Amerikkalainen sotataito

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Onkohan täällä kenelläkään tietoa tästä hankkeesta, puhumattakaan siitä, miten se etenee?

Paha sanoa, kun ei tiedetä, mistä hankkeesta on kyse. Oliko se edes yksittäinen hanke vaiko visionäärien tulevaisuudenkuva? Yhdysvaltain puolustusministeriöllä on muuten yli 685 tekoälyhanketta käynnissä tällä hetkellä...


Kuulostaa kuitenkin siltä, että tuo mistä kirjoitat olisi voinut olla jokin osa näitä isoja Future Combat Systems / Land Warrior / Future Soldier 2030 -ohjelmia.

Recent reports that the Pentagon is planning to spend tens of billions of dollars over the next decade to perfect computerized warfare sound like science fiction. But the plan, Future Combat Systems, is the realization of an old dream. What its designers envision is a 21st-century fighting force of automated tanks, helicopters and planes, remote missile launchers and even troops of robot soldiers -- all coordinated by a self-configuring network of satellites, sensors and supercomputers. A way to get the human out of the loop.


PERSONAL MODELING AND SIMULATION TOOLS
• Facilitate decision-making by providing war-gaming capability with expert system
augmentation (among other things, will be able to mimic decision-making patterns of
other military strategists)
• Provide ability to predict likely effects of fires – both kinetic and non-kinetic (e.g., risk of
noncombatant casualties and likely impact on local support for mission)
• System provides both an operational and training capability
Fire Control
• Micro-sensors/hyper spectral electro-optics/sensor fusion
• Polymer/adaptive and plastic zooming optics
• Optical Augmentation with dazzle/stun features
• Target state estimation and prediction with predicted target de-confliction
• Target geo-location and hand-off
• Laser radar for closed loop target and munition tracking and munition guidance
• Wireless link to Soldier
• Effect based weapon – target pairing algorithm
• Target classification
• Collaborative engagement
• Non-magnetic digital compass


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Voi jumalauta tuota sotataitoa... Onkohan tätä harrastettu jenkeissä laajemmaltikin, siksikö esim. F-35 on myöhässä?

.On FCS, Gen. Mike Murray said, the Army wrote a detailed wish list of performance requirements before it knew what was actually possible. Today, it’s diligently experimenting to see what’s possible with technology – technology that’s had more than a decade to advance since FCS was cancelled in 2009.

 
Voi jumalauta tuota sotataitoa... Onkohan tätä harrastettu jenkeissä laajemmaltikin, siksikö esim. F-35 on myöhässä?



En muista mistä näin luin, mutta tuo taisi olla jonkun vuosituhannen alkupuolen hallinnon alla kohtuu yleistä asevoimien projekteissa. Visioitiin vaatimuksia hankintaohjelmille niin, ettei (tarkoituksella) huomioitu teknologian valmiutta. Ajatus oli, että jos ei nykyteknologia vaatimuksia täyttäisikään, niin se stimuloisi valmistajien T&K-työtä kun ne pyrkii täyttämään vaatimukset.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
En muista mistä näin luin, mutta tuo taisi olla jonkun vuosituhannen alkupuolen hallinnon alla kohtuu yleistä asevoimien projekteissa. Visioitiin vaatimuksia hankintaohjelmille niin, ettei (tarkoituksella) huomioitu teknologian valmiutta. Ajatus oli, että jos ei nykyteknologia vaatimuksia täyttäisikään, niin se stimuloisi valmistajien T&K-työtä kun ne pyrkii täyttämään vaatimukset.

Puolensa kaikella. Silti tulee mieleen, että jos aikanaan olisi otettu toimintamalliksi "30% parempi, ei 300% parempi", niin nyt Yhdysvalloissa kehiteltäisiin jo Bradleyn ja M109:n seuraajien seuraajia. Sen sijaan on kaadettu miljardeja kaiken maailman Crusadereihin...
 
In the opening days of a future war against China, an F-35 pilot on a mission is tracked and shot down by air defenses. He safely ejects — but is trapped deep inside enemy territory.

Standing between him and his comrades: A bristling array of surface-to-air missiles, radars, enemy fighters and other defenses. If the U.S. Air Force sends a traditional combat search and rescue helicopter into that highly contested airspace, the chances are high it gets shot down, leaving the service with several more pilots and pararescuemen in need of their own rescuing.

Instead, the Air Force tries something new. It sends an autonomous drone — a self-piloting air taxi — whose smaller electric propellers let it operate much more quietly than a helicopter with massive rotors. If the drone is spotted and shot down, the Air Force hasn’t lost another airman and can try again with another drone to save the pilot. His rescue is still far from certain. But at least he’s got a chance.
 

“First, as we think about this problem, I’ve been in the Army for 38 years, and in my entire time in the Army on battlefields in Iraq, in Afghanistan, Syria, I never had to look up," Gen. Clarke said by way of introducing the threat posed by unmanned aircraft. "I never had to look up because the U.S. always maintained air superiority and our forces were protected because we had air cover. But now with everything from quadcopters – they’re very small – up to very large unmanned aerial vehicles [UAV], we won’t always have that luxury."

“The cost of entry into this, particular for some of the small unmanned aerial systems, is very, very low," he added. "I think that this is something that’s gotta continue to go up in terms of our priority for the protection, not just of our forces that are forward today – that’s the current problem – but what’s gonna come home to roost. Some of these technologies could be used by our adversaries on our near abroad or even into our homeland.”

Clarke's remarks echo comments from other senior U.S. military and other government officials in recent years, particularly with regard to the growing threats low-tier drones now pose to American troops even in relatively small conflicts against non-state actors. What he said here also reflects how an increasingly diverse set of actors, including militant and organized criminal groups, as well as various state and state-sponsored entities, are employing these capabilities outside of traditional battlefields for intelligence gathering purposes and direct attacks.
 
The Army’s brigade combat teams may have been the signature units of recent wars, but service leaders believe future conflicts will be dominated by divisions and even corps, officials said Monday.

“The large-scale combat [operations] against a peer threat, the amount of complexity, speed, violence, chaos, leads us to the conclusion that our great brigade combat team commanders are going to be wholly consumed winning the fight they're in,” said Gen. James Rainey, the new chief of Army Futures Command, at the Association of the United States Army’s conference in Washington, D.C.

Operations during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars were largely planned by brigade combat teams—some 4,000 troops led by a colonel—and executed by their battalions and companies. Rainey said these BCTs were built in a way that had them hold and operate in an area for a year but were not a “maneuver formation.”

The war in Ukraine has shown what the Army could face in a large-scale conflict, said James Greer, an associate professor at the U.S. Army School for Advanced Military Studies, who spoke on a future-of-warfare panel with Rainey. Ukraine has committed the equivalent of two full corps of troops and is fighting across a vast area, about 150 times larger than the Army’s National Training Center in California, Greer said. A single U.S. Army corps can be comprised of two to five divisions with up to 45,000 soldiers, commanded by a lieutenant general.

“So: very large formations, very large spaces, and of course, everyone's familiar with the lethality, the destruction, the consumption of materiel, ammunition, etc., on a scale that we haven't really thought through in a long time,” Greer said.

Focusing the Army on these larger formations will mean they will be able to work closer with the other services as well as allies and partners, Secretary Christine Wormuth in her Monday keynote.
 
En muista mistä näin luin, mutta tuo taisi olla jonkun vuosituhannen alkupuolen hallinnon alla kohtuu yleistä asevoimien projekteissa. Visioitiin vaatimuksia hankintaohjelmille niin, ettei (tarkoituksella) huomioitu teknologian valmiutta. Ajatus oli, että jos ei nykyteknologia vaatimuksia täyttäisikään, niin se stimuloisi valmistajien T&K-työtä kun ne pyrkii täyttämään vaatimukset.
Tätä harrastetaan meilläkin tällä hetkellä ja siihen on olemassa ihan hankintalain mukainen hankintatapakin. DARPA:n toimintatavoista kopioituna tunnetaan meillä innovatiivisena hankintana.
 
Jenkit on näköjään jossain vaiheessa julkaissut 12-osaisen kirjasarjan LSCO-sodankäynnistä. Nyt olisi siis tietoa tarjolla:

Large-Scale Combat Operations
The Army is shifting its focus and updating its doctrine to prevail in large-scale ground combat operations against peer and near-peer threats. To support the new doctrine codified in Field Manual 3-0, Operations , the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center commander, Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, directed the Army University Press to publish the seven-volume Large-Scale Combat Operations Historical Case Study book set. As he explains in this issue’s “Foreword,” his intent is “to expand the knowledge and understanding of the contemporary issues the U.S. Army faces by tapping our organizational memory to illuminate the future.” To introduce readers to this set, the following special section of Military Review provides an overview of each volume by its author. The downloadable version of the book set is available here on our website.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Books/Large-Scale-Combat-Operations-Book-Set/

Koostuu oheisista opuksista/aiheista:

Weaving the Tangled Web: Military Deception in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Volume 1
Edited by Christopher M. Rein, PhD

Volume 1, Weaving the Tangled Web: Military Deception in Large-Scale Combat Operations surveys twelve cases of MILDEC from World War I through Desert Storm focusing on how armies have successfully used preconceptions to either immobilize an opponent or force the expenditure of energy in unproductive directions. The case studies span the major wars of the twentieth-century from the perspectives of several great powers and offer both a primer for planners of military deception and a caution for all military personnel to remain constantly on guard for practitioners of this ancient art.

Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Volume 2
Edited by Lt. Col. Peter J. Schifferle, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired

Volume 2, Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large Scale Combat Operations, opens a dialogue with the Army. Are we ready for the significantly increased casualties inherent to intensive combat between large formations, the constant paralyzing stress of continual contact with a peer enemy, and the difficult nature of command and control while attempting division and corps combined arms maneuver to destroy that enemy? The chapters in this volume answer these questions for combat operations while spanning military history from 1917 through 2003. These accounts tell the challenges of intense combat, the drain of heavy casualties, the difficulty of commanding and controlling huge formations in contact, the effective use of direct and indirect fires, the need for high quality leadership, thoughtful application of sound doctrine, and logistical sustainment up to the task. No large scale combat engagement, battle, or campaign of the last one hundred years has been successful without being better than the enemy in these critical capabilities. What can we learn from the past to help us make the transition to ready to fight tonight?

Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires: Historical Case Studies of Converging Cross-Domain Fires in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Volume 3
Edited by Lt. Col. Thomas G. Bradbeer, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired

Volume 3, Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires: Historical Case Studies of Converging Cross-Domain Fires in Large Scale Combat Operations, provides a collection of ten historical case studies from World War I through Desert Storm. The case studies detail the use of lethal and non-lethal fires conducted by US, British, Canadian, and Israeli forces against peer or near-peer threats. The case studies span the major wars of the twentieth-century and present the doctrine the various organizations used, together with the challenges the leaders encountered with the doctrine and the operational environment, as well as the leaders’ actions and decisions during the conduct of operations. Most importantly, each chapter highlights the lessons learned from those large scale combat operations, how they were applied or ignored and how they remain relevant today and in the future.

The Long Haul: Historical Case Studies of Sustainment Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Volume 4
Edited by Lt. Col. Keith Beurskens, DM, U.S. Army, Retired

Volume 4, The Long Haul: Sustainment Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations is a collection of eleven historical case studies of sustainment operations drawn from the past one hundred years with lessons for modern LSCO. The book is organized chronologically, specifically including World Wars I and II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Falklands War, Operation Desert Storm, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The commanding general for the Combined Armed Support Command (CASCOM) presents future sustainment trends to conclude the book.

Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Volume 5
Edited by Jack D. Kem, PhD

Volume 5, Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension – especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.

Into the Breach: Historical Case Studies of Mobility Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Volume 6
Edited by Florian L. Waitl

Volume 6, Into the Breach: Historical Case Studies of Mobility Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations, examines ten historical case studies of mobility and countermobility operations from World War I through Desert Storm. The case studies take a closer look at mobility and countermobility successes and failures in large-scale combat operations against peer or near-peer threats. The chapters highlight several insights, themes, and patterns that current commanders and doctrine developers must be aware of when discussing or conducting mobility operations. The final chapter addresses future mobility and countermobility developments that the U.S. Army will face in Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) against peer and near-peer adversaries.

Perceptions Are Reality: Historical Case Studies of Information Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Volume 7
Edited by Colonel Mark D. Vertuli and Lieutenant Colonel Bradley S. Loudon

Volume 7, Perceptions Are Reality: Historical Case Studies of Information Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations, is a collection of ten historical case studies from World War II through the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Ukraine. The eleventh and final chapter looks forward and explores the implications of the future information environment across the range of military operations during both competition and conflict. The case studies illustrate how militaries and subnational elements use information to gain a position of relative advantage during large-scale combat. The intent of this volume is to employ history to stimulate discussion and analysis of the implications of information operations in future LSCO by exploring past actions, recognizing and understanding successes and failures, and offering some lessons learned from each author’s perspective.

The Competitive Advantage: Special Operations Forces in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Volume 8
Edited by Robert M. Toguchi and Michael E. Krivdo

Volume 8, The Competitive Advantage: Special Operations Forces in Large Scale Combat Operations presents twelve historical case studies of special operations forces from World War I through Operation Iraqi Freedom. This volume sheds light upon the emerging roles, missions, and unique capabilities that have forged a path for Army Special Operations Forces today. These case studies set Large Scale Combat Operations in the center and place ARSOF’s role in the forefront. If a reader were to take one piece from this volume, it would be the clear understanding of the close synergy that occurs between the Conventional Force and SOF in Large Scale Combat Operations for major wars in the 20th and early 21st century. That synergy should provide a broad azimuth for military planners and practitioners to follow as the Army, SOF, and the Joint Force combine to preserve the peace, defend the Nation, and defeat any adversary.

The Last 100 Yards: The Crucible of Close Combat in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Volume 9
Edited by Col. Paul E. Berg, U.S. Army

Volume 9, The Last 100 Yards: The Crucible of Close Combat in Large-Scale Combat Operations presents thirteen historical case studies of close combat operations from World War I through Operation Iraqi Freedom. This volume is a collection from the unique and deliberate perspective of the last 100 yards of ground combat. In today’s Army, there are few leaders who have experienced multi-domain large-scale ground combat against a near-peer or peer enemy first hand. This volume serves to augment military professionals’ understanding of the realities of large-scale ground combat operations through the experiences of those who lived it.

Maintaining the High Ground: The Profession and Ethic in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Volume 10
Edited by C. Anthony Pfaff and Keith R. Beurskens

Volume 10, Maintaining the High Ground: The Profession and Ethic in Large-Scale Combat Operations combines discussions and historical case studies from the past seventy-five years to address ethical challenges for the Army Profession. Healthy and functioning professions facilitate the employment of expert knowledge to serve a social good. In doing so, trust develops among professionals, as well as with the client, creating an acknowledged autonomy over its jurisdiction that allows the profession to maintain its effectiveness. For the Army, that jurisdiction is the application of land power and its client is the US government and the American public it serves. With today’s all-volunteer Army, maintaining public trust is critical, and large-scale combat operations require a professional class of leaders and soldiers with strong ethics and the ability to adapt and even shape their own future.

Deep Operations: Theoretical Approaches to Fighting Deep
Volume 11
Edited by Jack D. Kem

In the 11th volume of the LSCO series, editor Jack Kem has culled together articles, many of which were written in the 1980s, in order to connect to a period of time when the Army was adjusting from the concept of “active defense” to a greater orientation on how to have an offensive mindset, even when outnumbered. Today, the US Army is similarly shifting the operational concept from unified land operations to multi-domain operations. Accordingly, US adversaries are making similar adjustments to their operational concepts to “break free” from the past and become less predictable. The premise of this volume is that there is a general preference for the two sides to approach Deep Operations in fundamentally different ways, and these undercurrents may manifest themselves in future operations.

Enduring Success: Consolidation of Gains in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Volume 12
Edited by Eric M. Burke and Donald P. Wright

The 12th volume of the LSCO series, Enduring Success, offers a collection of historical case studies, ranging from 1898 to 2003, concerning the challenges of consolidating gains in the spatial or temporal wake of large-scale combat operations. Its contributors recount how senior military commanders historically confronted the problem of securing tactical and operational successes behind the front lines and linking those successes to higher-level objectives established by political leaders. As the case studies vividly illustrate, those who either ignore or fail in consolidation of gains efforts risk winning the battle but losing the war.
edit: Korjasin vähän muotoiluja ja lisäsin paremmat kuvaukset.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Youtube-kanavalla Iowan yliopiston ROTC-kurssin taktiikkaluentoja.

 
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