Neuvostoliiton ja Varsovan liiton (sekä muiden) tuotantomääristä

[Antares]

Bmpd-blogilla on ollut tapana julkistaa oma listansa Venäjän viennistä per vuosi, laitan tähän alle spoilerin taakse nämä artikkelit aikaväliltä 2010-2021: LÄHDE

Artikkelit löytyvät kätevästi, kun hakee heidän blogista hakusanalla Регистра ООН eli UN Register. Näissä viitataan siis jokavuotiseen Venäjän raporttiin, joka toimitetaan YK:lle (UN Register of Conventional Arms - lyhennetään usein muotoon UNROCA). KOSKA Venäjän raportti on ollut aina puutteellinen toimitettujen tietojen osalta (erityisesti vuoden 2016 jälkeen), bmpd-blogilla on ollut tapana julkaista omat "muistiinpanonsa" vuoden aikana kuulluista vientitoimituksista (ainakin niissä tapauksissa joissa heillä on kommentoitavaa).

He ovat myös seuranneet Ukrainan vientitoimituksia, ne löytyvät jakamani linkin takaa JA tuolla hakusanalla löytyy muitakin artikkeleita esim. yksi Valko-Venäjää koskeva.

HUOM: tämä on hyvin epätäydellinen lista, UNROCA:n julkaisemat tiedot ovat ilmoittajan hyväntahtoisuuden varassa. Täten Venäjän osalta ne ovat hyvin puutteelliset. Bmpd-blogin tekemien lisäysten / muistiinpanojen jälkeenkin alle lainaamani on vain osaksi hyödyllinen, koska he eivät välttämättä kuule kaikkia tapauksia eivätkä tohdi välttämättä julkaista kaikkea kuulemaansa (varsinkin vuoden 2016 jälkeen), mutta paras silti ottaa tänne talteen. Varsinkin vuoden 2016 jälkeen nämä raportit muuttuivat hyvin ohuiksi ja puutteellisiksi.

Jos näitä tutkii tarkemmin, voi olla hyvä klikata alkuperäisen artikkelin linkkiä (jaettu spoilerin takana, linkki ennen otsikkoa) ja käydä lukemassa kommentit artikkelin alta. En mene takuuseen mutta joskus siellä voi olla hyviä tiedonjyväsiä, jos jotain on jäänyt kirjoittamatta tai artikkelissa on virheitä. Toki samalla tulee altistaneensa itsensä venäläiselle kommentointikulttuurille, mikä on usein rujo - tämä varoitukseksi, kaiken varalta.

Jaoin jo aikaisemmin tässä ketjussa näistä raporteista koostamani taulukon, se löytyy tästä viestistä (sisältää pelkästään panssarivaunut): LINKKI

Tässä tiedot aikaväliltä 2010-2015, katso seuraava viesti missä on tiedot aikaväliltä 2016-2021:

Spoiler: Artikkelin teksti kokonaisuudessaan

https://bmpd.livejournal.com/37231.html

Russia's 2010 Report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms

bmpd

July 19th, 2011


As usual, the report of the Russian Federation for 2010 to the UN Register of Conventional Arms is relatively sparse in detail - in particular, the types of equipment exported are traditionally not indicated. However, in general, most of the data provided in the Russian report corresponds to information about Russian arms exports published in the media. Despite the absence of indications in the report of types of weapons, the bulk of the transfers are easily identified. We can say that Russia's report for 2010 does not contain any special sensations and no fundamentally new information.

The information on arms transfers declared by Russia in the report for 2010 to the UN Register can be distributed by country as follows (identification of systems and notes are ours)


India - 20 T-90S / SK tanks (the last of 124 ready under the contract in 2007, the supply of assembly kits, as usual, is not indicated), 112 guided missiles (according to the Indian report - 110 missiles: 80 air-to-air - apparently, as usual, RVV-AE and R-73E - and 30 anti-ship - apparently, also, as usual, 3M24E and 3M54E)

Cyprus - 27 T-80U / UK tanks (the first of 41 contracted out of stock in 2009)

Bangladesh - 40 AFVs (apparently, another BTR-80 with UN money)

Indonesia - 17 AFVs (BMP-3F), 3 combat aircraft (Su-27SKM), 3 combat helicopters (newly built Mi-35P), 4 guided missiles ("Yakhont" )

Yemen - 94 AFVs (BTR-80A)

Kuwait - 25 AFVs (BMP-3 optional)

Sudan - 45 AFVs (presumably the next BTR-80A)

Libya - 4 armored fighting vehicles (no data, but possibly BMP-3. Perhaps only a transfer for testing)

Turkmenistan - 8 artillery systems (it is not clear what it is about)

Vietnam - 2 combat aircraft (possibly Su-30MK2 of some tranche), 32 missiles ("Yakhonty" to the delivered division "Bastion-P")

Brazil - 6 combat helicopters (Mi-35M of new construction - in fact, only 3), 48 launchers and 62 missiles MANPADS "Igla-S" Venezuela

- 4 helicopters (Mi-17)

China - 7 helicopters (Mi-17)

Myanmar - 4 helicopters (Mi-35P from stock with repairs)

Ethiopia - 8 helicopters (presumably Mi-24 from stock)

Syria - 81 guided missiles (part - " Yakhonts" to the delivered "Bastions-P", part - most likely, air-to-air missiles")

Algeria - 139 guided missiles (apparently, mostly ammunition for the delivered Su-30MKI (A), plus, possibly, anti-ship 3M24E and 3M54E).

Egypt - 440 MANPADS missiles (apparently, Igla-S, mainly in Streltsy for the modernization of ZSU-23-4).


As usual, the Russian report lacks information about a number of known shipments - for example, 6 T-90S tanks and a certain number of BMP-3s to Turkmenistan. Information about military Mi-17 deliveries is also clearly incomplete. There are no transfers to Mongolia at all, and, apparently, to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

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https://bmpd.livejournal.com/36921.html

Report of Belarus for 2010 to the UN Register of Conventional Arms: Clarification with the Yemeni T-80B

bmpd
July 19th, 2011

The most curious part of Belarus' report for 2010 to the UN Register of Conventional Arms is the appearance in the report of information about the delivery of 66 main T-80B tanks by Belarus to Yemen.

Let us recall that information about the purchase by Yemen of a large batch of T-80B tanks from the presence of the armed forces of Russia or Belarus has been circulating since 2009. This delivery was indirectly confirmed in May 2011, when the State Enterprise "Kharkov Armored Repair Plant" announced that by June it would complete a two-year contract for the overhaul of about 150 tank gas turbine engines, as well as guided weapon systems and sights, concluded "with the country of the Middle East" .

The Belarusian report finally clarifies this situation, declaring the delivery of 66 T-80B tanks to Yemen in 2010. It is still unclear how many T-80B tanks Yemen will eventually receive (apparently, deliveries were continued in 2011), as well as whether these tanks were taken from storage in Belarus, or completely or at least partially re-exported from Russia. Recall that after the collapse of the USSR, Belarus received 92 T-80B tanks from the 11th Guards Tank Division of the GVSG, which was withdrawn to the territory of the republic in 1992. Since the mid-nineties, these 92 T-80B tanks have been in storage in Belarus, offered for sale abroad.

The sale of the T-80B to Yemen was the first delivery of tanks of this modification in "commodity" quantities outside the former USSR.

In addition to the indicated delivery of 66 T-80B tanks to Yemen, Belarus, in its report for 2010 to the UN Register, announced the following transfers of weapons (by country): Azerbaijan -

1 Su-25 attack aircraft, 30 D-30 howitzers

Sudan - 1 Su- 25

Nigeria - 2 Mi-24 attack helicopters

Uganda - 1 Mi-24 attack helicopter

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https://bmpd.livejournal.com/479236.html

Russia's report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms for 2011

bmpd

March 14th, 2013

The website of the UN Register of Conventional Arms (www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register) published the annual report of the Russian Federation to the Register for 2011 with a huge delay. Although the report was submitted by the Russian side to the Register on May 31, 2012, however, it was posted on the Register website in a "package" of reports from another 11 countries, prepared only on January 30, 2013 (document A/67/212/Add.2 ).

According to the report, the Russian Federation exported in 2011 (types of equipment, as usual, are not indicated in the report, and are added by us in brackets):

Tanks :

Venezuela - 35 (T-72B1V)

Cyprus - 14 (T-80UK)

Uganda - 44 (T-90CA)


Armored vehicles:

Bangladesh - 80 (BTR-80A)

Venezuela - 47 (15 BMP-3 and 32 BTR-80A )

Kazakhstan - 11 (3 BMPT and 8 BTR-80A)

Kuwait - 45 (BMP-3)

Uganda - 32 (BTR-80?)


Artillery systems:

Venezuela - 65 (17 2S23, 24 2S12, 24 BM-21)

Kazakhstan - 3 (TOS-1)


Combat aircraft:

Algeria - 26 (16 Yak-130, 8 Su-30MKI(A), 2 - Su-24M ? )

Vietnam - 8 (Su-30MK2)

Jordan - 2 (Il-76MF-EI )

Myanmar - 14 (MiG-29)

Uganda - 4 (Su-30MK2)


Combat helicopters:

Azerbaijan - 4 (Mi-35M)

India - 15 (Mi-17V-5)

Indonesia - 6 (Mi-17V-5)

China - 5 (Ka-31)

Myanmar - 4 (Mi-24P)

Peru - 8 (2 Mi-35P, 6 Mi-17V-5)

Sudan - 12 (probably 10 Mi -24P for Sudan and 2 Mi-17V-5 for South Sudan)

USA - 9 (Mi-17V-5, for Afghanistan)

Thailand - 3 (Mi-17V-5)


Warships:

Vietnam - 3 (2 patrol ships of project 11661E and 1 project 10412 patrol boat)

Turkmenistan - 2 (project 12418 missile boats)


Guided missiles:

Algeria - 68

Bangladesh - 36

Vietnam - 96

India - 270

Myanmar - 40

Uganda - 30

Syria - 74


Man-portable air defense systems:

Azerbaijan - 100 launchers and 500 missiles

Brazil - 8 launchers and 18 missiles

Venezuela - 300 launchers and 1,500 missiles

Egypt - 192 launchers and 647 missiles

Sudan - 25 launchers and 25 missiles

Thailand - 5 launchers and 30 missiles

Turkmenistan - 8 launchers and 24 missiles

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https://bmpd.livejournal.com/545949.html

Report of Russia to the UN Register for 2012

bmpd

June 20th, 2013

Data from the official report of the Russian Federation to the Register for 2012 appeared on the website of the UN Register of Conventional Arms .

According to this information, Russia officially declared the delivery in 2012 for the export of the following weapons that fall under the UN Register. As usual, the types of equipment are not indicated in the Russian report, so the corresponding notes were made by us.


I. Main tanks:

Algeria - 86 (T-90CA)

Venezuela - 42 (T-72B1V)


II. Armored combat vehicles:

Algeria - 5 (BREM-1CA)

Bangladesh - 70 (BTR-80A)

Venezuela - 124 (BMP-3, BTR-80A, special vehicles)

Kazakhstan - 73 (BTR-82A)

Cyprus - 4 (apparently, BREM- 80Y)


III. Large-caliber artillery systems:

Venezuela - 76 (2S19M, 2S23, 2S12, MLRS BM-21 and Smerch)

Azerbaijan - 18 (2S19M)


IV. Combat aircraft:

Algeria - 6 (Su-30MKI(A))

Vietnam - 10 (Su-30MK2)

India - 5 (1 Su-30MKI and 4 MiG-29K/KUB, vehicle kits for the Su-30MKI are not included)

Myanmar - 3 ( 2 MiG-29 and 1 MiG-29UB)

Uganda - 2 Su-30MK2


V. Combat helicopters:

Sudan - 4 (Mi-24P)

USA - 12 (Mi-17V-5, for Afghanistan)

Egypt - 10 (Mi-17V-5)

Mexico - 3 (Mi-17)

India - 31 (Mi-17V-5)

Azerbaijan - 8 (Mi-35M)

Bangladesh - 3 (Mi-17)

Brazil - 3 (Mi-35M)


VI. Warships:

India - 2 (project 11356 frigates)

Vietnam - 2 (apparently, patrol boats of project 10412)


VII (a). Missiles and rocket launchers:

Vietnam - 40 (apparently, aviation and anti-ship missiles 3M24E)

India - 37 (apparently, aviation and Club)

Turkmenistan - 32 (apparently, anti-ship missiles 3M24E)


VII (b). Portable SAMs:

Venezuela - 400 launchers and 2,000 missiles

Brazil - 8 launchers and 18 missiles

Azerbaijan - 200 launchers and 1,000 missiles

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https://bmpd.livejournal.com/885556.html

Russia's report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms for 2013

bmpd

June 12th, 2014

Data from the official report of the Russian Federation to the Register for 2013 appeared on the website of the UN Register of Conventional Arms .

According to this information, Russia officially declared the delivery in 2013 for export of the following weapons that fall under the UN Register. As usual, the types of equipment are not indicated in the Russian report, so the corresponding notes were made by us.

I. Main tanks:

Azerbaijan - 10 (T-90S)

Algeria - 101 (T-90CA)

Armenia - 35 (T-72B ?)

Venezuela - 15 (T-72B1V)


II. Armored fighting vehicles:

Azerbaijan - 10 (BMP-3)

Algeria - 10 (BREM-1CA?)

Armenia - 110 (BMP-2 and/or BTR-80?)

Bangladesh - 73 (BTR-80A)

Venezuela - 36 (BMP- 3, BTR-80A, special vehicles)

Indonesia - 37 (BMP-3F)

Libya - 7 (SPTRK "Chrizantema-S")


III. Large-caliber artillery systems:

Azerbaijan - 438 (!! - 2S19M, 2S31, MLRS "Smerch", TOS-1A and what else?)


IV. Combat aircraft:

India - 7 (MiG-29K / KUB, vehicle kits for the Su-30MKI are not taken into account)

Indonesia - 6 (Su-30MK2)

Myanmar - 2 (MiG-29UB)


V. Combat helicopters:

Azerbaijan - 25 (8 Mi-35M and 17 Mi-17V-1)

Ghana - 4 (Mi-171Sh)

India - 43 (Mi-17V-5)

Iraq - 4 (Mi-35M)

Kazakhstan - 4 (Mi-17)


VI. Warships:

Vietnam - 1 (project 06361 submarine)

India - 1 (project 11356 frigate)


For missiles in the published report form, as you can understand, there is confusion over categories a) and b). Apparently, it should look like this:

VII (a). Missiles and rocket launchers:

Algeria - 4 (?)

Vietnam - 13 (apparently aviation and anti-ship missiles 3M24E)

India - 361 (apparently aviation and Club)

Indonesia - 52 (apparently aviation)

Malaysia - 20 (RVV-AE)

Turkmenistan - 8 (apparently, anti-ship missiles 3M24E)


VII (b). Portable air defense systems:

Armenia - 50 launchers and 200 missiles

Egypt - 120 launchers and 468 missiles

Oman - 24 launchers and 102 missiles

Turkmenistan - 15 launchers and 60 missiles

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https://bmpd.livejournal.com/1541647.html

Russia's report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms for 2014

bmpd

October 24th, 2015

On the website of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, data from the official report of the Russian Federation to the Register for 2014 appeared with a significant delay.

According to the information given there, Russia officially declared the delivery in 2014 for the export of the following weapons that fall under the UN Register. As usual, the types of weapons and equipment are not indicated in the Russian report, so we made the corresponding notes.

It is easy to see that the report suffers from obvious incompleteness and a significant part of the deliveries was not included in it (the same combat helicopters for Iraq).



Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev inspects the T-90S tank received by Azerbaijan from Russia. Nakhichevan, 04/08/2014 (c) Press Service of the President of Azerbaijan


I. Main tanks:

Azerbaijan - 65 (T-90S)


II. Armored fighting vehicles:

Azerbaijan - 78 (BMP-3)


III. Large-caliber artillery systems:

Azerbaijan - 118 (2S19M, 2S31, MLRS "Smerch", TOS-1A)

Kazakhstan - 6 (MLRS "Smerch")


IV. combat aircraft:

Vietnam - 4 (Su-30MK2)

India - 4 (MiG-29K/KUB)


V. Attack helicopters:

India - 40 (Mi-17V-5)

Kazakhstan - 2 (Mi-17)

Peru - 8 (Mi-171Sh)

Rwanda - 2 (Mi-17)

USA - 30 (Mi-17V-5, for Afghanistan)


VI. Combat ships:

Vietnam - 2 (project 06361 submarines)


VII (a). Missiles and rocket launchers:

India - 7859 (as you can understand, the vast majority - TOUR "Reflex")

Indonesia - 6 (presumably aviation SD)


VII (b). Portable SAMs:

Thailand - 13 launchers and 24 missiles

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https://bmpd.livejournal.com/1974805.html

Russia's report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms for 2015

bmpd

June 22nd, 2016


Data from the official report of the Russian Federation to the Register for 2015 has appeared on the website of the UN Register of Conventional Arms .

According to the information given there, Russia officially declared the delivery in 2015 for the export of the following weapons that fall under the UN Register. As usual, the types of weapons and equipment are not indicated in the Russian report, therefore, where possible, the corresponding notes are made by us.

It is easy to see that the report suffers from severe incompleteness and a significant part of the deliveries was not included in it (for example, deliveries of equipment and weapons to Iraq, not to mention Syria).



Su-30SM fighters delivered in 2015 to the Air Defense Forces of Kazakhstan (c) Irkut Corporation JSC

I. Main tanks:

Azerbaijan - 25 (T-90S)


II. Armored fighting vehicles:

Azerbaijan - 30 (BMP-3)

Kuwait - 33 (BMP-3)


III. Large-caliber artillery systems:

Azerbaijan - 12 (presumably TOS-1A)

Kazakhstan - 54 (?)

Namibia - 12 (?)


IV. Combat aircraft:

Bangladesh - 14 (Yak-130)

Vietnam - 4 (Su-30MK2)

India - 6 (MiG-29K/KUB)

Kazakhstan - 4 (Su-30SM)


V. Combat helicopters:

Bangladesh - 5 (Mi-171Sh)

Brazil - 3 (Mi-35M)

India - 24 (Mi-17V-5)

Kazakhstan - 4 (Mi-171Sh)

Myanmar - 2 (Mi-24P)

Peru - 16 (Mi-171Sh-P)

Rwanda - 4 (Mi-17V-5)

Thailand - 2 (Mi-17V-5)

Turkmenistan - 2 (Mi-17V-5)


VI. Combat ships:

Vietnam - 2 (project 06361 submarines)


VII (a). Missiles and rocket launchers:

India - 168 (air and ship)

Venezuela - 1000 (?)

Vietnam - 91 (air and ship)


VII (b). Portable air defense systems:

Brazil - 14 launchers ("Igla-S")

 

[Antares]

Jatkoa edelliseen viestiin (LINKKI), tässä tiedot aikaväliltä 2016-2021 (tosin nämä käyvät kokoajan entistä hyödyttömämmiksi, näiden ilmoitusten mukaan tällä aikavälillä olisi myyty ainoastaan 64 kpl T-90S panssarivaunuja Vietnamille vuonna 2018 - uskoo ken tahtoo, jos haluaa saada edes aavistuksen vientimääristä ja kohdenmaista niin joutuu tutkimaan muita lähteitä):

Spoiler: Artikkelin teksti kokonaisuudessaan

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https://bmpd.livejournal.com/2663704.html

Russia's report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms for 2016

bmpd

June 12th, 2017


Data from the official report of the Russian Federation to the Register for 2016 has appeared on the website of the UN Register of Conventional Arms .

According to the information given there, Russia officially declared the delivery in 2016 for the export of the following weapons that fall under the UN Register. As usual, the types of weapons and equipment are not indicated in the Russian report, therefore, where possible, the corresponding notes are made by us.



One of the four Su-35SK fighters of the first batch delivered to China in 2016 under a contract in November 2015 for 24 aircraft (c) sina.com



I. Main tanks: none



II. Armored fighting vehicles:

Bangladesh - 170 (BTR-80 - publication )



III. Large-caliber artillery systems:

Azerbaijan - 6 (presumably TOS-1A)



IV. combat aircraft:

Bangladesh - 2 (Yak-130 - publication )

Belarus - 4 (Yak-130 - publication )

China - 4 (Su-35SK - publication )

Vietnam - 4 (Su-30MK2)

India - 8 (MiG-29K/KUB)

Kazakhstan - 2 (Su-30SM - publication )

Myanmar - 3 (Yak-130 - publication )



V. Combat helicopters:

Angola - 20 (16 Mi-24P and four Mi-171Sh - publication )

Bangladesh - 6 (Mi-171Sh - publication )

India - 3 (presumably Mi-17V-5 in the VIP version)

Kazakhstan - 6 (four Mi-35M and two Mi-171Sh - publication and publication )

Nigeria - 2 (Mi-35M - publication )

Serbia - 2 (Mi-17V-5 - publication )



VI. Warships:

Vietnam - 1 (submarine project 06361 - publication )



VII (a). Missiles and rocket launchers:

Angola - 84 (?)

India - 10809 (about 10 thousand of them - presumably TOUR "Reflex")

Kazakhstan - 6 (probably aviation)

Vietnam - 91 (aviation and ship)


VII (b). Portable air defense systems:

Armenia - 300 (apparently, Igla-S and Verba missiles)

Comment bmpd. It is easy to see that every year Russian reports to the UN Register suffer from more and more incompleteness and a significant part of the supplies are not included in them. As a result, the Russian report for 2016 finally turned into a semi-fictitious one. It completely lacks, for example, the supply of equipment and weapons to Iraq, not to mention Syria. Now, deliveries to Algeria, where T-90CA tanks, Su-30MKI(A) fighters (eight units) and Mi-28NE combat helicopters (six units) were shipped in 2016, are also not indicated, and, apparently, the same "embargo" was imposed to the mention of deliveries to Egypt (which received the R-32 missile boat ).

However, more "innocent" deliveries are not indicated, such as deliveries of modernized T-72B1 tanks to Nicaragua and non-modernized T-72B1 tanks to Uganda, T-90S tanks to Azerbaijan, armored personnel carriers to the CIS countries (Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), etc. .

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https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3223770.html

Russia's report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms for 2017

bmpd

June 1st, 2018


Data from the official report of the Russian Federation to the Register for 2017 has appeared on the website of the UN Register of Conventional Arms .

According to the information provided there, Russia officially declared the delivery in 2017 for the export of the following weapons that fall under the UN Register. As usual, the types of weapons and equipment are not indicated in the Russian report, therefore, where possible, the corresponding notes are made by us.



MiG-29 fighters transferred to Serbia from the presence of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Batajnitsa, 10/20/2017 (c) Oleg Ivanov / RIA Novosti

I. Main tanks: none


II. Armored fighting vehicles:

Azerbaijan - 61 (BMP-3 and BTR-82A - publication )

Bangladesh - 170 (BTR-80 - publication )


III. Large-caliber artillery systems:

Armenia - 6 (MLRS "Smerch")


IV. Combat aircraft:

Angola - 2 (Su-30K - publication )

China - 10 (Su-35 - publication )

Myanmar - 3 (Yak-130 - publication )

Serbia - 6 (MiG-29 - publication )


V. Combat helicopters:

Mali - 2 (Mi-35M - publication )


VI. Warships:

Vietnam - 2 (project 11661E frigates - publication )


VII (a). Missiles and rocket launchers:

India - 5800 (presumably, most of them are the Reflex TOUR)

China - 120 (apparently, aircraft for the Su-35)

Comment bmpd. It is easy to see that every year Russian reports to the UN Register suffer from more and more incompleteness and a significant part of the supplies are not included in them. As a result, Russian reports in recent years (including 2017) have finally turned into semi-fictitious. The report for 2017 not only completely lacks, for example, the supply of equipment and weapons to Iraq, not to mention Syria, but now, for example, Egypt (which received MiG-29M / M2 fighters in 2017 and combat helicopters Ka-52), Algeria, Kazakhstan and others, including most of the republics of the former USSR.

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https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3663620.html

Russia's report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms for 2018

bmpd

June 4th, 2019


The website of the UN Register of Conventional Arms contains data from the official report of the Russian Federation to the Register for 2018.

According to the information provided there, Russia officially declared the delivery in 2018 for the export of the following weapons that fall under the UN Register. As usual, the types of weapons and equipment are not indicated in the Russian report, therefore, where possible, the corresponding notes are made by us.


Four Russian Yak-130 combat training aircraft delivered to Laos in 2018. Vientiane, February 2019 (c) frame from the report of the Zvezda TV channel


I. Main tanks:

Vietnam - 64 (T-90S - publication )


II. Armored fighting vehicles:

Azerbaijan - 40 (BMP-3 - publication )

Vietnam -2 (apparently, BREM-1A)


III. Large-caliber artillery systems:

Kazakhstan - 24 (reactive flamethrower systems TOS-1A, and, apparently, other systems)


IV. combat aircraft:

Angola - 6 (Su-30K - publication )

China - 10 (Su-35 - publication )

Kazakhstan - 4 (Su-30SM - publication )

Laos - 4 (Yak-130 - publication )

Myanmar - 6 (Yak-130 - publication )



V. Combat helicopters:

Kazakhstan - 4 (Mi-35M - publication )

Nigeria - 2 (Mi-35M - publication )

Pakistan - 4 (Mi-35M - publication )

Thailand - 2 (Mi-17V-5 - publication )



VI. Combat ships: none [two project 06361 diesel-electric submarines transferred to Algiers in 2018]



VII (a) are not indicated. Missiles and rocket launchers:

China - 72 (apparently, aircraft for the Su-35)

India - 1250 (presumably, most of the "Reflex" TOUR)


VII(b). Portable anti-aircraft missile systems:

India - 80 (presumably Igla-S)

Bahrain - 264 (presumably Igla-S)


Comment bmpd. Again, it is easy to see that every year Russian reports to the UN Register suffer from more and more incompleteness and a significant part of the deliveries are not included in them. As a result, Russian reports in recent years (including 2018) have finally turned into semi-fictitious. The report for 2018 not only completely lacks, for example, the supply of equipment and weapons to Iraq, not to mention Syria. Egypt (which received MiG-29M/M2 fighters and Ka-52 combat helicopters in 2018), Algeria, and others, including most of the republics of the former USSR, also firmly moved into the category of "unmentioned" recipients.

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https://bmpd.livejournal.com/4045202.html

Russia's report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms for 2019

bmpd

June 1st, 2020


The website of the UN Register of Conventional Arms contains data from the official report of the Russian Federation to the Register for 2019.

According to the information provided there, Russia officially declared the delivery in 2019 for the export of the following weapons that fall under the UN Register. As usual, the types of weapons and equipment are not indicated in the Russian report, therefore, where possible, the corresponding notes are made by us.



Mi-35M combat helicopters and Mi-17V-5 transport and combat helicopters received by the Serbian Air Force and Air Defense from Russia at the end of 2019. Batajnica, 07.12.2019 (c) Ministry of Defense of Serbia

II. Armored fighting vehicles:

Iraq - 21 (probably BMP-3)

Zambia - 22 (presumably Tiger armored vehicles)


III. Large-caliber artillery systems:

Saudi Arabia - 24 (probably heavy flamethrower systems TOS-1A)


IV. combat aircraft:

Angola - 4 (Su-30K)


V. Combat helicopters:

Uzbekistan - 4 (Mi-35M)

Nigeria - 1 (Mi-35M)

Mali - 1 (Mi-35M)

Bangladesh - 5 (Mi-171Sh)

Serbia - 7 (probably , four Mi-35M and three Mi-17V-5)


VII (a). Missiles and rocket launchers:

China - 48 (probably aviation for Su-35 fighters)

India - 597 (presumably, most of the "Reflex" TOUR)


Comment bmpd. As has been repeatedly noted in previous years, it is easy to see that every year Russian reports to the UN Register suffer from increasing incompleteness and a significant part of the deliveries are not included in them. The report for 2019, as usual, completely lacks, for example, the supply of equipment and weapons to Syria, Egypt (which received MiG-29M / M2 fighters and Ka-52 combat helicopters in 2019), Algeria, and others, including most of the republics of the former USSR.

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https://bmpd.livejournal.com/4325108.html

Russia's report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms for 2020

bmpd

June 6th, 2021


The website of the UN Register of Conventional Arms contains data from the official report of the Russian Federation to the Register for 2020.

According to the information provided there, Russia has officially declared the delivery in 2020 for export of the following weapons that fall under the UN Register. As usual, the types of weapons and equipment are not indicated in the Russian report, therefore, where possible, the corresponding notes are made by us.



The Mi-35M combat helicopter (Malian registration number TZ-12H) delivered by the Mali Air Force from Russia, newly built by JSC Rostvertol (part of JSC Russian Helicopters). It was reported that it was delivered at the end of 2020, becoming the third under the 2016 contract with Mali for four Mi-35M helicopters, the ceremony of handing over the helicopter to the Malian side was held in Bamako on 01/12/2021. The first two Mi-35M helicopters were delivered to Mali in September 2017 (c) www.defenceweb.co.za



V. Combat helicopters:

Kazakhstan - 4 (Mi-35M)

Niger - 2 (Mi-35M)

Mali - 1 (Mi-35M)


VII(a). Missiles and rocket launchers:

China - 296

India - 567

Malaysia - 10

Serbia - 8

On behalf of bmpd, we point out that every year Russian reports to the UN Register suffer from increasing incompleteness and a significant part of the deliveries are not included in them. As a result, Russian reports in recent years (including 2020) have finally turned into semi-fictitious. In the reports for 2017-2020, for example, the supply of equipment and weapons to Syria, Iraq is completely absent; for example, Egypt (which received Su-35 and MiG-29M / M2 fighters and combat helicopters Ka-52), Algeria, and others, including most of the republics of the former USSR.

In 2020, according to the Russian report, combat aircraft, tanks, armored vehicles and artillery systems have already completely dropped out of the list of deliveries.

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https://bmpd.livejournal.com/4566859.html

Russia's report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms for 2021

bmpd

August 6th, 2022

Despite the special military operation in Ukraine, the Russian Federation submitted its report for 2021 to the UN Register of Conventional Arms in a timely manner. The report is posted on the UN Register of Conventional Arms website.

According to the information provided there, Russia officially declared the delivery in 2021 for export of the following weapons that fall under the UN Register. As usual, the types of weapons and equipment are not indicated in the Russian report, therefore, where possible, the corresponding notes are made by us.



Yak-130 combat training aircraft delivered from Russia at the end of 2021 in service with the air defense and air forces of the Vietnamese People's Army at the Fukat airfield, February 2022 (c) frame from a Vietnamese military television report


II. Armored fighting vehicles:

Turkmenistan - 1 (probably K63968 "Typhoon-K")


IV.(a). Combat aircraft:

Vietnam - 12 (Yak-130 - link )


V. Combat helicopters:

Congo - 2 (Mi-17)

Ethiopia - 4 (Mi-17)

Mali - 2 (Mi-35M)
Rwanda - 4 (Mi-17)

Thailand - 3 (Mi-17V-5)


VII. (a). Missiles and rocket launchers:

China - 242 (probably aircraft missiles for Su-35 fighters)

India - 2184 (presumably most of the "Reflex" TOUR)

Serbia - 20 (probably aircraft missiles for MiG-29 fighters)


VII. (b). Portable anti-aircraft missile systems:

India - 390 ("Igla-S")


On behalf of bmpd, we point out that every year Russian reports to the UN Register suffer from increasing incompleteness and a significant part of the deliveries are not included in them. In the reports for 2017-2021, for example, the supply of equipment and weapons to Syria, Iraq is completely absent, Egypt, Algeria, and others, including most of the republics of the former USSR, have also firmly entered the category of "unmentioned" recipients.

Combat aircraft, tanks, armored vehicles and artillery systems have already completely or partially dropped out of the lists of deliveries declared in the reports.

 

[Antares]

SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) on tietysti toinen lähde, jos haluaa tutkia eri maiden asevientiä. Tältä sivulta löytyvät linkit heidän tietokantoihinsa: LINKKI

Jos valitsee SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, valitsee sivulta "trade registers" ja syötää hakukoneeseen:

Step 1: Suppliers: Russia

Step 2: From: 1991 to: 2021 (HUOM: Neuvostoliitto hajosi vuoden 1991 lopuksi ja Venäjä tuli sen tilalle, mutta olisi silti fiksua laittaa haun alarajaksi 1950, ihan vain kaiken varalta - näin saa kaikki hakutulokset, jos syystä tai toisesta tietokannassa olisi jotain virheitä)

Step 3: "Armoured vehicles"

Step 4: Print register of "recipients"

Klikkaa tämän jälkeen "download" niin sivulta saa rtf-tiedoston, joka sisältää pyydetyt tiedot.

Yllä mainituilla hakuehdoilla tiedostossa on kymmenen sivua (jos tekee saman haun "Soviet Union" ja aikaväli 1950-2021 niin tiedostossa on 23 sivua - näin siis kun haku on rajattu "armoured vehicles")

Toki normaalit varoituksen sanat: SIPRI ei ole mikään Raamattu, sillä on varmasti puolensa ja puutteensa kuten kaikilla, parasta ottaa se yhtenä lähteenä muiden joukossa. Kun näitä lähteitä on useita, niiden tietoja voi vertailla toisiinsa. Ehkä sitten ajan kanssa muodostuu hyvän varmuuden omaava kokonaiskäsitys.

Spoilerin takana edellä kuvailemani haun tulokset (jaan tämän kuvina, koska taulukko hajoaa jos sen jakaa suoraan):

Spoiler: Artikkelin teksti kokonaisuudessaan

(loput seuraavassa viestissä)

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MUOKKAUS: en ehtinyt tutkimaan asiaa tarkemmin, mutta tein tällaisen huomion: jos tutkii SIPRI:n ilmoituksia Tsekkoslovakian ja Puolan viennin osalta kylmän sodan aikana, törmää siihen että näiden maiden osalta ei löydy tietoja T-72 viennistä, mikä on tietysti selvä puute.

Näiden lisäksi pitää katsoa Neuvostoliiton vientiä samalla aikavälillä, koska sieltä löytyy useita tietorivejä, joiden kommenteissa lukee näin: Possibly from Czechoslovak or Polish production line

Toisinaan mainitaan vain Tsekkoslovakia, toisinaan vain Puola, joskus molemmat maat yhdessä. Syystä tai toisesta näitä samoja rivejä ei löydy, jos hakee Tsekkoslovakian ja Puolan vientiä näiden maiden nimellä.

Pitää myös olla yleisesti ottaen varovainen, kun tutkii SIPRI:n tietoja, koska siellä voi olla virheitä (eikä muutenkaan ole järkevää luottaa vain yhteen tietolähteeseen, olipa se miten vakuuttavalta tuntuva tahansa), tässä voisi olla yksi virhe:

Algerian kohdalla on tietorivi, jonka mukaan heille olisi toimitettu 330 kpl T-62 vaunuja aikavälillä 1977-1979. Kommenteissa lukee "Probably from Czechoslovak production line".

Uralvagonzavod oli ainoa tehdas joka valmisti T-62 vaunuja, vaunu ei ollut tuotannossa Tsekkoslovakiassa. En silti sulje pois sitä vaihtoehtoa että Neuvostoliitto olisi käyttänyt Tsekkoslovakiaa ns. välittäjämaana, jonka avulla olisi pyritty häivyttämään "avun" alkuperäinen lähde. Normaalia venäläistä touhua, pyritään sysäämään vastuu heidän tekosista toisten niskaan.

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Toinen yksityiskohta, joka voi hämätä Neuvostoliiton tietojen osalta: Tsekkoslovakian ja Puolan tiedoissa on paljon tietorivejä, joista voisi päätellä että Neuvostoliitto on vienyt ko. vaunut näihin maihin. Kommenteissa lukee kuitenkin tähän tyyliin: Most assembled/produced under licence in Czechoslovakia; T-72B and T-72G versions

Tässä pitää olla tarkkana määrämaasta riippuen, Tsekkoslovakia ja Puola kokoonpanivat eri vaunuja kylmän sodan aikana MUTTA ymmärtääkseni kumpikaan maa ei ollut tuotannon osalta Neuvostoliitosta riippumaton, ei ainakaan T-72 tuotannon osalta (näitä edeltäneet T-34-85, SU-100, T-54 ja T-55 tuotannot saattoivat olla). Tämä tarkoittaa sitä että Neuvostoliitto toimitti erilaisia komponentteja näiden vaunujen kokoonpanoon eikä niitä valmistettu Tsekkoslovakiassa tai Puolassa. Näin nähtynä on oikein, että nämä mainitaan osana Neuvostoliiton vientiä, mutta pitää tosiaan olla tarkka sen kanssa, mistä puhutaan. Tämä riippuu tietysti vahvasti siitä, mikä "vientimaa" on kyseessä.

 

[Antares]

Edellisen viestin (LINKKI) asia jatkuu tässä:

Spoiler: Artikkelin teksti kokonaisuudessaan

 

[Antares]

Koostin edellisissä viesteissäni viittaamastani SIPRI:n seurannasta pelkät panssarivaunut taulukoksi:




Pari huomautusta: Intialle on merkitty 464 kpl T-90S kauppa vuodelle 2019 MUTTA sen toimitukset on merkitty jonnekin 2023/2025 tienoille, joten näitä ei lasketa mukaan kokonaissummaan.

Laskin vertailun vuoksi pari muuta summaa, toinen kokonaismäärä aikavälille 1992-2021 mutta siitä on jätetty pois Intian T-72M1 tuotanto 1990-luvulla eli 600 kpl.

Tämän lisäksi laskin summan aikavälille 1992-2012, mutta jätin siitäkin pois Intian T-72M1 tuotannon 1990-luvulla eli 600 kpl. Tämä aikaväli on siis sama kuin Kommersantin kuvassa.

Kommersantin mukaan aikavälillä 1992-2012 olisi viety 2 018 kpl panssarivaunuja ulkomaille, tosin tästä määrästä 709 kpl oli Iranille ja Intialle toimitettuja kittejä.

Vanhojen "varastovaunujen" vientimäärä oli myös 709 kpl, tosin tästä tulisi mahdollisesti jättää pois Omskin ennen vuotta 2006 valmistamat T-80 perheen vaunut joita oli 75 kpl - lähteestä riippuen nämä olivat joko uustuotantoa tai "Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen aikaan tehtaan pihalle valmistettuja".

JOS nämä Omskin T-80 vaunut olivat todella uustuotantoa, niin silloin "varastovaunujen" vientimäärä aikavälillä 1992-2012 olisi 709 - 75 = 634 kpl.

Täten UVZ:n uustuotannon määrä aikavälillä 1992-2012 oli Kommensantin mukaan:

2018 - 709 - 75 - 634 = 600 kpl.

Näistä 132 kpl oli T-72S ja 468 kpl T-90S ja T-90SA.

JOS lasketaan kittitoimitukset yhteen tämän UVZ:n uustuotannon kanssa, niin summa on 600 + 709 = 1 309.

Kittien toimitus ei tietysti ole täysin sama asia kuin uuden, toimintakykyisen vaunun toimitus, mutta on se kuitenkin "osatuotantoa" ja siten tuo tehtaalle töitä. Makuasia toki, laskeeko nämä millä tavoin.

Arvatenkin osa UVZ:n uustuotannosta (ainakin T-72S vaunut) voi kuvitella olleen valmistettu joko ennen Neuvostoliiton hajoamista tai vuosi pari sen jälkeen. En usko että UVZ:lla oli kovin kummoista uusien panssarivaunujen tuotantoa 90-luvulla. Tästä on saatu vihjeitä eri lähteistä, tekivät kuulemma pääasiassa armeijan eri ajoneuvojen peruskorjausta sekä virittelivät erilaisia vaunuja vientiä varten (eli messuille näytteille).

He valmistivat sen pienen määrän T-90 obr 1992 vaunuja, josta ollut aikaisemmin puhetta MUTTA Steve Zaloga kirjoittaa että UVZ olisi valmistanut näitä jo ennen Neuvostoliiton hajoamista tai hyvin pian sen jälkeen. UVZ valmisti T-90S testivaunuja vuosituhannen vaihteen tienoilla tapahtuneita Intian testejä varten (jotka edelsivät kauppoja ja vientiä) SEKÄ valmistelivat Venäjän armeijaa varten T-72BA nimellä tunnetun modernisointimallin (näitä tehtiin useita erilaisia, varsinaiset modernisoinnit alkoivat pienimuotoisina vasta vuoden 2000 jälkeen). Kuten nähdään, 90-luku on ollut hyvin synkkää aikaa myös heille.

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SIPRI:n kommentit eivät mahtuneet samaan kuvaan, liian leveä taulukko joten laitan ne tähän alle:




Listattu järjestys on sama kuin yllä olevassa taulukossa, joten vertailu on helpohkoa.

Afganistanin kohdalla lukee SIPRI:n materiaalissa itseasiassa "Northern alliance (Afganista)*"

Tämän lisäksi "Ukraine rebels*" on toinen listalta löytyvä *-merkillä merkitty vastaanottaja. *-merkille ei ole kerrottu selitystä SIPRI:n materiaalissa, mutta näiden kahden perusteella sillä on merkitty "ei-valtiolliset" toimijat eli erilaiset sissiryhmät/terroristit/vapaustaistelijat tai millä nimellä näitä haluaakaan kutsua.

HUOMAA, että Iranille ja varsinkin Intialle toimitetuista panssarivaunuista merkittävä osa on koottu määrämaassa ja näitä varten on joko toimitettu kitti Venäjältä TAI vaunut on valmistettu kokonaan määrämaassa. Täten nämä pitää pohtia erikseen, haluaako laskea ne "Venäjän toimittamiksi vaunuiksi" vai ei.

SIPRI ei erittele tarkemmin toimitusmääriä per vuosi vaan kertoo ainoastaan aikavälin ja kokonaismäärän, joten merkitsin nämä samalla logiikalla kuin aikaisemmassa Kommersantin kuvasta koostetussa taulukossa eli x-kirjan kertoo SIPRI:n ilmoittaman toimitusajan vuoden ja toimituksen viimeisen vuoden kohdalle on merkitty toimitettu kokonaismäärä.

Jos lukee SIPRI:n kommentteja niin huomattavassa osassa lukee "second-hand but modernized before delivery". Mietin, että osan kohdalla tuo voinee pitää paikkansa mutta toisien osalta ei välttämättä. Ehkä sanan "modernized" tilalla pitäisi käyttää "repaired", jos kyseessä on varastosta aktivoitu vaunu, joka on käynyt "Armoured repair plant" pajalla peruskorjattavana (eli sama peruskorjaus jota tehdään näille vaunuille ennen kuin ne toimitetaan Venäjän aktiivijoukoille, käytännössä vaihdetaan kuluvat osat ja ehkä myös moottori, jolloin näille tulee käytännössä nolla kilometriä mittariin - kuitenkin eri asia kuin nyt sota-aikana tietyille varastovaunuille tehty "de-conservation").

Toki korjauksen / modernisoinnin määrän määrää varmasti se, mitä ostajan kanssa on sovittu. Hyvä myös huomata, että tässä taulukossa EI OLE niitä tapauksia, kun ulkomailta on tuotu vaunuja Venäjälle korjattavaksi (kuten aikaisemmassa viestissäni mainittu Kuuban T-55M esimerkkitapaus).

Teen paremmalla ajalla kunnollisen vertailun Kommersantin kuvasta kootun taulukon kanssa (sen aikaväli 1992-2012) mutta alustavasti löytyy muutama selvä ero: Kommersantin mukaan 1992 myytiin Iso-Britannialle yksi T-80U, Omanille 6 kpl T-72S ja Kuuballe 50 tai 51 kpl T-72 vaunuja vuonna 1993.

Toisaalta Kommersant ei mainitse ainakaan Puolalle, Georgialle eikä varsinkaan Intialle toimitettu T-72 vaunuja (nämäkin 90-luvulla, erityisesti Intian numerot herättävät huomiota tässä SIPRI:n taulukossa - tosin selityksen mukaan "lisenssivalmistettu Intiassa" joten ehkä Venäjä ei toimittanut näihin edes sellaista määrää tavaraa jota voisi kutsua "kitiksi").

En myöskään luota 100% SIPRI:n kykyyn raportoida toimitettujen vaunujen malli oikein, tosin tämä on ymmärrettävää sinänsä: esim. T-72B ja T-72S näyttävät ulospäin hyvin samanlaisilta. Ainakin Venezuelan tapauksessa on selvä virhe: he kirjoittavat vaunujen olevan T-72M1M kun ne ovat todellisuudessa T-72B1V.

En tehnyt muutoksia tähän taulukkoon, koska halusin esittää ns. raakadatan sellaisena kuin se löytyy näistä ilmoituksista. Pitää paremmalla ajalla tutkia tarkemmin heidän numeroitaan ja arvioida, mitkä kuuluvat "Venäjän vienti" -taulukkoon ja mitkä tulisi jättää pois - tässäkin pitää toki tehdä oma tulkinta: lasketaanko vain kokonaisina toimitetut vaunut, vai otetaanko mukaan kittitoimitukset vai lasketaanko näiden lisäksi myös lisenssivalmistus (vaikkei siihen tehtäisi mitään osatoimituksia).

Joka tapauksessa lupaavalta vaikuttava lähde Venäjän viennille, varsinkin vuosien 2013-2021 osalta, näille on vaikeampi löytää tietoa tällä tavoin yhdeksi paketiksi koottuna. Sopimusten allekirjoittaminen tarjoaa toki yhden ajanhetken MUTTA tässä haetaankin toimitusmääriä per vuosi, jolloin ko. uutisista ei ole apua (vaikka mainittaisiinkin toimitusaikataulu, niin se on tavoite, ei toteutunut).

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Tässä yksi datapiste joka tuli mieleen kun katselin näitä numeroita: LÄHDE

Monday, September 21, 2020​

3000 tanks and vehicles based on them delivered from Russia abroad in the 21st century​

Spoiler: Artikkelin teksti kokonaisuudessaan

https://gurkhan.blogspot.com/2020/09/3000-xxi.html

Monday, September 21, 2020​

3000 tanks and vehicles based on them delivered from Russia abroad in the 21st century​

JSC Rosoboronexport (part of the Rostec State Corporation) over the 20 years of its activity on the international arms market has delivered abroad over 3,000 tanks and vehicles based on them, including artillery, engineering and other weapons systems and military equipment.

"Technique created by the Russian school of tank building, which turned 100 this year, annually receives the highest marks from foreign experts.

The latest developments of Rostec holdings: Armata and T-90MS tanks, BMPT Terminator fire support combat vehicles, Sprut-SDM1 light amphibious tanks, TOS-1A heavy flamethrower systems, Msta-S self-propelled howitzers, large a line of engineering vehicles on tank chassis and many other samples of domestic armored vehicles are at the top of the global demand.

In a number of countries, armored units, equipped mainly with Russian vehicles, have become the basis of the national armed forces," said Alexander Mikheev, General Director of JSC Rosoboronexport, Deputy Chairman of the Union of Machine Builders of Russia.

Today, more than 40 countries are actively using not only modern Russian armored vehicles (BTT), but even BTT, delivered decades ago during the Soviet era. At the same time, more than half of these countries over the past 20 years have signed large contracts with JSC Rosoboronexport for the supply of new batches or the modernization of the existing BTT in the fleet in order to radically increase the combat readiness and combat capability of their armies.

Abroad highly appreciate the key qualities of the Russian BTT:

high efficiency of combat use and the ability to solve a wide range of tasks, including thanks to rocket and cannon armament, which allows firing conventional ammunition and guided missiles;

ease of operation (equipment is easily mastered by personnel, easy to maintain and repair, even in the field);

automation of operations and control, increased mobility of armored personnel carriers, good security of crews, the ability to operate in the widest range of geographical and climatic conditions, from polar ice to the equator;

reliability of armored vehicles, unification of platforms and units, their high maintainability on the battlefield;

compliance with the performance characteristics declared.

The success of the export of the Russian BTT is inextricably linked with the quality training of foreign specialists, the creation of joint ventures abroad, and the conduct of various development work in the interests of foreign states.

Foreign customers pay great attention to the preliminary assessment of equipment, which makes it possible to make a decision on its purchase. Thus, the tests of T-90 tanks in the Thar Desert and the Arabian sands became a powerful advertisement for these vehicles, thanks to which a plant for the licensed production of T-90S was built in India, and a number of countries adopted them.

For 100 years, the Russian tank-building industry has traveled a path that no one else in the world has repeated, becoming a nationwide academy plant, in whose workshops engineering ideas are transformed into advanced military equipment.

The best achievements of science and the unique centuries-old combat experience of using tanks are today embodied in the Armata universal platform, the appearance of analogues of which is not predicted in the foreseeable future. Foreign deliveries of vehicles on this platform are the future of world tank building. At present, world tank exports are confidently led by the T-72, T-80 and T-90, which received a high-quality modern appearance as a result of Russian modernization.

"The huge scientific and technical groundwork and the colossal capacities of Russian heavy engineering enterprises, which include tank building, the latest production technologies, from welding and rolling of armor plates to the delicate integration of state-of-the-art digital equipment into multi-ton cases - all this provides Russia with leadership in this segment of the global arms market. This success has been achieved by the talents and conscientious work of hundreds of thousands of people working in design bureaus, standing behind machine tools, casting steel, assembling powerful combat vehicles.Only close-knit teams can achieve such high results.This glory belongs to the full extent to the global tank-building forward, the Rostec holding - corporation "Uralvagonzavod", which ensured the factory continuity of generations and preserved labor dynasties,where the transfer of experience is carried out from fathers to sons - the future tank builders of Russia, who have not been and should not be equal in the world," Alexander Mikheev emphasized.

Source

Artikkeli on tietysti kirjoitettu hyvin ympäripyöreästi, isoin kysymysmerkki on, mitä tarkoitetaan kun kirjoitetaan "tanks and vehicles based on them delivered from Russia abroad in the 21st century"

Tuolle ei tarjota selvää selitystä:

JSC Rosoboronexport (part of the Rostec State Corporation) over the 20 years of its activity on the international arms market has delivered abroad over 3,000 tanks and vehicles based on them, including artillery, engineering and other weapons systems and military equipment.

Tekstissä luetellaan useita panssarivaunun alustalle rakennettuja sotakoneita, mutta myös kevyt Sprut-SDM1, mikä ei tietysti "perustu panssarivaunuun". Toisaalta teksti ei väitäkään tätä.

Mahdollisesti hyödyllinen tiedonmurunen:

Today, more than 40 countries are actively using not only modern Russian armored vehicles (BTT), but even BTT, delivered decades ago during the Soviet era. At the same time, more than half of these countries over the past 20 years have signed large contracts with JSC Rosoboronexport for the supply of new batches or the modernization of the existing BTT in the fleet in order to radically increase the combat readiness and combat capability of their armies.

Eli yli 40 maata käyttää tällä hetkellä venäläistä ja/tai Neuvostoliiton aikaan valmistettuja "panssaroituja ajoneuvoja" ja näistä maista YLI PUOLET on allekirjoittanut "ison sopimuksen" Venäjän kanssa viimeisen 20 vuoden aikana. Jos katsoo yllä lainattuja SIPRI:n tietoja niin väite pitää paikkansa jo pelkästään panssarivaunujen osalta.

Määrän osalta on toki hieman vaikeampaa. Minun on helppo uskoa että tarkoitetaan juurikin panssarivaunuja sekä NIIDEN alustalle rakennettuja sotakoneita. Tekstin muotoilu saa uskomaan että puhutaan TOIMITETUISTA eikä tilatuista vaunuista joten mukaan voidaan laskea vuosituhannen vaihteen osalta 90-luvulla tilatut, joiden toimitus tapahtui esim. 2000, 2001 tai 2002. Toisaalta toisessa päässä leikkurin pitäisi toimia toiseen suuntaan eli ei lasketa allekirjoitettuja sopimuksia, joiden toimitusta ei ole vielä tapahtunut.

Artikkeli on julkaistu 21.9.2020 mutta se on tällainen messujen yhteydessä kirjoitettu mainosteksti. Siinä voi siis olla hieman pyöristystä ylöspäin, tosin ei välttämättä. Kiehtovasti joka tapauksessa eivät saaneet täyttä summaa kokoon pelkillä panssarivaunuilla vaan piti lisätä mukaan "niiden alustoille rakennetut koneet". Tuo ei kerro muuta kuin sen että aikavälillä 1.1.2000 - 21.9.2020 vietiin VÄHEMMÄN KUIN 3000 kpl panssarivaunuja, tosin tästäkin joutunee halkomaan hiuksia: mitä on VIENTI?

 

[Antares]

Kirjoitin toisessa ketjussa pitkät pätkät Venäjän asevoimille valmistetuista panssarivaunuista tehdystä Andrey Frolovin seurannasta (LINKKI), joten en ala toistamaan itseäni liiaksi asti, liitän tähän viestiin vain hänen seurantaan perustuvat taulukot, jotka minulla on eri lähteistä.

Venäläisen Andrey Frolovin vuonna 2009 julkaisemasta kirjoituksesta, jossa on taulukko vuosien 2007, 2008 ja 2009 hankintamääristä. Alla kyseisen taulukon Google Lens -käännös siltä osin kuin työkalu suostui kääntämään: LÄHDE, huom. avaa pdf-tiedoston

Notes: ( n )- new purchases, ( m ) - modernization, ( r ) - repair

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Ruotsalaiset ovat julkaisseet seurantadokumentin maaliskuussa 2016, sen numero on FOI-R--4239--SE ja otsikko on:

Russia’s state armament programme to 2020: a quantitative assessment of implementation 2011–2015

https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4239--SE

Lainaan siitä alle pari kohtaa joissa käsitellään panssarivaunuja (taulukko on raportin sivulta 91):

HUOM: taulukossa, kuten ruotsalaisten kahdessa julkaisussa on eroteltu jakoviivalla suunniteltu ja toteutunut määrä: "planned number / actual number"

Tämä taulukko yksin on hieman omituinen, ilmeisesti kuvattuna vain uustuotanto. Onneksi sivulla 93 on kirjoitettu hieman lisää:



Tarkoitan erityisesti kohtaa jossa puhutaan modernisoiduista panssarivaunuista:

2010: noin 40 kpl T-72BA
2011: 70 kpl T-72BA
2012: 30 kpl T-72BA
2013; 260 kpl "modernised and repaired T-72B3s"

Toisaalta jos vertaa alla olevaan taulukkoon, niin tästä puuttuu joka tapauksessa esim. vuonna 2012 korjattuja T-72B/B1 ja T-80BV vaunuja.

Hyvä puoli on, että tämä antaa ainakin osan vuosien 2010 ja 2011 numeroista, mutta samalla ei voi olla epäilemättä, etteikö tästä puuttuisi ainakin näitä korjattuja. TOISAALTA tekstissä sanotaan selvästi "modernised" eikä oteta siten kantaa korjattuihin, joten tässä mielessä siinä ei ole virhettä, ainoastaan laajemman kokonaisuuden kannalta puuttuvaa tietoa.

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Selitin toisessa viestissä pidemmästi, mistä tämä seuraava on otettu. Jos kiinnostaa lukea yksityiskohdista, tässä linkki viestiin. LINKKI

Yksi artikkeli sisältää myös tekstiä ja taulukkoja, tämä on vuoden 2015 artikkeli. LÄHDE

Tässä taulukossa sarakkeet ovat vuosijärjestyksessä: 2012, 2013, 2014 ja 2015:

Notes: ( n )- new purchases, ( m ) - modernization, ( r ) - repair

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Tämä seuraava on toisesta ruotsalaisesta raportista, jossa on luvut vuoteen 2018 asti (kiitos käyttäjälle xzu joka linkitti tämän viime kesänä, olin ehtinyt unohtamaan sen - linkki vanhaan viestiini LINKKI):

https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4758--SE

Tämä ruotsalaisten taulukko nojaa samaan tietolähteeseen, josta tuo yllä oleva on peräisin. Näissä on muutaman vuoden osalta päällekkäisyyttä ja jos näitä vertaa, huomaa että yllä oleva seuranta on tarkempi: siinä erotellaan selvästi esim. T-72BA ja T-72B/B1 määrät toisistaan.

N = new purchases, MRO = modernisation, repair, and overhaul

En ole tyytyväinen siihen että modernisation, repair ja overhaul on niputettu yhdeksi paketiksi. Näillä on suuri ero, kun mietitään mikä lopputuote saadaan. Toisaalta ruotsalaisten koostama taulukko on mainio, koska minulla ei ole parempaakaan tarjota.

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Kirjoitin toisessa viestissä näiden ruotsalaisten raporttien lähteistä: LINKKI

Oli vihdoin aikaa tutustua tarkemmin tähän ruotsalaisten tekemään dokumenttiin ja heidän taulukon lähde on CAST-organisaation julkaisema lehti nimeltä «Экспорт вооружений» LÄHDE joka kääntyy nimelle Arms Export. Se julkaistaan kuusi kertaa vuodessa ja siinä on ollut vuoden 2019 julkaisuun asti Andrey Frolov / Андрей Фролов kirjoittama artikkeli nimeltä “Ispolnenie gosudarstvennogo oboronnogo zakaza Rossii v 2014 godu" / Исполнение государственного оборонного заказа России в 2014 году. Tuo otsikko kääntyy muotoon "Execution of the state defense order of Russia in 2014" tai "Fulfillment of the state defense order of Russia in 2014". Vuoden numero tietysti vaihtuu riippuen siitä, mistä vuodesta puhutaan. Heillä on ollut tapana julkaista edellisen vuoden tiedot seuraavan vuoden lehdessä, yleensä joko toisessa, kolmannessa tai neljännessä numerossa (kuusi numeroa per vuosi).

Tämä Frolovin artikkeli on julkaistu yhdessä lehdessä per vuosi ja tämä käy ilmi mm. heidän bmpd-blogista hakemalla (käyttää hakusanaa "Исполнение государственного оборонного заказа России в": LINKKI

2011 - Frolovin artikkeli julkaistu lehdessä 2/2012 LÄHDE
2012 - Frolovin artikkeli julkaistu lehdessä 2/2013 LÄHDE
2013 - ?
2014 - Frolovin artikkeli julkaistu lehdessä 3/2015 LÄHDE
2015 - Frolovin artikkeli julkaistu lehdessä 3/2016 LÄHDE
2016 - Frolovin artikkeli julkaistu lehdessä 4/2017 LÄHDE
2017 - Frolovin artikkeli julkaistu lehdessä 4/2018 LÄHDE
2018 - Frolovin artikkeli julkaistu lehdessä 3/2019 LÄHDE

Nämä lehdet ovat maksullisia, mutta tämän 3/2019 lehden artikkelin jälkeen yhdenkään lehden sisällysluettelosta ei löydy tällaista artikkelia. Tuoreimpien lehtien sisällysluettelot ovat katsottavissa heidän nettisivulta (pitää klikata lehden kannen kuvasta niin aukeaa uudelle sivulle): LINKKI

Tämä pistää miettimään: mahtaisiko näissä alkuperäisissä artikkeleissa nämä tiedot olla tarkemmin merkittyjä?

Minulla ei ole pääsyä näihin ja tämä lehti on maksullinen. CAST-organisaatio on muuten sama joka on usein linkittämäni bmpd-blogin taustalla eli sinänsä "sama lähde".

TEORIASSA yllä olevista taulukoista voi koostaa yhtenäisen taulukon, josta nähdään Venäjän asevoimille toimitetut panssarivaunut aikavälillä 2007-2018, mutta olen hieman epäileväinen että näistä ei löydy kaikkia toimituksia. Suurin epäilys kohdistuu korjattuihin varastovaunuihin, käyttääpä sitten termiä repair tai overhaul. Olen melkoisen varma että T-72B/B1 ja T-80BV vaunuja on korjattu tietty määrä JOKA VUOSI, tosin määrät voivat vaihdella koska ulkomaiden vientiin korjattavia vaunuja on korjattu samoissa "armored repair plant" pajoissa jotka korjaavat vaunuja Venäjän asevoimille.

Voin toki olla väärässä tämän luulon osalta, vaikea olla varma jos ei ole esittää asiasta todisteita. Frolov tai CAST-organisaatio ei näytä julkaisseen tällaista taulukkoa vuoden 2018 jälkeen, en ainakaan onnistunut löytämään sellaista eikä heidän lehtiensä sisällysluetteloista löydy sitä. Ehkä ylempi taho on kieltänyt näiden tietojen julkaisun tai ehkä lehti vaihtoi linjaansa asian suhteen, vaikea sanoa.

Mahdollisesti bmpd-blogia ja muita lähteitä seuraamalla pystyy muodostamaan (puutteellisen) kuvan vuosien 2019-2022 osalta, tosin arvaan että tämä onnistuu uustuotannon ja modernisointien osalta MUTTA peruskorjattujen vaunujen määrät ovat ne vaikeimmat.

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Tämä ei suoraan liity edelliseen, mutta linkki tuli vastaan kun hain ylle lainattuja taulukoita: LÄHDE

Russia doesn’t produce tanks, UralVagonZavod with half production​

By Boyko Nikolov on July 8, 2022

Spoiler: Artikkelin teksti kokonaisuudessaan

https://bulgarianmilitary.com/amp/2...ce-tanks-uralvagonzavod-with-half-production/

Russia doesn’t produce tanks, UralVagonZavod with half production​

By Boyko Nikolov on July 8, 2022

MOSCOW — The only tank manufacturer in the Russian Federation – UralVagonZavod has partially suspended production, employees have been sent on unpaid leave and financial difficulties due to lawsuits against the Russian manufacturer continue. At the moment, UralVagonZavod does not produce the desired amount of tanks but has focused its efforts on repairing destroyed combat equipment.

Photo credit: Uralvagonzavod

Military analysts predict that the difficulties faced by the Russian manufacturer UralVagonZavod, the war in Ukraine, in which Russia is throwing a lot of armored vehicles, but also losing a lot of armored vehicles, will lead to a “reformatting of the entire world arms market in the foreseeable future. That is, the Russian Federation may be pushed out of its niche,” says Alexander Kovalenko in his commentary.

Production problems for UralVagonZavod are significant. In addition to the lack of components and spare parts, as well as the suspended supply of Western technology to Russia, UralVagonZavod is facing a “cooperative problem along the entire chain in the industry.” For example, the company is losing contracts and orders because another Russian manufacturer Barnaul Machine-Building Plant is losing customers, including countries from North America, India, China, and Egypt. Now, as with UralVagonZavod, the Barnaul Machine-Building Plant is laying off employees and stopping production, and only a year ago it was exporting to more than 30 countries around the world.

Photo credit: Defense Express

As BulgarianMilitary.com wrote two days ago [July 7th], UralVagonZavod even refuses to repair burned tanks coming from the war in Ukraine.

Financial problems​

Last but not least, the Russian tank manufacturer, which, in addition to military equipment, also produces metro trains and wagons for train sets, is experiencing serious financial problems due to obligations to Russian companies. For example, the Russian technology company IBS still expects UralVagonZavod to repay its debt to it, which amounts to nearly $800,000. The amount for such an enterprise should not be a problem, but an accounting report from last year [2021] shows that the total short-term and long-term liabilities of UralVagonZavod exceed 1.5 billion USD.

Despite the war and suspicions of “politicized courts” serving Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state-wide policies, Russian courts have rejected a large part of UralVagonZavod’s claims to reschedule the repayment period for accrued debts and put Russia’s largest and only tank manufacturer on the brink of survival.

UralVagonZavod’s profit has fallen sharply, and the state continues to help finance the purchase of new production technologies, creating a “false illusion” of a stable house of cards, which, however, may soon collapse.

“Whether there were new tanks is a very good question. In fact, UralVagonZavod has not been releasing new tanks from scratch for several years, as the Russian leadership likes to report about it. The company modernizes old Soviet tanks and presents them as new,” Alexander Kovalenko notes journalists. As experts explain, this is done to cut public funds.

The sanctions​

Photo credit: Defense Express

As we reported on July 6, the Ukrainian intelligence continues to claim that Russian industry has not yet overcome its dependence on Western technology and that economic sanctions are having a serious impact. In April this year, the US also mentioned problems in Russian production and repair of military equipment. In a speech at the end of March, Thea Kendler, assistant secretary for export administration at the Ministry of Trade, said that in addition to UralVagonZavod, the Russian company Baikal Electronics was experiencing difficulties. It is a company producing computers and semiconductors. According to Kendler, the company no longer receives integrated circuits. They are needed, she says, to maintain the company’s server equipment.

Kendler recalled that only 5% of imports to Russia come from the United States, but almost 50% come from Europe. At the same time, Taiwan has dealt a very serious blow to Russia’s military industry as the local TSMC has left the Russian market. TSMC is the world’s largest chip maker. With the departure of the Russian market from TSMC, Russia is losing a huge number of MIPS needed in the development of military intelligence systems and other military systems. In particular, it concerns the interruption of access to Elbrus chips.

There were signals already in May​

Reports of problems with heavy military equipment and the inability to carry out quality repairs, both in the field and in the repair plants of the Russian Federation, appeared as early as May. Several train sets were then seen transporting obsolete T-62M and T-62МВ tanks into the interior of Ukraine, the tanks being mobilized and taken from the reserve as well as from the inventory of military units in Tajikistan, Libya, and Syria.

According to unconfirmed information and according to Ukrainian sources, as of July 1, Russia has already lost over 1,500 tanks, 3,737 armored personnel vehicles, 800 artillery systems, 246 MLRS, and 105 anti-aircraft systems.

Spekulatiivinen artikkeli ja vieläpä lähteestä jota en ole lukenut ennen Ukrainan sotaa, ja silloinkin vain muutaman kerran kun sinne on linkitetty. Lainaan silti pätkän (alleviivaus minun):

Despite the war and suspicions of “politicized courts” serving Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state-wide policies, Russian courts have rejected a large part of UralVagonZavod’s claims to reschedule the repayment period for accrued debts and put Russia’s largest and only tank manufacturer on the brink of survival.

UralVagonZavod’s profit has fallen sharply, and the state continues to help finance the purchase of new production technologies, creating a “false illusion” of a stable house of cards, which, however, may soon collapse.

“Whether there were new tanks is a very good question. In fact, UralVagonZavod has not been releasing new tanks from scratch for several years, as the Russian leadership likes to report about it. The company modernizes old Soviet tanks and presents them as new,” Alexander Kovalenko notes journalists. As experts explain, this is done to cut public funds.

Sanoisin että tuo alleviivaamani kohta voi osua hyvinkin lähelle maalia. T-90A on viimeinen panssarivaunu jota on valmistettu enemmän Venäjän asevoimille, näistä viimeiset vuonna 2010. Toki T-90M vaunuista pieni tai suurempi osa voi olla uustuotantoa, mutta tästä kuulee arvioita puolesta toiseen. On hyvin mahdollista että vain 10 kpl olisi uustuotantoa ja loput modernisoituja T-90 perheen vaunuja. En osaa sanoa, milloin ja mikä määrä T-90S vaunuja on valmistettu Venäjän asevoimille, mutta selvästi niitä on koska niitä on käytetty Ukrainassa. Oletan ettei näitä ole välttämättä edes valmistettu heidän asevoimille vaan muuhun käyttöön (esittely, myynti, testit yms.), mutta voin olla väärässä.

Joka tapauksessa valtaosa Venäjän asevoimille valmistuneista vaunuista on joko modernisoituja vanhoja tai peruskorjattuja varastovaunuja. Tässä ei sinänsä ole mitään väärää, mutta tätä ei sovi unohtaa: ne eivät ole uusia vaunuja siinä mielessä millaiseksi "uusi" kuvitellaan. Toisaalta kuten nähdään aikaisemmin linkittämästäni SIPRI:n tiedoista, T-90S on ihan todellinen myyntimenestys, jota on valmistettu suuret määrät viimeisen 20 vuoden aikana. Toki osa näistä on Intiassa tehtävää lisenssivalmistusta JA ymmärtääkseni myös Algeria valmistaa ainakin osan vaunusta itse, tai vähintään kokoaa näitä kiteistä. Kaikki eivät siis ole UVZ:n tuotantolinjalta valmistuvia uusia vaunuja MUTTA merkittävä määrä on.

 

[Antares]

Jos otetaan kaikki edellisessä viestissä lainaamani taulukot ja syötetään niiden panssarivaunuja koskevat numerot saman taulukkoon, saadaan tällainen kokonaisuus (kaikissa alla olevissa merkintä "c. 40" tarkoittaa "about 40" eli "noin 40 kpl" - käytin silti summan laskennassa numeroa 40, koska en halunnut arvata olisiko todellinen määrä 35, 36, 37, 38 tai 39:



Kuten nähdään, taulukoissa on päällekkäisyyttä muutaman vuoden osalta. Tuota on helppo siistiä T-90A, T-72BA ja T-72B3 osalta, minkä jälkeen taulukko näyttää tältä. Oletan myös että vuonna 2015 Armenialle palkinnoksi valmistettu T-90 vaunu oli T-90S eikä T-90A:



Teen seuraavat oletukset: T-80BV (MRO) vuosina 2017 ja 2018 tarkoittaa T-80BVM modernisointia JA "T-72BA,T-72B/B1/B3 (MRO)" aikavälillä 2015-2018 tarkoittaa T-72B3 obr 2016 modernisointia - joista osa voi toki olla T-72B3 tasoa, muistan kuulleeni että näitä modernisointeja olisi tehty samaan aikaan ja jossakin suhteessa. HUOM: on myös mahdollista, kuten ruotsalaisten käyttämä laaja kategoria sanoo että osa näistä olisi T-72BA tai T-72B/B1 remontointeja. Tämän taulukon perusteella ei voida olla varmoja.

Otan myös pois tuon yhden T-90S vaunun vuodelta 2015 koska sen tiedetään menneen Armenialle. Vaunu saapui Armenian Yerevaniin 27.4.2016: LÄHDE

The T-90S tank Armenians won during the tank biathlon was transported to Armenian on April 27, the Ministry of Defense reports. The tank was produced in December 2015.

The Armenian team won the 2nd place at the “Tank Bialthon-2014” held in Russia and received the T-90S tank as a gift from the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Joka tapauksessa, edellä mainittujen muutosten jälkeen taulukko näyttää tältä:



Eniten tässä kiusaa tämä: missä menee T-72B3 ja T-72B3 obr 2016 raja (jos tällainen raja on edes olemassa)?

T-72B3 obr 2016 ei ole vaunun virallinen nimi, mutta se on vakiintunut käyttöön jotta voidaan tehdä ero aikaisempiin T-72B3 vaunuihin. Venäläiset lähteet kutsuivat vaunua aluksi nimellä модернизированных танков Т-72Б3 с дополнительной защитой mikä kääntyy muotoon "upgraded T-72B3 tanks with additional protection".

Jos en ole erehtynyt, tässä kirjoitetaan ensimmäisestä näitä vaunuja koskevasta sopimuksesta: LÄHDE

Contract for the modernization of 154 tanks to the level of T-72B3 with additional protection

March 6th, 2016

Spoiler: Artikkelin teksti kokonaisuudessaan

https://bmpd.livejournal.com/1776063.html

Contract for the modernization of 154 tanks to the level of T-72B3 with additional protection

bmpd
March 6th, 2016

On the website of public procurement appeared posted JSC " Scientific and Production Corporation "Uralvagonzavod" named after F.E. Dzerzhinsky " information about the intention to conclude a contract "Author's support and technical assistance during the overhaul with the modernization of 154 tanks of the T-72B type (T-72B, T-72B1, T-72BA) bringing to the form of the T-72B3 with additional protection " . The initial (maximum) price of the contract is 32.262 million rubles. The contract is valid until December 31, 2017. The purchase must be made from a single supplier, with work carried out in Nizhny Tagil.




Modified modernized tank T-72B3 (also referred to as T-72B3M, T-72B4) on display during the International Finals of the "Tank Biathlon-2014". Alabino, August 2014 (c) Vitaly V. Kuzmin / vitalykuzmin.net


The work must be carried out during 2015-2017 to ensure the execution of the state contract No. 1517187321301030119015402/R/3/2/234-2015-D GOZ, in accordance with the technical requirements (TT) No. 3/6/1-2015 dated 19.01.2015 g., on the basis of the terms of reference (TOR) dated 25.08.2015. Overhaul with the modernization of tanks of the T-72B type with the reduction to the form of the T-72B3 with additional protection is carried out according to the design and repair documentation AEL.184.SD-R7 with additions (for T-72B/B1 tanks) and AEL.184.SD-R8 (for T-72BA tanks).

It is indicated that on the basis of the ToR and ToR, the Contractor started the actual performance of work from 01.10.2015.

The purchase must be made from a single supplier, which, apparently, is Omsktransmash JSC, which is part of the integrated structure of this corporation, carrying out overhaul of T-72B tanks with modernization to the level of T-72B3.

Recall that earlier JSC Research and Production Corporation Uralvagonzavod named after F.E. Dzerzhinsky " placed in the procurement register information on the conclusion of an agreement with JSC Omsktransmash, which is part of the integrated structure of the corporation, for the overhaul of 32 T-72B tanks with modernization to the level of T-72B3. Under the terms of the agreement, 32 tanks are to be repaired by the end of 2015, and modernization is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2016.

As for the T-72B3 variant with enhanced protection, Andrey Terlikov, chief designer of NPK Uralvagonzavod, announced the creation of such a modification in June 2015 at the Army-2015 forum .“A set of additional protection has been prepared for the new modification of the T-72B3,” Terlikov informed. “In the near future, we plan to launch this modification into mass production.” According to Terlikov, the new modification of the T-72B3 also received a V2F tank diesel engine with an HP 1130 power. “The driver has received an automated control system that independently warns of damage and accidents, and the commander’s workplace is equipped with a panoramic sight,” added a representative of Uralvagonzavod. “This modification has proven itself from the best side,” said Terlikov.

Presumably, we are talking about a modification of the T-72B3 tank, first demonstrated during the "Tank Biathlon-2014" in the summer of 2014 and unofficially referred to in various sources as T-72B3M or T-72B4.

Artikkelin lopussa spekuloidaan että tämä "uusi modernisointi" voisi olla sama joita nähtiin "Tank Biathlon-2014" tapahtumassa kesällä 2014, mutta tiedämme ettei näin tapahtunut, nämä ovat eri vaunuja, ko. Tank Biathloniin valmistettuja vaunuja kutsutaan nimellä T-72B3 obr 2014.

Näitä tuskin on valmistettu suurta määrää, ainoastaan Venäjän joukkue käytti tätä vaunua "Tank Biathlon-2014" tapahtumassa (kiinalaiset toivat oman vaunun ja muut joukkueet käyttivät T-72B1 vaunuja - näin Vitaly Kuzminin mukaan, linkin takaa löytyy runsaasti hänen ottamiaan kuvia ko. tapahtumasta): LÄHDE

The Final of International Tank Biathlon 2014 competition​

Photo report from the Final of International Tank biathlon 2014 competition in Alabino training ground of 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division. Crews from Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and China took part in the final. Russian crew took the first place, Armenia - second and Chinese were the third.

Russian team used special biathlon version of T-72B3 called T-72B3M/B4 (official designation is still not adopted), Armenia and Kazakhstan had T-72B1 and only Chinese took their tank Type 96A.

Wikipedian mukaan 2015 vuodesta alkaen jokainen maa on käyttänyt T-72B3 vaunuja, poislukien Kiina joka käyttää aina omaa Type 96A vaunua ja Intia on (ainakin yhtenä vuotena) käyttänyt T-90 Bishma vaunua. LÄHDE

En ole tutkinut tätä tapahtumaa koskaan tarkemmin, mutta tuli mieleen tämä: oliko vuosi 2014 ainoa jolloin käytettiin T-72B3 obr 2014 vaunua? Kun muiden vuosien aikana puhutaan "T-72B3" vaunuista, niin mitä mallia tarkoitetaan?

Ei tällä ole suuresti merkitystä, mutta vuonna 2014 ainoastaan Venäjä käytti T-72B3 obr 2014 vaunua, joten valmistusmäärä olisi "vähintään yksi". Jos oletetaan pari varavaunua niin puhutaan silti selvästi alle kymmenestä. Toisaalta vuoden 2015 kilpailussa "T-72B3 käyttäjiä" oli 11 kpl. Oliko jokaiselle vain yksi vaunu vai oliko myös varavaunuja? Joka tapauksessa puhuttaisiin hyvin pienestä määrästä T-72B3 obr 2014 vaunuja.

Tämä on toki pelkkä kuriositeetti, Ukrainan sodan aikana Venäjä on menettänyt todistetusti ainakin 3 kpl T-72B3 obr 2014 vaunuja. LÄHDE

Tuo 3 kpl voi hyvinkin olla sama määrä minkä verran näitä on valmistettu. En ihmettelisi, vaikka näin olisi käynytkin: he menettivät myös (väitetysti) ainoan T-80UM2 vaununsa Ukrainassa, niitä ei ole valmistettu kuin yksi kappale.

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Vaan miten tätä ylle jaettua bmpd-artikkelia tulisi tulkita? Sopimuksen mukaan työ alkoi 01.10.2015 ja tuossa kirjoitetaan siitä, miten JSC Omsktransmash tulisi modernisoimaan 32 kpl T-72B vaunuja T-72B3 standardiin vuoden 2015 loppuun mennessä. Samassa lauseessa kirjoitetaan "and modernization is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2016". Toisaalta artikkelin varsinainen aihe on tuore sopimus, jonka mukaan UVZ tulisi modernisoimaan 154 kpl T-72B3 obr 2016 standardiin ja sopimuksen takaraja on "contract is valid until December 31, 2017".

Ilman lisätietoa, pelkästään tähän artikkeliin nojaten, tulkitsen tuota niin että ensimmäiset 32 kpl T-72B3 obr 2016 vaunuja valmistui vuoden 2016 aikana ja vuonna 2017 näitä modernisoitiin ylempänä taulukossa merkitty 150 kpl.

Näin tulkittuna vuoden 2015 aikana modernisoidut 170 kpl voisivat ollakin T-72B3 vaunuja ja vuonna 2016 näitä olisi modernisoitu 100 - 32 = 68 kpl.

HUOM: tässä on tehty loogista päättelyä sen sijaan että olisi kaivettu lisätietoa muista lähteistä. Useimmiten tällainen "arvaaminen" johtaa vääriin tuloksiin, joten tätä ei pidä ottaa varmana tietona vaan pelkästään numeroiden pyörittelynä.



Jos katsoo lainaamaani taulukko edellisessä viestissä, vuoden 2015 kohdalla lukee "170 T-72 (m; r)" eikä "T-72B3" kuten viereisissä sarakkeissa. On syys hyvin mahdollista että nämä ovat peruskorjattuja T-72B/B1/BA vaunuja JA että alkuperäisiä T-72B3 vaunuja olisi valmistettu vain vuosina 2013 ja 2014. Mikä selittäisi tällaisen? Yksi olisi että valmistivat pyydetyn / tilatun määrän T-72B3 vaunuja ja tilaukselle ei tullut jatkoa. Miksei olisi tullut? Koska se nähtiin liian vähäisenä modernisointina ja parempi versio oli ihan kohta valmis (T-72B3 obr 2016). Niitä varten tarvitaan kuitenkin T-72B/B1/BA aihioita joten miksei remontoitaisi niitä ns. odotellessa kun parempi modernisointi saadaan viimeisteltyä?

JOS olettaa tuolla tavoin, eikä kuten oletin ennen sitä, taulukko muuttuu hieman. En laita tähän muutettua versiota, mutta käytännössä siinä olisi 170 kpl ja 68 kpl rivillä T-72B/B1 vuosien 2015 ja 2016 kohdalla, minkä jälkeen ko. rivin summa olisi 97 + 170 + 68 = 335 kpl. T-72B3 summa puolestaan olisi 260 + 293 = 553 kpl.

Vaan mitä tapahtui tämän jälkeen, aikavälillä 2019-2022? Sotavuosi 2022 on iso mysteeri, en edes yritä arvioida sitä. Aikavälille 2019-2021 on tarjottavana muutama tiedonmurunen, mutta se vaatisi lisää tutkimista. Kirjoitin aikaisemmissa viesteissä T-80BVM ja T-90M toteutuneista tuotantomääristä (tai ainakin niistä numeroista, jotka on nähty julkisuudessa).

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T-80BVM osalta törmätään esteeseen: yllä on tehty oletus että vuosien 2017 ja 2018 T-80BV modernisointi olisi T-80BVM. Tiedetään myös että sopimuksen mukaan näitä olisi pitänyt valmistua 62 kpl vuosina 2018 ja 2019, 31 kpl per vuosi. Voin myös uskoa että vuodelle 2017 merkityt 10 kpl olisivat ns. esisarja.

Todellisuudessa tämä aikataulu EI toteutunut, lainaan vanhemmasta viestistä sen mitä kirjoitin toteutuneista T-80BVM toimituksista (bmpd-artikkeli on julkaistu 9.3.2021): LÄHDE

LÄHDE

2019: 31 kpl
2020: 20 kpl (tosin näiden lisäksi toimitettu "In November 2020, another batch of T-80BVM tanks was delivered to the Kazan Tank School" mutta en laske näitä aktiivijoukkojen vaunuiksi)
2021: "about" 80 kpl (tosin tämä on "plans to receive")

Altyn73 12.9.2021 julkaistun artikkelin mukaan Venäjän aktiivijoukoilla oli 72 kpl T-80BVM vaunuja: LÄHDE

Separate tank battalion of the 200th motorized rifle brigade (14th Army corps of the Northern fleet, Western military district) = 31 kpl
Tank battalion of the 423rd motorized rifle regiment (4th tank division, Western military district) = 21 kpl
Separate tank battalion of the 64th motorized rifle brigade (35th combined army, Eastern military district) = 20 kpl

Jos vertaa tuohon bmpd-artikkeliin, niin sen mukaan vuoden 2020 loppuun mennessä olisi toimitettu 51 kpl ja Altyn73 mukaan syyskuussa 2021 määrä olisi 72 kpl eli 21 kpl toimitettu aktiivijoukoille siihen mennessä (eli toisin sanoen artikkelin julkaisun aikaan vuodesta oli 2/3 takanapäin, vaunujen keskimääräinen tuotanto noin 10 vaunua per vuosikolmannes?). Bmpd-artikkelin mukaan vuoden 2021 aikana oli "tarkoitus vastaanottaa" 80 kpl näitä vaunuja.

Jos katsoo bmpd-artikkelin tilauksia ja suunniteltuja toimituksia per vuosi, niin selvästi ovat olleet kokoajan myöhässä näiden toimitusten kanssa. Ensimmäinen vuonna 2017 tehty tilaus sisälsi 62 kpl vaunuja, jotka piti toimittaa vuosina 2017 ja 2018 (31 kpl per vuosi eli yksi pataljoona per vuosi). Tämä tilaus saatiin mahdollisesti valmiiksi vuonna 2020, riippuu mikä määrä kuuluu tuohon panssarisotakoululle toimitettu "batch". Tämän tilauksen jälkeen vuosina 2019 ja 2020 on allekirjoitettu seuraavat sopimukset T-80B vaunujen modernisoinnista, määräksi sanotaan "estimated, up to 140" ja näiden toimitukset alkoivat vuonna 2021.

Jaroslaw Wolski kommentoi aikaisemmin: LÄHDE

Omsk / Omsktransmash as a repair shop - 62 T-80BVM per year, etc.

Ehkä tämä ei ole resurssien rajojen ulkopuolella MUTTA ylle lainaamani perusteella sanoisin että toistaiseksi vuosien 2019, 2020 ja 2021 aikana on toimitettu noin yhden panssarivaunupataljoonan verran vaunuja per vuosi eli 31 kpl. Saatan olla liian ankara vuoden 2021 arvioni kanssa ja nojata liiaksi Altyn73 blogiin. Se että syyskuuhun mennessä oli toimitettu "vasta" 21 kpl T-80BVM vaunuja ei tietysti tarkoita etteikö vuoden aikana olisi voinut valmistua 62 kpl tai jopa "odotettu 80 kpl". Modernisointien ja uustuotannon kanssa on tyypillistä että ensimmäiset pari vuotta menevät opetteluun, joten tuotantotahti on hitaampi mutta sen jälkeen päästään vauhtiin ja kyetään suurempiin toimituksiin (olettaen ettei ole muita esteitä tai rajoittimia).

Teen seuraavat oletukset: vaunujen toimitus viivästyi kuten yllä kirjotetaan. Koska taulukkoon on pakko merkitä jotain, kirjoitan näin:

2017: 5
2018: 5
2019: 31
2020: 30
2021: 31

Oletukset: Kazanin panssarisotakoululle toimitettu "batch" oli kymmenen vaunua JA vuoden 2021 aikana toimitettiin vain 31 vaunua.

-

T-90M modernisoinnin osalta tulkitsen bmpd-blogin kirjoitusta näin, linkki aikaisempaan viestiini: LINKKI

2020: 30
2021: 30

HUOM: tässäkin on epäselvyyttä, ylle merkitty aikataulu on se jonka mukaan vaunuja olisi luovutettu Venäjän armeijan omistukseen MUTTA saman bmpd-blogin tekstin perusteella näitä vaunuja luovutettiin varsinaisten aktiivijoukkojen käyttöön vasta myöhemmin:

...in August 2021 UVZ Executive Director Vladimir Roshchupkin said: that over the past period of the year "for the first time, new and upgraded to the level of T-90M" Proryv "tanks in the amount of 26 units were put into operation for the first time." Earlier in March 2021, it was reported that the first eight T-90M tanks handed over in 2021 entered the 27th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Sevastopol Red Banner Brigade of the 1st Guards Tank Army of the Western Military District, stationed in the village of Mosrentgen (Novaya Moscow).

Lainauksen aikajana, jos tulkitsen tekstiä oikein:

- Maaliskuu 2021: ensimmäiset 8 kpl luovutettiin 27th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army) käyttöön
- Elokuussa 2021 yksi UVZ:n johtajista Vladimir Roshchupkin sanoi että kuluvan vuoden aikana olisi luovutettu joukoille 26 kpl T-90M vaunuja. Tästä pitää tietysti vähentää edellinen 8 kpl, mikä kertoisi että aikavälillä maaliskuu 2021 - elokuu 2021 olisi luovutettu 18 kpl T-90M vaunuja

Toki näitäkin on valmistunut jonkinlainen esisarja ennen varsinaisia toimituksia, mutta en lähde spekuloimaan sillä ilman parempaa tietoa.

-

T-72B3 ja T-72B3 obr 2016 osalta minulla ei ole (ainakaan toistaiseksi) antaa vastaavia numeroita aikavälille 2019-2021. Yksi keino olisi verrata yllä lasketun taulukon numeroita Altyn73 tai Jaroslaw Wolskin arvioihin ja laskea, minkä verran mitäkin vaunutyyppiä PUUTTUU. Tämä voisi antaa vihjeen siitä, mikä määrä niitä olisi pitänyt valmistua aikavälillä 2019-2021, tosin tässä tehdään se oletus että yllä laskettu pitää paikkansa JA että Altyn73 tai Jaroslaw Wolskin tekemän seuranta olisi myös oikeassa (tai vähintään "jotain sinnepäin").

Jätän tuon myöhemmälle, lisään ainoastaan yllä tehdyt arvaukset T-80BVM ja T-90M osalta. Näiden muutosten jälkeen taulukko näyttää tältä (lisäsin myös vuosiluvun yläpuolelle juoksevan numeron 1-15 joka juoksee ns. väärään suuntaan, havainnollistamaan ko. vuotena valmistuneiden vaunujen ikää):



Eniten tässä kiusaavat T-72B3 ja T-72B3 obr 2016 vaunut: tiedetään että ensimmäinen T-72B3 vaunu luovutettiin loppuvuodesta 2011. Toisaalta oliko kyseessä ihan ensimmäinen ns. esisarjan panssarivaunu, minkä takia varsinainen modernisointi alkoi vasta 2013?

Toinen iso kiusa on tietysti erilaiset varastovaunujen T-72B/B1, T-80BV ja T-80U peruskorjaukset, joiden jälkeen vaunut on otettu aktiivijoukkojen käyttöön. Minun arvaus: jokainen syyskuussa 2021 heidän aktiivijoukoille merkitty panssarivaunu on joko modernisoitu, valmistettu (uustuotantona) tai peruskorjattu jossain vaiheessa aikavälillä 2007-2021. On myös mahdollista, että tiettyjä malleja kuten T-80BV olisi peruskorjattu enemmän kuin mille oli tarvetta (ehkä tulevaa T-80BVM modernisointia ennakoivasti, se kun on selvästi ainakin vuoden myöhässä) - näin ainakin on huhuttu, Jaroslaw Wolskin arvion mukaan näitä olisi jopa 620 kpl mikä on paljon enemmän kuin Altyn73 blogin mukainen 185 kpl. TOISAALTA pitää olla varovainen: eri "armored repair plant" pajat tekevät selvästi peruskorjausta ja pienimuotoista modernisointia ennen kuin ulkomaille myydyt vaunut toimitetaan (riippuu tietysti mistä on sovittu määrämaan kanssa) - eli jokainen pajan peruskorjaama vaunu EI mene Venäjän asevoimien käyttöön, ehkä jopa niin päin että peruskorjauskapasiteettia on priorisoitu vientiä silmällä pitäen? Arvauksia vain, ei kannata ottaa totena.

Toisaalta tiedetään myös että erilaisille panssarisotakouluille yms. laitoksille valmistuu oma määränsä panssarivaunuja, jotka eivät näy esim. Altyn73 arviossa (hän kirjoitti toisessa blogitekstissä epämääräisen arvion, että näillä kouluilla voisi olla vähintään 400 kpl eri tyyppien panssarivaunuja).

Jaroslaw Wolskin arvion numerot ovat selvästi suuremmat kuin Altyn73 blogin (tosin Altyn73 seuraa ainoastaan aktiivijoukkojen panssarivaunuja, ei tuotannon kokonaismääriä), joten jos olettaa että hänen arvionsa kertoisi valmistetuista kokonaismääristä, silloin olisi loogisempaa verrata hänen numeroihinsa. Silloinkin joutuu tekemään tulkintoja siitä, mitä hän on tarkoittanut milläkin kategorialla JA tietysti luottamaan siihen että hänen seurantansa on oikeassa tai ainakin "jotain sinnepäin".

Parasta olisi tietysti, jos kykenee haarukoimaan eri lähteistä realistiset arviot (tai mieluummin tiedot) eri vuosien modernisointimäärille JA remontoiduille varastovaunuille, silloin ei joudu tekemään loogisia loikkia jotka johtavat usein vääriin vastauksiin.

 

[Antares]

Etsin lisätietoa T-90S vientikaupoista, tässä yksi artikkeli (julkaistu 1.9.2017): LÄHDE

Spoiler: Artikkelin teksti kokonaisuudessaan

https://gurkhan.blogspot.com/2017/09/90.html

Friday, September 1, 2017​

Tank T-90. International market leader​

Tank T-90S. Photo Vitalykuzmin.net

Currently, several types of modern main battle tanks are represented on the international arms and equipment market. Armored vehicles produced by different countries find certain buyers and bring certain income to their manufacturers. At the same time, none of the modern foreign tanks can compare in terms of sales with Russian vehicles of the T-90 family. The latter have already managed to become the most massive export tanks built after the end of the Cold War.

The possibility of producing an export version of the latest T-90 tank was considered at the design stage. The result of this soon became the appearance of the T-90S tank, modified to take into account future sales to foreign customers. In October 1992, the latest armored vehicle was adopted by the Russian army, and at the same time, permission was received to export T-90S tanks. In the very near future, a new export tank could be shown to potential buyers and the desired orders could be received. However, over the next few years, the Uralvagonzavod enterprise, which developed the T-90S, failed to sign a single contract with foreign customers.

According to reports, at first, the promotion of the T-90S tank on the international market was difficult for bureaucratic reasons. It is known that until 1997, the manufacturing organization could not obtain permission to demonstrate a promising machine at foreign exhibitions. For the first time such a document was received only in 1997, before the IDEX exhibition in the United Arab Emirates. However, this time too, not everything went smoothly: the tank was shown to the visitors of the salon, although it was not officially included in the exposition.

Currently, several types of modern main battle tanks are represented on the international arms and equipment market. Armored vehicles produced by different countries find certain buyers and bring certain income to their manufacturers. At the same time, none of the modern foreign tanks can compare in terms of sales with Russian vehicles of the T-90 family. The latter have already managed to become the most massive export tanks built after the end of the Cold War.

The possibility of producing an export version of the latest T-90 tank was considered at the design stage. The result of this soon became the appearance of the T-90S tank, modified to take into account future sales to foreign customers. In October 1992, the latest armored vehicle was adopted by the Russian army, and at the same time, permission was received to export T-90S tanks. In the very near future, a new export tank could be shown to potential buyers and the desired orders could be received. However, over the next few years, the Uralvagonzavod enterprise, which developed the T-90S, failed to sign a single contract with foreign customers.

According to reports, at first, the promotion of the T-90S tank on the international market was difficult for bureaucratic reasons. It is known that until 1997, the manufacturing organization could not obtain permission to demonstrate a promising machine at foreign exhibitions. For the first time such a document was received only in 1997, before the IDEX exhibition in the United Arab Emirates. However, this time too, not everything went smoothly: the tank was shown to the visitors of the salon, although it was not officially included in the exposition.

The first demonstration to potential customers had a positive impact on further events. Shortly after the IDEX-1997 exhibition, negotiations began, which preceded the signing of new contracts. In 1999, Russia and India agreed to transfer three T-90S vehicles needed for use in trials. A little later, this technique was tested at Indian training grounds, and also compared with modern foreign machines of its class. According to the test results, the Indian military decided to buy Russian tanks. In addition, India offered to supply not only ready-made combat vehicles, but also assembly kits. The latter were planned to be "turned" into finished tanks at one of the Indian enterprises.

The contract for the supply of T-90S tanks to the Indian armed forces was signed in 2001. He meant the construction of 310 combat vehicles with a total cost of about 1 billion US dollars. In accordance with the existing agreement, Uralvagonzavod was to build and transfer 124 tanks to the customer. The rest of the equipment should have been sent to India in the form of assembly kits. The assembly of tanks under license was entrusted to HVF in the city of Avadi. It was supposed to complete the deliveries of the ordered equipment over the next few years.

In the context of the first "Indian" contract, the story of the customer's desire to receive guarantees became widely known. At that time, Russia and its industry were not going through the best of times, and there was a risk of stopping the construction of tanks for one reason or another. To resolve this problem, the top leadership of Russia had to take the situation under personal control. Fortunately, further events, despite some difficulties, developed according to a positive scenario, and the order was completed in full.

Finished 124 T-90S tanks, built in Nizhny Tagil, were handed over to the customer before the end of 2002. In the autumn of the same year, the Indian company HVF received the first sets of components and assemblies, after which it began to assemble armored vehicles on its own. The supply of tanks in "unassembled" form continued for about a year. Licensed assembly of tanks in India was carried out until the middle of the last decade. As a result of all these works, the Indian ground forces received 310 Russian-designed main battle tanks.

Having mastered the tanks of the first contract, the Indian military expressed their desire to continue purchasing and building. New contracts appeared already in 2006. First, the customer and the manufacturer signed a contract for the licensed production of 1,000 new tanks. A few months after the first contract, a new one appeared, according to which India was to receive another 330 T-90S vehicles with the production of some of this equipment in Russia. An important feature of the new contracts was the desire of the customer to receive updated equipment in a modified configuration.


Indian tanks T-90S "Bhishma" on exercises.

Especially for the Indian ground forces, a new modification of the T-90S was created, which differed in some design features. This project provided for the strengthening of the undercarriage and the refinement of the fire control system. In particular, regular thermal imaging devices were replaced by French-made products. Dynamic protection of the Russian development has given way to Indian counterparts.

Interestingly, the T-90S tanks, modified in accordance with the requirements of the Indian army, in addition to the official designation, received a new name "Bhishma" (literally - "Terrible"). It was decided to name a tank with high performance and combat capabilities in honor of one of the main characters of the Mahabharata epic, who became famous for his feats of arms and skillful diplomacy.

Already in 2007, India again ordered Russian tanks. This time it was about the production of 347 cars. It was planned to receive 124 tanks in finished form, and the rest were to arrive at the customer in the form of vehicle kits for assembly at the HVF plant. This order cost the Indian military 1237 million US dollars.

Enterprises "Uralvagonzavod" and HVF quickly managed to deploy the mass production of the required armored combat vehicles and begin to fulfill existing orders. The result of this was the appearance of a significant number of tanks and the start of the rearmament of the Indian ground forces. Over the next few years, very remarkable results were obtained. So, until 2010, inclusive, Russian tank builders sent more than 600 T-90S tanks to the customer in the original and modified version. At the same time, only a third of the tanks were handed over in finished form, while most of them were supplied as a set of parts for assembly at local enterprises. It is easy to see that by this time a little more than a third of all existing orders had been completed. Joint work continued, and has not been completed so far. New batches of Indian-assembled tanks are still entering the army; this process will continue over the next few years.


The main T-90CA tanks, intended for shipment to Algeria. June 2016

Orders for the production of T-90S for India are still being fulfilled. The state enterprise HVF has the ability to assemble up to a hundred tanks a year from vehicle kits, and therefore will have to produce new equipment before the end of this decade. According to reports, at present, the Indian ground forces are armed with more than 950 T-90S and Bhishma tanks. By 2020, it is planned to put into operation up to 2 thousand of these armored vehicles. Thus, the Indian army has already become the world's largest operator of the main tanks of the T-90S family, and in the near future will provide itself with an even greater gap from the main "competitors".

Algeria became the second foreign buyer of T-90S tanks. The African state showed its interest in Russian armored vehicles in the middle of the last decade. In March 2006, a contract was signed for the supply of 185 T-90S tanks. Simultaneously with this contract, several more agreements appeared for the supply of various Russian-made weapons and equipment. The total value of all contracts reached $8 billion. A few years later, Algeria initiated the signing of another contract.

At the request of the Algerian army, Uralvagonzavod created a specialized modification of the tank under the designation T-90CA, modified for operation in North Africa and other similar regions. The main differences between the "SA" machine and the base "C" machine were the use of an air conditioner and the possibility of installing searchlight systems from the Shtora optical-electronic suppression complex. Algeria also purchased T-90SKA command tanks, which differ in a different composition of communications equipment. In particular, they are equipped with a tactical battle management system T-BMS.

Unlike the Indian army, the Algerian side did not acquire a license to assemble Russian armored vehicles. Thanks to this, it was possible to reduce the waiting time for the required cars. As a result, to date, Algeria has received more than 300 tanks in linear and commander configurations.


T-90S tanks of the armed forces of Uganda and their crews.

In 2011, Azerbaijan added to the list of buyers of T-90S tanks. The army of this country wished to buy three battalion sets of armored vehicles - 94 vehicles. The agreement provided for an option for the further delivery of another 94 tanks. The Azerbaijani army received the first serial T-90S already in 2013. According to reports, about a hundred tanks have been delivered to date. Tanks for Azerbaijan, in general, correspond to the original T-90S project, but at the same time they carry optical-electronic suppression systems.

Another fairly large contract was concluded with Uganda. A few years ago, this African state acquired 44 Russian-made tanks. The supply of modern armored vehicles led to positive consequences in the context of the development of the army. The fact is that the basis of the Ugandan fleet of armored vehicles is still made up of obsolete T-55s.

Since a certain time, T-90 tanks of various modifications, including the original "A", have been supplied to the Syrian army. According to various sources, at least several dozen cars have already been transferred to a friendly state. Such deliveries are remarkable in that Russian tanks got the opportunity to take part in the current war and show their real potential. During the Syrian war, T-90s of various versions confirmed their combat effectiveness and high survivability. Several incidents with the shelling of such equipment with the help of anti-tank systems, which did not end in the destruction of armored vehicles, were widely known.

To complete the picture, it is also worth noting the supply of T-90S tanks to Turkmenistan and Armenia. The Turkmen army currently has only four such vehicles. The Armenian armed forces, in turn, have only one tank of this type. Of great interest is the "origin" of the only Armenian tank. In 2014, the national team of this country competed at the World Championship in tank biathlon and took second place in the overall standings. Such success was marked by a prize - the T-90S tank. Soon the armored car was handed over to the winning army.

In 2017, new reports appeared repeatedly about future deliveries of T-90 family tanks. Thus, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense earlier announced its intention to acquire at least 70 Russian armored vehicles. At the same time, it was only about the first batch, and in the future a new order could appear. The cost of the agreement, for obvious reasons, was not disclosed. In mid-July, new messages appeared in this regard. The Russian side has officially confirmed the signing of an agreement with Iraq. However, this time the volume and cost of the contract were not specified.


"Prize" tank T-90S, won by Armenian tankers in 2014.

According to various estimates, under the new contract (or contracts), Iraq may receive up to several hundred T-90S tanks or other modifications worth up to $1 billion. Naturally, all these are only approximate estimates, and therefore they should not be taken too seriously.

A few months ago, rumors and reports from unnamed sources appeared abroad and in our country about the imminent signing of a contract for the supply of T-90MS tanks to the armed forces of Egypt. Initially, publications on this topic mentioned the possibility of selling 400-500 tanks, but later these numbers were noticeably reduced. At the same time, it is said that it is possible to supply part of the armored vehicles in finished form in parallel with the organization of a licensed assembly. It can be assumed that in the very near future there will be the first official announcements about such a contract.


Ceremonial crew of Turkmen T-90SA tanks.

New export contracts may appear in the near future. In early July, the report of the research and production corporation Uralvagonzavod for 2016 was made freely available. This document provided some new information, as well as clarified the already known. In addition, the report specified the priority areas that are expected to be developed in the foreseeable future.

According to the report, in 2017 it was planned to fulfill the already concluded contracts with foreign customers in a timely and high-quality manner. At the same time, it was about Vietnam, which ordered 64 T-90S and T-90SK tanks, as well as Iraq, which is to receive 73 vehicles of the same types. Also this year, Uralvagonzavod is to complete pre-contract work with Kuwait, which wants to purchase 146 T-90MS/MSK tanks. The same machines are planned to be offered to India.

According to publicly available data, to date, at least 1,400 main battle tanks of various modifications of the T-90 family have been built by the domestic defense industry under export contracts. At least 1200-1300 armored vehicles will be built before the end of this decade in accordance with existing or planned contracts. Thus, the number of sold T-90 tanks will constantly grow, bringing certain incomes to the Russian industry.

If all the currently planned contracts are signed and fulfilled on time, then in the early twenties more than 2,600 T-90 tanks of completely Russian production or foreign assembly will serve in foreign armies. Thanks to this, one of the last Russian tanks will once again confirm its title as the most commercially successful tank in its class. Indian orders for a long time allowed the T-90 to break away from competitors in the context of the volume of export contracts, and new agreements will only strengthen its position in the international arms market.

The Uralvagonzavod report for the last year directly indicates that foreign customers are still showing interest in the rather old T-90S and its various modifications, but at the same time they should be offered the newer T-90MS tank. As you know, the development of the T-90 family is still ongoing and regularly leads to new results. Each new version of the Russian tank, embodied in metal, has every chance to interest a potential customer and become the subject of another lucrative deal.

Soviet and Russian tanks have been present on the international market for a very long time and quite deservedly retain their leadership positions. New machines of the T-90 family continue this "tradition" and, showing high performance, allow Russia to receive new major contracts. At the moment, the T-90S and its modifications are the most commercially successful tanks in the world, built after the end of the Cold War. There is every reason to believe that Russian tanks will maintain this status for many years to come.

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Tämä tuo hieman selvyyttä tiettyjen sopimusten ja toimitusten osalta. Sanoo myös että Algeria EI tekisi kittien kokoonpanoa vaan vaunut tehdään valmiiksi Venäjällä.

Intia on näistä kaikkein vaikeimmin hahmotettava: ovat allekirjoittaneet useita sopimuksia Venäjän kanssa JA tuotannon Intiassa olisi pitänyt alkaa jo ainakin 10 vuotta sitten. Silti hyvin pitkään toistui sama: tuotantoa ei saada käyntiin mutta vaunuja kootaan Venäjältä toimitetuista kiteistä. Osasyy ainakin alussa oli väitetysti Venäjän kieltäytyminen toimittaa tiettyjä teknologioita (joiden myynnistä oli kuulemma tehty sopimus). Helppo uskoa että Venäjä tavoilleen uskollisesti olisi viivytellyt näiden toimittamisen kanssa, ehkä jopa kieltäytynyt kokonaan. Näin saadaan pidettyä vaunujen tekeminen UVZ:n käsissä ja Intia nöyränä ostajana, ei tekijänä.

 

[John Hilly]

Etsin lisätietoa T-90S vientikaupoista, tässä yksi artikkeli (julkaistu 1.9.2017): LÄHDE

Spoiler: Artikkelin teksti kokonaisuudessaan

https://gurkhan.blogspot.com/2017/09/90.html

Friday, September 1, 2017​

Tank T-90. International market leader​

Tank T-90S. Photo Vitalykuzmin.net

Currently, several types of modern main battle tanks are represented on the international arms and equipment market. Armored vehicles produced by different countries find certain buyers and bring certain income to their manufacturers. At the same time, none of the modern foreign tanks can compare in terms of sales with Russian vehicles of the T-90 family. The latter have already managed to become the most massive export tanks built after the end of the Cold War.

The possibility of producing an export version of the latest T-90 tank was considered at the design stage. The result of this soon became the appearance of the T-90S tank, modified to take into account future sales to foreign customers. In October 1992, the latest armored vehicle was adopted by the Russian army, and at the same time, permission was received to export T-90S tanks. In the very near future, a new export tank could be shown to potential buyers and the desired orders could be received. However, over the next few years, the Uralvagonzavod enterprise, which developed the T-90S, failed to sign a single contract with foreign customers.

According to reports, at first, the promotion of the T-90S tank on the international market was difficult for bureaucratic reasons. It is known that until 1997, the manufacturing organization could not obtain permission to demonstrate a promising machine at foreign exhibitions. For the first time such a document was received only in 1997, before the IDEX exhibition in the United Arab Emirates. However, this time too, not everything went smoothly: the tank was shown to the visitors of the salon, although it was not officially included in the exposition.

Currently, several types of modern main battle tanks are represented on the international arms and equipment market. Armored vehicles produced by different countries find certain buyers and bring certain income to their manufacturers. At the same time, none of the modern foreign tanks can compare in terms of sales with Russian vehicles of the T-90 family. The latter have already managed to become the most massive export tanks built after the end of the Cold War.

The possibility of producing an export version of the latest T-90 tank was considered at the design stage. The result of this soon became the appearance of the T-90S tank, modified to take into account future sales to foreign customers. In October 1992, the latest armored vehicle was adopted by the Russian army, and at the same time, permission was received to export T-90S tanks. In the very near future, a new export tank could be shown to potential buyers and the desired orders could be received. However, over the next few years, the Uralvagonzavod enterprise, which developed the T-90S, failed to sign a single contract with foreign customers.

According to reports, at first, the promotion of the T-90S tank on the international market was difficult for bureaucratic reasons. It is known that until 1997, the manufacturing organization could not obtain permission to demonstrate a promising machine at foreign exhibitions. For the first time such a document was received only in 1997, before the IDEX exhibition in the United Arab Emirates. However, this time too, not everything went smoothly: the tank was shown to the visitors of the salon, although it was not officially included in the exposition.

The first demonstration to potential customers had a positive impact on further events. Shortly after the IDEX-1997 exhibition, negotiations began, which preceded the signing of new contracts. In 1999, Russia and India agreed to transfer three T-90S vehicles needed for use in trials. A little later, this technique was tested at Indian training grounds, and also compared with modern foreign machines of its class. According to the test results, the Indian military decided to buy Russian tanks. In addition, India offered to supply not only ready-made combat vehicles, but also assembly kits. The latter were planned to be "turned" into finished tanks at one of the Indian enterprises.

The contract for the supply of T-90S tanks to the Indian armed forces was signed in 2001. He meant the construction of 310 combat vehicles with a total cost of about 1 billion US dollars. In accordance with the existing agreement, Uralvagonzavod was to build and transfer 124 tanks to the customer. The rest of the equipment should have been sent to India in the form of assembly kits. The assembly of tanks under license was entrusted to HVF in the city of Avadi. It was supposed to complete the deliveries of the ordered equipment over the next few years.

In the context of the first "Indian" contract, the story of the customer's desire to receive guarantees became widely known. At that time, Russia and its industry were not going through the best of times, and there was a risk of stopping the construction of tanks for one reason or another. To resolve this problem, the top leadership of Russia had to take the situation under personal control. Fortunately, further events, despite some difficulties, developed according to a positive scenario, and the order was completed in full.

Finished 124 T-90S tanks, built in Nizhny Tagil, were handed over to the customer before the end of 2002. In the autumn of the same year, the Indian company HVF received the first sets of components and assemblies, after which it began to assemble armored vehicles on its own. The supply of tanks in "unassembled" form continued for about a year. Licensed assembly of tanks in India was carried out until the middle of the last decade. As a result of all these works, the Indian ground forces received 310 Russian-designed main battle tanks.

Having mastered the tanks of the first contract, the Indian military expressed their desire to continue purchasing and building. New contracts appeared already in 2006. First, the customer and the manufacturer signed a contract for the licensed production of 1,000 new tanks. A few months after the first contract, a new one appeared, according to which India was to receive another 330 T-90S vehicles with the production of some of this equipment in Russia. An important feature of the new contracts was the desire of the customer to receive updated equipment in a modified configuration.


Indian tanks T-90S "Bhishma" on exercises.

Especially for the Indian ground forces, a new modification of the T-90S was created, which differed in some design features. This project provided for the strengthening of the undercarriage and the refinement of the fire control system. In particular, regular thermal imaging devices were replaced by French-made products. Dynamic protection of the Russian development has given way to Indian counterparts.

Interestingly, the T-90S tanks, modified in accordance with the requirements of the Indian army, in addition to the official designation, received a new name "Bhishma" (literally - "Terrible"). It was decided to name a tank with high performance and combat capabilities in honor of one of the main characters of the Mahabharata epic, who became famous for his feats of arms and skillful diplomacy.

Already in 2007, India again ordered Russian tanks. This time it was about the production of 347 cars. It was planned to receive 124 tanks in finished form, and the rest were to arrive at the customer in the form of vehicle kits for assembly at the HVF plant. This order cost the Indian military 1237 million US dollars.

Enterprises "Uralvagonzavod" and HVF quickly managed to deploy the mass production of the required armored combat vehicles and begin to fulfill existing orders. The result of this was the appearance of a significant number of tanks and the start of the rearmament of the Indian ground forces. Over the next few years, very remarkable results were obtained. So, until 2010, inclusive, Russian tank builders sent more than 600 T-90S tanks to the customer in the original and modified version. At the same time, only a third of the tanks were handed over in finished form, while most of them were supplied as a set of parts for assembly at local enterprises. It is easy to see that by this time a little more than a third of all existing orders had been completed. Joint work continued, and has not been completed so far. New batches of Indian-assembled tanks are still entering the army; this process will continue over the next few years.


The main T-90CA tanks, intended for shipment to Algeria. June 2016

Orders for the production of T-90S for India are still being fulfilled. The state enterprise HVF has the ability to assemble up to a hundred tanks a year from vehicle kits, and therefore will have to produce new equipment before the end of this decade. According to reports, at present, the Indian ground forces are armed with more than 950 T-90S and Bhishma tanks. By 2020, it is planned to put into operation up to 2 thousand of these armored vehicles. Thus, the Indian army has already become the world's largest operator of the main tanks of the T-90S family, and in the near future will provide itself with an even greater gap from the main "competitors".

Algeria became the second foreign buyer of T-90S tanks. The African state showed its interest in Russian armored vehicles in the middle of the last decade. In March 2006, a contract was signed for the supply of 185 T-90S tanks. Simultaneously with this contract, several more agreements appeared for the supply of various Russian-made weapons and equipment. The total value of all contracts reached $8 billion. A few years later, Algeria initiated the signing of another contract.

At the request of the Algerian army, Uralvagonzavod created a specialized modification of the tank under the designation T-90CA, modified for operation in North Africa and other similar regions. The main differences between the "SA" machine and the base "C" machine were the use of an air conditioner and the possibility of installing searchlight systems from the Shtora optical-electronic suppression complex. Algeria also purchased T-90SKA command tanks, which differ in a different composition of communications equipment. In particular, they are equipped with a tactical battle management system T-BMS.

Unlike the Indian army, the Algerian side did not acquire a license to assemble Russian armored vehicles. Thanks to this, it was possible to reduce the waiting time for the required cars. As a result, to date, Algeria has received more than 300 tanks in linear and commander configurations.


T-90S tanks of the armed forces of Uganda and their crews.

In 2011, Azerbaijan added to the list of buyers of T-90S tanks. The army of this country wished to buy three battalion sets of armored vehicles - 94 vehicles. The agreement provided for an option for the further delivery of another 94 tanks. The Azerbaijani army received the first serial T-90S already in 2013. According to reports, about a hundred tanks have been delivered to date. Tanks for Azerbaijan, in general, correspond to the original T-90S project, but at the same time they carry optical-electronic suppression systems.

Another fairly large contract was concluded with Uganda. A few years ago, this African state acquired 44 Russian-made tanks. The supply of modern armored vehicles led to positive consequences in the context of the development of the army. The fact is that the basis of the Ugandan fleet of armored vehicles is still made up of obsolete T-55s.

Since a certain time, T-90 tanks of various modifications, including the original "A", have been supplied to the Syrian army. According to various sources, at least several dozen cars have already been transferred to a friendly state. Such deliveries are remarkable in that Russian tanks got the opportunity to take part in the current war and show their real potential. During the Syrian war, T-90s of various versions confirmed their combat effectiveness and high survivability. Several incidents with the shelling of such equipment with the help of anti-tank systems, which did not end in the destruction of armored vehicles, were widely known.

To complete the picture, it is also worth noting the supply of T-90S tanks to Turkmenistan and Armenia. The Turkmen army currently has only four such vehicles. The Armenian armed forces, in turn, have only one tank of this type. Of great interest is the "origin" of the only Armenian tank. In 2014, the national team of this country competed at the World Championship in tank biathlon and took second place in the overall standings. Such success was marked by a prize - the T-90S tank. Soon the armored car was handed over to the winning army.

In 2017, new reports appeared repeatedly about future deliveries of T-90 family tanks. Thus, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense earlier announced its intention to acquire at least 70 Russian armored vehicles. At the same time, it was only about the first batch, and in the future a new order could appear. The cost of the agreement, for obvious reasons, was not disclosed. In mid-July, new messages appeared in this regard. The Russian side has officially confirmed the signing of an agreement with Iraq. However, this time the volume and cost of the contract were not specified.


"Prize" tank T-90S, won by Armenian tankers in 2014.

According to various estimates, under the new contract (or contracts), Iraq may receive up to several hundred T-90S tanks or other modifications worth up to $1 billion. Naturally, all these are only approximate estimates, and therefore they should not be taken too seriously.

A few months ago, rumors and reports from unnamed sources appeared abroad and in our country about the imminent signing of a contract for the supply of T-90MS tanks to the armed forces of Egypt. Initially, publications on this topic mentioned the possibility of selling 400-500 tanks, but later these numbers were noticeably reduced. At the same time, it is said that it is possible to supply part of the armored vehicles in finished form in parallel with the organization of a licensed assembly. It can be assumed that in the very near future there will be the first official announcements about such a contract.


Ceremonial crew of Turkmen T-90SA tanks.

New export contracts may appear in the near future. In early July, the report of the research and production corporation Uralvagonzavod for 2016 was made freely available. This document provided some new information, as well as clarified the already known. In addition, the report specified the priority areas that are expected to be developed in the foreseeable future.

According to the report, in 2017 it was planned to fulfill the already concluded contracts with foreign customers in a timely and high-quality manner. At the same time, it was about Vietnam, which ordered 64 T-90S and T-90SK tanks, as well as Iraq, which is to receive 73 vehicles of the same types. Also this year, Uralvagonzavod is to complete pre-contract work with Kuwait, which wants to purchase 146 T-90MS/MSK tanks. The same machines are planned to be offered to India.

According to publicly available data, to date, at least 1,400 main battle tanks of various modifications of the T-90 family have been built by the domestic defense industry under export contracts. At least 1200-1300 armored vehicles will be built before the end of this decade in accordance with existing or planned contracts. Thus, the number of sold T-90 tanks will constantly grow, bringing certain incomes to the Russian industry.

If all the currently planned contracts are signed and fulfilled on time, then in the early twenties more than 2,600 T-90 tanks of completely Russian production or foreign assembly will serve in foreign armies. Thanks to this, one of the last Russian tanks will once again confirm its title as the most commercially successful tank in its class. Indian orders for a long time allowed the T-90 to break away from competitors in the context of the volume of export contracts, and new agreements will only strengthen its position in the international arms market.

The Uralvagonzavod report for the last year directly indicates that foreign customers are still showing interest in the rather old T-90S and its various modifications, but at the same time they should be offered the newer T-90MS tank. As you know, the development of the T-90 family is still ongoing and regularly leads to new results. Each new version of the Russian tank, embodied in metal, has every chance to interest a potential customer and become the subject of another lucrative deal.

Soviet and Russian tanks have been present on the international market for a very long time and quite deservedly retain their leadership positions. New machines of the T-90 family continue this "tradition" and, showing high performance, allow Russia to receive new major contracts. At the moment, the T-90S and its modifications are the most commercially successful tanks in the world, built after the end of the Cold War. There is every reason to believe that Russian tanks will maintain this status for many years to come.

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Tämä tuo hieman selvyyttä tiettyjen sopimusten ja toimitusten osalta. Sanoo myös että Algeria EI tekisi kittien kokoonpanoa vaan vaunut tehdään valmiiksi Venäjällä.

Intia on näistä kaikkein vaikeimmin hahmotettava: ovat allekirjoittaneet useita sopimuksia Venäjän kanssa JA tuotannon Intiassa olisi pitänyt alkaa jo ainakin 10 vuotta sitten. Silti hyvin pitkään toistui sama: tuotantoa ei saada käyntiin mutta vaunuja kootaan Venäjältä toimitetuista kiteistä. Osasyy ainakin alussa oli väitetysti Venäjän kieltäytyminen toimittaa tiettyjä teknologioita (joiden myynnistä oli kuulemma tehty sopimus). Helppo uskoa että Venäjä tavoilleen uskollisesti olisi viivytellyt näiden toimittamisen kanssa, ehkä jopa kieltäytynyt kokonaan. Näin saadaan pidettyä vaunujen tekeminen UVZ:n käsissä ja Intia nöyränä ostajana, ei tekijänä.

Miten nämä liittyvät Neuvostoliittoon ja Varsovan?

 

[SatSotHist]

Miten nämä liittyvät Neuvostoliittoon ja Varsovan?

Miksi eivät kuuluisi?

Venäjän (ja myös neukkulasta itsenäistyneiden valtioiden) aseteollisuus on jatkumoa Neuvostoliitolle.

 

[Antares]

Lyhyt artikkeli Tsekkoslovakian T-72 tuotannosta ZTS (Zavod Trucanske Strojarne) tehtaalla Martin-nimisessä kaupungissa, toisinaan näkee tehtaan nimenä ZTS Martin (julkaistu 24.1.2020): LÄHDE

Spoiler: Artikkelin teksti kokonaisuudessaan

https://gurkhan.blogspot.com/2020/01/72_25.html

Friday, January 24, 2020​

Assembly of T-72 tanks at a heavy engineering plant in the city of Martin​

Assembly of T-72 tanks at a heavy engineering plant in the city of Martin (ZTS Martin); 1991 year


The photo shows an assembly of training models of the T-72 tank, designed to study the design of the tank

The license for the production of T-72 tanks was acquired by Czechoslovakia in 1977, however, the introduction of the T-72 was delayed, both due to the modernization of the tank production of the plant and related enterprises previously engaged in the production of T-55 tanks, and the fulfillment of export orders for T -55. The first T-72s left the assembly shops of the Martin plant in 1981.A total of 556 T-72s were assembled until 1985, after which the plant switched to the production of an upgraded version - the T-72M. In the spring of 1986, after the production of 251 T-72M tanks, the plant began production of T-72M1 tanks. Tank production at the Martin plant was curtailed in 1993 after the production of 1,010 T-72M1s. Of the total produced tanks, 975 tanks entered service with the Czechoslovak People's Army, and the rest were exported. At the same time, mainly tanks of the T-72M1 modification were exported, earlier modifications were received only by the National People's Army of the GDR (280 tanks until 1989, of which 134 T-72 and 75 T-72M). In addition to the GDR, Czechoslovak-made T-72s were also delivered to Algeria (114 vehicles), Bulgaria (16), Iraq (90 units), Libya (119 units) and Syria (252 units), while, if we correlate the declared number of produced tanks and the number of exported, then partially export deliveries were also carried out due to the presence of the armed forces of Czechoslovakia - tanks previously transferred to the armament of the ChNA.









Source

Tästä lyhyestä kuvauksesta "aikajanan" suomennos:

- Tsekkoslovakia hankki lisenssin T-72 panssarivaunujen valmistamiseen vuonna 1977
- tuotannon käynnistäminen viivästyi, yksi syy oli tehtaan modernisointi ennen tuotannon aloittamista ja toisaalta tehtaalla sekä siihen liittyvillä toimijoilla oli vielä T-55 tuotanto kesken (mainitaan vientiin myytyjen T-55 vaunujen valmistus)
- ensimmäinen T-72 valmistui Martin tehtaalta vuonna 1981
- kaikkiaan 556 kpl T-72 vaunuja valmistui vuoteen 1985 mennessä (assembled until 1985), jonka jälkeen tehtaan tuotanto vaihtui valmistamaan päivitettyä vaunua, T-72M
- keväällä 1986, kun oli valmistettu 251 kpl T-72M vaunuja, tehdas aloitti T-72M1 tuotannon
- panssarivaunujen valmistus Martin tehtaalla päättyi vuonna 1993, jolloin oli valmistettu 1 010 kpl T-72M1 vaunuja
- 975 kpl valmistetuista vaunuista meni Tsekkoslovakian armeijan käyttöön ja loput menivät vientiin
- vientiin meni pääasiassa T-72M1 vaunuja, vanhempia malleja vietiin ainoastaan Itä-Saksaan (280 kpl vuoteen 1989 mennessä, joista 134 kpl oli T-72 ja 75 kpl T-72M)
- Itä-Saksan lisäksi Tsekkoslovakian valmistamia vaunuja vietiin Algeriaan (114 kpl), Bulgariaan (16 kpl), Irakiin (90 kpl), Libyaan (119 kpl) ja Syyriaan (252 kpl)

Jos summataan yhteen yllä luetellut vientikaupat, saadaan:

280 + 114 + 16 + 90 + 119 + 252 = 871

Jos tähän lisätään Tsekkoslovakian armeijalle myydyt vaunut, saadaan:

871 + 975 = 1 846

Kuitenkin tuotannon kokonaismääräksi saadaan:

556 + 251 + 1 010 = 1 817

Summat eivät täsmää, erotus on 29 vaunun verran.

Artikkelin viimeinen lause ottaa kantaa tähän:

...if we correlate the declared number of produced tanks and the number of exported, then partially export deliveries were also carried out due to the presence of the armed forces of Czechoslovakia - tanks previously transferred to the armament of the ChNA.

Tuo ero selittyy sillä että Tsekkoslovakian armeijalle tarkoitettuja vaunuja meni vientiin, eli näissä numeroissa on tuon verran vaunuja jotka on laskettu kahteen kertaan.

Kirjoitin Tsekkoslovakian T-72 vaunujen tuotannosta ja määristä parissa aikaisemmassa viestissä, tässä sivuutetaan lyhyesti T-72 tuotantoa edeltänyttä T-55 tuotantoa:

Lisää kuvia saman tyylisestä T-55A vaunujen lisäpanssaroinnsta, tosin nämä ovat Tsekkoslovakian tuotoksia. Andrei Tarasenkon blogin kirjoitus vuodelta 2019: T-55AM2

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Linkitetyssä artikkelissa Tarasenko kirjoittaa lyhyestä Tsekkoslovakian T-55 tuotantomääristä:

Czechoslovakia received a license to manufacture tanks in 1964. First, the T-55 was produced at the ZTS (Zavod Trucanske Strojarne) plant in the Slovak city of Martin, and from 1967 to 1982, the T-55A, a total of 3820 units were built.

Tuo aikataulu on linjassa aikaisemmassa viestissäni laittamani taulukon kanssa, jonka mukaan Tsekkoslovakian T-72 tuotanto alkoi pienimääräisesti vuosina 1981 ja 1982 mutta lähti kunnolla käyntiin vuonna 1983. Tsekkoslovakian T-72 vuosituotantomäärät aikavälillä 1981-1991:

18-50-130-212-251-277-290-284-62-107-101

Pienen tehtaan osalta on järkevää tehdä tällainen sujuva vaihto, missä vanha poisjäävä tuote ja uusi sen korvaava vaihtavat paikkaa tähän tyyliin. Suuren tehtaan osalta on loogisempaa tehdä rajumpi leikkaus ja panostaa täysillä uuden tuotteen tuotantoon saattamiseen, vaikka se tekisikin pienen loven vuosituotantoon. Toki riippuu tuotteesta, jos vanhan voi korvata uudella tuotannossa ilman merkittäviä tuotantolinjojen muutoksia ja häiriöitä niin silloin tietysti toimitaan niin. Panssarivaunujen osalta vaatinee että kaikki jigit ja valmistus- sekä kokoonpano vaativat niin suuria muutoksia, ettei "helppo vaihto" ole niin helppoa ja sujuvaa.

Toisaalta on myös mahdollista että Tsekkoslovakian T-55 tuotannon jatkuminen vuoteen 1982 asti johtui viennistä: heiltä meni tämä aika viimeisten tilausten täyttämiseen, samalla kun tehdas käynnisti T-72 tuotantoa.

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Tässä vanhemmassa viestissä kirjoitetaan enemmän T-72 tuotannosta, on jopa pari taulukkoa: LINKKI

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MUOKKAUS: sattumalta muuta tietoa hakiessa bmpd-blogin T-62 vaunujen valmistusmäärien käsittelevän artikkelin (LINKKI) kommenteissa tämä koskien Tsekkoslovakian T-55 ja T-72 tuotantoa. Pilkoin kommentin tekstin hieman luettavampaan muotoon, mutta sisältö on sama. Hän antoi alkuperäiseksi lähteeksi toisen foorumin, mutta linkki on rikki (LINKKI).

Mielenkiintoisia numeroita joka tapauksessa, käyttäjä 23mai1975 kirjoittaa näin:

Here in Czechoslovakia: they continued to make T-55s without any transitions to T-62s.

-55AK,
1972 - 53 + 356 T-55A and 16 export T-55AK,
1973 - 55 + 272 T-55A and 35 + 17 T-55AK,
1974 - 488 export T-55A and 59 export T-55AK,
1975 - 432 export T-55A and 141 export T-55AK,
1976 - 440 export T-55A and 196 export T-55AK,
1977 - 31 + 318 T-55 and 163 export T-55AK,
1978 - 60 + 364 T-55A and 101 export T-55AK,
1979 - 60 + 357 T-55A and 15 + 2 T-55AK,
1980 - 52 + 356 T-55A and 50 export T-55AK,
1981 - 120 + 160 T-55A and 8 export T- 55AK,
1982 - 18 export T-55A and 4 export T-55AK).

As a result, in 1971-82, 4431 were built (3888 for export: including Libya - 905, India - 92 in 1973-75) T-55A and 892 (807 for export: including Libya - 348 , India - 7 in 1973-75) T-55AK. In total, it turns out 6299 T-55A and 897 T-55AK.

Next came the T-72:

The decision on the licensed production of T-72 tanks in Czechoslovakia was made in 1977. The first batch was produced at the ZTS Martin plant (Slovakia) in 1981 with the provision of some components from Poland (engines, gearboxes) and the GDR (suspension elements, tracks).

In 1981-85, 556 main battle tanks T-72 ("Ural") were manufactured, practically no different from the Soviet original. Part of the tanks was exported to the GDR.
In 1985, the production of the T-72M variant was mastered, of which 556 units were built in 1985-86.
In 1986, this model was replaced by the T-72M1, produced in the amount of 1010 units in 1986-93.

Thus, 1817 tanks were produced in 1981-93.

Not a word about the T-62.

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Tuo oli yksi vasta tälle kommentille: It is a pity that there are no data for 1974-75. It is believed that sixty-twos were made in these years as well. In addition, there is information that 1500 T-62s were also produced in Czechoslovakia, but only for export. Interesting - and for SA too?

Olen kuullut tämän kaltaisen huhun ennenkin, mutta en usko että Tsekkoslovakia olisi koskaan valmistanut T-62 vaunuja, niitä valmisti ainoastaan UVZ Nizhny Tagilissa (en laske Pohjois-Korean ja Kiinan tuotantoja "T-62 tuotannoiksi").

Yksi kommentti ylle lainatuista numeroista: selvästi käyttäjä 23mai1975 on leikannut viestin jostain muualta ja siitä on tainnut jäädä vuosi 1971 pois, koska tekstissä lainaus alkaa näin: -55AK,

Jos tulkitsen hänen tekstiään oikein, numerot menisivät taulukon muodossa näin:


Hän kirjoittaa kokonaismääristä näin:

As a result, in 1971-82, 4431 were built (3888 for export: including Libya - 905, India - 92 in 1973-75) T-55A and 892 (807 for export: including Libya - 348 , India - 7 in 1973-75) T-55AK. In total, it turns out 6299 T-55A and 897 T-55AK.

Harmillisesti vuosi 1971 puuttuu, mutta tästä voitaneen laskea näin:

T-55A export (1971): 3 888 - 3561 = 327

T-55 (1971): 4 431 - 3 888 - 431 = 112

T-55AK export (1971): 807 - 757 = 50

T-55AK (1971): 892 - 807 - 50 = 35

Tällöin taulukko voidaan täydentää muotoon:



Entä mitä tarkoittaa hänen lause: In total, it turns out 6299 T-55A and 897 T-55AK.

T-55 pysyi tuotannossa vuoden 1982 jälkeenkin? Tuskin, vaihtoivat arvatenkin suoraan T-72 tuotantoon.

Tarasenkon mukaan T-55 tuli tuotantoon 1967, joten se tarkoittaisi että aikavälillä 1967-1970 valmistui:

T-55A: 6 299 - 4 431 = 1 868
T-55AK: 897 - 892 = 5

Näin siis jos uskotaan nämä numerot. Yksi lähde vain, joten uskoo ken tahtoo.

 

[Antares]

Miten nämä liittyvät Neuvostoliittoon ja Varsovan?

Tästä syystä ketjun otsikko on (alleviivaus minun):

Neuvostoliiton ja Varsovan liiton (sekä muiden) tuotantomääristä​

Ensimmäisestä viestistä löytyy kantava ajatus jota ketjun otsikko ei ehkä kerro riittävän hyvin: LINKKI

Ketjun otsikko on "Neuvostoliiton ja Varsovan liiton (sekä muiden) tuotantomääristä" mutta tarkoitus on että tämä käsittelisi pääasiassa meidän naapuria Venäjää sen eri aikoina. Heidän panssarivaunujen ja muiden sotakoneiden määriä, tosin laitoin tarkoituksella tuon "sekä muiden" jotta ei rajata muita valtioita ketjun ulkopuolelle.

Otsikko sanoo "tuotantomääristä" mutta tarkoitus ei ole rajata ketjua pelkästään määriin vaan myös keinoihin, joilla nämä määrät saatiin tehtyä eli tuotantotekniikkaan ja muuhun. Samoin erilaiset historialliset lähteet, joissa sivutaan vaunujen valmistusta, testaamista, käyttökokemuksia yms. ovat tervetulleita. Pääpaino silti tuotantomäärien tiedoilla sekä spekuloinnilla, jos tarkkaa tietoa ei ole.

 

[Antares]

Tuore kirjoitus T-14 Armatan vaikeuksista ja arvioista, mistä nämä johtuvat.

Tässä brittiläisen Sergio Miller kirjoittama (artikkeli julkaistu 10.2.2023): LÄHDE

Armata – the story is over​

Spoiler: Artikkelin teksti kokonaisuudessaan

https://wavellroom.com/2023/02/10/armata-the-story-is-over/

Armata – the story is over​

by Sergio Miller
February 10, 2023

When the T-14 Armata tank was sensationally unveiled at the 9 May Victory Day parade, in 2015, it embarrassingly broke down in front of thousands of onlookers during rehearsals. This proved an augury. Seven years later it can be stated with confidence the Armata story is over. This article explains its demise and wider implications.

An engine looking for a tank​

The origins of T-14 Armata lie in the cancelled T-95 (Object 148). This tank, a casualty of the troubled 1990s, was finally abandoned in 2010. Conceptual vehicles with unmanned turrets had existed since the 1980s (CIA Top Secret ‘Soviet Tank Programs’, NI IIM 84-10016, 1 Dec 84 offers interesting historical perspectives on these designs). However, in the case of T-14 Armata the idea did not start from the cancelled T-95, or even a tank design, but with an engine.

Some context is necessary. All Russian tank engines, remarkably, are descended from the highly successful V-2 diesel engine designed in 1931 at the Kharkov Locomotive Plant (now destroyed by Russian forces). The V-84 (T-72s), V-92S2F (T-72B3s, T-90s), the UTD-20 (BMP-1s and BMP-2s), and UTD-29 (BMP-3s) are further upgrades of this engine. The V-2 is the Kalashnikov of tank engines. The exception to this practical Soviet approach is the T-64. This tank was fitted with the 5TDF engine, a failed attempt to copy a German wartime bomber engine. It is for this reason that the 2-3,000 T-64s in storage will never return to service.

By http://vitalykuzmin.net/?q=node/651 – Vitaly V. Kuzmin, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=49017880

T-14 Armata also started with a new engine: a Russian copy of the German X-shaped Simmering SLA 16 engine (also known as the Porsche Tour 212). The Russian engine was designated the A-85-3. However, Transdiesel Design Bureau did not design the engine for a tank but rather as a unit for compressor oil and gas pumping stations. It proved a flop and failed to make any sales despite repeated demonstrations at exhibitions.

Designed around the engine​

By a roundabout and unclear route, Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) – Russia’s main tank manufacturer – decided to use the engine as the basis of a novel tank: the T-14 Armata. The tank was designed around the engine and not the other way round. It seemed a good idea: the A-85-3 was smaller and more powerful, if heavier, than the V-92S2F now fitted to the modern T-72B3s and T-90s. However, this decision had two important and deleterious consequences. The A-85-3 did not sell because it was complex, manifested too many problems, and was difficult to maintain. The engine needed many more run-hours to refine the design.

It is assumed UVZ was confident the problems would be rectified over time. They have not been and the A-85-3 remains a problem engine. The second consequence has followed from the size of the engine. A quick solution might have been to abandon the A-85-3 and refit T-14 Armata with the proven V-92S2F – except the latter does not fit, it is bigger. The only realistic engineering solution now is to start again. Currently, no authority appears willing to accept this reality.

An AliExpress tank​

In July 2021, the Russian MOD television channel TV Zvezda broadcast a documentary on T-14 Armata under its ‘Military Acceptance’ strand. The programme was filmed at the normally secretive 38th NII BTVT which celebrated its 90th anniversary last year and remains Russia’s premier armoured vehicle trials facility. A viewer of the 30-minute slot was treated to a futuristic world including rare footage of the inside of the T-14 Armata crew capsule.

T-14 Armata: a technologist’s dream tank, or nightmare? Source: Voennoye Obozreniye

The problem with all the gizmos is the microelectronics. Russian industry generally has been critically dependent on foreign microelectronics and associated technologies. These are no longer available due to sanctions (hence the joke Russian defence’s main supplier has become AliExpress). Captured Russian equipment such as drones reveals components are being sourced from wherever they can be found (including stolen Swedish traffic cameras in the case of the Orlan-10 UAV).

The perennial Russian problem of corruption has only worsened challenges posed by sanctions. The Volgograd Krasny Oktyabr (‘Red October’) plant which makes the armour plates for Russian tanks was declared bankrupt in 2018. Millionaire-owner Dmitry Gerasimenko is on the international wanted list for allegedly embezzling a loan of $65 million and transferring 6.2 billion roubles abroad. Such tales litter Russian industry. Since 2011, a staggering 72,000 officials have appeared before the courts on corruption charges. In 2022 alone (so much for patriotism) 60 defence industry officials and 250 public procurement officials have been prosecuted, 27 of whom were convicted of violations in the implementation of the state defence order.

Lack of an assembly line​

The final, practical and mundane reason why T-14 Armata will not become a production tank is because there is no assembly line. All models to date have been assembled by hand (like luxury cars). A sum of 64 million roubles was reportedly allocated to build the assembly line. The plant shell and workshops were built but are empty. Contracts were signed but Western machine tools and other technology were never supplied due to sanctions (the same story has now unfolded with Russia’s moribund automotive industry facing an uncertain future with the departure of Western and Far Eastern car manufacturers). As many as 200 suppliers would need to be re-profiled. This will not happen now.

As relevantly, UVZ is fully engaged in sustaining the T-72B3 and T-90M assembly lines, desperately needed to replace war losses (Omsktransmash, the other tank plant, is refurbishing T-62Ms). At the time of writing, at least 1,594 tanks have been lost including 448 T-72B3-series tanks, and 37 T-90-series tanks that remain rare in Ukraine. The Russian Army started the war with 2,600 operational tanks, of which around 1,000 were ‘modern’. It took UVZ roughly a decade to produce or upgrade the ‘modern’ fleet. It will take an equally long and probably lengthier time to recover Russia’s decimated tank regiments.

T-14 Armata, in the end, proved a story of technology over-reach. ‘The fact remains that the T-14 will remain a prototype toy with no chance of mass production’, Russian defence journalist Roman Skomorokhov has sentenced. The root problem with the engine means ‘the tank moves satisfactorily only under the cover of a group of technicians and engineers’. Only one experimental company was ever formed anyway in Central Military District (CVO) and the chances it will appear on a frontline, except for propaganda purposes, are small.

More than a novel tank is lost. In June 2015, The Royal United Services institute (RUSI) hosted an event on Armata, presented by the knowledgeable Ukrainian Igor Sutyagin. The talks highlighted the programme was about a family of ‘Armata’ vehicles (T-15 heavy IFV, T-16 BREM-T ARRV, K-25 Kurganets and others). It is highly unlikely any of these projects will now proceed in the near/mid-term or at all. The future looks much like the out-dated Soviet past. As a final blow T-14 Armata’s improved 2A82-IM 125mm cannon – an undeniable upgrade on comparatively under-gunned Russian tanks – will not serve on T-90M. The breech block doesn’t fit.

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Sergio Miller is a retired British Army Intelligence Corps officer. He was a regular contributor and book reviewer for British Army Review. He is the author of a two-part history of the Vietnam War (Osprey/Bloomsbury) and is currently drafting a history of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

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Kirjoitus käsittelee pääasiassa T-14 Armataa mutta sitä koskee oleellisesti tietysti Venäjän panssarivaunuja valmistavan teollisuuden tila. Lainaan alle mielenkiintoisen pätkän (alleviivaus minun):

As relevantly, UVZ is fully engaged in sustaining the T-72B3 and T-90M assembly lines, desperately needed to replace war losses (Omsktransmash, the other tank plant, is refurbishing T-62Ms). At the time of writing, at least 1,594 tanks have been lost including 448 T-72B3-series tanks, and 37 T-90-series tanks that remain rare in Ukraine. The Russian Army started the war with 2,600 operational tanks, of which around 1,000 were ‘modern’. It took UVZ roughly a decade to produce or upgrade the ‘modern’ fleet. It will take an equally long and probably lengthier time to recover Russia’s decimated tank regiments.

Tuo määrä 2 600 kpl kiinnitti huomion, sama numero kuin Altyn73 blogikirjoituksessa syyskuussa 2021 (tosin siitä laskelmasta puuttui muutama pataljoona, joiden vaunuista hänellä ei ollut tietoa sekä muutama potentiaalinen pataljoona, jotka "oli tarkoitus muodostaan vuoden 2021 loppuun mennessä").

Näistä vaunuista 1 000 kpl oli moderneita? Riippuu toki, mitkä määrät mitäkin mallia on valmistettu JA mitkä vaunut kukakin laskee "moderneiksi".

Makustelin asiaa toisessa ketjussa näin: LINKKI

Vastaan itselleni kysymykseen mikä määrä Venäjän aktiivijoukkojen vaunuista on modernisoitu 2000-luvulla. Ongelma on toki, mihin raja vedetään.

Lasken modernisoiduiksi aktiivijoukkojen vaunuiksi seuraavat vaunumallit: T-80UE-1, T-80BVM, T-90A, T-90M, T-72B3 obr 2016 ja T-72B3.

Seuraavat aktiivijoukkojen käytössä olevat vaunut EN laske modernisoiduiksi: T-80U, T-80BV, T-72BA, T-72B obr 1989, T-72B, T-72AV, T-72A.

Numerot ovat venäläisen Altyn73 blogista, löytyvät taulukkomuodossa esim. tästä viestistä.

Modernien vaunujen määräksi saadaan jompi kumpi (riippuu miten tulkitsee Altyn73 kirjoituksia):

1)

31 + 72 + 219 + 8 + 470 + 589 = 1 389

Vaunujen kokonaismäärä 2 613 joten modernisoitujen vaunujen osuus (1 389 / 2 613) = 0,5316

2)

31 + 72 + 240 + 65 + 527 + 795 = 1 730

Vaunujen kokonaismäärä 3 020 joten modernisoitujen vaunujen osuus (1 730 / 3 020) = 0,5728

Lainaamassani viestissä kirjoitin että muistaakseni Venäjän oman ilmoituksen mukaan "modernisoidun" kaluston osuus olisi yli 70% mutta ainakin tämän laskelman perusteella panssarivaunujen osalta ollaan 53 - 57,3 % välissä. Ehkä muisteluni koski kaikkia asevoimien ajoneuvoja tai "kalustoa", joten ehkä numero on tämän takia suurempi kun mietitään laajempaa kokonaisuutta? TAI ehkä laskelmassa tarkoitetaan "moderniksi ajateltua" kalustoa, johon voinee ehkä laskea panssarivaunujen osalta T-72BA, T-80U ja T-72 obr 1989. Tietääkseni he ovat myös "remontoineet" vanhempaa kalustoa viimeisen 10-15 vuoden aikana eli osan T-80BV ja T-72B vaunuista joten ehkä nämä lasketaan mukaan vaikka kyseessä ei olekaan "modernisointi" vaan ainoastaan "remontti" jolla vaunut pidetään toimintakuntoisina ilman että vaihdetaan esim. tähtäimiä.

TAI ehkä ryssä vain valehtelee tässäkin asiassa ja pyöristää luovasti ylöspäin? Tarve oli modernisoida 70% kalustosta tiettyyn päivään mennessä, joten pakkohan näin on olla käynyt, koska on suunnitelmat ja aikataulut ja niille osoitetut määrärahat (joista iso osa tietysti varastettu).

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Lainasin aikaisemmassa viestissä Jaroslaw Wolskin tekemää seurantaa, jossa on järjestelmällisempi jako "moderneihin vaunuihin" eri piirteiden osalta: LINKKI VIESTIIN

 

[Antares]

Pari tuoreehkoa kirjoitusta T-14 Armatan vaikeuksista ja arvioista, mistä nämä johtuvat.

Tässä brittiläisen Sergio Miller kirjoittama (artikkeli julkaistu 10.2.2023): LÄHDE

Armata – the story is over​

Jos anglikaanin horinat (LINKKI) epäilyttävät, niin tässä patrioottisella topwar.ru sivustolla julkaistu Roman Skomorokhov mielipidekirjoitus, johon britin kirjoitus osaksi perustuu (Skomorokhov kirjoitus julkaistu 30.12.2022): LÄHDE

"Armata" will not be. You can disperse​

Spoiler: Artikkelin tekstin ensimmäinen puolikas

https://topwar.ru/207749-armaty-ne-budet-mozhno-rashoditsja.html

"Armata" will not be. You can disperse​

December 30, 2022

To date, "Armata" has really become a household name, denoting either long-term construction, or fruitless attempts to do at least something from scratch. Just like "Coalition", "Kurganets", "Petrel" and other "unparalleled" works.

Let's try to answer an elementary question: can the Russian army get at its disposal, say, two hundred? These are two tank regiments, that is, practically a tank division. Shock, because these breakthrough machines can try to have a significant impact on the state of affairs in the NWO.

The whole problem is that serial production of "Armata" is now impossible for many reasons. It so happened that for a tank there is no ... however, it's easier to say that there is.

Engine​

Here I will allow myself a small historical digression. In 1931, within the walls of the Kharkov Locomotive Plant, a galaxy of talented and brilliant Soviet engineers K.F. Chelpan, T.P. Chupakhin, Ya.E. Vikhman, I.Ya. Trashutin created the V-2 tank diesel engine. Yes, the one that became the heart of the T-34, KV-1, KV-2, IS-1.

The V-2 turned out to be so successful that ALL diesel engines of Russian armored vehicles from V-84 (T-72), V-92S2F (T-72B3, T-90) to UTD-20 (BMP-1 and BMP-2) and UTD -29 (BMP-3) are further upgrades of this engine. And you can praise the V-2 for a long time, or vice versa, doubt its capabilities as a modern engine, but the fact is that almost all Russian armored vehicles are moved by this particular engine. Simple, but reliable and mastered to the screw.

V-92S2F

The A-85-3A "Armata" engine has nothing to do with the B-2. It was created by the Transdiesel Design Bureau in the early 90s as a unit for compressor oil and gas pumping stations based on the German X-shaped Simmering SLA 16 engine, also known as the Porsche Tour 212, created as an engine for the Tiger and King Tiger ". True, the ancestor was a 16-cylinder, but this, you see, is not significant.

But for some reason, the A-85-3 or 12N360 did not come to court, and they decided to try it as a power plant for the promising T-95 tank, which, by the way, can be safely called the ancestor of the "Armata", since the layout was the same: a capsule on three people and an almost empty tower.

The engine was named A-85-3.

X-shaped, 12-cylinder, the declared maximum power is about 1800 hp, in normal mode about 1500 hp. Weight 1550 kg, which is 500 kg more than the B-92. Of the minuses - heavy, complex, unreliable.

The engine was repeatedly demonstrated at various exhibitions, but could not interest anyone. And the leadership of Uralvagonzavod decided to solve the issue of this engine in a very peculiar way: to take and develop a new tank for it!

And at full speed, the Armata flew into an engine trap, because the A-85-3, under which the tank was developed, was very different in size from the B-92, and in which case it was not possible to replace the A-85-3 with the old and proven B-92 possible.

By the way, this happened when in 2014 they tried to replace the A-85-3 with Yaroslavl engines. In an experimental form, but did not work out. In addition, the automatic transmission assembly with the engine is also a problem with such a replacement attempt.

As a result, they decided to leave the A-85-3A, with which the tank moves satisfactorily only under the cover of a group of technicians and engineers. As for mass production, not everything is perfect here either. A-85-3A, although not new, but for 30 years its production has not been mastered and debugged due to the lack of demand for the engine.

And this is where you can finish with the engine, because the V-92 looks like a standard of reliability and simplicity against its background. The A-85-3A, although not as old as the B-92, is still almost 15 years of difference in favor of the German prototype, but nevertheless: over the 90 years of the existence of the B-2 and its descendants, the engine has worked out to the fullest. What can not be said about the A-85.

Now, probably, it is clear why UVZ still drives the T-72 / T-80 / T-90 line and is not at all eager to “Stamp“ Armata ”? The enterprise simply does not have such a number of factory teams that will debug engines in the fields. "Raw" engines that were not really produced.

I just don't want to talk about an automatic transmission. There is no data on it, whose hands it was, but the fact that automatic transmissions on Russian cars began to appear after the sale of car factories to foreign firms says a lot. Approximately, like German automatic transmissions on Russian military tractors.

Production capacity is a separate issue. They simply don't exist. There was a program to build a new production line for "Armata", but alas. The money was allocated, and, moreover, rather big money (they say the figure is 64 billion rubles), for which workshops were erected and contracts were concluded ... with Western manufacturers of machine tools. They took the money with great pleasure and did not supply equipment, as they included sanctions. That's all: the plant seems to be there, but there are no machines.

Therefore, all that UVZ can offer is the manual assembly of the T-14 piece by piece in the semi-handicraft conditions of the experimental workshop. And first of all, this is due to the need to drive the T-90M on the assembly line in military conditions, to upgrade the T-90 to the level of the T-90MS, and not to forget about the T-72, which also needs to be upgraded.

And here everything is simple: if in the USSR tanks were made at several factories, now the lion's share of the load lies with UVZ. Omsktransmash is definitely not an assistant here, the plant is engaged in somewhat different tasks.

Electronics​

Yes, all these tricky and not entirely clear boxes to which screens are connected are also huge problems with this.

The sanctions are tightening tighter and tighter, we have already forgotten about the French thermal imagers, that with microelectronics, on the basis of which all these boxes are made, no one knows for sure, but since we do not produce anything ourselves, and for a long time, we should not expect here "breakthroughs". For all the "breakthroughs" we have lead to "Ali-express".

One can understand how difficult it is to work in such conditions for domestic manufacturers of equipment such as Shvabe, Cyclone, Kathoda, when the usual supply schemes collapsed. “We don’t need to produce anything, we’ll buy everything” - this policy, which has been going on since the beginning of the 2000s, has to be paid for by installing Chinese civilian (and they themselves need the military) microcircuits in military equipment, which simply do not guarantee the proper quality of the devices.

The circular Doppler radar with AFAR, which was the “chip” of the “Afghanit”, infrared HD cameras of the all-round view, ultraviolet photocathode direction finders of missiles, a digital communication station with ESU TZ and other very useful electronics are under a big question mark due to the fact that access to the element base is closed by sanctions.

And if only to microcircuits... But here, even without sanctions, such things are happening in Russia, such as, for example, the disruption of the implementation of the State Defense Order by the Volgograd plant "Red October", a manufacturer, including tank armor. Krasny Oktyabr was already declared bankrupt in 2018, its owner Dmitry Gerasimenko is on the international wanted list for embezzling a loan of $65 million and transferring 6.2 billion rubles abroad. But these dismantlings will not help the plant, the enterprise seems to have begun to work, but you yourself understand how unstable it is - work is under supervision. How many military-oriented factories in our country have not risen from their knees.

And this tank, which is not yet a tank, is being sold to us as a "wonder weapon" ."Directly in accordance with the training manuals of 1945. Say, now "Armata" will come, will put things in order. They say that "Armata" will issue target designations to other tanks, T-90 and T-72 right on the battlefield! Network-centric principle of warfare.

But the question immediately arises: how will Armata do this? With the help of the most modern walkie-talkie R-123? In voice mode? Well, no question ... The radar will quite allow itself to detect targets, and the radio station will allow the tank commander to issue target designation to other vehicles.

But sorry, there's something wrong here.

In the Russian army, in theory (I myself saw at exhibitions how in parts of the NMD - no information) there is such a machine as the PRP-4A "Argus", designed specifically for monitoring the area.

The Argus is equipped with a fairly decent 1L-120-1 radar, which can detect targets in rain, snow, in smoke screens, determine coordinates and aim artillery at them. A tank can be detected at a distance of up to 16 km, smaller targets at shorter distances, but even a group of infantry in a jeep can be confidently “taken” from 10 km. Enough to point your guns, right?

Everything, the bicycle is invented!

Here we should not forget that if the "Armata" with the help of the radar sees the enemy, then the enemy, which is typical, sees the "Armata". Imported counterparts using radar even came up with modes to reduce the power of the emitter depending on the proximity of the target in order to less unmask the source.

But we decided not to break our heads over this at all, but let it “shine” to its fullest! The fact that the tank will become just an excellent target, for some reason, no one wants to speak out on this topic. And he will. And everything that is possible will begin to fly over this tank, from 125 mm to 7.62 mm.

(jatkuu seuraavassa viestissä)

 

[Antares]

Edellisessä viestissä lainattu (LINKKI) Roman Skomorokhov mielipidekirjoitus jatkuu tässä:

Spoiler: Artikkelin tekstin toisen ja viimeinen osa

Such a beautiful "Armata" left, found itself with the help of a radar (of course, there is nothing like that on the other side, everyone is still running around with rifles from Garand), received a carcass of all possible calibers (the nastiest ones are 12.7-mm and 30 mm) and ... And that's it, she fought back! Because the crew will turn into three blind and deaf, since all this electronic attachment will be taken down from the tower. Cameras, sensors, and everything else will stop working, and without them, the Armata is nothing more than an armored chest on tracks.

(otin kuville Google Lens -käännökset, alkuperäiset kuvat kyrillisillä teksteillä löytyvät artikkelista: LÄHDE)







How long do you think all this splendor will last under fire? What will be left after "straightening" with automatic guns of the BMP? Machine guns? Yes, "Afghanit" shells can easily be sent to hell, the system, as our tankers say, is quite, but a smaller and no less malicious one is a question.

And here the main doubts are not that all this electronic wealth can be normally APPLIED , but that it can then be REPLACED ! Today, excuse me, electronic components are being removed from damaged T-72s and sent to factories, because the shortage is huge, but what about new ones?

By the way, everything is new there: engine, gearbox, electronics, rollers, transmission ... And where would you order to take it?

What is good about the T-72 and T-90, that a lot suits them.

But in our case, it was necessary to perform an act that was essentially similar to the industrialization of Stalin in the 30s: to modernize and partially re-profile about 200 enterprises that would supply components for the Armata. And yes, build an assembly shop with a conveyor. Then it would be possible to say that the tank would go into production.

And so, unfortunately, the T-14 will remain something similar to Lobaev rifles: modern, beautiful, efficient (maybe in the case of a tank), but individually and manually.

And who prevented the same rollers from Soviet tanks from leaving ...

The question arises: is it possible to solve some of the problems by simplification?​

Easy. It is possible (albeit with a lot of effort) to organize the replacement of the A-85-3A with the V-92S2F, which is somewhat larger due to its layout and one and a half times weaker, naturally, the gearbox will go from the same T-90. Yes, such a tank will not run briskly, but it can be slightly lightened. Due to the fact that we do not install electronics that we cannot produce ourselves, and therefore we bought (although evil tongues in the West yell that Russian front companies bought almost 500 sets of French matrices for thermal imagers) wherever possible. But probably you should not count on this further, because it is still impossible everywhere.

What will happen in this "military version" of the T-14, you know? Yes, almost the same T-90, only slower. But it's already being released.

Therefore, watching this victory dispersed by the state media, you understand that, of course, a certain number of T-14s will definitely be sent to the front line or next to it. And in order to check in real combat conditions how truly a “miracle weapon” is, and in order to shoot the proper amount of ugly videos for the electorate. In principle, combat-ready "Armat" for a "special shock" tank company will most likely be scraped together. The main thing is to wait for a convenient moment for front-line tests, that is, offensive actions.

Why? Yes, everything is simple: so that the enemy does not get precious samples. When the army advances, all these “analogues” can easily trudge in the third echelon, shining with radars (a little, HARM will not joke), firing from cannons. More than enough for a beautiful picture. And even if something suddenly goes wrong, and another unplanned regrouping begins, the tanks can be safely removed to the rear. What is not always possible to do during defensive-retreat actions.

However, everyone already has an idea of how this happens, thanks to the personnel of the "Russian Lend-Lease" in the Kharkov region.

Therefore, I would not want the "Armata" to be in the hands of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

And this is the alignment obtained with all that T-14 "Armata" is a very, very interesting and meaningful project with a huge future, because it is not just a new generation tank, it is a PLATFORM on which you can create new vehicles for any task. Including under network-centric wars, to which we will someday come.

But for this it was necessary to invest money in the industry. Re-profiling those same 200 factories that would produce components and spare parts for hundreds of Armats. Give the engine engineers the opportunity and time to bring this unfortunate A-85 to mind (they say they can, but a series and time are needed). What prevented this from being done - we are unlikely to know, but the fact remains that the T-14 will remain a prototype toy with no chance of mass production.

In fact, it would be very interesting to know how much the T-14 can even fight. But I doubt that this tank will actually go to the front line. It's too expensive - prototype testing in real combat. Both financially and reputationally. Although who would talk today about reputation ...

Author: Roman Skomorokhov

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Kuka tällaista kirjoittaa, tässä eri lähteestä:

About the author: Who is Roman Skomorokhov? The man describes himself as a journalist and political commentator. Roman has a website "Military Review", where he acts as a moderator. I found some photos of the author of the blog, where he was photographed with Alexei Mozgovoy (killed in 2015), the Russian commander of the Russian Prizrak Battalion in Donbass. LÄHDE

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Tuo kuvaus artikkelin kirjoittajasta löytyi tämän linkin kautta:

A Russian blogger comments on Russian propaganda rumors about the T14 Armata for the Ukrainian front and why we are unlikely to see it in real combat Full text: https://hejto.pl/wpis/rosyjski-bloger-komentuje-pogloski-rosyjskiej-propagandy-o-t14-armata-na-front-u…

@wolski_jaros @Zbiesu I guess you like similar topics

https://twitter.com/x/status/1609570669330587649

 

[Antares]

Täydennystä T-80BVM modernisoinnin aikajanaan (artikkeli julkaistu 10.9.2017): LÄHDE

Spoiler: Artikkelin teksti kokonaisuudessaan

https://bmpd.livejournal.com/2838608.html

Upgraded tank T-80BVM

bmpd

September 10th, 2017

According to a participant under the nickname Decoder on the web resource otvaga2004.mybb.ru , on September 9, 2017, near Luga (Leningrad region), on the territory of the 33rd combined-arms training ground, official events were held in honor of the Day of the tanker, including a display of military equipment and shooting. Among the promising models of armored vehicles of the Armed Forces of Russia, the modernized T-80BVM tank and the new T-90M tank were openly demonstrated at this show for the first time.



A modernized T-80BVM tank at a demonstration of armored vehicles in honor of the Day of the tanker on the territory of the 33rd combined arms training ground. Luga (Leningrad region), 09/09/2017 (с) Decoder / otvaga2004.mybb.ru


On behalf of bmpd, we recall that on August 24, 2017, at the International Military-Technical Forum "Army-2017", JSC "Scientific and Production Corporation "Uralvagonzavod" and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation signed a contract for a major overhaul with a deep modernization of T-80 tanks. The executor of the contract will be Omsktransmash JSC, which previously produced T-80 tanks (part of NPK Uralvagonzavod).

On September 7, Alexander Shevchenko, head of the Main Armored Directorate (GABTU) of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, announced that the GABTU "is conducting state tests of the modernized T-90M tank, developed in the R & D [development work]" Proryv-3 ", preparations are underway for testing the modernized tank T-80BVM".














A modernized T-80BVM tank at a demonstration of armored vehicles in honor of the Day of the tanker on the territory of the 33rd combined arms training ground. Luga (Leningrad region), 09.09.2017 (c) Decoder / otvaga2004.mybb.ru

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Pari päivämäärää tästä:

- 9.9.2017 oli ensimmäinen kerta kun T-80BVM ja T-90M tuotiin yleisötapahtumaan nähtäville

- 7.9.2017 kuultiin tällainen julistus:

On September 7, Alexander Shevchenko, head of the Main Armored Directorate (GABTU) of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, announced that the GABTU "is conducting state tests of the modernized T-90M tank, developed in the R & D [development work]" Proryv-3 ", preparations are underway for testing the modernized tank T-80BVM".
Tuon mukaan siis T-90M testejä tehtiin tuohon aikaan kun taas samaan aikaan "tehtiin valmisteluja T-80BVM modernisoidun vaunun testaamiseksi".

Nyt jälkikäteen tiedetään että ensimmäiset 31 kpl T-80BVM vaunuja tullaan toimittamaan vasta vuonna 2019. Jos syksyllä 2017 tehtiin vasta "valmisteluja vaunun testaamiseksi" niin tämä kertonee osaltaan syyn viivästymiseen. Spekuloin aikaisemmin että ensimmäiset 10 kpl voisivat hyvinkin olla testejä varten ja kirjoitin taulukkoon 5 kpl vuonna 2017 ja 5 kpl vuonna 2018, mutta olisi helppo uskoa tällainenkin aikataulu: ensimmäiset 10 kpl olivat tosiaan ns. koesarja näitä testejä varten. Ne voivat valmistua vuonna 2017 mutta testejä päästään tekemään vasta vuonna 2018. Kun testit on saatu hyväksytysti valmiiksi, päästään vihdoin tekemään modernisointia jossain vaiheessa vuoden 2018 aikana mutta ensimmäiset vaunut toimitetaan vasta vuonna 2019.

JOS aikataulu olisi mennyt näin, silloin T-80BVM valmistusmäärät voisivat olla seuraavat (jos lasketaan "valmistuminen" vaunun toimituksesta asiakkaalle):

2017: 10 kpl (esisarja testejä varten)
2018: 0 kpl
2019: 31 kpl

Tämä on toki pelkkää spekulointia.

 

[Antares]

T-80UE-1 valmistuksen osalta yksi lähde talteen, joka on kadonnut normaalista internetistä mutta löytyy Internet Archivesta (alkuperäinen artikkeli julkaistu 16.6.2010): LÄHDE

Spoiler: Artikkelin teksti kokonaisuudessaan

http://web.archive.org/web/20120125213939/http://kvnews.ru/archive/2010/jur23(949)/money/14315/

Nikolay GORNOV

JSC "KBTM" defended two million rubles​

06/16/2010

The Tyumen cassation still canceled the last year's decision of the Omsk arbitration on the claim of the Ministry of Defense against the Omsk manufacturer of armored vehicles

The Federal Arbitration Court of the West Siberian District in Tyumen, having considered the cassation complaint of OAO KBTM on June 3, fully confirmed the position of the Omsk manufacturer of armored vehicles, which stubbornly did not understand why The Ministry of Defense demands a two-million penalty from him, if she herself did not want to help so that the state contract was executed on time. In addition, the number of T-80BV tanks subject to overhaul and modernization was increased after the signing of the state contract.

The Ministry of Defense made claims under the state contract, which was signed with KBTM as a result of the competition in 2007. Initially, the state contract dealt with the overhaul and modernization of the T-80BV tanks, bringing them to the form of the T-80U-E1. During 2007, the Omsk enterprise was supposed to modernize five armored vehicles and receive 100 million rubles for this. For the failure of the contract, a penalty was stipulated in the amount of 5% of the value of the outstanding work and a penalty in the amount of 1% of the value of the incomplete work for each day of delay. But by an additional agreement, the volume of the state contract was increased to ten units of armored vehicles, and the cost of work increased to 200 million rubles.

The KBTM did not dispute the fact of a six-month delay in the execution of the state contract, since it actually completed the entire scope of work only in June 2008, but does not consider itself guilty, since it repeatedly warned the Ministry of Defense about delays in deliveries to the plant and components, and the armored vehicles themselves, which needed to be repaired and modernize. The Ministry of Defense, they say, did not make any efforts in this direction, however, later it imposed a penalty and penalties in the amount of 291 million rubles for the failure to meet the terms of the state contract.

The Omsk enterprise refused to pay, and in August 2009 the Ministry of Defense filed a lawsuit with the Omsk Arbitration Court. In December 2009, the court recognized the validity of the requirements of the Ministry of Defense, nevertheless, it nevertheless reduced the amount of penalties for KBTM to a more realistic amount of 2 million rubles. The appeal left the decision of the first instance unchanged, but KBTM stubbornly insisted on its own, and the cassation ruled in favor of the enterprise, canceling the previous judicial acts. On June 4, the decision of the cassation came into force.

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Linkki löytyi tästä bmpd-blogin artikkelista (julkaistu 25.2.2012 - alleviivaus minun): LÄHDE

The latest upgrade options for the T-80

Spoiler: Artikkelin tekstistä osa

https://bmpd.livejournal.com/167974.html

The latest upgrade options for the T-80

bmpd

February 25th, 2012

Aleksey Khlopotov's blog ( http://gurkhan.blogspot.com ) contains interesting photos and data on the latest Russian T-80 tank upgrades. For about 15 years, the St. Petersburg Design Bureau Spetsmash has been continuously working on the development of various options for upgrading this tank. Options for the modernization of the T-80UA ("object 219AM-1", modernization of the T-80U tank), T-80U-E1 ("object 219AS-1", an option for the modernization of the T-80BV tank during overhaul - in fact, the installation of a tower from T -80UD on the T-80BV chassis), "object 219M" (a variant of the complex modernization of the T-80BV tank during overhaul) and "object 219AM2" (modernization of the T-80U tank due to the installation of the Arena-E active protection complex).

The T-80UA and T-80U-E1 tanks were adopted by the Russian Army in 2005, however, due to the changed policy in relation to the preservation of the T-80 series tanks, mass serial modernization of vehicles according to these options was practically not carried out. In 2007-2008, Omsk OAO KBTM under contracts with the Ministry of Defense of Russia in the amount of 200 million rubles upgraded 10 T-80BV tanks to the T-80U-E1 variant. There is no information about further modernization work.

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Tässä viitataan Aleksey Khlopotov blogikirjoitukseen, jonka jaoin aikaisemmassa viestissä. En lainannut ylle bmpd-blogista loppuosaa, koska se sisältää saman tekstin kuin Khlopotovin blogikirjoitus.

JOS uskotaan tätä, niin Omsk olisi modernisoinut 10 kpl T-80BV vaunuja T-80UE-1 standardiin aikavälillä 2007-2008. Oikeusjuttua käsittelevän uutisen mukaan tämä 10 kpl modernisointi saatiin valmiiksi kesäkuussa 2008.

Bmpd-blogi kirjoittaa 25.2.2012 että heillä ei ole lisätietoa muista modernisoinneista. Tämä on erikoista, koska esim. Jaroslaw Wolskin mukaan T-80UE-1 modernisointia olisi tehty 31 kpl eli yhden panssarivaunupataljoonan vaunumäärän verran.

Olen luottanut hänen arvioonsa, koska olen kuullut tuon numeron muistakin lähteistä. On mahdollista että näitä olisi modernisoitu suurempi määrä kuin mitä bmpd-blogi on tiennyt artikkelin kirjoituksen ajanhetkellä eli alkuvuodesta 2012. Ehkä viimeisen 10 vuoden aikana on opittu vaunujen todellinen määrä?

Toisaalta Oryxin tekemän seurannan mukaan T-80UE-1 vaunuja on menetetty Ukrainassa todistetusti 8 kpl (tämä minun viesti on kirjoitettu 13.2.2023): LÄHDE



Tämä on tietysti vähemmän kuin 10 kpl, mutta olen odottanut että niitä olisi menetetty suurempi määrä.

Altyn73 kirjoittaa blogissaan ainoastaan "T-80U and T-80UE-1" kokonaismäärästä eikä kerro näiden vaunutyyppien määrää. Olen aikaisemmin tehnyt oletuksen että Wolskin numero 31 kpl olisi oikein, minkä takia olen laskenut T-80U vaunujen määräksi 93 + 93 - 31 = 155 kpl.

JOS olisi niin että T-80UE-1 vaunuja olisikin valmistettu ainoastaan 10 kpl, se tarkoittaisi että Altyn73 tekemän seurannan mukaan Venäjän aktiivijoukkojen T-80U vaunumäärä syyskuussa 2021 olikin 93 + 93 - 10 = 176.

HUOM: tästä on myös jätetty kommentti hänen blogikirjoitukseensa: hänen laskelmistaan puuttuu panssarivaunurykmentin (3 x panssarivaunupataljoona) komentajan vaunu, joten rykmentin vaunumäärän pitäisi olla 94 kpl eikä 93 kpl, koska se pitäisi laskea 31 + 31 + 31 + 1 = 94 kpl.

En ole ottanut tätä niin vakavasti, koska suuressa kokonaisuudessa nämä yksittäiset vaunut eivät keikauta laskelmaa suuresti suuntaan tai toiseen. Silti JOS haluaa olla ihan tarkka ja JOS olettaa että tuo kommentti pitää paikkansa, niin silloin T-80U vaunujen kokonaismäärä voisi olla 94 + 94 - 10 = 178 kpl.

Joka tapauksessa, jos katsoo Oryxin seurantaa T-80U perheen vaunujen osalta niin selvästi ihan jokaista aktiivijoukkojen käytössä ollutta vaunua ei ole menetetty (ei ainakaan todistetusti) joten tässä mielessä tuo spekulointi T-80UE-1 vaunujen todellisella määrällä on ennenaikaista. HUOM: en pidä ajatusta 31 kpl eli yhden panssarivaunupataljoonan vaunumäärästä ollenkaan huonona, tuo olisi loogista että tilataan vaunuja juuri tällainen määrä tai tämän määrän monikerta. Ehkä he ovat saaneet tuollaisia 10 kpl modernisointitilauksia pari lisää myöhemmin? Hyvä silti ottaa varalta talteen tuo uutinen ja sen kommentointi, koska ikinä ei voi olla varma, mitkä numerot ovat totta ja mitkä perustuvat "jostain kuultuihin legendoihin".

HUOM: jos katsoo aikaisemmin lainaamiani Andrey Frolovin seurantataulukoita (LINKKI), niin niissä ei mainita T-80UE-1 modernisointiin viittaavia numeroita vuosien 2007-2008 kohdalla. Tämäkin vihjaa siihen suuntaan että hänen tekemänsä seuranta ei sisällä kaikkia vaunuja, vaan tarjoaa ainoastaan "rajallisen otoksen".

 

[Antares]

Julkaisin kahdessa aikaisemmassa viestissäni taulukon, johon on merkitty Venäjän panssarivaunujen vientikaupat aikavälillä 1992-2012. VIESTI 1, VIESTI 2

Taulukko perustuu Kommersantin julkaisemaan kuvaan, mutta siinä kerrotaan ainoastaan panssarivaunun malli, vientimaa, vientimäärä sekä aikaväli jolloin vienti tapahtui. Kuten taulukosta nähdään, päätin olla spekuloimatta sellaisten maiden osalta joista ei ole löytynyt tarkkoja vuosikohtaisia vientimääriä eli merkitsin taulukkoon kerrotun aikavälin ja kokonaismäärän. Jos löytyy jokin lähde, silloin tätä voi täydentää / tarkentaa tältä osin.

Tässä yksi lähde koskien Venezuelaan vietyjä T-72B1V vaunuja aikavälillä 2011-2012 (artikkeli julkaistu 31.3.2012): LÄHDE

Saturday, March 31, 2012​

Venezuela completes receipt of T-72B1V tanks from Russia​

Tutkin asiaa hieman lisää, tässä vanhempi bmpd-blogin uutinen tästä Venezuelan kaupasta (artikkeli julkaistu 28.5.2011): LÄHDE

Arrival of new Russian weapons to Venezuela

May 28th, 2011

Spoiler: Artikkelin teksti kokonaisuudessaan

https://bmpd.livejournal.com/5687.html

Arrival of new Russian weapons to Venezuela

May 28th, 2011

The well-known Venezuelan web resource www.fav-club.com reported that from May 11 to May 25, the first batches of equipment and weapons of Russian-made ground forces ordered under contracts for 2009-2010, including T-72M1M tanks, combat vehicles, were delivered to Venezuela from Russia BMP-3 infantry, BTR-80A armored personnel carriers and artillery systems.

According to www.fav-club.com , consignments of Russian armored vehicles and artillery began to arrive in Venezuela by sea in the port of Puerto Cabello starting from May 11th. On May 25, the Sluisgratch ship arrived in Puerto Cabello , delivering the first 35 T-72M1M tanks from Russia , the unloading of which is confirmed by the photographs cited by the resource. It is also reported that vehicles, artillery ammunition (including rockets) and explosives were delivered on the Sluisgratch . In total, according to the mentioned resource, from May 11 to May 25, the following were delivered to Venezuela and were accepted by the Venezuelan side:

35 T-72M1M main tanks (the Venezuelan resource calls them T-72B1V)

16 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles

32 BTR-80A wheeled armored personnel carriers

4 1V152 armored artillery command and observation posts (on the BTR-80 chassis)

13 120 mm 2S23 "Nona-SVK" self-propelled mortars (on the BTR-80 chassis)

24 2S12 "Sani" towed mortars 120 mm

24 multiple launch rocket systems BM-21 "Grad" caliber 122 mm A

batch of 23-mm towed twin anti-aircraft guns ZU-23-2

A number of military vehicles "Ural-43206" (4x4) and "Ural-4320" were also delivered (6x6) in various designs.

Reportedly







Unloading of T-72M1M tanks delivered from Russia from the Sluisgratch vessel in the Venezuelan port of Puerto Cabella May 25 (c)
Andis Silva/Notitarde/

www.fav-club.com port of Puerto Cabella May 25 (c) Andis Silva/Notitarde/www.fav-club.com




UPDATE: The designation T-72M1M in relation to tanks ordered by Venezuela is used in the Russian media. As you can easily see, the tanks delivered to Venezuela practically correspond in appearance to the T-72B vehicles with minimal modifications, so the designation T-72B1V used by the Venezuelan resource is apparently more accurate. According to known data, the vehicles are indeed T-72B1s from stock with minor modifications, and the supplied tanks, in particular, lack guided weapons.

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Motkotin aikaisemmin SIPRI:n käyttämästä lyhenteestä T-72M1M mutta tämä ei ole nähtävästi täysin väärin, lainaan alle pätkän spoilerin taakse kätketystä artikkelista:

The designation T-72M1M in relation to tanks ordered by Venezuela is used in the Russian media. As you can easily see, the tanks delivered to Venezuela practically correspond in appearance to the T-72B vehicles with minimal modifications, so the designation T-72B1V used by the Venezuelan resource is apparently more accurate. According to known data, the vehicles are indeed T-72B1s from stock with minor modifications, and the supplied tanks, in particular, lack guided weapons.

Eli tämän mukaan Venäjän mediassa näitä Venezuelalle myytyjä vaunuja on kutsuttu nimellä T-72M1M, mutta Venezuelassa eri lähteet kutsuvat niitä nimellä T-72B1V. Bmpd-blogin arvion mukaan vaunut näyttävät tosiaan tätä kuvausta vastaavilta JA tunnetun datan mukaan nämä ovat tosiaan T-72B1 vaunuja, jotka on otettu varastoista ja joille on tehty pieniä modifikaatioita.

Heidän myöhemmässä tätä kauppaa käsittelevässä artikkelissaan käyttävät vaunuista nimeä T-72B1V, linkki minun aikaisempaan viestiin jossa on lainattu tämän artikkelin teksti: LINKKI

 

[Antares]

Tsekkoslovakian T-34-85 tuotannosta (artikkeli julkaistu 22.8.2016): LÄHDE

Czechoslovak with Tagil ancestry​

Yuri Pasholok

Spoiler: Artikkelin teksti kokonaisuudessaan

https://warspot.ru/6901-chehoslovak-s-tagilskoy-rodoslovnoy

Czechoslovak with Tagil ancestry​

• tanks
• USSR
• Czechoslovakia

Yuri Pasholok

22 August '16

Tanks T-34-85 at the end of World War II turned out to be perhaps the most massive type of armored vehicles of the Czechoslovak army. The Czechoslovak corps received the first such vehicles at the beginning of 1945, in total, up to 130 tanks of this type were transferred to it during the war. They took part in the liberation of Prague, and later became the main armored forces of the post-war Czechoslovak army. After the war, deliveries continued. In the photographs of those years, there are Soviet cars, clearly released after May 9, 1945. T-34-85 became the first tanks of the Czechoslovak army to receive the famous tri-color "cockades" on the towers.

fruit of compromise​

Despite the fact that the T-34-85 was a completely modern tank at the end of World War II, it was no secret to anyone that the car was rapidly becoming obsolete. This was understood by the Czechoslovak military. On October 17, 1945, a meeting was held at the General Staff, at which its commander, divisional general Bogumil Bocek, approved the tactical and technical requirements for the Tank všeobecného použití (TVP), that is, the main battle tank. In these requirements, the image of the T-34-85 taken as a basis was clearly visible, but at the same time, the new Czechoslovak tank should have been quite different in details.

TVP development was delayed. The Military Technical Institute (Vojenský technický ústav, or VTU), where the TVP was designed, presented the tank concept in March 1946. On its basis, the engineers of the ČKD and Škoda factories had to develop their tanks. The result was the Škoda T 40 project , which was noticeably different from the original TVP. The project, presented in December 1946, already the next year ceased to meet the requirements of the Czechoslovak military. As a result, in 1948, TVP was redesigned, and the Škoda T 50 and ČKD T 51 projects were born. Self-propelled units began to be designed on their basis at the same time.


T-34-85 of Soviet production at the exercises of the Czechoslovak army in Milovice, 1952

Meanwhile, time passed, and not a single project progressed beyond the paper. It is not surprising that at one fine moment the military ran out of patience. And although work on TVP continued until March 1950, by that time the Czechoslovak General Staff had already made a decision, and by no means in favor of the developments of ČKD and Škoda.

Often this decision is called politically motivated. Indeed, on February 20-25, 1948, the communists occupied key positions in the leadership of Czechoslovakia, which led, among other things, to purges. On June 14, Klement Gottwald became president of Czechoslovakia. All this could not but affect relations with the USSR, including in the military sphere.

But it is precisely the decision of the Czechoslovak General Staff on tanks that is least connected with politics. The rapidly aging fleet of armored vehicles had to be updated, moreover, many units in general were in dire need of recruiting at least some kind of tanks. Things got to the point that the modernization and commissioning of the German StuG 40 and Pz.Kpfw began. IV. At the same time, the Czechoslovak industry has not produced a single truly new tank or self-propelled unit since the war. The only reasonable solution in this situation was to seek help from a political and military ally.


In the early 50s, some T-34-85s received headlight guards, like on this tank. In addition, some of the Czechoslovak tanks received Notek headlights.

In July 1949, Czechoslovakia received a license to manufacture the T-34–85. The reasons why this particular tank, which seemed obsolete back in 1945, was chosen for production are simple. Firstly, the Czechoslovak military were well acquainted with the T-34-85. Secondly, despite the fact that he really was not the latest tank, even at the end of the 40s this did not seem critical. Thirdly, the tank was technologically advanced, and its development in production did not present big problems.

An additional question arises as to why Czechoslovakia acquired a license specifically for the T-34-85, and not for the much more advanced T-54. The answer to this question is simple: by 1949, the production of the T-54 was just being mastered in the USSR, and its appearance was finally formed only by the beginning of the 50s. Even if you do not touch on the fact that the USSR could not have shared a license for a completely new car at all, mastering the production of the T-54 could require much more time. In the case of putting the T-34-85 on the conveyor, the Czechoslovak industry gained experience in the production of tanks, the combat weight of which exceeded 30 tons. Neither before the war, nor during it, combat vehicles of such a mass were built in Czechoslovakia.

Serial production with relocation​

Technical documentation for the T-34-85 was delivered to customers in November 1949. The sender was the Soviet plant No. 183 from Nizhny Tagil, the developer of the T-34-85. The tank, which was to be produced in Czechoslovakia, was somewhat different from those machines that were produced in the USSR. The last Soviet T-34-85s were produced back in 1946, and their design was gradually refined. It is not surprising that in the end, the Czechoslovak thirty-four differed from their Soviet counterparts.


Czechoslovak T-34-85 manufactured by ČKD Sokolovo, May 1952

For the production of tanks in January 1950, the restructuring of the ČKD Sokolovo plant, located in Prague, began. Using a locomotive plant as a base looks like a reasonable decision, especially if you take into account the presence of a developed fleet of lifting equipment on it. Specialists from the USSR arrived in Czechoslovakia to help organize the re-profiling of production.

The contractor for the production of engines was the Škoda plant in Pilsen, where the production of V-2 engines was organized. Another Škoda enterprise, located in the Slovak Dubnice nad Vahom, was identified as the manufacturer of weapons. Like ČKD Sokolovo, this plant, SMZ, was previously engaged in locomotive building. Finally, hull production was organized at the plant. Stalin (Závod JVStalina, ZJVS) in the Slovak Martin. The new tank can be called Czechoslovak without any reservations, since both Czech and Slovak enterprises were involved in its production.


Czechoslovak T-34-85 from the technical museum in Leshchany, with late-type optics. Pay attention to the quality of the tower casting

The post-war first-born was not easy for the Czechoslovak industry. The first sample of the Czechoslovak T-34-85 was made on September 1, 1951. By the beginning of October, seven more tanks had been manufactured, two of which went for short-term trials. In total, by the end of the year, 25 T-34-85s were produced.

The first tanks turned out to be quite "raw", which is quite normal for the initial releases of equipment. In droves, there were complaints about the operation of the clutch, transmission and other units. This was largely due to the fact that the required level of quality was not achieved immediately. It took time to get the process up and running. As a result, full-scale production of the T-34–85 began at ČKD Sokolovo only in February 1952.


Czechoslovak T-34-85s were equipped with such headlights with guards in the 1950s and 1960s.

As mentioned above, the Czechoslovak tank did not become the twin of the Tagil vehicles. From the plant number 183, the machine inherited the characteristic cast track rollers, although some of the tanks received stamped rollers. As for the turret, it looks more like the one that, at the end of production, the tanks of plant No. 174 (Omsk) received.

For various little things, the Czechoslovak tank is clearly calculated among the Soviet brethren. For starters, the build quality of the hulls and turrets is striking. Products coming from Martin were distinguished by a high level of care. Especially in this regard, the tower stands out, almost devoid of all kinds of irregularities characteristic of cast towers.

The hull of the tank was also slightly different. The hinges of the upper stern plate were enlarged, and the armored covers of the exhaust pipes had a more intricate design. Another feature characteristic of Czechoslovak tanks was the port for a field telephone located in the left rear of the hull. A mount for cables appeared on the left side, and the headlight received a characteristic-shaped guard. Early production tanks also featured Notek night driving lights copied from German ones.


This picture clearly shows the "curly" exhaust casings and the port for the field telephone, features characteristic of the Czechoslovak T-34-85

A total of 951 tanks were assembled at ČKD Sokolovo. Production continued until December 1953. Despite the widespread opinion that the Czechoslovak tanks were better than the Soviet ones, the picture turned out to be exactly the opposite with the tanks of this batch. On 81 tanks supplied to the Czechoslovak army in 1951–52, 280 breakdowns were recorded, of which 250 were directly related to poor workmanship. Comparison with Soviet-made tanks, the last batch of which arrived in 1949, turned out to be in favor of tanks made in the USSR.

The Czechoslovak military made quite definite conclusions for themselves. Already in May 1952, the first T-34-85 left the factory gates in the Slovak Martin, and mass production began here in September. It was these tanks that became the very hallmark of Czechoslovak quality. In 1952, both factories produced a total of 352 tanks, and in the next - another 1050 units. In 1953, ČKD Sokolovo switched to building locomotives, and the T-34-85 turned out to be the last tank produced by ČKD and in the Czech Republic in general. From now on, it was Martin who became the heart of Czechoslovak tank building, and in total 1785 tanks of this type were assembled here.


Installation project in T-34-85 100-mm guns, April 1954

The question of modernizing the T-34-85 was quickly raised. This was largely due to the fact that since 1953 the production of self-propelled guns SD-100, the Czechoslovak version of the Soviet SU-100, began. The 100-mm D-10T gun that stood on it, which received the Czechoslovak designation 100 mm vz. 44 S, had much greater armor penetration than the 85 mm T-34-85 gun. It is quite natural that there was a desire to put a more powerful gun on the tank, especially since its dimensions completely allowed it. Work on this topic was organized at the Konštrukta Trenčín enterprise (Trencin, Slovakia), and then at the Military Technical Institute.

(katso kuva alkuperäisestä artikkelista)
The first (top) and second (bottom) options for installing a 100-mm gun in the T-34-85 turret

Work on the Czechoslovakian T-34-100 began in 1953. On April 6, 1954, the Military Technical Institute presented projects for the T-34-85, armed with a 100-mm cannon mod. 1944. The tank remained practically unchanged, only the bow of the turret underwent alteration.

The first presented option looked the least problematic from the point of view of the organization of production. The main part of his tower did not change at all. The bow section was attached to it only by bolts, in which the cannon was rather strongly advanced forward. The gun received a TŠ-20 sight. Also, the installation of a coaxial machine gun was redone. In the second version, the bow of the tower had to be significantly redone. But this version had a higher projectile resistance.

According to calculations, the rate of fire of a 100-mm gun should have been about 8 rounds per minute, but it is hard to believe in the possibility of achieving such parameters. The experimental work budget was to be 780 thousand crowns, of which 160 thousand would be spent on design work, and the rest on the production of a prototype.

(katso kuva alkuperäisestä artikkelista)
Installation for overcoming water obstacles along the bottom

The question of organizing further work hung in the air for 2 months. Potentially, such an upgrade could increase the firepower of the tank. But along with the pros, there were also cons. In many ways, the current situation intersected with what happened 9 years earlier in the USSR.

In 1945, the T-34-85 with the 100-mm LB-1 gun installed in it came out for testing. The TsAKB team, headed by V. G. Grabin, managed to install the gun without altering the turret at all, and it could even fire. The main problem was that the working conditions of the crew were very cramped. From the further development of the topic in the USSR refused.

In the case of the development of Konštrukta Trenčín, things did not even reach the production of a prototype. The Czechoslovakian General Staff still wanted a 100mm cannon in the T-34-85, but not a 100mm cannon vz. 44 S. Now we were talking about the 100 mm AK 1 tank gun, which was planned to be installed in the latest TVP version. Among other things, this gun had an automatic loader and a vertical stabilizer.

But these wishes did not even reach the stage of a preliminary design. On June 30, 1954, the T-34-85 program with a 100-mm gun was finally closed. By that time, Czechoslovakia had received a license to produce the T-54. The last T-34-85s left Martin at the end of 1956, and the following year the factory produced the first T-54s. With their appearance, the Czechoslovak army finally solved the problem of arming its army with modern tanks.

long-lived internationalist​

Of the 2,736 T-34-85s built, the Czechoslovak army retained only 1,437, including 731 produced by ČKD Sokolovo and 706 produced by ZJVS Martin. The rest of the cars went for export. For the past two years, the Martin plant has produced cars exclusively for overseas sales.

As for the Czechoslovak army, in 1956 it had 1,701 T-34-85 tanks. This number also includes tanks that were received from the USSR. Due to the fact that T-54s of their own manufacture gradually entered service with the Czechoslovak army, the older materiel was gradually withdrawn. By 1967, when Martin was already producing T-55s, T-34-85s of all types, only 1,120 units remained in the army. Some of the decommissioned T-34-85 went abroad, some tanks were converted into special vehicles. At the end of 1971, the number of T-34-85s was reduced to 780 and gradually continued to decrease.

(katso kuva alkuperäisestä artikkelista)
Czechoslovak T-34-85 on the set of the film, 60s. The tank has a Notek headlight

As part of the Czechoslovak army, the career of the T-34-85 turned out to be calm. The car has become a training desk for so many tankers. It was experimented with various equipment, including an underwater driving system. The fate of the T-34-85 of Czechoslovak production abroad was completely different. They had to fight a lot, and these tanks went into the first battle even at a time when their production in Martin had not ended.


Captured T-34-85 Egyptian army in Haifa, 1957

On March 21, 1953, Antonin Zapototsky took the place of the deceased leader of Czechoslovakia, Klement Gottwald, which led to certain changes in the country's political course. In the same year, export deliveries of the T-34-85 began. On September 21, 1955, an agreement was signed between Czechoslovakia and Egypt on the supply of a number of weapons and military equipment. T-34-85s, of course, were present among them.

In total, Egypt received 820 tanks, some of which (230 units) managed to take part in the battles for the Suez Canal. The fighting began on October 29, 1956, Israel, France and Great Britain fought against Egypt. During this conflict, the warring parties suffered heavy losses in armored vehicles. Among the trophies of the anti-Egyptian coalition were T-34-85 tanks of Czechoslovak production.

The next time the Czechoslovak T-34-85 had to fight in a completely different corner of the globe. Cuba acquired about a hundred tanks, both Soviet and Czechoslovak. Purchases were made directly from the warehouses of the Czechoslovak army and went to the customer with a very large discount - 67 percent. Fidel Castro did not fail - the tanks were useful to him. In April 1961, the famous Battle of the Bay of Pigs took place , where the troops of the opponents of the revolution in Cuba, supported and armed by the CIA, landed. At that time, the Cubans had only ten T-34-85s, mostly Soviet-made, but they also turned out to be very useful. Their opponents were American light tanks M41 Walker Bulldog, in terms of the totality of combat characteristics, they are significantly inferior to them. One T-34-85 was destroyed, but the "gusanos", as the Cubans called the counter-revolutionaries, lost all their tanks. By the way, one of them is now in the exposition of the Patriot Park.


Destroyed Syrian T-34-85, Golan Heights, 1967. The tank has a turret for mounting an anti-aircraft machine gun DShK

Syria turned out to be the second buyer of the Czechoslovak T-34-85 in terms of volume of purchased tanks. In total, 120 cars went there. The tanks that ended up in the Syrian army received the largest number of changes among all the T-34-85 produced in Czechoslovakia. The most noticeable detail was the massive turret for the DShK machine gun mounted on the commander's cupola.

Syrian T-34-85s had a chance to sniff gunpowder in early June 1967, when the Six Day War broke out. A significant part of these tanks turned out to be either knocked out or captured by the Israeli army . At the same time, Egyptian T-34-85s again went into battle. In total, 251 tanks of this type were lost by the Arabs. Some of the trophies were later converted by the Israeli military into long-term weapon emplacements buried along the border with Syria and Jordan. Their engines and undercarriage were removed, and a large ammunition rack was placed in place of the control compartment.

Among the regions where Czechoslovak cars were exported, there were also calmer ones. For example, Romania and Bulgaria received a total of 120 vehicles. About 30 tanks went to India, Iraq and Yemen. In the latter, however, these tanks still had to fight. The Czechoslovak T-34-85 also fought in Lebanon, where they ended up in the 70s.


T-34-85 of Czechoslovak production in Lebanon, 70s

In general, "his" T-34-85 turned out to be a great success for Czechoslovakia. It was the first medium Czechoslovak tank to reach the stage of serial production. In addition, before him, Czechoslovakia had never produced tanks in such quantities. The release of the T-34-85 allowed Czechoslovakia not only to bring its tank-building industry to a high level, but also to return with its products to the international arms market.

There was, however, one huge downside. Czechoslovakia no longer produced tanks of its own design, and did not really develop them. The licensed production of Soviet tanks turned out to be more profitable, without requiring significant costs for the design and production of prototypes.

The author is grateful to Jiri Tintera and František Rozkot ( Franti š ek Rozkot ), Czech Republic, for their help in preparing the material.

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Sources and literature:

• VHU Prague (Military Historical Archive)
• Dubánek, M — From bayonets to jets. Unfinished Czechoslovak arms projects 1945–1955, Prague, Mladá fronta 2011 http://forum.valka.cz
• http://ftr.wot-news.com
• Photo archive of the author

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Aikajana:

- In July 1949, Czechoslovakia received a license to manufacture the T-34–85
- Technical documentation for the T-34-85 was delivered to customers in November 1949. The sender was the Soviet plant No. 183 from Nizhny Tagil.
- For the production of tanks in January 1950, the restructuring of the ČKD Sokolovo plant, located in Prague, began.
- The first sample of the Czechoslovak T-34-85 was made on September 1, 1951.
- By the beginning of October 1951, seven more tanks had been manufactured, two of which went for short-term trials.
- In total, by the end of the year (1951), 25 T-34-85s were produced.
- full-scale production of the T-34–85 began at ČKD Sokolovo only in February 1952.
- Already in May 1952, the first T-34-85 left the factory gates in the Slovak Martin, and mass production began here in September.
- In 1952, both factories produced a total of 352 tanks, and in the next - another 1050 units.
- A total of 951 tanks were assembled at ČKD Sokolovo. Production continued until December 1953.
- In 1953, ČKD Sokolovo switched to building locomotives, and the T-34-85 turned out to be the last tank produced by ČKD and in the Czech Republic in general.
- From now on, it was Martin who became the heart of Czechoslovak tank building, and in total 1785 tanks of this type (T-34-85) were assembled here.
- On June 30, 1954, the T-34-85 program with a 100-mm gun was finally closed. By that time, Czechoslovakia had received a license to produce the T-54. The last T-34-85s left Martin at the end of 1956, and the following year the factory produced the first T-54s.

Kokonaistuotantomääristä:

Of the 2,736 T-34-85s built, the Czechoslovak army retained only 1,437, including 731 produced by ČKD Sokolovo and 706 produced by ZJVS Martin. The rest of the cars went for export. For the past two years, the Martin plant has produced cars exclusively for overseas sales.

Tuon perusteella ei kykene laatimaan tarkkoja tehdaskohtaisia valmistusmääriä per vuosi, mutta tällaisen taulukon pystyy koostamaan:


Kahden viimeisen vuoden tuotanto meni kokonaan vientiin, mutta tämä ei auta asiaa. Tsekkoslovakian armeija piti 1 437 kpl oman teollisuuden valmistamista vaunuista, joten vientiin meni:

2 736 - 1 437 = 1 299

Vaan tämä ei auta vuosikohtaisiin tuotantomääriin. Ehkä tähän taulukkoon saa täydennystä jostain toisesta lähteestä.

HUOM: venäjänkielisestä wikipediasta löytyi tällainen knoppitieto (tosin ei lähdettä): LÄHDE

In total, 2736 T-34-85 tanks were produced in Czechoslovakia in 1951-56, taking into account special vehicles (VT-34 engineering vehicles, JT-34 cranes, MT-34 bridge layers, PBCHT-34 evacuation vehicles and PB-34 heavy bulldozers) - 3185.

 

[Antares]

Jatkoa edelliseen, tällä kertaa aiheena SU-100 tuotanto Tsekkoslovakiassa, heidän vaunut tunnettiin nimellä SD-100 (artikkeli julkaistu 5.2.2018): LÄHDE

SU-100 in Czechoslovakian​

Yuri Pasholok

Spoiler: Artikkelin tekstistä ensimmäinen puolikas

https://warspot.ru/11163-su-100-po-chehoslovatski

SU-100 in Czechoslovakian​

• tanks
• cold war
• USSR
• Czechoslovakia

Yuri Pasholok

Feb 05 '18

After the end of World War II, work on the creation of tanks and self-propelled guns of the Czechoslovak design proper began to decline. The reasons for this were not so much political as technical. Czechoslovak developers of military equipment simply could not keep up with the changing requirements of the Czechoslovak military. This led to licensed production of Soviet T-34-85 tanks starting in Czechoslovakia in September 1951 . A similar situation developed with medium self-propelled guns: a little less than 800 SD -100, licensed copies of the SU-100, were built in Czechoslovakia.

forced step​

By the end of World War II, the Czechoslovak army had 22 Challenger tank destroyers . These vehicles, along with 188 Cromwells, went to the recreated Czechoslovak army from the 1st Czechoslovak armored brigade. Also on May 9, 1945, there were 2 SU-85s in units of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps, but in July 1945 these vehicles were gone.
By June 1946, the Czechoslovak tank brigades had Soviet, American and British-made combat vehicles, as well as 25 LT-38 and 19 ST-I (Jagdpanzer 38 tank destroyers were used under this designation in the Czechoslovak army). The Czechoslovak military hardly liked the presence of various foreign equipment in service, but there was nowhere to go. The vast majority of the developments of domestic designers were based on pre-war projects. For example, Škoda's mid-range self-propelled artillery projects were based on the T-22 chassis, which was a development of the pre-war Škoda S-II-c, also known as the T-21.


SU-100 at the parade in Kyiv on May 1, 1949. With all the richness of choice, it was these cars that turned out to be the only ones that Czechoslovakia was able to launch in its series

In the autumn of 1945, the TVP (Tank všeobecného použití, main battle tank) medium tank development program was launched. Initially, it was conducted by the Military Technical Institute VTU (Vojenský technický ústav). Later, it was taken over by Škoda, which developed the design of the T-40 tank. Then the development was carried out as a joint project of ČKD and Škoda. Since the end of 1948, self-propelled units began to be developed within its framework. According to the Czechoslovak military, the TVP-based self-propelled guns were supposed to become mobile, with weak armor and have turrets open from above. These were self-propelled guns from the “duplex” 152 mm ShKH 43.5 / 675 TVP and 100 mm ShPTK 14.75 / 950-TVP, which were a self-propelled howitzer and a tank destroyer, respectively.

Two more vehicles were also designed that did not have towers, but were distinguished by better protection and closed cabins - 152 mm ShKH 43.5 / 675 TVP and 100 mm ShPTK 14.75 / 900-TVP.

Meanwhile, the work was being delayed, and this could not but disturb the command of the Czechoslovak army. To temporarily solve the problem, the process of overhaul and the commissioning of captured German equipment began. So in the Czechoslovak army, self-propelled guns ShPTK vz.40 / 75N (since 1949 SD 75 / 40N), created from the German StuG 40 Ausf.G. A total of 124 such machines were put into operation. In addition, by 1949 the Czechoslovak army received 12 German Nashorn tank destroyers , designated ShPTK vz.43N. Also in 1949, the Czechoslovak army received 20 ISU-152s, which received the designation TSD 152/37S.

5 years have passed since the end of the war, and neither the new Czechoslovak tank nor the self-propelled guns based on it existed even in the form of prototypes.


100-mm R 11 anti-aircraft gun, on the basis of which the A 20 anti-tank gun was designed

It was possible to solve the delicate situation thanks to the acquisition of licenses for mass production. In July 1949, Czechoslovakia bought a license to produce the Soviet T-34-85 medium tank. Ironically, it was planned to change it to TVP, the work on which ceased in the spring of 1950. Of course, the T-34-85 was very outdated by that time, but, as you know, it is better to have a titmouse in your hands than a crane in the sky. In addition, the Soviet Union helped in organizing mass production. The tanks were to be built by the ČKD Sokolovo plant in Prague, which produced locomotives. In January 1950, preparatory work began. The organization of production went quite quickly: already on September 1, 1951, the first T-34-85 of Czechoslovak production was delivered.

The death of the TVP project meant that the self-propelled guns designed on its basis were left without a base. The solution to this problem was to be the licensed production of the SU-100. The life cycle of this machine turned out to be longer than that of the T-34-85. After the production of the SU-100 was discontinued at the Ural Heavy Machine Building Plant (UZTM) in 1947, production was mastered at plant No. 174 in Omsk. The last SU-100s were delivered there in 1948.

This is what an SD-100 with a 100 mm A 20 gun could look like

By the beginning of the 50s, the SU-100 was also outdated. But the same base as the T-34-85 made it easier to establish its mass production in Czechoslovakia. And the main armament of the SU-100, the 100-mm D-10S gun, was quite modern even for the early 50s. However, at a meeting on December 13-14, 1950, it was proposed to put a Czechoslovak gun on the licensed SU-100. It could be the 100 mm A 20 anti-tank gun, which was developed by Škoda. Its anti-aircraft version was the R 11, and the AK 1 tank gun was also designed, which was created for the TVP. At a distance of 1 km, the A 20 penetrated 140 mm thick armor set at an angle of 30 degrees from the normal. These figures were better than those of the D-10S.

Another thing is that out of all this Czechoslovak trinity, only R 11 reached the stage of manufacturing prototypes. In such a situation, there was no particular point in altering it. In addition, since the beginning of the 50s, Czechoslovakia has already begun to receive SU-100s from Soviet warehouses. In total, 452 vehicles of this type were delivered to the Czechoslovak army, which received the designation SD-100. The licensed car received the same name.

Self-propelled with Omsk pedigree​

The final decision to acquire a license for the production of the SU-100 was made in 1951. The same ČKD Sokolovo plant became the place of production. Case production was organized at the plant. Stalin (Závod JVStalina, or ZJVS) in the Slovak Martin. In Slovakia, at the SMZ locomotive plant (one of the Škoda factories located in Dubnice nad Vahom), they also made a licensed D-10S, which received the Czechoslovak designation 100 mm SHK vz.44 S.


One of the SD-100s on exercises in the mid-50s. It is clearly seen that the car has "Sverdlovsk" towing hooks, but at the same time the "Omsk" commander's cupola

The organization of the release of self-propelled guns was delayed. The troops needed to be saturated primarily with tanks, and with self-propelled guns, thanks to German and Soviet vehicles, the situation did not look so deplorable. Due to the fact that the production of the T-34-85 was considered a priority, the first SD-100 was only delivered in 1953. Serial production went rather slowly. In total, 129 SD-100s were built in Prague in 1953-54 - for comparison, 951 T-34-85s were also produced there. Even taking into account the fact that the T-34-85 began to be produced 2 years earlier, the difference is still significant.

In 1954, tank production was moved to the Slovak Martin. The fact is that the cars themselves were assembled in the Czech Republic, and the engines were also made. But the production of weapons and hulls was located in Slovakia. Moving the release to Martin looks like a logical decision to simplify production.


Captured SD-100 in Israel, 1957. The headlight has a characteristic guard

The Czechoslovakian self-propelled unit had a number of differences that make it quite easy to distinguish it from the Soviet ones. As mentioned above, the last enterprise that produced the SU-100 in the USSR was plant No. 174. It was on the basis of the Omsk documentation that the SD-100 drawings were developed. But the design documentation for the T-34-85 was transferred to Czechoslovakia from plant No. 183 in Nizhny Tagil. Czechoslovak designers also made their contribution. The result was a real engineering vinaigrette, as, indeed, in the case of the Czechoslovak T-34-85. Despite the fact that the documentation on the tanks came from Nizhny Tagil, the Czechoslovak vehicles have a number of elements that were clearly of Omsk origin.


During operation, some cars received Notek headlights

During the production of the T-34-85 and SU-100, Plant No. 174 developed its own design of the tow hook, which did not have a protrusion for fixing the tow cable thimble. On the Czechoslovak car, this same hook was replaced with a regular one, with a ledge. At the same time, the upper stern sheet of both the SD-100 and the Czechoslovak T-34-85 had an Omsk design. The exhaust caps had a characteristic figured shape of the bases, the hinges of the upper stern sheet were unified with the hinge of the round hatch for access to the transmission. Another purely Omsk element can be seen on the road wheels. Factory #174 hub caps had the characteristic shape that both the SD-100 and T-34-85 received. The tracks of both machines with transverse stiffeners were also of Omsk origin.


The casting quality of Czechoslovak vehicles was higher, and the edges of the armor plates look neater.

There were, however, features characteristic of Czechoslovak production. First of all, this is a very neat execution. On Soviet-made machines, the edges of the sheets, especially the front ones, had a rather rough shape. Considering the conditions in which the work of Soviet tank builders was going on, this is not surprising, especially since beauty did not affect combat qualities in any way. The hulls assembled in Martin have a very neat execution. The same applies to the quality of casting: there are no shells and areas of rough surface on Czechoslovak-made machines.

On the cast side of the commander's cupola there is a rectangular welding also of Omsk origin. And the commander's cupola itself was also developed by factory #174. An easily noticeable detail that immediately betrays Czechoslovak origin is the communication port with the crew, located in the left rear corner of the hull. Sometimes he comes across on Soviet-made vehicles that ended up in the Czechoslovak army. The headlight of the Czechoslovak self-propelled guns had a characteristic fence. These signs are quite enough to distinguish the Czechoslovak SD-100 from the Soviet SU-100.


Characteristic stern, exactly the same as the Czechoslovak T-34-85. On the left is a communication port with the crew, typical of Czechoslovak tanks.

As in Prague, the production of the T-34-85 had priority at the Martin plant. Nevertheless, the ratio of built self-propelled guns and tanks was no longer as devastating as at ČKD Sokolovo. In total, 641 SD-100s were built in Martin, while T-34-85s - 1765 units.

It was the presence in production of the SD-100 with a more powerful gun that led the designers to think about re-equipping the T-34-85. This idea, however, did not progress further than the paper. Even with a more powerful gun, the T-34-85 still remained an obsolete tank. And in 1957, the production of the T-54 began with the same 100-mm gun. The SD-100 outlived its brother a little: the last self-propelled guns of this type were produced in 1957, and the T-34-85 was discontinued in 1956. The licensed version of the SU-100 turned out to be the only self-propelled unit on a tank chassis that was mass-produced in Czechoslovakia in the post-war years. For a number of reasons, none of the projects of the Czechoslovak self-propelled guns went into production, including the vehicles that were developed on the basis of the T-34-85.

(jatkuu seuraavassa viestissä)​