Neuvostoliiton ja Varsovan liiton (sekä muiden) tuotantomääristä

[Antares]

Loput edellisen viestin artikkelista:

Spoiler: Artikkelin tekstistä toinen puolikas

Self-propelled anti-aircraft gun on a medium base​

Almost immediately after the end of the war, Škoda began to develop anti-aircraft artillery, including automatic ones. Even during the war, Škoda developed a 50 mm automatic anti-aircraft gun, which was intended for the German army. After the war, this development continued to develop. The result of this work was a 50-mm automatic gun, which had frankly German roots. The gun, designed in 1948, was supposed to be mounted on a 50 mm ShPLK 2,12 / 1020-LP ZSU , based on a redesigned Škoda T-17 chassis. Neither the anti-aircraft gun nor the chassis for it advanced further than the paper.


A prototype ZSU based on the T-34, 1953

In 1949, the 57 mm R 8 anti-aircraft gun, a revised version of the same 50 mm anti-aircraft gun, was tested. Like the previous design, it was created with an eye on German developments. Power was supplied from metal clips with a capacity of 3 shots each. Ammunition R 8 differed from the Soviet 57-mm cartridges.

Later, the R 10 anti-aircraft gun appeared with a carriage modeled on the 40-mm Bofors anti-aircraft gun. The development of this system was delayed, only in 1956 the R 10 was put into service. The gun competed with the Soviet S-60 system with varying degrees of success, winning in some respects and losing in others. 220 R 10s were manufactured, and at the same time the Czechoslovak army also purchased S-60s. This was the only success of the Czechoslovak designers in the field of creating medium-caliber anti-aircraft systems. The larger anti-aircraft guns that Škoda developed did not go into production.


On the layout sample, the cabin was plywood

Against the backdrop of progress in work on the R 10, the question arose again of creating an anti-aircraft self-propelled gun. Due to the death of the Škoda T-17 and Škoda T 50 projects, the T-34-85 remained the only suitable base for it. On September 19, 1952, the VTU institute received an assignment to develop a ZSU using the T-34-85 chassis and the R 10 anti-aircraft gun. In addition to anti-aircraft functions, the vehicle was also assigned the task of combating weakly armored targets. After studying foreign experience, the VTU came to the conclusion that it was necessary to create an anti-aircraft tank like the English Crusader AA, the Swedish Landsverk Anti and its Hungarian derivative Nimrod. This simplified the task, since in this case it was not necessary to install a large platform and, accordingly, seriously alter the T-34-85 chassis.


For the calculation of 4 people, the tower was too small

When designing, it was required to keep the combat weight of the vehicle within the limits of the mass of the T-34-85. The task was complicated by the fact that the Czechoslovak military demanded that the frontal part of the anti-aircraft tower be protected from small-caliber artillery fire. In addition, the regular calculation of the gun consisted of 4 people (2 gunners, commander and loader). As a result, it was not possible to fully fit into the specified requirements. The combat weight of the T-34-85 turret, together with the gun, ammunition and crew, was 7820 kilograms, and the anti-aircraft turret weighed 8400 kilograms. The tower was made open from the stern and from above. In the frontal part, the thickness of the armor was 40 mm, and on the sides - 20 mm. However, the armor plates of the test sample of the anti-aircraft turret were made of plywood.


This ZSU did not pass the firing test

The results of the tests, which were carried out from March to July 1953, were not particularly good. The turret turned out to be too cramped, and the very idea of using the R 10 cannon as a weapon for the ZSU with minimal design changes turned out to be erroneous. The tower is too high. On August 29, 1953, work on this topic was stopped.


Self-propelled anti-aircraft gun LP-157, 1955

In 1955, the design office in Brno developed its own ZSU, this time made in the form of a full-size layout. Instead of the R 10 gun, it was supposed to install its improved version, which received the designation R 12. The designers made the ZSU LP-157 tower uninhabited. The ammunition was in the box to the left of the gun, and the calculation of three people (2 gunners and commander) was located below. This significantly reduced the size, and also reduced the combat weight. Also in Brno, a double-barreled version of the ZSU was developed, designated LP-257. A scale model of this machine was made.

However, the R 12 gun still needed to be built, and the time of the T-34-85 was coming to an end. In addition, the prospects for the purchase of the Soviet ZSU-57-2 loomed on the horizon. Work on the ZSU on the basis of the T-34-85 stopped, although the ZSU-57-2 was not included in the armament of the Czechoslovak army. Czechoslovakian wheeled ZSU Praga PLDvK vz. 53/59, built on the basis of the V3S truck, turned out to be, if not worse, then certainly simpler and cheaper.


Self-propelled rangefinder LV-157, with which the actions of the LP-157 were to be coordinated

The last Czechoslovak vehicle based on the T-34-85 was the mobile PUAZO (anti-aircraft artillery fire control device) LV-157. This machine was also developed in Brno and was intended to coordinate the fire of the ZSU LP-157. In fact, it was a self-propelled rangefinder, which was armed in the form of a quadruple DShK installation. Things did not progress further than a full-size layout built on the same chassis as the LP-157. Since the LP-157 and LP-257 projects were canceled, there was no need for a self-propelled rangefinder for them.

Warrior Internationalist​

The appearance of the SD-100 and the Soviet SU-100 made it possible to partially solve the problem associated with the weak armament of the T-34-85. Since 1953, self-propelled guns began to enter service with tank regiments. The 85-mm S-53 gun could no longer effectively deal with new types of foreign tanks, and self-propelled guns were used as a means of reinforcement. In tank regiments, the share of the SU-100 began to account for a third of the total number of vehicles. The tanks replaced by the SD-100 were sent to storage bases.


SD-100 on exercises, mid-70s

Czechoslovak tank regiments remained mixed until 1960. Gradually, the place of the SD-100 and T-34-85 was taken by the T-54, which had a 100 mm gun, but in a turret, and even with much more serious protection. Now SD-100s have started to go to storage bases. In addition, they were actively offered to foreign buyers.

After the withdrawal from the tank regiments, the SD-100 was used as training vehicles until the mid-70s. It is not surprising that quite a lot of such machines have survived in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. SD-100 in many private and public collections in Europe play the role of the Soviet SU-100, here the comical situation with the G-13 was largely repeated. The difference is that the G-13 was still produced from the backlog of the Jagdpanzer 38 hulls, while the SD-100s were built in Czechoslovakia from scratch, and even in the mid-50s. For this reason, passing off such an ACS as a Soviet vehicle is not the best idea. But to some museums and collectors who are poorly versed in the topic, such cars are sold precisely as Soviet, military production. Such "Stradivarius drums" are not uncommon: museums in Munster, Sinsheim, La Wonseno and a number of other places have exactly the SD-100,


SD-100 parade in Cairo, 1957 The signs of self-propelled guns of Czechoslovak production are clearly visible

In total, the Czechoslovak army received 460 SD-100s out of 770 issued. The remaining SD-100s were built for export sales. On March 21, 1953, Antonin Zapototsky took the place of the deceased president of Czechoslovakia, Klement Gottwald. Under him, Czechoslovakia again became an active seller in the arms market. Already in 1953, sales began, and tanks were among the products offered. One of the first buyers was Egypt, where since 1955 the SD-100 began to arrive. It was Czechoslovak vehicles that were used by Egypt against the troops of Israel, England and France during the Suez conflict of 1956. The SD-100s at Bovington, Duxford and Saumur are all trophies from 1956. In total, Egypt received 148 SD-100s.


Israeli spoils of the Six Day War, 1967

In addition to Egypt, Syria acquired 38 SD-100s. These vehicles, like the Egyptian ones, were used in the 1967 Six Day War. Then the Israel Defense Forces pretty much replenished the collection of trophies. 100% of captured SU-100s in Israeli museums are SD-100s, which can be easily identified by their characteristic details.


The 1973 Yom Kippur War was the last in which the SD-100 fought en masse.

Later, deliveries of self-propelled guns from Czechoslovakia became mixed. In addition to the SD-100, a significant percentage were Soviet-made vehicles. Sometimes Czechoslovakia turned out to be only an intermediary between the USSR and other countries. For example, 50 SU-100s were delivered to Cuba from Czechoslovakia, but in fact these are Soviet vehicles. The situation is very similar with the 50th SU-100 that ended up in Yemen. The cars there are also clearly Soviet. Delivered SD-100 to Bulgaria, Romania, Ethiopia and Morocco.

Yuri Bakhurin
Czechoslovakian self-propelled guns in the Middle East
Photo review of the self-propelled guns SD-100 in the exposition of the Museum of the Israel Defense Forces

• modernity
• tanks
• photos
• Czechoslovakia

It's safe to say that the Czechoslovak military made the right choice with the SD-100. Although they did not succeed in producing tanks and self-propelled guns of their own design, they managed to solve the problem of arming the army with armored vehicles due to licensed production. In addition, thanks to the export deliveries of licensed cars, Czechoslovakia also managed to earn money. The country has again returned to the international arms market, albeit with combat vehicles not of its own design.
The author is grateful to Jiri Tintera and František Rozkot, Czech Republic, for their help in preparing the material.

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Sources:

1. Materials of VHU Prahan (Vojenský historický archive)
2. Mgr.Martin Dubánek - Od bodáku po tryskáče - Nedokončené Československé zbrojní projekty 1945-1955, Mladá fronta 2011
3. The Czechoslovak Army 1945–1954, Peter Brojo, Josef Studeny, Capricorn Publications, 2012, ISBN 978–80–87578–01–8.
4. http://forum.valka.cz
5. http://ftr.wot-news.com
6. Photo archive of the author

 

[tulikomento]

Tsekkoslovakian T-34-85 tuotannosta (artikkeli julkaistu 22.8.2016): LÄHDE

Czechoslovak with Tagil ancestry​

Yuri Pasholok

Spoiler: Artikkelin teksti kokonaisuudessaan

https://warspot.ru/6901-chehoslovak-s-tagilskoy-rodoslovnoy

Czechoslovak with Tagil ancestry​

• tanks
• USSR
• Czechoslovakia

Yuri Pasholok

22 August '16

Tanks T-34-85 at the end of World War II turned out to be perhaps the most massive type of armored vehicles of the Czechoslovak army. The Czechoslovak corps received the first such vehicles at the beginning of 1945, in total, up to 130 tanks of this type were transferred to it during the war. They took part in the liberation of Prague, and later became the main armored forces of the post-war Czechoslovak army. After the war, deliveries continued. In the photographs of those years, there are Soviet cars, clearly released after May 9, 1945. T-34-85 became the first tanks of the Czechoslovak army to receive the famous tri-color "cockades" on the towers.

fruit of compromise​

Despite the fact that the T-34-85 was a completely modern tank at the end of World War II, it was no secret to anyone that the car was rapidly becoming obsolete. This was understood by the Czechoslovak military. On October 17, 1945, a meeting was held at the General Staff, at which its commander, divisional general Bogumil Bocek, approved the tactical and technical requirements for the Tank všeobecného použití (TVP), that is, the main battle tank. In these requirements, the image of the T-34-85 taken as a basis was clearly visible, but at the same time, the new Czechoslovak tank should have been quite different in details.

TVP development was delayed. The Military Technical Institute (Vojenský technický ústav, or VTU), where the TVP was designed, presented the tank concept in March 1946. On its basis, the engineers of the ČKD and Škoda factories had to develop their tanks. The result was the Škoda T 40 project , which was noticeably different from the original TVP. The project, presented in December 1946, already the next year ceased to meet the requirements of the Czechoslovak military. As a result, in 1948, TVP was redesigned, and the Škoda T 50 and ČKD T 51 projects were born. Self-propelled units began to be designed on their basis at the same time.


T-34-85 of Soviet production at the exercises of the Czechoslovak army in Milovice, 1952

Meanwhile, time passed, and not a single project progressed beyond the paper. It is not surprising that at one fine moment the military ran out of patience. And although work on TVP continued until March 1950, by that time the Czechoslovak General Staff had already made a decision, and by no means in favor of the developments of ČKD and Škoda.
Often this decision is called politically motivated. Indeed, on February 20-25, 1948, the communists occupied key positions in the leadership of Czechoslovakia, which led, among other things, to purges. On June 14, Klement Gottwald became president of Czechoslovakia. All this could not but affect relations with the USSR, including in the military sphere.
But it is precisely the decision of the Czechoslovak General Staff on tanks that is least connected with politics. The rapidly aging fleet of armored vehicles had to be updated, moreover, many units in general were in dire need of recruiting at least some kind of tanks. Things got to the point that the modernization and commissioning of the German StuG 40 and Pz.Kpfw began. IV. At the same time, the Czechoslovak industry has not produced a single truly new tank or self-propelled unit since the war. The only reasonable solution in this situation was to seek help from a political and military ally.


In the early 50s, some T-34-85s received headlight guards, like on this tank. In addition, some of the Czechoslovak tanks received Notek headlights.

In July 1949, Czechoslovakia received a license to manufacture the T-34–85. The reasons why this particular tank, which seemed obsolete back in 1945, was chosen for production are simple. Firstly, the Czechoslovak military were well acquainted with the T-34-85. Secondly, despite the fact that he really was not the latest tank, even at the end of the 40s this did not seem critical. Thirdly, the tank was technologically advanced, and its development in production did not present big problems.

An additional question arises as to why Czechoslovakia acquired a license specifically for the T-34-85, and not for the much more advanced T-54. The answer to this question is simple: by 1949, the production of the T-54 was just being mastered in the USSR, and its appearance was finally formed only by the beginning of the 50s. Even if you do not touch on the fact that the USSR could not have shared a license for a completely new car at all, mastering the production of the T-54 could require much more time. In the case of putting the T-34-85 on the conveyor, the Czechoslovak industry gained experience in the production of tanks, the combat weight of which exceeded 30 tons. Neither before the war, nor during it, combat vehicles of such a mass were built in Czechoslovakia.

Serial production with relocation​

Technical documentation for the T-34-85 was delivered to customers in November 1949. The sender was the Soviet plant No. 183 from Nizhny Tagil, the developer of the T-34-85. The tank, which was to be produced in Czechoslovakia, was somewhat different from those machines that were produced in the USSR. The last Soviet T-34-85s were produced back in 1946, and their design was gradually refined. It is not surprising that in the end, the Czechoslovak thirty-four differed from their Soviet counterparts.


Czechoslovak T-34-85 manufactured by ČKD Sokolovo, May 1952

For the production of tanks in January 1950, the restructuring of the ČKD Sokolovo plant, located in Prague, began. Using a locomotive plant as a base looks like a reasonable decision, especially if you take into account the presence of a developed fleet of lifting equipment on it. Specialists from the USSR arrived in Czechoslovakia to help organize the re-profiling of production.

The contractor for the production of engines was the Škoda plant in Pilsen, where the production of V-2 engines was organized. Another Škoda enterprise, located in the Slovak Dubnice nad Vahom, was identified as the manufacturer of weapons. Like ČKD Sokolovo, this plant, SMZ, was previously engaged in locomotive building. Finally, hull production was organized at the plant. Stalin (Závod JVStalina, ZJVS) in the Slovak Martin. The new tank can be called Czechoslovak without any reservations, since both Czech and Slovak enterprises were involved in its production.


Czechoslovak T-34-85 from the technical museum in Leshchany, with late-type optics. Pay attention to the quality of the tower casting

The post-war first-born was not easy for the Czechoslovak industry. The first sample of the Czechoslovak T-34-85 was made on September 1, 1951. By the beginning of October, seven more tanks had been manufactured, two of which went for short-term trials. In total, by the end of the year, 25 T-34-85s were produced.

The first tanks turned out to be quite "raw", which is quite normal for the initial releases of equipment. In droves, there were complaints about the operation of the clutch, transmission and other units. This was largely due to the fact that the required level of quality was not achieved immediately. It took time to get the process up and running. As a result, full-scale production of the T-34–85 began at ČKD Sokolovo only in February 1952.


Czechoslovak T-34-85s were equipped with such headlights with guards in the 1950s and 1960s.

As mentioned above, the Czechoslovak tank did not become the twin of the Tagil vehicles. From the plant number 183, the machine inherited the characteristic cast track rollers, although some of the tanks received stamped rollers. As for the turret, it looks more like the one that, at the end of production, the tanks of plant No. 174 (Omsk) received.

For various little things, the Czechoslovak tank is clearly calculated among the Soviet brethren. For starters, the build quality of the hulls and turrets is striking. Products coming from Martin were distinguished by a high level of care. Especially in this regard, the tower stands out, almost devoid of all kinds of irregularities characteristic of cast towers.
The hull of the tank was also slightly different. The hinges of the upper stern plate were enlarged, and the armored covers of the exhaust pipes had a more intricate design. Another feature characteristic of Czechoslovak tanks was the port for a field telephone located in the left rear of the hull. A mount for cables appeared on the left side, and the headlight received a characteristic-shaped guard. Early production tanks also featured Notek night driving lights copied from German ones.


This picture clearly shows the "curly" exhaust casings and the port for the field telephone, features characteristic of the Czechoslovak T-34-85

A total of 951 tanks were assembled at ČKD Sokolovo. Production continued until December 1953. Despite the widespread opinion that the Czechoslovak tanks were better than the Soviet ones, the picture turned out to be exactly the opposite with the tanks of this batch. On 81 tanks supplied to the Czechoslovak army in 1951–52, 280 breakdowns were recorded, of which 250 were directly related to poor workmanship. Comparison with Soviet-made tanks, the last batch of which arrived in 1949, turned out to be in favor of tanks made in the USSR.

The Czechoslovak military made quite definite conclusions for themselves. Already in May 1952, the first T-34-85 left the factory gates in the Slovak Martin, and mass production began here in September. It was these tanks that became the very hallmark of Czechoslovak quality. In 1952, both factories produced a total of 352 tanks, and in the next - another 1050 units. In 1953, ČKD Sokolovo switched to building locomotives, and the T-34-85 turned out to be the last tank produced by ČKD and in the Czech Republic in general. From now on, it was Martin who became the heart of Czechoslovak tank building, and in total 1785 tanks of this type were assembled here.


Installation project in T-34-85 100-mm guns, April 1954

The question of modernizing the T-34-85 was quickly raised. This was largely due to the fact that since 1953 the production of self-propelled guns SD-100, the Czechoslovak version of the Soviet SU-100, began. The 100-mm D-10T gun that stood on it, which received the Czechoslovak designation 100 mm vz. 44 S, had much greater armor penetration than the 85 mm T-34-85 gun. It is quite natural that there was a desire to put a more powerful gun on the tank, especially since its dimensions completely allowed it. Work on this topic was organized at the Konštrukta Trenčín enterprise (Trencin, Slovakia), and then at the Military Technical Institute.

(katso kuva alkuperäisestä artikkelista)
The first (top) and second (bottom) options for installing a 100-mm gun in the T-34-85 turret

Work on the Czechoslovakian T-34-100 began in 1953. On April 6, 1954, the Military Technical Institute presented projects for the T-34-85, armed with a 100-mm cannon mod. 1944. The tank remained practically unchanged, only the bow of the turret underwent alteration.

The first presented option looked the least problematic from the point of view of the organization of production. The main part of his tower did not change at all. The bow section was attached to it only by bolts, in which the cannon was rather strongly advanced forward. The gun received a TŠ-20 sight. Also, the installation of a coaxial machine gun was redone. In the second version, the bow of the tower had to be significantly redone. But this version had a higher projectile resistance.

According to calculations, the rate of fire of a 100-mm gun should have been about 8 rounds per minute, but it is hard to believe in the possibility of achieving such parameters. The experimental work budget was to be 780 thousand crowns, of which 160 thousand would be spent on design work, and the rest on the production of a prototype.

(katso kuva alkuperäisestä artikkelista)
Installation for overcoming water obstacles along the bottom

The question of organizing further work hung in the air for 2 months. Potentially, such an upgrade could increase the firepower of the tank. But along with the pros, there were also cons. In many ways, the current situation intersected with what happened 9 years earlier in the USSR.

In 1945, the T-34-85 with the 100-mm LB-1 gun installed in it came out for testing. The TsAKB team, headed by V. G. Grabin, managed to install the gun without altering the turret at all, and it could even fire. The main problem was that the working conditions of the crew were very cramped. From the further development of the topic in the USSR refused.
In the case of the development of Konštrukta Trenčín, things did not even reach the production of a prototype. The Czechoslovakian General Staff still wanted a 100mm cannon in the T-34-85, but not a 100mm cannon vz. 44 S. Now we were talking about the 100 mm AK 1 tank gun, which was planned to be installed in the latest TVP version. Among other things, this gun had an automatic loader and a vertical stabilizer.

But these wishes did not even reach the stage of a preliminary design. On June 30, 1954, the T-34-85 program with a 100-mm gun was finally closed. By that time, Czechoslovakia had received a license to produce the T-54. The last T-34-85s left Martin at the end of 1956, and the following year the factory produced the first T-54s. With their appearance, the Czechoslovak army finally solved the problem of arming its army with modern tanks.

long-lived internationalist​

Of the 2,736 T-34-85s built, the Czechoslovak army retained only 1,437, including 731 produced by ČKD Sokolovo and 706 produced by ZJVS Martin. The rest of the cars went for export. For the past two years, the Martin plant has produced cars exclusively for overseas sales.

As for the Czechoslovak army, in 1956 it had 1,701 T-34-85 tanks. This number also includes tanks that were received from the USSR. Due to the fact that T-54s of their own manufacture gradually entered service with the Czechoslovak army, the older materiel was gradually withdrawn. By 1967, when Martin was already producing T-55s, T-34-85s of all types, only 1,120 units remained in the army. Some of the decommissioned T-34-85 went abroad, some tanks were converted into special vehicles. At the end of 1971, the number of T-34-85s was reduced to 780 and gradually continued to decrease.

(katso kuva alkuperäisestä artikkelista)
Czechoslovak T-34-85 on the set of the film, 60s. The tank has a Notek headlight

As part of the Czechoslovak army, the career of the T-34-85 turned out to be calm. The car has become a training desk for so many tankers. It was experimented with various equipment, including an underwater driving system. The fate of the T-34-85 of Czechoslovak production abroad was completely different. They had to fight a lot, and these tanks went into the first battle even at a time when their production in Martin had not ended.


Captured T-34-85 Egyptian army in Haifa, 1957

On March 21, 1953, Antonin Zapototsky took the place of the deceased leader of Czechoslovakia, Klement Gottwald, which led to certain changes in the country's political course. In the same year, export deliveries of the T-34-85 began. On September 21, 1955, an agreement was signed between Czechoslovakia and Egypt on the supply of a number of weapons and military equipment. T-34-85s, of course, were present among them.

In total, Egypt received 820 tanks, some of which (230 units) managed to take part in the battles for the Suez Canal. The fighting began on October 29, 1956, Israel, France and Great Britain fought against Egypt. During this conflict, the warring parties suffered heavy losses in armored vehicles. Among the trophies of the anti-Egyptian coalition were T-34-85 tanks of Czechoslovak production.

The next time the Czechoslovak T-34-85 had to fight in a completely different corner of the globe. Cuba acquired about a hundred tanks, both Soviet and Czechoslovak. Purchases were made directly from the warehouses of the Czechoslovak army and went to the customer with a very large discount - 67 percent. Fidel Castro did not fail - the tanks were useful to him. In April 1961, the famous Battle of the Bay of Pigs took place , where the troops of the opponents of the revolution in Cuba, supported and armed by the CIA, landed. At that time, the Cubans had only ten T-34-85s, mostly Soviet-made, but they also turned out to be very useful. Their opponents were American light tanks M41 Walker Bulldog, in terms of the totality of combat characteristics, they are significantly inferior to them. One T-34-85 was destroyed, but the "gusanos", as the Cubans called the counter-revolutionaries, lost all their tanks. By the way, one of them is now in the exposition of the Patriot Park.


Destroyed Syrian T-34-85, Golan Heights, 1967. The tank has a turret for mounting an anti-aircraft machine gun DShK

Syria turned out to be the second buyer of the Czechoslovak T-34-85 in terms of volume of purchased tanks. In total, 120 cars went there. The tanks that ended up in the Syrian army received the largest number of changes among all the T-34-85 produced in Czechoslovakia. The most noticeable detail was the massive turret for the DShK machine gun mounted on the commander's cupola.

Syrian T-34-85s had a chance to sniff gunpowder in early June 1967, when the Six Day War broke out. A significant part of these tanks turned out to be either knocked out or captured by the Israeli army . At the same time, Egyptian T-34-85s again went into battle. In total, 251 tanks of this type were lost by the Arabs. Some of the trophies were later converted by the Israeli military into long-term weapon emplacements buried along the border with Syria and Jordan. Their engines and undercarriage were removed, and a large ammunition rack was placed in place of the control compartment.

Among the regions where Czechoslovak cars were exported, there were also calmer ones. For example, Romania and Bulgaria received a total of 120 vehicles. About 30 tanks went to India, Iraq and Yemen. In the latter, however, these tanks still had to fight. The Czechoslovak T-34-85 also fought in Lebanon, where they ended up in the 70s.


T-34-85 of Czechoslovak production in Lebanon, 70s

In general, "his" T-34-85 turned out to be a great success for Czechoslovakia. It was the first medium Czechoslovak tank to reach the stage of serial production. In addition, before him, Czechoslovakia had never produced tanks in such quantities. The release of the T-34-85 allowed Czechoslovakia not only to bring its tank-building industry to a high level, but also to return with its products to the international arms market.

There was, however, one huge downside. Czechoslovakia no longer produced tanks of its own design, and did not really develop them. The licensed production of Soviet tanks turned out to be more profitable, without requiring significant costs for the design and production of prototypes.

The author is grateful to Jiri Tintera and František Rozkot ( Franti š ek Rozkot ), Czech Republic, for their help in preparing the material.

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Sources and literature:

• VHU Prague (Military Historical Archive)
• Dubánek, M — From bayonets to jets. Unfinished Czechoslovak arms projects 1945–1955, Prague, Mladá fronta 2011http://forum.valka.cz
• http://ftr.wot-news.com
• Photo archive of the author

HUOM: tämä on osa Tsekkoslovakian panssarivaunutuotantoa käsittelevää artikkelisarjaa, jonka viimeiset osat tosin ovat T-34-85 ja SU-100, ei siis ainakaan toistaiseksi ole kirjoitettu T-54, T-55 ja T-72 tuotannosta kylmän sodan aikana.

Previous articles on Czechoslovak armor:

ST vz.39 and other Czechoslovak pre-war medium tanks: http://warspot.ru/4667-chehoslovatskiy-sredniy
Pz.Kpfw.38 (t) nA: http://warspot.ru/4357 -nenuzhnyy-razvedchik
Škoda tanks and self-propelled guns in 1939–1943: http://warspot.ru/5578-prototipy-dlya-okkupantov
TVP, part 1: http://warspot.ru/4909-chehoslovatskaya-alternativa-dlya -tridtsatchetvyorki
TVP, part 2: http://warspot.ru/4935-neudachnaya-istoriya-sozdaniya-udachnogo-tanka
Czechoslovak StuG 40:http://warspot.ru/6088-stalnoe-nasledstvo-tretiego-reyha
Photo review on SD 75/40N: http://warspot.ru/6089-chehoslovatskaya-sau-nemetskogo-proizvodstva-na-siriyskoy-sluzhbe

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Löysin myös sattumalta yhden kuvauksen "ZTS Martin" tehtaan nimistä: LÄHDE

Approximately in the construction of a small mechanical workshop, the existing enterprises, according to the decree of the Ministry of Industry of the Czech Republic from July 1949, turned to 1.1. In 1950, a separate plant, Krivan, was established. Martin (Krivan np Martin). renamed first to I.V. Plants Stalin (Závody JVStalina) and, again, in the 60s, in Turchiyansk, the machine-building plant Martin g.p. (Turčianské strojárně Martin np), later VGY ZTS > VGY = production and economic group > ZTS = heavy engineering plants (VHJ ZTS) and finally ZTS Martin g.p. (ZTS Martin np), this name and nature of production did not change until 1989.

Tsekkiläiset ja puolalaiset lisenssisotkat olivat ymmärtääkseni laadullisesti parempia mitä sota-aikaiset neukut.

 

[Antares]

Lainasin edellisiin viesteihin pari osaa Tsekkoslovakian panssarivaunutuotantoa käsittelevästä artikkelisarjasta (lainaamani T-34-85 ja SU-100 / SD-100 olivat sarjan viimeiset osat, ainakin toistaiseksi), ei siis ainakaan toistaiseksi ole kirjoitettu T-54, T-55 ja T-72 tuotannosta kylmän sodan aikana.

Previous articles on Czechoslovak armor:

ST vz.39 and other Czechoslovak pre-war medium tanks: http://warspot.ru/4667-chehoslovatskiy-sredniy
Pz.Kpfw.38 (t) nA: http://warspot.ru/4357 -nenuzhnyy-razvedchik
Škoda tanks and self-propelled guns in 1939–1943: http://warspot.ru/5578-prototipy-dlya-okkupantov
TVP, part 1: http://warspot.ru/4909-chehoslovatskaya-alternativa-dlya -tridtsatchetvyorki
TVP, part 2: http://warspot.ru/4935-neudachnaya-istoriya-sozdaniya-udachnogo-tanka
Czechoslovak StuG 40: http://warspot.ru/6088-stalnoe-nasledstvo-tretiego-reyha
Photo review on SD 75/40N: http://warspot.ru/6089-chehoslovatskaya-sau-nemetskogo-proizvodstva-na-siriyskoy-sluzhbe

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Lainasin edellisessä viestissä lyhyen pätkän T-34-85 vaunun venäjänkielisestä wikipedia-artikkelista, mutta lainaan tähän alle siitä Tsekkoslovakian ja Puolan T-34-85 tuotantoa käsittelevän osuuden kokonaan, koska siinä on Puolan vuosituotannon numeroita: LÄHDE

Licensed production at factories in Poland and Czechoslovakia.​

In the late 1940s in accordance with the decision of the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia, to assist in the development of serial production of T-34-85 tanks, design and technological documentation, technological equipment, equipment were transferred from the USSR, Soviet specialists were seconded [6] [ 8 ] . In 1949, the ČKD Plant ( Prague ) acquired a license for the production of the T-34-85 tank and the SU-100 self-propelled guns [6] . In 1951, the Polish plant Bumar Labedy, located in the city of Gliwice (Poland) acquired a license for the production of the T-34-85 [8] .

The T-34-85 tanks of Polish and Czechoslovak production had minor design differences. Serial production was carried out: in Poland for 5 years; in Czechoslovakia for 6 years [6] [8] . By May 1, 1951, the first 4 Polish T-34-85s were assembled, some of the components and assemblies for them were delivered from the USSR. From 1952 to 1956, 1380 cars were produced in Poland [8] .

1952 - 5

1953-310

1954-370

1955-430

1956-265 (including for export - 130 for the GDR, transferred in March-July of the same year)

The first T-34-85s in Czechoslovakia were assembled partly from components supplied from the USSR. The first tank was assembled on September 1, 1951, eight more tanks were completed before October. The tanks assembled in the shortest possible time under pressure from the USSR were subjected to a series of tests. During these tests, some failures occurred due to the poor quality of the production of the first tanks (in particular, steering, clutch, drives and electrical equipment). However, despite these shortcomings, the government gave the tank a green light, and mass production at the CKD in Sokolov began in February 1952 and continued until December 1953. At the same time, a government decision was made to transfer the production of tanks from Sokolov to Martin. The first tank of completely Czechoslovak production was made in the winter of 1952.

In total, 2736 T-34-85 tanks were produced in Czechoslovakia in 1951-56, taking into account special vehicles (VT-34 engineering vehicles, JT-34 cranes, MT-34 bridge layers, PBCHT-34 evacuation vehicles and PB-34 heavy bulldozers) - 3185. Early series tanks had flaws (for example, gearboxes remained problematic for many years, their quality in the early years was lower than the same Soviet-made units). All tanks produced in 1955-56 were exported. A total of 1,437 tanks were delivered to the Czechoslovak army, and 1,299 were exported. In the last three years, the quality of production has improved significantly, and some improvements have been made. Tanks were exported mainly to Egypt (820) and Syria (120), Romania and Bulgaria, as well as to other countries such as India, Iraq and Yemen. Cuba received 100 tanks (probably

In 1953, Polish T-34s were upgraded twice and designated T-34-85M1 and T-34-85M2 respectively. During the modernization, a preheater was installed; the engine was adapted to operate on various types of fuel; installed devices that facilitate the management of the tank; changed the location of the ammunition; a remote control system for a course machine gun was installed, which made it possible to reduce the number of crew members to 4 people; scuba diving equipment installed. In the PNR, on the basis of the T-34 tank, several samples of engineering and repair and recovery vehicles were developed and produced [6] [8] .
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Lainaan aikaisemmasta viestistäni (LINKKI) taulukon, se on Steve Zalogan kirjasta "Tanks at the iron curtain 1946-60 - early cold war armor in central Europe" (kirja julkaistu 23.11.2021)

Varsovan liiton panssarivaunujen tuotantomäärät aikavälillä 1951-1960 (Puola ja Tsekkoslovakia):

Jos vertaa aikaisemman viestin taulukkoon, vuoden 1952 valmistusmäärä on eri: tässä se on 400 kpl, kun toisen lähteen mukaan se olisi 352 kpl. Kokonaismäärä on molemmissa sama. Jos luotetaan Zalogan tietoihin, edellisen viestin taulukon tuntemattomien numeroiden määrää saadaan karsittua hieman:



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Viittasin aikaisemmassa viestissä (LINKKI) Andrei Tarasenkon kirjoitukseen: LÄHDE

Linkitetyssä artikkelissa Tarasenko kirjoittaa lyhyestä Tsekkoslovakian T-55 tuotantomääristä:

Czechoslovakia received a license to manufacture tanks in 1964. First, the T-55 was produced at the ZTS (Zavod Trucanske Strojarne) plant in the Slovak city of Martin, and from 1967 to 1982, the T-55A, a total of 3820 units were built.

Jos oletetaan että T-54A tuotanto jatkui Tsekkoslovakiassa T-55A sarjatuotannon alkuun asti, niin silloin aikajanasta puuttuvat aikavälin 1961-1970 vuosituotantomäärät:



Leveä taulukko, joten tässä 80-luvun osuus:



Tästä kokonaiskuvasta puuttuvat muutama vuosi alkupäästä T-34-85 osalta sekä koko 1960-luku eli T-54A tuotannon osuus sekä T-55A alkuvuosien osuus. Olen kirjoittanut viennin numerot siltä osin kun ne ovat löydettävissä, mutta tekemistä riittää vielä. Lisäksi tästä puuttuu kokonaan SU-100 / SD-100 tuotanto.

HUOM: Tsekkoslovakian ja Puolan käytössä olleet vaunujen nimet EIVÄT ole samat kuin mitä Neuvostoliitto käytti omista vaunuistaan tai niiden vientiversioista. Se mitä esim. T-72M1 tarkoittaa, riippuu siitä kuka ko. vaunun valmisti. Tämä on hyvä muistaa, jos tekee laajempia tarkasteluja eri "vaunutyyppien" valmistusmääristä.

T-55 vaunujen puuttuvasta osuudesta: LINKKI

Tarasenkon mukaan T-55 tuli tuotantoon 1967, joten se tarkoittaisi että aikavälillä 1967-1970 valmistui:

T-55A: 6 299 - 4 431 = 1 868
T-55AK: 897 - 892 = 5

Miten tämä jakautuisi vuosille 1967-1970, se vaatii lisätyötä.

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Tsekinkielinen wikipedia-artikkeli "T-54 and T-55" sanoo näin:

• 1957–1983 (Czechoslovakia)

Artikkelissa ei kuitenkaan sanota edes kuinka monta tällaista vaunua valmistettiin Tsekkoslovakiassa, saati sitten vuosituotantomääriä. Ihan tyhjin käsin ei silti tarvinnut lähteä: LÄHDE

In Czechoslovakia, conversions of T-54A to T-54M, i.e. to T-55A standards, took place from 1968. [3] In the 1980s, the tanks were modernized and equipped with a "Kladivo" microprocessor fire control system, which increased the probability of hitting with the first shot 3 - 4x. The modernization also included a substantial strengthening of the armor protection on the front of the body and the tower, a more powerful engine, a laser radiation detector and a number of other improvements, the tank was designated T-55M2. Production took place from 1985. Despite the very successful modernization of a completely outdated tank, the machine was not promising due to the advent of the T-72 tank. Therefore, only a little over 450 units were produced.

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Yksi lähde Tsekkoslovakian T-54 ja T-55 kokonaismäärille: LÄHDE

Т-54 и Т-55. «Танк-солдат» - Барятинский Михаил Борисович (eng. käännös: T-54 and T-55. "Tank Soldier" - Baryatinsky Mikhail Borisovich)

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia received a license for the production of T-54A tanks in 1958. They were produced by the ZTS (Zavod Trucanske Strojarne) plant in Martin in Slovakia. Until 1964, about 2.5 thousand combat vehicles left its workshops. The modernization of the Czechoslovak T-54A was carried out according to programs similar to the Soviet ones.

Licensed production of the T-55 in Czechoslovakia began in 1964.

Until 1967, the ZTS plant produced the T-55, and then until 1982, the T-55A. A total of 3820 units were manufactured.

In the 1980s, the modernization of the fleet of Czechoslovak T-55 tanks began. At the first stage of modernization, the Kladivo control system with a ballistic computer and a laser rangefinder was installed on the tanks. In the aft part of the tower, SDIO laser irradiation detection and warning devices were installed. Tanks that passed the first stage of modernization were given the designation T-55AM1. At the second stage of modernization, Czechoslovak tanks received the KUV 9K116-1 "Bastion" (not installed on all tanks) and additional multilayer armor for the hull and turret. A V-55AM2 diesel engine with a power of 620 hp, a thermal insulation casing for the gun and smoke grenade launchers were installed on the starboard side of the turret. Such tanks received the designation T-55AM2 (with the Bastion KUV - T-55AM2-B). The T-55AM2 tanks were in service with the ChNA, VNA and NNA of the GDR.

In addition to linear tanks in Czechoslovakia, VT-55A ARVs (1820 units) and MT-55 bridge layers were manufactured and supplied to other Warsaw Pact countries.

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Baryatinskin mukaan T-54A tuotanto olisi voinut tapahtua aikavälillä 1958-1963 ja T-55 tuotanto aikavälillä 1964-1966 ja T-55A tuotanto aikavälillä 1967-1982. T-55 ja T-55A kokonaismäärä oli hänen mukaansa 3 820 kpl.

JOS uskotaan että Tsekkoslovakia valmisti aikavälillä 1957-1963 "noin 2 500 kpl" T-54A panssarivaunuja JA jos uskotaan Steve Zalogan taulukkoon merkityt määrät, niin silloin aikavälillä 1961-1963 olisi valmistettu:

2 500 - (10 + 98 + 313 + 350) = 1 729

Ehkä ensimmäiset 10 kpl vuonna 1957 olivat ns. esisarja eikä niitä lasketa mukaan sarjatuotantoon? Toisaalta kokonaismäärä on joka tapauksessa "about 2 500" joten tässä ei puhuta "tarkoista" määristä.

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HUOM: vastaus kysymykseen Tsekkoslovakian panssarivaunutuotannosta aikavälillä 1961-1970 saattaa löytyä Steve Zalogan viime vuonna julkaistusta kirjasta "Tanks at the Iron Curtain 1960–75" (julkaistu 19.7.2022) mutta en ole vielä hankkinut sitä itselleni. Ehkä jossain vaiheessa myöhemmin. Jos jollakulla on tämä kirja hyllyssä, voisi vilkaista mitä taulukoita sieltä löytyy.

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Löysin myös sattumalta yhden kuvauksen "ZTS Martin" tehtaan nimistä. Nimi vaihtui muutaman kerran kylmän sodan aikana, mutta se tuskin sotkee merkittävästi: vuoden 1953 jälkeen tämä tehdas oli ainoa panssarivaunuja valmistava tehdas Tsekkoslovakiassa: LÄHDE

Approximately in the construction of a small mechanical workshop, the existing enterprises, according to the decree of the Ministry of Industry of the Czech Republic from July 1949, turned to 1.1. In 1950, a separate plant, Krivan, was established. Martin (Krivan np Martin). renamed first to I.V. Plants Stalin (Závody JVStalina) and, again, in the 60s, in Turchiyansk, the machine-building plant Martin g.p. (Turčianské strojárně Martin np), later VGY ZTS > VGY = production and economic group > ZTS = heavy engineering plants (VHJ ZTS) and finally ZTS Martin g.p. (ZTS Martin np), this name and nature of production did not change until 1989.

 

[Antares]

Tein Baryatinskin kirjassa kuvaillun aikataulun mukaiset muutokset Tsekkoslovakian panssarivaunutuotannon aikatauluun eli seuraavat muutokset edellisen viestin taulukkoon: T-54A tuotanto aikavälillä 1958-1963, T-55 tuotanto aikavälillä 1964-1966 ja T-55A tuotanto aikavälillä 1967-1982.

Tämän jälkeen taulukko näyttää tältä (aikaväli 1951-1979):



HUOM: Tsekkoslovakian kansannousun murskaus tapahtui 20–21.8.1968. Tätä seurasi maan miehitys. Tämä tapahtuma osuu taulukon "tuntemattomalle" alueelle, mutta arvatenkin sillä on ollut jonkinlainen vaikutus ZTS Martin tehtaan tuotantoon. Puhutaan myös T-55A tuotannon ensimmäisistä vuosista, tosin T-54A, T-55 ja T-55A välillä ei ole suuren suuria eroja, joten tässä mielessä tuotantotahdin voisi kuvitella pysyneen korkeana vaikka tuotannossa oleva vaunumalli vaihtuikin (T-72 tuotantoon ottamisella oli suurempi vaikutus, koska se poikkeaa niin selvästi T-54/T-55 vaunuista).

 

[Antares]

Mainio tsekkiläinen artikkeli joka vastaa osaan aikaisemmissa viesteissäni tapailemistani kysymyksistä sekä paljoon muuhun. Todellinen kultakimpale, jos Tsekkoslovakian sotakoneiden tuotanto kylmän sodan aikana kiinnostaa. LÄHDE

ANALYSIS: The efficiency of arms production in Slovakia during the construction of socialism​

• 30. 7. 2017
• 125 comments
• Dušan Mihálik

In Slovakia, a considerable number of inhabitants have the idea that during socialism there was a huge arms production in our country, which earned a lot of money, and after 1989 the Czechs liquidated it, and Slovaks therefore still have high unemployment. The symbol of this process is, of course, former President Havel. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the past as it was and whether it is true or just a deep-rooted myth.

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Lainaan toisesta mainiosta tsekkiläisestä kirjoituksesta (joka lainaa paljon yllä viittaamastani artikkelista) kuvauksen Dusan Mihalikista: LÄHDE

For me, the second link is far more important and interesting. Because it is produced by an author who actively worked in the Slovak arms industry. He experienced it in its heyday, as well as in its post-revolutionary decline. And he certainly didn't care what happened to his company and, above all, his job, why it happened, where the real causes are and who is to blame. That's one reason. The second is that it is built on a huge number of honest sources and provides a multifaceted view of the Slovak, but also the Czech/Slovak arms industry and the conditions in which it was located. However, this text requires what is called a sic flash and a willingness to wade through a lot of numbers.

Tämä artikkeli käsittelee Tsekkoslovakian sotateollisuuden romahdusta 1989 jälkeen ja siihen liittyviä "myyttejä". Hyvin mielenkiintoista luettavaa, jos aihe kiinnostaa. Tämä on julkaistu valka.cz nimisellä sivustolla, josta löytyy runsaasti mielenkiintoisia artikkeleita laidasta laitaan.

The arms industry debacle after 11/17/1989​

02/12/2018

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Lainaan yllä viittaamastani Dusan Mihalik artikkelista muutaman taulukon (artikkeli julkaistu 30.7.2017):

Tsekkoslovakian sotateollisuuden toimijat aikavälillä 1950-1989:


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Annex no. 5 – Production of heavy armored equipment in Slovakia (1952-1991):



HUOM: jos 1952 on ensimmäinen vuosi, niin 1991 on neljäskymmenes. Täten Tsekkoslovakian kylmänsodan aikainen keskiarvoinen raskaiden panssaroitujen ajoneuvojen (eng. heavy armored equipment) vuosituotanto oli:

45 044 / 40 = 1 126,1

Keskiarvo toki hämää, vuosien välillä on aina vaihtelua, mutta onhan tuo melkoinen tahti.

Taulukon mukaan tästä määrästä meni vientiin:

21 212 + 10 408 = 31 620

Viennin osuus kokonaistuotannosta:

31 620 / 45 044 = 0,701980 eli pyöristettynä 70,2%.

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Annex no. 6 – Export of heavy armored equipment from Slovakia to socialist countries (1952-1991):

HUOM: NDR = Německá demokratická republika = German Democratic Republic (GDR) = DDR eli Itä-Saksa

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Appendix No. 7 – Export of heavy armored equipment from Slovakia to non-socialist countries (1952-1991):

HUOM: melko käännöskukkanen, taulukon sarake nimeltä "Glass of beer" = Libya

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Artikkelin lopussa on lähdeluottelo, josta voi hakea lisätietoa eri aiheista:

RESOURCES:

1) Zubko Štefa, Zubko Juraj, Armored technology 1944-2001 production in the Slovak Republic, Magnet Press Slovakia, 2002.

2) Hofman Jiří, Baur Jan, Tajemství riadiotechníkých pátrače Tamara, Nakladatelství Sdělovací technika, Prague 2003.

3) Vopat Zdeněk et al. ., Konštrukta Trenčín, Magnet Press Slovakia, RESS Senica 2000.

4) Komárek Valtr et al., Prognoza a program, Academia Praha 1990.

5) Zídek Petr, Sieber Kerel, Czechoslovakia and the Middle East in the years 1948-1989, Prague 2009.

6) Zídek Petr, Sieber Kerel, Czechoslovakia and Sub-Saharan Africa East in the years 1948-1989, Prague 2007.

7) Krč Miroslav et al. , Military expenditures during the Cold War and after its end, Prague 2000.

8) Francev Vladimír, Czechoslovak tank forces 1945-1992, Grada publishing, 2012.

9) Bajzíková Anna, Defense industry and armaments – a phenomenon of the state sector (the case of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic), Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of 10) Economic Studies, Bachelor thesis, Prague 2009.

10) Štaigl Jan, Turza Peter, Military History, Arms production in Slovakia in the years 1969-1992, Military History magazine.

11) Štaigl Jan, Štefanský Michal, Military History of Slovakia VI. Volume 1945-1968, Magnet Press, 2007.

12) Internet (www.wikipedia.org, www.valka.cz and others)

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Lähdeluettelo sellaisena kuin se on alkuperäisessä artikkelissa eli nimet, otsikot yms. ilman käännöstä:

ZDROJE:

1) Zubko Štefa, Zubko Juraj, Obrnená technika 1944-2001 výroba v Slovenskej republike, Magnet Press Slovakia, 2002.

2) Hofman Jiří, Baur Jan, Tajemství riadiotechnického pátrače Tamara, Nakladatelství Sdělovací technika, Praha 2003.

3) Vopat Zdeněk a kol., Konštrukta Trenčín, Magnet Press Slovakia, RESS Senica 2000.

4) Komárek Valtr a kol., Prognóza a program, Academia Praha 1990.

5) Zídek Petr, Sieber Kerel, Československo a Blízky východ v letech 1948-1989, Praha 2009.

6) Zídek Petr, Sieber Kerel, Československo a subsaharská Afrika východ v letech 1948-1989, Praha 2007.

7) Krč Miroslav a kol., Vojenské výdaje v letech studené války a po jejím skončení, Praha 2000.

8) Francev Vladimír, Československé tankové síly 1945-1992, Grada publishing, 2012.

9) Bajzíková Anna, Obranný priemysel a zbrojenie – fenomén štátneho sektoru (prípad Československa a Českej republiky), Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Fakulta sociálních věd, Institut 10) ekonomických studií, Bakalárska práca, Praha 2009.

10) Štaigl Jan, Turza Peter, Vojenská História, Zbrojná výroba na Slovensku v rokoch 1969-1992, časopis Vojenská história.

11)Štaigl Jan, Štefanský Michal, Vojenské dejiny Slovenska VI. Zväzok 1945-1968, Magnet Press, 2007.

12) Internet (www.wikipedia.org, www.valka.cz a iné)

 

[Antares]

Lainaan edellisessä viestissä viitatun Dušan Mihálik artikkelin kokonaisuudessaan: LÄHDE

ANALYSIS: The efficiency of arms production in Slovakia during the construction of socialism​

Spoiler: Artikkelin tekstin ensimäinen kolmannes

ANALYSIS: The efficiency of arms production in Slovakia during the construction of socialism​

BVP-1 of the Czechoslovak People's Army; illustration photo / Tony Hisgett; CC BY 2.0

• 
  30. 7. 2017
• 
  125 comments
• 
  Dušan Mihálik

In Slovakia, a considerable number of inhabitants have the idea that during socialism there was a huge arms production in our country, which earned a lot of money, and after 1989 the Czechs liquidated it, and Slovaks therefore still have high unemployment. The symbol of this process is, of course, former President Havel. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the past as it was and whether it is true or just a deep-rooted myth.

Difficult construction process​

The introduction of the production of military equipment under Soviet licenses in Czechoslovakia was significantly influenced by the conclusions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of February 1951, when it was decided that mainly Soviet licenses would be used. Based on them, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Czech Republic adopted a resolution on the accelerated rearmament of the Czechoslovak Republic. army and restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic. of the arms industry and was developed into the "Plan of maximum production in the years 1951-1953". Although it was not possible to fulfill it, it still meant a significant increase in the capacity for the production of weapons, especially in Slovakia. Slovakia was considered a safe base for production because of the threat of raids by the powerful American bomber air force.

However, due to the rapid increase in bomber performance, this was largely an illusory protection. In the early 1950s, American reconnaissance versions of bombers, such as RB-47s without problems penetrated deep into the airspace of the USSR, and NATO reconnaissance aircraft operated without problems over our territory. The air defense of the Warsaw Pact countries gradually improved, but in the event of a conflict, our armories were just as vulnerable as those in the Czech Republic. However, this did not change the focus on heavy military equipment on Slovak territory.

Socialist countries invested heavily in their arms industry and expanded the production of modern weapons. Theoretically, the planned economy is advantageous for special production, for the possibility of a simply directive system, where there is no problem in prioritizing a selected enterprise or industry even at the expense of the rest of the economy.

But in practice, it has been confirmed once again that the system of central planning with officially set prices is not flexible enough for changing conditions. The directive planning system completely failed in the necessary cooperations within the framework of the Warsaw Pact (VZ) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (MEC). Problems of non-convertible currencies, fictitious and unrealistic exchange rates with Western freely convertible currencies and the complex use of the so-called of the convertible exchange rate were the same as in the civil sector.

Big Brother Watch​

Due to non-market conditions, there was no possibility of comparing mutual costs even between the countries of the VZ. However, this was already the intention of the Soviet strategy, so that individual states could oppose the General Assembly under Soviet pressure only individually without coordination.

Soviet pressure took the form of "Recommendations on the state of the armed forces and their equipment" , which was issued by the High Command of the Warsaw Pact to individual countries for the respective five-year period. The recommendation, specified in the annual protocol, determined the number of persons, equipment, unions and departments. The finalization of the budget and financial side was the exclusive matter of the respective state.

In the case of problems with implementation, the reduction of requirements or the postponement of implementation were discussed at the highest level. In the 1980s, due to tensions within the General Assembly and economic problems, many demands were simply not fulfilled.

Foreign trade in military equipment was always in surplus for Czechoslovakia (Appendix No. 1)

Annex no. 1 – Foreign trade in military equipment 1952-1990 (in million CZK of trade parity)

Period	1952-1955	1956-1960	1961-1965	1966-1970	1971-1975	1976-1980	1981-1985	1986-1990
Socialist landscapes
Export	2 151	3 238	5 325	9 151	12 000	15 000	25 200	33 400
Import			5 195	6 282	9 400	12 200	20 500	30 300
Balance (+)			130	2869	2600	2800	4700	3100
Other countries
Export	273	1 795	1 087	2 865	3 400	4 700	12 000	7 600
Import	8	17	33	52	200	300	400	400
Balance (+)	265	1 778	1 054	2 813	3 200	4 400	11 600	7 200

​

Costs of the arms industry​

The growth of military spending was initially slow, especially in the 1950s, when a large amount of captured German military equipment was still being used. There is quite a bit of relevant statistical information from this period, but the increase in costs was not significant. Defense and security costs hovered around 2% of GDP.

The gradual increase began mainly after Czechoslovakia's entry into the Warsaw Pact, when the USSR pushed for an increase in armaments, mainly on the countries bordering the Western bloc - that is, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the GDR. However, the increase in capacities was gradual and became apparent only from the 1960s (Appendix No. 2).

In the 1960s, arms production gradually increased, and this trend was interrupted only after 1968, when the deployment of massive Soviet troops somewhat reduced the need for the construction of the Czech Republic. army. In addition, MS. the party also financed the Soviet occupation troops.

The stated costs must be taken with a certain margin, because something for the armed forces was drawn from other chapters that are more difficult to identify, especially in the 80s, when the Cold War escalated and the army had problems with financing the growing demands. The Slovak Republic had more than half of the arms production (Appendix No. 3). In 1989, it already reached around 60%. (appendix no. 4).

Appendix No. 2 – Budgetary expenditures for defense, military expenditures and the share of budgetary expenditures for defense in the national income and state budget of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1961-1989 (mln. Kčs) in current prices:

Year	Defense Budget Expenditures	Of which military expenditure (MNO)	HDP	Share of defense expenditure in GDP (%)	Expenditures of the state budget	Share of defense spending (%)
1961	9 841	9 011	172 021	5,72	111 915	8,79
1962	10 816	9 920	175 378	6,16	123 201	8,78
1963	11 821	11 013	172 883	6,83	125 815	9,39
1964	11 990	11 021	169 713	7,06	130 318	9,20
1965	10 270	10 001	173 519	6,16	116 138	9,21
1966	10 910	10 296	195 576	5,57	154 795	7,04
1967	12 875	12 103	233 992	5,50	147 193	8,74
1968	15 062	13 890	257 797	5,84	151 393	9,94
1969	18 007	15 624	293 717	6,13	176 942	10,17
1970	18 997	16 233	312 959	6,07	194 313	9,77
1971	19 806	16 900	327 915	6,03	148 043	13,37
1972	20 470	17 543	346 333	5,91	143 318	13,38
1973	21 056	17 750	363 204	5,79	157 705	13,35
1974	21 989	18 715	380 663	5,77	175 389	12,53
1975	22 233	19 045	409 970	5,42	273 774	8,12
1976	23 077	19 714	418 182	5,51	290 071	7,95
1977	24 014	20 633	414 990	5,78	278 301	8,62
1978	23 988	20 801	348 015	5,47	283 912	8,44
1979	25 102	21 866	460 667	5,44	292 403	8,58
1980	25 941	22 582	486 281	5,33	304 182	8,52
1981	27 353	23 045	472 003	5,79	207 823	13,16
1982	27 710	23 999	496 035	5,58	314 046	8,82
1983	29 430	24 851	507 325	5,80	213 598	13,77
1984	33 508	30 066	541 461	6,18	222 373	16,06
1985	31 491	27 808	559 974	5,62	233 402	13,49
1986	32 250	29 750	570 064	5,65	235 226	13,71
1987	34 185	30 385	587 056	5,82	245 191	19,94
1988	37 727	32 877	606 269	6,22	258 400	15,60
1989	38 675	35 062	619 405	6,25	263 107	14,70

Appendix No. 3 – Slovakia's share of special production in the years 1971-1989

	Czechoslovakia	SR	the share of SR
	billion CZK	billion CZK	%
1971-1975	54,1	28,4	52,5
1976-1980	77,2	42,6	55,2
1981-1985	116,2	65	55,9
1986-1989	102,6	57,4	55,9
1971-1989	350,1	193,4	55,2

Appendix No. 4

Subjects of arms research and development in Slovakia (1950-1989)
Construct Trenčín ZTS VÚHYN Dubnica nad Váhom ZTS EVÚ Nová Dubnica	VÚT Žilina ZTS VVÚ Martin VÚ 080 Liptovský Mikuláš	ZTS VVÚ Košice ZTS VVÚ Komárno

Subjects of arms production in Slovakia (1950-1989)
ZTS Dubnica nad Váhom ZVS Dubnica nad Váhom PS Považský Bystrica + ZTS Martin + ZTS Námestova + ZTS Prakovce + ZTS Lučenec + ZTS Aluminum + ZTS Malacky + ZTS Trstená	Tesla Liptovský Hrádok Tatra Wagon Poprad Vihorlat Snina VVS Košice PPS Detva + Krupina Plant + Vlkanová Plant + Lučenec Plant + Tisovec Plant + Hriňová Plant + Rimavská Sobota Plant	ZVT Banská Bystrica Tatra Bánovce nad Bebravou Tesla Sparrow Slovak Shipyard Komárno ZVS Meopta Bratislava Malacky cable

​

(jatkuu seuraavassa viestissä)

 

[Antares]

Spoiler: Artikkelin tekstin toinen kolmannes

Efficiency of special production​

One thing was the cost of special production, another thing was the efficiency of use. The shortcomings of the planned economy were manifested at every level. Licensed production of the T-34/85 tank was associated with huge deficiencies and disastrous initial production quality. It started in the Czech Republic at the ČKD Sokolovo, but was gradually transferred from 1952 to Slovakia.

However, it was fully mastered only in 1954. The introduction of tank production was undoubtedly a great organizational feat, but it is also a fact that in 1954 the T-34/85 tank was already obsolete and was replaced by a new one in a relatively short time (in 1957) with the T-54A tank, which represented the world's best in its time and set the direction for the development of tank technology in NATO countries as well.

The main cause of unnecessarily spent resources during development was the insufficient concept of weapons developments, which was influenced by ignorance of progressive changes in technology, especially the lack of knowledge and ties to the development of military technology of the USSR. Developers in Czechoslovakia had to familiarize themselves with developments in special technology through professional Western magazines.

In practice, this was manifested by solving the development of systems that had already been developed, or whose development no longer made sense for progress in other areas. In 1952-1955, the Trenčín plant, the largest development center of armaments production, was unnecessarily dealing with a new anti-aircraft cannon, although the production of anti-aircraft guided missiles was already being prepared in the USSR. Of course, there were many such cases.

In many cases, however, the stoppage of successful MS. arms projects by simply shutting down competition from the Soviet side using a political line.

In addition to significant financial losses, this low efficiency also brought significant moral losses, because the meaning of work was lost for many highly qualified and motivated workers. These problems were also the subject of official professional conferences, which often went against the party line of the Communist Party, and were also part of official documents where companies criticized planning deficiencies within the RVHP. However, state officials "resolved" real shortcomings mainly by persecuting "subversives" of the established order.

Annex no. 5 – Production of heavy armored equipment in Slovakia (1952-1991):


Almost 45 thousand were produced in Slovakia in the period 1952-1989. of armored vehicles, which made us the leader among manufacturers of this technology, right behind the great powers (Appendix No. 5).

There were three main groups of customers in this mass of technology. The Czechoslovak People's Army was a large customer, taking almost a third of the production, almost half of which went for export to socialist countries (appendix no. 6) - mainly within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, and the rest, roughly a fifth, went for export to non-socialist, mainly developing countries (appendix no. .7). It should be added that the presented tables indicate where the selected military equipment ended up as new from the point of view of the economy - that is, who paid for it, or he had to pay.

Export deliveries were often handled in such a way that the equipment was withdrawn from the army's stocks after a very short time and its delivery to the Czechoslovak Army (ČSA) was therefore only formal and did not actually serve there, at most it was stored for a short time. They returned the spent funds to the army.

It only applies to new technology delivered practically always at the same time as the production of the given technology in Slovakia, and the reasons were related to the need to quickly fulfill a contract that the manufacturer was unable to fulfill (case T-34/85 and OT-62 in table no. 5). However, it should be added that the exact scope of foreign deliveries is quite difficult to determine, the authors differ considerably.

Annex no. 6 – Export of heavy armored equipment from Slovakia to socialist countries (1952-1991):

Technique	USSR	Poland	Bulgaria	Romania	NDR	Yugoslavia	Hungary	Together
T-34/85			238	335			100	673
SD-100			65	60				125
JT-34		1						1
T-54AR							76	76
T-55					375	42	25	442
T-55A				118	1362	492	539	2511
T-55AK				17	30	18		65
VT-55	680			14	251	26	135	1106
MT-55	935		17	6		98		1056
MT-55 chassis					458			458
JVBT-55	200				118	151	31	500
T-72			76		134		43	253
T-72M					25			25
T-72MK					5		3	8
T-72M1			16		91		3	110
T-72M1K					5		2	7
VT-72B	45				3		2	50
OT-62		126				1		127
OT-62R		22						22
GDP-1	10096	1297			813			12206
VPV	125				8			133
GDP-1K	136				142			305
GDP-1P					150			150
BVP-1PK					27			27
MP-31	133	11			8			152
GDP-2		62			30			92
DANA	126	111						237
RM-70					229			229
RM-70/85		30			36			66
Together	12476	1660	412	550	4300	828	959	21 212

Appendix No. 7 – Export of heavy armored equipment from Slovakia to non-socialist countries (1952-1991):

Technique	Yemen	Egypt	Syria	Glass of beer	Iran	Irak	Algeria	Sudan	Morocco	India	Zimbabwe	Together
T-34/85	30	275	120									425
SD-100		125	36									161
T-55A		420	951	905						92		2368
T-55AK		10	380	348						7		745
VT-55		22	359	83			5			112		581
MT-55			30	50		8	4			98		190
JVBT-55			61	50		74	3					188
T-72M			50									50
T-72M1			199	119		90	106					514
T-72M1K			9				8					17
OT-62		810				465		19	28	300		1622
OT-62R								1				1
DTP-62								1	2	20		23
GDP-1			1275	666	400	750						3091
AMB-S			240									240
DANA				27								27
RM-70				145								145
RM-70/85											20	20
Together	30	1662	3710	2393	400	1387	126	21	30	629	20	10 408

This is also due to the fact that the USSR often transferred the fulfillment of supplies to its socialist satellites, and thus a significant part of the weapons produced in Slovakia were delivered through USSR contracts. In the case of production in Slovakia, it was mainly the case of infantry fighting vehicles.

It is difficult to trace the exact scope of supplies even to the USSR. Usually a number from 5100 pcs to "approximately 10 thousand" is given. Since my father took part in the ceremony of handing over the 10,000th BVP card, where he received the award "Exemplary Company Employee" with the date 19.10.1988 (Appendix No. 8), it can be proven that the deliveries were indeed over ten thousand pieces.

Appendix No. 8

Diploma awarded to workers on the occasion of handing over the 10,000th jubilee vehicle of the BVP series to the USSR at ZŤS Dubnice nad Váhom

Other times, the numbers of arms deliveries to individual countries are relatively accurate, even many authors agree, but mathematically those numbers do not match the number of manufactured pieces of the given technology, often upwards! That is why it is necessary to take the technical numbers in question with a certain reserve not only here, but also in all sources. Without giving specific primary documents, it is necessary to take each author with skepticism.

What is important are the actual delivered numbers of equipment and not just contractual deliveries, which could have been shortened on the one hand (e.g. due to bad payment discipline on the part of the customer) or, on the contrary, increased (by an addition that the researcher did not get his hands on). Considering that part of the materials deteriorated after 1989, the memorials are not reliable in these cases (if they are alive at all) and the recipient countries have inaccessible archival sources (Syria, Libya), it is likely that complete certainty with the number of exported equipment to that or we will never have that country.

Another problem is that the customer was only formal and the technology was in turn sold to a third party. It should concern e.g. deliveries of BVP-1 machines to Iran via Syria in the 1980s.

It should be said that the tables do not include used equipment delivered after longer service or storage at ČSA. This had no direct impact on arms production and was often sold for symbolic prices, or even for free. The largest free aid delivery was the delivery of 93 T-54AR tanks to Syria after the war was lost in 1973.

(jatkuu seuraavassa viestissä)

 

[Antares]

Spoiler: Artikkelin tekstin viimeinen kolmannes

And what was the economic benefit for Slovakia, or Czechoslovakia?​

The answer is not as simple as it might seem. Of course, supplies for one's own army do not earn the state anything, at most they can save the costs of buying one's own equipment. The export was divided into two parts. Exports to socialist countries, mainly Warsaw Pact countries and capitalist countries. The price was determined within the framework of socialist planning using the so-called differential indicator. The latter meant the ratio between production and selling price.

If it was less than 1, it meant export subsidies, e.g. Škoda cars were exported in the 1980s with a difference index of 0.6, which meant that 40% of its production price was subsidized by the state. Of course, it only made sense in a socialist non-market economy - it was about currencies. On the contrary, for example, the balanced sophisticated electronic passive search engine TAMARA and its predecessor RAMONA had a differential indicator of 2.5. Appendix No. 9 gives an approximate picture of these indicators.

Appendix No. 9 – Differential export indicators

Years	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Export to socialist countries
Civil engineering production	1,24	1,29	1,32	1,36	1,35	1,27	1,33
Special technique	1,03	1,13	1,13	1,2	1,24	1,17	1,24
Export to non-socialist countries
Civil engineering production	1,02	1,02	1	1,03	1	1,06	1,1
Special technique	1,65	1,91	1,81	1,64	1,46	1,53	1,52

The price for the Allies was to be determined according to the principles agreed in the RVHP "cleaned of "conjunctural influences" and averaged over a five-year planning period. There was pressure for all products produced under a Soviet license (and this was the majority of heavy equipment produced in Slovakia) for the level of these prices to be adjusted to the Soviet price level.

The low cost prices of the huge Soviet arms production was a form of the so-called imposed on all member countries by the recommendation of the RVHP Permanent Commission for the Defense Industry. Thus, the entire production based on Soviet licenses often became unprofitable. According to the analyzes of the MS. parties should be priced 1.7-3 times higher. However, this was a problem for the state, which matched the price to the producer. The manufacturing companies themselves got paid everything, including the profit. In addition, manufacturers of special equipment had other advantages, e.g. adjustment of normative profit or faster depreciation of assets. It is therefore not surprising that companies tried to develop "special" rather than civilian production.

Market principles were applied only when exporting to capitalist countries, because of course it was impossible to do business on the international market otherwise. There was theoretically no problem to make money by exporting relatively high-quality heavy weapons.

In practice, however, various politically motivated advantages of selected "friendly" regimes were applied, mainly in the form of long-term loans provided by the Czechoslovak Republic. side, which, however, often did not pay off and so the profit was more or less illusory.

In practice, there were even absurd cases of assistance. In 1956, a contract was signed with Yemen for the supply of weapons for 87 million. including 15 T-34/85 tanks and 50 SD-100 self-propelled guns, but Czechoslovakia was to receive only 30% of this price, and even that was to be repaid in 10 years with one percent interest. This "favorable" trade was allocated by the USSR and the Czechoslovak Republic. the management had to fulfill it even though it was aware of the economic absurdity of the trade, or rather a gift. In addition, the Soviet side demanded within the contract also "the provision of broad technical support in the form of supplies of repair capacities, the sending of Czechoslovak instructors for training and delivery of a production line for the production of handguns".

The biggest concern was to keep this deal a secret from other customers, because such deals are in the Czech Republic. the party could not afford much, especially after the "friendly" Yemen paid only the first installment and thus the payments ended despite the continued military aid, but without the export of heavy weapons. It should be added that the method and time of the signing of this contract is not clear, the sources are quite contradictory, but it is quite enough to illustrate the absurdity of the "lucrativeness" of exports in the given period (however, the scope of the actual deliveries is unknown, the sources diverge - one of the other unclear examples of our export, in table no. 6 the most often given delivery data is 30 pcs T-34/85).

The difference in export efficiency can be easily demonstrated by the export of infantry fighting vehicles in 1981-1985. About 3,748 of them were exported to socialist countries with a loss of 1.24 billion. CZK and about 1,318 to non-socialist ones and the profit was 2.3456 billion. CZK. The total profit in the seventh five-year period thus represented 1.105 billion. CZK.

The best customer of our heavy weapons was clearly Libya, which was the most solvent of the countries of the developing world due to its oil wealth. However, at the end of the 80s, even this customer ceased to be fully reliable and had a problem with payments for the delivered weapons.

The payment discipline of many of our large customers was low, and at the end of 1990, many of our customers already had large receivables after the due date. The value of total export receivables of the Czechoslovakia in 1990 was very high for some countries: Syria – more than 1 billion. USD (of which a special 750 million USD), Iraq – 400 million. USD, Libya – 156 million. USD, Algeria – 37 million. USD.

Benefit for Slovakia​

If we want to assess the benefit of the massive production of special equipment for Slovakia, or Czechoslovakia, so we should analyze the financial results of special production. However, despite the planned economy, the reality is that it is a big problem to get relevant numbers. It is unbelievable, but the authors who research this area agree that it is not even possible by 1971! There are simply no grounds for it.

Originally, all resources from foreign trade in weapons flowed into the state budget, and all the needs of the defense industry were subsidized. Thus, the principle of a direct relationship between the foreign exchange of armed goods and the state budget applied. The change occurred only in 1967 with the adoption of the so-called of the new management system of the national economy.

Appendix No. 10 Relationship of foreign trade in weapons to the state budget (in millions of CZK)

Pointer	1971‐1980	1981‐1990
Levy to the state budget	4 025	6 205
+ from management results	2172	3 208
+ other levies	1853	2 997
Subsidies from the state budget	975	650
The resulting relationship to the state budget	+3 050	+5 555

Basic relations characterizing the value of production and the extent of spent state resources can be drawn up at the macroeconomic level for the period 1971-1990 (Annex No. 10). And even these numbers are due to time. For example, many costs for the development of military technology were hidden in the budget chapter of research and development, and on the contrary, resources for special production were often used for civilian production as well. The state budget also drained a significant part of the balance sheet profit in the form of additional levies.

It was often just the realization of unrealistic plans for concrete reality. Therefore, it is possible to add up these imprecise numbers ... but the guaranteed result is not certain and basically not even possible.

Many people were employed in the arms industry in Slovakia. About 35 thousand directly, tens of thousands more in related industries. It is a fact that their salary conditions were above standard. In addition to the basic salaries, it was possible to receive quarterly performance bonuses, which were certainly motivating in relation to the salary. They were in the amount of a few hundred kroner, which is at a salary of 2-3. thousand In the 1980s, CZK was an interesting improvement and, in addition to its financial value, it was in the form of diplomas (Appendix No. 11).

Appendix No. 11

Diploma for good performance of work tasks. It was associated with the payment of a reward in the amount of several hundred crowns, which was a significant salary improvement at the time.

There was also an opportunity to earn extra by submitting improvement proposals, often up to the salary. In addition to money and diplomas, badges were part of the awards (Annex No. 12). However, it was a matter of course that it was necessary to be educated in the party and personal evaluations, which also concerned privacy, which was not a specialty of the arms industry only. The workers also had to sign non-disclosure agreements, as the military industry was accompanied by great secrecy.

Appendix No. 12

Times are changing​

Sometimes it is not so much the specific numbers that are important, but the trends. And the trend was clear at the end of the 80s - a decline.

The highest values in exports and imports were reached in 1986. However, the peak of arms production in Czechoslovakia was not until 1987. Its volume reached approx. 29.3 billion. CZK, the share of weapons production in the total engineering production of Czechoslovakia was in the range of 10–11%. At the end of the 80s, the political situation in the world changed completely. As a result of the fall of the Eastern Bloc, 80% of the markets for Slovak arms manufacturers were "automatically" lost - that is, the internal market and the countries of the socialist bloc.

However, the decline in arms sales had already occurred earlier. In the 1980s, new weapon systems were introduced, which were more powerful, but also incomparably more demanding and therefore more expensive. While the production price of the T-55A tank was around 2 million CZK, the new T-72 tank already cost over 13 million. CZK. The army itself inevitably planned to limit the purchase of new equipment and to solve modernization by modernizing the existing equipment - e.g. of T-55A tanks to the standard T-55AM1 and T-55AM2 "Hammer".

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was also of great importance, which already defined the reduction of conventional weapons at the end of 1988 with completion by 1992. It drastically reduced the stocks of heavy equipment, which eased the budgets of countries, but severely affected manufacturers. With the collapse of the bipolar world, purchases in the former Soviet bloc countries were reduced to an absolute minimum, where already started projects were mostly just catching up. In essence, the situation was only realized when the armies of the Soviet bloc demanded weapons, but they had significant problems with financing, especially in the form of credit. This also applied to the USSR, which lost the ability to balance its obligations and exports stopped. Subsequent debts were settled by successor Russia for many years after the collapse of the USSR.

A big change was also the abolition of restrictions on the export of weapons from the successor states of the USSR. Russia or Ukraine immediately offered for export the most modern versions of their T-72 or T-80 tanks, which was unthinkable during the Cold War. "Downgraded" technology was mainly exported outside the socialist states, and the best versions were kept by the Soviet army. Thus, it secured technological superiority over its often uncertain allies.

Start of conversion​

Officially, the Presidium of the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic decided on the suppression of arms production at the end of June 1988, and preparations for the conversion of production from special to civilian began immediately. The communist leadership planned the production of only 25 T-72M1 tanks for export in 1990. However, the new non-communist government decided that 107 would be produced and most of the costs were borne by the federal budget due to the threat of rising unemployment.

The government's decision to end the production of armored vehicles at ZTS Martin, ZTS Dubnica nad Váhom and PPS Detva came in 1991. The production of 100 T-72M1 tanks for Syria, which also bought those produced in 1990, had just finished. This was not without political delays, as the US and Israel were not enthusiastic about the trade. However, stopping production was not a matter of politics, but of the market.

Most former customers no longer wanted any equipment from our armories, and many even quickly got rid of their modern ones (former GDR army) at low prices and limited the already small maneuvering space for the supply of new weapons. The former capitalist customers were not even able to pay off the old astronomical debts, and the new government no longer had the desire and especially the money to lend to an uncertain business.

In Slovakia, the conversion mainly concerned the enterprises Konštrukta Trenčín (97% of special production), ZVS Dubnica nad Váhom (87%), ZŤS Hriňová (72%), ZŤS Dubnica nad Váhom (70%), ZŤS Prakovce (68%), ZŤS Martin and Strojárne Malacky (64% each), ZŤS Detva (60%), Meopta Bratislava (58%), Tesla Liptovský Hrádok (57%) and other companies to a lesser extent.

The situation was very difficult, because the decline in production was rapid and a lot of materials and subcontracts remained in the warehouses. Many special single-purpose technologies were completely new, difficult for the civilian sector to use.

Why did the conversion "hurt"?​

It is an indisputable fact that after 1989 there was quite a lot of naivety about further developments. Arms production was somehow "automatically" rejected, and it was not even at the highest political level, especially the federal level, to keep it alive. Objectively, it should be added that this was a reality and no other politicians would do anything about the radical reduction of our special industry. The consequences could only be mitigated. And it cannot be denied that help flowed from the federal level to the businesses affected by the conversion. And not a small one (appendix no. 13).

Appendix No. 13 Conversion projects with the support of the federal budget

	1991	1992
businesses	projects	billion CZK	businesses	projects	billion CZK
CR	36	62	0,3	21	43	0,21
SR	30	64	1,2	25	47	0,79
Czechoslovakia	66	126	1,5	46	90	1

In addition, there was a process of debt relief through state-owned banks in the form of writing off old debts. They were written off in a total value of about 2.5 billion. CZK and mainly affected Slovak companies, which reduced their indebtedness by hundreds of millions of CZK, the most ZŤS Dubnica nad Váhom – 900 million. CZK.

Where did the mistake happen?​

In Slovakia, mainly Czech politicians, especially the first and last president of Czechoslovakia, Václav Havel, have become symbols of the "bad" conversion. As already stated in the "Havel" times, the massive reduction of our arms production was already decided. The best proof is that even after the establishment of our independent state, nothing fundamental about the collapse of heavy weapons production has changed, despite the proclaimed great support.

It must be said that the first "live war" and Operation Desert Storm in 1991 in Kuwait also dealt a big blow to our armed forces. A propaganda well-managed war where the weapons were "surgically precise" was pushed into the living rooms of the whole world as a parade of destroyed Soviet technology, destroyed by the victorious coalition in a short time.

About the fact of poor training of Iraqi soldiers, air superiority, etc. was not discussed. Soviet weapons were only suitable for scrap.

He couldn't handle socialism​

The roots of our painful conversion must be sought elsewhere, namely in the planned economy. During almost 40 years of building arms production in Slovakia, it only reacted weakly to the market and the changing world. The decline in the demand for weapons in developing countries was "solved" by borrowing from our side and by constantly postponing the repayment of old loans, and not by adjusting to lower demand. The same problem was also in the arms trade of socialist countries and the domestic army, respectively. the budgets of the Czechoslovak Republic already indicated that the decline was inevitable. The more the artificial production "steamed", the more it "splashed".

It should not be forgotten that the conversion was only one and not even by far the biggest problem in the conditions of the collapsing socialist economy. The whole society was changing rapidly, the market opened up, better quality cheaper goods arrived, and domestic businesses had problems from Aš to Svidník. It was not possible to deal with only one segment of the economy, which, moreover, was unnecessary for the domestic army during its downsizing, and exports were often politically "explosive".

Many former workers of our arms industry today only nostalgically remember the "good times" and do not mention the post-revolutionary change for the better. It is understandable. They worked honestly in the highest quality enterprises of the state and created millions of values, and their products are today all over the world. However, even their best efforts could not outweigh the flawed functioning of the planned economy, where the economy was not decided by the market, but by the party.

Privatization - the final solution?​

The last stage of the transformation was privatization. Although it started shortly after 1989 and was often "wild", the fact remains that only a specific private owner can take care of his business responsibly. With the passage of time, it can be concluded that the various ways of saving the state's "strategic" arms industry in practice meant only waste and the enrichment of financial groups connected to political parties, and it had minimal impact on the declared "saving" of jobs.

RESOURCES:

1) Zubko Štefa, Zubko Juraj, Armored technology 1944-2001 production in the Slovak Republic, Magnet Press Slovakia, 2002.

2) Hofman Jiří, Baur Jan, Tajemství riadiotechníkých pátrače Tamara, Nakladatelství Sdělovací technika, Prague 2003.

3) Vopat Zdeněk et al. ., Konštrukta Trenčín, Magnet Press Slovakia, RESS Senica 2000.

4) Komárek Valtr et al., Prognoza a program, Academia Praha1990.

5) Zídek Petr, Sieber Kerel, Czechoslovakia and the Middle East in the years 1948-1989, Prague 2009.

6) Zídek Petr, Sieber Kerel, Czechoslovakia and Sub-Saharan Africa East in the years 1948-1989, Prague 2007.

7) Krč Miroslav et al. , Military expenditures during the Cold War and after its end, Prague 2000.

8) Francev Vladimír, Czechoslovak tank forces 1945-1992, Grada publishing, 2012.

9) Bajzíková Anna, Defense industry and armaments – a phenomenon of the state sector (the case of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic), Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of 10) Economic Studies, Bachelor thesis, Prague 2009.

10) Štaigl Jan, Turza Peter, Military History, Arms production in Slovakia in the years 1969-1992, Military History magazine.

11) Štaigl Jan, Štefanský Michal, Military History of Slovakia VI. Volume 1945-1968, Magnet Press, 2007.

12) Internet (www.wikipedia.org, www.valka.cz and others)

 

[Antares]

Aikaisemmassa viestissäni (LINKKI) lainaamani artikkelin tiedot voidaan esittää myös tässä muodossa:



Tsekkoslovakian T-72 vienti vaunutyypeittäin per vientimaa:


Laadin aikaisemmassa viestissäni (LINKKI) yhden taulukon johon oli laskettu T-72 tuotannon kokonaismäärät mutta vuosien perusteella, tiedot perustuivat viestissä jaettuun tarkempaan taulukkoon. Kirjoitin silloin näin:

Jos ei välitä kenelle vaunu on valmistettu ja haluaa pelkät kokonaismäärät niin tässä kokoamani taulukko jossa on summattu numerot yhteen vaunutyypeittäin:



Tanknet-foorumilla on kirjoitettu Tsekkoslovakian vientimääristä ja nämä ovat selvästi tiedossa (kokonaismäärät ja kohdemaat). Koostin näistä tiedoista puutteellisen taulukon, johon on merkitty tiettyjen vuosien toimitusmäärät (nämä olen arvannut ko. vuoden valmistusmääristä, ne mitkä on helppoa ja loogista päätellä). Kohdemaat, vaunumäärät sekä X-kirjaimella merkityt toimitusvuodet ovat Tanknet-foorumin tietojen perusteella: LÄHDE



Taulukon "HUOM +78" tarkoittaa Syyrialle myytyjä vaunuja, jotka otettiin Tsekkoslovakian armeijan varastoista ja ilmeisesti toimitus oli vuonna 1991. Tästä oli alkuperäisen taulukon yhteydessä nootti.

Näiden lisäksi tiedetään että Itä-Saksa tilasi 12 kpl T-72M1 vaunuja vuonna 1989, mutta nämä tulivat jälleenmyyntiä varten (kohdemaa ei ole tiedossa). Tästä syystä nämä vaunut eivät löydy Itä-Saksan armeijan kirjanpidosta, koska niitä ei otettu missään vaiheessa vastaan. Lisäsin tämän tiedon "vientitaulukkoon" Itä-Saksan kohdalle, punainen korostus.

Jos vertaa tätä tarkempaa taulukko ylempään "vientitaulukkoon" niin kokonaismäärässä on seuraava erotus:

996 - 984 = 12

Tarkempi tutkimus paljastaa, että tämän eron aiheuttaa Itä-Saksan väitetty"re-export" (Itä-Saksalle merkittyjen kokonaismäärien ero: 260 vs 272).

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Tässä sama vientitaulukko uudestaan, lisäsin tähän vuosikohtaisten vientimäärien summat:



Alapuolella puolestaan "tarkasta taulukosta" poimitut tyyppikohtaiset vientimäärät per vuosi.

Tietyt vaunutyypin toimitusmäärät per kohdemaa per vuosi ovat pääteltävissä, mutta paljon tuntemattomia myös.

 

[John Hilly]

Etkö voisi panna nämä pitkät viestit spoilerin alle. Ei tarvitsisi rullata, jos ei kiinnosta.

 

[SatSotHist]

Etkö voisi panna nämä pitkät viestit spoilerin alle. Ei tarvitsisi rullata, jos ei kiinnosta.

Jossakin toisessa threadissa olisin voinut olla samaa mieltä. Mutta tämä nimenomainen ketju on lähes yksinomaan Antares raudanlujaa tilastodataa NL/Venäjä/Jne tuotantomääristä.

Toivon että tilastomestari jatkaa entiseen malliin.

 

[Antares]

Etkö voisi panna nämä pitkät viestit spoilerin alle. Ei tarvitsisi rullata, jos ei kiinnosta.

Koitan muistaa harkita muotoilua tarkemmin, seuraavan kerran kun kirjoitan jostain pidemmästi. Spoilerin käytössä on pari ongelmaa:

- jos en ole erehtynyt, foorumin hakukone ei näe spoilerin sisälle, joten tietyn viestin löytäminen voi olla ongelma (tästä syystä pusken nämä samaan ketjuun)
- suurempi ongelma on se, että nettiselaimen hakutoiminto ei näe spoilerin taakse

Tämä jälkimmäinen on ongelma silloin kun haen itse jotain tietoa tästä ketjusta, enkä muista millä sivulla olen kirjoittanut siitä. Tämä ketju pomppii aiheesta toiseen levottomasti, riippuen siitä mikä on milloinkin ollut mielenpäällä. Esimerkiksi tämä: viittasin aikaisemmassa viestissä Mikhail Baryatinskyyn ja hänen kirjaansa, mutta en muistanut, olinko lainannut hänen kirjoistaan aikaisemmin. Tieto löytyy kohtuullisen nopeasti, kun voi hakea tällä nimellä. Jos nimi on piilossa spoilerin takana, se ei löydy, joten joutuisin klikkaamaan jokaisen spoilerin auki, jotta selaimen haku löytää nimen.

Ehkä jollain koodarilla on tähän kätevämpi keino, mutta minulla ei ole sellaista tiedossa. Kirjoitan tähän ketjuun näitä viestejä, jotta saan kerättyä ajatukset ja taulukot yhteen paikkaan. Tätä ei varsinaisesti ole muotoiltu ns. muiden luettavaksi. Jos spoilerin käyttö tekisi asiat minulle vaikeammaksi, niin tuskin tulen käyttämään sitä jatkossakaan (ainakaan enemmässä määrin, vaikka se tekisikin lukukokemuksesta paremman jotain tiettyä tietoa hakevalle).

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Neuvostoliiton eri vaunutyyppien valmistusmäärät vuosittain aikavälillä 1957-1973.

Lähde:

100 лет российского танкостроения - Устьянцев С., Чернышева Е. - 2020

100 years of Russian tank building - Ustyantsev S., Chernysheva E. - 2020

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 216.

Huomaa, että tässä taulukossa on niputettu T-54 ja T-55 tuotantomäärät samalle riville. Tarkkuus ei siis ole paras mahdollinen. Eri vaunujen valmistusmäärät sisältävän rivin alapuolella on merkitty tähdellä valmistavien tehtaiden tuotannon aikaväli. Muotoilu on hieman kömpelö, eikä tämä tietysti kerro, montako vaunua ko. tehdas valmisti.

Tehtaiden nimien käännökset:


Tässä varsinainen taulukko:

Tätä on hyvä verrata vanhemmasta viestistäni löytyvään Solyankin et. al. taulukkoon, joka on huomattavasti tarkempi ja laadukkaampi MUTTA se loppuu vuoteen 1965. LINKKI

Toisaalta, kuten nähdään, Omsk oli ainoa tehdas joka jatkoi T-55 perheen vaunujen valmistusta vuoden 1965 jälkeen, joten aikavälille 1966-1973 merkitty tuotanto on 100% tämän tehtaan tuotantoa. Alla olevan taulukon mukaan T-80B tuotanto alkoi Omskin tehtaalla hyvin pienimuotoisesti vuonna 1978, vuoden 1979 ollessa ensimmäinen parempi vuosi. Tämä herättää tietysti kysymyksiä: mitä he tekivät aikavälillä 1974-1978? Jatkuiko T-55 perheen vaunujen tuotanto ja jos jatkui, tehtiinkö valtaosa näistä vientiin?

Steve Zalogan mukaan kyllä, T-55A oli tuotannossa Omskin tehtaalla vuonna 1979 (seuraava lainaus on Steve Zalogan kirjasta "T-80 standard tank - Soviet armys last champion" (kirja julkaistu 17.2.2009):

The Obiekt 219R was accepted for Soviet service in 1978 as the T-80B and entered production at LKZ that year, replacing the earlier T-80. It entered production at the Omsk plant in 1979, belatedly replacing the T-55A that was still in production there for export. The Omsk plant was also assigned to develop the Obiekt 630 command version of the T-80B, designated T-80BK. The command version added a land navigation system and an additional command radio.

Lainauksesta voisi päätellä että T-55A tuotannosta valtaosa tai jopa kaikki olisi mennyt tässä vaiheessa vientiin. Muotoilu belatedly replacing voitaisiin kirjoittaa myös näin: replacing later than should have been the case. Se ei siis ota kantaa siihen, pysyikö T-55A tuotannossa vielä sen jälkeenkin kun T-80B tuotanto alkoi. Minun arvaus: ei.

UVZ:n osalta taulukko on myös hyvin selvä: he olivat ainoa tehdas joka valmisti T-62 perheen vaunuja JA näiden valmistus päättyi vuonna 1973, jolloin aloittivat T-72 perheen vaunujen valmistuksen (katso alla oleva taulukko).

Kharkovan tehdas siirtyi T-54 / T-55 tuotannosta suoraan T-64 tuotantoon, joka alkoi vuonna 1964. Kuten nähdään, 1964 ja 1965 oli molempien tuotantoa rinnakkain.

Tämän taulukon mukaan Volgogradin tehdas oli ainoa, joka valmisti kevyitä PT-76 vaunuja. Kirjoitin aikaisemmassa viestissä, että LKZ (Kirov Plant, Leningrad) olisi myös valmistanut näitä aikavälillä 1951-1967, mutta tämän mukaan näin ei olisi ollut. LKZ valmisti IS-4 panssarivaunuja 1947-1951, T-10 panssarivaunuja 1953-1965 ja piti taukoa panssarivaunujen valmistuksesta hieman yli kymmenen vuoden ajan, kunnes aloittivat ensimmäisenä tehtaana T-80 perheen vaunujen valmistuksen, mikä tapahtui aikavälillä 1976-1989 (katso alla oleva taulukko).

En ole koskaan suuremmin välittänyt PT-76 vaunuista, joten on hyvin mahdollista että olen erehtynyt tuossa aikaisemmassa luulossani. Toki PT-76 alustalle tehtiin muitakin ajoneuvoja: BTR-50 ja Shilka ainakin.

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Neuvostoliiton eri vaunutyyppien valmistusmäärät vuosittain aikavälillä 1966-1990.

Lähde:

100 лет российского танкостроения - Устьянцев С., Чернышева Е. - 2020

100 years of Russian tank building - Ustyantsev S., Chernysheva E. - 2020

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 239.

Poimin taulukon alareunan selitykset tähän ja käänsin tehtaiden nimet luettavampaan muotoon, laskin myös rivien summan:



Tämä taulukko tuo jonkin verran uutta tietoa jos vertaa aikaisempiin vastaavaa aikakautta käsitteleviin taulukoihin (joita on käsitelty useammassakin tämän ketjun viestissä, tässä YKSI).

Uutta tietoa vanhempaan taulukkoon verrattuna: T-64 / Obyekt 432 vuosituotanto alkupään osalta, T-80UD vuosituotanto, T-80 perheen vaunujen tuotanto on jaettu kolmen niitä valmistaneen tehtaan osuuksiksi (tosin 90-luvun tuotantomäärät puuttuvat edelleen). Tässä on myös kerrottu, mitä vaunutyyppejä mikäkin tehdas valmisti.

Lainaan muistutuksena toisesta kirjasta, linkki vanhempaan viestiini: LINKKI

T-64A tuli tuotantoon 1969 vuodesta alkaen, mutta sitä ennen aikavälillä 1964-1968 Kharkovan tehtaalla valmistettiin alkuperäistä T-64 mallia eli Obyekt 432.

Obyekt 432 valmistusmäärät olivat (lähde: Ustyantsev S.V., Kolmakov D.G. - Боевые машины Уралвагонзавода. Танк Т-72, sivu 34):

1964: 90 kpl
1965: 160 kpl
1966: 294 kpl
1967: 330 kpl
1968: 318 kpl

Yhteensä 1 192 kpl

Kuten nähdään, vuoden 1966 määrä on hieman eri, tosin 294 kpl ei ole kaukana 300 kpl. Vuosi 1968 on erikoisempi, 318 kpl on selvästi vähemmän kuin 425 kpl. Tälle ei ole selvää selitystä, tosin en ole lukenut kirjan tekstiä vielä. Ehkä se antaa apua. Helppo selitys olisi toki se, että jommassa kummassa on virhe.

Aikaisemmissa taulukoissa kerrottiin että T-64A / T-64B kokonaisvalmistusmäärä aikavälillä 1969-1972 oli 1 560 kpl ja aikavälillä 1969-1987 se oli 13 108 kpl. Summa ei täsmää yllä olevan taulukon T-64 perheen vaunujen kokonaismäärän kanssa, mutta tämä selittyy erilaisella aika-asteikolla.

Aikaisempien taulukoiden mukaan T-80 perheen vaunujen kokonaisvalmistusmäärä olisi ollut 7 066 kpl, kun taas yllä olevan taulukon mukaan se oli:

1 135 + 5 396 + 550 = 7 081

Taulukkoja vertaamalla nähdään että summat täsmäävät aikavälillä 1976-1983 mutta sen jälkeen on kolme vuotta, joiden osalta numerot poikkeavat toisistaan (alle merkitysti vasemman puolimmainen numero on yllä olevasta taulukosta laskettu, oikean puolimmainen puolestaan "vanhoista taulukoista" otettu):

1984: 675 vs. 670
1985: 800 vs. 770
1986: 820 vs. 840

Heittoa on siis kumpaankin suuntaan.

Näiden jälkeen vuosien 1987-1990 osalta numerot täsmäävät molemmissa taulukoissa.

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Suuri puute näissä kaikissa taulukoissa on tietysti vaunutyyppikohtaisten vuosituotantomäärien puuttuminen. Ainoa poikkeus on T-80UD. Näitä on valmistettu tämän taulukon perusteella 550 kpl aikavälillä 1986-1990. Neuvostoliitto hajosi joulukuussa 1991 joten ko. vuosi jäi viimeiseksi tuotantovuodeksi. Kharkovan tehtaan tuotanto pysähtyi nopeasti tämän jälkeen, koska eivät saaneet osia rajan takaa Venäjältä. Muiden tehtaiden osalta vuodet 1991 ja 1992 olivat todennäköisesti viimeiset edes hieman normaalit vuodet, mutta näille ei ole virallisia numeroita, ainoastaan spekulaatiota ja eri kirjojen esittämiä arvioita. Olen spekuloinut näistä aikaisemmin tässä ketjussa, mutta siinäkin paino on sanalla spekulointi.

Se on kuitenkin selvää että tuotantomäärät romahtivat hyvin pian Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen eikä Venäjän armeija tilannut uusia panssarivaunuja juuri lainkaan, vaan keskittyi vanhojen varastovaunujen ylläpitoon ja remontointiin (poislukien pieni määrä T-90 obr 1992 vaunuja). Ulkomaiden vienti puolestaan ei riittänyt alkuunkaan, vaikka sitä tapahtui jonkin verran. Yleisesti ottaen 90-luku oli hyvin synkkää aikaa näiden tehtaiden osalta.

 

[Antares]

Omskin tehtaan T-80B ja T-80BV vuosituotantomäärät aikavälillä 1978-1990 (HUOM: kirjan mukaan Omsk valmisti ensimmäiset T-80U vaunut vasta vuonna 1991, katso toinen viestini - LINKKI).

Lähde:

Омский завод транспортного машиностроения - Устьянцев С. - 2018

Omsk transport engineering plant - Ustyantsev S. - 2018

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 100.


Alemman rivin käännös: including commander

OLETAN että tämä tarkoittaa sitä, että T-80BK ja T-80BVK sisältyvät tuohon ylemmän rivin kokonaismäärään. JOS näin on, silloin "ei-komentovaunujen" määrä pitää laskea niin, että ylemmästä rivistä vähennetään alemman rivin numerot per vuosi.

Yleisesti ottaen näissä numeroissa on taas hieman heittoa, jos vertaa aikaisemman viestin taulukkoon ja siihen merkittyyn Omskin tehtaan vuosituotantomääriin. Ei paljon eroja, mutta jonkin verran.

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Saman kirjan sivulta 108 löytyy hyvin mielenkiintoisia numeroita. Lainaan alle käännöksen ja siinä viitatun taulukon (taulukon ylemmällä rivillä on T-80BV ja alemmalla rivillä T-80U):

It is said that the Chinese character for the word "crisis" is formed by the fusion of two OTHERS: "danger" and "opportunity". A more precise characterization can hardly be imagined.

What happened to the Omsk Transport Engineering Plant at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s can hardly be considered a mere danger. In November 1991, General Director S.A. Katyk said at a meeting of representatives of the labor collective that over the years of the conversion that began in 1988, the output of defense products has decreased three times [1].

In absolute terms, the production of tanks in the 1990s looked like this [2]:



Beginning in 1994, the Department of Defense systematically delayed payment for products already delivered; and in 1997 they stopped ordering armored vehicles altogether [3].

All that remained was the repair of previously produced equipment, which, in principle, could not ensure the break-even operation of the enterprise. In the 1990s, meager funds were allocated for these purposes, and even in the early 2000s, the Ministry of Defense had no more than 400 million rubles a year for the restoration of the "eighties", and a significant part of them was directed not to the plant production, but to tank repair enterprises [4].

Silence came to the tank shops of Omsktransmash for the first time in their history. Dead silence.
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Omskin tuotannon aikavälillä 1991-1996 kertovan taulukon merkitty lähde [2]:

2. Справочные данные. Л. 17-18, 208 // Музей «УВЗ».

Kääntyy muotoon:

2. Reference data. L. 17-18, 208 // UVZ Museum.

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Tässä Omskin tehtaan tuotanto Neuvostoliiton viimeisenä vuotena 1991 sekä sen hajoamisen jälkeen, laskin summat vaikkei tuossa olekaan paljoa laskettavaa:



Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen eli Venäjän aikana eli aikavälillä 1992-1996 valmistui ainoastaan 231 kpl T-80U vaunuja.

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Steve Zaloga on kirjoittanut UVZ:n tehtaan 90-luvun tuotannon osalta, että tilaukset loppuivat vuoden 1996 tienoilla. Oletan että T-90 obr 1992 vaunut valmistettiin aikavälillä 1992-1996. Tämän jälkeen myös heillä keskityttiin tämän jälkeen vientikauppojen metsästykseen sekä varastovaunujen remontointiin, uusien vaunujen tilauksia ei tullut.

He suunnittelivat 90-luvun viimeisinä vuosina useamman erilaisen T-72 perheen vaunujen modernisointipaketin, mutta Venäjän valtio hylkäsi ne liian kalliina. Lopulta saivat hieman jalkaa oven väliin ja vuosituhannen vaihteen tienoilla aloitettiin T-72BA nimellä tunnettu vaatimaton modernisointiprojekti.

Samaan aikaan 90-luvun lopulla suunnittelivat hitsatun terästornin vientiin tarjottavia T-90S vaunuja varten ja saivat näille ensimmäiset vientikaupat 2000-luvun alussa. Venäjän armeija osti vihdoin ensimmäiset uudet panssarivaunut vuonna 2004, nämä olivat T-90A vaunuja.

 

[Antares]

Mietin Kharkovan tehtaan T-80UD tuotantoa taulukkoon merkityn ajan jälkeen. Seuraava lainaus on Steve Zalogan kirjasta "T-80 standard tank - Soviet armys last champion" (kirja julkaistu 17.2.2009) - lainasin siitä pitkät pätkät aikaisemmassa viestissä, jos kiinnostaa lukea lisää: LINKKI

The Kharkov plant in newly independent Ukraine attempted to keep T-80 production alive there, but suffered from some unique problems. About 70 percent of the T-80UD came from plants outside Ukraine, mainly Russia. Production was 800 combat vehicles in 1991, but only 43 in 1992 and none in 1993 as the supply of components dried up. Since the Ukrainian state budget was too small to support any extensive production, the plant turned to the export market. In 1993, the Malyshev plant demonstrated the T-80UD to Pakistan and in the summer of 1995, two T-80UD underwent extensive testing there. In August 1996, Pakistan announced plans to purchase 320 T-80UD tanks from Ukraine. One critical component was the cast turret - this came from the Azvostal foundry in Mariupol, which had already ceased production; the other casting facility was at the Omsk plant in Russia. So the Malyshev plant's design bureau developed a new welded turret that resulted in the Obiekt 478BK (BK = Bereza-Katanaya: Rolled-armor birch tree), with the first completed in 1993. Ukraine began manufacturing its own version of the D-81 125mm gun at the KBA-3. Of the 320 tanks delivered to Pakistan in 1997-1999, 145 used the original cast turret, including 52 tanks completed under Soviet contracts but never delivered, plus new tanks built with remaining Soviet-era turrets, and some tanks from Ukrainian army stocks. Ukrainian Army T-80 strength fell from about 350 tanks prior to the sale to 271 afterwards. The remaining 175 tanks were the new production Obiekt 478BE with the welded turret.

Kohdistan huomion tähän lauseeseen:

Production was 800 combat vehicles in 1991, but only 43 in 1992 and none in 1993 as the supply of components dried up.

Ylle lainatun taulukon mukaan T-80UD tuotanto olisi tapahtunut seuraavasti:

1986: 50
1987: 55
1988: 125
1989: 150
1990: 170

Minun on vaikea uskoa että vuonna 1991 olisi valmistunut 800 kpl T-80UD vaunuja. Toki lainauksessa kirjoitetaan "combat vehicles" mutta muuten puhutaan panssarivaunuista.

JOS kirjoitusta tulkitsee niin, että vuoden 1991 loppuun mennessä T-80UD vaunuja oli valmistunut 800 kpl, niin silloin vuoden 1991 valmistusmäärä olisi:

800 - (50 + 55 + 125 + 150 + 170) = 250

Epäilyttävän suuri määrä, se tarkoittaisi 250 / 800 = 0,3125 eli miltei kolmasosa koko tuotantomäärästä (tällä aikavälillä, tuotanto jatkunut kuuden vuoden ajan).

Toisaalta Zaloga tuntuu olevan varma tästä määrästä, seuraava lainaus on hänen kirjasta "T-90 standard tank: the first tank of the new Russia" (kirja julkaistu 20.2.2018) - alleviivaus minun:

The imposition of the “defense sufficiency” doctrine in the Gorbachev years led to substantial reductions in Soviet tank production. The Soviet Union had five tank plants in 1980 but only three remained active by 1991. After the Soviet collapse, only two remained inside the Russian Federation. Annual tank production plummeted from 3,254 in 1987 to 1,000 in 1991 and fell rapidly after that. The Kharkov tank plant, long considered the premier Soviet tank design and production center, had produced 800 T-80UD tanks in 1991.

JOTEN jos jatketaan aikaisempaa sarjaa Zalogan kertoman mukaan, saadaan seuraavat vuosituotantomäärät:

1986: 50
1987: 55
1988: 125
1989: 150
1990: 170
1991: 250
1992: 43
1993: 0

Kokonaismäärä olisi näiden summa eli 843 kpl (aikaväli 1986-1993).

Toisaalta Zaloga kirjoittaa myös näin, tämä on kirjasta "T-80 standard tank - Soviet armys last champion" (kirja julkaistu 17.2.2009) - alleviivaus minun:

Soviet tank production continued to decline in the late 1980s due to Gorbachev's attempts to rein in defense spending. The original 1989 plan had been for 3,739 T-80 and T-72 tanks, but this was cut back to 1,530 tanks, and the 1990 plan cut to 1,445 tanks.

Total production of the T-80UD prior to the Soviet collapse was rather modest at about 500 tanks, of which about 350 were still located at the Kharkov plant when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 (huom. Neuvostoliitto hajosi virallisesti 26 joulukuuta 1991 joten sinänsä oletan että tuon vuoden tuotanto valmistui kokonaisuudessaan, paitsi jos oli jotain aikataulusta myöhäisiä vaunuja sekä tuotantolinjalla tietysti keskeneräisiä eri vaiheissa kokoonpanoa). The T-80UD was first deployed with the two "Kremlin court divisions": the 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division (4th GTD) and the 2nd Guards Taman Motor Rifle Division (MRD) in the Moscow area. The T-80UD was first publicly shown at the May 9, 1990 Victory Day parade in Red Square in Moscow. They were seen on the Moscow streets again during the attempted putsch in August 1991.

Tämän mukaan kokonaisvalmistusmäärä ennen Neuvostoliiton romahdusta olisi ollut "noin 500 kpl" joista "noin 350" oli Kharkovan tehtaan pihalla odottamassa noutoa.

Minun on vaikea uskoa, että Kharkovan tehdas olisi kasvattanut tuotantoa vuoden 1990 määrästä 170 kpl vuoden 1991 määrään 250 kpl. Varsinkin kun tämän olisi pitänyt tapahtua aikana, jolloin Neuvostoliitto leikkasi rajusti panssarivaunujen ja muiden sotakoneiden tuotantomääriä.

Makustelin samaa asiaa aikaisemmassa viestissä näin: LINKKI

Zaloga kirjoittaa 80-luvun lopun rajusta alamäestä näin:

The Soviet Union had five tank plants in 1980 but only three remained active by 1991. After the Soviet collapse, only two remained inside the Russian Federation. Annual tank production plummeted from 3,254 in 1987 to 1,000 in 1991 and fell rapidly after that. The Kharkov tank plant, long considered the premier Soviet tank design and production center, had produced 800 T-80UD tanks in 1991.

Olen hieman kahden vaiheilla T-80UD osalta. Zalogan muista kirjoituksista voi tulkita että Kharkovan tehdas valmisti 800 T-80UD panssarivaunua vuoteen 1991 mennessä. Toisaalta lainaamassani tekstissä sanotaan aika selvästi että he olisivat valmistaneet 800 kpl T-80UD vaunuja vuonna 1991. Toisaalta tuo sopisi aika huonosti yhteen sen tiedon kanssa että vuoden 1991 kokonaistuotanto olisi ollut 1 000 vaunua, en usko että Kharkovan osuus olisi ollut 80%. Nizhny Tagil on vuosi toisensa jälkeen valmistanut noin 55% vuosituotannosta. Muistan lukeneeni jossain että Omsk ei olisi valmistanut yhtäkään T-80 vaunua vuonna 1991, joten tuo 1 000 vaunun osuus sisältäisi vain Kharkovan T-80UD ja Nizhny Tagilin T-72B, T-72B1 ja T-72B obr 1989 vaunuja, nämä jossakin suhteessa. Ehkä muistan väärin, saattoi olla niinkin että Kirovin tehdas ei valmistanut T-80 vaunuja vuonna 1991 mutta Omsk teki jonkin määrän.

Sekä näin: LINKKI

Tilastoista tiedetään että vuonna 1989 Neuvostoarmeijalle toimitettiin 1 600 kpl uusia panssarivaunuja, joista 890 kpl T-72 vaunuja (55,625%) ja 710 kpl T-80 vaunuja (44,375%). Vuonna 1990 toimitettiin 1 404 kpl uusia panssarivaunuja, joista 774 kp T-72 vaunuja (55,13%) ja 630 kpl T-80 vaunuja (44,82%).

Tuon perusteella voisi arvata että vuoden 1991 osalta, jos tuo Zalogan tieto 1 000 kpl uudesta vaunusta pitäisi paikkansa, niin niistä 55% voisi olla T-72 vaunuja ja 45% voisi olla T-80 vaunuja. Tämä tarkoittaisi 550 kpl T-72 vaunuja ja 450 kpl T-80 vaunuja.

Tilastot ovat toki vain tilastoja, mutta aikaisemman viestin taulukon perusteella Omsk valmisti 75 kpl T-80BV ja 150 kpl T-80U vaunuja vuonna 1991. Yhteensä siis 225 kpl.

JOS oletetaan että Kharkovan tehdas olisi kyennyt valmistamaan 250 kpl T-80UD vaunuja, niin silloin "T-80 perheen" vaunuja olisi valmistettu 225 + 250 = 475 kpl vuonna 1991.

Loput tuosta väitetysti 1 000 kpl määrästä olisi UVZ:n T-72 perheen vaunujen tuotantoa Nizhny Tagilissa.

Toisaalta jos otetaan prosenttiosuudet vakavammin JA uskotaan että T-80 vaunuja olisi (todennäköisesti) valmistettu yhteensä 450 kpl, niin silloin Kharkovan tehtaan määrä voisi olla:

450 - 225 = 225

Tämä muuttaisi kokonaistuotantomäärän arviota näin:

1986: 50
1987: 55
1988: 125
1989: 150
1990: 170
1991: 225
1992: 43
1993: 0

Kokonaismäärä olisi tällöin 818 kpl, joista 775 kpl olisi valmistunut ennen Neuvostoliiton romahdusta (eli vuoden 1991 loppuun mennessä).

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Lainaus toisesta viestistä, asiaa lähestytään hieman eri kulmassa: LINKKI

Minulla oli toisessa taulukossa "tieto" jonka mukaan Ukrainassa olisi valmistettu T-80UD vaunuihin asennettavia 6TD-1 moottoreita seuraavasti:

1986: 62 kpl
1987: 99 kpl
1988: 183 kpl
1989: 229 kpl
1990: 203 kpl

Näiden summa on 776 kpl, mutta en usko että kaikkia niitä on asennettu vaunuihin. Oletan että huomattava määrä (arvaisin että voisi olla jopa useampi kymmenen) olisi mennyt ensin testattavaksi ja edustaisivat siten uuden moottorin ns. nollasarjaa. Näiden lisäksi tietty osuus on varmasti mennyt erilaisia mekaanikkoja yms. kouluttavien yksiköiden käyttöön.

Lisään tähän pari ajatusta: kyseessä oli uusi moottori, joten olisi ollut loogista valmistaa suurempi määrä moottoreita / voimapaketteja kuin vaunujen valmistusmäärä, jotta näitä löytyy kätevästi varastoista ja korjaamoilta, mikäli vaunuissa ilmenee ongelmia moottorin osalta. Toisaalta jos ajatellaan vähän kauemmas, moottorien valmistus varastoon on yleensäkin järkevää jos vaunuja on tarkoitus käyttää kovaa ja niille tullaan tekemään perusteellinen remontti 5-10 vuoden kuluttua (tai miten pitkä suurten remonttien aikaväli onkaan).

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Julkaisin aikaisemmassa viestissä CFE-ilmoitusten datan, tämä on marraskuulta 1990: LINKKI



Aikaisemmin julkaistussa taulukossa oli nolo virhe: olin jättänyt 112 kpl T-80 vaunuja laskematta, jolloin summa olikin 4 762 kpl eikä 4 874 kpl minkä jälkeen spekuloin villisti että kyseessä voisi olla Neuvostoliiton armeijalle luovutettujen T-80UD vaunujen määrä.

Korjasin virheen myöhemmässä viestissä (LINKKI), mutta hyvä silti korjata tämä taulukko.

Zaloga kirjoittaa T-80 perheen vaunujen kokonaismäärästä näin (tämä on kirjasta "T-80 standard tank - Soviet armys last champion" (kirja julkaistu 17.2.2009)):

Total T-80 production was probably more than the 4,874 tanks reported under the CFE Treaty, as none were listed in the Ukraine, even though about 320 were at the Kharkov plant, and there were probably some T-80s at the Omsk tank plant as well.

Ja näin, lainaus kirjasta "T-90 standard tank: the first tank of the new Russia" (kirja julkaistu 20.2.2018) - alleviivaus minun:

In 1992, the Russian defense ministry made it clear that it could no longer afford to simultaneously buy two main battle tanks. Russian officials stated that they wished to cut production down to a single type, either the T-72 or the T-80. However, selecting one or the other tank meant that economic catastrophe would befall the losing city. Therefore, Russian officials continued to order both types in small amounts. In 1992, the Russian Army ordered only 20 tanks: 5 T-80U tanks from Omsk and 15 tanks from Nizhni-Tagil. Tank production at Omsk and Nizhni-Tagil in 1992–93 was well beyond the puny state orders due to some export orders, but only a pale shadow of the 1980s. This additional production was not ordered by the Russian Army, but undertaken simply to keep the plants from closing. There was the hope that large export orders would emerge to save the plants and sop up this surplus. However the anticipated export orders did not materialize. The UVZ in Nizhni-Tagil had about 350 T-72S and T-90 tanks in its factory yards, and Omsk had 150−200 T-80U tanks. Some of these T-80U tanks were exported to Cyprus and South Korea in 1996; UVZ gradually exported the T-72 tanks. Lack of pay at the Nizhni-Tagil plant led to strikes in July 1995 during which the workers seized several of the idle tanks and drove them through the city in protest.

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Huomaa muuten aikaisemmassa viestissä kerrotut numerot, joiden mukaan Omsk olisi valmistanut T-80 perheen komentovaunuja seuraavat määrät:

1984: 26
1985: 33
1986: 67
1987: 30
1988: 40
1989: 30
1990: 30

Näiden summa on 256 kpl.

CFE-ilmoitusten mukaan marraskuussa 1990 Neuvostoliiton armeijalla oli 217 kpl T-80BK ja 23 kpl T-80BVK vaunuja, näiden summa on 240 kpl.

Ilmoituksella ei ole erikseen mainintaan T-80UD tai T-80UK vaunuista MUTTA ei ole mahdoton ajatus, että nämä olivat vasta tulossa osaksi Neuvostoliiton armeijaa, vaikka niitä olisi valmistettu jo muutaman vuoden ajan. Toisaalta voi olla, että ne olisi laskettu osaksi jonkin toisen vaunun kategoriaa eli kuten Zaloga pohtii, onko osa T-80U sarakkeen vaunuista T-80UD vaunuja.

Helppo uskoa että muutama vuonna 1990 valmistunut T-80BK ja/tai T-80BVK ei olisi vielä ehtinyt siirtyä Neuvostoliiton armeijalle, mistä syystä valmistusmäärä ei täsmää 100% CFE-ilmoituksen määrän kanssa. 240 kpl vs 256 kpl tarkoittaisi 16 kpl eroa.

Omskin ja UVZ:n tehdas sijaitsevat Ural-vuoriston itäpuolella MUTTA oletan että CFE-ilmoituksiin on merkitty vain armeijan vastaanottamat vaunut, joten sinänsä tehtaan sijainnilla ei ole välttämättä merkitystä näiden määrien osalta: tehtaan pihalla luovutusta odottavaa vaunua tuskin lasketaan osaksi kokonaisuutta, mikä voisi selittää puuttuvat T-80UD ja T-80UK vaunut.

 

[Antares]

T-80BV ja T-80U tuotannosta Leningradin Kirovin sekä Omskin Transmash-tehtailla.

Lähde:

Омский завод транспортного машиностроения - Устьянцев С. - 2018

Omsk transport engineering plant - Ustyantsev S. - 2018

Teksti on käännetty kirjan sivuilta 90-100, konekäännös joten käännösvirheiden tai outojen sanavalintojen mahdollisuus on ilmeinen.

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CHAPTER 4 THE SYMBOL OF THE SUPERPOWER

CHANNEL TANK

In 1976, a sharp turn took place in the fate of the Omsk Transport Engineering Plant - it received a new task that crossed out previous developments, but opened up prospects for such a reconstruction, which had never been dreamed of before.

On July 6, 1976, the Decree of the Government “On the Adoption of a Tank with a Gas Turbine Engine into Armament of the Soviet Army” was issued. Instead of the factory code "object 219.", the car was assigned the T-80 index. It appeared in the design bureau of the Leningrad Kirov Plant, its chief designer was N. S. Popov. The design was carried out on the basis of the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the creation of the T-64 tank with a gas turbine engine with a power of 1000 hp. dated April 16, 1968 - despite the fact that tank builders of Leningrad began work with gas turbine engines in the late 1940s [1].

To solve this daunting technical problem, Leningraders had to produce 158 different experimental machines, which passed 647,000 km in tests, that is, circled the equator 16 times [2].

In 1976-1977, the Kirov Plant produced the first 70 serial "eighties" - 30 and 40, respectively. Opportunities for further growth were limited; the enterprise did not have sufficient space and, moreover, received a serious civilian burden in the form of Kirovets tractors. Looking ahead, we note that the level of 100 tanks in Leningrad was reached only in 1983, and the maximum of 140 units was reached in 1988. Therefore, the all-powerful curator of the Soviet military-industrial complex D. F. Ustinew chose "Omsktransmash" as the main production base for the T-80. Moreover, this was done even before the official adoption of "object 219" into service, in the five-year plan for the production and supply of weapons and military equipment for 1976-1980 [3].

The car improved rapidly. The Omsk plant actually started production not of the T-80, but of a more advanced model - the T-80B tank (object 219R) put into service in 1978. At the turn of the 1970-1980s, it was the most advanced MBT of all those in service with the Soviet army. According to the coefficients of the military-technical level developed by the branch institute VNIItransmash, the T-80B exceeded the T-72 by 35% and the T-72A by 13% [4].

And it's not just the unique gas turbine engine. The T-80B was a tank of parameters limiting for the SOVIET industry. It collected all the best of what domestic factories could give at least in limited quantities - materials, fire control systems, other components and assemblies

For example, the 9K112 Kobra guided weapon system first appeared in 1976 on the Kharkov T-64B tank. Its missile fired through a cannon barrel with high accuracy hit targets at distances of up to 4 km, protected by armored steel with a thickness of up to 600-700 mm along the normal. However, the KUV received only a part of the newly built T-64B tanks, the rest were produced in the T-64B1 variant, without guided weapons. The KUV did not stand out at all for the Tagil tanks T-72 and T-72A. At the same time, without exception, all T-80B tanks had ECUs [5].

And this is no coincidence. Direct participants in the creation of the T-80 tank V.I. Kozishkurt and A.S. Efremov testify: “It is authentically known that the choice of dislocation of these machines was determined exclusively by political conjuncture. The large-scale production of the then newest T-80 tank was subordinated to the task of equipping units and formations of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany with this formidable combat vehicle” [6].

In the early years, during the period of development of the "eighties" in the army, they were operated in the Leningrad Military District under the supervision of the designers of the Kirov Plant [7].

In January 1983, deliveries of T-80B tanks to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany began. By January 1987, there were 838 "eighties", and in 1990 - already 2967 pieces. In the second half of the 1980s, T-80 tanks also began to arrive in the Northern Group of Forces, that is, in Poland [8].

Discussions about the advantages and disadvantages of diesel and gas turbine engines in relation to the tank have been going on for more than half a century, and there is no end in sight. However, everyone agrees that in northern and central Europe, the T-80 tanks found themselves in the most favorable conditions for themselves. Soft and very moist
The climate, the densest network of good roads and gas stations made it possible to fully reveal the highest dynamic qualities of the T-80. There is a well-known case when, during exercises in the GDR, “eighties” entered the German autobahn and began to overtake buses with tourists. At the strategic headquarters game according to the scenario of war with NATO, it was determined that T-80 tanks could go through all of Western Europe and reach the Atlantic already on the fifth day of hostilities. That is why the “eighties” got the nickname “Channel tanks” [9]. The only thing that could, if not stop them, then delay them, was the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

The T-80B tank in the 1980s became a real symbol of the military power of the USSR in its confrontation with the NATO bloc and, above all, with another superpower - the United States.

IMPROVEMENT T-80

Although the Kirov Plant did not shine with volumes release "eighties", its design the bureau remained in charge of the car but the efforts of Leningraders on the T-80B tank in the
early 1980s, gas turbine engines were introduced with powerful 1100 hp and upgraded cannon 2A46M-1. And in the middle of the decade in a series went modification of the T-80BV with a hinged dynamic protection "Kontakt-1" from cumulative shells and grenades [10].

And, finally, in November 1984, the T-80U tank (object 219AS) was put into service with a new fire control complex dubbed from the commander with a digital ballistic computer, a 9K119 guided weapon system with missile guidance laser beam, gas turbine engine with a power of 1250 hp. In addition, the vehicle was equipped with the second-generation dynamic protection <<Kontakt-5", which reduces the effect of not only HEAT, but also sabot projectiles, an air intake device and an additional GTA-18A power unit to provide energy in the parking lot when the main power supply is turned off engine [11].

True, it was not possible to deploy the serial production of the T-80U until the end of the 1980s. Only in Leningrad in 1989, 50 machines were built - and even then with an old gas turbine engine with a power of 1100 hp. In Omsk, the new machine was mastered only in 1991 [12].

KBTM also joined the work on the T-80. To begin with, in pursuance of a joint decision of the ministries of defense and the defense industry of November 20, 1981, the “object 644” was developed, manufactured and tested - the T-80B tank with a backup version of the power plant, that is, with a diesel engine V -84 in case of shortage of gas turbine engines in wartime. The design documentation was approved by the interdepartmental commission and deposited. The main constructor V. V. Shapovalov [13] was the author of this project. In 1984, the production of the commander's version of the T-80B began - the T-80BK tank ("object 630").

It was created and produced only in Omsk [14]. For the training of crews, a complex fire training simulator for the commander and gunner of T-80BV tanks was developed, manufactured, tested and introduced into serial production, as well as the class of the material part of this tank [15].

GREAT RECONSTRUCTION

The restructuring of the Omsk transport engineering plant to produce the most complex Soviet tanks turned out to be a very expensive task in every sense.

Firstly, the production of engineering vehicles based on the T-72 tank, which had been created for several years, had to be broken. By the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated July 27, 1977, this task was shifted to Uralvagonzavod, where it was planned to build a special building of engineering vehicles. However, its construction was delayed, so the first chassis for the IMR were assembled in 1982-1983 in tank shops; they were completed at the Novokramatorsk Mechanical Plant. In 1985, an initial batch of 5 BREM-1s went for testing. In 1989, an initial batch of MTU-72 bridgelayers was produced. Thus, for a number of years, engineering vehicles on a tank base did not enter the Soviet army at all [16].

Secondly, the reconstruction of the Omsk plant, provided for by the joint Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of June 27, 1976, turned out to be a very ambitious task and required a lot of effort and money. The new design task PZ-60 developed by the Institute 8 GSPI essentially meant the construction of another larger plant next to the old one, the construction area was to be 430 thousand m². In total, it was proposed to build new buildings: - hull and assembly and delivery
HOV № 12 and 13;

- shops of loading mechanisms No. 95;
- a block of workshops No. 19 with a thermal cutting department;
- buildings of mechanical assembly shops No. 7 and 8;
- thermal shop No. 16;
- tool shop No. 20;
- caterpillar tracks workshops,
- electroplating shop [17].

The general plan of the enterprise was carried out not in such a way as to minimize inter-shop transportation. The whole organization was based on the principle of direct-flow production processes with the manufacture of parts and assemblies in closed areas. The project provided for the best technologies and equipment known at that time. Among them are stands and tilters with a hydraulic drive, two-arc submerged arc welding machines, conveyor welding and assembly of housings. For the first time in the domestic tank building for the machining of the hull, CNC machining centers were introduced (in this case, foreign ones, by Berardi). OTs had tool magazines with 80 cells and devices for automatic tool change. In total, about 60% of all mechanical processing was assigned to the OC. For painting works, 6 conveyor lines with automated washing were designed. For the first time in the country, a section for robotic stamping was provided in the cold stamping shop using industrial robots “Cyclone 3B”. In general, according to the project, high-performance equipment was supposed to make up 68% of the entire machine park [18].

For the technological re-equipment of the plant in 1976, it opened its own branch of the branch All-Union Scientific Research Technological Institute, the head part of which was based in Leningrad. The scientific institution was headed by V.D., who was transferred from Nizhny Tagil. Antropov. Other enterprises of the industry already had similar branches: in Kharkov it was established in 1967, in Nizhny Tagil - In 1968, in Chelyabinsk - in 1975 [19]. The structure of the Omsk branch included the technological departments of procurement and mechanical assembly production, design departments for special equipment and tooling, control systems, commissioning and implementation sector. The branch was located on the premises rented from the plant. Looking ahead, we note that a number of developments introduced at the plant named after the October Revolution of the VNITI were awarded VDNKh medals [20].

Technological preparations for the production of the T-80 began at the end of 1977. The Department of the Chief Designer of Special Process Equipment in 1978-1982 alone created more than 600 projects of non-standardized equipment, assembly and test benches. In 1978–1980 alone, the plant manufactured 717 pieces of equipment [21].

Mobilization for the "eighties" went in all possible directions - party, trade union, Komsomol, various public "councils". Even the newspaper Zavodskiye Izvestia, which is usually sterile in its coverage of defense production, published several articles on the development of T-80 production. Of course, the name itself was not mentioned in the newspaper, the unconcealed substitution “product No. 4” was used [22]. In the middle of 1978, the assembly of the first gas turbine tank was to begin. By June, the first batch of parts was made, despite the lack of tooling [23].

By the end of the year, three machines were assembled, albeit with the use of Leningrad components. Further development of production is presented in the table compiled according to the GABTU data [24].

Mastering the production of T-80 tanks was marked by a high award: in 1981 the plant was awarded the Order of Lenin [25].

Alemman rivin käännös: including commander

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Muutamia ajatuksia tästä.

Yleensä kun Neuvostoliitossa tehtiin komentovaunuja, olipa kyse T-54K, T-72AK tai T-80BK niin vastuu vaunun suunnittelusta ja toteuttamisesta asetettiin yhden ja saman tehtaan vastuulle. Tämä tarkoitti käytännössä sitä että tämä yksi ja sama tehdas myös rakentaa kaikki nämä vaunut. Yllä lainatun perusteella ainakin T-80BK vaunujen osalta tämä vastuullinen tehdas oli Omsk. Oletan että koskisi myös T-80BVK vaunuja eli myös nämä kaikki olisi valmistettu Omskissa.

Tämä oli hieman shokeeraavampi kohta (alleviivaukset minun):

And, finally, in November 1984, the T-80U tank (object 219AS) was put into service with a new fire control complex dubbed from the commander with a digital ballistic computer, a 9K119 guided weapon system with missile guidance laser beam, gas turbine engine with a power of 1250 hp. In addition, the vehicle was equipped with the second-generation dynamic protection <<Kontakt-5", which reduces the effect of not only HEAT, but also sabot projectiles, an air intake device and an additional GTA-18A power unit to provide energy in the parking lot when the main power supply is turned off engine [11].

True, it was not possible to deploy the serial production of the T-80U until the end of the 1980s. Only in Leningrad in 1989, 50 machines were built - and even then with an old gas turbine engine with a power of 1100 hp. In Omsk, the new machine was mastered only in 1991 [12].

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Viitattu lähde [12]:

12. Справочные данные. Л. 209 // Музей «УВЗ»;
Карпенко А. В. Обозрение отечественной бронетанковой техники (1905-1995 гг.). СПб., 1996. С. 386.

Kääntyy muotoon:

12. Reference data. L. 209 // UVZ Museum;
Karpenko A. V. Review of domestic armored vehicles (1905-1995). SPb., 1996. S. 386.

HUOM: minulla on tämä Karpenkon kirja "Review of domestic armored vehicles (1905-1995)" mutta en osaa sanoa miksi tässä kohdassa on viitattu siihen. Kirja on mainio kokoelma Neuvostoliiton valmistamia panssarivaunujen ja muiden ajoneuvojen numeroita (pituus, leveys yms.) mutta siinä ei mainita sanallakaan eri vaunutyyppien valmistusmääriä. On toki karkea maininta "suunnitteluvuodesta" sekä "minä vuonna vaunu otettiin tuotantoon", ehkä viitattu kirjaan tästä syystä?

Oletan että vuosituotantomäärien varsinainen lähde on silti tämä "Reference data. L. 209 // UVZ Museum" mitä on tietysti mahdoton tarkistaa, paitsi jos käy penkomassa ko. museon arkistoja.

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Olen aina ollut hyvin epäileväinen internetissä usein toisteltujen T-80U vaunujen valmistusmäärien osalta, koska kyseessä oli hyvin kallis ja monimutkainen kokonaisuus JA koska se tuli tuotantoon Neuvostoliiton viimeisten vuosien aikana.

MUTTA tästä epäluuloisuudesta huolimatta en olisi kehdannut esittää näin pieniä määriä, kuin mitä tässä sanotaan: Leningradin Kirovin tehtaan vuoden 1989 tuotanto (50 kpl) olisivat ainoat T-80U vaunut jotka valmistuivat ko. tehtaalla. Omskin tehdas puolestaan aloitti tuotannon vasta vuonna 1991. Lainasin aikaisemmin taulukkoa, joka kertoo Omskin uustuotannon aikavälillä 1991-1996.

JOS tämä pitäisi paikkansa, niin silloin T-80U vaunujen tuotantotahti olisi ainoastaan:

1989: 50 (LKZ tuotanto)
1990: 0
1991: 150
1992: 5
1993: 65
1994: 92
1995: 51
1996: 18

Aikavälin 1989-1996 kokonaismäärä olisi siis näiden summa eli 431 kpl.

Pari kommenttia tästä: on tietysti ilmiselvää että vaunuja valmistui jokin määrä aikavälillä 1984-1988 mutta puhuttaneen ns. esisarjasta eli harjoitellaan tuotantoa, tehdään testejä yms.

Tämän lisäksi syytä muistaa, että useimpien lähteiden mukaan viimeinen T-80U valmistui Omskin tehtaalta vuonna 2001. Miten monta vaunua valmistui aikavälillä 1997-2001? Tämä ei ole tiedossa, mutta vaunu ei koskaan saavuttanut vientimenestystä JA samaan aikaan Venäjä päätti keskittyä T-72 / T-90 perheiden vaunuihin mikä ei poistanut sitä tosiseikkaa, että T-80 perheen vaunut olivat merkittävässä asemassa osana heidän asevoimiaan koko 90-luvun ja 2000-luvun alun ajan. Koska vaunut olivat aktiivijoukkojen käytössä, niille teetettiin peruskorjauksia "armored repair plant" -pajoissa (ja arvatenkin osa näistä tehtiin myös Omskin tehtaalla).

T-80U ei ollut vientimenestys MUTTA vientiä kuitenkin tapahtui pienimuotoisesti: laadin aikaisemmassa viestissä taulukon venäläisen Kommensantin infograafista, sen mukaan T-80U vaunuja vietiin ulkomaille seuraavat määrät: LINKKI

1992 - Iso-Britannia - 1 kpl
1996 - Etelä-Korea - 33 kpl
1996-1997 - Kypros - 41 kpl (T-80U ja T-80UK)
2005 - Etelä-Korea - 2 kpl (T-80UK - Omskin tehtaan konkurssin jälkeen joten eivät voi olla "uustuotantoa" vaikka olisivatkin uutta vastaavassa kunnossa)

Kommersantin taulukko päättyy vuoteen 2012.

Toisessa viestissäni oli SIPRI:n datan mukainen taulukko Venäjän viennistä, se sanoo vientimääristä näin: LINKKI

1996-1997 - Etelä-Korea - 33 kpl
1996-1997 - Kypros - 41 kpl
2005-2006 - Etelä-Korea - 10 kpl
2010-2011 - Kypros - 41 kpl

Steve Zaloga kirjoittaa kirjassaan "T-80 Standard Tank The Soviet Armys Last Armored Champion" T-80 perheen vaunujen viennistä näin, lainaus ko. kirjasta sivuilta 34-35:

A handful of export orders for the T-80U did materialize, though they were fulfilled mostly by using undelivered inventory from the Omsk plant. Morocco acquired about five T-80 tanks in the late 1980s, ostensibly for testing for a future tank requirement; it is widely believed that they ended up in the hands of US, British, and German intelligence agencies. Russia sold Britain one T-80U in 1992 as a goodwill gesture connected with President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Britain in 1992. Sweden evaluated the T-80U for its tank competition starting in 1993, but finally settled on the Leopard 2. The Russian government owed South Korea a substantial amount of money from the Soviet period, and partly paid these debts through the sale of military equipment. The Republic of Korea Army received about 80 T-80U tanks from 1996 to 2005. These are used primarily by "opposing forces" units for training. Cyprus acquired 41 T-80U tanks, including 14 of the new T-80UK command tanks in 1996-97.

Omsk attempted to reinvigorate international interest in the T-80 by more elaborate improvements, including active protection systems as detailed below. Export sales were too small to keep the Omsk tank plant busy, and in spite of a few small state orders for tank rebuilding, the plant went bankrupt in 2006. At the time of writing, the Russian government planned to consolidate the tank business around Uralvagon in Nizhni-Tagil, with Omsk assigned tank rebuilding efforts as well as some design work. The Russian Army began to fund upgrades for its aging T-80 fleet in the 2007 defense budget.

Steve Zaloga kirjoittaa yllä olevassa lainauksessa että Etelä-Korealle olisi myyty 80 kpl, mutta oletan sen olevan virhe.

Toisen lähteen mukaan alunperin keskusteltiin 80 kpl T-80U vaunun antamisesta (velkojen kattamiseksi) mutta määrä supistui 35 kpl: LÄHDE

The subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union and the impoverishment of the new Russian Federation made it impossible for Moscow to repay the loans in cash.

The Russian Federation began supplying tanks, combat vehicles, military helicopters, and other defense equipment to the South Korean armed forces as partial payment of the $2 billion debt to the ROK that Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union.

Under their terms, Russia provided the ROK armed forces with Soviet-era T-80U main battle tanks, METIS-M anti-tank missiles, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, Kamov Ka-32 transport helicopters, and Murena-E hovercraft. Although South Korea had originally planned to purchase 80 tanks, the ROK ended up buying only 35 T-80U tanks. South Korea also received 70 BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicles from Russia.

En osaa sanoa, onko Venäjä todella myynyt Kyprokselle 2 x 41 kpl T-80U vaunuja, joista osa T-80UK.

Se on kuitenkin selvää että näitä vaunuja myytiin Kyprokselle 41 kpl 90-luvun puolivälissä. Myytiinkö myöhemmin lisää, pitää tarkistaa.

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Jos käytetään Kommersantin numeroita, T-80U ja T-80UK vaunuja meni vientiin 77 kpl. Jos taas käytetään SIPRI:n taulukkoa, näitä olisi viety 125 kpl.

Laskin aikaisemmin aikavälin 1989-1996 uustuotannon kokonaismääräksi 431 kpl.

Tällöin Venäjällä itsellään voisi olla viennin jälkeen:

431 - 77 = 354
431 - 125 = 306

Pitää myös muistaa: Omsk haki aktiivisesti vientiä 90-luvulla ja vielä 2000-luvun ensimmäisinä vuosina, joten he varustivat muutamia vaunuja erikoisversioiksi, joilla houkuteltiin ostajia. Oletan että näitä varten on tuskin tehty kokonaan uusia vaunuja, jos pihalta löytyy uutta vastaavan kuntoisia aihioita. Tästä syystä valmistusmäärät aikavälillä 1996-2001 voivat olla hyvin pieniä, ehkä jopa yhden tai kahden käden sormilla laskettavissa.

Tästä seuraisi se että Venäjällä voi hyvinkin olla selvästi alle 400 kpl T-80U vaunuja, KOSKA näitä ei missään vaiheessa ehditty valmistaa tätä enempää.

Tämä selittäisi osaltaan sen, miksi Venäjän väitettiin olleen kiinnostunut ostamaan TAKAISIN Etelä-Korealle myymänsä T-80U ja T-80UK panssarivaunut (artikkeli julkaistu 14.9.2016): LÄHDE

Vaunujen vähäinen määrä selittäisi myös sen, miksi näitä käytetään kimpassa T-80UE-1 vaunujen kanssa (joita on väitetysti valmistettu jotain 10-31 kpl välistä, sanoisin että näitä on todistetusti valmistettu 10 kpl mutta 31 kpl olisi looginen määrä, yhden panssarivaunupataljoonan verran - jos siis näitä olisi päätetty modernisoida suurempi määrä) JA miksi osana samaa joukkoa operoi heidän AINOA T-80UM2 prototyyppivaununsa (joka menetettiin Ukrainassa, tosin Drotz-järjestelmä oli poistettu käytöstä).

Ukrainan sodan aikana tuli vastaan tällainen näkemys / luulo / tieto: LÄHDE

The Russians has to retire the T-90 (built 1997-2001) in the early 2010s and half of its T-80U (built 1988-1992) fleet in the late 2010s, mainly because these modern tanks were operated in high-readiness 1st-line units and were worn out.

Venäläisen Altyn73 mukaan Venäjän aktiivijoukoilla oli syyskuussa 2021 käytössään 2 x 93 kpl "T-80U and T-80UE-1" eli 186 kpl. Tosin jos lasketaan +1 vaunu per rykmentti eli rykmentin komentajalle vaunu, niin näitä olisi 2 x 94 kpl = 188 kpl.

Pitääkö ylle lainattu näkemys / luulo / tieto paikkansa edelleen? Onko T-80U vaunuista edelleen puolet "korjattavana"? Hän kirjoittaa että "late 2010s" mikä voisi tarkoittaa aikaväliä 2017-2019. Hyvin tuore tapaus ja lisäksi harvinaisempien vaunujen peruskorjaus on varmasti aikaavievä operaatio, vaatii myös erikoisempia varaosia (sama juttu mainittujen T-90 obr 1992 vaunujen osalta).

JOS pitäisi, kokonaismäärä olisi:

2 x 188 = 376

Selvästi alle 400 kpl, mutta enemmän kuin yllä laskemani 306-354 kpl.

Hän myös käyttää sanaa "retire" mikä voisi tarkoittaa että vaunut olisi otettu syrjään pidemmäksi aikaa - ellei jopa pysyvästi: sana tarkoittaa kirjaimellisesti jäädä eläkkeelle tai tässä yhteydessä oikeammin "laittaa eläkkeelle". Yleensä tämä tarkoittaa pysyvää asiantilaa eli ei olla enää palaamassa "työelämään". Olisi helppo uskoa, että näin on voinut käydä myös näiden vaunujen osalta: harvinaisia, vähälukuisia vaunuja, joten korjaaminen ja varaosien saatavuus varmasti ongelmallista - ainakin tiettyjen osien osalta. Aihiot olisi loogisempaa käyttää osana jotain modernisointia (T-80BVM, T-90M), sen sijaan että yritettäisiin korjata vanhaa ja "palauttaa alkuperäinen suorituskyky" (mikä olisi 30 vuotta vanha T-90 obr 1992 osalta ja T-80U osalta 40 vuotta).

JOS näitä vaunuja ei ole edes tarkoitus palauttaa aktiivijoukkojen käyttöön sopiviksi vaan ovat nykyisin pelkästään aihioita, jotka voidaan käyttää osana jotain modernisointiprojektia tai kannibalisoida käytössäolevien vaunujen varaosiksi - olettaen että näin ei ole jo tapahtunut: jotenkinhan nykyiset käytössäolevat vaunut on pidetty toimintakuntoisina. Miten päin tahansa asiaa haluaakaan katsoa, on hyvin mahdollista että Venäjän aktiivijoukkojen käytössä olevat T-80U ja "sen kaltaiset vaunut" ovat viimeiset jäljelläolevat - Altyn73 seurannan mukaan 186 kpl tai jos lasketaan mukaan rykmentin komentajan vaunut, 188 kpl.

Mistä päästään Ukrainan sotaan ja Venäjän vaunumenetyksiin. Oryxin tämän päivän numerot Ukrainasta (25.2.2023):



T-80U ja sen kaltaisia vaunuja on menetetty todistetusta tasan 100 kpl. Jokainen voi halutessaan lisätä haluamansa kertoimen niiden osalta, mitä ei ole nähty julkisuudessa. Ehkä jotain 20-30% väliltä.

Joka tapauksessa on selvää että Venäjän aktiivijoukot ovat menettäneet todistetusta vähintään puolet T-80U vaunuistaan, ehkä jopa 70%. Jos lainaamani juoru pitäisi paikkansa, heillä voisi olla "vajaa 200 kpl" jossain varastoissa odottamassa korjausta. HUOM: tässä ei lasketa Venäjän haltuun jääneitä T-80UD vaunuja, mutta niistä osa romutettiin ja otettiin tornit säästöön (osa torneista käytettiin T-80UE-1 modernisoinnissa), joten heillä voi olla tällaisia suolestettuja aihioita myös.

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HUOM: näissä minun tuumailuissa ja tarjoamissa numeroissa on selvä ristiriita CFE-ilmoitusten datan kanssa - paitsi jos lasketaan mukaan T-80UD vaunut. Neuvostoliiton ilmoituksen mukaan sen joukoilla oli 410 kpl "T-80U-vaunuja" marraskuussa 1990 (katso aikaisemman viestin taulukko). JOS Leningradin Kirovin tehdas teki ainoastaan 50 kpl vuonna 1989 ja Omskin tehtaan ensimmäiset vaunut valmistuivat vuonna 1991, niin silloin ukrainalaisia T-80UD vaunuja pitäisi olla tämän ilmoituksen aikaan ainakin:

410 - 50 = 360 kpl

Edellisen viestin taulukon mukaan T-80UD valmistustahti oli:

1986: 50
1987: 55
1988: 125
1989: 150
1990: 170

Näiden summa on 550 kpl. Iso kysymys on tietysti, miten nopeasti näitä vaunuja toimitettiin armeijan panssarijoukoille? Hyvä muistaa myös tämä Steve Zalogan kommentti:

Total T-80 production was probably more than the 4,874 tanks reported under the CFE Treaty, as none were listed in the Ukraine, even though about 320 were at the Kharkov plant, and there were probably some T-80s at the Omsk tank plant as well.

Jos 550 kpl kokonaismäärästä "noin 320 kpl" oli tehtaan pihalla CFE-ilmoituksen antamisen aikoihin, niin se tarkoittaisi että "jossain muualla" pitäisi olla 230 kpl.

Toisaalta 230 + 50 = 280 kpl eli selvästi vähemmän kuin ilmoitettu 410 kpl.

Jokin ei siis täsmää tässä laskelmassa / logiikassa.

 

[Antares]

T-80U viennin hakemisesta 1990-luvulla ja 2000-luvun alussa.

Lähde:

Омский завод транспортного машиностроения - Устьянцев С. - 2018

Omsk transport engineering plant - Ustyantsev S. - 2018

Teksti on käännetty kirjan sivuilta 108-113, konekäännös joten käännösvirheiden tai outojen sanavalintojen mahdollisuus on ilmeinen.

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The vicissitudes of the gun market

It would seem that the T-80 MBT, a symbol of Soviet tank power in the 1980s, is simply doomed to success in the world arms markets. Abroad they knew about the merits of the “eight dozen”, it is enough to recall the words of the Minister of Defense of the Syrian Arab Republic in the 1980s, Mustafa Tlas: “As a soldier and specialist in tanks, I consider the T-80 the best tank in the world” [5 ].

The Omsk tank had support in Russian foreign trade structures. If you turn to the book of one of the leaders of the state company "Rosvooruzhenie" B.N. Kuzyka <<Behind the scenes of a breakthrough: Russia in the arms markets”, the T-80U is mentioned dozens of times, whole pages of descriptions are devoted to it. For comparison: the T-90 tank is given one line [6].

It was the T-80U that was the first, back in 1993, to be "released" abroad to participate in the IDEX international arms exhibition in Abu Dhabi. The car amazed everyone present with its maneuverability and especially with its 14-meter ski jump. American "Abrams" did not try to jump, but when trying just repeat the route fell off the slope and lost the caterpillar [7].

After the UAE, the T-80U participated in trials in India, Sweden, China, and Greece [8].

And everywhere the car showed excellent results. In tender trials in Greece, a maximum speed of 80 km/h was officially registered. And the T-80U gained a speed of 50 km/h in 30 seconds after the start of movement [9].

Especially for the promotion of T-80 tanks to foreign markets, the Omsk authorities organized and in 1996 for the first time held the International Exhibition of military equipment, technologies and weapons [10]. 43 countries sent their delegations to it, but the most representative was the American 20 people, including the chief developer of the Abrams tank, Philip Letta [11]. A dynamic display of equipment in 1996 was held at the training ground of the Airborne Forces training center. The performance of the T-80U tank, as always, evoked thunderous applause from those present [12].

Nevertheless, sales volumes turned out to be quite modest and, in any case, insufficient to support the enterprise. 41 T-80U tanks were bought by Cyprus, the contract value was 175 million US dollars (4 million 268 thousand for one tank). In October 1996, the "eighties" were first paraded in Nicosia. According to open press data, these tanks were supplied by the plant [13].

Another batch was received by South Korea - as part of the repayment of the debt of the USSR. Negotiations on this topic began as early as 1993, and in 1997 80 T-80U tanks were handed over [14].

In 2005, two more tanks went to Korea - this time commander's T-80UK, equipped with additional means of communication, thermal imagers "Agava-2" and Koep "Shtora" [15].

In 2010-2011, the Cypriots also acquired an additional 41 T-80U tanks, this time from the presence of the Russian Armed Forces. Their major overhaul was carried out in Omsk. In addition, several BREM-80U were purchased - they will be discussed later [16].

And it's all. No one else purchased Russian T-80 tanks. There are several reasons for this.

Firstly, the world market turned out to be oversaturated with used, but quite combat-ready and not always obsolete military equipment and weapons. After the end of the Cold War, many countries tried to get rid of the surplus, but young states, whose military legacy exceeded their needs and capabilities, were especially zealous. Just one example: during the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine inherited 9293 tanks from the Soviet units deployed on its territory. By the beginning of 1997, there were 4080 units left, by the beginning of 2012 - 2395 pieces [17].

But the main thing was still the second circumstance: a tank of limiting parameters could not but be expensive. One of the first to pay attention to this was Yu.P. Kostenko, a well-known functionary of the Soviet military-industrial complex. We suggest listening to his opinion: “Let's evaluate the specific situation in the domestic tank building that took place at the beginning of 1989. Consider two tanks of the same type, which were in mass production and in service. Let's conditionally designate their tanks No. 1 and No. 2. In accordance with the then existing methodology, the coefficient of the technical level of tank No. 1 is 1.25, and tank No. 2 - 1.15. Without taking into account economic characteristics, tank No. 1 has some advantage. What are the values of these characteristics? The cost of tank No. 1 is 824 thousand rubles, including the engine 104 thousand rubles. The cost of tank number 2 is 280 thousand rubles, including the engine 15 thousand rubles. Serial production of tanks No. 1 is much less than tanks No. 2, but it is not this circumstance that determines the high cost of tank No. 1, but its design and technological complexity” [18].

Designations Yu.P. Kostenko - "tanks No. 1 and No. 2" - not too complicated camouflage for the T-80U and T-72B. Only one Soviet tank engine • GTD- cost 104 thousand rubles; and the wholesale price of the T-72B tank, according to data for 1988, was 271,100 rubles, which is even less than the figure adopted in Yu.P. Kostenko. It turns out an interesting picture: for the amount required for the production of ONE T-80U tank, it was possible to build THREE T-72B tanks [19].

Of course, Soviet-era pricing is more than a relative thing - and not always related to the real market value of weapons. But here are other figures: T-90S tanks with thermal imagers and diesel engines with a capacity of 1000 hp sold in 2001 to India. In terms of military technical level, the T-80U was at least not inferior, but cost the buyer almost $2 million per unit cheaper than the "eighties" purchased by the Cypriots. And not due to dumping - Uralvagonzavod did not have to complain about the profit from the deal [20].
The gap in operating costs for the T-80 and T-72 is not as large as the production cost, but it is also expressed in convincing numbers. According to calculations made in 1997 for the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, depreciation the operating and operating costs per 1 km of run for the "eighties" are tens of percent higher than for the T-72 [21].

In general, the Soviet T-80 gas turbine tank, like the American Abrams, is a fighting vehicle of very wealthy powers that do not spare any means to obtain even a slight military-technical superiority of their tank, and without compromising numbers. All other countries simply cannot afford such things.

And, finally, the third reason: in the post-Soviet period, only countries with a tropical climate or those located in the no less hot desert belt of Africa and the Middle East bought domestic armored vehicles. Under these conditions, the advantages of gas turbine engines over diesel are not as obvious as in the north of Europe or in Canada. For quite understandable reasons, NATO countries did not want to buy Russian tanks and could not - but seriously consider openly espionage actions like the acquisition of one T-80U by the British in 1991 - naturally, for careful study [22].

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T-80U vientimäärät ylle lainatun perusteella:

- 41 T-80U tanks were bought by Cyprus, the contract value was 175 million US dollars (4 million 268 thousand for one tank). In October 1996, the "eighties" were first paraded in Nicosia. According to open press data, these tanks were supplied by the plant [13].

- Another batch was received by South Korea - as part of the repayment of the debt of the USSR. Negotiations on this topic began as early as 1993, and in 1997 80 T-80U tanks were handed over [14].

- In 2005, two more tanks went to Korea - this time commander's T-80UK, equipped with additional means of communication, thermal imagers "Agava-2" and Koep "Shtora" [15].

- In 2010-2011, the Cypriots also acquired an additional 41 T-80U tanks, this time from the presence of the Russian Armed Forces. Their major overhaul was carried out in Omsk. In addition, several BREM-80U were purchased - they will be discussed later [16].

Kokonaisvientimäärä olisi siis:

41 + 80 + 2 + 41 = 164

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[Antares]

Omsktransmash tekemisistä vuoden 2012 jälkeen.

Lähde:

Омский завод транспортного машиностроения - Устьянцев С. - 2018

Omsk transport engineering plant - Ustyantsev S. - 2018

Teksti on käännetty kirjan sivuilta 163-167, konekäännös joten käännösvirheiden tai outojen sanavalintojen mahdollisuus on ilmeinen.

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LONG-WAITED SERIES

No matter how good engineering machines designed by KBTM, they could not provide work for the whole plant. The company needed a normal serial order. And, as usual, there would be no happiness, but misfortune helped.

During the two post-Soviet decades, the needs of the army were at the very margins of state interests. Eventually, according to 2012 data, modern (new or modernized) tanks accounted for only about 5% of the fleet of domestic combat vehicles in service. For comparison: in NATO countries this figure reaches 40%. 60% of Russian tanks were 1.2-1.9 times inferior to Western models in terms of their military-technical level [59].

The problem required intervention at the highest level. In February 2012, a meeting of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin, Minister of Defense A.E. Serdyukov and General Director of OAO NPK Uralvagonzavod O.V. Sienko, where a decision was made on a deep modernization of T-72B / T-72B1 tanks - using, among other things, Omsk capacities. Somewhat earlier, on November 29, 2011, the corporation issued an order from the general director to carry out this operation on the premises of OAO KBTM [60].

The modernization project to the level of T-72B3 was carried out by the developer of the T-72 tanks - OJSC "Ural Design Bureau" and was repeatedly revised by him. At the turn of 2011-2012, 368 groups (50,000 sheets of A4 format) of design documentation and 5,891 technological documents (132,692 sheets) were transferred from Nizhny Tagil to Omsk. Initially, it was envisaged to achieve (in two stages) a high localization of production. Flexible universal technologies for overhaul were designed and implemented, allowing to quickly switch from one type of machine to another (T-72, T-80, T-90, BREM). If necessary it became possible to use the Omsk site as a reserve for the production of components and parts for machines assembled at Uralvagonzavod [61].

In preparation for the modernization of the T-72B / B1 tanks, a department for acceptance, washing and disassembly of received vehicles was organized in the assembly shop. Mechanical assembly shops were re-profiled for the production of new parts, assemblies and mechanisms for Omsk residents. A large amount of bench equipment was manufactured [62].

In April 2012, the first “seventy twos" arrived at KBTM. In order to develop a new business, a group of workers went to Nizhny Tagil; in turn, the Tagil residents taught Siberians directly in Omsk [63].

To imagine the scale of the work, suffice it to say that 600 workers of “tank workshop No. 113” had to disassemble the machine from 23 thousand parts and assemble it again, installing new devices, components and assemblies [64].

Despite the scale and complexity of the work done, it should be noted that it did not cause serious difficulties: for the people who assembled the T-80, T-72 tanks, this is not an unsolvable task. The quality of work in Omsk was at least not inferior and is not inferior to Uralvagonzavodsk. It is no coincidence that, starting from 2014, vehicles upgraded at Omsktransmash have been submitted to the Tank Biathlon [65].

In the "Tank biathlon-2015" participated 15 "seventy-two" Omsk modernization, and none of them fell out of the race due to water. Teams from all countries competed on the T-72B3, with the exception of China. But the Russians were the winners [66].

70 T-72B3 tanks were already prepared for Tank Biathlon 2016, and no comments were received from any of the teams that used them [67].

In addition to the Russian army, T-72B3 tanks in the most modern configuration are supplied today to the Armed Forces of Belarus [68].

OMSK FAVORITE

The Creator loves all his offspring, no matter how many there are. But sometimes among them appears especially close and dear. At Omsktransmash, such a favorite is the "eighty". Everyone speaks about the T-80 tank with a breath, from the chief designer to a journalist of a factory newspaper or a simple worker. After the bankruptcy of the plant, OJSC KBTM took over the service maintenance of “eighties" in the army. In 2011, the repair of T-80BV tanks resumed, since there are still a lot of them in the troops. The Military Balance magazine reports that there are three thousand T-80BVs plus another 200 T-80Us in the 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Division [69].

Meanwhile, the preservation of the combat readiness of these quite solid machines is gradually turning into turned into an almost impossible task. A significant number of units and spare parts for the T-80BV are simply not being produced at present. Among them are the equipment of the fire control system, the complex of guided weapons, the control system and automation of the loading mechanism, fire-fighting equipment and much more [70].

The army leadership was not very worried about this fact in the early 2010s. In September 2013, the head of the GABTU, Alexander Shevchenko, announced that, according to the concept for the development of armored weapons until 2020, by 2015 only T-90A tanks or those upgraded to their level of “seventy-two” [71] would remain in permanent readiness units. "Eighties", however, was destined for operation until the resource was completely exhausted and then written off for scrap.

However, after 2014, the military-political situation around Russia changed dramatically and menacingly, especially in the western and northern directions. The struggle for the Arctic region has intensified, relations with the NATO bloc have reached unprecedented tensions since Soviet times, and the troops of the Western alliance are now much closer to Moscow and St. Petersburg than they were in the 1980s.

Alas, the ancient Roman proverb “if you want peace, prepare for war” has not lost its relevance today. Our country once again needed numerous and well-armed tank troops. Meanwhile, the number of T-72B tanks suitable for modernization in our army is limited. At the same time, upgrading the older T-72A to the level of the T-90 is too difficult and expensive. And therefore, willy-nilly, the eyes of the military turned to the T-80BV.

Especially since the danger was growing precisely in the northern and northwestern regions of Russia. But the creators of the "eighties" V.I. It was not by chance that Kozishkurt and A.S. Efremov emphasized: “But it is especially good, and we emphasize where it has no equal - this is in the vast expanses of Siberia and the Far East, territories with cold and long winters” [72].

In addition, the T-80BV can be equipped with much of what the modernized T-72s receive, and thereby unify different machines. Therefore, another version of the T-80BV tank modernization was born in Omsk. According to the open press, it includes the installation of a Sosna-U multi-channel gunner's sight with a thermal imaging observation channel and a laser control channel for a guided missile, a modern Relikt dynamic protection complex, new communications equipment, as well as the refinement of monoblocks with GTE in order to reduce fuel consumption in the "idle idle" mode, which is up to 50% of the total engine operation time [73].

So the favorite returned to Omsktransmash. The first modernized T-80BV tanks entered the army in 2017 [74].

 

[Antares]

Leningradin Kirov -tehtaan työntekijän kommentteja T-80U vaunuista sekä yleisesti tuotannosta 1980-luvulla:

Lähde:

Уроки танкостроения - А. Ефремов - 2010

Lessons in tank building - A. Efremov - 2010

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Kirjan alkusanat, jotta on selvää, kuka kirjailija on:

The book was written by an employee of the tank design bureau of the Kirov Plant in St. Petersburg (now OAO Spetsmash - Special Design Bureau of Transport Engineering), who worked at the plant and in the design bureau for almost 50 years.

It introduces the reader to the history and lessons of tank building, to the tanks of the pre-war, war and post-war periods, which were developed in Leningrad - St. Petersburg, as well as to a number of civilian vehicles based on them.

The book contains information about the specialists, designers of the famous design bureau of the Kirov Plant, the creators of the modern T-80U tank. The history of the development of many machines created in St. Petersburg is interesting, based on facts and eyewitness accounts directly involved in their creation. The publication is intended for readers interested in the history of the development of military and civilian equipment.

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Seuraava teksti on käännetty kirjan sivulta 98-100, konekäännös joten käännösvirheiden tai outojen sanavalintojen mahdollisuus on ilmeinen.

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T-80U - improved

I would like to focus on improved models T-80U, since enough has been written about the T-80 before.

The development of the T-80U tank was necessary to restore in order to ensure the superiority of the domestic tank fleet over foreign ones. The gas turbine power plant (GTSU) has become one of the main factors ensuring the combat operational and technical superiority of the T-80U over domestic and foreign counterparts.

During its development, the principle of deep modernization was used, in which it becomes possible to combine newly developed and more advanced systems and components that can give the tank high combat and operational qualities while maintaining and borrowing the most efficient, reliable and proven elements from existing serial samples.

In this regard, first of all, a working concept for an improved tank T-80, which included three main components:

- increasing the accuracy, range, as well as the speed and power of the main armament of the tank in the fight against tank-dangerous targets, ensuring the possibility of conducting effective fire fighting with the best foreign tanks, for which development had already begun by that time;

- creation of anti-projectile and anti-radiation protection capable of withstanding the effects of both main anti-tank weapons and nuclear weapons. Paying special attention to the noise immunity of guided weapons;

- increasing the level of mobility, operational and technical capabilities, reducing fuel consumption and used fuels and lubricants.

The development and creation of the tank was carried out by a special design bureau of transport engineering (SKBTM) of the State Enterprise "Kirov Plant in Leningrad" in collaboration with a number of enterprises and organizations. First of all, this is the All-Union Research Institute of Transport Engineering (Leningrad), the scientific and production association "Zavod im. V.Ya. Klimov" (Leningrad), the production association "Plant of transport engineering" (Omsk). Main Armored Directorate of the Moscow Region (Moscow), Instrument Design Bureau (KBP) of the Accuracy Research and Production Association (Tula), Tochpribor Central Design Bureau (Novosibirsk), Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau (Kharkov) , Central Design Bureau "Krasnogorsk Mechanical Plant" (Krasnogorsk, Moscow Region).

The basis for the development of the tank was the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of 07/05/1981 of the year, and on November 27, 1984, the T-80U tank was put into service.

Serial production of T-80U tanks was organized at three plants of the Ministry of Defense Industry USSR: at the Leningrad production association "Kirov Plant" in accordance with the order of the Ministry of Defense of July 12, 1987, at the OMCKOM Production Association "Transport Engineering Plant" on the basis of the decision of the Ministry of Defense of May 16, 1989 and at the Kharkov Production Association "Transport Engineering Plant named after Malyshev" on the basis of the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of 09/02/1985 according to the design documentation of the general designer N. S. Popov.

Since 1992, the Agava-2 thermal imaging device for observation and aiming began to be installed on parts of the T-80U (the industry delayed the supply of thermal imagers, so not all vehicles received them). The video image (for the first time on a domestic tank) is displayed on a television-type screen. For the development of this device, its creators were awarded the Kotin Prize. The serial T-80U tank with the introduced improvements is known under the designation T-80UM.

The T-80UK command tank received a remote detonation system for shrapnel fragmentation shells with a non-contact electronic fuse. T-80UK communication facilities operate in the VHF and HF bands. The R-163-U ultra-shortwave radio station with frequency modulation, operating in the operating frequency range of 30 MHz, has 10 preset frequencies. With a four-meter whip antenna in medium-rough terrain, it provides a range of up to 20 km.

With a special combined antenna of the “symmetrical vibrator” type, mounted on an 11-meter telescopic mast mounted on the vehicle body, the communication range increases to 40 km (with this antenna, the tank can only work in the parking lot). The R-163-K shortwave radio set, operating in the 2 MHz frequency range in telephone-telegraph mode with frequency modulation, is designed to provide communication over a long distance. It has 16 preset frequencies. With a whip HF antenna 4 m long, which ensures operation when the tank is moving, the communication range was initially 20-50 km, but due to the introduction of the possibility of changing the antenna pattern, it was possible to increase it to 250 km. With a whip 11-meter telescopic antenna, the operating range of the R-163-K reaches 350 km. The commander's tank is also equipped with THA-4 navigation equipment and an AB-1-P28 self-contained gasoline power unit with a power of 1.0 kW, an additional function of which is to recharge the batteries during parking with the engine off. The creators of the machine have successfully solved the issue of electromagnetic compatibility of numerous radio-electronic means. For this, in particular, a special electrically conductive caterpillar tape was used. Armament, power plant, transmission, running gear, observation devices and other equipment of the T-80UK corresponds to the T-80UM tank, however, the ammunition load of the gun has been reduced to 30 rounds, and the PKT machine gun to 750 rounds. Design and technical solutions for the main systems and components of the T-80U tank had by that time world and domestic novelty, as evidenced by 126 copyright certificates for inventions received by SKBTM employees and collaborating organizations.

The development of the tank was a major achievement of the domestic industry.

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Seuraava teksti on käännetty kirjan sivulta 112, konekäännös joten käännösvirheiden tai outojen sanavalintojen mahdollisuus on ilmeinen.

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In 1984, an experimental set of dynamic protection was installed on experimental T-80A tanks. Note that the Kirov designers did this much earlier than their foreign competitors. Following this, more powerful multi-layer armor was installed on the T-80 tank, equivalent in its protective properties to steel armor 500 mm thick. Such a tank became known as the T-80B. And in 1985, the T-80B tank was equipped with a hinged dynamic protection system, after which the vehicle received the designation T-80BV. Somewhat later, the same complex began to be installed on previously built T-80B tanks, but this was done, as a rule, during a major overhaul. When the time came for the T-80U tank, its armor protection was significantly increased. The design of armor barriers has changed, as a result, the relative share of armor in the mass of the tank has increased. The first series of the T-80U tank were equipped with the latest mounted dynamic protection kit "Contact". Later, the hinged elements were replaced with built-in dynamic protection (VDZ), which is able to withstand not only cumulative, but also kinetic projectiles. The combination of advanced multi-layer combined armor with VDZ protects the T-80U tank from all known types of mass-produced cumulative anti-tank weapons and reduces the likelihood of being hit by blanks.

 

[Antares]

UVZ:n tehtaan vaikeuksista V. Potkin aikakaudella eli pääasiassa 1990-luvulla.

Lähde:

Главный конструктор В. Поткин. Танковый прорыв - Э. Б. Вавилонский - 2013

Chief designer V. Potkin tank breakthrough - E. B. Vavilonsky - 2013

Seuraava teksti on käännetty kirjan sivulta 104-125, konekäännös joten käännösvirheiden tai outojen sanavalintojen mahdollisuus on ilmeinen.

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Tug of war

The tank building of our country has a glorious history and until recently enjoyed great prestige in the world. However, the world and, especially, the domestic market of armored vehicles turned out to be highly politicized.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, due to the meager funding of tank building in the USSR, tank design bureaus and factories began to fight more actively for the right to be developer and supplier of tanks manufactured under the state defense order, as well as their exporter.

In the USSR, three tank building centers fought for this right, mass-producing main battle tanks that entered service with the Soviet Army: Kharkov with the main battle tank of the T-64 type, Leningrad with the main battle tank of the T-80 type, and Nizhny Tagil with the main battle tank of the type T-72 *.

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* Since the secession of Ukraine from the USSR and its acceptance of independence, the State Enterprise “Plant im. V.A. Malyshev” and the tank design bureau “State-owned enterprise KMDB im. A.A. Morozov" began to compete in the international arms market with Russian tank enterprises (Ed. note)

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From 1972 to 1987, the USSR Ministry of Defense organized thirteen special military tests (войсковых испытаний (ВИ)) of tanks with diesel and gas turbine engines. At that time, there was no need for Tagil residents to advertise their equipment. Good advertising was given to us by the results recorded in the reports. Despite the fact that the Ministry of Defense Industry with its subordinate industry institutes, patronized by the all-powerful D.F. Ustinov was against us, the military were our supporters, and this allowed us to move forward. Since the mid-1980s, reports on the results of military tests of competing tanks have ceased to be sent to us.

At the same time, the information received from industry institutes about monitoring the controlled operation of tanks of competing enterprises in the troops was closed.
I am convinced that if there had not been such a rigid closeness on tank topics, which was in the USSR, and, subsequently, in Russia, the T-80 tank would never have appeared in serial production.

Only by chance in 2005 did we get official information that during military operation, and, therefore, in the combat use of tanks, the hourly and travel fuel consumption of the T-80 tank is four times greater than that of the T-72. , a column of T-80 tanks needs 5-6 times more tankers than a column of T-90 tanks! The volume of transported fuel from oil refineries and fuel depots should increase by the same amount! Stunning numbers! [53]. It seems to me that not everyone reported to the top leadership of the country and the Ministry of Defense about the true state of affairs in the tank industry.

On June 8, 1992, the President of Russia B.N.Yeltsin arrived at Uralvagonzavod. Two days later, he and the head of the GBTU, Colonel-General A.A. Galkin was shown a new "object 188" in the experimental workshop of the tank design bureau. Explanations were given by Vladimir Ivanovich Potkin. After that, the tank made a run at maximum speed along the factory road. Departing from Nizhny Tagil and being strongly impressed by his acquaintance with the plant and UKBTM, Boris Nikolaevich said: Mighty plant and design bureau! He instructed V.I. Potkin to arrive in Moscow on June 15 to prepare a draft government decree on the acceptance of "object 188>> for the Armament of the Russian Army and the permission to supply this tank in export performance abroad.

From the sale of exports, Boris Nikolayevich promised to leave 80% of the proceeds to the plant [31].

On October 5, 1992, Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 759-58 was issued on the adoption of the "object 188" (the name of the tank "T-90") into service with the Russian army and the modification of this T-90S tank for export deliveries [31].

With the adoption of the T-90 tank in 1992, the GBTU announced the transition to a single tank in order to get rid of the different brands of tanks in the army [54].

In 1995, Minister of Defense P.S. Grachev confirmed the decision taken by the GBTU to no longer produce gas turbine tanks in connection with the choice of the T-90 as a single tank for the Russian army [55].

After that, in any other country, the rivalry between firms ends. States encourage competition for the best quality, primarily at the level of ideas, at the stage of research. However, at the stage of creating the finished product, priority should be given to the winning project in order not to duplicate weapons systems. Uralvagonzavod had the opportunity to participate in international arms exhibitions, advertise its tank, and look for buyers. Logically, at these exhibitions, Russia should exhibit a single T-90S tank, approved by the President of Russia for export. But in our country everything developed in a completely different scenario.

Completely ignoring the decision of the GBTU and the Ministry of Defense to choose a single T-90 tank for the army, the tank design bureau of St. Petersburg with tripled energy began to develop, manufacture modernized and prototypes of products and seek their adoption for service!!! In the incredibly difficult 1990s of lack of money that fell on defense industry enterprises, the Ministry of Defense, as the main customer, continued to stimulate work on the creation of MBT with a gas turbine power plant. Nonsense!!!

During these years, the following product samples were created:

- T-80UK (object 630A). Adopted in the early 1990s;
- T-80UE. Modified version of the T-80UM. Designed specifically for - the Greek tender in 1995;
- T-80UM (object 219AS-M). Modernization of the T-80U. 1992;
- T-80UM1 "Bars" (object 219AS-M1). Modification of the T-80UM. 1997;
- T-80UM2. Experienced promising tank. A prototype was made;
- "Object 640". Experienced main tank developed by Design Bureau OZTM. 1997

Moreover, on March 2, 1996, a resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation was adopted on the start of work on the creation of gas turbine engines with high efficiency indicators using the scientific and technical reserve of NIID (Moscow) and VNIITM (St. Petersburg).

Terms of reference for the development of a new gas turbine engine for placement in the MTO of a tank with increased dimensions issued by the GABTU of the RF Ministry of Defense. In the same year, one engine was manufactured (modification GTD-1250 - product <<29>) with an additional power take-off to the pumping station to drive attachments for engineering machines (topic "Set") [52], [56 ].

On June 8, 1993, by the Decree of the President of Russia, a group of specialists and General Designer N.S. Popov was awarded the State Prize of the Russian Federation for 1993 in the field of science and technology for the development of a set of new technical solutions for the T-80U tank and its introduction into mass production.

From March 1989 to January 19, 1995, UKBTM was involved in the parallel creation of the latest promising tank, equipped with the most powerful tank gas turbine power plant at that time, manufactured at the aircraft plant named after. V.Ya. Klimov in St. Petersburg. To perform this work, UKBTM issued a tactical and technical assignment from the General Customer - GBTU. JSC "Spetsmash" (subject - <<MTO-39"), which was the developer of the T-80 gas turbine tank, was involved as a co-executor of the work.

With scant funding from OKP for R & D to create a promising tank, both design, production and research work on the tank chassis immediately doubled. It was necessary to start work on the creation of the most complex information and control system of the driver (IUS-VG) in SKB "Rotor" from zero. UKBTM created a prototype gas turbine tank equipped with IUS-VG, which made several trips to the factory test site. It was necessary to debug and refine the IMS software. At this time, instead of a salary, employees of SKB Rotor were given sausage and bread. Prolonged lack of money and excessive overload of people at work caused the mass dismissal of the entire leading staff of Department No. 8 - the developer of the unique IUS-V (VG) complexes. Work on the most important area of modern technology - the intellectualization of the tank - was suspended for a long time.

It should be noted that Vladimir Ivanovich, being an adherent of the development of diesel power plants, strictly controlled the progress of work on the creation of a promising tank with a gas turbine control system, meeting the deadlines.

In order to avoid reproaches from the apologists of the gas turbine direction in tank building for unskilled design work using the GTSU in the tank, he, being the chief designer of the R&D for the whole tank, did not interfere in the layout of the engine-transmission compartment, transferring this component R&D KB N.S. Popov.

At the same time, the Russian Department of Defense Industry did not allow the T-90 to participate in international arms exhibitions in 1993 and 1995, allowing Uralvagonzavod to demonstrate only the T-72S, which was due to officials lobbying the T-80U tank, which competed with the T-90 on the international weapons market. For the first time, permission to show the tank at the IDEX exhibition in Abu Dhabi was given only in 1997, however, even then, information about the T-90 was not presented to the organizers of the exhibition by the Rosvooruzheniye officials responsible for this, as a result of which the tank was not officially included in her program. There were obstacles for the timely arrival at the exhibition to the responsible representative of UKBTM N.A. Molodnyakov. But, thanks to the energetic intervention of the newly appointed head of the GABTU of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, S.A. Maev, in the procedural affairs of the Exhibition, the T-90 tank was nevertheless successfully demonstrated and attracted the attention of foreign military experts.

S.A. Maev closely followed the demonstration of the tank, asked the crew for their opinion on the control of the tank, overloads when passing obstacles, etc. With his arrival at the GABTU, the tank builders of Nizhny Tagil felt powerful support in promoting our tanks to the international arms market.

But five years have been lost. During these years, the 30,000-strong staff of UVZ was driven to despair, the workers beat out wages by driving out onto the streets of the city in a tank, and Ukraine outperformed Russia on the international arms market by signing a tank contract with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. True, Islamabad did not have much to choose from, since all of its traditional arms suppliers, except China, interrupted military-technical cooperation with this country due to nuclear testing there. But it was armored vehicles that made Ukraine one of the ten largest world manufacturers of military equipment and armaments. Russia, showing “insufficient flexibility in responding to market demands” (a very mild wording taken from the media!) was able to conclude in 1996 a contract for the supply of the Greek part of the Republic of Cyprus, a microscopic state, with an insignificant number of T-80U tanks (about the eighth part of the Pakistani contract). -

When, finally, Russia, due to the largest deliveries of tanks to India and Algeria, became the world leader in terms of sales of tank equipment, for which V.I. Potkin and his followers, and the ground forces of India began to plan to increase their fleet of T-90S tanks by 2020 to 1707 units *, involuntarily wanted to ask the former heads of the Ministry of Defense and Rosvooruzheniya: did they understand that if these contracts were concluded five years earlier, then UVZ would have easily survived the “dashing" 1990s, would have been able to keep a couple of hundred enterprises and industry institutes afloat, and the army would have received the latest promising tanks to create which the state did not have enough funds?

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* According to other sources, India plans to bring the total number of Russian T-90S tanks to two thousand units [60], [61] (Ed. note)

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Supporters of the T-80 tank had to explain their position. One of the leaders of the state company Rosvooruzhenie B.N. Kuzyk wrote in his book that the main goal of "Ros-Voruzhenie" was "... not to let the military-industrial complex die, ... to save the work of millions of highly qualified specialists, to raise from their knees the regions that are completely dependent on the state of affairs in the military-industrial complex" [57 ]. But S.V. Ustyantsev and D.G. Kolmakov, having studied this issue, found out that the export deliveries of T-80 tanks abroad "... were made from the Armed Forces and, therefore, were not intended to preserve tank production at the Omsk Transport Engineering Plant" [58].

On February 22, 2012, an article by V.V. Putin**, in which he wrote [59]: “...we must strictly guard a limited number of really important secrets - and, conversely, stimulate the exchange of most of the scientific and technical information between all those who can effectively use it...Whenever it does not contradict the national interests in the field of state secrets, it is necessary to abandon the practice of holding closed auctions. Procurement in the field of defense must be under close public scrutiny...The CCCP perished from the suppression of natural, market principles in the economy... When not only they tested, but even adopted several competing systems at the same time..."

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** V.V. Putin President of the Russian Federation (2000-2008), Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation (2008-2012), re-elected President of the Russian Federation on March 4, 2012.

 

[Antares]

UVZ:n tehtaan vientikaupoista V. Potkin aikakaudella eli pääasiassa 1990-luvulla.

Lähde:

Главный конструктор В. Поткин. Танковый прорыв - Э. Б. Вавилонский - 2013

Chief designer V. Potkin tank breakthrough - E. B. Vavilonsky - 2013

Seuraava teksti on käännetty kirjan sivulta 104-125, konekäännös joten käännösvirheiden tai outojen sanavalintojen mahdollisuus on ilmeinen.

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EXPORT OF TANKS

The author of this essay did not set himself the task of telling in detail about what the design bureau was doing when V.I. Potkin. It wasn't part of his job. An essay on the life story of the chief designer should not be likened to a technical report or a list of all the work he performed. Nevertheless, the reader can find a lot of interesting information on the main activities of V.I. Potkin from the memoirs of many people included in the collection.

Still, I would like to dwell in detail only on Lotkin's finishing work, which ended with a breakthrough on the world arms market.

Vladimir Ivanovich understood that the plant and design bureau are a symbiosis of two enterprises that bring mutual benefit to each other, and they should only survive together. He closely monitored the economic performance of Uralvagonzavod.

As mentioned above, 1988 was the year of the highest economic growth for Uralvagonzavod in terms of volume indicators.

The coming year of 1989 was the beginning of the reform of the USSR economy and the transition of enterprises to self-financing and self-sufficiency. It was marked by a sharp decline in government orders for manufactured products. For special equipment, the decrease in government orders amounted to 38% compared to the previous year [31].

Since that moment, the volume of production of military equipment has been steadily declining to previously unimaginable proportions. There were periods in the 1990s when the state did not order a single tank.

At the same time, the export of tanks abroad ceased, as the administrative bodies of the country responsible for making decisions in the field of arms exports were abolished in 1990. In this regard, about three hundred tanks unpaid by the state accumulated in the warehouses of UVZ and along the perimeter of the fence in the early 1990s. Only at the end of 1993 in Russia, the state monopoly on the sale of weapons was restored through the creation of the state company Rosvooruzhenie.

The expected assistance to Uralvagonzavod from the Rosvooruzhenie company began to be felt only at the end of the 1990s after the new management of UVZ, represented by General Director N.A. Malykh and the new head of the GABTU, Colonel-General S.A. Maeva.

In May 1994, the Government of the Russian Federation, by its Decree No. 479 “On Granting Enterprises the Right to Participate in the Military-Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation with Foreign Countries”, provided manufacturers with the opportunity to directly enter foreign markets, search for partners to sell products, semi-above the state order, subject to the obligatory condition of obtaining a license and maintaining state control and the need to interact with Rosvooruzhenie as an intermediary.

But Uralvagonzavod did not have to use this right soon. In his memoirs relating to 1999, M.T. Shpak writes: “... Work is underway to obtain the independence of the enterprise [in terms of] export [products] to near and far abroad...” [31].

It seems that all the circumstances were against the tank builders of Nizhny Tagil.

Even the head of the State Planning Committee of the CCCP, Davidovsky, hatched the idea since 1990 that exported tanks, manufactured according to the documentation of UKBTM, should be divided between two plants - UVZ and ChTZ in the following volumes: until 1991, 50% each, and since 1991 UVZ - 0%, ChTZ - 100 % [31].

The situation could only be saved by the export of Ural tanks, whose rating until the early 1990s was very high. Potkin did not start this work from scratch. V.N. Venediktov set a good example for his successor. The T-72 tank he created was a good seller abroad. In 1976, the USSR government decided to allow the export of the T-72 tank, both the supply of vehicles manufactured at Soviet factories and the sale (transfer) of production licenses.

EXPORT OF TANKS TYPE T-72

Exported T-72 tanks were manufactured in eight main modifications under the following indices:

- T-72 (export modifications E and E-1), basically corresponding to the domestic tank T-72;
- T-72M (export modifications E-2, E-3 and 3-4). They differed from the basic domestic T-72A tank in the armor protection of the turret, the ammunition package and the collective protection system;
- T-72M1 (export modifications of E-5 and E-6). They differed from the basic domestic T-72A tank of a later release in the armor of the hull and turret;
- T-72S. It is basically similar to the domestic T-72B tank (it differs in the level of armor and collective protection and the range of ammunition).

The tanks were delivered to the Warsaw Pact countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR, as well as to Libya, Algeria, Syria, Iraq and India.

Since 1987, Uralvagonzavod has started producing an export version of the T-72B tank - T-72S. It differed from its basic model by some improvements in the fire control system, in particular, by the presence of a wind sensor. The tank was equipped with a set of dynamic protection, consisting of 155 hanging containers on the hull and turret (instead of 227 containers on the T-72B). The T-72S tank became the first export Soviet tank equipped with the 9K120 Svir guided weapon system. This complex ensured the firing of a rocket during the day from a place and from short stops. It had a jam-free semi-automatic missile control system based on a laser beam. The use of a guided projectile made it possible to increase the range of destruction of armored targets up to 4000 meters (M1A2 "Abrams" and "Leopard" - 3000 meters, "Leclerc" - 3400 meters) with a probability of hitting a tank-type target equal to 0.8 . The T-72S tank underwent multi-day complex tests in India in 1993 and in Algeria in 1997 and was highly appreciated.

During his work as chief designer V.I. Potkin was busy promoting this tank for export.

In 1989-1991, four major intergovernmental agreements in the field of military-technical cooperation were concluded between the USSR and Iran for a total amount of 5.1 billion dollars, which turned Iran into one of the leading importers of all types of Russian military equipment in subsequent years. weapons.

The largest was the agreement dated November 13, 1991, which provided for the transfer of a license and the provision of technical assistance in organizing the production in Iran of one thousand T-72S tanks and one and a half thousand BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, as well as ammunition for them for a total of 2.2 billion dollars. The supply of components, spare parts and other property, the license for the production of which was not transferred to the Iranian side, was calculated until 2011. Within the framework of this contract, the Russian side carried out the construction in Dorud (Lurestan province) of a plant for the licensed production of T-72S tanks, which began operating on July 8, 1997.
According to a source [62], during the implementation of the agreement in 1993, 100 T-72S tanks were delivered to Iran from Uralvagonzavod, and later 22 more (20 in 1994 and 2 in 1996). From 1996 to the end of 1999, Uralvagonzavod supplied Iran with 300 tank kits for licensed assembly of T-72S tanks. In total, during the period 1993-2000, actually 422 T-72S tanks were delivered at various stages of technological readiness.

From the very beginning, the United States had a sharply negative attitude towards Russian arms sales to Iran and, starting from 1992, began to put active pressure on this issue on the “democratic” Russian leadership.

Under pressure from the United States, Russia unilaterally terminated its obligations to Iran. In May 1995, at a meeting with the President of the United States of America, W. Clinton in Moscow, B. Yeltsin agreed to the agreements, according to which the Russian Federation pledged ahead of schedule, before the end of 1999, to complete the fulfillment of all previously signed contracts for the supply of military products and services to Iran, after which deliveries under these agreements no longer produce. In return, what were received from the United States were, in fact, general statements of the most empty nature. The confidential Memorandum (“Protocol”) signed by Russian Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin and US Vice President A. Gore dated June 30, 1995, became the official bilateral formalization of these agreements. Russia's unilateral rupture of its obligations under the concluded contracts hurt the Iranian side, finally forming in the eyes of the Iranians the image of the Russian Federation as an unstable and unreliable partner. By the time deliveries to Iran were terminated under an agreement dated November 13, 1991, the contract remained unfulfilled by Uralvagonzavod and Kurganmashzavod - Iran, in particular, 578 T-72S tanks were not delivered.

Uralvagonzavod and Kurganmashzavod lost very large guaranteed orders, which could to a large extent load the capacities of these plants until at least 2005 [62].

In 1995, a contract with Iran was Uralvagonzavod's only means of existence. But even he could not fully satisfy the huge plant in terms of the means to carry out production and pay the wages of the workers. The necessary funds had to be borrowed from banks at high interest rates [31].

However, with the proceeds from the transfer of licensed design documentation to Iran, V.I. Potkin managed to create two expensive hulls of the newest promising tank [52].

PRODUCTION OF T-72 TYPE TANKS UNDER LICENSE ABROAD

In many countries of the world, there is a need to modernize tens of thousands of Soviet T-72 tanks, which are in service with the national armies of more than thirty countries. Active work on the world arms market in terms of the modernization of T-72 tanks was carried out and continues to be done by firms in many countries. Ukraine is especially active in this work.

According to the estimates of the Rosoboronexport company, about fifty options for the modernization of the “seventy twos” have appeared in various countries [58].
Modernized T-72 tanks of their own design, manufactured abroad, began to act as competitors of Russian tanks on the world arms market.

It should be borne in mind that the improvement of the T-72 tank carried out by foreign specialists was aimed at a significant improvement in its performance characteristics. This was, in particular, confirmed during the tests of the Yugoslav M84 tank on the territory of the USSR in 1987-1988.

Tank M-84, purchased in Yugoslavia, was manufactured at the plant. Dzhuro Dzhakovich in the city of Slovensky Brod and entered VNIITM on December 10, 1986*. In addition to the tank, Yugoslavia side supplied an additional FCS and a DNKS-2 commander's device [63].

* The M84 tank is almost an exact copy of the Soviet T-72 tank, since the turret, hull, power plant (later the V-46 engine was boosted by installing turbochargers, engine power was increased to 1000 hp), chassis, transmission and main weapons were used from the base tank without changes. - Ed.

The main attention in these tests was given to the tank control system and its effect on the effectiveness of shooting in day and night conditions. A comparative assessment of the combat and technical characteristics of the M-84 in relation to the domestic T-72 tank was also carried out.

In 1991, the production of tanks under licenses issued by the USSR to Poland and Czechoslovakia (T-72, T-72M), India and Iraq (T-72M1)* was completed.

* After the collapse of the USSR, the production of the T-72M1 tank in India was continued under a Russian license. - Ed.

After the contracts with these countries were exhausted, sales of Russian tanks were supposed to decrease. Based on this and taking into account that other countries have stepped up work to improve Soviet developments and began to compete with modern Russian technology, V.I. Potkin accelerated work at UKBTM upon completion of the development work “Improvement of 72B”, which began in 1986 under the leadership of V.N. Venediktova. The new tank received the index "Object 188".

Simultaneously with the work on the base vehicle "Object 188", UKBTM was engaged in the creation of an export version of the tank and, a little later, a commander's version. Since 1986, the management of the R & D was carried out by the deputy chief designer N.A. Molodnyakov.

The design of "Object 188" was a combination of the best technical solutions from what was created by defense institutes and design bureaus and took into account the experience of operating tanks of the T-72 type in dozens of countries around the world and their use in real conditions of modern combat.

The hull of the tank, in addition to reinforced multilayer combined armor, had universal dynamic protection. Additional protection against damage by guided and high-precision weapons was provided by the TShU-1 optical-electronic suppression system installed on the tank (the topic “Shtora-1”). By that time, this means of protecting the tank had no foreign analogues. According to published data, COEP reduces the risk of hitting an ATGM tank with semi-automatic command guidance systems by 3-5 times, and by 1.5 times with corrected artillery shells. KOEP is able to counteract one - - temporarily several shells directed at the tank from different sides. KOEP was serially installed only on this tank [31]. A shot with a high-explosive fragmentation projectile (OFS) with an electronic remote fuse was introduced into the tank's ammunition load. Moreover, the OFS could operate with a remote detonation system to defeat the enemy’s manpower. The ammunition package also included guided anti-tank missiles of the KUV 9K119 “Reflex” guided weapon system. The tank had an improved 1A45T fire control system, which included the 1A42 fire control system (FCS), the PNK-4S sighting and observation system for the commander, as well as the Buran-PA gunner’s tank night sight or the Agava-2 thermal imager. . Due to problems with the production of "Agave" sights "Buran" were installed on the tanks. KUV <<Reflex» allowed to increase the range of fire up to 5000 m against targets moving at speeds up to 70 km/h.

Unlike the T-72B, the Object 188 could fire guided weapons on the move at speeds up to 30 km/h.

The improved undercarriage is designed for an increased service life.

Such an impressive list of innovations in the design of the tank justifiably led to a discussion of the issue of giving the name of the tank a new status after it was put into service.
On October 5, 1992, a decree of the government of the Russian Federation was issued on the adoption of the "Object 188" into service with the Russian army under the name "tank T-90>> / For export deliveries, the tank was given the name "tank T-90S.

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