Konflikti Kiinan merellä

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To counter PRC claims and preserve a hope that international law and norms might be maintained in the South China Sea region, the U.S. Navy conducts freedom of navigation (FON) operations in the PRC-claimed waters. FON operations, however, are temporary exercises and no longer appear to have the diplomatic and media effects they had in previous years. FON ops can be conducted within the vicinity of the Paracels or Spratleys and the PRC government loudly will protest, but the reality will not change.

The United States and its allies must take more a decisive approach to reestablishing law and norms and emplace a mobile offshore base (MOB) to create an “island of freedom” in the South China Sea. A viable position would be on the Macclesfield Bank or in Dangerous Ground to the west of Palawan, Philippines. This MOB—a concept discussed in the late 1990s—could start as a single (inoperative) oil rig manned by a “peace contingent” of U.S. and partner Coast Guardsmen and Department of Defense civilians. Officially it would be an aid to navigation in dangerous ground.

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-04/build-island-freedom

 

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Researchers are proposing a new boundary in the South China Sea that they say will help the study of natural science while potentially adding weight to China’s claims over the disputed waters, according to a senior scientist involved in the government-funded project.

The new boundary will help to define more clearly China’s claims in the contested region, but it is not clear whether or when it will be officially adopted by Beijing, the scientist said.

A precise continuous line will split the Gulf of Tonkin between China and Vietnam, go south into waters claimed by Malaysia, take a U-turn to the north along the west coast of the Philippines and finish at the southeast of Taiwan.

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/soci...-china-sea-proposed-continuous-boundary-first

Kiinan tekosaaret, valloitus ilman laukausten vaihtoa.

 

[Osasto 31]

Kiinalla ei ole vain Vanuatu tähtäimessä: https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/trouble-in-paradise-a-chinese-occupation-in-tahiti/

Trouble in Paradise: A Chinese Occupation in Tahiti

TAHITI — China’s strategic and military interests in the South Pacific are expanding rapidly. They build on longstanding links and fill the vacuum left by receding U.S. and French power projection in the region, as well as Australia and New Zealand’s longstanding neglect of key relationships.

China is now acknowledged by many Pacific leaders as the dominant power in the region. While Pacific leaders will continue to work with traditional partners, they will not back down on their expanding relations with China. China has offered to them what the United States and its allies cannot, massive sums of money for development projects that promise jobs and economic independence.

But China — like any lender — exacts a price for its aid, and Pacific nations are gradually learning the cost. Nothing sums up the challenges and dilemmas Pacific peoples face in dealing with a rising China more than the simmering political scandal over the Chinese consulate in Tahiti’s illegal occupation of a house used for China’s diplomatic offices in French Polynesia.

 

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Over the last five years, many volumes have been written about the South China Sea. China’s construction of artificial islands on disputed features in the Spratly Islands has combined with fishing clashes, resource competitions, and freedom of navigation operations to focus substantial international attention on the situation in the South China Sea. Yet, perhaps the most potentially explosive situation in maritime Asia lies to the north, in the East China Sea. Yet, with a few notable exceptions, the East China Sea has received relatively less attention.

Whereas China is increasingly poised to dominate the South China Sea, this is not the case in the East China Sea, at present. Few of China’s rivals in the South China Sea have the capability to challenge Beijing’s overreaching claims, and fewer still have the willingness to do so. Even Vietnam, which has been the most risk acceptant South China Sea claimant, has recently suspended oil and gas projects in its own exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the face of Chinese pressure. In the East China Sea, however, Japan has demonstrated both the capability and the intent to uphold its claims and push back against Chinese assertiveness. Moreover, the United States has shown greater willingness to stand behind Japan in upholding its maritime claims, which has not always been the case with regard to U.S. commitments to the Philippines.

With Chinese construction in the South China Sea nearly finished and its political influence neutralizing potential challengers, Beijing’s attention is likely to shift elsewhere in the years ahead. Although the Taiwan Strait is an obvious candidate for renewed tensions, the East China Sea is perhaps riper for a renewed contest of wills. Tensions in the East China Sea have subsided since 2012, but that temporary decrease should not be interpreted as a permanent stabilization of the regional security environment. Chinese leaders have a tendency to push their agenda forward in one region while practicing restraint in other regions. Much of China’s focus over the last five years has been on the South China Sea, but with China’s projects in the South China Sea nearing completion, Beijing may be preparing to turn back to the East China Sea.

When Beijing does shift focus to the East China Sea, it will find a much more favorable situation there than that which existed in 2012. The balance of forces in 2020 will include a far more capable set of Chinese government and government-affiliated actors. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has expanded substantially and is increasingly fielding highly-capable forces with improved experience exercising joint operations involving air and naval forces. China’s coast guard has also grown rapidly in both the number and size of the vessels that it fields, including well-armed coast guard ships. Furthermore, the Chinese fishing fleet and maritime militia are more capable and better coordinated today than they were in 2012.

How might China use these new capabilities to achieve its objectives in the East China Sea? Beijing could use its fishing fleet, maritime militia, or coast guard to contest administrative control of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese—this essay uses Senkaku Islands in accordance with the U.S. Board of Geographic Names). Alternatively, Beijing could attempt to exploit fishing or oil and gas resources across the median line in the East China Sea. Moreover, China could use economic measures to pressure Japanese businesses into changing their behavior or that of the Japanese government. Although the Japan Coast Guard and Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) have been preparing for an increase in Chinese pressure in the East China Sea, the pace of China’s military and paramilitary modernization programs will prove difficult to match. Therefore, Japan and the United States are likely to find themselves in a more disadvantageous position in the years ahead than they were in the 2010 and 2012 East China Sea crises.

This study explores the changing patterns of Chinese behavior in the East China Sea and describes the expected balance of forces in the years ahead, including the rapid growth in Chinese capabilities. The next section includes projections of Chinese, Japanese, and U.S. force structures and the postures of their respective militaries, coast guards, and fishing fleets. The following sections put forward several potential crisis scenarios that should inform policymakers moving forward. Finally, the concluding section suggests areas that Japan and the United States could explore to improve their ability to deter crises and respond rapidly and decisively if escalation does occur.

https://amti.csis.org/flashpoint-ecs-recommendations/

 

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Katsaus Itäiselle Kiinan Merelle. Näistä viidestä skenaarioista pidän todennäköisempänä drone skenaarioita ja tunteiden kuohahtamista sen jälkeen. Toisaalta Kiinan porauslautat aivan Japanin merialueiden tuntumassa on sama kuin ryöstö kun esiintymät menevät pitkälle toiselle puolelle.

While the trends in the East China Sea have been concerning, Japan and China have been able to avoid a major incident in the area over the last five years. Yet, with Chinese capabilities improving and the margin of the Japan-U.S. alliance’s supremacy narrowing, the likelihood of an incident is growing.

This section reviews several potential incidents that could arise and describes how each might challenge Japan, the United States, and their existing alliance mechanisms. It discusses five possible incidents: fishing clashes at sea, a collision on or around the Senkaku Islands, the deployment of an oil rig over the median line, a challenge to aircraft operating in China’s East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, and a military escalation involving unmanned systems.

https://amti.csis.org/flashpoint-east-china-sea-potential-shocks/

Filippiinit on pitkälti Kiinan taskussa. Tämä on modernia YYA siirtomaatoimintaa.

In a telling sign of the dramatic turn in Philippine-China relations, the two nations recently agreed to pursue joint development agreements (JDA) on hydrocarbon deposits in the South China Sea. During his late March visit to Beijing, Philippine foreign secretary Alan Peter Cayetano hailed a “golden period” in Philippine-China relations, and reiterated his country’s commitment to ensuring disputes in the South China would not derail ties with Beijing.

Instead, the Filipino diplomat expressed his hopes that the maritime spats “will be turned into a source of friendship and cooperation between our two countries.” Specifically, diplomats discussed the possibility of an “offshore oil and gas exploration” scheme based on a “suitable legal framework” that circumvents sovereignty disputes and provides a mutually-beneficial outcome.

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, however, tried to reassure everyone that any resource-sharing deal would be pursued in “a prudent and steady way” so as to secure its viability. During his early April visit to China for the Boao Forum, Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte also discussed joint-development plans with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, who underlined his commitment to ensure “the task of this year shall be upgrading the relationship.”

The problem, however, is that so far there are no specific details as to the location, modality and conditions for a proposed Philippine-China JDA in the South China Sea.

Moreover, there isn’t a single encouraging precedent, as recent history is replete with proposed resource-sharing agreements between China and its neighbors going astray. Crucially, an actual JDA in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), may violate both the Philippine constitution and the 2016 South China Sea arbitration award ruling.

https://amti.csis.org/perils-philippine-china-joint-development-scs/

 

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Straits Quay, George Town, Penang - Aavekaupunki

Mageswari Sangaralingam, a research officer for Friends of the Earth Malaysia, says the thousands of sq km of land reclaimed across coastal Asia has meant the annihilation of mangroves, wetlands and reefs – destroying the habitats and breeding grounds for fish, sea turtles, crustaceans, plants and other marine life. In addition, the new cities, transport hubs and industrial zones built on the new land inevitably create added pollution and waste, he says.

“The multimillion-ringgit fisheries sector here on which thousands depend is being traded off for development,” says Sangaralingam. “Fish are being wiped out, and the fishermen will soon be too as they lose fishing grounds.”

“You have this development and yet people are losing their jobs,” adds film-maker Han. “You have reclamation which promised development, but you have fishermen who are losing their livelihoods, looking for second jobs … You build so many buildings here but in the end it doesn’t belong to us, it will be bought up by other people and foreigners.”

I visit Straits Quay – the high-end shopping mall surrounded by luxury condos overlooking the fishing village. On three trips here I’ve never seen anyone actually shopping in its luxury boutiques. The hallways are bare wind tunnels and even the giant atrium that acts as an opulent entranceway to the mall appears desolate, echoing the caws of resident crows and little else. If it wasn’t for a few stragglers slipping in and out to pick up groceries at the small supermarket – and the yacht owners drinking on the patio of the Irish-themed pub – the place could be called a ghost mall.

https://www.theguardian.com/cities/...-of-reclaimed-land-asia-malaysia-penang-dubai

Hyvä pitkä artikkeli siitä mitä tapahtuu luonnolle ja ympäristölle, kun näitä tekosaaria kasaillaan. Ihmetystä kyllä herettää nämä tyhjät kaupungit vaikka kaukoidässä luulisi riittävän ihmisiä asumaan myös uusilla alueilla.

 

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Great powers have a habit of intervening to shield weak allies from rival great powers and advance their own purposes. Last week it was Russia vowing to shoot down American missiles bound for Syrian chemical-weapon sites. Judging from recent Chinese words and deeds, next week could see the U.S. Navy attempting to repulse a Chinese assault on nearby Taiwan.

The Chinese Communist Party depicts the island as a wayward province and has pledged to restore mainland sovereignty there—by force if necessary. As China amasses military power, improving its chances of imposing a solution at manageable cost, it may define necessary more expansively. Power begets ambition.

The prospect of maritime war is nothing new to the Western Pacific. Sometimes the possibility of a U.S.-China war hovers in the background. Sometimes it vaults into the foreground. In April 2018, China’s navy held live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait at short notice, ostensibly to “deter separatists” and “draw a red line to the U.S. and Taiwan.” The exercise came on the heels of a South China Sea naval parade ballyhooed as China’s biggest in 600 years.

That is, the parade was the biggest since the age of Admiral Zheng He and the Ming Dynasty, when China (briefly) ruled the Asian seas. President-for-Life Xi Jinping likes keeping company with grand figures from China’s past—and using them for branding and messaging in the here and now

http://warisboring.com/why-a-u-s-china-war-over-taiwan-wont-be-anything-like-the-syria-strikes/

 

[ctg]

China has installed cruise missiles and surface-to-air missile systems on three of its outposts in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, according to reports.

The US news network CNBC reported that the YJ-12B cruise missiles could target ships within a radius of 295 nautical miles and the HQ-9B long-range surface-to-air missiles could strike within 160 miles, citing sources with knowledge of US intelligence reports.

The move, if confirmed, would mark the first Chinese missile deployments in the Spratly islands, where several Asian countries including Vietnam and Taiwan have rival claims.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...-missiles-on-south-china-sea-outposts-reports

 

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When Vietnam and Malaysia submitted a joint claim for the outer limits of their continental shelves in the South China Sea to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 2009, China objected. In response, it submitted a nine-dashed, or U-shaped, line map of its claim in the South China Sea to the United Nations. The Chinese statement and the U-shaped line provoked official objections, including notes to the United Nations from Vietnam and Indonesia.

The U-shaped line has since become a target for international criticism, with many scholars questioning its legal basis and Beijing’s activities within it, including its habit of driving away foreign ships exploiting oil and gas resources within the U-shaped line and its annual summer fishing ban in parts of the South China Sea since 1999. Due to their disagreements with China, many foreign governments and scholars have asked for the Taiwanese government’s explanation of the original meaning behind the U-shaped line (which was first officially introduced by the Republic of China in 1947).

But with the issue’s rising international profile and political sensitivity, Taipei would rather keep silent on its interpretation of the U-shaped line. This is compounded by Taiwan’s frustration that it is excluded from most venues for managing the South China Sea, such as those between China and ASEAN on the implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, and the more recent negotiations on a China-ASEAN Code of Conduct. To ask Taipei to accept the political risks of taking a position on the U-shaped line—especially one more in line with the legal positions of the other claimants than with those of China—without access to any of these mechanisms to manage the disputes is unfair.

The Philippine government, with the support of the United States and Japan, filed a case before an arbitral tribunal under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 2013, hoping to resolve its disputes with China by legal means. The tribunal ruled in 2016 that China’s purported claims to historic rights within the U-shaped line have no legal basis. But the ruling did not tackle the legality of the U-shaped line itself, in all its potential interpretations. To do so would have been outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal. This led to mistaken reporting by the international press that the U-shaped line is inconsistent with UNCLOS.

While Taiwan has not officially clarified its position, the original purpose behind the U-shaped line when it was published in 1947 seems to have been as an island attribution line. It marked an area of the South China Sea within which the government of the Republic of China claimed sovereignty over all islands and expected their return following World War Two. Maritime rights have evolved since that time, especially in 1982 with the introduction of the exclusive economic zone in UNCLOS. Faced with those evolving concepts, the U-shaped line was bound to provoke arguments. But if the line refers only to the islands within it, then it does not run counter to UNCLOS.

In the early 1990s, the government of Taiwan organized a task force to draft a new Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. At that time, some Taiwanese scholars argued that Taiwan should claim the seas within the U-shaped line as historic waters. But the Legislative Yuan rejected such an enlarged concept of the U-shaped line because it was inconsistent with the UNCLOS definition of historic waters. As a result, Taiwan’s Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which was adopted in 1998, is completely in accordance with the regulations of UNCLOS, despite Taiwan not being a party to the treaty. Since that time, the government has made no move to claim historic waters within the U-shaped line. And that basic policy has been consistent across both Kuomintang and Democratic Progressive Party administrations.

Despite China’s attempts to entitle the seas within the U-shaped line with a new concept of historic rights, the line itself is not inconsistent with UNCLOS. Given the rising tensions, it is natural that the meaning of the line has caused nervousness in the region, especially since the intensification of the disputes in 2009. But the mere existence of the U-shaped line is not to blame—it has since 1947 been a claim to sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea.

https://amti.csis.org/phantom-u-shaped-line/

 

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https://i0.wp.com/amti.csis.org/wp-...rs-2018-05-06-WM.jpg?w=1196&h=1218&crop&ssl=1

elso vehkeitä Mischief saarella

Satellite imagery from April 28 reveals the first confirmed deployment of a military aircraft, a Shaanxi Y-8, on China’s base at Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands. The Y-8 was designed as a military transport aircraft, but some variants are used for maritime patrol or signals intelligence. This should be particularly concerning to the Philippines, which has about 100 civilians and a small military garrison on Thitu Island just 12 nautical miles away.

https://amti.csis.org/accounting-chinas-deployments-spratly-islands/

 

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China’s “debtbook diplomacy” uses strategic debts to gain political leverage with economically vulnerable countries across the Asia-Pacific region, the US state department has been warned in an independent report.

The academic report, from graduate students of the Harvard Kennedy school of policy analysis, was independently prepared for the state department to view and assessed the impact of China’s strategy on the influence of the US in the region.

The paper identifies 16 “targets” of China’s tactic of extending hundreds of billions of dollars in loans to countries that can’t afford to pay them, and then strategically leveraging the debt.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/15/warning-sounded-over-chinas-debtbook-diplomacy

It said while Chinese infrastructure investment in developing countries wasn’t “inherently” against US or global interests, it became problematic when China’s use of its leverage ran counter to US interests, or if the US had strategic interests in a country which had its domestic stability undermined by unsustainable debt.

The academics identified the most concerning countries, naming Pakistan and Sri Lanka as states where the process was “advanced”, with deepening debt and where the government had already ceded a key port or military base, as well places including Papua New Guinea and Thailand, where China had not yet used its amassed debt leverage.

Papua New Guinea, which “has historically been in Australia’s orbit”, was also accepting unaffordable Chinese loans. While this wasn’t a significant concern yet, the report said, the country offered a “strategic location” for China, as well as large resource deposits.

While there was a lack of “individual diplomatic clout” in Cambodia, Laos and the Philippines, Chinese debt could give China a “proxy veto” in Asean, the academics said.

They also warned that the 2023 expiration of the compact of free association between Micronesia, Palau and the Marshall Islands could “threaten the unfettered basing access and right of strategic denial the US has enjoyed since world war two, and help the Chinese navy extend its reach past the first island chain into the blue-water Pacific”, it said.

China’s methods were “remarkably consistent”, the report said, beginning with infrastructure investments under its $1tn belt and road initiative, and offering longer term loans with extended grace periods, which was appealing to countries with weaker economies and governance.

Construction projects, which the report said had a reputation for running over budget and yielding underwhelming returns, make debt repayments for the host nations more difficult.

“The final phase is debt collection,” it said. “When countries prove unable to pay back their debts, China has already and is likely to continue to offer debt-forgiveness in exchange for both political influence and strategic equities.”

 

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China’s air force has landed bombers on islands and reefs in the South China Sea as part of a training exercise in the disputed region, it said in a statement.

Several bombers of various types – including the long-range, nuclear strike-capable H-6K – carried out landing and take off drills at an unidentified island airfield after carrying out simulated strike training on targets at sea, the Chinese airforce said.

“A division of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) recently organised multiple bombers such as the H-6K to conduct take-off and landing training on islands and reefs in the South China Sea in order to improve our ability to ‘reach all territory, conduct strikes at any time and strike in all directions’,” it said.

The statement said the pilot of the H-6K bomber conducted assault training on a designated sea target and then carried out take-offs and landings at an airport in the area, describing the exercise as preparation for “the west Pacific and the battle for the South China Sea”.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...orce-lands-bombers-on-south-china-sea-islands

 

[ctg]

Maritime security in the Indian Ocean requires much more than ships, weapons, and sailors. Assets at sea and in the air must be integrated with significant land-based infrastructure. China appreciates this fact. Apparently, the United States and India either do not, or they lack the will or means to match the Chinese.

China’s Maritime Silk Road, part of the Belt and Road Initiative, is not really a “road” at all. Rather, it is a strategic model designed to transfer control over strategic sea lines of communication—the major security function in the Indian Ocean—from the United States and India to China.

https://amti.csis.org/u-s-india-need-maritime-initiative/

 

[ctg]

The House Armed Services Committee has sent its report on the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to the floor. And buried in that report are words of caution about the F-35C, the Navy's version of the F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter—and the Navy's whole carrier air capability in general. The reason for that concern is that the F-35C doesn't have the range to conduct long-range strikes without in-flight refueling—and the Navy's tanker planes are not exactly "stealth."

The F-35C suffers somewhat from the length of its development cycle. Competition for the Joint Strike Fighter program began in 1993—25 years ago—when the military threats facing the United States were significantly different. In 1993, there was no concern about Chinese "carrier killer" anti-ship ballistic missiles, for example; but in 2010, China introduced the Dongfeng (or Dong-Feng) 21D, an anti-ship ballistic missile with a range of 900 miles and a circular error probability of 20 meters. That's accurate enough, with satellite tracking and terminal guidance, to hit an aircraft carrier far offshore.

The F-35C's advertised range is 1,200 nautical miles (roughly 2,200 kilometers), roughly 10 percent longer than that of the F/A-18. But for most strikes, that would require the carriers launching F-35C sorties to be much closer to the coast than falls within the comfort zone. And with advanced air and coastal defense systems—including, for example, the sorts that are popping up on islands in the South China Sea these days—less-than-stealthy tanker planes would give up the whole game.

https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy...e-for-real-stealth-strikes-house-report-says/

Vietnam has reason to worry about China — particularly China’s increasing presence in the South China Sea complete with air bases on artificial islands and a massive maritime militia comprised of fishing boats, with crews answering directly to the People’s Liberation Army.

Vietnam has its own claims in the region, and recent naval patrols and a landing by a Chinese H-K bomber in the Paracel Islands — a first — have amounted to a violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty, Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry stated on May 21.

What’s less clear is how Vietnam would respond if tensions with China were to ever escalate to armed conflict. The scenario is not out of reach. China’s single war since the Korean War was with Vietnam in 1979. In 1988, Chinese troops and naval gunfire killed 64 Vietnamese soldiers at the Johnson South Reef. And during the past few years, Vietnam has patiently bolstered its military with the help of a long-time partner, Russia, clearly in response to China’s own maneuvers at sea.

Vietnam’s military doctrine is also closely guarded, according to a recent article by defense analyst Derek Grossman of the RAND Corporation, a research institute with close ties to the U.S. Air Force. But there are a few key attributes of Vietnam strategy that tells us how it would likely confront China at sea — and those date back to wars Vietnam has fought, and won, in the past.

http://warisboring.com/vietnams-plan-to-counter-china-is-with-a-peoples-war-at-sea/

 

[Kiusankpl]

Tulee ruuhkaa tuolla kohta kunhan Kiinan voimistuvan laivaston vastapainoksi naapurit saavat mm. nämä fregattinsa rakennettua:

Japani:
The 30FFM class frigate program carried out by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Mitsui Bussan comprises eight 3,900-ton vessels with the lead ship construction to start in 2019 to be commissioned in 2022. The JMSDF may order between 22 and 28 such ships two per year to counter the Chinese Navy buildup in the South China Sea.

http://www.deagel.com/Fighting-Ships/30FFM_a003682001.aspx

Etelä-Korea:
The Daegu-class frigates of the Republic of Korea Navy. 8 Daegu-class ships are planned, with the final goal of 20-22 frigates (of all types) in the ROKN.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daegu-class_frigate

 

[ctg]

HQ9 ja muita aseita tekosaarilla https://amti.csis.org/exercises-bring-new-weapons-paracels/

 

[ctg]

The Pentagon has pulled its invitation for China to join maritime exercises in the Pacific because of Beijing's "continued militarization" of the South China Sea, an official said Wednesday, in the latest sign of US-China strains.

China hit back at the decision, calling it "very non-constructive" and saying it was taken without due reflection.

http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Pentagon_pulls_Chinas_invite_to_Pacific_naval_exercises_999.html

 

[ctg]

Two US warships sailed near South China Sea islands claimed by China on Sunday, two US officials told Reuters, in a move likely to anger Beijing as Donald Trump seeks its continued cooperation on North Korea.

China’s defence ministry duly expressed its opposition to what it called “provocation”. The US action seriously infringed upon Chinese sovereignty because the warships entered Chinese territorial waters without permission, the ministry said in a short statement.

Chinese ships and aircraft were sent to warn the US ships to leave, it said.

The operation was the latest attempt to counter what Washington sees as Beijing’s efforts to limit freedom of navigation in the strategic waters. The operation was planned months in advance and such operations have become routine but it came at a particularly sensitive time, days after the Pentagon uninvited China from a major US-hosted naval drill.

The US officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the Higgins guided-missile destroyer and the Antietam, a guided-missile cruiser, came within 12 nautical miles of the Paracel Islands, among a string of islets, reefs and shoals over which China has territorial disputes with its neighbors. The US vessels carried out maneuvering operations near Tree, Lincoln, Triton and Woody islands, one of the officials said.

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/may/27/us-warships-south-china-sea

 

[ctg]

China’s placement of weapons systems on manmade islands in the South China Sea is designed to intimidate and coerce others in the region, the US defence secretary James Mattis has said, laying out a sharp criticism of Beijing at an international security forum.

Speaking at the Singapore summit, he warned that America’s recent move to disinvite China from a multinational naval exercise this summer was an “initial response” to the militarisation of the islands.

And, in response to a question, he said that “much larger consequences” were possible in the future if China did not find a way to work more collaboratively with others in the region.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...-intimidation-and-coercion-in-south-china-sea