Puolalainen kirjoittaa hauskasti omista havainnoistaan sekä kuulemastaan koskien tätä sotaa, käsittelee Venäjän armeijan panssarivaunujen huoltoa ja siihen liittyviä "haasteita":
#IFRNU2022
Invasion of the Russian Federation to Ukraine 2022 - notes in the margin - Tomasz Leśnik ©
Part III. "Mr. Majster, it is so bad!" - that is, the repair and evacuation services of the Russian Federation's WPIZ in Ukraine.
As I wrote, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, as a result of not fully understood decisions to discontinue the mobilization development, the WPIZ entered Ukraine basically without guns (repair battalions), operational repair teams, evacuation patrols, and field repair bases. The rally columns, laden like Gypsy caravans, went deep into Ukrainian territory without looking back. We all saw the result in the form of a really large number of abandoned / damaged cars, which no one had to evacuate to the back (sorry, the Ukrainian Independent Tractor Division took care of the evacuation - only not entirely in the direction that would be satisfactory for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation).
Here is a small inconvenience - buggies and other units responsible for the evacuation of damaged equipment, its repairs, etc. quite often have a relatively low level of manpower during P. this is troublesome, and on the occasion of larger exercises or maneuvers, reservists are simply appointed in the desired number and the units are developed to the required level (but usually not to the "W" state), similarly with the equipment, which is mostly preserved in stock on an intact . How was the three-day special military operation supposed to be "well, it would have passed somehow, but when it turned out to be a full-blooded war with a significant use of WPIZ, the matter was over and with time the situation has normalized, but it is still, well, far from perfect. Currently it is so that, yes, the evacuation of damaged equipment is relatively efficient, even the most heavily damaged vehicles are sent by rail to permanent repair bases and to the factory after verification. , a lot of "minor problems" emerged.
Personnel status, i.e. Kadry, stupid "- since there is no" official mobilization "then it is impossible to appoint reservists from various corps of personnel from the specialty of the technical personal group. Of course, they save themselves by transferring cadres from units not involved in Ukraine, even from other types of armed forces, which is already pathological. Various incentives and persuasions are used "in relation to reservists, and even people formally not subject to the mobilization obligation, in order to persuade them to sign such voluntary (of course) contracts, etc. The results of these activities are varied, but in the end the completion of the personnel is at least in some cases, it is far from the required and the degree of professionalism is definitely different (such a euphemism), which strongly affects the capacity, but this is not the only problem and here let's move on to the second point.
Equipment - Well, it is not a special surprise that, by a strange coincidence, it turned out that the facts were so slightly inconsistent with the inventory. Of course, in the basic categories of equipment, everything was correct, but for example, the equipment of mobile repair shops - it's kind of a bit, not necessarily. After all, it is not surprising that when the captain had a dacha renovation, he did not go to the store to buy the necessary grinder, table drill or welding machine, but only borrowed from the state of vehicles that he had in his records - and that sometimes he forgot to return - well, it happens. The result was and is an official loot in Ukrainian car / locksmith workshops / tool shops, ordered by commanders of beams, field repair bases or equipment parks, and a perfect exemplification of this is an anecdote how one of the patrols sent into the field almost shot himself with tictock guns ( bandits from Kadyrov) for one Migo-Mage. The staff is forced to combine "(khmm, as I would have known it from somewhere) to make additional small tools, dismantling stations etc. with their own expense. This military improvisation gives results as such, but here the third problem comes in all in white.
Spare parts / repair kits - that is, "Andrzej, where I can find such a fender" - again stock levels. Inventory of deep storage warehouses from spring-summer 2020 supposedly showed that everything with the number and condition of vehicles stored in them, as well as repair kits whether spare parts showed that it is in the best order, there are some minor flaws, but in general it is OK. Well, I can only suspect what this action must have looked like, because the reality after February 24, 2022 croaked and showed the middle finger. Something strange "August" it happened both with complete engines of the W-46 series as well as repair kits for them. As field workshops or equipment parks began to place demands for drive components, it turned out that, for example, in one of the warehouses, while the actual state of the W-55U or GTD-1000 was in line with the warehouse (after several dozen years), the W-46 was .. THREE out of several dozen by papers, and with the W-84 it was only a little better. Of course, the situation is different in different parts of the USSR back to Russia, but problems are basically everywhere. The situation is identical with other components of the driveline, such as the side gears. Deficiencies in the supply of both complete power units and repair kits to field bases cause an avalanche increase in the number of inoperative equipment disconnected from the line. The same (and sometimes even worse) happens with components for radio stations, sights, parts for automatic loading machines or SKO. Not so long ago, there was a panic with the search for tubes for the restored T-62 series of vehicles, because it turned out that they were physically absent or they were defective / damaged / improperly stored. Amba fatima again. ("amba fatima" tarkoittaa asioita joilla on tapana kadota)
Finally, the icing on the cake, which is the legendary "user friendly" vehicles with Soviet origin, their ease of use and repair. If you are interested, I recommend checking the time needed to replace, for example, the power unit in the T-72A / M and in the Leopard 2. What some may be surprised.
Instead of a summary - which is terrible, in a moment the tanks, bewups will stop, Russia will capitulate and the Ukrainian flag will be flown in the Kremlin? Oh no, not at all.
Field bases or equipment parks completely cannibalize those vehicles that have been classified for long-term repairs in the deep rear / factory in railways due to damage - evacuation transports are almost completely naked. Of course, this will extend the rear repair (or in fact "rebuilt"), but it allows to maintain the efficiency of the equipment at the military level. The Russians, in order to replenish losses and eliminate the overhang, reached for a solution that is perhaps not very sophisticated, but effective. They simply systematically deliver new ones to the front. vehicles. The word new should be put in quotation marks, because it is basically equipment either from long-term storage warehouses (this is worse), or from military units that do not take part in combat directly (eg Far East). o military units, they most often hand over equipment that is not in the current / training operation group, but only that from maintenance / invalidity. As a rule, it should be in good condition, but in fact it is different.
Of course, units should receive in return for their shipped to the front, eg T 72AV / B, BMP-1 and 2 other vehicles, so that the status from the tables of receivables / jobs matches - and they get. e most often from deep storage warehouses are vehicles which, hmm, disintegrating casks / shells / technical monuments / scrap materials that are not able to drive off the ramp on their own - these are adequate terms for what, for example, tank battalions near the Chinese border receive. Another thing is that it does not bother you at all - especially in the context of operations in Ukraine, unless it turns out that such a battalion should be developed to the "W" state - oh yes, then it will be really funny. T-62 family (not without problems), which also fly makeshift holes, especially where they can be a substitute for more valuable vehicles.
Industry is also trying to give the army new vehicles - but here it is because the hardest part for problems with component suppliers. And precisely, with the shortage of components or spare parts, Russia is also trying to somehow manage by buying, where possible, everything that is suitable for their vehicles. Often with strong support from intelligence services, using methods such as corruption, price-piercing to sometimes exorbitant levels, and even blackmail. All this taken together, plus the different nature of the activities in the current phase of the conflict, means that, unfortunately, the vehicles constituting the core of the WPIZ of the Russian Federation's Armed Forces will not run short on the Ukrainian front. Recently, field repair bases have also been given a consolation several times, which, combined with the expected (hopefully) soon arrival of ATACMS and disruption of the mps supply (propellants, lubricants), may cause difficulties in maintaining an appropriate number of operational and available vehicles.
To be continued?
