3.3 The Arms Deal
The intelligence reports indicating that Pyongyang might be supplying weapons to Moscow first surfaced in September 2022, roughly seven months after Russia launched its full scale invasion of Ukraine. While initially these reports were met with a degree of skepticism, largely due to the lack of hard evidence on the battlefield, the gradual quarterly reduction in the intensity of Russian artillery shelling suggested that the Kremlin indeed had been struggling witha shortage of ammunition. If in March-April 2022 Russian forces were firing approximately 70,000 to 80,000 rounds per day, by May this number had decreased to 60,000. By January 2023, the daily rate had further fallen to 20,000 projectiles, with subsequent drops to 14,000 in April-May, 12,000 by July-August, and 8,000 by November.(21)
This downward trend was likely owed to the miscalculations surrounding Russia’s plans for a rapid offensive in Ukraine. Moscow apparently underestimated the possibility of a prolonged war, which ultimately led to the quick exhaustion of Russian stockpiles. Despite efforts to scale up domestic production, Russia’s current output of around 250,000 artillery shells per month —equivalent to 3 million per year (22)— can only sustain a daily firing rate below 10,000 rounds. While sufficient for maintaining low-intensity routine engagements, this volume is inadequate for frequent large scale bombardments necessary to keep an advantage in the war of attrition. Failing to close the gap, Russia was compelled to seek external sources of ammunition, which likely led to its approach toward North Korea.
Convincing the Kim regime to assist evidently took some time, as the first shipment of military equipment to Russia was not delivered until August 2023,(23) nearly a year after intelligence initially reported on the possibility of an arms deal between Pyongyang and Moscow, which allows to suggest that negotiations were challenging and required considerable bargaining efforts. By October 2023, it was confirmed that North Korea had transferred over 1,000 containers of weaponry to Russia, (24) with shipments increasing to 6,700 containers by February 2024,(25) nearly doubling to either 13,000 (South Korean intelligence)(26) or 16,500 (U.S. intelligence) containers by August 2024,(27) and eventually reaching 20,000 containers by October 2024.(28)
While it is not possible to ascertain the precise distribution of the contents within these containers using satellite imagery alone, most analysts estimate that approximately 80-95% of the shipment consists of ammunition, primarily 152mm and 122mm artillery shells, with the remaining 5-20% comprising other forms of weaponry such as portable surface-to-air missiles, rifles, rocket launchers, and mortars. (29) The skewness in the assessments toward ammunition can be attributed to two major factors.
First, heavy weaponry appears to be delivered in separate batches and only periodically. For instance, North Korean short-range ballistic missiles KN-23/KN-24 were actively employed by Russia between late December 2023 and February 2024, after which their use paused for five months before resuming in July and August 2024. This break in exploitation suggests at least two scenarios. The deployment of KN-23/KN-24 missiles in Ukraine may have been part of a broader agreement between Moscow and Pyongyang, aimed not only at mitigating a potential shortage of Russian Iskander-M missiles, (30) but also attesting North Korean weaponry in a live combat environment, enabling the collection of performance data and the identification of deficiencies.(31) Considering that the first tranche, allegedly consisting of 50 KN-23/KN-24s, demonstrated a 50% failure rate due to deviations from their programmed trajectories and premature detonation in the air,(32) additional time was likely required for modifications to improve their precision and effectiveness, potentially through collaboration between the Russian military and North Korean engineers. (33) Another plausible scenario is that, with or without modifications, North Korea may have simply needed time to produce another batch of 50 missiles for delivery to Russia. The KN-23 and KN-24 are relatively new models, with the KN-23 having undergone its first test in May 2019 and the KN-24 in August 2019. This suggests that North Korea may not have large stockpiles of these weapons. Given that Pyongyang would likely prefer to hold back some missiles for its own security, and provided that its production capacity is capped at 10-20 KN-23/KN-24s per month,(34) the five-month period likely reflects the time necessary to manufacture and deliver the additional 50 units. The examination of debris from the August attacks on Kyiv revealed that the missiles employed in the strike were manufactured in 2024, (35) suggesting that the five-month lapse in their use could be indeed linked to production related factors. Whether North Korea aimed to implement improvements or simply needed time to assemble additional units remains unclear, particularly given that the newly launched missiles continue to experience premature detonations and demonstrate poor accuracy.(36) (37)
Second, missiles and missile systems seem to be delivered via rail, air or land rather than by sea. According to multiple intelligence reports, North Korea and Russia have consistently utilized 20-foot containers for their shipments.(38) (39) The interior dimensions of these containers can accommodate only 6-meter loads. The length of KN-23 and KN-24, for instance, ranges between 7 and 9 meters, meaning that even in a disassembled state these missiles would not fit within a standard 20-foot container.(40) Similarly, this constraint applies to anti-tank missile complex such as the Bulsae-4, the first sighting of which was documented near Kharkiv in late July 2024.(41) Available data suggests that the vehicle's length exceeds 7 meters,(42) indicating that it, too, would not fit within such a container.
In light of these factors, it can reasonably be assumed that approximately 95% of all shipments consist primarily of North Korean ammunition. While the figure of 20,000 containers may seem formidable, the quality and operational effectiveness of the delivered artillery rounds are rather questionable, with failure rates reportedly being comparable to those observed in KN-23/KN-24 missiles. According to Ukrainian military officials, around half of all North Korean shells are defective, with most originating from the 1970s and 1980s. A significant portion of these shells are non-functional, while the remainder require restoration or inspection prior to use.(43) These assessments align with numerous reports from Russian soldiers. According to their accounts, North Korean shells frequently fail to reach their intended targets due to inconsistencies in the powder charges. The low quality of the powder results in shells being utilized in situations where "accuracy, reliability, and even the successful exit of the projectile from the barrel are of minimal importance."(44)
Considering the scale of the arms transfer and the reported poor quality of the delivered weapons, a critical question arises regarding the financial cost of North Korea’s military assistance to Russia. Given that assessments may vary depending on differing assumptions and the calculation methods employed, this policy paper aims not to determine an exact figure but rather to evaluate the range of the potential cost of the deal, based on the type, quantity, and possible pricing of the North Korean weapons supplied to Russia.
According to recent reports, the number of containers sent from North Korea to Russia is estimated to be around 20,000. Assuming that 5% of these shipments consist of supplementary materials or equipment, it can be inferred that approximately 19,000 containers are filled solely with ammunition. Experts suggest that around 75-85% of these containers carry 152mm shells, while 15-25% contain 122mm rounds. The upper estimates of 85% (152mm) to 15% (122mm) seem to be more plausible, not only because 152mm shells offer greater range and explosive power which Russia seems to prioritize, but also because the majority of Russia's modern artillery platforms are designed to fire 152mm rounds.
Based on various measurements and assessments, it is presumed that a 20-foot shipping container can accommodate approximately 276 crates of 152mm shells or 264 crates of 122mm rounds. Each crate of 152mm ammunition holds a single unit, whereas a crate of 122mm ammunition contains two units.(45) Taking these figures as a baseline for calculations, the total number of ammunition deliveries can be approximated as follows:
For 152mm:
276 (ammo crates per container) * 16,150 (85% of containers) * 1 (number of artillery shells per box) =4,457,400 pieces.
For 122mm:
264 (ammo crates per container) * 2,850 (15% of containers) * 2 (number of artillery shells per box) =1,504,800 pieces.
Total: 4,457,400 (152mm) + 1,504,800 (122mm) = 5,962,200 pieces.(46)
Beyond ammunition, the only confirmed North Korean manufactured weapons used in Ukraine include the KN23/KN-24 ballistic missiles and the Bulsae-4 anti-tank missile complex. Based on the aforementioned information, it can be inferred that Russia likely received only two batches of KN-23 and KN-24 missiles, the first in the fall of 2023 and the second in the summer of 2024, each likely comprising 50 units, bringing the total number of missiles of this type to an estimated 100. In the case of Bulsae-4, a leaked catalog of North Korean military assets for sale suggests that the complex is comprised of three components, each of which can be purchased individually in separate sets: the missiles are available in batches of 100, guidance launchers in sets of 10, and checking devices for the missile and launcher in sets of 2.(47) Provided that the Bulsae-4 vehicle was spotted in Ukraine only in July 2024, and given that North Korean weapons tend to underperform, it is unlikely that Russia would have acquired more than two complex sets without first evaluating their battlefield effectiveness.
As for the price of each item, Russian-produced 122mm ammunition is estimated to cost approximately $500 per unit, while the price for 152mm rounds ranges between $800 and $1,000 per unit.(48) (49) (50) (51) Given that North Korea supplies Russia with ammunition produced in the 1970s and 1980s, the price for North Korean 122mm rounds is likely to be between $150 and $300 per unit, and for 152mm rounds, between $300 and $500 per unit. The exact cost North Korea negotiated with Russia remains uncertain, as Pyongyang has a track record of selling weapons at both below and above market rates.(52) Given Russia’s urgent need for ammunition, it is possible that North Korea sought prices comparable to those of newly manufactured Russian munitions. Leaked documents from September 2022 reveal that Russia paid Iran significantly above market value for ammunition: $726 for new 122mm rounds and $625 for stockpiled ones, as well as $1,190 for new 152mm rounds compared to $650 for older stock.(53) It is unclear whether North Korea managed to secure a similar deal, especially considering reports of Iranian ammunition being of significantly higher quality. Nonetheless, with a precedent of overpaying, it is reasonable to estimate both the lower and upper bounds of the potential pricing. In the case of KN-23 and KN-24 missiles, the price per unit is reported to range between $1.5 million and $3 million. (54) (55) For the components of the Bulsae-4 complex, North Korea charges $42,000 per missile, $65,000 per launcher and $35,000 per checking device.(56)
Taking into account potential price variations, the total costof the arms deal is estimated to range between $1.72 billion and $5.52 billion, as outlined below:
Low Estimate:
$1,717,860,000 (for $300/152mm, $150/122mm, $1.5million/KN-23/24, 1 Bulsae-4 set)
$2,839,980,000 (for $500/152mm, $300/122mm, $1.5million/KN-23/24, 2 Bulsae-4 sets)
High Estimate:
$4,628,160,000 (for $800/152mm, $500/122mm, $3million/KN-23/24, 2 Bulsae-4 sets)
$5,519,640,000 (for $1,000/152mm, $500/122mm, $3million/KN-23/24, 2 Bulsae-4 sets)
3.4 Military Collaboration
Concerns over the potential deployment of North Korean troops to Ukraine in support of Russia first emerged in August 2022, following reports that the Kim regime intended to send around 1,000 workers to Donbas (57) and subsequent unverified claims in Russian state media that Pyongyang was prepared to dispatch 100,000 "volunteers" to assist theKremlin in its war efforts.(58) It was not until October 2024, however, when Ukrainian officials claimed that they identified six of the twenty soldiers killed in a missile strike near Donetsk as DPRK officers.(59) The incident has sparked considerable debate regarding the true objectives of these soldiers in Ukraine and whether more troops should be expected to follow.
There are two primary reasons why the direct involvement of North Korean combat forces seems plausible. First, Russia is facing a significant shortage of military personnel. According to reports, provincial officials are failing to meet more than a third of their recruitment quotas (60) despite increasingly generous financial incentives introduced by the government.(61) Based on the current estimates, Putin needs to secure at least 500,000 people in the next 12 months to offset troop losses and rotate his forces in Ukraine.(62) To mitigate this manpower deficit, Russia has resorted to enlisting foreign fighters, drawing individuals from regions such as the Middle East, Central Asia, India, and Africa. Thus far, however, these efforts have resulted in the recruitment of only 20,000 soldiers, (63) which suggests that Moscow might be increasingly interested in potential reinforcements from North Korea.
Second, the DPRK has a history of involvement in military conflicts abroad, not only through arms sales, training, and technical assistance but also through the deployment of its special forces, as seen during the Libyan-Egyptian War,(64) the Angolan Civil War,(65) and the Vietnam War.(66) Given the significant monetary rewards promised by the Kremlin to foreign fighters, the Kim regime might view sending troops to Ukraine as an opportunity to enhance its financial standing. Even under conservative estimates, Kim Jong-un could potentially accumulate between $143 million and $572 million in additional annual revenue if he were to commit between 5,000 and 20,000 personnel to support Russia's war effort. (67) Apart from financial benefits, the regime might be equally interested in gaining firsthand combat experience to study contemporary warfare, as well as securing access to Western weapons.
The overall capacity of the DPRK's military could hypothetically allow Kim Jong-un to deploy up to 100,000 troops to Ukraine. Realistically, however, the likelihood of such a commitment seems improbable for several reasons. First, over the past two years, Kim Jong-un has shown increasing reluctance to send North Korean citizens abroad. Despite Russia's high demand for labor the number of incoming North Korean workers has remained astonishingly low. If previously, the quantity of North Korean workers consistently present in Russia stood at around 40,000, this figure now scarcely reaches 7,000, with more than 6,000 representing DPRK individuals who have stayed in Russia since 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (68) This reluctance to supply a labor force might be a sign of the regime’s efforts to limit the population’s exposure to the outside world. If such a caution is demonstrated with civilian workers, the hesitation to send soldiers abroad is likely to be even more pronounced.
Second, the deployment of a large number of soldiers poses challenges in controlling their movements on the ground, heightening the possibility of desertion or defection. The dispatch of such a force would require security personnel to closely monitor the troops, ensuring they do not flee. This, however, could overstretch the resources and personnel committed.
Third, North Korea cannot afford to deplete its valuable human resources, particularly given that its primary adversary, South Korea, has a population twice its size. Considering that Russia’s need for assault infantry is paramount, any contingent sent by the regime would likely face high mortality rates. Therefore, by deploying troops overseas, DPRK risks undermining its capacity to defend its own borders, especially if hostilities were to erupt on the Korean Peninsula.
While Kim Jong-un might be reluctant to send regular troops to Ukraine, he could still consider deploying special forces and engineer units capable of supporting both combat and non-combat operations. This move would align well with North Korea’s longstanding practice of offering military assistance in regions like the Middle East and Africa, where DPRK's involvement has often encompassed a blend of combat engagement and logistical or technical support. In fact, recent reports suggest that around 3,000 North Koreans are already undergoing training in Russia,(69) with an additional 10,000 soldiers being prepared for deployment to Vladivostok in the near future.(70) Although the presence of DPRK forces has been confirmed by Ukrainian, (71) South Korean,(72) and U.S. intelligence,(73) speculation regarding the exact scale and objectives of this military dispatch continues to grow. According to various sources, the number of North Korean soldiers currently present in Russia is estimated to range between 1,500 and 2,900. The figure approximating 3,000 appears rather plausible, not only because such a contingent could have been moved to Russia undetected, but also because it aligns with past DPRK patterns of deploying military personnel abroad. For instance, North Korea dispatched a similar number of troops to Angola in the 1970s and 1980s, (74) and more recently to Syria in 2016. (75) Considering the number of weapons that requires North Korean oversight, and the scale of the war against Ukraine, the regime, in perspective, could potentially provide Russia with additional 3 to 4 units, comprising 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers of various skills. Even in such a case, however, North Korean assistance is unlikely to change the overall course of the war.
That said, the deployment could still be used as an effective psychological tool. With numerous videos now circulating on social media, it is plausible that Russia might be deliberately fostering uncertainty around North Korean arrivals to inflate both the purpose and scale of DPRK involvement. By doing so, Moscow may expect that the perceived direct engagement of Pyongyang in the conflict could prompt Western powers to enter negotiations under conditions more favorable to Russia. This tactic, however, is likely to backfire, as both the West and South Korea have already started discussing the possibility of offering more active assistance to Ukraine in response to these developments.
3.5 Economic Ties
According to available data, there was a steady growth in commercial ties between the two countries from 2022 to 2024. In 2022, the trade volume constituted $3.78 million rising nine-fold to $34.4 million in 2023, and further increasing to $52.9 million between January and May 2024. This upward trend suggests a potential return to presanction levels, when the average trade volume between the two states hovered around $100 million annually. The possible restoration of pre-2014 patterns marks a significant recovery, especially in contrast to the 2018-2020 period, when annual turnover stood at approximately $45million (See Graph 2). While the 2024 figure of $52.9 million reflects substantial growth in commercial ties at the bilateral level, it still remains relatively modest on a broader scale, particularly when compared to the substantially larger trade volumes between North Korea and China. In 2023, Russia accounted for just 2% of North Korea’s trade, while China commanded a staggering 97% (See Graph 1). This imbalance is unlikely to shift in Moscow's favor in the near future, largely due to the limited range of goods that North Korea can offer to Russia. As a result, even if trade between the two countries surpasses the $100 million mark in 2024, this dynamic will likely reflect sanctions evasion, marking a return to trading goods regularly exchanged before international restrictions, rather than a true expansion or diversification of the trade relationship.
As evident from the figures above, the reported statistics do not account for the arms deal, which is estimated to range between $1.72 and $5.52 billion. This omission suggests that transactions involving weapons might be conducted through a Soviet-style barter system, or a mixture of barter and cash. The latter scenario appears more plausible, as it is unlikely that the Kim regime would have agreed to enter into the arrangement without securing a substantial inflow of hard currency, which North Korea urgently needs to sustain its struggling economy. On the barter front, experts identify two primary items of exchange: food and oil.(76) In March 2024, the first direct seaborne shipments of oil were delivered to North Korea since the introduction of UN sanctions in 2017. Satellite images from March reveal that at least five North Korean oil tankers departed from the Far Eastern Russian port of Skhidnyi.(77)
Another potential source of bilateral revenue could be North Korean labor. Reports indicate that Pyongyang has been actively recruiting additional workers for deployment to Russia,(78) with some even suggesting that these workers have been already sent to the Russian Far East ahead of the Kim-Putin summit.(79) Russian sources, however, point that as of June 2024, local companies still face penalties for employing North Korean workers.(80) The Russian Far East, which has historically struggled with worker shortages, now confronts an even greater demand amid the war against Ukraine.
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