Bhutanin konflikti

Kansainvälisoikeudellisesti mielenkiintoinen tuo Bhutan. Vuoden 1949 sopimuksessa Intian kanssa se suostui Intian ohjaukseen, mitä ulkosuhteisiin tulee.

Kiina aikoo rakentaa "uuden silkkitien", jolla se saa 60 maata parantamaan ennestään nousevaa talouttaan. Uuden silkkitien pääväylä kulkee Kiinasta Keski-Aasian kautta Iraniin ja sieltä Turkkiin. Istanbulista reitti jatkuu Itä-Euroopan halki Moskovaan. Moskovasta pääväylä kulkee Valko-Venäjän kautta Liettuaan. Pääreitin on tarkoitus jatkua Liettuasta aina Afrikan sarveen saakka. Hankkeen nimi vapaasti suomennettuna on "yksi vyöhyke, yksi tie".

Luultavasti maapala liittyy tähän.
Tämä kriisi on saanut alkunsa jo kauan sitten. Kiina ja Intia sotivat jo vuonna 1962 (Kiina hyökkäsi Kuuban kriisin aikana ettei suurvallat pystyneet vaikuttamaan tilanteeseen). Kiina voitti mutta silti sillä jäi vaatimuksia mm. Bhutanilta.
Kiinaa harmittaa se että Intia ei ole innostunut silkkitiestä niin kuin Kiina haluaisi.

Cnn kirjoittaa seuraavasti 11.7:

(CNN)A Chinese road building project in the Himalayas has become the center of an escalating border dispute between India and China, with both sides accusing the other of territorial intrusions.

Described by the Indian government as a "significant change of status quo with serious security implications for India," the controversial road runs through the disputed Doklam Plateau, on the unmarked border between China and Bhutan.

Though not a part of Indian territory, the plateau holds immense strategic importance for Delhi and is vital to its geopolitical interests

"The area in contention is extremely close to a very vulnerable stretch of Indian territory that effectively connects the bulk of India to its northeastern states," Shashank Joshi, senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London told CNN.

"Additional construction could skew the local balance of power in China's favor, essentially leaving India more vulnerable to invasion in case of a military confrontation with Beijing."

The Doklam dispute is the latest in a long-running series of territorial flare-ups between India and China. In 1962, the two countries engaged in a bloody border war, and skirmishes have continued to break out sporadically in the decades since.

On June 26, China accused Indian border guards in the state of Sikkim of crossing into its territory in southwestern Tibet, in an attempt to obstruct the construction of a new mountain road.

India has not denied its troops were present in the area. According to a statement released by the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indian personnel "approached the Chinese construction party and urged them to desist from changing the status quo."

In response, China blocked religious pilgrims from India from visiting the Manasarovar shrine, accessible only via the Himalayan Nathu La that runs alongside the border between the two nations, "out of security concerns."

The moves come at a time of steadily deteriorating ties between the two countries, say analysts, who point to Chinese investment in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and Chinese frustration with India's unwillingness to join its One Belt One Roaddevelopment initiative as points of contention.

Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Ely Ratner told CNN the current dispute was an indication of the challenges China faces as a global leader.

"It goes to show how hard it's going to be for China to lead the region when core elements of its foreign policies are so ideological, uncompromising, and irreconcilable with its neighbors and other major powers."
Tässä vielä taustaa:
Why did China only claim Tibet, but not Nepal or Bhutan?
Afterall Nepal was under the influence of Qing Dynasty during 1800's.
Sino-Nepalese War
Nepalese–Tibetan War

And Bhutan was a part of Tibet throughout much of its history.
History & Politics
History of Bhutan

Given Nepal's and Bhutan's location, they would have been of immense geo-strategic value to China, as China could have directly connected with Bangladesh and cut of India from its north eastern territories.

So, why is it that China never laid claims over Nepal or Bhutan but still does lay claim over territories like indian occupied Tibet?

Ritwik Banerjee
, Sanskrit enthusiast
Answered Apr 30, 2015
Your assumption is incorrect.

China does claim parts of Bhutan. These is a boundary dispute between the two nations that is a small fraction of China's international land border, but a significant portion of land for a small nation like Bhutan.

Officially, the claim into Bhutanese territory follows a plot that is now so standard that it warrants no more than stifled yawn:

That piece of land you think is yours was a part of another land that used to belong to Tibet, which used to belong to China a couple of hundred years ago according to some documents maintained by the then Emperor's court in Beijing. If you disagree, you're a dumb Western propaganda!
(Never mind the fact that Tibet can make the exact same claims about Yunan province in China, but, well ... they don't have the military to back up that claim. And also, that's not the point of this answer.)

But the strategic reason behind this claim is different, and from India's perspective, far more sinister. Due to the way India was partitioned in 1947, she was able to retain a very narrow sliver of land that connects the north-eastern states to the rest of India. This piece of land, the Siliguri Corridor, is often called the Chicken's Neck, and rightly considered to be one of the most vulnerable points in India's political geography. Here is what it looks like (take special note of the strategic importance of Nepal and Bhutan in this picture):

Also note that the region in the upper right of this picture (above the dashed line) is Arunachal Pradesh, an entire state of India that China is claiming as Chinese territory. (Never mind that the Tawang monastery, which paid homage to Lhasa, received voluntary gifts as opposed to mandatory taxes from only the 13% of the population that was Buddhist. Historically, Arunachal Pradesh was always a mix of traditional tribal religions and Hinduism.)

Now let us look at the territory dispute between Bhutan and China. Here is a snapshot taken from Google maps (please open it in a new tab for a clearer and magnified picture):

Note that geographically, these regions are not in the Tibetan plateau, but very much a part of the higher reaches of the Himadri range of mountains in the Himalayas. China has little interest in Jakarlung and Pasamlung, at least when compared to the Doklam plateau. The major objective is to "resolve" the dispute in Jakarlung and Pasamlung in exchange for a bigger slice of land from the Doklam plateau completely given away to Beijing.

Why so interested in expanding claims around the Doklam plateau?

Because it enables China to broaden the strategic Chumbi Valley, exposing the Siliguri Corridor to an even more direct Chinese threat [1].

In the event of a confrontation, the PLA can simply cut off the entire north-eastern India and easily take control of Arunachal Pradesh (and perhaps even more ... maybe a thousand years ago some other part of India was a part of a kingdom in Arunachal Pradesh!).

The only reason China is currently not claiming parts of Nepal is because there is tug-of-war going on between India and China for influence in Nepal. And so far, China has been extremely successful in reducing Indian influence. A significant portion of the Nepalese people vehemently hate India ... and while the people of India don't understand the reason behind it, a detailed analysis of New Delhi's actions (or lack thereof) in Nepal shows that this hatred may be partly justified.

China saw this anti-India sentiment as an opportunity, and has exploited it with astonishing success! Now, however, if they start claiming parts of Nepal's territory, all this soft power will simply vanish, and Nepal will turn to India in order to counter the Chinese threat -- exactly as it had turned to China to counter what it saw as intrusive actions of India in Nepal.

In fact, this to-and-fro between China and India has been going on in Nepalese politics even when India was still British India. It resumed with new enthusiasm after the Chinese annexation of Tibet. India, however, was rather obtuse and instead of gradually increasing real influence in Nepal, repeatedly acted in ways that could be construed as interfering in Nepal's sovereign matters. This is what led to the anti-India sentiment I mentioned earlier.[2]

I personally believe that China will, indeed, claim the Mustang region of Nepal in the near future. After all, the people of Mustang speak Tibetan, and consider themselves to be Tibetan in all socio-cultural dimensions[3, 4].

The pretext will be the same story as before:

This was a part of Tibet, and Tibet was a part of China. We don't care if Tibetan documents show otherwise. Qing documents are mightier because ... umm ... well, because you're a Western propaganda!
But doing so now would be premature, and will definitely undo the inroads they have made into Nepal over the last three decades. Unlike India, I find it highly unlikely that China will act bluntly until its influence in Nepal is indisputably strong.

[1] In Bhutan too, Chinese grab land
[2] China–Nepal relations
[3] The Unexpected Familiary: Finding Myself in the Kingdom of Lo (Mustang)
[4] Kurtis R. Schaeffer. Himalayan Hermitess : The Life of a Tibetan Buddhist Nun. Oxford Univ. Press.

What China’s Himalayan warmongering reveals

NEW DELHI – At a time of rising Sino-Indian tensions over a weeks-long troop standoff at the trijunction where the borders of Tibet, Bhutan and the Indian state of Sikkim meet, China’s warmongering has become so raucous and coarse that, to the casual observer, a Himalayan military conflict may seem imminent. In reality, Beijing is waging — in Chinese strategic tradition — full-throttle psychological warfare to compel India to back down without a shot being fired.

The current crisis, more significantly, has underscored the centrality of propaganda in China’s foreign policy — from the aggressor playing the victim to unremitting efforts to camouflage the intrusion into tiny Bhutan that precipitated the standoff. China’s vitriolic war rhetoric and unrealistic preconditions for holding talks stand out in stark contrast to India’s measured tone and readiness to peacefully resolve the crisis.

The crisis, in fact, has highlighted how China blends psychological warfare (“psywar”), media warfare and the manipulation of legal arguments (“lawfare”) to undermine the opponent’s information-control capabilities and to buttress its strategic game plan. Disinformation and deceit are among the tools China is employing in its psywar to tame India without military combat, in Sun Tzu style.

Its psy-ops have included mounting almost daily threats to teach India a lesson, unless it gives in. Indeed, the authoritarian regime in Beijing has shown itself adept at exploiting the political divisions in the world’s largest democracy, including reaching out to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s opponents and attacking his “Hindu nationalism” in order to help sow dissensions in India on its current China approach.

Given China’s rise as a praetorian state, its foreign ministry is probably the weakest government branch, yet that ministry has taken the lead to intimidate India in unbecoming and undiplomatic language. Beijing is also using its state media to threaten an “all out confrontation” along the entire, more than 4,000 km Sino-Indian border and to warn India that it would suffer a humiliating rout greater than it did in the 1962 war. One Chinese state mouthpiece even called the Indian foreign minister a liar.

In the current crisis, the Chinese state and its media have worked in tandem to feed disinformation as part of the psychological operations (psy-ops). After all, media organizations, backed by an annual $10 billion budget from the state, have become integral to China’s global propaganda offensive. Chinese propaganda is getting smarter and more targeted, with some in the Indian media lapping up the disinformation, yet Beijing’s mendacity is becoming conspicuous.

Consider two examples. In mid-July, the Chinese state broadcaster CCTV telecast a video of live-fire military exercises in Tibet by a mountain brigade deployed against India. It later came to light that this was a routine annual drill conducted in early June before the crisis began. Shortly after the CCTV report, the Chinese military’s official newspaper, PLA Daily, said tens of thousands of tons of military hardware had been moved to Tibet in response to the troop standoff. This report too turned out to be part of China’s psywar, with Indian intelligence still finding no evidence of a Chinese military buildup in Tibet.

In this light, what can China hope to achieve through its psy-ops? India has a lot at stake: If it were to wilt under the Chinese pressure, it would impair its national security and potentially open the path to its long-term strategic subordination to China. In addition, China would be able to mount a stronger military threat against India’s hold on its far northeast.

China’s psywar has failed to obscure even the key facts. The crisis was triggered in mid-June after days of growing local military tensions when People’s Liberation Army troops sought to unilaterally change the territorial status quo by beginning work on a strategic highway through Bhutan’s Doklam Plateau, which is located very close to the Tibet-Bhutan-Sikkim trijunction. (China contends that Doklam is its own territory in the way it claims the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands or the sprawling northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.) The Chinese encroachment prompted the Indian army to swiftly intervene and halt the road construction, triggering the standoff.

The PLA has for years been quietly chipping away at strategic areas in Bhutan’s north and west. It has also waged an aggression by stealth to assert its claim over the Doklam plateau, including by increasingly sending Tibetan herdsmen and armed patrols there and by turning some natural paths into small paved roads. Bhutan has long complained of Chinese encroachments. For example, it told its parliament in 2009 that it had “protested many times to the Chinese regarding the road-construction activities.”

Bhutan, with just 8,000 men in its military, police and militia, has no means to resist Chinese encroachments. Its security partner, India, was earlier loath to go beyond training and advising Bhutanese forces. But with China’s latest land grab also threatening Indian security, New Delhi decided that Bhutan’s fight was India’s fight. In a strategic miscalculation that has fueled its current fury, China anticipated Bhutan’s diplomatic protest over its latest road construction but not India’s rapid military intervention.

New Delhi cannot allow Beijing to gain control of Doklam because it will result in China fortifying its military positions around the trijunction and bringing India’s territorial link with its northeastern states within Chinese artillery range. This link — the Siliguri Corridor — is just 27 km wide at its narrowest point and is aptly known as the “Chicken Neck.” If China built the highway through Doklam, it would be able to transport heavy tanks to the trijunction and, in the event of a war, seek to cut off India from its northeast.

The risk that a frustrated China could escalate its current psy-ops to a military conflict cannot be discounted. Indeed, Beijing is signaling that it will brook no Indian “interference” in Bhutan’s external relations or national security, although Indo-Bhutanese relations are governed by a friendship treaty and defense arrangements. It wants India to leave Bhutan to its fate.

More fundamentally, China’s intrusion into Bhutan and its war rhetoric against India raise important larger issues. One issue is China’s disregard of international law, including the bilateral accords it has signed with Bhutan and India pledging not to alter the status quo unilaterally. As events in the South China Sea and East China Sea also illustrate, Beijing signs agreements and treaties but does not comply with them.

Another issue is China’s abiding faith in propaganda, extending from fake history claims to other countries’ territories to disinformation operations intended to deceive and outmaneuver opponents. The reliance on propaganda blurs the line between fact and fiction to such an extent that, gradually, the Chinese state begins to believe its own propaganda and act upon it. This factor, along with its associated risks, is apparent in the Doklam standoff.
Foreign Affairsin kirjoitus:

August 1, 2017
Can the Doklam Dispute Be Resolved?
The Dangers of China and India's Border Standoff
By Michael Auslin

South China Seas was the prime catalyst for former U.S. President Barack Obama’s so-called pivot to Asia. The same worry has motivated President Donald Trump to restart freedom of navigation operations near contested islands off the Philippines and Vietnam militarized by China. As a result, policymakers have overlooked equally dangerous clashes happening on land. War in Asia could well break out thousands of miles from those contested waters. Most worrying, today, Chinese and Indian troops are facing off just yards away from each other, high in the remote Himalayas, at a spot called Doklam—a reminder that great power conflict in Asia on land, too, could potentially throw the region into chaos.


Current territorial disputes in Asia resemble nineteenth-century European conflicts. These include not only those concerning well-known crisis spots such as the Korean Peninsula’s 38th parallel but obscure disagreements such as the 2008–11 clash between Cambodian and Thai armed forces over ancient Buddhist temple enclaves along the border running between northern Cambodia and northeastern Thailand.

The Sino-Indian flashpoint is in territory claimed by both China and tiny Bhutan, with the latter’s claim long supported by India. The ambiguity of a nineteenth-century treaty has put Beijing and New Delhi at odds over whether China can extend a road through this forbidding territory right up to the border with India. Indian troops have blocked the Chinese from continuing construction, which has led to a military standoff.

There has long been contested territory between the two nuclear powers. They share a border over 2,000 miles long, and in 1962 fought a brief but bitter border war also in the Himalayas. As a result, China controls a contested area called Aksai Chin at the very northern tip of India, while India holds a much larger territory called Arunachal Pradesh, which borders Tibet. Each state claims sovereignty over the other holding, leading to repeated incursions and standoffs along the border, usually by Chinese forces moving temporarily into Indian-claimed territory. The Doklam Plateau, where the current crisis is unfolding, is a narrow land link between subcontinental India and its remote northeastern states that are surrounded by Bangladesh, Burma, and China.

Great power disputes have the potential to wreak havoc throughout Asia, as the Sino-Indian faceoff shows. From New Delhi’s perspective, China continues to try to encircle it from the north, not only in Bhutan but also through the Sino-Pakistan alliance, which links a growing and aggressive power to India’s deadliest enemy, one that has nuclear weapons trained on India’s major cities. With Chinese naval ships increasingly transiting the Indian Ocean, India feels pressured on land and by sea, accounting in part for its forceful response to the Chinese road-building scheme. Given its concerns over China’s growth, New Delhi will only bristle at Chinese Minister Wang Yi’s admonishment to “behave yourself and humbly retreat.”

Adding yet another layer of complexity, both India and China are led by powerful nationalist leaders, each the most charismatic figures their countries have seen in a generation. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has embraced an activist foreign policy, including forming warm relations with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. For his part, Chinese President Xi Jinping has steadily expanded China’s presence globally, launching the One Belt, One Road initiative and founding the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. He has also built new bases for the Chinese military in the South China Sea, among other endeavors.

Neither leader is likely to acquiesce. Xi has a crucial Communist Party Congress coming up this fall, where he hopes to further consolidate his considerable power. Modi is coming off successful elections that have given him a boost in domestic politics. Nationalism in both countries is a core element of foreign policy, making it harder to control passions during a crisis.


Yet both countries also have a great deal to lose should they come to blows. Not only would a conflict tarnish China’s reputation as a global leader but anti-Chinese elements in Tibet and Xinjiang could also try to take advantage of any fighting to push back against the harsh Chinese security presence in their territories. As for India, another defeat by the better equipped Chinese would not only be a national humiliation but would raise fears that China’s ally Pakistan might stir up more trouble on their tense border, as well as give China greater influence in countries near India, including Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.

Although full-scale war is unlikely to break out in the Himalayas, a protracted standoff raises the chance of an accident or miscalculation that could cause an armed clash. Other nations, such as Russia or Japan, might also get involved to show moral support for one side or the other, or to possibly offer some type of material aid. As for the United States, there is little, if any, role that it can play other than to encourage both sides to settle their quarrel through diplomatic means.

Doklam may be in one of the most isolated spots on earth, but it reflects one aspect of Asia’s current “great game.” The region’s powerful states all have disputes with each other that have lingered for decades, with little resolution in sight. As they have become richer, thanks to globalization and trade, often with each other, they have modernized their militaries, so as to be able to lay credible claims on contested territory. Throw nationalism into the mix, and the recipe for ongoing crisis is nearly complete. Even if Asia’s military pot does not boil over, it will be set at a low boil for the foreseeable future.
Eipä ole hyvä tilanne. Lieneekö Pohjois-Koreasta jo tehty kaupat Kiinan kanssa ja annettu vapaat kädet Bollywoodissa.
Indian and Chinese troops clashed briefly on a disputed area of land in the Himalayas, officials said, exacerbating tensions during a months-long standoff between the two armies.

Chinese troops threw stones at Indian soldiers near Pangong Lake, a major tourist attraction in the picturesque mountain region of Ladakh on Tuesday, an Indian defence official said.

He said Chinese soldiers had twice tried to enter the Indian territory but had been pushed back.

“There was a minor incident. There was some stone pelting from the Chinese side but the situation was quickly brought under control,” he told news agency AFP on condition of anonymity.

The brief confrontation was resolved after Indian and Chinese sides retreated to their respective positions, he added.

Police in the north Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, where Ladakh is located, said clashes were relatively common along the de facto border known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

“These things happen every summer but this one was slightly prolonged and more serious but no weapons were used,” a police source in Srinagar told AFP
Tämä kriisi on saanut alkunsa jo kauan sitten. Kiina ja Intia sotivat jo vuonna 1962


Paljon paljon ennemmin.

Full text of facts and China's position concerning Indian border troops' crossing of China-India boundary

Chinese Foreign Ministry issued on Wednesday a document of the facts and China's position concerning the Indian border troops' crossing of China-India boundary in the Sikkim Sector into the Chinese territory.


1. The Dong Lang area (Doklam) is located in Yadong county of the Tibet Autonomous Region of China. It borders India's Sikkim state on the west and the Kingdom of Bhutan on the south. In 1890, China and the UK signed the Convention Between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet which delimited the boundary between the Tibet region of China and Sikkim. According to the Convention, the Dong Lang area, which is located on the Chinese side of the boundary, is indisputably Chinese territory. For long, China's border troops have been patrolling the area and Chinese herdsmen grazing livestock there. At present, the boundary between the Dong Lang area and Sikkim is a part of the China-India boundary in the Sikkim Sector.


Kuva sopimuksesta
Sopimus kokonaisuudessaan löytyy ihan isobritannian virallisilta sivuilta

En ole mikää kansainvälisen oikeuden asiantuntija, mutta mielestäni kiinan mielipide ei ole tuulesta temmattu.
Kyllä kai siirtomaa isäntä britannia on ollut ihan laillinen sopija osapuoli yli sata vuotta sitten.

Tuolta alueelta ei taida muita sopimuksia sen jälkeen olla?

Viimeksi muokattu:
Tässä koetetaan tehdä arviota siitä, kumpi "voitti". Kai tasapelissä on kaksi voittajaa?


Syy siihen miksi Kiina haluaa omia Himalajan alueen itselleen.

Two sub-parallel belts, Cenozoic aged Himalayan leucogranite on the Tibetan Plateau, extend east to west over more than 1000 km, regarded as the largest granitic belts in the world. The diverse rare-metal mineralization was identified commonly related to these leucogranites.

The Himalayan leucogranite is unique with petrolgoical characteristics similar to the well -known rare-metal granites worldwide. However, relatively few studies on the rare-metal mineralization in this region have been published.

The research groups in Nanjing University and Institute of Geology and Geophysics, Chinese and Academy of Science organized a field expedition in south Tibet in the summer of 2016 to constrain the distribution of mineralization in the region, which was published in the Science China Earth Sciences.

The first exciting discovery identified in the field is the widespread Be-mineralization containing in most of leucogranitic plutons (Fig. 2a).

The authors states in the article: "Aquamarine, a variety of beryl, major precious mineral resource in Nepal, has been widely explored and exploited and traded for a long time, and they may also be Be-mineralization potential on the Chinese side of the Himalayas."

Detailed microscope observation and microprobe analysis were conducted at the laboratories and twelve leucogranite plutons were found to contain rare-metal bearing minerals such as beryl (the representative of Be mineralization), columbite-group minerals (Fig. 2b), tapiolite, pyrochlore-microlite, fergusonite, Nb-Ta rutile (the representative of Nb-Ta mineralization), and cassiterite (the representative of Sn mineralization).

Based on the analytical results, the researchers revealed the distribution of the mineralization as: "Rare-metal mineralization was observed in both the Tethyan and Higher Himalayan belts.

No clear differences between the two belts were identified. However differences are clear when comparing the eastern and western parts of the belts. The eastern plutons are characterized by Nb, Ta, Sn, and Be mineralization and Sn mineralization is notably absent in western plutons.

"These results suggest that rare-metal mineralization in the Himalayan leucogranites is regionally variable, but does not appear to be controlled by tectonic characteristics of granite emplacement and the pluton size."

Petrogenesis was also prepared for the Himalayan rare-metal leucogranite. The model of "magmatic fractionation" and the abundance of fluxing components in the melt (e.g., H2O, Li, F, B, and P) are very important for the formation of the granite and enrichment of rare metal in the melt and/or fluids.

Rare metal has the widespread application value in the strategic development of new industries.

"China ranks high in resources and production of rare-metal mineral, especially in two granitic belts in the Nanling range and the Altai district (Xinjiang) with several world- class deposits", the authors in the article pointed out the immense value of the investigation in the Himalaya: "Our preliminary study on the Himalayan region shows additional enormous potential for the rare-metal mineralization in what may become the country's economically important metallogenic belt."