Antares
Respected Leader
Edellisen viestin artikkeli jatkuu, osa 2/3:
First, every action has a counteraction. If they use their KABs, we must also use our GBUs , our guided bombs. And we use these weapons and increase the scale. By the way, our Air Force makes such very sensitive strikes for the enemy, and they suffer losses.
Our guidance systems are much better than the enemy's. We have a sufficient number of electronic warfare means that affect the control system of enemy CABs. It flew in one direction, and then for some reason flew in another. The control system and the fight against electronic warfare means is a constant competition, as is the competition between drones and electronic warfare means.
Secondly, it is clear that active actions, active defense, counter-offensive actions remain. They are being carried out, and each time they confirm their effectiveness. Even in these conditions, bold, decisive actions, including on enemy territory, lead to the fact that we thwart all their plans.
Next. The technological component. Regarding drones, improving their characteristics, increasing the range of attack — we also began to receive drones on fiber optics with a 20 km cable , which in principle equalizes our chances with the enemy.
Photo: Main Communications Directorate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrsky and Editor-in-Chief of LB.ua Sonya Koshkina
And I hope that, perhaps, in a month or two or three, we will be able to significantly increase the number of fiber-optic FPVs , which will practically deprive the enemy of the advantages that he currently has.
And, of course, the development of ground drones. There are a lot of them being produced now. Remotely controlled modules. They all have elements of artificial intelligence, that is, they are able to detect targets independently, identify them, and are able to fire automatically, semi-automatically.
Many believe that this is the future.
Well, of course, this is already actually happening, as we once saw in Star Wars.
You mentioned the destruction of the enemy's plans. It is known that the campaign against Kursk thwarted the offensive against Sumy and Kharkiv. Perhaps there is something else that can be discovered?
The thing is that some actions love silence. And we don't talk about them not because we want to hide something, it's just to protect the lives of our people. But we carry out such actions. I think time will pass and everyone will find out about them.
You said that strikes on Russian arsenals reduced the use of artillery shells by half. And how else do our strikes on objects deep in enemy territory affect the course of hostilities?
I have already said that the amount of ammunition has decreased. We managed to destroy several storage and assembly sites of "shaheeds", which also affected the total number of their use.
We carried out a series of successful strikes on airfields , and the enemy was forced to deploy, move its aircraft deep into Russia. If earlier it was at a distance of 100–150 km, now it is 200–300 km - Engels, Shaykovka.
Photo: SBU screenshot
Consequences of the UAV strike on the Engels airbase
A few days ago, our successful actions destroyed a long-range bomber Tu-22M3 . It had just landed and our drone hit it. The cost was about $100 million.
The Russian fleet is effectively locked in Novorossiysk. Sometimes it breaks through, but for them it is a test because they know that they are constantly under threat from our strikes.
The air defense system is also one of the areas of damage during a "deep strike", which significantly reduces the capabilities of both the air defense system itself and the system for detecting our air attack means. Each such station costs tens of millions of dollars.
In the same annual address, you wrote: “About 70 thousand servicemen were sent to the combat zone as a result of the reduction (reduction) of the number of protection, service and support units.” However, people from air defense, electronic warfare, and combat aviation units were also transferred to combat brigades. Of course, there is a shortage of people at the front, but is it worth sacrificing narrow specialists who are valuable to the Defense Forces? Are you satisfied with this rotation?
The work continues. We have plans, calculations, and we continue the transfer from rear units to combat units , differentially. Remember the story with pilots, engineers - we take into account the specifics. Usually the transfer concerns security units, logistics support. Moreover, there are also restrictions in logistics, when, for example, those who transport ammunition or fuel have the appropriate permits. And if we transfer them to brigades, then to the same specialties that they performed in logistics units.
In short, this process is ongoing. This is one of the sources of replenishment.
Does it justify itself?
Of course, it justifies.
Photo: Main Communications Directorate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrsky and Editor-in-Chief of LB.ua Sonya Koshkina
The president announced the figure of 30,000 mobilized every month. Speaking of plans, will it remain the same or will we increase it?
The president announced the figure he announced. And this is indeed the figure we must adhere to.
The enemy increases the number of its Armed Forces by eight to nine thousand every month thanks to contractors. In some regions, the cost of a contract reaches 40 thousand dollars. And money is always an incentive for them.
We know that the Russian troops have been replenished with 12,000 North Koreans. Some of them have been eliminated in various ways. What is their number now, and how does this affect the course of hostilities?
The Koreans are arriving. There have already been at least two waves of training and replenishment. They were actively used in the battles in Kursk, forming the basis of the offensive groups. They suffered significant losses because they were attacking and using old Soviet tactics.
Now we are observing the improvement of their training, weapons, and equipment. They have actually switched to the standards of the Russian army. And they continue to be used.
And we don't see how this can be stopped?
Stop? Only physically.
It is known that about six million men have not updated their data in the CCC. Accordingly, they are avoiding mobilization. Is there a vision of how to attract them to the army?
First of all, we need digitalization. When the process is digitalized, we will know all our citizens and where they are.
What part of the mobilization needs is covered by recruitment?
In general, all the figures related to mobilization are confidential. I know all the figures, how many people came this month through recruitment, how many last month, but everything related to mobilization is confidential information. You say one figure, and there ( the enemies . — S.K. ) they will quickly count.
Photo: Suspilne Lviv/Olga Deineka
Recruitment center employee Vasyl Dzesa advises Yevhen Kvasha at the recruitment center of the 24th Motorized Rifle Brigade in Lviv
Let's face it, how effective is the recruiting system?
It is gaining its capabilities. Various projects have been launched. There is an opportunity to sign a contract or choose the part in which you want to serve. That is, the system is as flexible as possible. We use all acceptable forms that ensure the involvement of our citizens in military service.
On February 11, the Ministry of Defense presented the terms of contracting for 18–24-year-old volunteers , including a payment of UAH 1 million and a cash allowance of UAH 120,000. The initiatives have caused a mixed reaction.
Skeptics say it is unfair to those already in the ranks of the Defense Forces: people in the same units for the same tasks will receive different financial support. And why should experienced fighters who hold the front line receive less than inexperienced reinforcements? Volunteers or mobilized people who came in 2022 or 2023 have no chance of demobilization, but 18-24-year-olds can demobilize after a year of contract.
In addition, boys of this age who were mobilized earlier did not have such payments. The president promised to somehow review this mechanism. Is there any progress in this direction?
Yes, work is constantly underway, including to eliminate all those negative aspects.
When will the result be and what should it look like, in your opinion?
If I tell you now you won't believe it. I think in the near future, within a month or two. This campaign has actually just started, it is gaining momentum.
Are guys already using this option?
They are using it. And in order to provide maximum opportunities, remember, initially six brigades were identified during the experiment, now 10 more have been added. We are considering all forms, methods, discussing these issues at the Headquarters in order to maximally involve those who can fight, and those who have some limitations - so that they use their capabilities where they can show them, for example, in anti-aircraft units that fight drones, in mobile groups.
Photo: Olga Kosova
Military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
But it's strange that such a situation has arisen at all. The president claims that he consults with the military on such issues, and here such a resonance is primarily in the military environment.
The military mostly fights. We, of course, join this campaign, but this is more of a question for the Ministry of Defense.
Many military personnel we spoke with say that the Defense Forces have problems with payments for injuries and deaths of servicemen. People often have to go to court to receive proper payments. At the same time, the state has found money to encourage young people. This also does not contribute to a sense of justice.
Problems with payment of compensation for injuries mainly lie in the bureaucratic plane.
The issue is that in order to receive payment, appropriate documents must be provided confirming the circumstances of the injury, the severity of the injury or trauma, the person must undergo a course of treatment and rehabilitation, and there must also be appropriate certificates. Although, of course, the list of these documents is significantly reduced.
In order to simplify this process as much as possible, we introduced a vertical social support service (patronage service), starting with the brigades and ending with the General Staff. And at least the number of such appeals has significantly decreased. I believe that this project has shown its effectiveness.
Therefore, the issue here is not about money, but about procedures.
The problem with the SZCH. Has the situation improved after the criminal punishment for unauthorized abandonment of units was postponed in case of return to the front?
Yes, the situation has changed. Much more servicemen have started to return, and many of them are fighting very well, showing good results.
Some units are almost half staffed by those military personnel who voluntarily left the units.
How many have returned?
Well, thousands.
Photo: General Staff
Servicemen of the 10th Separate Mountain Assault Brigade "Edelweiss"
The (apparently) insufficient level of mobilization causes two more systemic problems that affect the morale and psychological state of the military and the combat capability of the units: the long-term lack of rotations and the lack of prospects for demobilization. The Cabinet of Ministers was supposed to submit a bill on demobilization by December 18, 2024, but did not do so.
The Ministry of Defense is currently working on several very strange versions of the bill, which would provide for the possibility of long-term rotation or treatment for military personnel for a period of three to five months.
Rotations are carried out. In general, when I began my activities as commander-in-chief, we immediately began withdrawing brigades to restore combat readiness. In fact, the seven brigades that thwarted the offensive in the Kharkiv region were just withdrawn for rotation. Before that, there were no rotations.
But I want to say that the front is constantly expanding, the Kursk operation and the enemy's actions in the Kharkiv region, in Vovchansk, gave us an increase in the front by 200 km. And the enemy has increased its group fivefold since the beginning of the aggression. Every month they increase it by eight to nine thousand, in a year it turns out 120–130 thousand. On January 1, 2025, the group of troops in Russia, which is participating in the hostilities in Ukraine, numbered 603 thousand soldiers, today it is already 623 thousand.
Imagine if they were paid $20,000-$40,000 just for signing a contract, not to mention all the other financial support payments, and a soldier gets $2,500 or more. That is, they throw money at people, and that is the main incentive. We cannot afford that.
If we take the prepared mobilization resource of the enemy — those who have undergone military service, military training — it is about 5 million people. And the mobilization resource in general is 20 million. Imagine their potential. And what can we do in these conditions? Of course, mobilization and transfer.
The issue of rotations will always be on the agenda. Because the front is expanding, the war could last for years…
In conditions when we cannot conduct a full rotation... And we cannot conduct a full rotation, because we are returning to the issue of mobilization again, and we will not delve into it, because it is quite sensitive. There are schedules in brigades, companies, people are released. Anyway, some units of brigades are in the second echelon, so people are released.
Photo: Max Trebukhov
Along with the issue of rotation, demobilization is also being actively discussed. Among the ideas is to release those who have been serving since 2022. It is clear that this is completely unrealistic . But assuming this, how many people are currently at the front since the full-scale invasion?
Many people. Remember, when the Verkhovna Rada raised the issue last year to include the issue of demobilization in the law on mobilization and provide the opportunity to demobilize those who had served three years, then we calculated that in April of this year, out of the entire group that we had at the front, about 350 thousand would be discharged immediately.
In fact, we would have lost a third of the army.
OSA 2/3 - artikkelin käännös jatkuu seuraavassa viestissä
In your address on the occasion of your year as Commander-in-Chief, you wrote that one of the priorities is “non-standard actions, not just defense.” Of course, you shouldn’t reveal your plans to the enemy, but do we have the capabilities to do “not just defense” now ? Given the offensive in Sumy and Kharkiv regions , I mean. After all, the enemy has clearly drawn conclusions from Kursk . Sumy is now being ironed out by KABs, and we can’t actually do anything about it .First, every action has a counteraction. If they use their KABs, we must also use our GBUs , our guided bombs. And we use these weapons and increase the scale. By the way, our Air Force makes such very sensitive strikes for the enemy, and they suffer losses.
Our guidance systems are much better than the enemy's. We have a sufficient number of electronic warfare means that affect the control system of enemy CABs. It flew in one direction, and then for some reason flew in another. The control system and the fight against electronic warfare means is a constant competition, as is the competition between drones and electronic warfare means.
Secondly, it is clear that active actions, active defense, counter-offensive actions remain. They are being carried out, and each time they confirm their effectiveness. Even in these conditions, bold, decisive actions, including on enemy territory, lead to the fact that we thwart all their plans.
Next. The technological component. Regarding drones, improving their characteristics, increasing the range of attack — we also began to receive drones on fiber optics with a 20 km cable , which in principle equalizes our chances with the enemy.
Photo: Main Communications Directorate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrsky and Editor-in-Chief of LB.ua Sonya Koshkina
And I hope that, perhaps, in a month or two or three, we will be able to significantly increase the number of fiber-optic FPVs , which will practically deprive the enemy of the advantages that he currently has.
And, of course, the development of ground drones. There are a lot of them being produced now. Remotely controlled modules. They all have elements of artificial intelligence, that is, they are able to detect targets independently, identify them, and are able to fire automatically, semi-automatically.
Many believe that this is the future.
Well, of course, this is already actually happening, as we once saw in Star Wars.
You mentioned the destruction of the enemy's plans. It is known that the campaign against Kursk thwarted the offensive against Sumy and Kharkiv. Perhaps there is something else that can be discovered?
The thing is that some actions love silence. And we don't talk about them not because we want to hide something, it's just to protect the lives of our people. But we carry out such actions. I think time will pass and everyone will find out about them.
You said that strikes on Russian arsenals reduced the use of artillery shells by half. And how else do our strikes on objects deep in enemy territory affect the course of hostilities?
I have already said that the amount of ammunition has decreased. We managed to destroy several storage and assembly sites of "shaheeds", which also affected the total number of their use.
We carried out a series of successful strikes on airfields , and the enemy was forced to deploy, move its aircraft deep into Russia. If earlier it was at a distance of 100–150 km, now it is 200–300 km - Engels, Shaykovka.
Photo: SBU screenshot
Consequences of the UAV strike on the Engels airbase
A few days ago, our successful actions destroyed a long-range bomber Tu-22M3 . It had just landed and our drone hit it. The cost was about $100 million.
The Russian fleet is effectively locked in Novorossiysk. Sometimes it breaks through, but for them it is a test because they know that they are constantly under threat from our strikes.
The air defense system is also one of the areas of damage during a "deep strike", which significantly reduces the capabilities of both the air defense system itself and the system for detecting our air attack means. Each such station costs tens of millions of dollars.
In the same annual address, you wrote: “About 70 thousand servicemen were sent to the combat zone as a result of the reduction (reduction) of the number of protection, service and support units.” However, people from air defense, electronic warfare, and combat aviation units were also transferred to combat brigades. Of course, there is a shortage of people at the front, but is it worth sacrificing narrow specialists who are valuable to the Defense Forces? Are you satisfied with this rotation?
The work continues. We have plans, calculations, and we continue the transfer from rear units to combat units , differentially. Remember the story with pilots, engineers - we take into account the specifics. Usually the transfer concerns security units, logistics support. Moreover, there are also restrictions in logistics, when, for example, those who transport ammunition or fuel have the appropriate permits. And if we transfer them to brigades, then to the same specialties that they performed in logistics units.
In short, this process is ongoing. This is one of the sources of replenishment.
Does it justify itself?
Of course, it justifies.
Photo: Main Communications Directorate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrsky and Editor-in-Chief of LB.ua Sonya Koshkina
The president announced the figure of 30,000 mobilized every month. Speaking of plans, will it remain the same or will we increase it?
The president announced the figure he announced. And this is indeed the figure we must adhere to.
The enemy increases the number of its Armed Forces by eight to nine thousand every month thanks to contractors. In some regions, the cost of a contract reaches 40 thousand dollars. And money is always an incentive for them.
We know that the Russian troops have been replenished with 12,000 North Koreans. Some of them have been eliminated in various ways. What is their number now, and how does this affect the course of hostilities?
The Koreans are arriving. There have already been at least two waves of training and replenishment. They were actively used in the battles in Kursk, forming the basis of the offensive groups. They suffered significant losses because they were attacking and using old Soviet tactics.
Now we are observing the improvement of their training, weapons, and equipment. They have actually switched to the standards of the Russian army. And they continue to be used.
And we don't see how this can be stopped?
Stop? Only physically.
It is known that about six million men have not updated their data in the CCC. Accordingly, they are avoiding mobilization. Is there a vision of how to attract them to the army?
First of all, we need digitalization. When the process is digitalized, we will know all our citizens and where they are.
What part of the mobilization needs is covered by recruitment?
In general, all the figures related to mobilization are confidential. I know all the figures, how many people came this month through recruitment, how many last month, but everything related to mobilization is confidential information. You say one figure, and there ( the enemies . — S.K. ) they will quickly count.
Photo: Suspilne Lviv/Olga Deineka
Recruitment center employee Vasyl Dzesa advises Yevhen Kvasha at the recruitment center of the 24th Motorized Rifle Brigade in Lviv
Let's face it, how effective is the recruiting system?
It is gaining its capabilities. Various projects have been launched. There is an opportunity to sign a contract or choose the part in which you want to serve. That is, the system is as flexible as possible. We use all acceptable forms that ensure the involvement of our citizens in military service.
On February 11, the Ministry of Defense presented the terms of contracting for 18–24-year-old volunteers , including a payment of UAH 1 million and a cash allowance of UAH 120,000. The initiatives have caused a mixed reaction.
Skeptics say it is unfair to those already in the ranks of the Defense Forces: people in the same units for the same tasks will receive different financial support. And why should experienced fighters who hold the front line receive less than inexperienced reinforcements? Volunteers or mobilized people who came in 2022 or 2023 have no chance of demobilization, but 18-24-year-olds can demobilize after a year of contract.
In addition, boys of this age who were mobilized earlier did not have such payments. The president promised to somehow review this mechanism. Is there any progress in this direction?
Yes, work is constantly underway, including to eliminate all those negative aspects.
When will the result be and what should it look like, in your opinion?
If I tell you now you won't believe it. I think in the near future, within a month or two. This campaign has actually just started, it is gaining momentum.
Are guys already using this option?
They are using it. And in order to provide maximum opportunities, remember, initially six brigades were identified during the experiment, now 10 more have been added. We are considering all forms, methods, discussing these issues at the Headquarters in order to maximally involve those who can fight, and those who have some limitations - so that they use their capabilities where they can show them, for example, in anti-aircraft units that fight drones, in mobile groups.
Photo: Olga Kosova
Military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
But it's strange that such a situation has arisen at all. The president claims that he consults with the military on such issues, and here such a resonance is primarily in the military environment.
The military mostly fights. We, of course, join this campaign, but this is more of a question for the Ministry of Defense.
Many military personnel we spoke with say that the Defense Forces have problems with payments for injuries and deaths of servicemen. People often have to go to court to receive proper payments. At the same time, the state has found money to encourage young people. This also does not contribute to a sense of justice.
Problems with payment of compensation for injuries mainly lie in the bureaucratic plane.
The issue is that in order to receive payment, appropriate documents must be provided confirming the circumstances of the injury, the severity of the injury or trauma, the person must undergo a course of treatment and rehabilitation, and there must also be appropriate certificates. Although, of course, the list of these documents is significantly reduced.
In order to simplify this process as much as possible, we introduced a vertical social support service (patronage service), starting with the brigades and ending with the General Staff. And at least the number of such appeals has significantly decreased. I believe that this project has shown its effectiveness.
Therefore, the issue here is not about money, but about procedures.
The problem with the SZCH. Has the situation improved after the criminal punishment for unauthorized abandonment of units was postponed in case of return to the front?
Yes, the situation has changed. Much more servicemen have started to return, and many of them are fighting very well, showing good results.
Some units are almost half staffed by those military personnel who voluntarily left the units.
How many have returned?
Well, thousands.
Photo: General Staff
Servicemen of the 10th Separate Mountain Assault Brigade "Edelweiss"
The (apparently) insufficient level of mobilization causes two more systemic problems that affect the morale and psychological state of the military and the combat capability of the units: the long-term lack of rotations and the lack of prospects for demobilization. The Cabinet of Ministers was supposed to submit a bill on demobilization by December 18, 2024, but did not do so.
The Ministry of Defense is currently working on several very strange versions of the bill, which would provide for the possibility of long-term rotation or treatment for military personnel for a period of three to five months.
Rotations are carried out. In general, when I began my activities as commander-in-chief, we immediately began withdrawing brigades to restore combat readiness. In fact, the seven brigades that thwarted the offensive in the Kharkiv region were just withdrawn for rotation. Before that, there were no rotations.
But I want to say that the front is constantly expanding, the Kursk operation and the enemy's actions in the Kharkiv region, in Vovchansk, gave us an increase in the front by 200 km. And the enemy has increased its group fivefold since the beginning of the aggression. Every month they increase it by eight to nine thousand, in a year it turns out 120–130 thousand. On January 1, 2025, the group of troops in Russia, which is participating in the hostilities in Ukraine, numbered 603 thousand soldiers, today it is already 623 thousand.
Imagine if they were paid $20,000-$40,000 just for signing a contract, not to mention all the other financial support payments, and a soldier gets $2,500 or more. That is, they throw money at people, and that is the main incentive. We cannot afford that.
If we take the prepared mobilization resource of the enemy — those who have undergone military service, military training — it is about 5 million people. And the mobilization resource in general is 20 million. Imagine their potential. And what can we do in these conditions? Of course, mobilization and transfer.
The issue of rotations will always be on the agenda. Because the front is expanding, the war could last for years…
In conditions when we cannot conduct a full rotation... And we cannot conduct a full rotation, because we are returning to the issue of mobilization again, and we will not delve into it, because it is quite sensitive. There are schedules in brigades, companies, people are released. Anyway, some units of brigades are in the second echelon, so people are released.
Photo: Max Trebukhov
Along with the issue of rotation, demobilization is also being actively discussed. Among the ideas is to release those who have been serving since 2022. It is clear that this is completely unrealistic . But assuming this, how many people are currently at the front since the full-scale invasion?
Many people. Remember, when the Verkhovna Rada raised the issue last year to include the issue of demobilization in the law on mobilization and provide the opportunity to demobilize those who had served three years, then we calculated that in April of this year, out of the entire group that we had at the front, about 350 thousand would be discharged immediately.
In fact, we would have lost a third of the army.
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OSA 2/3 - artikkelin käännös jatkuu seuraavassa viestissä
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