ with a power of 1000 hp. With. A prototype tank product 184 with B-92S1 passed the test cycle, but was not accepted into service with the Russian army and was not mass-produced.

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"PRODUCT 188A"

1995

A prototype of the T-90 tank with a welded turret. In July-August 1996, repeated tests of the prototype were carried out in the scope of extended PSI. The tank "object 188A" was not accepted into service with the Russian army and was not mass-produced. Subsequently, the welded turret, tested on this sample, after a certain refinement, was put into mass production at JSC NPK Uralvagonzavod for the T-90S and T-90A tanks

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"PRODUCT 184" with SUO "SANOET-2"

1996

The prototype of the T-72B tank with the fire control system "Sanoet-2", developed by JSC "UKBTM" together with the Central Design Bureau "Peleng" (Minsk, Republic of Belarus) and the French company "SAT". The tank “Izdeliye 184” with the Sanoet-2 FCS was not mass-produced and was not exported.

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"PRODUCT 172M-V" WITH SKS-3

1997

A prototype of the T-72S tank with the SKS-3 freon air conditioning system. The T-72S tank with SKS-3 was not mass-produced and was not exported.

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BMR-ZM ("PRODUCT 197")

1997

Armored demining vehicle developed on the basis of the T-90 tank. It is a modernized version of the BMR-3, developed by the 472nd design and technology center of the USSR Ministry of Defense (Kiev). The prototype BMR-3M was manufactured by December 31, 1997. BMR-3M was not accepted into service with the Russian army and was not mass-produced.

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"PRODUCT 184. WITH ENGINE B-92C2"

1998

A prototype of the T-72B tank, equipped with a motor-transmission unit (MTU), which included a B-92S2 engine with a power of 1000 hp. The prototype was designed and manufactured in order to test the engine as part of the product. The tank “product 184 with the V-92S2 engine was not accepted into service with the Russian army and was not mass-produced. However, MTU with this engine was later (since the beginning of the 2000s) introduced on tanks of the T-72, T-90 family and vehicles based on them.

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T-72M1 WITH SIGHT 1К13-2

1998

A variant of the modernization of the T-72M1 tank. Developed by UKBTM together with KBP (Tula). At the first stage of modernization, it was planned to install a sight-guidance device 1K13-2, on the second sight TKB-822. The final assembly of the prototype was carried out on the territory of OAO KBP with the participation of UKBTM specialists.

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T-90S obr. 1999

Prototypes of the T-90S tank in various configurations, developed in the interests of the armed forces of India. These samples, made in the amount of 3 tanks, from May 28 to July 20, 1999, were tested in the natural and climatic conditions of India. According to the test results, on February 15, 2001, in the capital of India, Delhi, a contract was signed for the supply of a batch of T-90S to this country and the organization of its licensed production in India.

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IMR-3 ("PRODUCT 193")

1999

Obstacle engineering vehicle with an increased level of radiation protection. Developed as part of the R&D "Robot-2" using the chassis product 637>, as well as the engine-transmission unit of the T-90 tank. In the period from June 1 to December 31, 1995, the IMR-3 successfully passed preliminary, and in 1996-1997 - state tests. A characteristic feature of the machine is an increased level of anti-radiation protection. Adopted by the Russian army in accordance with the order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation of January 30, 1999. Not mass-produced.

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"PRODUCT 195"

2000

A prototype of a promising main battle tank (MBT), developed as part of the Improvement-88 development project. During its development, a fundamentally new layout scheme of the product was implemented, which differs from the traditional “classical” one, according to which the vast majority of Soviet tanks were created. This, in turn, led to the introduction of a large number of innovative design solutions on the tank, which affected almost all the main systems of the vehicle. The product was equipped with new, more advanced weapon systems and fire control systems, means of protection against various means of destruction, including high-precision weapons, a motor-transmission unit, a running gear, and much more. Prototypes manufactured during R&D differed in the composition of the installed equipment, systems, assemblies and assemblies. State tests (GI) of prototypes were suspended due to the exclusion from the state defense order on the basis of the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of December 29, 2008. The technical groundwork obtained during the implementation of this R&D was subsequently actively used in the creation of a prototype of a promising main battle tank within the framework of the R&D "Armata".

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"PRODUCT 172M2K"

2002

Comprehensive modernization of the T-72 tank in the interests of foreign customers. As part of the R&D "Breakthrough", a prototype of a modernized tank based on the T-72AK was developed and manufactured. This machine has been repeatedly demonstrated at various arms exhibitions, starting from REA-2002, held in Nizhny Tagil on July 9-13, 2002. A number of measures worked out on this combat vehicle were subsequently implemented on the modernized T-72 foreign customers after the signing of the relevant contracts.

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"PRODUCT 184" Arena-E

2002

A variant of the complex modernization of the T-72 type tank with the installation of an improved fire control system, the Arena-3 KAZ and built-in dynamic protection, including the original DZ containers on the turret, a more powerful engine and an upgraded undercarriage. In total, one mock-up sample was made, which was demonstrated at the REA-2002 arms exhibition (Nizhny Tagil, July 2002). For export, the tank "product 184" with KAZ <<Arena-E>> was not supplied and was not mass-produced

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"PRODUCT 184" with a NEW GENERATION DYNAMIC PROTECTION COMPLEX

2002

A prototype of the T-72B tank with a dynamic protection complex (D3) of a new generation, developed as part of the R&D project “Relic. Made in October 2002. In the period from December 16, 2002 to March 20, 2003, the prototype passed preliminary tests on the territory of the NIIBT test site, and from October 30, 2003 to January 31, 2004, it successfully passed state tests. According to the results of the tests, the Relikt dynamic protection complex was adopted by the Russian army in 2005. In the future, the results of the work obtained during the implementation of the R & D "Relic" were used to create BMPT, BMPT-72 and T-90MS tanks and "object 188M"

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"PRODUCT 188 WITH TSHU-2 COMPLEX

2003

A prototype of the T-90 tank with the TSHU-2 optoelectronic suppression system, manufactured in 2003. Passed a cycle of tests, including preliminary, in the period from July to September 2004. This topic has not received further development. The tank "product 188" with the TShU-2 complex was not accepted into service with the Russian army and was not mass-produced.

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"PRODUCT 172M-E6" WITH MODERNIZED FCS

2003

Prototypes of the T-72M1 tank with the Sosna-U and ESSA-72 control systems (2 pcs.). They were developed for participation in an international tender for the modernization of the control system of the T-72M1 tanks of the Indian army. In 2003, two T-72M1 tanks were modernized on the territory of a foreign customer with the participation of specialists from JSC UKBTM and JSC NPK Uralvagonzavod and successfully passed the tests.

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M-84AB1

2004

A prototype of the modernized M-84AB tank, developed as part of the R&D “Modernization of the M-84AB Tank” by JSC UKBTM together with the Serbian company Yugoimport-SDPR in the interests of the Kuwaiti army. The prototype was manufactured in 2004 on the territory of a foreign customer with the participation of representatives of JSC UKBTM and JSC NPK Uralvagonzavod. In 2004-2005, it successfully passed tests in Serbia and Kuwait, confirming the declared characteristics. However, the contract for the modernization of the M-84AB was not signed.

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"PRODUCT 184M"

2005

Comprehensive modernization of the T-72B tank (prototype). Developed as part of the development work "Slingshot-1". The prototype was made in April 2005. In 2007, "product 184M" successfully passed the GI, but was not accepted into service with the Russian army. Nevertheless, a number of constructive measures worked out on the Object 184M tank were later implemented during the modernization of the T-72 and T-90 family tanks

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"PRODUCT 188C" WITH TEK-02M AND AP-18E

2006

A prototype of the T-90S tank with a TEK-02M thermoelectric air conditioner and an AP-18E auxiliary gas turbine power unit. This sample was developed in the interests of the Indian army. During June-July 2006, one of the T-90S tanks of the Indian army was finalized on the customer's territory with the participation, among other things, of specialists from JSC UKBTM. Tested in August of the same year

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T-72B S KISP 1K713

2007

A prototype of the T-72B tank, equipped with a set of firing and destruction simulators (KISP) 1K713. Developed within the framework of the development work "Kotlas-KZ" and is a further development of the theme "Kotlas". The work was carried out by JSC UKBTM jointly with Tochpribor (Novosibirsk) and JSC Peleng (Minsk, Republic of Belarus). UKBTM JSC developed documentation for a set of components installed on the product. The prototype of the tank, finalized in October 2007, including with the participation of JSC UKBTM specialists, passed preliminary tests at one of the training grounds of the Siberian Military District. However, this topic has not yet received further development. T-72B KISP 1K713 was not accepted into service with the Russian Army and was not mass-produced.

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PRODUCT 188A 1K

2009

A prototype of the T-90AK command tank with the PTK-T-1 software and hardware system. A prototype was made, which passed preliminary tests. It differed from the serial T-90A tank by the installation of a software and hardware complex, additional communications equipment and a reduced ammunition load.

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"PRODUCT 188A1" WITH PTK-T-1U-01

2009

A prototype of the T-90A tank. It differed from the serial T-90A tank by installing the PTK-T-19-01 software and hardware complex. An initial batch was made and sent for testing in the troops.

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PRODUCT 188A1" WITH COEP TSHU-1-7M

2009

A prototype of the T-90A tank with a SOEP TShU-1-7M, manufactured under the state defense order in 2009 and passed periodic tests in August-November of the same year. It differs from the serial T-90A tank in a modified optoelectronic suppression station (there is no modulator). Based on the results of the tests, the SOEP TShU-1-7M was introduced into the T-90A tank from 01.01.2011. However, since 2011, the purchase of T-90A tanks by the Russian army has been stopped. Nevertheless, the SOEP TShU-1-7M was installed on the T-90S, manufactured by JSC NPK Uralvagonzavod under a contract with a number of foreign countries

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"PRODUCT 188A1 (C)" CK32K

2010

A prototype of the T-90A (C) tank with a KE2K air conditioner-energy unit developed by OAO NPO Elektromashina. KE2K was installed on the turret instead of the stern box of spare parts and was designed to provide an acceptable temperature in the habitable compartments of the tank, cool the thermal imaging camera of the gunner's sight and use it as an auxiliary power plant when the main engine of the product was not running. Installation and testing of the KE2K as part of the T-90S tank was carried out in January-February 2010. In the future, this work has not received its development. Tank T-90S with KE2K was not mass-produced and was not exported.

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T-90MS (PRODUCT 188MS")

2011

TANK HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED AT VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL ARMS EXHIBITIONS INCLUDING IDEX INCLUDING SUCCESSFUL INTEREST FROM SPECIALISTS AND GUESTS OF THE EXHIBITION BOK

Modernized tank T-90S. Developed as part of the R&D "Proryv-2" in the interests of foreign customers. A set of measures was implemented on the product, which made it possible to significantly increase security, firepower, crew capabilities for searching, detecting and destroying targets, survivability, command controllability and mobility compared to the base product. The T-90MS tank is equipped with a new turret with an aft armored module, which houses part of the main ammunition load, a 24-hour automated fire control system, a new generation of dynamic protection, a new cannon, modern means of communication, a more powerful engine, etc. Depending on the wishes customer, the product package may change.

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PRODUCT 172M-6 "WITH 2A46M GUN

2012

A prototype of the T-72M1 tank with a 2A46M gun. The modernization of the tank was carried out in the interests of one of the foreign customers. Two T-72M1 tanks, modified according to the design documentation of UKBTM JSC and with the participation of Russian specialists, were tested in the period from May to June 2012 on the territory of one of the foreign customers

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"PRODUCT 172MS"

2013

SAMPLE TANK MANUFACTURED BY AD NPK ETILVAGONZAVOD DEMONSTRATED FOR THE FIRST TIME AT THE WEAPONS EXHIBITION /AE 2013

Modernization of the T-72M1 tank with the introduction of a number of measures, including the installation of a modern FCS, DZ and KAZ Arena-M. The implemented measures make it possible to significantly increase the level of protection of the product from modern weapons and expand the capabilities of the crew in terms of command controllability, as well as round-the-clock search, detection and destruction of various targets
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Linkitin aikaisemmin tämän "Military history visualized" -Youtube-kanavan videon nimeltä "Where are Russia's T-80s?" LINKKI

Hyvää pohdintaa, mutta tämän ketjun kannalta mielenkiintoisin osuus on ihan videon lopussa, missä hän tuumailee löytämiensä kokonaisvalmistusmäärien suuria eroja. Näille ei ole selvää selitystä, mutta samoja arvauksia mitä tässäkin ketjussa on ollut. Haluan pureutua videoon tarkemmin myöhemmin, mutta käsittelen ensin yhtä sen kommenteista.

Videon kommenteissa ei ole suuremmin pohdittu tätä erikoista kokonaismäärien poikkeamaa, minkä luulisi herättävän kovasti keskustelua: eri lähteiden kesken on yli 2 000 vaunun ero.

Siellä oli kuitenkin yksi kommentti, jossa ei ole tietysti kerrottu lähteitä (tämä on toki tyypillistä internetissä eikä kannata odottaa parempaa Youtube-videon kommenteilta), mutta poimin silti numerot tähän koska siinä on mielenkiintoinen poikkeama.

Tarkoitan käyttäjän "Filip MiSko" kommenttia, jonka lainaan alle kokonaisuudessaan:

i found this nambers of t80 produktion. erial production in Omsk (modifications T-80B and BV):

1978 - 3 pieces
1979 - 60 pieces
1980 - 90 pieces
1981 - 208 pieces
1982 - 320 pieces
1983 - 440 pieces
1984 - 570 pieces (including 26 command ones, before that command ones were not issued)
1985 - 610 pieces (including 33 command)
1986 - 620 pieces (including 67 command)
1987 - 685 pieces (including 30 command)
1988 - 740 pieces (including 40 command)
1989 - 510 pieces (including 30 command) + 50 pieces of T-80U in Leningrad (LKZ)
1990 - 460 pieces (including 30 command)
1991 - 75 pieces of T-80BV. + 150 pieces of T-80U.

Further only T-80U.
1992 - 5 pieces (Omsk);
1993 - 65 units (Omsk);
1994 - 92 pieces (Omsk);
1995 - 51 pieces (Omsk);
1996 - 18 pieces (Omsk).

(plus another 45 * T-80U made in Kharkov).

In total, excluding Kharkov and experimental early machines (T-80), which were made in small batches in Leningrad, 5391 T-80B and BV and 431 T-80U were manufactured.

T-64(A, B, BV) - 13,100 pcs.
T-72 of all modifications, only for the USSR (until 1990) - 17,831.

In total, 35,872 T-64, T-72, T-80 of all modifications + 200 T-80U and about 700 T-80UD were produced in 1991.

T-80U / UD in Kharkov:
1983 - 10 T-80U units (December).
1985 - 30 units T-80U + 5 units T-80UD.
further only UD.
1986 - 45-47 units
1987 - 75 units
1988 - 125 units
1989 -150 units
1990 - 170 units
1991 - 100 units
1992 - 43 units

A total of 40 T-80U units and 715 T-80UD units.


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Puran hänen kommenttinsa numerot järjestyksessä ylhäältä alaspäin, yksi oleellinen kokonaisuus kerrallaan.

Omskin T-80B ja T-80BV tuotantoa (sekä komentovaunut) koskevat numerot ovat selvästi Омский завод транспортного машиностроения (julkaistu vuonna 2018) kirjan sivulta 100 löytyvästä taulukosta (näiden vaunutyyppien vuosituotantomäärät aikavälillä 1978-1990).

Omskin T-80BV ja T-80U vuosituotantomäärät aikavälillä 1991-1996 ovat myös hyvin selvästi samasta kirjasta, taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 108.

Jaoin nämä taulukot aikaisemmin tässä ketjussa. LINKKI

"Filip MiSko" kommentti ei mainitse sanallakaan Leningradin tehtaan T-80 / T-80B / T-80BV tuotantoa, mutta hän mainitsee tehtaan valmistamiksi 50 kpl T-80U vaunua vuonna 1989. Sinänsä kommentti ei siis ole väärin, koska siinä kirjoitetaan Omskin tehtaan T-80 vaunujen tuotannosta, mutta oletan että hän ei ole nähnyt 100 лет российского танкостроения (julkaistu vuonna 2020) kirjan taulukkoa (LINKKI) jossa kerrotaan (väitetysti) Leningradin tehtaan T-80 perheen vaunujen tuotanto aikavälillä 1976-1989. Näiden vuosien summa on taulukon mukaan 1 135 kpl. Maininta LKZ:n 50 kpl T-80U tuotannosta vuonna 1991 löytyy kirjasta Омский завод транспортного машиностроения (julkaistu vuonna 2018) joka on selvästi yksi hänen tärkeimpiä lähteitään:

True, it was not possible to deploy the serial production of the T-80U until the end of the 1980s. Only in Leningrad in 1989, 50 machines were built - and even then with an old gas turbine engine with a power of 1100 hp. In Omsk, the new machine was mastered only in 1991 [12].

Takaisin kommentin pureksintaan.

Tämä seuraava kohta on mysteeri: (plus another 45 * T-80U made in Kharkov).

MUTTA asia on selvä, jos lukee hänen kommenttinsa loppuun asti: hänen mukaansa Kharkovan tehdas valmis 10 kpl T-80U vaunuja vuonna 1983 ja 30 kpl vuonna 1985. Mistä hän saa summaan +5 kpl, vaikea sanoa. Ehkä kirjoitusvirhe, ehkä tarkoittaa "sarjatuotantoa edeltäneitä prototyyppivaunuja"?

Omskin T-80 vaunujen tuotannon kokonaismäärät täsmäävät, ei yllätyksiä tässä.

Nämä seuraavat kokonaismäärät ovat eri taulukosta:

T-64(A, B, BV) - 13,100 pcs.
T-72 of all modifications, only for the USSR (until 1990) - 17,831.


Sama data on jaettu taulukon muodossa parikin kertaa tässä ketjussa: LINKKI 1, LINKKI

Taulukko löytyy kirjasta nimeltä Уральский вагоностроительный завод. 80 лет (julkaistu vuonna 2016) sivulta 77.

HUOM: huvittavasti kummassakin linkkien takana jaetussa taulukossa on laskettu väärin T-64A / T-64B ja T-80 summat, pitäisi lukea 13 108 kpl T-64A / T-64B osalta ja 7 066 kpl T-80 osalta. Rivien tiedot on oikein mutta summat merkitty väärin näille kahdelle. T-72 osalta summat ovat oikein.

Steve Zalogan kirjasta "T-90 standard tank: the first tank of the new Russia" (kirja julkaistu 20.2.2018) sivulta 5 löytyy muuten sama taulukko MUTTA siinä ei ole eritelty Neuvostoliiton asevoimille toimitettuja vaunuja ja suoraan vientiin valmistettuja - tämä erottelu löytyy ylempää linkitetyistä taulukoista.

HUOM: "Filip MiSko" kirjoittaa T-64(A, B, BV) - 13,100 pcs. kun taas jakamieni taulukkojen mukaan summan pitäisi olla 13 108 kpl. Liekö käynyt pyöristysvirhe?

Tämän jälkeen hän kirjoittaa kokonaismääristä yleisesti, ei mitään erikoista tässä.

MUTTA tätä seuraa mielenkiintoisin osuus:

T-80U / UD in Kharkov:
1983 - 10 T-80U units (December).
1985 - 30 units T-80U + 5 units T-80UD.
further only UD.
1986 - 45-47 units
1987 - 75 units
1988 - 125 units
1989 -150 units
1990 - 170 units
1991 - 100 units
1992 - 43 units

A total of 40 T-80U units and 715 T-80UD units.


Jaoin aikaisemmassa viestissä (LINKKI) taulukon kirjasta nimeltä 100 лет российского танкостроения (julkaistu vuonna 2020). Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 239.

Siinä taulukossa on hieman eroja yllä kerrottuihin määriin verrattuna. Kirjan taulukon mukaan Kharkovan tehtaan T-80UD tuotanto olisi alkanut vasta vuonna 1986. Kirjan taulukossa vuosien 1986 ja 1987 valmistusmäärät ovat eri suuruiset kuin "Filip MiSko" kommentissa, tosin vuosien 1988, 1989 ja 1990 osalta ne ovat samat. Kirjan taulukon mukaiset vuosituotantomäärät:

1986: 50
1987: 55
1988: 125
1989: 150
1990: 170

Toisaalta kirjan 100 лет российского танкостроения (julkaistu vuonna 2020) taulukossa kirjoitetaan ainoastaan T-80UD tuotannosta joten sinänsä ei ole väärin jos Kharkovan valmistamat T-80U vaunut jäävät mainitsematta JA jos puristaa "Filip MiSko" kommentissa 5 kpl vuodelta 1985 vuoden 1986 valmistusmäärän kanssa samaan pakettiin (5 + 45 tai 5 + 47), niin saadaan suunnilleen sama numero kuin kirjan taulukossa vuonna 1986: 50-52 kpl.

MUTTA vuosi 1987 on selvästi poikkeava: 55 kpl vs. 75 kpl

Voisiko olla kirjoitusvirhe? Tai käännösvirhe? Toisaalta tuntuisi että 75 kpl edustaisi luonnollisempaa kasvua: vajaa 50 --> 75 --> 125, kuin 50 --> 55 --> 125.

HUOM: ei pidä koskaan sotkea logiikkaa näihin, meillä on nämä numerot ja sillä hyvä.

Toisaalta kirjassa jaettu taulukko päättyy vuoteen 1990 mutta "Filip MiSko" tietää kertoa numerot myös vuosille 1991 ja 1992. Nämä voivat olla poimintoja muista lähteistä, esim. seuraava lainaus on Steve Zalogan kirjasta "T-80 standard tank - Soviet armys last champion" (kirja julkaistu 17.2.2009):

The Kharkov plant in newly independent Ukraine attempted to keep T-80 production alive there, but suffered from some unique problems. About 70 percent of the T-80UD came from plants outside Ukraine, mainly Russia. Production was 800 combat vehicles in 1991, but only 43 in 1992 and none in 1993 as the supply of components dried up.

Vaan mistä vuoden 1991 numero on peräisin? Samaan tapaan poimittu jostain muusta lähteestä? Yritin aikaisemmassa viestissä yhdistellä eri lähteitä ja laskea vuoden 1991 tuotantomäärää, mutta tulokseksi tuli aivan liian suurelta kuulostava 250 kpl. LINKKI

Hyvä osoitus taas siitä että logiikan käyttö aukkojen täyttämiseen johtaa useimmiten vääriin tuloksiin. Ei myöskään voi koskaan olla varma, pitääkö jokin kirjoitus ottaa 100% todesta, kuten viestissä lainattu Steve Zalogan kirjoittama: The Kharkov tank plant, long considered the premier Soviet tank design and production center, had produced 800 T-80UD tanks in 1991. Tämän numeron käyttäminen yhdessä muiden lähteiden kanssa johti siihen että vuoden 1991 valmistusmääräksi voi laskea tuon 250 kpl. JOS todellinen määrä olisikin "Filip MiSko" kommentin mukainen 100 kpl, virhe olisi huomattavan suuri (100 vs 250).

Kharkovan tehtaan T-80U / T-80UD vuosituotantomäärien lähde on toistaiseksi mysteeri. Linkitin lähteet jotka antavat osittain samat numerot, mutta ei kuitenkaan täysin samoja. Onko "Filip MiSko" kommentissa sitten lainattu jotain toista kirjallista lähdettä? Selvästi tämä voi olla jostain alan kirjallisuudesta TAI tullut muuten vain vastaan jossain keskustelupalstalla / blogissa. En ihmettelisi, jos ukrainalaiset olisivat olleet rennompia näiden tuotantomäärien numeroiden jakamisen osalta ja siten ne olisivat olleet tiedossa jo pidempään (jos on asioinut oikeilla foorumeilla), mutta jos muisti ei petä pahasti, en muista nähneeni näitä numeroita koskaan aikaisemmin.

"Filip MiSko" kommentissa ei kerrota tuotantomääriä vuoden 1992 jälkeiselle ajalle mutta arvatenkin 1990-luku oli synkkää aikaa myös Kharkovan tehtaan osalta. Panssarivaunujen valmistus oli usean komponentin osalta riippuvainen Venäjällä sijaitsevista tehtaista ja kun maiden tiet erkanivat, nämä logistiikkaketjut katkesivat. Toki Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen myötä panssarivaunujen ostaja hävisi myös eikä itsenäistyneellä Ukrainalla ollut rahaa saati tarvetta ylläpitää panssarivaunutuotantoa. Kharkovan tehtaan kohtalo oli pitkälti sama kuin Omskilla eli hakivat raivokkaasti vientikauppoja 1990- ja 2000-luvun alussa mutta onnistumiset olivat lopulta aika vähäisiä. Kokivat sitten hitaan kuoleman ja menettivät pala kerrallaan eri kykyjä mitä vaunun valmistamisessa tarvitaan (tornin valaminen, moottorin valmistus jne.). Venäjällä oli pitkälti sama tilanne myös UVZ:n osalta, mutta muutama suurempi vientikauppa pitivät heidät pinnalla. Samoin Venäjän valtion kassan toipuminen ja armeijan modernisointi noin vuodesta 2012 alkaen pitivät tehtaan toiminnassa, joskaan ei läheskään siinä laajuudessa kuin mitä se oli Neuvostoliiton aikaan.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Jaoin aikaisemmassa viestissä Andrey Frolovin tekemään seurantaan perustuvan taulukon: LINKKI

1676204394229-png.73900


Spekuloin linkitetyssä viestissä enemmänkin näillä numeroilla, mutta otin tähän taulukon jota on "siistitty" muttei muuten muokattu.

Toisessa viestissä pohdin puolestaan Venäjän asevoimille toimitettujen T-90A vaunujen määriä per vuosi. LINKKI

Tämä perustuu valtaosaksi Vasiliy Fofanovin kertomiin määriin per vuosi, mutta sisältää minun spekulaatiota Buran-M ja ESSA-tähtäimisten vaunujen sijoittumisesta aikajanalle. Spekulaatio perustuu osaksi Steve Zalogan kirjoituksiin mutta osaksi myös muihin lähteisiin:

t-90-production-numbers-zaloga-and-russianarmour-info-combined-jpg.67357


Lainasin ylempänä pätkän kirjasta УКБТМ 75 лет тагильской школе танкостроения (julkaistu vuonna 2017):

However, at first, a more modest “budget” version of the T-72BA went into action. These tanks were adopted by the Russian Army by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 435 dated April 16, 2005. According to the open press, in 2005, 17 tanks were upgraded to the T-72BA level, in 2006 - already 139 vehicles [30].

Viitattu lähde [30] on:

30. Справочные данные ОАО «УКБТМ». Л. 2 // Музей УВЗ: Независимое военное обозрение. 2004. № 45; 2006. No 48.

30. Reference data of OAO UKBTM. L. 2 // UVZ Museum: Independent military review. 2004. No. 45; 2006. No 48.

Onko kirjan siteeraama lähde luotettava? Puhutaanko nyt oikeasti toimitetuista vaunuista vai ainoastaan sopimuksesta ko. modernisoitavan vaunumäärän toimittamisesta? Tällainen sopimus voi jakaantua useamman vuoden ajalle, jolloin vuosikohtainen valmistusmäärä olisi tietysti koko summaa pienempi.

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JOS otetaan nämä numerot todesta ja oletetaan että kyseessä olisivat vuosituotantomäärät, niin nämä yhteen taulukkoon merkittyinä saadaan tällainen:

1677567845024.png

Poistin 1 kpl T-90S koska se vaunu meni Armenialle palkinnoksi menestyksestä Tank Biathlon -kilpailussa.

Poistin myös alimman rivin nimestä "T-72BA" koska suurella todennäköisyydellä tätä modernisointia ei ole tehty aikavälillä 2016-2018, vaan arvatenkin sen valmistus päättyi kun T-72B3 tuli tuotantoon. Ruotsalaisten käyttämä epämääräinen ilmaisutapa jättää auki sen vaihtoehdon, että alimman rivin numerot olisivat joko peruskorjattuja T-72B/B1 vaunuja tai T-72B3 tai T-72B3 obr 2016. Spekuloin tällä aikaisemmassa viestissä (LINKKI) mutta jätän nämä spekulaatiot pois tästä taulukosta.

Lisäksi poistin alimmalta riviltä 170 kpl, mutta jätin sen kolmanneksi alimmalle riville. Oletan siis että kyse on samoista vaunuista mutta on epäselvää, mikä vaunutyyppi on kyseessä (eli onko modernisointia vai remontointia).

Huomaa myös, että merkintä "c. 40" tarkoittaa "about 40" eli "noin 40 kpl" - käytin silti summan laskennassa numeroa 40, koska en halunnut arvata olisiko todellinen määrä 35, 36, 37, 38 tai 39. Samaan aikaan jätin merkinnän "some" laskematta mukaan, ajattelin että nämä kaksi "pyöristystä" kumoaisivat toisensa kokonaisuutta ajatellen. Epätäydellistä toki, mutta sellaista tämä numeroiden pyörittely on.

T-72BA modernisointi on määrien osalta melko rajusti vaihtelevaa, mutta ei toki mahdotonta. Kyse on ainoastaan käytettävissä olevasta rahasta ja resursseista.

En sano että ylläoleva taulukko olisi totuus, ainoastaan että tilanne näyttää tältä jos mainittujen lähteiden numerot laitetaan samaan taulukkoon. Ei sovi myöskään unohtaa tätä: T-72B3 / T-72B3 obr 2016 modernisointi on suunniteltu paitsi T-72B/B1 vaunuille niin myös T-72BA (väitetysti). Näistä on siis suunnitelmat olemassa eli mitä tehdään ja miten, jos kyseisen tyypin vaunu tulee modernisoitavaksi. En nyt muista, missä näin tällaisen tiedon mutta yritän etsiä ja lisätä viittauksen siihen, kun kerkiän.

Onko yhtäkään T-72BA vaunua muutettu T-72B3 / T-72B3 obr 2016 malliksi vai onko kyseinen modernisointi ainoastaan suunniteltu eli varauduttu tekemiseen? Tätä en osaa sanoa. Toisaalta T-72BA sellaisena kuin se on nähty usein (Kontakt-5 elementit) ei ole kovin kaukana ensimmäisistä T-72B3 vaunuista. Oikeastaan voisi sanoa että ensimmäiset T-72B3 vaunut olivat "T-72BA + ampujan lämpötähtäin". T-72BA vaunuissa oli parempi moottori kuin alkuperäisissä T-72B3 vaunuissa, joten nämä modernisoinnin suhteessa toisiinsa ovat melkoinen sillisalaatti. En ihmettelisi, vaikka jokin osa T-72BA vaunuista olisi muutettu T-72B3 / T-72B3 obr 2016 malleiksi, se olisi ainakin helpohko tapa tuottaa suurempi määrä modernisoituja vaunuja (katso vuodet 2013 ja 2014), kuin jos aihioksi tulisi pelkästään T-72B/B1 vaunuja, joiden modernisointi on suurempi työmäärältään.

Spekulointia vain, ei ole varmaa tietoa.

MUOKKAUS: T-72BA vaunujen modernisoinnista oli maininta artikkelissa, jossa kirjoitettiin "T-72B3 with additional protection" modernisointia koskevasta sopimuksesta eli T-72B3 obr 2016 vaunuista. Lainasin ko. artikkelin tekstin kokonaisuudessaan aikaisemmassa viestissä (LINKKI) mutta lainaan tähän alle oleellisen kohdan (artikkeli julkaistu 6.3.2016): LÄHDE

The work must be carried out during 2015-2017 to ensure the execution of the state contract No. 1517187321301030119015402/R/3/2/234-2015-D GOZ, in accordance with the technical requirements (TT) No. 3/6/1-2015 dated 19.01.2015 g., on the basis of the terms of reference (TOR) dated 25.08.2015. Overhaul with the modernization of tanks of the T-72B type with the reduction to the form of the T-72B3 with additional protection is carried out according to the design and repair documentation AEL.184.SD-R7 with additions (for T-72B/B1 tanks) and AEL.184.SD-R8 (for T-72BA tanks).

It is indicated that on the basis of the ToR and ToR, the Contractor started the actual performance of work from 01.10.2015.


Toki kysymys kuuluu: modernisoitiinko osa T-72BA vaunuista T-72B3 standardiin jo ennen tätä? JOS oletetaan että valtaosa T-72BA nimellä tunnetuista modernisoinneista tehtiin aikavälillä 2005-2011, niin olivat kohtuu tuoreita vaunuja T-72B3 modernisoinnin alkaessa. Toisaalta olisi loogista, että T-72BA vaunuihin asennettaisiin ampujan lämpötähtäin, se kasvattaisi vaunujen suorituskykyä merkittävästi ja muilta piirteiltään vaunu on jo modernisoitu. Toisaalta jos näin toimitaan niin silloin viedään aktiivijoukoilta "juuri äsken" modernisoitu vaunu ja tehdään sille lisää töitä. Ehkä ensimmäistä T-72BA vaunujen peruskorjauksen laskettiin ajoittuvan T-72B3 obr 2016 modernisoinnin aikakaudelle ja tästä syystä laadittiin suunnitelma, minkä mukaan muutostyöt tehdään (sitten kun niiden aika tulee)?

Tämä vaatisi lisäselvityksiä. Toki se että jostain on laadittu suunnitelmat, ei tarkoita välttämättä että yhtäkään T-72BA vaunua olisi modernisoitu T-72B3 tai T-72B3 obr 2016 standardiin.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Intian T-90S kaupan merkityksestä UVZ:lle sekä sitä seuranneista uusista kaupoista.

Lähde:

УКБТМ 75 лет тагильской школе танкостроения- Д. Г. КОЛМАКОВ, С. В. УСТЯНЦЕВ – 2017

UKBTM 75 years of the Tagil school of tank building - D. G. Kolmakov, S. V. Ustyantsev – 2017

Seuraava teksti on käännetty kirjan sivulta 126-136, konekäännös joten käännösvirheiden tai outojen sanavalintojen mahdollisuus on ilmeinen.

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INDIAN CONTRACT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

It is no secret that a new take-off of Tagil tank building began with the “Indian contract dated February 15, 2001 for the supply of 310 T-90S tanks to India. This was preceded by a long and difficult work.

Trials in India continued for two months in 1999, under the most difficult conditions imaginable. It should be noted that the presented machines differed significantly from the basic version of the T-90S, developed in the early 1990s. The changes affected the tank chassis, FCS, protective equipment, and turret design. As already mentioned, a V-92S2 diesel engine was installed. All three tanks had different sighting and observation systems during tests. One was equipped with a Buran tank night sight manufactured by the Krasnogorsk Optical and Mechanical Plant, and the other two were equipped with Nocturne and Essa thermal imaging sights. Taken together, this tormented: “The West destroyed the Soviet Union primarily with the aim of destroying its military-industrial complex. But now the USSR is gone, and the military-industrial complex is alive and fully capable!

Meanwhile, in 1999, UKBTM presented only a very few of its developments. The West had to experience a real shock already in the 21st century provided by the T-90S tank with approximately one and a half superiority in the WTU level over the base model T-72B [1].

The test of strength, which was subjected to three Tagil T-90S tanks by the Indian military in the summer of 1999, could not stand any other combat vehicle in the world. In the Thar desert, at daytime air temperatures up to 53 degrees and at night about 30, with almost complete absence of roads, each tank traveled more than 2000 km, overcoming sand dunes 10-15 m high [2].

It was after these tests that the military attache at the Indian embassy in Moscow, Brigadier General D. Singh, said: “In terms of efficiency, the T-90S can be called the second deterrent after nuclear weapons” [3].

In the meantime, in September 1999, V.B. Domnin. Previously, he was not on the staff of the Design Bureau, but for more than thirty years he worked closely with the designers. Back in 1967, after graduating from the Omsk Tank Technical School, V. B. Domnin was sent to serve in the military acceptance and over the next thirty years he went from a senior technician to an authorized GABTU of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in the Siberian and Ural military districts. All military and engineering vehicles of UVZ of this time one way or another passed through the hands of V.B. Domnina.

Having retired in 1997, V.B. Domnin continued to work at Uralvagonzavod as First Deputy Chief Engineer. In this capacity, he participated in the testing of T-90S tanks in 1999. Returning to my, v.b. Domnin headed the design team temporarily left without a leader [4].

But back to the T-90S tank. It was first openly presented to the domestic public in Nizhny Tagil at the already mentioned arms exhibition in 1999. A characteristic detail: at the exhibition in 2000, the T-90S tank was examined and photographed for more than an hour by the famous American designer, the developer of Abrams, Philip Lett [5].

The execution of the contract was long and difficult. In the spring of 2000, the Indian Ministry of Defense informed the Parliament of the Republic of its intention to purchase more than 300 T-90S tanks for an amount exceeding $700 million. But soon there was a message that the parliamentary defense committee blocked the deal, and blamed the Russian side for this, which raised the cost of the contract per tank from $2.1 to $2.8 million. In addition, there were doubts - would Uralvagonzavod and UKBTM exist in the next 25 years? And will anyone service and upgrade the purchased tanks. Finally, all issues were agreed upon during the visit of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin to India on October 2-5, 2000. The people of Tagil still remember the personal participation of the President in the conclusion of the most important contract [6].

124 T-90S tanks were sent to India ready-made, the remaining 186 were sent as kits for subsequent assembly at the heavy engineering plant in Avadi (Tamil Nadu). According to media reports, the first Indian-assembled T-90S rolled off the assembly line on January 7, 2004. It was named "Bishma" in honor of the legendary wrestler from the epic Mahabharata. The chief of staff of the ground forces, General Nirwal Chand Vij, spoke at the solemn ceremony and highly appreciated the technical capabilities of the Russian machine entering service with the Indian army [7].

According to some reports, by this time the T-90S tanks had already shown themselves well in conflicts on the Indo-Pakistani border [8].

It should be noted that serial T-90S were equipped with the Essa thermal imaging sight, developed by the Belarusian company Peleng>> using the Catherine-FC thermal imaging camera of the French company Thales Optronic. The final assembly of the sights was carried out by the Vologda Optical and Mechanical Plant. Together with the tanks, the Indian military got the opportunity to acquire the latest tank ammunition, such as, for example, the TUR 9M119M1 with a tandem warhead [9].

Further cooperation was determined by an agreement on the licensed production of 1000 tanks for 15 years. Thus, the T-90S in the future will form the basis of India's mobile land defense. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee called the Russian-Indian contract for the T-90S “a manifestation of a stable and rapidly developing cooperation with the Russian Federation in the military and military-technical fields” [10].

The Indian contract attracted worldwide attention; other countries began to look at and order T-90S tanks. In an unexpected way, the prospects for foreign economic activity of FSUE “PO Uralvagonzavod” were predicted in 2004 by the American agency Forecast International. Calculating the prospects for world production of tanks ten years ahead, analysts from the United States came to the conclusion that Uralvagonzavod would be their leading manufacturer. It will account for more than 15% of newly assembled combat vehicles and most of those sold on the free market. Two Western corporations will retain their positions: the American General Dynamics and the German Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, as well as Chinese enterprises. But all of them will work only for their own armies, or for the Armed Forces of reliably “attached” satellites [11].

Trying to build on the success achieved with India, UKBTM, together with Uralvagonzavod, continued to promote the T-90S tank to the international arms market in the new century. This was expressed both in participation in various exhibitions and forums, and in tender trials or demonstration shows held in different countries. And everywhere the Tagil car confirmed its high technical characteristics.

For example, in the period from August 31 to October 1, 2005 in Saudi Arabia, in accordance with the agreement, for the first time in the history of relations between the two countries, a demonstration demonstration of the T-90S tank was held on the territory of the customer. To test the tank, a group of testers was formed from among the professional servicemen of the Saudi Arabian army, who are instructors for training tank crews, who underwent preliminary training in the skills of operating completely unfamiliar new combat vehicle. The training was conducted with the active participation of KB representatives. Sea trials of the tank were carried out at the test site, in a desert area. At the same time, the air temperature varied from +28°С to +54°С. Test routes were laid on loose sands, takyrs, rocky soils, dunes up to 10 meters high (3-storey house) with ascent angles up to 25-30 degrees and descent up to 40 degrees, as well as along mountainous terrain. During the tests, the T-90S tank covered 1524 km. During the movement, our specialists were constantly in the tank, who controlled the actions of the Saudi drivers. Despite the extreme operating conditions, the equipment did not disappoint. There were no failures and damages of the machine during the sea trials, and all systems, components and assemblies worked reliably. At the same time, the firing results clearly showed the possibility of a relatively rapid training of the customer's gunners in shooting using a guided weapon system. On September 19, the shooting was attended by the commander of the Southern Military District, Major General of the General Staff Omar Hasan Bibeyri, who was satisfied with the results. He considered it necessary to note that “the joint work of Russian and Saudi specialists made it possible to start real shooting in just two days of intensive training ... the successful completion of fire tasks indicates that the design of the Russian T-90S tank is indeed simple and reliable” [12].

The contracts were not long in coming. We present only some of the information gleaned from the open press.

In 2009, the first contract was completed (prepared around 2006-2007 Dah) for the supply of 185 tanks to Algeria; and in the fall of 2011 a new one was signed for another 120 tanks. His execution continued throughout 2012. It should be noted in particular that Algeria acquired T-90S tanks with an improved FCS, including, among other things, an automatic target tracking machine. These machines also have an air conditioner [13].

In 2010, a contract was signed for the supply of T-90S tanks to Turkmenistan [14].

Under the 2010 contract, Uganda received a batch of T-90S in 2011-2012 [15].

As a result, the Tagil "product" became the best-selling among the newly manufactured MBTs in the world for the period 2001-2010. Thanks to the T-90 tank, in 2008 Uralvagonzavod took the 90th position in the world list of the largest arms exporting firms, and in 2009 it rose to the 67th place [16].

The T-90S model of 1999 created a precedent that was unthinkable in Soviet tank building: the export vehicle became the basis for the development of the MBT of the Russian army.

In 2004, UKBTM and Uralvagonzavod again received a state defense order. A little later, on April 15, 2005, by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the T-90A tank was adopted and put into mass production - with a welded turret, a 1000-horsepower engine, and starting from 2006 with a thermal imaging sight. Up to 2010, according to the open press, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation received about 290 vehicles [17].

Simultaneously with the T-90A tank, a new modification of the 125 mm 2A46M-5 smoothbore gun was put into service. It differed from its predecessor by a 15% greater accuracy of combat, and the total vibrational dispersion during firing on the move with the introduction of the new system decreased by 1.7 times [18].

Additional capabilities of the weapon system of the T-90A tank are provided by products developed by the Nizhny Novgorod Central Research Institute Burevestnik. In 2000, the test vehicle (KPM) 1037 "Tug" was adopted for the supply of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The wheelbase is equipped with everything necessary to drive ordering the main armament of the MBT - from a device for mechanical cleaning of the barrel to an opto-electronic system for monitoring the curvature of the barrel with direct transmission of information to a computer and an air flow velocity simulator for testing a wind sensor. KPM can also be used as a workplace for the commander of the armament and technical support service, since its computer contains a lot of reference information [19].

In 2007, the KPM was modernized, receiving the code 1037M, and the composition of the equipment has changed significantly. In particular, a stationary and very large on-board computer was replaced by a secure and more productive laptop (control unit BU 38) [20].

It remains to add that the majority of T-90A tanks are serving in the most explosive and armed conflict-prone border regions of our country, and even outside it, for example, at the Russian military base in Abkhazia [21].

In November 2015, T-90A tanks, along with older vehicles of the 1992 model, entered the battle for the Syrian city of Aleppo. The tankers of the government army received orders for 15 vehicles, which very quickly gained fame as the most powerful and almost invulnerable tanks in this war. The Internet and the media instantly filled the pictures and videos of the shelling of the "nineties" by various ATGMs - without serious consequences for them [22].

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Tuossa on paljon mielenkiintoista asiaa, mutta poimin siitä yhden lyhyen pätkän (alleviivaus minun):

In 2004, UKBTM and Uralvagonzavod again received a state defense order. A little later, on April 15, 2005, by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the T-90A tank was adopted and put into mass production - with a welded turret, a 1000-horsepower engine, and starting from 2006 with a thermal imaging sight. Up to 2010, according to the open press, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation received about 290 vehicles [17].

Tämän lähteeksi on merkitty:

17. Независимое военное обозрение. 2012. № 35

17. Independent military review. 2012. No. 35

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Jos katsoo aikaisempaa viestiä, laskin Vasiliy Fofanov vanhan nettisivun tarjoamista vuosituotantomääristä sekä Steve Zalogan kirjan tiedoista, että Venäjän asevoimille olisi valmistettu T-90A vaunuja aikavälillä 2004-2010 seuraavat määrät: LINKKI

T-90A Buran-M / T-90AK Buran-M = 32 kpl
T-90A ESSA / T-90AK ESSA = 247 kpl

Näiden summa on 279 kpl.

Tuo laskelma nojaa enemmän Fofanovin sivulta saatuihin vuosituotantomääriin ja lainaa Zalogalta ainoastaan vuodet jolloin Buran-M ja ESSA-tähtäimillä varustetut vaunut olivat tuotannossa (Zaloga ei ole ainoa lähde, joka on kirjoittanut tästä). Vaahtosin aikaisemmassa viestissä T-90A vaunujen valmistusmääristä ja eri lähteiden epäloogisista kirjoituksista: LINKKI

Yllä lainatun mukaan vaunuja olisi valmistunut "noin 290 kpl", olkoon se yksi lähde lisää näiden muiden jatkoksi.

Oletan että 285-289 kpl olisi sellainen vaihteluväli jonka voi hyvin pyöristää ylöspäin kategoriaan "noin 290 kpl". Toki teoriassa mikä määrä tahansa yli 280 kpl voisi pyöristää myös ylöspäin, mutta vaatii hieman käsitteen venytystä.

Ukrainan sodassa on nähty että Venäjä käytti ainakin muutamaa T-90S vaunua. Arvatenkin näitä on valmistettu ainakin messuja varten, kun pitää olla omia / UVZ:n käyttöön tarkoitettuja esittelyvaunuja. Lisäksi voisi kuvitella että Venäjän asevoimat olisivat saattaneet haluta muutaman ulkomaisten sopimusten mukaan valmistetun T-90S / T-90SA vaunun itselleen, jos ei muusta syystä niin testikäyttöön. En ole aikaisemmin nähnyt luuloja / tietoja / arvauksia että heidän asevoimillaan olisi virallisesti käytössä näitä vaunuja, joten oletan että määrä olisi pienehkö, ehkä jotain väliltä 3-10 kpl - tämä on minun arvaus ilman lähteitä.

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En voi olla palaamatta tähän kommenttiin, jossa ohimennen mainitaan T-90 vaunut, tämä on lainaus tämän ketjun aikaisemmasta viestistä: LINKKI

Tässä vielä yksi lähde pureksittavaksi, silmäilin Alexei Khlopotov / Aleksey Khlopotov / Алексей Хлопотов (tunnetaan nimimerkistä Gur Khan) blogia ja siellä on julkaistu kirjoitus helmikuussa 2020, jossa jutellaan uusien asejärjestelmien toimituksista. Lainaan siitä pätkän (alleviivaus minun): LÄHDE

The volume of deliveries of armored vehicles to the Ground Forces is defined as 400 new and modernized models. Among them are T-72BZM tanks with domestic sighting systems, T-90M Proryv-3, T-80BVM and infantry fighting vehicles BMP-1AM. The T-90M "Proryv-3" is distinguished by impenetrable protection, an automated fire control system and a forced engine. The first tanks are already entering the troops. Now the Ground Forces have about 400 T-90 tanks of various modifications. In accordance with the state contract signed in the summer of 2019, all of them will be modernized. In general, the complete renewal of the tank fleet is considered by the military department as one of the priorities of the procurement policy for the next five years.

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Tuo ei tietysti välttämättä tarkoita, että T-90 ja T-90A vaunuja olisi valmistettu Venäjän asevoimille 400 kpl. Sanamuotoja voi väännellä ja käännellä ja keksiä tuolle erilaisia merkityksiä: aktiivijoukkojen käytössä olevien vaunujen määrä, kirjoitushetkellä olemassaolevien määrä mutta osa romutettu ennen sitä jne jne. Silti ei voi olla vertaamatta minun aikaisempaan tuumailuun, jonka lopputulema oli 404 vaunua. Kummallinen sattuma vain vai voisiko tosiaan olla että T-90 obr 1992 ja T-90A vaunuja kaikkinensa, komentovaunut mukaanluettuna olisi valmistettu Venäjän omille joukoille noin 400 kpl?

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T-90 obr 1992 vaunujen valmistusmääräksi näkee usein 120-125 kpl ja pidän tätä uskottavana. JOS ottaa lainauksen kirjaimellisesti eli "Venäjän armeijalla on 400 kpl T-90 perheen vaunuja" niin silloin numerot täsmäävät kohtuu mukavasti:

120 + 279 = 399
125 + "noin 290" = "noin 415"

Aikaisemmin oli puhetta, että osa T-90M vaunuista voisi olla uustuotantoa. Toisaalta samassa lainauksessa sanottiin että alunperin oli tilattu 10 kpl uustuotantona ja loput olivat vanhojen vaunujen modernisointia. Asiaa on pyritty hämärtämään ja sumuttamaan, MUTTA jos olettaa että valtaosa olisi tosiaan vanhempien T-90 vaunujen modernisointia ja pieni määrä, ehkä tuo 10 kpl uustuotantoa, niin silloin voisi todella pitää paikkansa, että T-90 obr 1992 ja T-90A kokonaisvalmistusmäärä olisi "noin 400 kpl" (Venäjän asevoimien käyttöön valmistetut vaunut).

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Tämä seuraava on kirjasta УКБТМ 75 лет тагильской школе танкостроения- Д. Г. КОЛМАКОВ, С. В. УСТЯНЦЕВ – 2017, suora lainaus sivuilta 115 ja 116 (alleviivaukset minun):

In December 1992, the first batch of 13 T-90 tanks was assembled at Uralvagonzavod.

During its production, problems arose with the Agava-2 thermal imager. It was very expensive, and the plant had already lost working capital and could not afford to purchase such products at its own expense. As a result, only 2 tanks in the pilot batch had a thermal imager [24].

The commander's version of the T-90K was put into service by order of the Minister of Defense No. 034 dated June 3, 1994 [25].

In 1993, serial production of T-90 tanks began. We do not have exact data on how many of these machines were built and delivered to the Russian armed forces, but it is obvious that, by Soviet standards, very few. Information in the open press is very contradictory, the figures for the total release fluctuate between 120 and 250 machines. In fact, all of them were concentrated in two Siberian divisions [26].


Tämä puolestaan on saman kirjan sivulta 108 (alleviivaus minun):

The crisis and the collapse of the Soviet Union had a severe impact on tank building. The new Russian government, which is in euphoria from reconciliation with the West, modern weapons, and armored vehicles in particular, were not needed. According to the open press, the production of tanks for the Russian army in 1992 amounted to 600 vehicles, in 1993 - 150, in 1994 - 60 and in 1995 - 50 units. Then the orders stopped altogether [4].

As applied to Uralvagonzavod, it all looked as follows: the state order for combat vehicles for 1990 amounted to 51% of the 1988 level and continued to decline in subsequent years. In 1992, the volume of production of military products at the plant was approximately 25%, as in 1994 - only 2.15% of the stable 1986 level. In the second half of the 1990s, there were years when the state ordered nothing at all [5].


Tuon lisäksi samasta kirjasta löytyy seuraava lainaus kirjan lopusta, siellä on suuri taulukko jossa listataan UKBTM suunnitelmien mukaan rakennettuja sarjatuotantovaunuja ja testiyksilöitä. T-90 obr 1992 vaunu löytyy sivulta 193, siitä kirjotietaan näin (alleviivaus minun):

Adopted by the Russian Army by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of October 5, 1992 (Order of the Minister of Defense of April 28, 1993). In December of the same year, an initial batch of tanks was made. Serial production was carried out at JSC NPK Uralvagonzavod in the period from 1993 to 1995. The T-90 was the first mass-produced tank equipped with the OEP TShU-1 complex.

Toki nämä kaikki perustuvat "avoimiin lähteisiin" joten osa voi olla totta, tai sitten kaikki tai sitten ei yksikään. JOS uskotaan se että Venäjän valtio ei olisi tilannut yhtäkään Omskin vaunua aikavälillä 1993-1995 JA jos samalla uskotaan yllä kerrotut tilausmäärät, niin silloin T-90 obr 1992 kokonaismäärä voisi olla:

1992: 13
1993: 150
1994: 60
1995: 50

Näiden summa on 273 kpl.

Toisaalta mitä enemmän lukee Venäjän panssarivaunutuotannosta Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen, sitä selvemmäksi tulee että Omsk ei luovuttanut ilman tappelua. En siksi usko hetkeäkään että UVZ olisi kyennyt kaappaamaan Venäjän armeijan kutistuvat tilausmäärät 100% itselleen.

Kuten kirjoitin aikaisemmin, T-90 obr 1992 valmistusmääräksi kuulee usein 120-125 kpl ja pidän tätä määrää uskottavana. Todellinen valmistusmäärä ja vuosituotantomäärät ovat tietysti UVZ:n tiedossa, mutta niitä ei ole kerrottu julki. Koska tieto on salainen, eri kirjat tanssivat tämän numeron ympärillä, kuten tuossa yllekin lainatussa pätkässä.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Neuvostoliiton panssarivaunujen viennistä, T-72 vaunujen valmistuksesta ulkomailla sekä "menetetyistä mahdollisuuksista" millä tarkoitetaan tilaisuuksia läheisempään yhteistyöhön mm. Tsekkoslovakian tutkimus- ja tuotekehityksen kanssa (tämä yhteistyö olisi voinut olla syvempää).

Lähde:

УКБТМ 75 лет тагильской школе танкостроения- Д. Г. КОЛМАКОВ, С. В. УСТЯНЦЕВ – 2017

UKBTM 75 years of the Tagil school of tank building - D. G. Kolmakov, S. V. Ustyantsev – 2017

Seuraava teksti on käännetty kirjan sivulta 99-107, konekäännös joten käännösvirheiden tai outojen sanavalintojen mahdollisuus on ilmeinen.

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TANKS FOR FRIENDS AND ALLIES

Starting from 1953, military-technical cooperation with foreign states was carried out by the Main Engineering Directorate (GIU), which at various times was part of various foreign economic ministries and state committees of the USSR. Among other things, the tasks of the SMI included both the supply of finished armored vehicles and the sale of licenses and the organization of licensed production [19].

The implementation abroad of medium tanks T-54 / T-55 and T-62 did not create special problems for the Uralvagonzavod and its “department 520”, since it was about the supply of ordinary serial products. A completely different picture emerged with the export “seventy-two”. The fact is that these were the only Soviet MBTs available to foreign customers, and they differed both from the vehicles for the Soviet army and from each other.

The very idea of developing an export version of the T-72 and delivering it to the countries of the socialist camp and the third world stemmed from the same struggle of party and economic clans for the right to equip the Soviet army. Let us give just one story, told in the memoirs of the director of Uralvagonzavod in 1969-1979, I.F. Krutyakova:

"D. F. Ustinov, having become the Minister of Defense of the USSR, he visited India and donated a large batch of T-72 tanks, and also gave an obligation to build and equip a tank plant in India for large-scale production of T-72 tanks. Upon his return from India, the Minister of Defense convened the Military Council of the USSR, to which I was also invited. At this Military Council, he announced that he had signed an agreement with the Indian government for the supply of 5,000 T-72 tanks to India... But in India in 1977 a new party came to power and the government changed. The new government refused to pay, citing the mistake of its predecessors” [20].

It is obvious that the production of 5,000 export tanks would eliminate Uralvagonzavod from the list of suppliers of military equipment for the Soviet Armed Forces for several years. Recall that the production in 1976 was only 1017 tanks [21].

Having completely switched Uralvagonzavod to export and gradually transferring the Kharkov plant to the production of T-80 tanks, D.F. Ustinov turned the "eighties" into the only MBT of the USSR. But India refused Ustinov's “gift”, and the organization of the production of the T-80 in Kharkov ran into great difficulties and dragged on for almost a decade. I had to continue to produce and deliver to the Armed Forces of the USSR both the gradually obsolete “sixty-fours” and the “seventy-twos” unloved by Ustinov.

But even after the failure of the first Indian contract, Uralvagonzavod retained the obligation to arm its allies under the Warsaw Pact and friendly third world countries. The joint protocol of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the CPSU of January 5, 1978 authorized the sale of T-72 tanks and the transfer of technical documentation to the CMEA countries and developing countries [22].

In this regard, all modifications of the T-72 created in Nizhny Tagil had their own tailor-made version with a reduced level of protection, as well as other sights and ammunition compared to vehicles for the Soviet army of the same time. For the first time, the design of the “seventy-two” was redesigned for export deliveries back in 1975. But officially, the first version of the export tank “object 172M-E” was created on the basis of a joint decision of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Defense Industry, the State Committee for Economic Cooperation and the State Planning Committee of the USSR dated January 13, 1978. The way for external supplies was opened by the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 259-RS dated February 10 of the same year. Later export analogues of the T-72A were the T-72M and T-72M1 vehicles, which were sold starting from 1980 and 1983, respectively. In 1987, an export version of the T-72B tank - T-72S was developed.

In fact, there were many more export variants of the T-72, they had a factory code "E" with a development number number. T-72S, manufactured for Iran, was designated "172M-E8” - i.e. export tank of the eighth modification. There were many differences between them: monolithic towers and with a sand layer, optical and laser rangefinder sights, etc., etc., and all this in different combinations for different countries [23].

Uralvagonzavod sent the first export vehicles in 1978 to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, India and Algeria. In total, in the period 1978-1981, it was planned to manufacture about 500 combat vehicles for foreign consumers. By the beginning of the 21st century, export modifications of the T-72 tank produced by Uralvagonzavod alone were in service with the armies of 16 countries of the world [24].


TAGIL "SEEDLINGS"

The history of the transfer of Soviet machine-building technologies abroad requires a separate and very detailed study. An obvious feature of the domestic industrial culture is its high adaptability, which is understood in two senses: both as the ability to accept and assimilate other people's achievements, and as the ability to inculcate one's technologies on foreign soil. Moreover, to instill fully, and not only in the form of the notorious “screwdriver assembly”.

For the post-war Uralvagonzavod, this work began with the supply of drawing and technical documentation for the T-34-85 tank.

It is known that back in 1945, the Soviet government decided to transfer to China a license for the production of "thirty-four" [25]. However, the project did not take place - - devastated by decades of civil wars and battles with the Japanese invaders, the country was unable to produce such complex products.

Therefore, the first licenses for the "thirty-four" in 1950 were received and used at that time by much more developed Poland and Czechoslovakia. So, the Prague company "ČKD" during 1952-1956 at its new plant named after Stalin in Martin (Slovakia) manufactured 1785 T-34-85 tanks. The indicators of the Polish plant "Bumar" were noticeably more modest [26].

Design support for the production of tanks of the T-54 type required the personal participation of the Tanil people. Moreover, they did not act on behalf of the Design Bureau, but were seconded to the SMI.

It is known that in 1956, complete sets of documentation for the T-54A tank were transferred to three countries - Poland, Czechoslovakia and China. Before that, in the winter of 1955-1956, groups of Czech and Polish specialists visited the USSR to get acquainted with the production. All design documentation was prepared by the Nizhny Tagil plant No. 183, but the Soviet leadership did not dare to show its kilometer-long assembly shops even to the allies. Both delegations went to Omsk to plant No. 174 [27].

In the catalog of personalities of the UVZ Museum, it is noted that from August 1956 to August 1958, a team of Soviet specialists in putting the T-54 tank into production in Czechoslovakia was led by V.K. Baidakov, and V.N. Venediktov in 1958-1960 did the same in China. Mastered under the leadership of the latter, the T-54A tank (under the Chinese designation Type 59) was produced at the plant in Baotou until 1987 [28].

The next stage of international cooperation is related to the main battle tank T-72. Its design and production technologies are a pronounced domestic product, but at the same time they were perfectly transplanted into foreign soil. For twenty years, from the end of the 1970s to the end of the 1990s, UKBTM and Uralvagonzavod, together with several domestic technological institutes, managed to grow a whole “flower garden” of foreign enterprises capable of independently producing T-72 tanks and improve their design.

The transfer of licenses and technical documentation for the production of T-72 tanks to the People's Republic of Poland and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was first approved by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the CCCP No. 1420-rs of June 24, 1976. The corresponding order for the Ministry of Defense Industry was issued on July 14 of the same 1976. At Uralvagonzavod, the preparation of documentation began in August. It was planned that the task would be completed by the end of April 1977 [29].

This was followed by a joint protocol of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated January 5, 1978, which approved and allowed the transfer of technical documentation to some countries for organizing their own production of export modifications of the T-72 tank [30].

According to General Yu.M. Potapov, who participated in the transfer of technological and design documentation for T-72 tanks to socialist countries, the corresponding plants in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were designed to produce up to 250 vehicles per year [31].

Poland and Czechoslovakia were the first to organize their own production. Curiously, the West learned about this as early as 1978, although the Czechoslovak and Polish “seventy-twos” began to leave the factories in 1981 and 1982, respectively [32].

In Czechoslovakia, the production of “seventy-Twos” was carried out by two factories of the ZTS company: in the city of Dubnitsa (manufacturing of the tower) and the city of Martin (chassis and final assembly). In total, during the period from 1981 to 1991, they managed to assemble 1,782 tanks. Design of the support MBT in 1978-1982 was carried out here by A.S. Shchelgachev [33].

In Poland, until 1994, the Urzadzen Mechanicznych Bumar-Labedy plant for the production of armored vehicles in the city of Gliwice produced 1610 tanks of the T-72 type [34].

Yugoslavia received about 50 Tagil-built T-72 tanks back in 1979, but its own production of a slightly modified version, called the M-84, began in 1983. In total, according to Western data, Yugoslavia managed to build about 700 tanks by the beginning of 1991 [35].

In 1988, by order of the Ministry of Defense Industry No. 423 of July 8, the sale of a license for the T-72M to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was allowed with the organization of mass production in 1991, but the project was not implemented and remained on paper [ 36].

The turn of non-socialist partners in the tank business came a little later. The sale of the license and technical documentation for the T-72 tank to India was approved by Order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 464 dated March 13, 1982. In Nizhny Tagil, the matter was taken seriously in 1984. In May, a team of chief specialists was created to promptly resolve issues related to the development of the production of T-72 tanks in India [37].

The first self-assembled T-72M1 tanks rolled off the assembly line of the plant in the Indian city of Avadi at the turn of 1987-1988. Sets of assemblies and parts were supplied from the USSR, but it was planned to gradually increase the share of Indian-made parts to 97%. Apparently, this problem was not completely solved until the end of production of the T-72 in 1994. In total, the plant in Avadi assembled 1068 "seventy twos" [38].

It remains to add that in 1990-1992 a group of Tagil specialists, who started to put into serial production of the T-72 tank in India, was headed by S.P. Zagurovsky [39].

Iraq was next to receive the license for the T-72. Uralvagonzavod took up the preparation of documentation on the basis of the order of the Ministry of Defense Industry No. 384 dated July 27, 1986. In addition to drawings and technical descriptions, in 1988-1990 UVZ was supposed to send up to 100 sets of components and assemblies to Iraq, but we have no evidence of this. In 1990, the assembly of tanks was already starting at the plant in Taji, but was almost immediately curtailed due to international sanctions after the attack on Kuwait [40].

The rest of the countries that did not receive their own production of T-72 tanks, but had a fleet of such vehicles, the USSR helped in the arrangement of repair enterprises. Thus, at the beginning of 1982, UKBTM and Uralvagonzavod received an order (according to the order of the Minister of Defense Industry No. 703 dated December 8, 1981) to provide technical assistance in retrofitting and transferring technical documentation to tank repair plants in Bulgaria and the GDR. Another Ministerial Order No. 702 dated December 8, 1981 ordered that the same be done for developing countries that received "seventy-twos" [41].


LOST OPPORTUNITIES

By investing forces, resources and intelligence in the tank building of Eastern Europe, the USSR could count not only on a certain number of combat vehicles for the Warsaw Pact countries. In the end, Czech tank building proved its maturity back in the first half of the 1940s, albeit in the service of the German Wehrmacht. The experience of German scientists and engineers in the USSR was used in the most shameless way, why not do the same with specialists from Eastern Europe?

However, common sense recedes always and everywhere when Her Majesty secrecy comes into play. The Ministry of Defense stopped all attempts to cooperate in promising areas. We do not have data for the 1970-1980s: the funds of the Ministry of Defense Industry have not yet been opened. But for the 1950s and 1960s, the situation is known, and it cannot be called otherwise than insulting.

Head of the 5th Department of the Commission for Military-Technical Cooperation G. Myshkov greeted his leaders in a note dated June 4, 1959:

“Some of the countries, in particular Czechoslovakia and Poland, stubbornly raise the issue of including in the subject of research and development work related to new technology and technology that goes beyond the scope of transferred licenses , but for reasons beyond our control, due to restrictions, we are forced to bypass this issue without going into details, which inevitably gives rise to a feeling of suspicion and distrust among representatives of the countries participating in the meeting” [42].

Forcing constructors. Czechoslovakia and Poland to deal with minor or already resolved topics in the USSR, the Soviet leadership overloaded the already few domestic design bureaus. Meanwhile, the allies offered assistance on very significant problems. Thus, in the R&D plans for 1960, Polish colleagues announced their intentions to develop a stereoscopic rangefinder with partial automation of aiming the gun of the T-54A tank and a gas turbine engine running on diesel fuel with a capacity of 850 hp. The draft plan of Czechoslovakia included the mechanization of loading the “fifty-four” cannon. However, in the conclusions of the Soviet side, the impossibility of providing technical assistance “due to lack of experience” was invariably noted, although work on the creation of both range finders and turbines had been going on for more than a decade [43].

Despite the pettiness imposed and the need to reinvent what had already been created in the USSR, the allies sometimes managed to surprise the Soviet side. This is evidenced, for example, by the “Conclusion of the Soviet side based on the materials of the delegation of Czechoslovakia on the tank rangefinder sight “Tandal” dated August 29, 1961. Here it is almost in full:

1. The Czechoslovak side has done a lot of useful work, outlining a way to improve the efficiency of aimed shooting from serial tanks T-54A and T-55. The rangefinder-sight "Tandal" introduced a new unit for tank instrumentation - a computing device for accounting and automatic input into the aiming angle of corrections for the drop in the initial velocity of the projectile, charge temperature and ambient temperature.

2. The use of the rangefinder-sight "Tandal" in combination with the stabilizer of the tank gun can significantly increase the combat qualities of the tank and therefore it is advisable to recommend further work in Czechoslovakia on this rangefinder and placing it in the tank. It would be expedient to develop and manufacture prototypes of the device in Czechoslovakia, suitable for placement in T-54A and T-55 tanks without significant alterations of these tanks and reducing their combat characteristics.

3. The rangefinder-sight "Tandal" in its current form cannot be installed in tanks produced in the Soviet Union without a fundamental alteration of the turrets and an increase in the weight of the tanks.

4. Recommend that the Czechoslovak side continue work on the Tandal rangefinder sight in order to create prototypes of the device and install them in serial T-54A and T-55 tanks.

At the same time, the characteristics of the armor resistance of the turrets, as well as the maneuverability and driving characteristics of the tanks, must be preserved. It is advisable to introduce a mechanism for automatically entering corrections for the course of your tank into the rangefinder-sight "Tandal".

The Soviet side asks for permission from the Czechoslovak side to use its developments on the Tandal rangefinder sight in carrying out research and development work in the Soviet Union-3e [44].

But here we see the exception rather than the rule.
 
"Military history visualized" -Youtube-kanavan video nimeltä "Where are Russia's T-80s?" (video julkaistu 15.11.2022):


Kirjoitin videosta minua kiinnostavimman osuuden alle (videon aikaväli 8:43 - 12:13)

Tämä ”osuus” on otsikoitu: ”Something does not add up...”

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While looking at the various numbers for the T-80s, I stumbled upon an interesting discrepancy. Namely that about 2 000 T-80 tanks seem to be unaccounted for.

According to Russian sources the Soviet Union built 7 066 from 1976 to 1990 whereas Zaloga notes 7 111, based on the latest Russian publications.

Although be aware that in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed in November 1990 a far lower number was given by the Russians.

Total T-80 production was probably more than the 4 874 tanks reported under the CFE Treaty, as none were listed in the Ukraine, even though about 320 were at the Kharkov plant, and there were probably some T-80s at the Omsk plant as well (Zaloga, S. T-80 Standard Tank: The Soviet Armyäs Last Champion, Osprey Publishing: Oxford, UK, 2009, p. 28)

Meanwhile the numbers from Andrey Tarasenko added up to a count for 6 234 according to TacError.

Furthermore in an e-mail exchange, Steven Zaloga noted that the number only accounts for the Soviet Union. There might have been a few more produced later but it is hard to tell.

Meanwhile someone else noted that this number could have been inflated as well due to corruption and meeting production quotas.

So this raises already a major eyebrow, since one of those numbers is clearly wrong, since the difference between produced numbers and reported numbers for the Treaty is 2 237 tanks.

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(kuvakaappaus videon ajanhetkeltä 10:40)

And keep in mind, this was the best Soviet tank.

It is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union lost more than 2 000 tanks from 1976 to 1990 since the T-80 was not used in any war the Soviet Union participated in. For instance in Afghanistan, other tanks were used.

And to put that number in context, according to Oryx, the Russian forces so far have lost about 1 460 tanks in Ukraine yet that accounts for ALL TYPES.

Be aware that loss / kill claims are always just a guideline, I did many videos on this before.

Anyway, the point is losing about 2 000 tanks in non-combat situations, particularly the best one in the Armed Force is basically a bit odd.

So I contacted several people about this. Basically there are two kinds of explanations which I think are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

One side thinks that the Russian production numbers are just overstated. This is particularly interesting since English Wikipedia notes just 5 400+ T-80 produced while Russian Wikipedia now lists more than 10 000 T-80s built, although this might include post-Cold War tanks as well.

Yet according to Zaloga the total number should be about 7 600 T-80s from 1976 to 1996.

The other explanation from Steve Zaloga, he noted that the CFE Treaty only counted tanks west of the Urals. Additionally, the counting rules might not require tanks that were still in the plants, for instance he notes that no T-80UD were shown in the tables, likely since they were still at the Kharkov plant. Furthermore the Omsk plant in Siberia is located east of the Urals.

He also noted that US officials suspected that the Russians might deliberately have moved large numbers of their most modern tanks, like the T-80, east of the Urals as well.

But I guess this is something for the future.

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Hän kirjoittaa videon viimeisellä dialla seuraavasti:

Thanks to Steven Zaloga, TacError, Stan, Andrew, Ketti, Tankolad & Tobias!

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Silmäilin videon kommentteja ja poimin niistä muutaman tähän alle. En ota kantaa, olenko samaa vai eri mieltä, lähinnä kokosin tähän muutaman jotka kiinnittivät huomioni:

KittyCatC

One thing to consider. Soviet Union "tank" production numbers also include "knock down kits" which were basically everything but the actual hull and turret castings. The parts would be mounted on the tank and the tank tested in order to ensure the "tank" worked and then it would be sent for disassembly with the hulls and turrets being sent back to the factory for assembly. This would likely account for several hundred to a thousand of the tanks that are missing from the declared numbers as they arent really a tank but were still produced.

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Daniel Bromwich

With regards to the large numbers discrepancies; As you mentioned earlier in your video it's possible that the high cost and maintenance requirements of the turbine engine mean that there are many t-80's in storage that have engines that are unfit for service and haven't been replaced or repaired due to cost. Also, it's possible that when a T-80B, for example, it restored and updated to T-80BVM standard that is being counted as an additional production number. so a T-80B that was updated to a BV and then subsequently to a BVM could be counted 3 times.

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Mate Vodopija

I think the problem is much more simple - lack of gas turbine engines, russia didn't produce any after 1990 and they were maintaining the fleet by cannibalizing the spare stock ( us did the same with abrams turbines) so now they probably have lots more hulls than available engines

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Kora Na

You can go directly to the Russian source for that number on wikipedia. Where you will see, they directly mention not a tank, but an engine " GTD - 1000 / 1250 " , so it's not just T80 but a plethora of Tanks and machines with that name... which Russian wikipedia assumes that any vehicle with that engine is a T80, which is incorrect. The actual number of all of the T80 tanks produced and all of it's modifications would be not more than 8 thousand. Surviving to this day T 80s would be no more than a few thousand - 3k - 4k no more.

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Lee Miller

Or maybe the missing tanks where used as spare parts as it being a new technology parts might not have been available or funds to make them.

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R Hammond

Why not ask the question.....were the purchase/build numbers for the T-80s true, or was the actual number made/delivered....half of what they claim? I would suggest that a significant number produced/built....ended up sold to other countries, and were never in the Russian inventory as they claim.

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hegoyoutubination

I don't mean to offend, I'm sorry if did so, but I think it would be more appropriate to ask a russian tanker, not a ukrainian one, about russian tanks, but whatever, you do you. So, anyway:

1. A significant number of T-80s in storage (around 20-30%) were cannibalized and still are being cannibalized for spare parts; The same is with T-64s in Russia.

2. As noted by mr. Zeitzev, some number was ill-treated and are now unfit in any way (they are scrap metal at best), despite being listed as a stored tank.

3. T-80s are being taken out of storage and modernised, but not all of them to T-80BVM standart, some to just T-80BV (there is a significant number of T-80Bs in stock). It is done by 3 plants these days. Russian military concept here is Replace with Closest - if you lose your tank, new one you get is the same variant or older one of the same tank, because of training reasons, like noted by you about Chechen war mistakes.

4. It is a wide misconception in the West that thermal sights and advanced computer optics are the main strong point of a tank. Actually, there are drones, recce vehicles and inf to go and check things. 2 main traits demanded from a tank are either mobility (in urban combat) or accuracy (for field combat). This is why T-80BVM is the best regarded among russian tanks, as it is quite agile during street fighting and has a decent enough optical sights as well as advanced AT missile to hit targets from enclosed positions up to 5 kilometers, sometimes working as a makeshift howitzer rather than a tank.
 
Venäläisen Altyn73 artikkeli, jossa käsitellään T-72B3 modernisoinnin kymmenvuotista historiaa (artikkeli julkaistu 24.9.2021):

10 years of the T-72B3 tank

  • Sep. Wednesday, 24th, 2021 at 4:26 PM

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Tank T-72B3 from the 333rd training center for combat use (Nizhny Novgorod region) as an "aggressor" at the exercises "West-2021", September 2021, photo © Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on October 25, 2011 on the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian

Federation the following message appeared:

“In accordance with the rearmament plan, the troops of the Southern Military District (SMD) continue to receive modern models of weapons and military equipment. Today , a train with modernized T-72B tanks equipped with modern powerful rocket and cannon weapons, the latest communications equipment and effective fire control systems arrived at the Khankala railway station for a motorized rifle unit stationed in the Chechen Republic .Representatives of OJSC NPK Uralvagonzavod, who arrived with the equipment, will help the personnel of the unit to master all the innovations and features of the operation of the modernized tanks. As a result of the intensive supply of weapons and military equipment, the fleet of combat vehicles of motorized rifle formations stationed on the territory of the Chechen Republic, until the end of November this year. will be completely renovated.”

The exact date of release of the first serial model of the T-72B3 tank is unknown to me, but it can be assumed that this event took place at the Uralvagonzavod enterprise in September 2011. I think I won’t be mistaken if I say that the 10th anniversary of the most massive vehicle of the Russian tank forces has already has come. With what I want to congratulate all my readers!

Below under the cut is my purely biased note on the history of the T-72B3 tank over the past ten years.

Specialists of the Ural Design Bureau of Transport Engineering in 2011 developed a project for the modernization of the T-72B tank in several versions. The option selected by the military department was put into production at the Nizhny Tagil enterprise Uralvagonzavod. In 2014 and 2016, new options for upgrading the T-72B tanks were developed and put into production. Nowadays, it has become a practice to designate modernized vehicles of various options as “T-72B3 tank (2011 model)”, “T-72B3 tank (2014 model)” and “T-72B3 tank (2016 model)”, but officially all options are called strictly T-72B3.

On October 25, 2011, the first batch of modernized tanks (at least ten vehicles) arrived at the location of the tank battalion of the 17th motorized rifle brigade (Shali, Chechen Republic).

November 1, 2011 on the LiveJournal page of the famous Nizhny Tagil athlete Natalya Ragozina, photographs of a visit to Uralvagonzavod were published, where, among other things, new T-72B3 tanks are captured. It is believed that these are the very first pictures of the tank published on the Web. February 3, 2012 on the Zvezda TV channel for the first time shows the new tanks of the 17th motorized rifle brigade
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It is worth noting that the correct name of the T-72B3 tank appeared in open sources only in December 2013. Before that, there were various options for the name - “modernized T-72B tank”, “T-72BM tank” and even met “T-72B1”. Unfortunately, on television they still confuse the number "three" with the letter "ze" and on the air the name "tank te seventy-two be ze" is constantly pronounced aloud, even on the departmental channel "Zvezda".

In May 2012, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and JSC Scientific and Production Corporation Uralvagonzavod entered into an agreement on the supply of a modernized tank to the troops. The cost of upgrading one tank amounted to just over 52 million rubles. Deliveries under the agreement began in December 2012.
Since 2013, work on the modernization of T-72B tanks to the level of T-72B3 has also been carried out at the Omsktransmash enterprise.

The troops received tanks in battalion sets - three companies, ten tanks each. There are 30 tanks in total.

In 2011-2015 troops received 13 sets for rearmament. Unloading thirty T-72B3 tanks for the 38th motorized rifle brigade (Yekaterinoslavka, Amur Region) December 2013 source Since 2015, the number of tanks in the set has changed - the number of companies has increased to four. There are 40 tanks in total. In 2015-2016 troops received 7 sets for rearmament.
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Tank T-72B3 no. 548 of the fourth tank company of the tank battalion of the 74th motorized rifle brigade during the exercise, 2019. © Aleksey Kitaev


In 2016, the formation of six tank companies in the units of the Airborne Forces was announced. Subsequently, all companies were consolidated into tank battalions, which confirms the fact that all 60 tanks were received.

A certain number of tanks (at least ten) were delivered to the training centers of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

In April 2017, photographs of T-72B3 tanks in the Syrian Arab Republic as part of pro-government military formations were made public. According to my estimate, at least ten tanks of new production were delivered.

Thus, for the period 2011-2016. At least 750 T-72B3 tanks of the 2011 model were shipped to the troops and for export.

Since 2017, in connection with the re-equipment with other equipment, T-72B3 tanks were withdrawn from eight battalions. One tank battalion disbanded. In total, about 280 tanks dropped out. Of these, according to my estimates, about 150 vehicles entered service with the newly formed and super-troop replenishment of existing units. So, until September 2021, the battalions of the 21st and 205th motorized rifle brigades received the battalions of the 21st and 205th motorized rifle brigades in addition to the staff, the fourth supernumerary company was received by the tank battalion of the 138th motorized rifle brigade.

205-72-3-559-115-2020-1
Tank T-72B3 b / n 559 of the supernumerary fifth tank company of the tank battalion of the 205th motorized rifle brigade during the exercises, 2020

T-72B3 tanks are armed with the newly formed two tank battalions of the 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division, separate tank battalions of the 20th and 42nd motorized rifle divisions. Tank T-72B3 from the second tank battalion of the 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division (Kaliningrad region) with the signs of the second tank battalion of the former 20th motorized rifle brigade during combat training, July 2021 © Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation At least 20 vehicles received into service with training centers of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. In 2014, a new version of the modernization of the T-72B3 tanks was developed to participate in the Tank Biathlon competition.

18-11-72-3-213-2021-4

According to some reports, a total of 80 tanks are planned to be upgraded. Now in all four military districts there are at least 40 units of T-72B3 tanks of the 2014 model. Shipment of the new T-72B3 tank of the 2014 model for participation in the Tank Biathlon competition, June 2021, source

Option for upgrading the T-72B3 tank with improved combat characteristics was developed and put into production in 2016.
The cost of work to upgrade the tank under the agreement amounted to 79 million rubles per unit. The shipment of tanks to military units began in March 2017. For brevity, this modification is often referred to as T-72B3M, but this is strictly unofficial.

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Troops receive tanks in battalion sets - three companies, ten tanks each. There are 30 tanks in total. From 2017 to the present day, the troops received 15 kits for rearmament. Tank T-72B3M from the 1st Tank Regiment of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division during the Zapad-2017 exercise, September 2017, photo © Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation At least 20 vehicles entered service with training centers of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation . In 2017-2020 At least 19 T-72B3M tanks delivered to Belarus The first batch of modernized T-72B3M tanks handed over to the armed forces of Belarus. 06/02/2017 © voentv.mil.by

Thus, for the period 2017-2021. at least 480 T-72B3M tanks were shipped to the troops and for export.

2-1-72-3-719-2017-1

In total, over the past decade, our troops have received at least 1240 T-72B3 tanks of all variants.

The history of the combat use of T-72B3 tanks
is rather short. In the spring of 2014, several battalion tactical groups armed, among other things, with T-72B3 tanks, were deployed to the border areas with Ukraine. According to the resource lostarmour.info, during the clashes with units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, four tanks were completely destroyed and one serviceable T-72B3 tank was captured. On June 1, 2015, the commander of a tank company of a tank battalion of the 200th motorized rifle brigade, senior lieutenant Romanov Vitaly Vyacheslavovich, was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation for his courage and heroism during a special assignment.

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Toisinaan internetissä näkee viittauksia tähän artikkeliin, josta vedetään johtopäätös että T-72B3 modernisointeja on tehty 1 240 kpl.

Kuitenkin jos laskee Altyn73 toisesta artikkelista Venäjän aktiivijoukkojen käytössä olevat vaunut, sen mukaan näitä olisi:

T-72B3 - 589 kpl
T-72B3 obr 2016 - 470 kpl

Yhteensä 1 059 kpl.

Missä ovat loput? Venäjällä on erilaisia panssarisotakouluja, mekaanikkokouluja yms. jotka tarvitsevat jonkinlaisen määrän vaunuja opetuskäyttöön.

1 240 - 1 059 = 181

Lainaamassani Altyn73 artikkelissa on muutama mielenkiintoinen kommentti, lainaan ne spoilerin taakse. Tämä artikkeli on itseasiassa tuoreempi kuin se mistä ylle lainaamani numerot on otettu. Näissä kommenteissa Altyn73 kirjoittaa että kävi materiaalin uudestaan läpi tätä tuoreempaa artikkelia varten ja teki muutaman korjauksen, minkä takia vaunumäärissä on eroja. Olin lukenut tämän artikkelin aikaisemmin mutta jostain syystä tämä asia oli päässyt unohtumaan. Pitääpä tutkia paremmalla ajalla, millaisia muutoksia hän joutui tekemään ja miten se vaikuttaa kokonaismääriin:

Max Polesov kommentti:

Russia got about 6 thousand T-72B / B1.

About a thousand sold out (Chechnya, export from stock, decommissioning, etc.).

1240 B3 has already received RA

Those. in total, somewhere in the region, 3.5 thousand T-72B / B1 remained for possible modernization.


Altyn73 vastaus tähän:

Now the T-72B is no longer in normal condition at the storage bases. In 2016, there were reports of deliveries from combat units of old T-72 tanks for modernization into T-72B3M. And in combat units, about 800 T-72Bs remained. There are also T-72BAs, but there are few of them, and even those can use armored hulls for the production of T-90Ms. So in five or six years, taking into account the supply of 150 tanks a year, there will no longer be a resource for modernization. It is urgent to establish mass production of Armata, otherwise the percentage of combat-ready vehicles will begin to fall rapidly.

Max Polesov vastaus tähän:

I do not agree.

From the T-72B / B1, judging by the modernization in the T-72B3M, only the hull is required. Well, the tower itself. New SLA, engine, harp (is the transmission also new?).
About 2.5 thousand T-72B / B1 remaining at the bases (3.5 thousand in total T-72B / B1 minus 800 in parts) cannot completely turn into "dust" so that the hull would not fit for an upgrade .

Again, there are still about 4 thousand T-80BVs for the BVM and about 350 T-80Us for a possible upgrade in the image of the T-80BVM.

PS - how can the T-72BA (isn't it a modernized T-72B?) in the T-90M if it has a cast turret ???

As I understand it, in the T-90M you can only use the T-90A, right?


Altyn73 vastaus tähän:

then why do they ride T-72A and T-72AV in the 90th TD? Why won't the 59th, 218th and 237th tank regiments be fully equipped? The sites near Omsktransmash and the 61st repair plant are packed with T-72Bs with combat unit numbers. That's it, the resource is running out. If in 2011 they would not have made a decision on a cheap MASS modernization of the T-72B3, then now there would not have been thousands of combat-ready tanks.

Max Polesov vastaus tähän:

Because on some bases the T-72A / AB was better preserved than the T-72B. And on some, even a couple of hundred T-62M / MV in an acceptable condition, and T-72B and T-80BV (I’m not talking about the T-80UD) on others in the trash.

But since for the T-72B3, only an armored hull with a turret and a partially running gear are required, then those that will be thrown into the trash.

The situation is similar with the equipping of combined-arms regiments of new divisions with artillery - "Msta-B", and not more suitable for the quality of the regimental "Acacia". But which, after the base, must be driven through the BRTZ before being delivered to the troops, otherwise it will be slow and not firing.

As for the tank regiments, the staff of the remaining BRTZs must be expanded. They do not have time to restore armor from bases (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled guns, tracked engineering and command vehicles). And no one canceled the planned repairs of already combatants


Altyn73 vastaus tähän:

The economy does not allow expanding the BTRZ - it is too wasteful.

Max Polesov vastaus tähän:

in light of the current additional revenues from gas, oil and coal, they could expand... :)

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SHWD kommentti:

Most likely there are no T-80Us at the storage bases, but there are many at the training grounds as targets, the T-80BVM is obtained by installing a tower from the T-80UD on the T-80BV hull, in theory there should be about 500 towers, the hulls were cut, the towers were put into storage . But it seems to be running out, there were reports of the possible use of standard T-80BV turrets

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dima9411 kysymykset:

That is, the t-90m of the new building is the converted t-72b? Where is it fashionable to find a link?

Altyn73 vastaus tähän:

the armored hull of the T-72BA tank (and not the T-72B) CAN be used for the production of the T-90M. I don’t know if such a manipulation was actually carried out, especially since there are almost no T-72BA tanks left in Russia.

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Max Polesov kommentti:

For the 21st and 205th brigades, there are quite significant clarifications compared to the article on the Day of the tanker.

In the 21st, as a result, there are more tanks than in tank brigades.

Is it already such clarifications on many positions?

PS: according to the memory of the OSh SA - supernumerary tank companies in brigades and regiments can formally belong to the security and maintenance battalions of army headquarters. I don’t know exactly their place in the modern staff - probably these battalions are now on the staff of the RA control brigades.


Altyn73 vastaus tähän:

when I was preparing this article, I revised the material, checked it with the tail numbers on the photo and video and came to the conclusion that in 2015-16 the organizational staff for tanks changed. There are no more platoons of four tanks, now there are strictly three tanks everywhere, but battalions of four companies have appeared like the 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade had before.

Differences from the previous review are as follows. in the 138th Motor Rifle Brigade there are four companies on the T-72B3 plus a company (or maybe even two) on the T-80BV of the supernumerary. In two battalions on the T-90A (27 MSBR and 1 SME), 30 vehicles each, not forty. There are five companies in the 205th MSBR, in the 7th military base, 74th, 36th, 37th, 39th MSBR four companies. There are five companies in the 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade in the first battalion, and four companies remain in the second. Haven't found any other differences yet. In theory, the 38th and 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade also switched to four companies, but there is no photo or video evidence.

Max Polesov vastaus tähän:

Clear.

Thank you.

In the 138th, in general, it’s not a tank company of the battalion of the army headquarters guard then, but almost a set of tank battalions for the 25th brigade, which simply does not have enough boxes in Luga (again, unlike their previous PPD).

PS - and the 205th and 21st, as I understand it, are now the first candidates for deploying the next divisions.


Altyn73 vastaus tähän:

it is unlikely that the 205th and 21st will be deployed in the division. There are not enough people for the 18th, 19th and 20th divisions. And the 144th has been completing its formation for the fifth year.

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Tuon lukeminen palautti mieleen aikaisemman viestin, jossa lainasin Altyn73 kirjoitusta T-72BA vaunuista, kirjoitin silloin näin (HUOM: Altyn73 artikkeli on julkaistu 28.9.2021): LINKKI

Tuossa on muutama mielenkiintoinen yksityiskohta: ensinnäkin kirjoitetaan että vuoden 2009 lopussa joukoilla olisi 219 kpl T-72BA vaunua ja vuonna 2010 olisi allekirjoitettu sopimus 198 kpl modernisoinnista ja maaliskuussa 2011 uusi sopimus 300 vaunun modernisoinnista. Puolalainen panssarivaunujen asiantuntija Jaroslaw Wolski on arvioinut T-72BA vaunujen määräksi 750 kpl. Nähdään, mistä tuo luku on peräisin: 219 + 198 + 300 = 717 kpl.

Toisaalta tiedetään että ensimmäiset T-72B3 vaunut luovutettiin asevoimille vuoden 2011 lopussa. Tässä on pari vaihtoehtoa: joko 2010 ja 2011 allekirjoitetut sopimukset on tehty valmiiksi ja T-72BA vaunuja on todella valmistettu reilut 700 kpl tai sitten toinen tai molemmat näistä sopimuksista johtivat T-72B3 vaunujen tekemiseen ja T-72BA vaunuja olisi ehkä tuo reilut 200 kpl.

Venäjän armeijan kalustoa tarkasti seuraava Altyn73 kirjoitti viime vuonna blogissaan Kazakstanin T-72BA vaunuista: LÄHDE

Tanks T-72BA of the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan

  • Sep. Wednesday, 28th, 2021 at 8:11 PM

1660503743998.png


Modernization of T-72B tanks to the level T-72BA was carried out at the Uralvagonzavod enterprise in 1998-2005. Among other things, the updated tanks received a new track with a parallel rubber-metal hinge (RMSH) from the T-90 tank, which is seriously different from the previous one.

according to known data, by 2005, the 81st motorized rifle and 152nd tank regiments of the 27th motorized rifle division, the 276th motorized rifle and 239th tank regiments of the 34th motorized rifle division were armed with T-72BA tanks - a total of eight tank battalions . After repeated reorganization and rearmament measures, in 2021 T-72BA tanks remained in only two battalions - in the 488th motorized rifle regiment of the 144th motorized rifle division (heir to the 276th motorized rifle regiment) and in the 21st motorized rifle brigade (heir to 152nd Tank Regiment). There are several single examples in the tank battalions of the 90th Panzer Division, 35th and 60th motorized rifle brigades. Where did six more battalions of updated T-72BA tanks disappear to?

On May 7, 2015, at the parade in the capital of Kazakhstan, Astana (now Nur-Sultan), the T-72BA tanks were shown for the first time, but what is remarkable - with OLD-style caterpillars. in all the pictures known to me (some of them below) of the Kazakh T-72BA tanks, the caterpillars of the OLD model. Judging by the numbering, now in Kazakhstan six tank battalions, out of thirteen available, are armed with T-72BA tanks. Just six "missing" battalions from the Russian troops. New tracks, most likely, were replaced with old ones before being shipped to Kazakhstan in 2015-2016. And the removed tracks were already going to equip the newly modernized T-72B3 tanks. Here is my version. By the way, the 35th motorized rifle brigade also has a T-72BA tank on old tracks.

1660503784332.png


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Hän spekuloi että Venäjä olisi myynyt valtaosan T-72BA vaunuista Kazakstanille aikavälillä joskus vuoden 2015 jälkeen. Military Balance 2021 julkaisun mukaan Kazakstanilla olisi 300 kpl T-72BA vaunuja. Kazakstan on ainoa maa jonka kohdalla T-72BA mainitaan, sen lisäksi vaunut mainitaan Donetsk Peoples Repuclic ja Luhansk Peoples Repuclic kohdalla - ryssä siis toimittanut heille näitä vaunuja. Olisiko Kazakstan ostanut nämä vaunut Venäjältä ja ehkä tilannut tietylle määrälle omia vaunuja modernisaation Nizhny Tagililla? Toinen vaihtoehto on että ovat tehneet Venäjän kanssa vaihtokaupan ja toimittaneet omista varastoista aihioita Venäjälle, joka puolestaan on modernisoinut niistä T-72B3 vaunuja tai purkanut varaosiksi.

Jos katsotaan Ukrainan sodan 2022 tappioita niin T-72BA on hyvin vähän edustettuna siellä, tosin nämä on helppo sekoittaa T-72B obr 1989 kanssa. Altyn73 mukaan Venäjällä olisi ollut vuonna 2005 kahdeksan pataljoonaa T-72BA vaunuja. Yhden pataljoonan koko on 31 vaunua joten 31 x 8 = 248 vaunua. Hänen mukaansa vuonna 2021 "T-72BA remained in only two battallions". Tuon voi lukea kahdella tapaa: vaunuja oli kaksi pataljoonaa eli 62 kpl tai vaunuja oli kahdessa pataljoonassa, mutta pataljoona voi olla vaunutyypeiltään sekalainen. Täten Venäjällä olisi aktiivijoukoilla huomattavan pieni määrä T-72BA vaunuja ja näistäkin osa on tuhottu Ukrainassa. Oryxin mukaan näitä olisi menetetty 5 kpl tähän päivään mennessä: 1 damaged, 4 captured (14.8.2022).

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Lainasin aikaisemmin Alexey Khlopotov kirjoituksia T-72BA vaunuista: VIESTI 1, VIESTI 2

Tästä modernisaatiosta ja sen "vuosituotantomääristä" on hyvin vaikea saada kiinni, eri lähteet puhuvat näistä erilailla. Kazakstanilla on tosiaan Military Balancen mukaan T-72BA vaunuja huomattava määrä käytössään joten on mahdollista että Venäjä olisi myynyt ne sinne. Ehkä olivat peruskorjauksen tarpeessa, joten myydään ne naapurille joka maksaa vaunuista + niiden korjauksesta?

Toinen looginen vaihtoehto olisi että Venäjä olisi modernisoinut valtaosan omista T-72BA vaunuistaan T-72B3 tai T-72B3 obr 2016 standardiin JA samaan aikaan Kazakstan olisi ostanut omille T-72B / T-72B1 vaunuilleen T-72BA standardin mukaisen modernisoinnin. Vaan miksi ostaa T-72BA, miksei T-72B3?

Ehkä Kazakstanin T-72BA vaunut on modernisoitu joskus aikaa sitten, ehkä samaan aikaan kun Venäjä osti omille asevoimilleen tätä modernisointia? JOS näin olisi, se tarkoittaisi että Venäjä ei ole myynyt omia vaunujaan Kazakstanille joten ne on joko modernisoitu tai varastoitu odottamaan modernisointia.

Altyn73 seurannan mukaan Venäjän aktiivijoukoilla oli syyskuussa 2021 käytössään vain 71 kpl T-72BA vaunuja. Se on selvästi vähemmän kuin ne määrät mitä näitä vaunuja on aikoinaan modernisoitu eri lähteiden mukaan.

HUOM: spekuloin aikaisemmassa viestissä (LINKKI) eri vaunutyyppien valmistus- ja modernisointimäärillä, mukaanlukien T-72BA. Eri lähteiden yhdistelyn seurauksena laskin että T-72BA vaunuja olisi modernisoitu 398 kpl aikavälillä 2005-2012, mutta kiinnitin huomiota että yhdessä lähteessä mainittu 139 kpl vuonna 2006 kuulostaa epäilyttävän suurelta määrältä.

1677567845024-png.74752


Alexey Khlopotov kirjoittaa vaunuista näin:

From 2000 to 2009, more than a hundred tanks were modernized in Nizhny Tagil according to the T-72BA / T-72BA1 variants.

JOS oletetaan että aikavälillä 2000-2004 olisi valmistunut kourallinen vaunuja, ehkä yksittäisiä koevedoksia sekä pieni määrä valtion testeihin JA "sarjatuotanto" käynnistyi vasta virallisen hyväksynnän jälkeen (mikä tapahtui vuonna 2005), niin silloin valtaosa modernisoinnista olisi tapahtunut aikavälillä 2005-2012.

Alexey Khlopotov on tyypillisesti ollut hyvin tietoinen siitä mitä UVZ:lla tapahtuu ja hänellä on hyvät kontaktit sinne. Voisi siis kuvitella että hän tietäisi mistä kirjoittaa.

JOTEN voisi kuvitella että vuodelle 2006 merkitty 139 kpl olisikin ko. vuonna allekirjoitettu sopimus JA todellinen modernisointimäärä jakautuisi useammalle vuodelle.

31 + 31 + "noin 40" + "noin 40" = "noin 142"

Mikä määrä sitten valmistui vuonna 2006? Tässä yksi arvaus:

"yli 100" - 17 - 31 - 31 = "yli 21"

Tässä on otettu Khlopotovin kirjoitus sanatarkasti sekä tulkittu muotoilua From 2000 to 2009 siten että tässä tarkoitetaan "ennen vuoden 2009 alkua" eli "vuoden 2008 loppuun mennessä". En pidä tällaisesta että yritetään sovittaa logiikkaa mukaan, pitäisi mieluummin löytää lähde josta selviää todellinen vuosituotantomäärä. Aukkojen täyttäminen logiikan avulla johtaa useimmiten vääriin arvauksiin.

MUTTA jos arvasin oikein ja jos sovittaa tuon "yli 21 kpl" tuohon taulukkoon, niin silloin T-72BA modernisoinnin kokonaismääräksi saadaan:

17 + "yli 21" + 31 + 31 + "noin 40" + "noin 40" + 70 + 30 = 280 kpl

Tässä laskelmassa "yli 21" = 21 ja "noin 40" = 40.

TOISAALTA Altyn73 mukaan vuoteen 2005 mennessä näitä vaunuja olisi kahdeksan pataljoonan verran eli 248 kpl. Ketä tässä sitten uskoisi? Hän kirjoittaa että tämä olisi according to known data mutta ei kerro lähdettä tälle. Epäilin että voisiko tarkoittaa Military Balance -julkaisua, mutta tarkistuksessa selvisi että eivät ole kirjoittaneet sanaakaan T-72BA vaunuista 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 tai 2009 julkaisuissaan.

Alexey Khlopotov ja Altyn73 eivät selvästi voi olla molemmat oikeassa, olen taipuvaisempi uskomaan tässä asiassa Khlopotovia.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Novaya Gazeta Europe artikkeli Venäjän aseteollisuuden vaikeuksista, vuosituotantomääristä yms. (artikkeli julkaistu 2.11.2022): LÄHDE

The barren barrels

Russia’s military industry has all sorts of problems: there are barely any details for tanks, aircraft electronics and newest missiles are in short supply

12:19 PM, 2 November 2022

Georgy Aleksandrov, exclusively for Novaya Gazeta Europe

https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2022/11/02/the-barren-barrels-en

The barren barrels

Russia’s military industry has all sorts of problems: there are barely any details for tanks, aircraft electronics and newest missiles are in short supply

12:19 PM, 2 November 2022

Georgy Aleksandrov, exclusively for Novaya Gazeta Europe

1677745229457.png
An abandoned Russian tank in Izyum, Ukraine’s Kharkiv region, September 2022. Photo: Metin Aktas / Anadolu Agency / Getty Images

Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s former president and currently the deputy chairman of the Security Council inspected Uralvagonzavod, one of Russia’s leading military production facilities, on 25 October. As Medvedev said himself, he was inspecting the tank production situation in particular. On his Telegram channel, he wrote about the objectives that were set up during an offsite meeting: acceleration of the equipment supplies to Russia’s troops in Ukraine, strict execution of the state defence order in all its key parameters, and preventing supplies disruption. Medvedev’s main message after visiting the complex, however, was for the foreign readers of his channel: “One more thing. Reading the enemy’s analytics, I have come across multiple claims that Russia will soon be out of military equipment and essential weaponry. They say we’ve wasted all of it. Don’t hold your breath. Our production of weaponry and special equipment is increasing many-fold in all domains: from tanks and artillery to high-precision missiles and drones. Just wait for it!” Almost 5 trillion rubles (€81.3 billion) invested into Russia’s defence budget for 2023 are at stake here.

Novaya Gazeta Europe has analysed whether Medvedev’s words regarding the “many-fold” increase in the production of tanks and other military vehicles can be put into practice. Military experts and employees within Russia’s military industry have helped us in doing so. Since such a co-operation would put them at risk, triggering “fake news” and “army discreditation” charges in the best possible scenario, we’re forced to cite the sources still based in Russia on the condition of anonymity.

Unprepared for war​

“The people who started the ‘special military operation’ have been trampling down Russia’s defence sector for many years,” a source within the Russian military industry tells Novaya-Europe. “When Putin came to power, a redivision of the market started. The old top brass was eliminated and replaced by the new ‘efficient management.’ Those factories that had some of their manufacture exported to other countries managed to keep their affairs afloat. In fact, exports are the only thing that kept the military industry alive. The factories that lacked exports potential were either destroyed or sold off. Some of the buildings have been turned into shopping malls, others were simply abandoned.

The profit margin is minimal when it comes to state defence order, Novaya-Europe’s source says. This is Soviet legacy: back in the day, the product price was calculated as the prime cost plus a minor revenue mark-up, say, 5 to 15%. If a tank was sold to a different country for 2.5-3 million dollars, Russia’s Defence Ministry would only return 1 million to the factory’s budget on a good day. These circumstances meant that it was unprofitable for the factories to work with the state and the state defence order. Our source recalls Kurganmashzavod (a vehicle plant based in Kurgan, Russia, known for producing BMP infantry fighting vehicles — translator’s note) failing to comply with the state defence order for several years straight but in the meantime dutifully selling its BMP-3 fighting vehicles to the UAE and Malaysia.

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The Kurgan Vehicle Plant a.k.a Kurganmashzavod. Photo: kmz.ru

Some factories, specifically those manufacturing commercially viable products for exports, took out loans to buy equipment from banks in the West. However, after the Crimea annexation and the Western sanctions that followed it, they were forced to switch to Russian banks, falling into debt bondage. Some factories were on the verge of bankruptcy. The matter is being addressed these days, and a debt restructuring programme at the expense of the state budget is a possible option.

Military research, development and engineering also lacked state financing in Russia, as the source says.

“It is common practice in the US when their Defence Ministry pays money to the factories, expecting prototypes of certain products in return,” an employee within the Russian military industry says. “This might as well be a competition, and two companies would be working on one order at the same time. They both would then receive money from the Defence Ministry. The latter would test both and start serial production of the better one. It works the other way around here, they say: guys, go work at your own expense! Those few lucky ones who receive financing anyway are interested in wasting time deliberately, putting off the final result as long as they can to keep getting the money. Therefore, Russia’s factories find it beneficial to keep manufacturing old but tried and tested produce, using the Soviet stocks and avoiding major production risks.”

There is no innovative, science-driven produce in Russia these days, and it should not be expected to appear anytime soon, the expert believes.

“It is obvious that Russia’s army is in catastrophically short supply of almost all types of equipment,” an employee for Rostec, a state-owned defence conglomerate, says. “This is why the government orders the factories all over the country receive are so urgent. It seems as if the new priority now is all about quantity, not quality. In simpler words, it’s unimportant which tanks are being sent to the frontlines: the newest T-90M models or the recommissioned T-62 ones.”

The Rostec employee says Uralvagonzavod received a state order of 400 tanks shortly after the Ukraine War started. As per the factory’s public relations office, the tanks production line there has a full load of work up until 2024. However, after Russia started massively losing its equipment on the frontlines, the deadlines must have been seriously tightened up.

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A partially destroyed T-72BA Russian tank captured by Ukraine’s army on an exhibition in Gdańsk, August 2022. Photo: Artur Widak / NurPhoto / Getty Images

However, even in the tank industry, the instructions from the highest management cannot be executed immediately.

“Everyone was unprepared for a war. Launching any sort of production requires time. First and foremost, all suppliers, selectors and allied manufacturers should be dealt with,” the Rostec employee says. “Producing tanks requires metal, guns, engines, electronics, communication devices and all sorts of other complex mechanisms and integral units. All those things were purchased based on the actual contracts and cannot be acquired in a snap of a finger. There were no stocks, too; we have a lean manufacturing policy.

Handmade tanks​

Our source working for one of the state corporations in Russia estimates the current Uralvagonzavod’s production capacity at 200–250 tanks a year. The footage of Medvedev’s visit indicates that the new tanks are being assembled manually, and the old ones are being modernised on the stocks. Notably, the old Soviet assembly line provided an annual capacity of thousands of tanks each year. The workers at the factory make jokes that their tanks are handmade as they speak to the Novaya-Europe reporter unofficially.

Stepping up production requires production space expansions. However, those tens of billions of rubles allocated to build state-of-the-art workshops capable of automatically assembling Armata tanks have been “used up” already. Uralvagonzavod pursues its contractors in court, and not a single square metre of new workspaces has been constructed. The purchased equipment and the expensive imported machines lie rotting in crates for years. This is why no mass production of Armata tanks is to be expected in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, Alexander Potapov, Director General at Uralvagonzavod, has not been held accountable for scuttling one of the most ambitious projects of Russia’s military industry.

As a result, Armatas are being assembled in the same section of the factory as T-90s and T-72, fundamentally heavier and bigger models, although there is no relevant equipment for that. It is unknown how many Armatas are in operation now, it’s safe to assume that about a dozen of them used for military displays at the Red Square, plus a few vehicles, were provided to certain units for training. For instance, an Armata tank was seen in Kazan’s Higher Tank Command School.

1677745325654.png
Tank production line at Uralvagonzavod. Screenshot from a YouTube video

Uralvagonzavod lacks trained assembling specialists to set up a new production line within the existing workspaces. To step up production, the factory would need to hire more people. These days, the factory’s schedule is three shifts, seven days a week, same as most military industry facilities.

Uralvagonzavod used to deliver tanks in dozens but handing in a batch of 5 or 10 tanks to the army is somewhat common these days. The factory is now focused on producing T-72B3M tanks, although a set of modern T-90M appeared on the Internet recently. Ukraine’s servicemen have already captured some of those. It’s difficult to make up a worse marketing campaign than the newest Russian tanks getting put out of action using old rocket launchers and anti-tank missiles.

Russia’s Defence Ministry might be in possession of up to eight thousand tanks of different models, from T-62 to T-80, preserved in storage, as per Volya, a Telegram channel. Volya tried to figure out how many tanks are in Russia’s use, and found out that up to 90% of the depreserved vehicles require mandatory modernisation. According to the channel’s calculations, Russia’s tank industry is currently capable of producing up to 250 new vehicles and modernising up to 600 old ones each year.

Terminators under repair​

Ukraine is outweighing Russia more and more on the frontlines in terms of firepower owing to the NATO-supplied long-range gun systems capable of delivering fire at a distance of 30-40 km. The 2S19 Msta, Russia’s most advanced self-propelled howitzer, is only capable of firing a projectile at the distance of 24 km. Such a small distance (by today’s terms) was designed because old projectiles were supposed to be used, and Russia had those galore. Therefore, the potential increase in shooting distance is limited by the weapon’s ballistics. There is another one: the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV is the newest Russian howitzer, capable of hitting a target of up to 70 km away from its location. Russia started designing it in the late 1990s, and it also has an autonomous turret with increased fire rate. However, UralTransMash has only produced several prototypes so far, and there are no such vehicles on the front lines.

A 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV during the rehearsal of the Victory Day parade, Alabino near Moscow, 11 April 2016. Photo: Wikimedia

A 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV during the rehearsal of the Victory Day parade, Alabino near Moscow, 11 April 2016. Photo: Wikimedia

Novaya-Europe’s source in Rostec says that the Armata and the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV share the same problem regarding the gun system: Russia does not produce the required type of gun steel. Only two factories in Russia produce blanks for parts of the receiver group: the Motovilikha Plants in Perm and Barrikady, a machine manufacturing plant in Volgograd.

“Russia’s metal industry is dead,” our source says. “When a competition for barrel blanks was announced, all the samples put up for it turned out to be defective. The special thing about the new barrels is that they must withstand greater pressure, that is, be more durable. This requires special alloys and melting modes, as well as small-sized furnaces. The thing is: Russia’s metallurgy is focused on large volumes and mass grades of steel.

Back in the day, some of the managers within the industry considered that the open-hearth smelting process had become inefficient, and all open-hearth furnaces were extinguished in the country. However, only those furnaces could produce high-quality steel, including the one used to produce artillery.

Another much-touted product of Uralvagonzavod is the Terminator tank support combat vehicle sold to Algeria in commercial quantities. Four of those vehicles were seen in Ukraine, which pleased Russia’s patriotic public. However, in the next video, posted about a month later, the vehicles were filmed undergoing repair.

Iskanders not laughing anymore​

It is generally believed that Russia has a strategic stockpile of Iskanders, Kalibrs and other modern missiles.

“Russia’s Defence Ministry does not provide any data on the number of equipment produced, used in the theatre of operations or lost there,” Pavel Aksyonov of BBC explains to Novaya Gazeta Europe. “For instance, we can only estimate how many missiles are manufactured in Russia by indirect signs: by the number of missiles launched and by the selection of missiles. During the massive missile attacks on Ukraine which followed the blowing up of the Crimean bridge, Tornado S, S-300, Kh-101, Kh-55, Kalibr and Iskander missiles were used, as well as UAVs, and so on. At the same time, there is still no data on the number of missiles of each type that were taken down or hit targets in Ukraine.
A contact for Novaya-Europe who works in the development of missiles reports that many types of missiles, such as Kalibr, are being immediately sent from the production lines to the launch points.

Russia’s Defence Ministry reported that a total of 99 missiles had been launched on targets in Syria between 7 October 2015 and 3 November 2017.

“An ordinary US destroyer ship carries over 90 cruise missiles. And they have dozens of those,” our source says. “Russia has nothing of this kind. They use corvettes and frigates, which only have 8 or 16 launchers. In a year’s time, the nuclear cruiser Admiral Nakhimov (former Kalinin), which has been under modernisation since 1999, is expected to return to combat duty. It will be converted to launch modern missiles.”

Another reason to doubt the sufficiency of Russia’s high-precision missiles is the use of S-300 anti-aircraft systems against ground targets. Such missiles are guided quite imprecisely when used in the ground-to-ground mode. Moreover, a powerful fragmentation warhead leads to numerous casualties among the unprotected civilian population when it hits a residential area.

The Kinzhal missile system, which Putin used to scare the West with, is the same Iskander model attached to a MiG-31 fighter-interceptor jet. Russia has very few such missiles, our sources say, same as MiG-31 jets modified to carry those: there are only several planes, to be specific.

“Also, the Kh-22 anti-ship missile with a homing head was used during the attacks on Ukraine,” a rocket engineer says. “Simply put, it is able to tell a block of metal in the form of an aircraft carrier from the flat sea. It cannot, however, pick the right building out of many in an urban landscape. In this case, it flies using the pre-determined navigation route and arrives somewhere in the vicinity of the target, quite imprecisely, in fact. The possible deviation in this case is hundreds of meters at best.”

According to our contact, Russia does not have the production capacity to manufacture the missiles to replace those already used. Back in 2018, the crew at the Dubna Machine Building Plant protested against the management methods of AFK Sistema which owned the enterprise. Russia hauled away the equipment from Ukraine’s Dnipro in the early 2000s and placed it at the plant in Dubna, where the production of the Kh-series missiles was launched. According to our source, Almaz-Antey, which produces Kalibr, S-300 and S-400, has issues with the imported machines that have stopped working due to the sanctions.

Corruption is the cause​

Since the Soviet times, Russia’s aviation design bureaus have had a surplus of fundamental research in aerodynamics. For instance, Russia’s latest aircraft, the Su-57, have an excellent glider. But Russia’s electronics are larger and less reliable, which increases the weight of the aircraft. The characteristics of radar stations, as well as communication systems, are significantly inferior to their Western counterparts. Russia’s radars have a smaller detection range, they can track fewer targets, they have worse target recognition quality, and so on. The domestic engines are also weaker in terms of technical characteristics than the Western ones. At the same time, the sources of Novaya Gazeta Europe in the military industry say that only a few of these newest Su-57 fighters can be assembled each year.

A Su-57 during a demonstration flight at the MAKS-2011 air show. Photo: Wikimedia

A Su-57 during a demonstration flight at the MAKS-2011 air show. Photo: Wikimedia

The situation with the helicopters is no better. America’s modern rotorcraft are one and a half times smaller and much more efficient in terms of load and weapons. In terms of their weight, size, and operational characteristics, they leave the Russian ones far behind. Russia’s helicopters consume more fuel, not to mention the fact that the engines for most models were manufactured in Ukraine. Notably, Vyacheslav Boguslaev, the head and co-owner of Ukraine’s Motor Sich PJSC, was arrested for supplying engines and spare parts for Russian attack helicopters. Russia has failed to set up their own production, and it is likely that in the foreseeable future, combat helicopters in Russia will simply cease to be produced.

Our sources say that the production of drones is a new way of stealing lots of money from Russia’s defence industry.

“The command is very poorly versed in this area,” says the Rostec expert. “The entire experience of the effective use of UAVs came exclusively from below until recently. This is how it worked: a quadcopter bought with sponsors’ money or fundraising fees appeared at the units, and the troops learned how to use it, mastered strategy, tactics, piloting combat techniques and methods of effective use. The Defence Ministry does not have a separate department that would collect, systematise, and analyse these practices. When the need arose, the military officials were more concerned about how to steal and launder money rather than how to ensure combat effectiveness.

As our source says, a lot of small firms appeared several years ago, pretending to be developing UAVs. Often, the development would mean nothing but assembly of “a flying machine” based on a Chinese drone, which was then lobbied through people in the army command as the latest domestic development. Russia literally does not produce any low-power aircraft engines, be it reciprocating or jet ones. Such engines have a special thing about them: a certain ratio of dead weight to useful power is required. Electric motors, like those that the Chinese put on copters, are also not produced in Russia. But the top brass was thrown dust into their eyes, which eventually forced them to buy drones off Iran and to import large blocks and parts from China for their own promising models.

All our sources agree upon the point that Russia started the war with an industry that had failed to modernise. The money allocated on this modernisation was spent inefficiently. The Western sanctions leave zero chance for Russia to produce new developments.

“On the other hand, the T-62 is a tank that is easy to use, and it is much simpler for a mobilised person to learn how to operate it than with modern vehicles,” says our source from Rostec. “If Russia runs out of those, the T-34 can be taken from pedestals, there are many of those all across the country.”
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Jatkoa edelliseen viestiin, siinä viitataan tähän Volya media -artikkeliin, tässä on yritetty laskea Venäjän varastoissa olevien panssarivaunujen määriä sekä annettu arvio tehtaiden ja "armored repair plant" pajojen kyvystä remontoida vanhoja varastovaunuja (artikkeli julkaistu 24.10.2022): LÄHDE

How long will Russia have enough tanks and how many vehicles can it produce and upgrade annually​

Volya

October 24, 2022

https://telegra.ph/Na-skolko-Rossii...t-proizvodit-i-modernizirovat-ezhegodno-10-24

How long will Russia have enough tanks and how many vehicles can it produce and upgrade annually​

Volya

October 24, 2022

a39314ae35037500fdba8.jpg

UVZ Executive Director Vladimir Roshchupkin (third from left) shows Dmitry Medvedev a workshop at the enterprise
Text: telegram channel "Will"

Dmitry Medvedev came to UVZ with an inspection. Recently, he heads the control commission of the Security Council. UVZ is the main supplier of new tanks for the RF Armed Forces, as well as the main manufacturer of platforms for self-propelled artillery mounts and heavy flamethrower systems.

In August, Sergei Shoigu came to the enterprise, who demanded to increase the production of tanks to two units per day. The management of the plant tried to reason with the minister, but could only reassure him a little. We agreed on 40 vehicles per month.

During the first month, UVZ managed to assemble three tanks, according to the Tagil TG channel and sources close to the plant. During the second month, from 16 to 24 tanks were produced. At the same time, it is not known how many of them are new, and how many are modernized T-72s.

We with the military in the Ministry of Defense, military experts and specialists in tank production, asking spokesmen to calculate how many tanks the Russian Armed Forces have at long-term storage bases, how many can be produced and how much Russian enterprises can modernize .

Recall, according to Ukrainian data, since the beginning of the war, the Russian Armed Forces have lost 2,444 tanks of various models and modifications. According to sources in the Ministry of Defense, the losses are a little more modest, about 2070 vehicles during the eight months of the war (counting those that failed due to breakdowns or crew errors).

According to Oryx experts, visually confirmed losses of Russian tanks amounted to 1,407 units. According to a Russian military expert who constantly cooperates with us, the tank losses of the RF Armed Forces for eight months amounted to from 1,400 to 1,700 vehicles.

Sources in the Ministry of Defense estimate tank stocks at 7,500 - 8,000 tanks of various models, from T-62 to T-80. Military experts believe that the reserves are more modest, and do not exceed 6,000.

“Tanks with BDH (long-term storage bases) need to be modernized. Especially in terms of protection, optics - modern sights, communications. Vehicles are on the move, but without modern stuffing, they will be of little use in a real battle, especially in confronting modern equipment in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and even with poorly trained crews, ”comments a Russian military expert associated with the Russian Defense Ministry.

The Russian defense industry has had big problems with sights and communications since 2014, when it became impossible to purchase technologies and samples in Europe. We discussed this at length with another Russian military expert, a specialist in the defense industry (interview here ).

Up to 90% of all mothballed tanks are subject to mandatory modernization. What can the Russian defense industry offer, in which there are not so many armored repair plants (BTRZ) and tank manufacturers left.

Before the start of the war , Uralvagonzavod modernized about 100 cars a year. He produced about a hundred more a year. Issue volumes were dictated by contracts. Under current conditions, with the availability of components, UVZ is able to produce 200-250 new tanks per year. Provided that other enterprises will be engaged in modernization, since UVZ has limited production capacities - the assembly and modernization of tanks is carried out in the same workshop.

Omsktransmash , which is part of the UVZ concern, specializes not in production (it cannot deal with it due to the lack of equipment and the lack of hull production), but in modernization. According to a military expert, the Omsk plant is able to modernize up to 200 old vehicles a year. It's about the T-72.

In the Russian Federation there are several armored personnel carriers specializing in the modernization of tanks. The most powerful is the 61st BTRZ in the Leningrad Region. This enterprise was engaged in the T-72B1MS “White Eagle” model, which was supposed to compete on the international arms market with the modernization of the T-72 from UVZ. The enterprise specializes in the modernization of the T-72 and T-80 and is able to "capitalize" up to 200 vehicles per year.

The 103rd BTRZ at Atamanovka in the Chita region can also upgrade up to 200 units per year. He specializes in T-62 and T-72.

Other armored repair plants in the Russian Federation specialize in infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, airborne combat vehicles and other armored vehicles.

In early September, it became known about the decision of the Russian government to build two new armored personnel carriers, which will specialize in the modernization and repair of tanks, as well as other armored vehicles. The 71st and 72nd BTRZ are planned to be built in the Rostov and Moscow regions. There is no word yet on the timing of construction. It can be assumed that in six months to eight months these enterprises can start working and in 2024 reach the volume of 200 modernized machines per year from each plant.

It turns out that, with a rough estimate, the Russian tank industry is able to produce up to 250 new vehicles per year and upgrade up to 600 old ones (before the commissioning of two new plants).

While maintaining the current rate of tank losses in the Russian army, production and modernization will make up for a little more than a third of the loss.

It is extremely difficult to increase production volumes today, because there are no means of production: modern lines, machine tools, workshops, equipment. And there is nowhere to take all this, since supplies from Europe and the USA are impossible, and China will not be able to fill this gap with its technologies and, most likely, will not want to.

Taking into account the stocks of tanks accumulated since Soviet times and the current production volumes, the RF Armed Forces are provided with tanks for three years of combat operations of the same intensity as in 2022. With an increase in losses and an increase in the intensity of the war, the reserves may last for two or even a year and a half.

Why did Medvedev go to UVZ​

The simplest explanation for Dmitry Medvedev's visit is his appointment as head of the control commission of the Security Council. But there is something else. At the last meeting of the Security Council, Medvedev's report on the situation with migration in Russia was announced.

The broadcast was cut off even before Medvedev opened his mouth. According to our sources, this is due to the content of the report.

Dmitry Medvedev has announced plans to put the economy on a war footing when a significant number of Russian men go to fight. They are supposed to be replaced by workers from Central Asia, mainly Kyrgyzstan, as well as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Qualified labor is supposed to be attracted from Iran, China, some of the workers with industrial production skills on old equipment, the Russian Federation, according to Medvedev, can even get in North Korea (in the past 20 years, North Koreans have been used in logging and other work in Primorye and the Far East.

With regard to the defense industry, the use of foreign labor, firstly, is ineffective, because the same UVZ provides its workers with armor from mobilization and has not problems with workers, but with the means of production. Secondly, the Russian defense industry, in principle, does not provide for the involvement of foreigners in production. This is contrary to all internal regulations and will lead to a heart attack by all the specialized departments of the FSB and the Foreign Intelligence Service.

Sources in the Security Council and the Presidential Administration suggest that the Russian Federation is negotiating with China on the supply of new lines for the defense industry, moreover, together with workers. This will require the construction of new workshops next to existing enterprises. That is, Medvedev came not only to see how and how many tanks are made in Nizhny Tagil, but also to find out how to quickly increase production capacity.

Unlike Moscow political sources, experts in the defense industry are extremely skeptical about the likelihood of the arrival of Chinese workers and Chinese machine tools. Partly because the benefit of Chinese enterprises and the state itself from such labor migration is not at all obvious, partly because Chinese machine tools and equipment will not be able to solve the production problems of Russian enterprises, including UVZ. In addition, it will give China access to technologies that all Russian intelligence agencies try to keep secret, especially from the Chinese communists.

According to sources close to the plant, Dmitry Medvedev threatened UVZ executive director Vladimir Roshchupkin with a criminal case, yelled at the company's management and demanded an increase in production. Since Shoigu's visit in August at the plant, according to Medvedev, nothing has been done to solve this problem.

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The Economist -artikkeli, joka on ylle lainattuja tuoreempi, mutta viittaa osaksi edellisiin (artikkeli julkaistu 27.2.2023): LÄHDE

How quickly can Russia rebuild its tank fleet?​

It has one tank factory, and is increasingly reliant on refurbishing old models

Feb 27th 2023

https://www.economist.com/the-econo...how-quickly-can-russia-rebuild-its-tank-fleet

How quickly can Russia rebuild its tank fleet?​

It has one tank factory, and is increasingly reliant on refurbishing old models

Feb 27th 2023

A man looks at russian T-72 tank destroyed during Russia's invasion to Uktaine, Ivanivka village, Chernihiv area, Ukraine, 20 April 2022 (Photo by Maxym Marusenko/NurPhoto via Getty Images)


During the second world war Germany’s armed forces destroyed Soviet tanks at a phenomenal rate. But although the Red Army lost 80,000 tanks, the Soviet Union’s industrial might allowed it to finish the war with more tanks than it had when the conflict began.

Today’s tanks are much more sophisticated and expensive, and are therefore deployed in far smaller numbers. Yet in its war with Ukraine Russia, like the Soviet Union, has lost a huge number of tanks. Ukraine claims to have destroyed more than 3,250. Oryx, an open-source intelligence blog, has documented 1,700 losses. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank, says that around half of Russia’s pre-war fleet of t-72s—which numbered around 2,000 and made up the bulk of its tank force—has been destroyed.

Russia’s tanks have failed to give it the advantage in Ukraine, and its forces will struggle to carry out another major offensive without sufficient armoured support. Ukraine has secured battle tanks from its Western allies in recent weeks, which it will probably use in a spring counter-offensive. Russia will need to bolster its own fleet if it hopes to hold on to territory it has won. Can it replace its lost tanks this time?

In the 1940s Soviet factories could produce more than 1,000 tanks a month. Plants that made tractors and railway engines were told to build tanks instead. Today ramping up production is harder. The electronics in modern tanks—for night vision, aiming guns and a host of other functions—are highly sophisticated. That makes production slower and means that many factories designed for other types of manufacturing cannot easily make tanks instead. Russia has only one tank factory left: UralVagonZavod, a huge complex built in the 1930s. But financial mismanagement and huge debts have slowed modernisation. Workers joke that they assemble tanks by hand. Novaya Gazeta, a liberal Russian newspaper, reports that the plant makes just 20 per month. One Western official tells The Economist that, in total, the Russian armed forces’ demand for tanks is outstripping production by a factor of ten.

In an attempt to meet the demand, Russia has increased the rate at which it restores old tanks, of which it has thousands in storage. In Ukraine modern Russian tanks, such as T-90s, now fight alongside large numbers of T-72B3s, built decades ago but upgraded with guns, reactive armour (which reduces the chance of a hit penetrating the vehicle) and digital communications. Even with these improvements, older tanks are inferior to new models, and are less likely to survive a hit from Ukrainian forces—but they are still useful. UralVagonZavod rebuilds about eight tanks a month, and three other armoured-vehicle repair plants each refurbish around 17, according to Russian media. Two more plants of similar size are due to come online in the next few months.

This means that, although Russia can only build 20 new tanks a month, it may soon be able to resurrect 90 or so a month from its boneyards. Still, that would not make up for the estimated 150 it is losing each month, according to analysis by Oryx. And production may be hampered by shortages of parts. Semiconductors, the computer chips that control modern tanks, are in particularly short supply. The European Commission claims that Russia is using chips from imported dishwashers and refrigerators in military hardware. Some newly refurbished tanks in Ukraine contain a hodgepodge of hardware from different models and lack high-tech gear, such as wind-speed sensors, which allow accurate shooting.

Russia is not alone in these problems. Ukraine and its allies also lack the ability to produce tanks quickly. Ukraine’s only tank factory, near Kharkiv, was destroyed early in the war. America, which has promised to send 31 M1A2 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, has one factory, with capacity to make 15 tanks each month. Production elsewhere in the West is similarly slow, leading to a scramble to find old tanks to donate. But in general, attacking forces use more tanks than defenders. As the conflict grinds on, Russia is likely to see its fleet steadily decline in both quantity and quality. This time, manufacturing might not save it.

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Poimin artikkelista panssarivaunuja koskevat numerot:

- UVZ:n Nizhny Tagilin tehtaan uustuotanto 20 kpl per kuukausi, mikä tarkoittaisi 240 kpl per vuosi (oletan että tässä tarkoitetaan paitsi T-90S / T-90A / T-90M uustuotantoa niin myös varastovaunujen modernisointia T-72B3 ja T-72B3 obr 2016 sekä T-90M standardeihin)

- UVZ:n Nizhny Tagilin tehtaan kyky aktivoida varastovaunuja 8 kpl per kuukausi, mikä tarkoittaisi 96 kpl per vuosi

- kolme "armored repair plant" kyky aktivoida varastovaunuja 17 kpl per kuukausi per paja, mikä tarkoittaisi 204 kpl per vuosi per paja. Yhteensä näiden kolmen kapasiteetti olisi siis 51 kpl per kuukausi, mikä tarkoittaisi 612 kpl per vuosi

Näistä voidaan siis summailla että uusien panssarivaunujen valmistus + vanhojen modernisointi olisi 240 kpl per vuosi JA varastovaunujen aktivointi olisi 708 kpl per vuosi. Jos laskee nämä yhteen, saadaan 948 kpl.

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Näiden lisäksi Venäjä on ainakin nimellisesti perustanut kaksi uutta "armored repair plant" pajaa, artikkelin mukaan nämä tulisivat toimintaan muutaman kuukauden kuluttua. Tämän jälkeen heillä voisi olla kykyä aktivoida varastovaunuja yhteensä 90 kpl per kuukausi, artikkelin mukaan. Tämä tarkoittaisi yhteensä 1 080 kpl per vuosi.

Mietin, että onko tuossa laskettu näille uusille pajoillekin kyvyksi 17 kpl per kuukausi. Tuo voidaan kokeilla: 5 x 17 + 8 = 93 kpl.

Ehkä on ajateltu, että alkuun tahti olisi hieman hitaampi kuin "kokeneilla pajoilla", tosin on mahdollista että muodostuu jokin muu pullonkaula (esim. varaosien saatavuus, sopivien aihioiden löytäminen ja siirto pajalle).

JOS muutos toteutuisi kuten se on esitetty artikkelin arviossa, se tarkoittaisi että uusien panssarivaunujen valmistus + vanhojen modernisointi olisi 240 kpl per vuosi JA varastovaunujen aktivointi olisi 1 080 kpl per vuosi. Jos laskee nämä yhteen, saadaan 1 320 kpl.

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Artikkelissa ei mainita Omsktransmashia, joka on modernisoinut T-80BVM vaunuja (ovat myös tehneet T-72B/B1 ja T-80BV peruskorjauksia ilman modernisointia). Ehkä se on laskettu osaksi UVZ:n numeroa, koska kuuluvat virallisesti ko. konserniin? T-80BVM modernisointimäärä oli noin 31 kpl per vuosi, mutta tämä oli ennen Venäjän hyökkäystä Ukrainaan. 31 kpl per vuosi tarkoittaisi 2,58333 per kuukausi.

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HUOM: muistutuksena, lainasin aikaisemmassa viestissä (LINKKI) Puolan Jaroslaw Wolskin arviota Venäjän kyvystä "tuottaa uutta ja aktivoida varastovaunuja": LÄHDE

ON THE ROOM:

UVZ (eli Uralvagonzavod eli Nizhny Tagilin tehdas) up to 200 to 300 machines per year
Kurganmash - as above (BMP only)
Omsk as a repair shop - 62 T-80BVM per year, etc.

And there are also 5 regional repair plants which become factories after mobilization.

They renovated from 80 to 180 pieces of technique. Yes, during peacetime RUS had the ability to produce/renovate from 860 to 1500 pieces of technology.

Below, an information board of one of the five regional plants with "production" (cars repaired with mileage reset)
(HUOM: tämä on БТРЗ № 61 eli 61st armored repair plant tehtaan seinältä otettu kuva)

1672941305254-png.72430


How much are RUS able to repair on a war footing? In theory, the minimum is DOUBLE in relation to peacetime. Estimated from 1600 to 3000 pieces of technology. Currently, the Russians say that in one of the mobilized repair plants they will release 230-260 units per year, e.g. T-62M

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Sanoisin että hänen antamansa arvio rauhanajan kapasiteetista osuu aika samoille linjoille kuin The Economist -artikkelin arvio. Toisaalta Wolski arvioi, että SOTA-AJAN kapasiteetti voisi olla kaksi kertaa suurempi (tosin hän painottaa että kyse on teoreettisesta kapasiteetista).

Hän myös kirjoittaa viidestä varastoituja panssarivaunujen aktivoivasta pajasta ("armored repair plant"), oletan että tässä on laskettu mukaan kaksi viime syksynä perustettua pajaa, joiden pitäisi olla "valmiita tuotantoon" parin kuukauden kuluttua (jos uskotaan The Economist -artikkelin arviota).

HUOM: tässä puhutaan keskiarvoista, yllä on БТРЗ № 61 eli 61st armored repair plant tehtaan seinältä otettu kuva ja siitä nähdään selvästi, että ovat remontoineet 187 kpl panssarivaunuja vuonna 2014 ja 188 kpl panssarivaunuja vuonna 2015. Onko tämä ko. pajan huippu vai uusi normaali näiden vuosien jälkeen? Ei ole tietoa. Ovatko muut "armored repair plant" pajan yhtä tehokkaita? Ei ole tietoa.

The Economist -artikkeli arvioi että yhden pajan kapasiteetti olisi 204 kpl per vuosi (+ UVZ:n Nizhny Tagilin kapasiteetti näiden pajojen lisäksi). Wolski puolestaan arvioi yhden "armored repair plant" pajan rauhanajan vaihteluväliksi 80-180 kpl per vuosi ja sota-ajan (teoreettisen) kapasiteettin vaihteluväliksi 160-360 kpl.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Jatkoa edelliseen, tässä Forbes Ukraina -artikkelissa on arvioitu Venäjän kärsimien menetysten rahallista arvoa (artikkeli julkaistu 2.3.2023): LÄHDE

02 March 17:52

Russia has already lost $25 billion worth of equipment in the war in Ukraine. Forbes calculations​


https://forbes.ua/ru/war-in-ukraine...-na-25-mlrd-rozrakhunki-forbes-02032023-12111

02 March 17:52

Russia has already lost $25 billion worth of equipment in the war in Ukraine. Forbes calculations​

Vladimir Datsenko
Forbes

Since February 24, 2022, in the war in Ukraine, Russia has lost more than 3,000 tanks, the value of which exceeds $5 billion. At the same time, Russia is now able to produce only 45 restored and new tanks per month

Forbes Ukraine has released a new issue of the print magazine. It contains almost two dozen exclusive materials. You can buy the magazine with free shipping here .

During the year of the war in Ukraine, Russia lost most of the equipment that it had before the start of a full-scale invasion. According to the Western military, the Russian Federation may take years to fully restore the equipment, writes The Washington Post. The Minister of Defense of Ukraine Oleksiy Reznikov estimates this term more precisely : from five to 10 years.

Russia suffered the most tangible losses in the tank forces. In 12 months of a full-scale war, the Russian army lost a fourfold advantage in the number of tanks that it had a year ago. Moreover, according to the military doctrines of the Russian Federation, it was tank units that were supposed to form the basis of offensive forces.

Russia was so confident in its tank forces that it even created a separate tank army for the war against NATO. Already in the fall, British intelligence confirmed that this army had died in Ukraine.

The total cost of Russian tanks destroyed in Ukraine exceeds $5 billion. The total loss of ground forces equipment is estimated at $13 billion.

Russia has already lost $25 billion worth of equipment in the war in Ukraine. Forbes calculations / Photo 1


Kuvan tekstien käännös englanniksi:

1677841976238.png

The problem for updating this equipment is not only the cost, but also the physical capabilities of the Russian defense industry.

Russian tank factories in 2022, on average, produced about 45 restored and new tanks per month, writes The Economist. In 2023, Moscow plans to launch two more enterprises and will be able to increase this figure to 110.

Another big problem for the Russian Federation is the installation of optical devices and thermal imaging sights on tanks. From about the mid-2000s, Russia began installing thermal imaging matrices from the French manufacturer Thales on its tanks and armored vehicles . Now the export of these products is prohibited due to sanctions.

The Russian Aerospace Forces have lost about $11.4 billion worth of equipment. Although Russia still has a lot of aviation, its production will be problematic in the future - Russian aircraft have a large share of imported components.

The most expensive damage to Russian equipment remains the cruiser Moskva, worth $750 million.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:

Russia has already lost $25 billion worth of equipment in the war in Ukraine. Forbes calculations​

Nämä ovat ilmeisesti jenkkibiljoonia (eli miljardeja täällä)
Siis noin puolet siitä mitä Marinin hallitus on ottanut lisävelkaa hallituskaudellaan. Ei valitettavasti heilauta Putinia ollenkaan
 
Neuvostoliiton panssarivaunujen vuosituotanto vaunutyypeittäin aikavälillä 1960-1975.

Lähde:

Tanks at the Iron Curtain 1960-75 - Steven J. Zaloga - kirja julkaistu 21.6.2022

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 13.
1677877296331.png

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Yleisesti Puolan ja Tsekkoslovakian panssarivaunutuotannosta ja viennin kokonaismääristä aikavälillä 1964-1982.

Lähde:

Tanks at the Iron Curtain 1960-75 - Steven J. Zaloga - kirja julkaistu 21.6.2022

Seuraava lainaus ja taulukot ovat kirjan sivuilta 18-19.

Warsaw Pact

Both Czechoslovakia and Poland were already license-producing the T-54A tank and switched to T-55 production in 1964. This program was part of a larger Soviet effort to have the Warsaw Pact countries provide more of their own weapons.

In 1962, Poland began negotiations to switch to T-55 production at Zakłady Mechaniczne Bumar-Labędy. The first ten T-55 were turned over to the Polish Army in 1964. By the end of 1965, there were 128 Polish manufactured T-55 in service. Production of the T-55A began in 1968, and by 1970 there were 956 T-55/T-55A tanks in Polish service. Total production of the T-55 and its variants in Poland up to 1981 was around 5,000 vehicles, the majority of which were exported.

The ZŤS-Martin plant in Czechoslovakia switched production from the T-54A tank to the T-55 in 1964 and in 1967 switched to the T-55A, producing it through 1982. As in the case of Poland, the majority of the tanks were manufactured for export, going to other Warsaw Pact armies as well as clients in the Middle East and elsewhere.


1677877543103.png

The Polish and Czechoslovak T-55 production was heavily oriented towards export within the Warsaw Pact. The East German Nationalen Volksarmee (NVA) provides a typical example, with the Soviet Union providing the original tanks, but the bulk of the tanks coming from imports from Czechoslovakia and Poland.

1677877584733.png

One of the minor mysteries of this era was the absence of production of the T-62 in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Soviet production of the T-62 ended in 1972, yet production of the T-55A continued in the Warsaw Pact states for a decade afterwards. There have been some suggestions that Poland and Czechoslovakia balked at the license production fees demanded by the Soviets for T-62 production, but a definitive account of this policy is still lacking. Both countries shifted to T-72 production in the 1980s.


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Yhdysvaltain panssarivaunujen vuosituotanto vaunutyypeittäin aikavälillä 1960-1975.

Lähde:

Tanks at the Iron Curtain 1960-75 - Steven J. Zaloga - kirja julkaistu 21.6.2022

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 23.
1677877704554.png

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Leopard 1 mallien tilausmäärät Saksalta, osa NATO-maista sai näitä vaunuja lisää myöhempinä vuosina kun toiset NATO-maat luovuttivat niitä ko. maille.

Lähde:

Tanks at the Iron Curtain 1960-75 - Steven J. Zaloga - kirja julkaistu 21.6.2022

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 31.
1677877915699.png
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Tsekkoslovakian T-34-85 panssarivaunujen vuosituotantomäärät aikavälillä 1951-1956.

Lähde:

Ceskoslovenske Tankove Sily 1945-1992 - Vladimir Francev - 2012

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 69.

Otsikon käännös: Table No. 1 - Licensed production of the T-34/85 tank in Czechoslovakia 1951-1956
1677937277917.png
Vasemman reunan sarake kertoo valmistajan.

ČKD = ČKD (Českomoravská Kolben-Daněk) Sokolovo plant, Prague, Czech Republic
ZJVS = Závody J. V. Stalina plant, myöhemmin TS Martin = Turčianské strojárne Martin, vielä myöhemmin ZŤS Martin = ZTS (Zavod Trucanske Strojarne) plant in Martin in Slovakia

MNO = Ministerstvo národní obrany = Ministry of National Defense = omalle armeijalle
MZO = Ministerstvo zahraničního obchodu = Ministry of Foreign Trade = vientiin
Oba = Both = molemmat
Celkem = In total = yhteensä / summa

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Tsekkoslovakian SD-100 rynnäkkötykkien (heikäläinen versio SU-100 vaunusta) vuosituotantomäärät aikavälillä 1953-1957.

Lähde:

Ceskoslovenske Tankove Sily 1945-1992 - Vladimir Francev - 2012

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 71.

Otsikon käännös: Table No. 2 - Licensed production of the SD-100 self-propelled gun in Czechoslovakia 1953-1957
1677937506712.png
Vasemman reunan sarake kertoo valmistajan.

ČKD = ČKD (Českomoravská Kolben-Daněk) Sokolovo plant, Prague, Czech Republic
ZJVS = Závody J. V. Stalina plant, myöhemmin TS Martin = Turčianské strojárne Martin, vielä myöhemmin ZŤS Martin = ZTS (Zavod Trucanske Strojarne) plant in Martin in Slovakia

MNO = Ministerstvo národní obrany = Ministry of National Defense = omalle armeijalle
MZO = Ministerstvo zahraničního obchodu = Ministry of Foreign Trade = vientiin
Oba = Both = molemmat
Celkem = In total = yhteensä / summa

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Tsekkoslovakian T54A, T-54AR ja T-54ARK panssarivaunujen vuosituotantomäärät aikavälillä 1957-1964.

Lähde:

Ceskoslovenske Tankove Sily 1945-1992 - Vladimir Francev - 2012

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 112.

Otsikon käännös: Table No. 3 - Production of T-54A, T-54AR and T-54ARK tanks in ZJVS/TS Martin 1957-1964
1677937640396.png
MNO = Ministerstvo národní obrany = Ministry of National Defense = omalle armeijalle
Mad'arsko = Hungary = Unkari
Celkem = In total = yhteensä / summa

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Tsekkoslovakian T-34-85 panssarivaunujen vuosituotantomäärät aikavälillä 1959-1966.

Lähde:

Ceskoslovenske Tankove Sily 1945-1992 - Vladimir Francev - 2012

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 113.

Otsikon käännös: Table No. 4 - Production of T-34/85 tank applications in ZJVS/TS Martin for MNO 1959-1966
1677937718244.png
Alimman rivin tekstin käännös:

Note: 1/ plus 6 units of the prototype series produced in 1958 in ČKD
2/ of which 1 unit was exported to Poland in 1963

Celkem = In total = yhteensä / summa

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Tsekkoslovakian T-55, T-55A ja T-55AK panssarivaunujen vuosituotantomäärät aikavälillä 1964-1970.

Lähde:

Ceskoslovenske Tankove Sily 1945-1992 - Vladimir Francev - 2012

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 115.

Otsikon käännös: Table No. 5 - Production of T-55, T-55A and T-55AK tanks in TS/ZTS Martin 1964-1970
1677937791782.png
MNO = Ministerstvo národní obrany = Ministry of National Defense = omalle armeijalle
MZO = Ministerstvo zahraničního obchodu = Ministry of Foreign Trade = vientiin
Oba = Both = molemmat
Celkem = In total = yhteensä / summa

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PS. Hieman nolostuttaa, miten paljon palstatilaa ja erilaisia irtolähteitä käytin aikaisemmissa tämän ketjun viesteissä Tsekkoslovakian panssarivaunujen valmistuksen tarkasteluun ja samalla unohdin ihan tyystin että tällainen kirja on paitsi olemassa, niin myös löytyy minun hyllystä.

Parempi toki myöhään, kuin milloinkaan.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Tsekkoslovakian T-55A alustaan perustuvien erilaisten "tukivaunujen" vuosituotantomäärät aikavälillä 1967-1970.

Lähde:

Ceskoslovenske Tankove Sily 1945-1992 - Vladimir Francev - 2012

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 116.

Otsikon käännös: Table No. 6 - Production of T-55A tank applications in ZTS Martin 1967-1970
1677937918778.png
MNO = Ministerstvo národní obrany = Ministry of National Defense = omalle armeijalle
MZO = Ministerstvo zahraničního obchodu = Ministry of Foreign Trade = vientiin
NDR = Německá demokratická republika = GDR = German Democratic Republic = DDR eli Itä-Saksa
Oba = Both = molemmat
Celkem = In total = yhteensä / summa
Oba typy = Both types = molemmat tyypit

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Tsekkoslovakian T-55A ja T-55AK panssarivaunujen vuosituotantomäärät aikavälillä 1971-1982.

Lähde:

Ceskoslovenske Tankove Sily 1945-1992 - Vladimir Francev - 2012

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 144.

Otsikon käännös: Table No. 7 - Production of the T-55A and T-55AK tank at ZTS Martin 1971-1982
1677938033235.png
MNO = Ministerstvo národní obrany = Ministry of National Defense = omalle armeijalle
MZO = Ministerstvo zahraničního obchodu = Ministry of Foreign Trade = vientiin
Oba = Both = molemmat
Celkem = In total = yhteensä / summa

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Tsekkoslovakian VT-55A ja MT-55A "tukivaunujen" vuosituotantomäärät aikavälillä 1971-1983.

Lähde:

Ceskoslovenske Tankove Sily 1945-1992 - Vladimir Francev - 2012

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 145.

Otsikon käännös: Table No. 8. Production of VT-55A and MT-55A tanks at ZTS Martin 1971-1983
1677938103400.png
MNO = Ministerstvo národní obrany = Ministry of National Defense = omalle armeijalle
MD = ? - kirjan alussa on sanasto, siellä lukee: md = mechanizovaná divize (eli mechanized division) - epäilen silti, tarkoitettaisiinko tätä vai onko kyseessä jokin valtiollinen toimija
MZO = Ministerstvo zahraničního obchodu = Ministry of Foreign Trade = vientiin
Celkem = In total = yhteensä / summa

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Tsekkoslovakian T-72 panssarivaunujen vuosituotantomäärät aikavälillä 1981-1991.

Lähde:

Ceskoslovenske Tankove Sily 1945-1992 - Vladimir Francev - 2012

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 147.

Otsikon käännös: Table No. 9 - Production of the T-72 tank and derived versions in ZTS Martin 1981-1991
1677938167455.png
Alimman rivin tekstin käännös: Note: 78 T-72M1 units paid to MNO in 1990, but sold to Syria via MNO/HTS VT-72B produced + 1 unit as a working sample in 1989

MNO = Ministerstvo národní obrany = Ministry of National Defense = omalle armeijalle
MZO = Ministerstvo zahraničního obchodu = Ministry of Foreign Trade = vientiin
Oba = Both = molemmat
Celkem = In total = yhteensä / summa
Bojove = Fighting = pelkät taistelupanssarivaunut eli niiden summa

PS. olen lainannut tätä taulukkoa aikaisemmin tässä ketjussa mutta en muistanut, mistä kirjasta / lähteestä oli ottanut sen. Hyvä että tähänkin tuli nyt selvyys.

Oletan myös että yllä on virhe: kun lukee VT-55B niin pitäisi lukea VT-72B. Tässä kohdassa kirjoitetaan siis VT-72B viennistä 80-luvun lopussa. Alempana on rivi jossa lasketaan näiden vaunujen summa viennin ja omille asevoimille toimitettujen osalta, mikä vahvistaa käsitystä siitä että rivi olisi nimetty väärin. Muutenkin koko taulukko puhuu T-72 perheen vaunuista joten miksi siellä olisi yksi rivi jossa kirjoitetaan T-55 perheen vaunuista?

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Tsekkoslovakian JVBT-55A ja MT-55A "tukivaunujen" vientimäärät aikavälillä 1971-1983.

Lähde:

Ceskoslovenske Tankove Sily 1945-1992 - Vladimir Francev - 2012

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 155.

Otsikon käännös: Table No. 10 - Production of export JVBT-55A tanks and MT-55A chassis 1971-1983
1677938274793.png
Alimman rivin tekstin käännös: Note: In 1969, one JVBT-55A prototype was produced at ZTS Martin for the production plant.

Celkem = In total = yhteensä / summa

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Tämä lienee selvää, mutta kirjoitan silti: taulukoissa kerrotaan uustuotantona valmistuneiden vaunujen vastaanottaja eli karkeasti joko oma armeija tai vienti MUTTA lienee selvää että jossain vaiheessa myöhemmin alunperin Tsekkoslovakian armeijalle valmistetut vaunut siirtyivät reservistä vientiin.

En ole ehtinyt kääntää tätä kirjaa vielä joten määristä ei ole tietoa, mutta oletan että uustuotannosta valmistuneet vaunut korvasivat pikkuhiljaa vanhempia reservissä olevia vaunuja ja tällöin nämä vapautuivat vientiin.

Oletan myös että nämä vaunut kävivät ennen vientiä peruskorjattavina eli kulkivat "armored repair plant" pajan kautta. Tässä vaiheessa on myös saatettu tehdä erilaisia ostajamaan vaatimia muutoksia, tosin tämä on vain minun arvaus. Kaikki maat eivät välttämättä vaatineet muutoksia.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Jaoin noin kuukausi sitten toisessa ketjussa tämän Oryxin numeroihin perustuvan laskelman (ketju julkaistu 14.2.2023 - LÄHDE), otan sen tänne talteen koska sama twitter-tili viittaa siihen tuoreemmassa kirjoituksessaan. Tässä minun aikaisemman viestin sisältö:

Mielenkiintoinen laskelma eri vaunutyyppien menetyksistä, antaa laskelman Venäjän ja Ukrainan menetyksille (kymmenen päivää vanha mutten muista nähneeni täällä).

Isoja kuvia joten laitan spoilerin taakse, lainasin myös kumpaankin viestiin tulleet kommentit ja hänen vastauksensa niihin:


LÄHDE

A rough calculation on Russian Tank/BMP loss rate as of mid-Feb 2023 basing on the work of @oryxspioenkop and the others.
@Danspiun @naalsio26 @HN_Schlottman @Rebel44CZ

Fo5iBalaAAI2rac



Linkit viitattuihin lähteisiin:

Oryx - https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
Tverezo - https://tverezo.info/post/167958
BMPD - https://bmpd.livejournal.com/4393829.html
Covert Cabal -


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Ukrainian loss rate.

Fo6n8rkaYAIYPY7



Correction: total number of T-80BVs captured by/abandoned to Ukr forces shall be 98. 198 is the number of the whole T-80 family.

Linkit viitattuihin lähteisiin:

Oryx - https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-ukrainian.html
Oryx - https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/answering-call-heavy-weaponry-supplied.html

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LAINAAN SEURAAVAKSI eri viesteihin tulleita kommentteja ja hänen vastauksia niihin. Nämä ensimmäiset kommentit on annettu Venäjän taulukkoa käsittelevään viestiin:

Kysymys / kommentti: Good job. An important caveat is all the BMP-1 losses attributed to DNR/LNR that wouldn't be counted as being in Russian service.

Suyi vastaus: Good catch. I totally forget that.

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Kysymys / kommentti: I wonder why there are so little T90a losses ? Russia afraid to lose them maybe.

Suyi vastaus: Maybe the actual number of T-90A in service is lower than what BMPD reported, since Russia was replacing them with T-72B3s in 2021.

Kysymys / kommentti: Very likely the case. I only recall seeing them lost by the 27th MRB and 20th MRD in this war up until one was abandoned around Vuhledar. I don't know who was operating the latter.

Kysymys / kommentti: Not many units use them and if I remember right most of the losses where found in only a few spots on the front (Sumy and Kharkiv are two known areas). So maybe a brigade or two have entered into combat in Ukraine who uses T 90A'. Also t

Suyi vastaus: T-90As lost in Sumy/Kharkiv shall belong to the 27th gv.omsbr. There should be more T-90As in the southern front (from the 136th omsbr, 19th msd, and the 20th http://gv.msd).

Kysymys / kommentti: Could they have pulled them off the line and sent back to the factories to be upgraded to the M pattern? Since Russia is so keen on upgrading them, would explain why we've seen a lot of T-80 BVS and older T-72s destroyed on the southern front because they replaced the T-90 As..

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Kysymys / kommentti: Does this include the losses, reserve and active vehicles used by the sepparatis, paramilitaries, or the chechens?

Suyi vastaus: Yes and no. The separatists mainly operates T-64BVs and BMP-1s. Their losses are counted by Oryx, but their equipment is not counted in the active service numbers. So the loss rate of BMP-1 may be higher than actual.

Kysymys / kommentti: I see. Do we know or have a rough estimate on how many ukrainian vehicles were captured by Russia during the first days or week of the invasion? Is that counted somewhere?

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Kysymys / kommentti: Hi mate, great work. Q/ Where did you get the T72B3 numbers from? I have 558 refurbished in 2020, with 100 extra each year is 758. The B3M is upgraded from the B3 and there were 250 units of this type. Did you count them as upgraded from T72?

Suyi vastaus: bmpd.livejournal.com/4393829.html

Kysymys / kommentti: On this website, it is 837 B3 and B3M types, and the rest are B. It's not THAT important, cause as you state the replacement rate doesn't match the losses

Suyi vastaus: I recounted and got 998... Bad counting :(

Kysymys / kommentti: I am ok to split the difference mate! :D Russia is going to lose and that is more important. Appreciate all the counting you have done

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Kysymys / kommentti: Asking an unrelated question, what are the two multipliers in the table?

Suyi vastaus: In the Orxy data, in addition to the identified battle damage of specific models, there are also battle damages of unidentified models, such as "unknown tank" and "unknown T-72". The proportion of the model is the same as the loss ratio of the known model, so the "distribution" of the battle damage of these unknown models to the loss of the specific model is arithmetically expressed as multiplying by a specific multiplier. For example, "unknown tank" item / total tank loss without "unknown tank" = 0.13, we get a multiplier of 1.13

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Kysymys / kommentti: moreover, I think simply distributing unknown tanks to all models are not reasonable. a (maybe) better method is allocate quantity according to loss proportion. then my result is (487*0.9+102*0.5+196*0.3)/1240≈44% T72B3 losses.( I assume 5~10% of tank losses are duplicate)

Suyi vastaus: It is according to loss proportion.

Kysymys / kommentti: but your result is 643, where are the extra 33 tanks?

Suyi vastaus: Shit I fucked up with my math again...Multiplier 1 should have been 111.68%, not 116.8%.

Fo-c9hdagAEPTHd



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Kysymys / kommentti: Holy sh*t, the entire initial active numbers of T80’s was obliterated

Suyi vastaus: Sadly Russia still has a considerable T-80BV stock (mainly retrieved from the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany and Poland) in reserve and they are now unmothballing them.

Kysymys / kommentti: That’s unfortunately true. But thing is, Russia still has to keep an active force in key regions and borders across Russia, so a massive part would be reserved for this role. I’m not saying T80s specifically, but in general.

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Kysymys / kommentti: T72B3 has no reserve?

Suyi vastaus: There has never been a reserve for this car, and as much equipment as it is built, because this is the latest car (before T-90M).

Kysymys / kommentti: Has everything been sent to the army?

Suyi vastaus: Generally, a batch of 10-20 vehicles will be delivered to the army.

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Kysymys / kommentti: Great excel but it must be added the newly produced equipment since the start of the invasion. Russian armed forces received around 200 BMP-3 this year alongside additional T-72B3.

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Kysymys / kommentti: Have you seen this website?

https://github.com/leedrake5/Russia-Ukraine

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Kysymys / kommentti: the bmpd article you refenceed lacked ~7 units equipment information. another one(also from bmpd) counts a more reliable number of T72B3 series, which let me believe it should be around 1200~1400.

https://bmpd.livejournal.com/4402499.html

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NÄMÄ SEURAAVAT KOMMENTIT on annettu Ukrainan taulukkoa käsittelevään viestiin:

Kysymys / kommentti: Any reasons for the low loss rate of T72s compared to T80?

Suyi vastaus: Before the war, T-72 mainly serves in reserve units, while T-80 serves in marine and air assault forces which heavily engaged in initial combat.

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Kysymys / kommentti: I think Ukrainians are less eager to upload losses, while they rush each time it's Russian, so Oryx 70% is properly closer than Oryx 80% equipment loss

Suyi vastaus: Reasonable.

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Kysymys / kommentti: Did Ukraine not have T-80U/UK tanks before the war?

Suyi vastaus: Ukriane sold out its 300-ish T-80UD to Pakistan in late 1990s. Its T-80BV fleet is mainly salvaged from Malyshev tank graveyard, where some 300 T-80BVs from the 20th Tank Division (was in Poland) were left rot since the end of USSR.

-

Tämä Suyi-nimeä käyttävä twitter-tili on kirjoittanut sodan aikana Venäjän panssarivaunujen määristä, ei usein mutta toisinaan. Hän vaikuttaa aiheeseen perehtyneeltä ja lisää usein lähteet käyttämilleen numeroille. Hän voi olla kokonaisuutta ajatellen oikeassa tai väärässä (tämä vaatisi tarkemman tarkastelun), mutta on myös mahdollista että kirjoituksissa on tiedonmurusia, jotka ovat oikein. Tästä syystä on hyvä seurata, mitä hän kirjoittaa ja ottaa ainakin numerot talteen.

Hänen tuoreehkoa ketjuaan siteerattiin Forbes-artikkelissa (artikkeli julkaistu 12.3.2023): LÄHDE

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davida...ut-of-t-72-tanks-and-quickly/?sh=1f57894f6099

The Russian Army Is Running Out Of T-72 Tanks—And Quickly​

David Axe
Forbes Staff
I write about ships, planes, tanks, drones, missiles and satellites.
Mar 12, 2023,08:48pm EDT

0x0.jpg

A Russian army T-72B. RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY PHOTO

Russia’s tank shortage is worse than some observers previously thought. The Kremlin’s stocks of its most numerous tank, the Cold War-vintage T-72, are running out fast.

The worsening T-72 shortfall helps to explain why the Russians increasingly are equipping their newly-mobilized battalions with obsolete T-62 and T-80B tanks.

When it comes to assessing the Russian tank arsenal, one of the best independent sources is a Twitter user with the handle @partizan_oleg.

Drawing on unclassified data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and other sources, including the Oryx blog’s painstaking count of visually-confirmed vehicle losses in the current phase of the Russia-Ukraine war, @partizan_oleg estimates how many tanks the Russians have left after more than a year of hard fighting.

Their assessment of T-72 stocks has changed—for the worse. In a mid-February count, @partizan_oleg assumed Russia went to war with nearly 2,000 of the 50-ton, three-person T-72s with their 125-millimeter smoothbore main guns.

In the first 12 months of fighting, the Ukrainians destroyed or captured nearly 1,200 T-72s or likely T-72s that Oryx could confirm. Since there undoubtedly have been tank losses that didn’t leave video or photographic evidence, the Oryx count is an undercount. If Oryx confirmed 80 percent of losses, then the Russians actually have written off 1,500 T-72s.


But per @partizan_oleg’s earlier count, the Russians had 6,900 old T-72s in storage, around a third of which might’ve been recoverable after decades of corrosive exposure to rain, snow and cycles of hot and cold.

The problem, for the Kremlin, is that @partizan_oleg’s February count was off. Double-checking their numbers on Tuesday, @partizan_oleg realized that, in fact, the Russians probably only have 1,500, not 6,900, old T-72s in storage. “And many of them are probably not in good shape,” they pointed out.

The recount was pretty straightforward. @partizan_oleg started with the number of T-72 hulls that Soviet industry produced in a 23-year production run between 1968 and 1991—18,000—and started subtracting tanks the Soviets and Russians either lost in combat, abandoned abroad or exported to foreign customers.

That’s how they arrived at the much lower number of war-reserve T-72s. The big variable, @partizan_oleg acknowledged, is that their production data might not include the very first T-72 model, the crude T-72 “Ural.” It’s unclear how many Urals the Uralvagonzavod factory in Sverdlovsk Oblast may have produced then stored. Perhaps hundreds. Perhaps a couple thousand.

But even after adding some very old Urals to @partizan_oleg’s T-72 survey, a stark conclusion is unavoidable. The Russians have lost potentially two-thirds of the T-72s that are in active service or in recoverable storage.

So it makes a lot more sense why the Kremlin is pulling out of storage T-62 tanks that are even older than any T-72 is, as well as T-80Bs that are roughly contemporaneous with early T-72s. Russian industry can produce just a handful of new tanks every month—far too few to make good monthly losses in the triple digits.
All that is to say, the Russians are running out of tanks. And quickly.

Follow me on Twitter. Check out my website or some of my other work here. Send me a secure tip.
David Axe

I'm a journalist, author and filmmaker based in Columbia, South Carolina.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Edellisen viestin artikkelissa viitatun twitter-ketjun teksti ja kuvat (ketju julkaistu 7.3.2023): LÄHDE

I tried to sort out Russian T-72 stockpiles with limited sources and many assumptions, and here it is:


Russian military basically stopped to build new T-72 hulls for its own armed forces since the fall of the Soviet Union. From 2013 some 1100 T-72B3/B3Ms were converted from existing T-72B hulls. So the Russian T-72 stockpile maintained unchanged since 1991.

According to Internet sources (!!) that I can not 100% be sure, some 18,000 T-72s were made before the Soviet breakup.

According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)'s International Arms Transfer Database (which is, frankly speaking, not 100% accurate), some 7400 T-72s were exported by the USSR from 1970 to 1991.

According to V.Feskov (2013) , a total of 5144 T-72s were fielded by the USSR as of late 1980s in the CFE area (excl. Siberia, Central Asian, Turkestan, Transbaikal, and Far East MDs). A couple of divisions were missing in these charts but they won't make a big difference.

(HUOM: taulukot ovat kirjasta: Вооруженные Силы СССР после Второй мировой войны: от Красной Армии к Советской. Книги 01 - В.И. Феськов, В.И. Голиков, К.А. Калашников, С.А. Слугин - 2013 - kirjan nimi englanniksi Armed Forces of the USSR after the Second World War: from the Red Army to the Soviet. Book 1)

Taulukon otsikko (taulukko löytyy kirjan sivuilta 179 ja 180): Annex 4.6. The main armament and military equipment of motorized rifle divisions in the late 1980s.
Fqoi254aMAAKjr1


Taulukon otsikko (taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 231): Annex 5.6. The main armament and military equipment of tank divisions in the late 1980s.
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Post-USSR Central Asian republics (Turkestan+Central Asian MD) obtained some 1800-2000 T-72s.

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The Transbaikal MD (incl. the 39th Army in Mongolia) was another major user of the T-72: no less than 1400 should had been fielded; the Far Eastern MD, however, was fielded with T-80s.

If we add these numbers up, we have the number of 7400+5144+1800+1400=15700. Given that the first batch of T-72s were introduced in 1970, which was 20 yrs before the end of the Soviet Army, it is possible that some 2000 early T-72 Urals had already been retired from service.

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The Soviet Army ended in 1991 with some 8300 T-72 tanks. Among them, ~1800 were acquired by Central Asian countries, ~800 acquired by Trancaucasus countries, ~1160 acquired by Belarus, ~600 by Ukraine.

Russian Federation also exported some 500 T-72s (excluding those newly-built for India) from 1991-2021. That gives the number left as 3440. I think this may be close to the actual number of T-72s that Russian has got before the war. Among them some 1961 were in active service.

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What was unexpected by me is that the calculated amount of T-72s (some 1500) in storage is much fewer than what I assumed before. (I thought there could have been 7000!) And many of them are probably not in a good shape.


Now that 1000 T-72s are confirmed lost by @oryxspioenkop , which was 1/2 of Russian's pre-war active T-72 fleet and maybe more than 1/3.5 of its total T-72 fleet. I think the actual loss number should be ~40% higher (1400 pieces lost/unserviceable).

The more important thing is that it may already have been impossible for the Russians to compensate its T-72 losses from its reserve even with earlier types e.g. the T-72 Ural.

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Kuten aikaisemminkin, hänen kirjoituksiinsa tulee runsaasti hyviä kysymyksiä, joihin hän vastaa usein parhaansa mukaan. Lainaan alle muutaman näistä:

Kysymys / kommentti: How much do you think the t-80 is left with? LÄHDE

Suyi vastaus: Theoretically, there should be more than 2,500 vehicles (including deep reserves), but it is hard to say how many will actually be active. This year the Russians should mainly count on the T-80BV to fight. The T-62 is only 800 anyway, and it will take several years to refurbish it. After these T-80BVs are consumed next year, I don't know what else the Russians can find out...

Kysymys / kommentti: What do you think the output of the t-80bvm is? I think the t-80bv consumes more than a thousand a year at most. Of course, I don’t think all 2500 can be used, maybe only half can be used.

Suyi vastaus: One hundred and fifty a year is more than that, and it should not have reached this number last year

Kysymys / kommentti: Do you have any news on t-80u production?

Suyi vastaus: Not counting UD should be around 500. At the end of the Cold War, apart from the 2nd near-Motor Division and the 4th Near-Tank Division of the Moscow Military Region, it was mainly equipped with some units of the 5th Army in the Far East. So far, Russia has not shown any signs of unblocking the new T-80U (especially considering the huge loss of the 4th near-tank division), and it is speculated that there is no ready-to-use reserve at all.

Kysymys / kommentti: I also think so, it seems that the fourth division originally used ud, I think the total output of u seems to be around 700, and when sold to Korea and Greece, there are basically 500 left

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Kysymys / kommentti: In the case of t-80, estimates put the number of t-80 russia had before the invasion at around 500 in active service and 3000 in storage. BY visual confirmations they lost the equivalent of 90% of their active t-80. What do you think is the actual number of t-80 in storage? LÄHDE

Suyi vastaus: The T-80s were largely from the former Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) and Poland (NGF), the Leningrad MD, and the Far Eastern MD. I think 500 active + 3000 storage is a decent assumption.

Kysymys / kommentti: So we should start worrying about hordes of T-80s instead? Which is an objectively superior tank compared to T-72

Suyi vastaus: The Russians have already fielded a lot of T-80s from storage. The T-80BVs is more and more frequently seen on the frontline, which I think will gradually become the backbone of Russian tank troops by late 2023.

Kysymys / kommentti: Hopefully stored ones are T-80Bs or even older T-80A, which, with some slapped on ERA still won’t be too much of a problem like the T-80U or T-80BVM

Suyi vastaus: The Russians are fielding the T-80Bs now. I don't know if it is a sign that the Russians have already running out of T-80BV reserves.


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Kysymys / kommentti: Interesting analysis. You may also want to consider the number of T-72s that Belarus has been shipping to Russia. LÄHDE

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Kysymys / kommentti: The great analysis. Thank you. This explains or partially explains some patterns. Russia pulled from storage mostly T-80 (and T-62), but not T-72 (because they lack of them and, probably, because there is probably signinficant deterioration of remaining hulls as only 1/3 not used

Also, need to upgrade T-72s from the most backyard storage fields makes it impossible to keep the # of active tanks. Let's see how many T-80 could be pulled without major refurbishment. Taking into account frequent losses of BVs, I think Ru could pulled ~500 T-80B/V from storage.

And still, that 2000 of T-72 retired by the end of 1980s could be still used, aren't they?

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Kysymys / kommentti: General Cavoli said ruskies lost more than 2000 mtb s LÄHDE

Suyi vastaus: Yeah, it is highy likely to be true, since Oryx has already documented 1807 MBTs lost, while Oryx assumely only represents ~80% of the actual number.

Kysymys / kommentti: Best guess for remaining T-72s, 80s etc? And at current lose rates, prediction on when matters become critical for them?

Suyi vastaus: I made one a month ago. Be aware that my assumption on T-72 storages wassignificantly higher then.

https://twitter.com/partizan_oleg/status/1625344309565468674

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Kysymys / kommentti: Hi mate, interesting numbers. Do you know if in these numbers the losses of the russians against Chechnya is included? Not many have been lost in Syria but in Chechnya, it was a massacre. According to Oryx around 170 T-72s LÄHDE

https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/11/russias-wars-listing-equipment-losses.html

(Russia’s Wars: Listing Equipment Losses During The First Chechen War (1994-1996))

Suyi vastaus: Ops I didn't count them.

Kysymys / kommentti: Given that in those time people didn't had smartphones or commercial drones to capture shots of broken stuff I assume actual losses are way more. Might be even double but buh

Kysymys / kommentti: They visually lost 155 T72s in both chechen wars + Georgia in 2008. They also lost some in Ukraine before 2022 and other wars like Syria so the actual number will be even lower.

Kysymys / kommentti: At that point we have to consider that not every loss is permanent. Oryx lost of the first Chechen War for example includes around 25% captured and damaged tanks that may have been recoverable. On the other hand there were certainly non-combat write-offs as well.

Kysymys / kommentti: I did a count from all Oryx lists on Ukraine, Chechnya and Georgia. For Chechnya, I counted together the Chechen and Russian losses excluding the captures, since Russia absorbed the Chechen army. It gives 1049 T-72 destroyed or captured, 125 damaged and abandoned.

So, 1174 losses in total only with photo or video evidence. If we take the 20% unobserved loss rate mentioned by Oryx, we arrive at about 1410.

Kysymys / kommentti: And there were some used T-72 hulls converted to T-90, may be TOS/BMPT/etc as well

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Kysymys / kommentti (suosittelen tutustumaan tämän linkin takaa löytyvään koontaan): I tried to calculate T72 tanks available on end of 2021 LÄHDE

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet...Av7D4Wv7514kT4Etfgz3Y_H2c/edit#gid=1891324368

1009 / 2230 = 45%

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Kysymys / kommentti: Could exported russian T-72 also be a part of this calculation? Iran: 422 T72M1 (1991 onwards) Laos 30 xT-72B (2018) Nicaragua : 50 xT-72B (2016) Serbia: 30 x T-72 (2016) Venezuela: 92 x T-72M1 (2011-13) Yemen 39 x T-72 (2000) = 663 tanks. LÄHDE

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Kysymys / kommentti: The numbers 1330 spaces under cover of hangars, unkown number of tanks therein. 2299 are just hulks stored for scrapping. 1304 in storage needing long term restoring at a dedicated facility. 2075 "Combat Ready" Only 886 can be fueled, armed fueled and sent to war. Bad numbers. LÄHDE

Kysymys / kommentti: Tbh that assesment missed some pretty big and important tank storage facilities, lilke the 103rd Armor Repair Facility in Chita

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Kysymys / kommentti: Your numbers are very wrong and now a Forbes article appeared using them. I checked your numbers in this thread. Pls be more careful with something like that. We can’t underestimate Russia. It doesn’t help Ukraine. LÄHDE

Hän kirjoitti pidemmän kritiikin tälle ketjulle, tässä sen sisältö (pelkkä teksti, en lainaa kuvia - HUOM: olen taipuvainen uskomaan että Suyi-nimimerkki tietää mistä kirjoittaa, mutta jokaiselle sattuu virheitä, lainaan tämän kritiikin tähän koska se tuli vastaan twitteriä selatessa): LÄHDE

*sigh* in case you come to read this thread or what it states: He added up the equipment which was stationed at certain areas of the SU & then just flat out subtracted it from Russia stockpile, just to then claim Russia lost 2/3 of the T72. It‘s wrong. The equipm. was pulled out mostly.

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https://twitter.com/partizan_oleg/status/1633166869514559490

The graphic above shows mongolias stock pile of 100 T72s vs 1.400 he claims as being stationed there. That was the first country I checked.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_Mongolian_Armed_Forces

Why am I writing this? Because the first outlet took these numbers for granted and published a wrong report based on this.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davida...ut-of-t-72-tanks-and-quickly/?sh=171c2d776099

Over 25.000 T72 we’re produced. (viittaa Suyi kirjoitukseen: According to Internet sources (!!) that I can not 100% be sure, some 18,000 T-72s were made before the Soviet breakup.)

https://twitter.com/partizan_oleg/status/1633166857841807366

1.285 T72 are accounted for in these countries, not 2.000. (neljä kuvaa, en kopioi niitä tähän - ne näkee linkin takaa: LINKKI)

-100 in Mongolia, not 1.4K
-1.285 in central Asian countries, not 1.8K
-Why is he just like that substracting 2K?
-5K more produced than what he claims

Trans Caucasus countries 990 not 800.
Belarus 862, not 1160.

Alright I m tired again. 7.000 more produced than what he claimed, not 5.000. His whole method is highly questionable and for whatever reason, he shave off 10.800 T72s, if I just follow his logic and correct it, while there are many more T72 users and it’s not as simple. So: Why?
 
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Samalta Suyi-nimiseltä twitter-tililtä ketju T-80U panssarivaunuista, lainaan sen spoilerin taakse kokonaisuudessaan (ketju julkaistu 17.3.2023): LÄHDE

A T-80U thread. Russia inherited 600~700 T-80Us from the Soviet Army in 1991. According to SIPRI some 125 were exported to Cyprus and South Korea (among which 74 were exported before 2000). No recorded battle losses before Feb 2022.

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The "T-80U" in this thread refers to the original T-80U, the T-80UD and the T-80UE-1.

The T-80Us were firstly introduced to the 4th Guards Tank Division in late 1980s and later the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division in early 1990s. Both divisions were very active during the 1991 Coup Attempt and the 1993 Constitutional Crisis.

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As of Jan 1, 2000, some 495 T-80Us remained in service in the 2nd GMRD and the 4th GTD, Moscow MD. Some may serves in the Far Eastern MD but I can't confirm. The 2nd GMRD transfered its T-80Us assumedly to the 3rd MRD after the arrival of T-90As since 2005.

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The Russian Military Reform started in 2008 and the introduction of T-72B3 series also saw a rapid shrink of T-80U numbers from the Russian Order of Battle. As of July 2016, some 190-230 T-80Us remained in service (in the 4th GTD).

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With the 423rd Guards Motor Rifle Regiment reequipped with T-80BVs from unknown time period, the 4th GTD participated in the war with two regiments (12&13th GTR) of some 189 T-80U tanks (of which 4 BTG worth of 126 tanks were committed in the first period).

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Among them 101 (53.4%) were confirmed lost by @oryxspioenkop. If we add the "unknown tanks" and the fact that only some 80% of actual loss, the loss ratio would be [101+206*101/(1845-206)]/(189*0.8)=75.3%(!) This is not surprising since the 4th GTD f*cked up a lot.

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My wonder is, however, after a whole year of battle, there is still no evidence that any T-80Us were reactivated for service. It is logical to introduce the tank of the same type to an unit that is familar to it. But it didn't happen.

The most reasonable explanation is that these retired tank are mainly T-80UDs with Ukrainian 6TD-1 diesel engine that Russia can not manufacture. Another explanation is that it mainly served in high readiness units in which its motor hour was rapidly depleted.

Among these "disappeared" T-80U pieces, the fate of some are known. Many were simply scrapped in the 206th Armor Tank Repair Plant (BTRZ) in Primorsky Krai, before the plant was bankrupted in 2012.

https://primamedia.ru/news/242392/

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Some were destroyed as target vehicles in maneuvers.


Back in March 2022, there was unconfirmed reports by the Ukr MOD that the commander of RU 13th GTR committed suicide on discovering 90% of his reserved tanks could not be used. But this is never officially confirmed.

https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/russian-commander-shot-himself-finding-26579585

My assumption is there is simply no T-80U storage anymore for the Russian Army and the Russian T-80U fleet has effectively been non-exist.

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Ketjun kommenteissa oli linkitetty tämä T-80UD vaunuja käsittelevä video, videon otsikon ja kuvauksen käännös (video julkaistu 6.1.2020):

Sawn on metal T-80UD​

Tanks and other armored vehicles, history. The lack of a wide view, not foresight and misunderstanding of the issue, became the reason for this!


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Suosituksista löytyy toinen video samalta kanavalta (video julkaistu 13.10.2021):

T-80UD continued​

Tanks and other armored vehicles, history. The previous video left some understatement, I will try to tell in more detail about the moments associated with this epoch-making machine in the second part. In addition to the T-80UD, I will touch on the T-64BV and object 476.

 
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