Konflikti Kiinan merellä

[ctg]

Kaksi uutta saarenvaltausta https://amti.csis.org/paracels-beijings-other-buildup/

 

[aj77]

Exclusive: U.S. destroyer challenges China's claims in South China Sea


FILE PHOTO - The guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain approaches the aircraft carrier USS George Washington for a fueling at sea in this December 5, 2010 handout photo courtesy of the U.S. Navy.U.S. Navy/Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Cheng S. Yang/Handout
Idrees Ali

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A U.S. Navy destroyer carried out a "freedom of navigation operation" on Thursday, coming within 12 nautical miles of an artificial island built up by China in the South China Sea, U.S. officials told Reuters.

The operation came as President Donald Trump's administration seeks Chinese cooperation in dealing with North Korea's missile and nuclear programs and could complicate efforts to secure a common stance.

The officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the USS John S. McCain traveled close to Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands, among a string of islets, reefs and shoals. China has territorial disputes with its neighbors over the area.

It was the third "freedom of navigation operation" or "fonop" conducted during Trump's presidency. Neither China's defense ministry nor its foreign ministry immediately responded to a request for comment.

The operation was the latest attempt to counter what Washington sees as Beijing's efforts to limit freedom of navigation in the strategic waters, and comes as Trump is seeking China's cooperation to rein in North Korea.

Tensions have risen recently after North Korea carried out two nuclear tests last year and two ICBM tests last month, prompting a strong round of U.N. sanctions which angered Pyongyang who threatened to teach the United States a "severe lesson".

Trump in turn responded by warning North Korea it would face "fire and fury" if it further threatened the United States.

U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis issued a stark warning to North Korea on Wednesday, telling Pyongyang that it should stop any actions that would lead to the "end of its regime and the destruction of its people."

The United States has criticized China's construction of islands and build-up of military facilities in the sea, and is concerned they could be used to restrict free nautical movement.

The U.S. military has a long-standing position that its operations are carried out throughout the world, including in areas claimed by allies, and they are separate from political considerations.

The Trump administration has vowed to conduct more robust South China Sea operations.


In July, a U.S. warship sailed near a disputed island in the South China Sea claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam.

Experts and officials have criticized President Barack Obama for potentially reinforcing China's claims by sticking to innocent passage, in which a warship effectively recognized a territorial sea by crossing it speedily without stopping.

China's claims in the South China Sea, through which about $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes each year are contested by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.

Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard in Beijing; Editing by Clarence Fernandez and Matthew Mpoke Bigg




http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-southchinasea-exclusive-idUSKBN1AQ0YK?il=0

 

[Talvela]

U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis issued a stark warning to North Korea on Wednesday, telling Pyongyang that it should stop any actions that would lead to the "end of its regime and the destruction of its people."

Onko nyt myös Mattis hullu?

 

[ctg]

A US warship has sailed close to an artificial island created by China in the South China Sea as part of a “freedom of navigation” operation.

The USS John S McCain destroyer sailed within six nautical miles of Mischief Reef, part of the disputed Spratly Islands south of the Paracel Islands.

A US official said a Chinese frigate sent radio warnings at least 10 times to the USS McCain.

“They called and said ‘Please turn around, you are in our waters,’” the official said.

“We told them we are a US [ship] conducting routine operations in international waters.”

The official said the interactions were all “safe and professional”, with the operation lasting about six hours from start to finish.

China’s foreign ministry said: “The US destroyer’s actions have violated Chinese and international laws, as well as severely harmed China’s sovereignty and security.

“China is very displeased with this and will bring up the issue with the US side.”

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...ilitary-tells-us-ship-to-turn-around-10-times

LOL. Kiina on pyyhkinyt kansainvälisillä lailla takamustaan jo jonkin aikaa. Eivät he edes räpäyttäneet silmäänsä Haagin oikeusistuimen päätökselle. Meno jatkui kahta hurjempana. Olisi hurjaa lukea heillä meriradiossa takaisin Haagin päätös.

 

[ctg]

Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte’s first year in office was a strategic roller coaster. Throughout the year, he tirelessly sought to reorient his country’s foreign policy away from its traditional allies in favor of China and Russia. As Duterte bluntly put it, he sought an “independent” foreign policy, which “will not be dependent on the United States”.

Despite facing domestic resistance from civil society and the defense establishment, Duterte forged ahead fortifying bilateral relations with China, with particular focus on infrastructure investments in his home island of Mindanao. While lashing out at Washington, mainly in response to disagreements over his brutal war on drugs, Duterte has gone the extra mile to praise Beijing, which has offered large-scale economic benefits in exchange for the Philippines’ acquiescence in the South China Sea.

Duterte also pursued tighter defense ties with China, while scaling back its joint military exercises with America and nixing war games as well as plans for joint patrols in the South China Sea. Through he has made 21 trips overseas, including two to China, Duterte has so far deliberately snubbed Washington and other major Western capitals.

The specter of an Islamic State (IS) province in Mindanao, however, forced Manila to return to its traditional allies. The Pentagon has provided assistance to the Philippine military against IS-affiliated fighters, who continue to hold Marawi, the country’s largest Muslim-majority city, in a siege that now stretches into its third month.

Yet, as the 2017 chairman of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Duterte has soft-pedaled on the South China Sea disputes in an effort to please China. The upshot is the regional body’s fast slide into irrelevance in shaping the regional security architecture.

https://amti.csis.org/duterte-asean-embrace-pax-sinica/

 

[Mustaruuti]

Kiinalaiset ovat mahdollisesti kehittämässä pommikoneella kannettavaa ballistista lentotukialuksen-torjunta ohjusta. Idea on ulottaa torjuntakehä niin kauas, että US NAVY:n koneet eivät pysty efektiivisesti enää toimimaan.

A anti-ship ballistic missile carrying H-6N could extend China's anti-access bubble even farther and put US naval strike groups at greater risk.
http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...hed-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-toting-bomber

 

[Jukkis]

Kiinalaiset ovat mahdollisesti kehittämässä pommikoneella kannettavaa ballistista lentotukialuksen-torjunta ohjusta. Idea on ulottaa torjuntakehä niin kauas, että US NAVY:n koneet eivät pysty efektiivisesti enää toimimaan.

A anti-ship ballistic missile carrying H-6N could extend China's anti-access bubble even farther and put US naval strike groups at greater risk.
http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...hed-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-toting-bomber

Juu, olisikohan jenkkien aika kehittää laivalta ammuttava ballististen ohjusten torjuntaohjus...

En oikeasti ymmärrä miten mediat jaksaa näistä kohkata, kun vasta-ase (SM-3) on testattu ja otettu käyttöön vuosia ennen uhka-asetta... Useimmille laivastoille nuo toki ovat oikea eksistentiaalinen uhka, mutta jostain syystä nämä lehtijutut aina kohkaavat miten iso vaara nämä ovat juuri jenkkien tukialusosastoille Aegis BMD-saattajineen.

 

[Mustaruuti]

Juu, olisikohan jenkkien aika kehittää laivalta ammuttava ballististen ohjusten torjuntaohjus...

En oikeasti ymmärrä miten mediat jaksaa näistä kohkata, kun vasta-ase (SM-3) on testattu ja otettu käyttöön vuosia ennen uhka-asetta... Useimmille laivastoille nuo toki ovat oikea eksistentiaalinen uhka, mutta jostain syystä nämä lehtijutut aina kohkaavat miten iso vaara nämä ovat juuri jenkkien tukialusosastoille Aegis BMD-saattajineen.

Toi on ilmeisesti aika vittumainen. Kyllä saattaisi tukialuksella vähän jänskättää, kun ohjukset Aegikselta lähtevät matkaan.

How it differs from standard MRBMs is that it can maneuver dynamically during reentry and has the ability to target large vessels during the terminal phase of its flight.

In essence, it is a carrier killer that engages at hypersonic speeds and steep angles of descent, making most traditional defensive weaponry useless against it. Even advanced anti-ballistic missile capabilities would be hard pressed to intercept a DF-21D depending on its stage of flight.

 

[Gyllis1]

Kiinalaiset ovat mahdollisesti kehittämässä pommikoneella kannettavaa ballistista lentotukialuksen-torjunta ohjusta. Idea on ulottaa torjuntakehä niin kauas, että US NAVY:n koneet eivät pysty efektiivisesti enää toimimaan.

A anti-ship ballistic missile carrying H-6N could extend China's anti-access bubble even farther and put US naval strike groups at greater risk.
http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...hed-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-toting-bomber

Hmmm... Näin täysin maallikkona tulee muutama iso ongelma mieleen Kiinalaisten kannalta: Ensimmäinen ongelma on ylipäätään havaita se tukialus (meri on iso ja tukialus pieni ja vaihtaa paikkaa ullattavan nopeasti, tulee neulat ja heinäsuovat mieleen), sen jälkeen se pitää tunnistaa (mikäli ei haluta ampua vahingossa jotain supertankkeria). Näiden kahden kohdan jälkeen se täytyisi jollain sensorilla saada ohjuslaukaisuun riittävän tarkkuuden seurantaan. Mikä tuo sensori olisi? Satelliittien lentoradat taitavat olla turhan ennalta arvattavat, niiltä piilottelu onnistuu. Laivoilla eikä lentokoneilla ole noin 300-400 merimailia lähemmäksi asiaa tukialuksesta (CAP partiot, AEW-koneet ja uloimmat laivat partioivat noin 200 merimailin päässä tukialuksesta). Jäljelle jää horisontin yli näkevät, isot maasijoitteiset tutka-asemat? Jotka ovat varmaan sitten amerikkalaisten risteilyohjusten maalilistan kärjessä jos lähtevät kinuskien kanssa hippasille.

Toi on ilmeisesti aika vittumainen. Kyllä saattaisi tukialuksella vähän jänskättää, kun ohjukset Aegikselta lähtevät matkaan.

Ihan saletisti on, yhtä lailla vittumaiselta hommalta kyllä myös kuullostaa tuollaista tukialusryhmää vastaan hyökkääminen (itse laittaisin roponi ennemmin suklareille jos pakko valita).

Tässä jotain perusjuttuja, mielenkiintoista lukemista:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Carrier_Group_tactics

 

[Mustaruuti]

Ihan saletisti on, yhtä lailla vittumaiselta hommalta kyllä myös kuullostaa tuollaista tukialusryhmää vastaan hyökkääminen (itse laittaisin roponi ennemmin suklareille jos pakko valita).

Tässä jotain perusjuttuja, mielenkiintoista lukemista:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Carrier_Group_tactics

Jep. Kiitos.

Tuli poikasena luettua esim. tämä kirja (muiden McLeanien ja Clancyjen ohella) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Storm_Rising

Siinä on varsin yksityiskohtainen selostus modernista merisodankäynnistä tukialusosastoilla. (alla wikipedia-lyhennelmä)

This advantage is put to immediate use as a NATO carrier battle group, led by USS Nimitz, USS Saratoga and the French carrier Foch, is successfully attacked by Soviet Badger and Backfire bombers, the latter firing Kingfish missiles. The Soviet Badgers fire modified Kelt missiles as decoys whose radar transmitters make them appear to be Backfires on the predicted attack vector, far out from the main air fleet. The American carriers' F-14 interceptors are committed against the decoys, leaving an insufficient number of Crusaders from the Foch and the ships' surface-to-air missiles to defend against the 'real' Backfires approaching from another direction. A few of the Backfires and most of their Kingfish missiles are shot down by the F-8 Crusaders, the Aegis missile cruisers, the destroyers whose surface-to-air missiles can guide on the AEGIS radar signals, and the Phalanx antimissile gun systems, but some of the Kingfish get through. The Foch is sunk, the amphibious assault carrier USS Saipan explodes, taking 2,500 Marines with her, and the USS Nimitz damaged, with the two American carriers forced to spend several weeks under repair, Nimitz at Southampton, England and Saratoga at Norfolk, Virginia.

Joskus on tullut kommentoitua, että US NAVY:n tukialusosasto on hankala maali. Kiteytettynä mm. tähän.

https://maanpuolustus.net/threads/konflikti-kiinan-merellä.1785/page-10#post-282562

Lentotukialus vaihtaa paikkaa 60km/h. Tuo sen sijaan pysyy paikallaan.

Joka tapauksessa, jenkkien lentotukialukset ovat kiinalaisten yksi ykköshuolia. Ja he ovatkin eri tavoin pyrkineet huolellisesti niihin tutustuen rakentamaan kyvykkyyksiä niiden torjumiseen.

Hmmm... Näin täysin maallikkona tulee muutama iso ongelma mieleen Kiinalaisten kannalta: Ensimmäinen ongelma on ylipäätään havaita se tukialus (meri on iso ja tukialus pieni ja vaihtaa paikkaa ullattavan nopeasti, tulee neulat ja heinäsuovat mieleen), sen jälkeen se pitää tunnistaa (mikäli ei haluta ampua vahingossa jotain supertankkeria). Näiden kahden kohdan jälkeen se täytyisi jollain sensorilla saada ohjuslaukaisuun riittävän tarkkuuden seurantaan. Mikä tuo sensori olisi? Satelliittien lentoradat taitavat olla turhan ennalta arvattavat, niiltä piilottelu onnistuu. Laivoilla eikä lentokoneilla ole noin 300-400 merimailia lähemmäksi asiaa tukialuksesta (CAP partiot, AEW-koneet ja uloimmat laivat partioivat noin 200 merimailin päässä tukialuksesta). Jäljelle jää horisontin yli näkevät, isot maasijoitteiset tutka-asemat? Jotka ovat varmaan sitten amerikkalaisten risteilyohjusten maalilistan kärjessä jos lähtevät kinuskien kanssa hippasille.

Jep. Paikallistaminen on SE juttu. Sitä käsiteltiin kyseessä olevassa artikkelissa (siitä löytyy myös linkitetty artikkeli nimenomaan tuosta asiasta, jossa kirjoittaja oli 2011 sitä mieltä, ettei Kiinalla vielä ollut kunnollista kykyä).

Kyseisessä ohjuksessa on tutka tukialusosaston löytämiseen ja tukialuksen maalittamiseen. Mutta karkea kohdealue pitää ensin saada tietoon.

Niitä karkean paikallistamisen keinoja on paljon, joita jo joitain mainitsitkin. Foorumilaisten kannattaa lukea molemmat artikkelit.

Sukellusveneet ovat aina ikäviä. Erityisesti, jos ne voivat pysytellä kaukana ja vain välittää tiedon sijainnista.

Lisäksi esim. tämä J-20 on uusi ikävä assetti, joka soveltuu varsin hyvin tukialusosaston paikallistamiseen.

 

[Jukkis]

Toi on ilmeisesti aika vittumainen. Kyllä saattaisi tukialuksella vähän jänskättää, kun ohjukset Aegikselta lähtevät matkaan.

How it differs from standard MRBMs is that it can maneuver dynamically during reentry and has the ability to target large vessels during the terminal phase of its flight.

In essence, it is a carrier killer that engages at hypersonic speeds and steep angles of descent, making most traditional defensive weaponry useless against it. Even advanced anti-ballistic missile capabilities would be hard pressed to intercept a DF-21D depending on its stage of flight.

Boldasin oleellisen, ja juuri tämän vuoksi nimesin nimenomaan SM-3:n. SM-3 on Aegis BMD:n "mid-course interceptor"-komponentti. Sen tehtävä on tuhota hyökkäävä ase ennen kuin se palaa ilmakehään, joten terminaalivaiheen liikehtimiskyky ei auta väistämään sitä. Ilmakehään asti selvinneen taistelukärjen torjumiseen käytetään SM-2 block IV ja SM-6-ohjuksia. Puolustajaa auttaa vielä sekin, että hyökkäävä ase ei voi väistellä täysin vapaasti, vaan sen on pakko väistöliikkeistä huolimatta yrittää ohjautua kohti maalia. Melkein osumakin on täysi huti - ydinaseita ei kannata vetää mukaan keskusteluun, koska niiden tullessa peliin lentotukialukset menettävät merkityksensä ja ICBM:t ratkovat kuka häviää vähiten.

P.S. RSR niin kuin kaikki Clancyn kirjoittama teksti on puhdasta fantasiaa - esim. venäläisillä ei koskaan ollutkaan kykyä tai haluakaan hyökätä koordinoidusti lentorykmentin kokoisilla osastoilla. Kuvaus on kyllä yksityiskohtainen, mutta keksityt yksityiskohdat ovat silti keksittyjä.

 

[ctg]

Kiinan valloitustaktiikka tutkielma kuvien kera.

On August 15, Philippine Congressman Gary Alejano released photographs of Chinese vessels, including fishing, coast guard, and navy ships, that he claimed had been operating within 1 to 3 nautical miles of Philippine-occupied Thitu, or Pag-asa, Island. Citing military sources, the congressman said that at least two fishing ships, two Chinese naval vessels, and a China Coast Guard ship were operating around Thitu by August 12, with others, including at least one more navy ship, arriving over the next three days. Thitu is the largest of the Philippines’ 10 occupied features in the Spratly Islands and is home to more than 100 Filipino civilians.

https://amti.csis.org/confirming-chinese-flotilla-near-thitu-island/

One possible explanation for the flotilla’s sudden and provocative appearance is that Beijing wanted to dissuade Manila from planned construction on Thitu. The Philippine government has said it plans to spend about $32 million on upgrades including a beaching ramp, desalination facilities, and long-overdue repairs to the islet’s crumbling runway. Those upgrades have been delayed, reportedly due to inclement weather, but Lorenzana has made clear that they remain in the pipeline. In light of this week’s events, Manila might feel that those upgrades are even more urgent.

 

[ctg]

BEIJING (Reuters) - The "wrong" actions of the United States on Taiwan, its South China Sea patrols and deployment of an advanced anti-missile system in South Korea have had a large, negative influence on military trust, a senior Chinese officer said on Thursday.

Fan Changlong, a vice chairman of China's powerful Central Military Commission, told Joseph Dunford, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, that mutual trust mechanisms between the two militaries had continued to improve, China's defense ministry said.

"But wrong actions on the Taiwan issue, the United States deploying the THAAD system around China, U.S. ships and aircraft's activities in the South China Sea, the United States close-in surveillance in the sea and air near China have had a large, negative influence on bilateral military ties and mutual trust," Fan added.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-dunford-idUSKCN1AX0EF

Judging from the foreign-policy commentary produced and consumed in the United States, you’d think the South China Sea lay just off America’s East Coast. Every Chinese move in disputed maritime territories is analyzed as though it’s an existential threat to America’s lifelines.

There’s no doubt that China’s growing assertiveness in waters far from its own coasts has sparked great angst in the region. The “nine-dash line” that Beijing pushes as the basis of its claims includes virtually the whole of the South China Sea, including areas claimed by its neighbors, like Vietnam and the Philippines.

But the reality is that U.S. core interests are not really at stake, and China knows it. The ferocity of the debate among Washington wonks reflects far less the actual importance of the rocks and islets than the uncertainty of a United States struggling to rethink its post-World War II preeminence now contested by a re-emergent China. It would be better to simply have that conversation in the open.

http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/17/stop-the-south-china-sea-charade/

China knows that the Trump administration lacks a comprehensive strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region. Whatever its shortcomings in terms of implementation, the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” did conceptually integrate the diplomatic, military, and economic elements of a comprehensive regional strategy. In contrast, the present administration’s rejection of the hard-fought Trans-Pacific Partnership was a strategic shock and a blow to U.S. credibility. That has left Chinese projects like the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank unchallenged. Like the global financial crisis of 2008, perceived U.S. weakness has emboldened China.

But even in the face of the Obama administration’s cautions against unilateral change and support for a rules-based international order, Beijing disregarded U.S. diplomacy, trashed the Hague tribunal’s ruling against its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, and effectively changed the status quo.

The Chinese bet, correctly, that, as long as shipping lanes are not threatened, the United States will not risk war with a nuclear weapons state over rocks and reefs to which it has no claims, just to defend the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which it won’t ever ratify. Washington’s absence from the governance councils at UNCLOS makes it easier for Beijing to push its largely bogus interpretations of the treaty.

 

[Mustaruuti]

P.S. RSR niin kuin kaikki Clancyn kirjoittama teksti on puhdasta fantasiaa - esim. venäläisillä ei koskaan ollutkaan kykyä tai haluakaan hyökätä koordinoidusti lentorykmentin kokoisilla osastoilla. Kuvaus on kyllä yksityiskohtainen, mutta keksityt yksityiskohdat ovat silti keksittyjä.

Jep. Kirja kokonaisuudessaan kärsi mielestäni jossain määrin uskottavuuden puutteesta jo silloin kun aikoinaan sen luin. Fantasia maistui vähän liiaksi, vaikka kuinka kuorruttelisi teknisillä detaljeilla

Myöhemmistä clancyistä (jotka joku muu todennäköisesti kirjoitti) tuli ihan lukukelvottomia.

Remeksiäkin jaksoin lukea muistaakseni vain 1,5 kun olivat liian sepustetun oloisia. En tiedä, ovatko sittemmin parantuneet.

McLeanit sen sijaan olivat paljon parempia. Ne eivät koettaneet paketoida kokonaista konfliktia, vaan käsittelivät jotain määrättyä pientä osaa siitä.

 

[ctg]

On 21 June, the Chinese Academy of Sciences hailed a breakthrough – a major upgrade to a kind of quantum device that measures magnetic fields. The announcement vanished after a journalist pointed out the invention’s potential military implications: it could help China lock down the South China Sea.

“I was surprised by the removal,” says Stephen Chen of the South China Morning Post, who raised the issue. “I have been covering Chinese science for many years, and it is rare.”

Magnetometers have been used to detect submarines since the second world war. They are able to do this because they can measure an anomaly in Earth’s magnetic field – like one caused by a massive hunk of metal.

But today’s devices can only detect a submarine at fairly short range, so tend to be used to home in on the location once the sub has already been spotted on sonar.

https://www.newscientist.com/articl...ubmarine-detector-could-seal-south-china-sea/

 

[ctg]

 

[ctg]

Several industries are trying to assess what open confrontation in the South China Sea would cost them, and a lot of them don't like what they're finding.

The world's second-largest economy is getting more wary — and more vocal in its opposition — about increased U.S. naval patrols along the vast body of water, which holds some of the world's busiest trade routes.

https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/23/sou...anies-and-assets-hit-hardest-by-a-crisis.html

BANGKOK — For decades, the United States Navy has served as the foremost symbol of America's power in the Asia-Pacific. With bases from South Korea to Japan to Guam and a fleet of warships bristling with modern weaponry, it has been a physical reminder of the nation’s strength and vigilance in the region to friends and foes alike.

Few images could have been as damaging to that reputation as that of the guided-missile destroyer John S. McCain limping into Singapore on Monday after a predawn collision with an oil tanker punched a hole in the warship’s hull.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/world/asia/uss-mccain-collision-us-decline.html

 

[ctg]

Alarm bells sounded when Chinese ships recently gathered at Sandy Cay, a set of sandbars close to Philippines-occupied Thitu Island in the Spratly archipelago.

In 2012, China wrested control of Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea from the Philippines. With the shoal—reefs, rocks, and a vast lagoon—located just 220 km (137 miles) from the Philippines’ main island Luzon, the incident heightened tensions and embarrassed Manila, which the following year opened a case in an international tribunal challenging Beijing’s territorial moves in the sea.So alarm bells went off earlier this month when Chinese ships gathered at Sandy Cay, a set of sandbars close to Philippines-occupied Thitu Island in the sea’s Spratly archipelago. The island has a small civilian population and a decrepit runway the Philippines has been meaning to repair.

http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2...park-fears-new-land-grab/140536/?oref=d-river

 

[ctg]

It was foolish to tie China’s national dignity and sovereignty to patently absurd claims to islands and seas [11]. But party leaders did so. And they did so repeatedly, publicly, and in the most unyielding terms imaginable. By their words they stoked nationalist sentiment while making themselves accountable to it. They set in motion a toxic cycle of rising popular expectations.

Breaking that cycle could verge on impossible. If Beijing relented from its maritime claims now, ordinary Chinese would—rightly—judge the leadership by the standard it set. Party leaders would stand condemned as weaklings who surrendered sacred territory, failed to avenge China’s century of humiliation[12] despite China’s rise to great power, and let jurists and lesser neighbors backed by a certain superpower [13] flout big, bad China’s will [14].

No leader relishes being seen as a weakling. It’s positively dangerous in China. As the greats of diplomacy teach [15], it’s tough for negotiators or political leaders to climb down from public commitments. Make a promise and you bind yourself to keep it. Fail to keep it and you discredit yourself—and court disaster in the bargain.

Like any sane leadership, Beijing prefers to get its way without fighting. Fighting, though, could be the least bad of the options party leaders have left themselves. Quite the predicament they’ve made for themselves.

Which leads to the second point. Judging from Chang’s words, small-stick diplomacy [16] has run its course. Small-stick diplomacy was about deploying the China Coast Guard and fellow nonmilitary sea services to police waters Beijing claimed. It depicted China’s sovereignty in the South China Sea as a fact, and dared woefully outmatched rivals to reverse that fact.

Left unopposed, de facto Chinese sovereignty—a near-monopoly on the use of force [17] within borders sketched on the map—would have become entrenched over time. Once it became the new normal, it might even have taken on an aura of legitimacy among seafaring states.

http://scout.com/military/warrior/A...to-Win-a-War-in-the-South-China-Sea-106555871

 

[ctg]