Naamat näkyvillä, liian puhtaat varusteet, keltaiset nauhat ja lisäksi puhujalla on taskut kiväärikranaatteja varten, mutta vain kahvallinen AK74M.
Ei jatkoon.
Ei jatkoon.
Antares
Respected Leader
Totta, tosin sodan intensiteetti on jotain ihan muuta kuin Yhdysvaltain sodat Afganistanissa ja Irakissa tai Neuvostoliiton sota Afganistanissa 1980-luvulla.
Ehkä sopivampi vertailukohta olisi Irakin ja Iranin sota 1980-luvulla: LÄHDE
https://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-Iraq-War
In September 1980 the Iraqi army carefully advanced along a broad front into Khūzestān, taking Iran by surprise. Iraq’s troops captured the city of Khorramshahr but failed to take the important oil-refining centre of Ābādān. By December 1980 the Iraqi offensive had bogged down about 50–75 miles (80–120 km) inside Iran after meeting unexpectedly strong Iranian resistance. The zeal of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), an Iranian state militia initially tasked with safeguarding the Islamic Revolution from internal threats, proved effective: a victory by the militia in April 1981 convinced the Iranian leadership to amplify its role in combat and promote its development. In the months ahead Iraqi forces were compelled to give ground, and in September Iranian forces pushed the Iraqis back across Iran’s Kārūn River.
But under the leadership of Ruhollah Khomeini, who saw Saddam as an obstacle to the Islamic Revolution, Iran remained intransigent and continued the war in an effort to overthrow the Iraqi leader. In July Iranian forces invaded Iraq’s Al-Baṣrah province. Iraq’s defenses solidified once its troops were defending their own soil, and the war settled down into a stalemate with a static, entrenched front running just inside and along Iraq’s border.
Iran repeatedly launched fruitless infantry attacks, using human assault waves composed partly of untrained and unarmed conscripts (often young boys snatched from the streets), which were repelled by the superior firepower and air power of the Iraqis. Both nations engaged in sporadic air and missile attacks against each other’s cities and military and oil installations.
Despite the conflict being focused in oil-rich regions, the disruption to the global oil flow had been hitherto minimal. But in 1984, with no end to the war in sight, the two countries began attacking each other’s oil-tanker shipping in the Persian Gulf. Iran also attacked tankers headed to and from Kuwait and other Gulf states, prompting the United States and several western European nations to station warships in the Persian Gulf to ensure the flow of oil to the rest of the world. The so-called Tanker War, which included strikes on more than 100 oil tankers, marked an increase in international interest and involvement in the conflict.
The oil-exporting capacity of both nations was severely reduced at various times as a result of air strikes and pipeline shutoffs, and the consequent reduction in their income and foreign-currency earnings brought the countries’ economic development programs to a near standstill. Iraq’s war effort was openly financed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other neighbouring Arab states and was tacitly supported by the United States and the Soviet Union, while Iran’s only major allies were Syria and Libya.
In 1987 the military balance began to favour Iraq, which had raised an army of about one million and had obtained state-of-the-art arms from France and the Soviet Union, including thousands of artillery pieces, tanks, and armoured personnel carriers and hundreds of combat aircraft. This arsenal (enormous for a country of some 18 million inhabitants) was bolstered by the addition of substantial quantities of chemical weapons, which the regime acquired or produced throughout the 1980s. At the same time, Iraq committed substantial resources in an attempt to develop or purchase other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including biological and nuclear arms.
In July 1987 the UN Security Council had unanimously passed Resolution 598, urging Iraq and Iran to accept a cease-fire, withdraw their forces to internationally recognized boundaries, and settle their frontier disputes by negotiations held under UN auspices. Iraq agreed to abide by the terms if Iran reciprocated. Iran, however, demanded amendments condemning Iraq as the aggressor in the war (which would have held them liable for paying war reparations) and calling on all foreign navies to leave the gulf.
Military operations in the gulf resumed, and in April 1988 Iraq—this time using chemical weapons against the Iranian troops—recaptured the Fāw peninsula. Later it liberated the districts of Salamcha and Majnūn, and in July Iraqi forces once again penetrated deep into Iran. That same month Iran Air flight 655, a passenger plane, was shot down by a U.S. missile cruiser after being mistaken for a fighter jet. The tragedy, which left 290 dead, accentuated the heavy toll the war had taken on civilians in Iran. Now war-weary, Iran finally accepted United Nations Resolution 598 on July 20, and the cease-fire came into force on August 20, 1988.
In August 1990, while Iraq was preoccupied with its invasion of Kuwait (see Persian Gulf War), Iraq and Iran restored diplomatic relations, and Iraq agreed to Iranian terms for the settlement of the war: the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from occupied Iranian territory, division of sovereignty over the Shaṭṭ Al-ʿArab waterway, and a prisoner-of-war exchange. The final exchange of prisoners was not completed until March 2003.
1980–81: Iraqi offensive and Iranian pushback
In September 1980 the Iraqi army carefully advanced along a broad front into Khūzestān, taking Iran by surprise. Iraq’s troops captured the city of Khorramshahr but failed to take the important oil-refining centre of Ābādān. By December 1980 the Iraqi offensive had bogged down about 50–75 miles (80–120 km) inside Iran after meeting unexpectedly strong Iranian resistance. The zeal of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), an Iranian state militia initially tasked with safeguarding the Islamic Revolution from internal threats, proved effective: a victory by the militia in April 1981 convinced the Iranian leadership to amplify its role in combat and promote its development. In the months ahead Iraqi forces were compelled to give ground, and in September Iranian forces pushed the Iraqis back across Iran’s Kārūn River.
1982–87: Iranian offensive, stalemate, and the Tanker War
In May 1982 Iranian forces recaptured Khorramshahr. Iraq voluntarily withdrew its forces from all captured Iranian territory soon after and began seeking a peace agreement with Iran.But under the leadership of Ruhollah Khomeini, who saw Saddam as an obstacle to the Islamic Revolution, Iran remained intransigent and continued the war in an effort to overthrow the Iraqi leader. In July Iranian forces invaded Iraq’s Al-Baṣrah province. Iraq’s defenses solidified once its troops were defending their own soil, and the war settled down into a stalemate with a static, entrenched front running just inside and along Iraq’s border.
Iran repeatedly launched fruitless infantry attacks, using human assault waves composed partly of untrained and unarmed conscripts (often young boys snatched from the streets), which were repelled by the superior firepower and air power of the Iraqis. Both nations engaged in sporadic air and missile attacks against each other’s cities and military and oil installations.
Despite the conflict being focused in oil-rich regions, the disruption to the global oil flow had been hitherto minimal. But in 1984, with no end to the war in sight, the two countries began attacking each other’s oil-tanker shipping in the Persian Gulf. Iran also attacked tankers headed to and from Kuwait and other Gulf states, prompting the United States and several western European nations to station warships in the Persian Gulf to ensure the flow of oil to the rest of the world. The so-called Tanker War, which included strikes on more than 100 oil tankers, marked an increase in international interest and involvement in the conflict.
The oil-exporting capacity of both nations was severely reduced at various times as a result of air strikes and pipeline shutoffs, and the consequent reduction in their income and foreign-currency earnings brought the countries’ economic development programs to a near standstill. Iraq’s war effort was openly financed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other neighbouring Arab states and was tacitly supported by the United States and the Soviet Union, while Iran’s only major allies were Syria and Libya.
In 1987 the military balance began to favour Iraq, which had raised an army of about one million and had obtained state-of-the-art arms from France and the Soviet Union, including thousands of artillery pieces, tanks, and armoured personnel carriers and hundreds of combat aircraft. This arsenal (enormous for a country of some 18 million inhabitants) was bolstered by the addition of substantial quantities of chemical weapons, which the regime acquired or produced throughout the 1980s. At the same time, Iraq committed substantial resources in an attempt to develop or purchase other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including biological and nuclear arms.
In July 1987 the UN Security Council had unanimously passed Resolution 598, urging Iraq and Iran to accept a cease-fire, withdraw their forces to internationally recognized boundaries, and settle their frontier disputes by negotiations held under UN auspices. Iraq agreed to abide by the terms if Iran reciprocated. Iran, however, demanded amendments condemning Iraq as the aggressor in the war (which would have held them liable for paying war reparations) and calling on all foreign navies to leave the gulf.
1988: Escalation and cease-fire
In early 1988 Iranian forces, in cooperation with Iraqi Kurds, threatened the area from Kirkūk to the Turkish border and penetrated to the towns of Hājj ʿUmrān and Ḥalabjah in Iraq’s northeastern provinces. They met with stiff resistance in the north, however. Using chemical weapons, Iraqi forces killed as any as 5,000 Kurdish civilians in and around Ḥalabjah in March 1988.Military operations in the gulf resumed, and in April 1988 Iraq—this time using chemical weapons against the Iranian troops—recaptured the Fāw peninsula. Later it liberated the districts of Salamcha and Majnūn, and in July Iraqi forces once again penetrated deep into Iran. That same month Iran Air flight 655, a passenger plane, was shot down by a U.S. missile cruiser after being mistaken for a fighter jet. The tragedy, which left 290 dead, accentuated the heavy toll the war had taken on civilians in Iran. Now war-weary, Iran finally accepted United Nations Resolution 598 on July 20, and the cease-fire came into force on August 20, 1988.
Casualties
The war had been one of the most destructive conflicts of the late 20th century. The total number of combatants on both sides is unclear, but both countries were fully mobilized, and most men of military age were under arms. The number of casualties was enormous but equally uncertain. Estimates of total casualties range from 1,000,000 to twice that number. The number killed on both sides was perhaps 500,000, with Iran suffering the greatest losses. It is estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000 Kurds were killed by Iraqi forces during the series of campaigns code-named Anfāl (Arabic: “Spoils”) that took place in 1988 (see Kurd).In August 1990, while Iraq was preoccupied with its invasion of Kuwait (see Persian Gulf War), Iraq and Iran restored diplomatic relations, and Iraq agreed to Iranian terms for the settlement of the war: the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from occupied Iranian territory, division of sovereignty over the Shaṭṭ Al-ʿArab waterway, and a prisoner-of-war exchange. The final exchange of prisoners was not completed until March 2003.
Tämän sodan vaiheet kuulostavat myös hyvin samanlaisilta kuin Ukrainan sota aikavälillä 2014-2022, tosin huomattavasti suuremmassa mittaluokassa.
Tarkoitan sitä että sodan aktiivivaihe kesti 2014 keväästä vuoden 2015 loppuun ja sen jälkeen sota jämähti asemasodaksi ja tykistöllä ampumiseksi. Sitä kesti 2016-2022.
Tämän tuoreen sodan vaiheet voivat helposti mennä samoihin uriin: vuosi 2022 oli aktiivisin vaihe, vuoden 2023 alussa molemmat yrittävät läpimurtoa mutta kumpikaan ei kykene siihen. Molemmat menettävät terävimmän kärjen, minkä jälkeen ei ole voimavaroja / kalustoa uusiin läpimurtoihin. Sota jämähtää tällöin asemasodaksi, jossa tapahtuu pieniä mutta suuressa mittakaavassa merkityksettömiä rintamalinjan muutoksia.
Helppo uskoa että tällaista sotaa voisi jatkua vuosikausia, kuten Iranin ja Irakin tapauksessa.
Toisaalta jos kävisi niin että Venäjä haaskaa voimansa kevään aikana ja Ukraina onnistuisi omassa vastahyökkäyksessään, on mahdollista että sota kehittyisi eri suuntaan. Mietin myös että kesällä jalkaväkihyökkäykset voivat olla tehokkaampia, koska on aluskasvillisuutta joka piilottaa joukkojen liikkeet (ei toki täydellisesti, osaksi vain). Toisaalta kevyt jalkaväki liikkuu kävelyvauhtia, jos ei ole ajoneuvoja käytössä. Niillä ei saada aikaan syviä läpimurtoja, siihen tarvitaan nopeampaa kalustoa.
ziizaah
Alikersantti
Ei kait me oikeen tiedetä tämän iskun yksityiskohtia. Itse olisin lentänyt dronen suoraan koneen sen osan päälle minkä olisin halunnut tuhota. Kranun pudottaminen dronesta on kuitenkin epätarkempaa kun suoraan kohteeseen päin jyrääminen. Tässä tapauksessa ei ole mitään tarvetta saada dronea ehjänä takaisin, koska operoidaan vieraalla maalla ja dronen mahdollinen kotimatka voi paljastaa tekijän.
Joku varmaan osaa kertoa onko nuo koneet kuinka täydessä polttoainelatingissa ja sytyttääkö kranaatti siiven päällä räjäytettynä polttoaineen kovinkaan hyvin.
vz
Kapteeni
Olihan sillä nyt kranaattikivääri vasemmalla olalla.
Antares
Respected Leader
Väitetysti Valko-Venäjällä on määrätty opettajat allekirjoittamaan tällainen paperi:
Tekstin käännös, huom. teksti leikkautuu hieman oikeasta reunasta joten käännös ei ole 100%:
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Sinänsä ihan normaalia toimintaa diktatuureissa: laitetaan ihmiset allekirjoittamaan todistuksia ja jos myöhemmin jää kiinni mielenosoittamisesta tms. niin voidaan kaivaa tämä paperi esiin ja syyttää "sopimuksen rikkomisesta".
Sitten videoidaan tunnustus ja heitetään vankilaan.
Toki tämä paperin allekirjoittaminen on ainoastaan varautumista, aikaisemmin ei ole nähty tarvetta sille vaan eri syistä pidätetyt on pakotettu allekirjoittamaan "tunnustuksia" ja lukemaan ne videokameralle. Näihin tapauksiin verrattuna tämä tuore käänne voi kertoa siitä että varautuvat tuleviin levottomuuksiin etukäteen.
Tekstin käännös, huom. teksti leikkautuu hieman oikeasta reunasta joten käännös ei ole 100%:
Director
State Educational Institution "Secondary School No. 1
Mr. R
Full name
COMMITMENT
on compliance with the requirements of the legislation of the Republic of Belarus and local legal acts of the State Educational Institution "Secondary School No. 1 in Rechitsa
I.
I undertake to comply with the requirements of the legislation of the Republic Belarus, local legal acts of the State Educational Institution “Secondary School No. 1 in Rechitsa”, including not forcing employees to participate in a strike (Article 200 of the Criminal Code), not refuse to perform labor duties (in whole or in part) without good reason and not call on other persons to stop performing labor duties without good reason:
Do not create obstacles for other employees to perform their work responsibilities:
not to illegally collect and provide information about the private life (or) personal data of another person without his consent, and also not to disseminate such information (Article 203-1 of the Criminal Code);
not call for the application of sanctions against the Republic of Belarus, its citizens organizations:
not to take actions aimed at inciting racial, papional religious or other social hatred or discord, the rehabilitation of Nazism (Article 130 130-1 of the Criminal Code);
not to propagandize and not to take actions aimed at publicly demonstration, including using the global computer network Internet or any other information network, production, distribution of nazi symbols or paraphernalia, as well as not to store or acquire such symbols or paraphernalia for the purpose distribution (Article 19.10 of the Code of Administrative Offenses);
not violate the established procedure for holding a meeting, rally, street procession, demonstration, picketing, other mass event (Article 24.23 of the Code of Administrative Offenses);
do not organize or prepare group activities, grossly violating public order, and not to participate in such activities (Article 342 of the Criminal Code)
not to call for actions aimed at causing harm to the national security of the Republic of Belarus and not to disseminate knowingly false information about the political, economic, social, military or international situation of the Republic of Belarus, the legal status of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, or government agencies that discredit the Republic of Belarus (art. 361, 369-1 of the Criminal Code),
not to carry out extremist activities, as well as not to distribute information products containing calls for extremist activities that promote such activities (Art. 361-1-361-5 of the Criminal Code, Art. 1911 of the Code of Administrative Offenses)
It was explained to me that in case of my violation of the requirements established by the legislation of the Republic of Belarus, local legal acts of the head of the health department of the Gomel Regional Executive Committee, disciplinary, administrative or criminal liability, including disciplinary liability in the form of dismissal in accordance with paragraph 7 n of Article 42, paragraph 8 of clause 7 of article 42, clause 10 of part 1 of article 47 of the Labor Code of the Republic of Belarus.
(signature)
(full name)
State Educational Institution "Secondary School No. 1
Mr. R
Full name
COMMITMENT
on compliance with the requirements of the legislation of the Republic of Belarus and local legal acts of the State Educational Institution "Secondary School No. 1 in Rechitsa
I.
I undertake to comply with the requirements of the legislation of the Republic Belarus, local legal acts of the State Educational Institution “Secondary School No. 1 in Rechitsa”, including not forcing employees to participate in a strike (Article 200 of the Criminal Code), not refuse to perform labor duties (in whole or in part) without good reason and not call on other persons to stop performing labor duties without good reason:
Do not create obstacles for other employees to perform their work responsibilities:
not to illegally collect and provide information about the private life (or) personal data of another person without his consent, and also not to disseminate such information (Article 203-1 of the Criminal Code);
not call for the application of sanctions against the Republic of Belarus, its citizens organizations:
not to take actions aimed at inciting racial, papional religious or other social hatred or discord, the rehabilitation of Nazism (Article 130 130-1 of the Criminal Code);
not to propagandize and not to take actions aimed at publicly demonstration, including using the global computer network Internet or any other information network, production, distribution of nazi symbols or paraphernalia, as well as not to store or acquire such symbols or paraphernalia for the purpose distribution (Article 19.10 of the Code of Administrative Offenses);
not violate the established procedure for holding a meeting, rally, street procession, demonstration, picketing, other mass event (Article 24.23 of the Code of Administrative Offenses);
do not organize or prepare group activities, grossly violating public order, and not to participate in such activities (Article 342 of the Criminal Code)
not to call for actions aimed at causing harm to the national security of the Republic of Belarus and not to disseminate knowingly false information about the political, economic, social, military or international situation of the Republic of Belarus, the legal status of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, or government agencies that discredit the Republic of Belarus (art. 361, 369-1 of the Criminal Code),
not to carry out extremist activities, as well as not to distribute information products containing calls for extremist activities that promote such activities (Art. 361-1-361-5 of the Criminal Code, Art. 1911 of the Code of Administrative Offenses)
It was explained to me that in case of my violation of the requirements established by the legislation of the Republic of Belarus, local legal acts of the head of the health department of the Gomel Regional Executive Committee, disciplinary, administrative or criminal liability, including disciplinary liability in the form of dismissal in accordance with paragraph 7 n of Article 42, paragraph 8 of clause 7 of article 42, clause 10 of part 1 of article 47 of the Labor Code of the Republic of Belarus.
(signature)
(full name)
-
Sinänsä ihan normaalia toimintaa diktatuureissa: laitetaan ihmiset allekirjoittamaan todistuksia ja jos myöhemmin jää kiinni mielenosoittamisesta tms. niin voidaan kaivaa tämä paperi esiin ja syyttää "sopimuksen rikkomisesta".
Sitten videoidaan tunnustus ja heitetään vankilaan.
Toki tämä paperin allekirjoittaminen on ainoastaan varautumista, aikaisemmin ei ole nähty tarvetta sille vaan eri syistä pidätetyt on pakotettu allekirjoittamaan "tunnustuksia" ja lukemaan ne videokameralle. Näihin tapauksiin verrattuna tämä tuore käänne voi kertoa siitä että varautuvat tuleviin levottomuuksiin etukäteen.
Sjuggen
Alikersantti
No, kait sotavehkeessä on miehistölle happinaamarit? Ei reiän rungossa pitäisi vielä estää koneen primääri käyttötarkoitusta?
Antares
Respected Leader
Joku voi löytää tästä jotain uutta, tosin nyt kun sotaa on käyty yli vuosi, niin Krimin eri tukikohdat ja niiden käyttötarkoitus lienevät monille selvät.
Suorat linkit ko. artikkeleihin joissa on karttakuvia ja koordinaatit:
Sevastopol. North side - https://investigator.org.ua/ua/sevastopol-pivnich/
Sevastopol. Bays and the city - https://investigator.org.ua/ua/sevastopol-buhty/
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Muut artikkelit löytyvät tältä sivulta: https://investigator.org.ua/ua/bavovna/
The cycle of materials about Russian objects in Crimea, which are potential legal military targets for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, is addressed to the civilian population - our citizens in the ARC and Sevastopol - by the Center for Journalistic Investigations , so that they can protect themselves and stay away from them.
Suorat linkit ko. artikkeleihin joissa on karttakuvia ja koordinaatit:
Sevastopol. North side - https://investigator.org.ua/ua/sevastopol-pivnich/
Sevastopol. Bays and the city - https://investigator.org.ua/ua/sevastopol-buhty/
-
Muut artikkelit löytyvät tältä sivulta: https://investigator.org.ua/ua/bavovna/
The cycle of materials about Russian objects in Crimea, which are potential legal military targets for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, is addressed to the civilian population - our citizens in the ARC and Sevastopol - by the Center for Journalistic Investigations , so that they can protect themselves and stay away from them.
stunt cock
Luutnantti
Mitä jos sille seuraavallekin tapahtuu jotain? Varmaan iskun jälkeen lentokentän suojaukseen pitää panostaa enemmän. Ehkä jopa ilmatorjuntaa pitää siirtää lisää suojaamaan kenttää. Ainakin yksi on poissa pelistä jonkun aikaa, joten väkisinkin iskulla on seurauksensa.
Olihan Moskva risteilijän upotuksen jälkeen hetki, kun täälä osa jo oli ihan varma ettei mitään ollut tapahtunut ja kaikki oli pelkkää puhetta. Että menee se joskus noinkin päin.
jpjukola
Kersantti
Tiedä kannattaako tuota yökameralla ja lasermittaimella olevaa ihan pommikoneena käyttää - ehkä tulenosoitukseen olisi parempi. Mutta toki jos vaikka Fotonordicilta sen on ostanut sen 12 kk vakuutuksen kanssa
ilmaslaavi
Luutnantti
Hmm, jos nämä nyt oikeesti on (omasta tahdosta) ryssiä jotka sotivat ryssän sotilasinfraa ja putinia vastaan ryssäinmaassa, niin eikö tämä olisi sitten jo ennemmin sisällissodan larppausta? Toki flaseflagina sekin kai voisi mennä, jos putin haluaa ajaa äkkiä läpi jotain lakeja millä saadaan muiluttaa omia ihan miten halutaan (onko se ennenkään ollut este?), jos epäillään kansan nousemista suurta johtajaa vastaan.
Toisaalta voi myös olla ihan legit yritys saada ryssälässä jotain sisäistä kahinaa aikaiseksi, mutta teippaukset kyllä tuntuu turhilta noin pienellä ryhmällä ja muutenkin vähän haiskahtaa.
StepanRudanskij
Respected Leader
Ei noilta pojilta ainakaan keltainen teippi ole loppumassa.
Cappe
Luutnantti
On ehkä odottamattoman painehäviön varalta hätähappea. Ei noilla koneilla kuitenkaan minnekään korkealle lennellä jos rungossa on reikiä. Leviää äkkiä se reikä isommaksi ja pahimmassa tapauksessa tippuu taivaalta koko hökötys. Vertaa kestävyyttä ehjä alumiinitölkki vs. tölkki, jossa on valmiiksi repeämä. Se repeämä lähtee hyvin herkästi leviämään.
Tutkakoneen ideana on saada se tutka korkealle, niin näkee kauemmas.
Tästä tuli ajatus että... se Kershin silta. Kannattaako sitä pommittaa rikki vai pitäiskö siitä itään menevät kaistat korjata kansainvälisenä avustustyönä kunnolla kuntoon.
Niinhän se rottakin luikkii karkuun kun pakotie on olemassa. Sitten kun sitä ei ole, rotta hyökkää päälle.
RKSTAK
Ylipäällikkö
Nämähän voi pelata kaksilla rattailla. Sanoin alunperin täällä että tämä ryssä legioona on riskialtis porukka. Vaikka taistelevat ryssiä vastaan voi vauhtisokeus jättää näkemättä mikä heidän todellinen tarkoitus on.
Tälle operaatiolle on oltava korkean tason hyväksyntä. Jännä nähdä mihin kehittyy
Niin mikä estää käyttämästä niitä kaistoja länteen menevässä liikenteessä?
Paperossi tumpattu taas väärin Venäjällä.
Antares
Respected Leader
Tämä on yksi video / kuva joka on jäänyt minulle terävimpänä mieleen sodan ensimmäiseltä päivältä: Ukrainan ja Venäjän joukot ajavat toistensa ohi samaa tietä pitkin.
Jos en muista väärin, tämä olisi eteläisestä Ukrainasta, Venäjän joukot ajavat Krimiltä kohti Khersonin kaupunkia (korjatkaa toki, jos muistan väärin).
Vastaavanlaisia kaoottisia videoita ja kuvia oli muitakin, sellaisia missä kalustoa on tien laidassa, milloin kummankin ja toinen ajelee vierestä ohi.
Jos en muista väärin, tämä olisi eteläisestä Ukrainasta, Venäjän joukot ajavat Krimiltä kohti Khersonin kaupunkia (korjatkaa toki, jos muistan väärin).
Vastaavanlaisia kaoottisia videoita ja kuvia oli muitakin, sellaisia missä kalustoa on tien laidassa, milloin kummankin ja toinen ajelee vierestä ohi.