Niiden taktisten haltuunotto olis raju juttu, toinen huikea olis tuhota ne Venäjän puolelle, kun kuljettavat niitä. Itsehän just mainostivat ettei ne ole sen laajemmin vaarallisia. Nyt pitää myös huomioida ja lännen olla valppaana, Putinin roistohallinto voi suunnitella jotain muutakin niillä taktisilla, suuntaan tai toiseen suoraa käyttöäkin, ja puheet niiden siirrosta ValkoVenäjälle voi olla hämäystä, että niiden parissa puuhastelu menis sen siirron piikkiin.
Ukrainan konflikti/sota
Puurokulho
Luutnantti
RKSTAK
Ylipäällikkö
Siinä pähkinäkuoressa. Datalinkki yltää 12km. Jännä että pusikkoon tippunu, oisko häiritty.
Joo tuo se oli. Ymmärsin myös, että DPR:n komentajat ottavat rintamalle tulevilta mobikeilta varusteet pois. Epäilen, että nuo myydään eteenpäin ja rahat otetaan itselle. Jos mobikit pistetään vain kuolemaan, niin turhaan niille varusteita antaa.
Antares
Respected Leader
Bakhmutin ympäristön tilanteen muutos, gif-videossa vertaillaan 27.2.2023 ja 26.3.2023 tilanteita:
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Yhden miehen näkemys siitä, miksi Putin kokee Ukrainan kehityksen niin vaarallisena (ei sinänsä uusi keksintö, useampi on tässäkin ketjussa esittänyt samansuuntaisia arvioita sodan syistä - minä mukaanluettuna):
Here's why I believe Ukraine was, and remains, such a threat to Vladimir #Putin:
In 1989, Putin was a KGB officer in Dresden when the Berlin Wall fell and communism collapsed. How did that collapse happen?
East Germans who were (illegally) watching West German TV saw that their neighbors to the West had a life, and lifestyle, far superior to the one in East Germany.
More freedom. More income. More opportunities. Better quality of life.
So, East Germans voted with their feet and fled. Putin soon experienced the collapse of East German firsthand.
Today, Putin's worst nightmare is a #Ukraine that holds free and fair elections, and has a free media, human rights, freedom of speech and religion.
Ukraine, Russia's neighbor, already has a higher standard of living than Russia. Ukraine has not yet reached its potential, but unlike #Russia, they've already made some significant strides in that direction. (Compare the respective trajectories of North and South Korea since 1970 if you want to see a historical precedent.)
A successful #Ukraine is simply a ticking time bomb for an autocratic revanchist Tsar in the Kremlin, plain and simple. So yes, you could say that Ukraine was an existential threat to Putin's kleptocratic regime. But not for the absurd reasons the #Kremlin has claimed.
Viestin kommenteista poimittu:
I believe you are right. As Kennan said; “The jealous and intolerant eye of the Kremlin can distinguish, in the end, only vassals and enemies, and the neighbors of Russia, if they do not wish to be one, must reconcile themselves to being the other.”
Johon hän vastasi näin:
George Kennan was a wise man. His words ring true even today.
Toinen oli eri mieltä:
Upon closer inspection this theory of Russian "jealousy" falls apart when we look at Russians' exposure to the EU and successful ex-communist countries - especially Poland and the Baltic republics. Ukraine's pre-2022 success was in being better than Moldova in some years...
Material considerations tend to come before human rights, and Russia is a comparatively wealthier country than those it wishes to subjugate. Ukrainian democracy is, unfortunately, no more of a contagion to Russia than Taiwanese democracy is to China.
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Yhden miehen näkemys siitä, miksi Putin kokee Ukrainan kehityksen niin vaarallisena (ei sinänsä uusi keksintö, useampi on tässäkin ketjussa esittänyt samansuuntaisia arvioita sodan syistä - minä mukaanluettuna):
Here's why I believe Ukraine was, and remains, such a threat to Vladimir #Putin:
In 1989, Putin was a KGB officer in Dresden when the Berlin Wall fell and communism collapsed. How did that collapse happen?
East Germans who were (illegally) watching West German TV saw that their neighbors to the West had a life, and lifestyle, far superior to the one in East Germany.
More freedom. More income. More opportunities. Better quality of life.
So, East Germans voted with their feet and fled. Putin soon experienced the collapse of East German firsthand.
Today, Putin's worst nightmare is a #Ukraine that holds free and fair elections, and has a free media, human rights, freedom of speech and religion.
Ukraine, Russia's neighbor, already has a higher standard of living than Russia. Ukraine has not yet reached its potential, but unlike #Russia, they've already made some significant strides in that direction. (Compare the respective trajectories of North and South Korea since 1970 if you want to see a historical precedent.)
A successful #Ukraine is simply a ticking time bomb for an autocratic revanchist Tsar in the Kremlin, plain and simple. So yes, you could say that Ukraine was an existential threat to Putin's kleptocratic regime. But not for the absurd reasons the #Kremlin has claimed.
Viestin kommenteista poimittu:
I believe you are right. As Kennan said; “The jealous and intolerant eye of the Kremlin can distinguish, in the end, only vassals and enemies, and the neighbors of Russia, if they do not wish to be one, must reconcile themselves to being the other.”
Johon hän vastasi näin:
George Kennan was a wise man. His words ring true even today.
Toinen oli eri mieltä:
Upon closer inspection this theory of Russian "jealousy" falls apart when we look at Russians' exposure to the EU and successful ex-communist countries - especially Poland and the Baltic republics. Ukraine's pre-2022 success was in being better than Moldova in some years...
Material considerations tend to come before human rights, and Russia is a comparatively wealthier country than those it wishes to subjugate. Ukrainian democracy is, unfortunately, no more of a contagion to Russia than Taiwanese democracy is to China.
Viimeksi muokattu:
RKSTAK
Ylipäällikkö
Kyllä on raukkamaista, raukkamaista ryssät! 
Lisäksi samaan aikaan Druzhkivka joutui rakettihyökkäyksen kohteeksi - kaksi S300-rakettia osui Druzhkivkan orpokotiin ja tuhosi sen lähes kokonaan.
Alustavien tietojen mukaan Druzhkivkassa ei ole tällä hetkellä uhreja tai uhreja.
Uhrien lukumäärästä Slovjanskissa tiedot ovat muuttumassa - pelastusoperaatio on käynnissä. Ilmoitan teille tarkemmin sen edistymisestä.
Lisäksi samaan aikaan Druzhkivka joutui rakettihyökkäyksen kohteeksi - kaksi S300-rakettia osui Druzhkivkan orpokotiin ja tuhosi sen lähes kokonaan.Alustavien tietojen mukaan Druzhkivkassa ei ole tällä hetkellä uhreja tai uhreja.
Uhrien lukumäärästä Slovjanskissa tiedot ovat muuttumassa - pelastusoperaatio on käynnissä. Ilmoitan teille tarkemmin sen edistymisestä.
Antares
Respected Leader
Melitopolissa paukkunut myös (kaksi tuntia vanha twiitti):
In Melitopol, locals report explosions in several buildings used by the Russians. There were explosions in the dormitory of the automotive technical school where Russian military lived, as well as in the buildings of the state security service.
https://t.me/riamelitopol/86573
In Melitopol, locals report explosions in several buildings used by the Russians. There were explosions in the dormitory of the automotive technical school where Russian military lived, as well as in the buildings of the state security service.
https://t.me/riamelitopol/86573
RIA-Melitopol
RIA-Melitopol
WAR 2022
RIA-MelitopolRIA-MelitopolWAR 2022
Arrived at the building where there was a Russian State Security Service (GSB). press
SUBSCRIBE TO THE CHANNEL | Send news @RiaMelitopolTV
In Melitopol, explosions destroyed several terraced buildings at once
According to local residents, from the dormitory of the automotive technical school, where the fake Minister of Education and Science Olena Shapurova housed the military (next to the automotive technical school), Russian military personnel ran out into the yard in just their underpants. The occupiers are panicking
The building of the so-called Russian State Security Service was also destroyed.
The DSB was located in several buildings. The managers are located in the cramped building of the former higher education institution - the Melitopol branch of the Zaporizhzhya Institute of Economics and Information Technologies on the 50th anniversary of Victory avenue. It was surrounded by a metal fence. In these buildings, destruction is observed after the arrivals
Racists write in their TG dumps about 4 victims. But to believe them is to disrespect yourself
pressSUBSCRIBE TO THE CHANNEL | Send news @RiaMelitopolTV
t.me/riamelitopol/86573
38.2K views
Mar 27 at 09:14
RIA-MelitopolWAR 2022RIA-Melitopol
RIA-MelitopolWAR 2022Arrived at the building where there was a Russian State Security Service (GSB). pressSUBSCRIBE TO THE CHANNEL | Send news @RiaMelitopolTVIn Melitopol, explosions destroyed several terraced buildings at onceAccording to local residents, from the dormitory of the automotive technical school, where the fake Minister of Education and Science Olena Shapurova housed the military (next to the automotive technical school), Russian military personnel ran out into the yard in just their underpants. The occupiers are panicking
The building of the so-called Russian State Security Service was also destroyed.
The DSB was located in several buildings. The managers are located in the cramped building of the former higher education institution - the Melitopol branch of the Zaporizhzhya Institute of Economics and Information Technologies on the 50th anniversary of Victory avenue. It was surrounded by a metal fence. In these buildings, destruction is observed after the arrivals
Racists write in their TG dumps about 4 victims. But to believe them is to disrespect yourself
press
SUBSCRIBE TO THE CHANNEL | Send news @RiaMelitopolTVt.me/riamelitopol/86573
38.2K views
Mar 27 at 09:14
Viimeksi muokattu:
Sotakoira
Kapteeni
Sillä näyttäisi olevan ongelmia luotiliivin kanssa kun ei saa sitä kypärän kanssa laitettua.
Sanavalmis Muurinen
Kenraali
Trentin analyysia ryssien tappioista.
Päätyy 544000 rysyn lukemiin battle (kaatuneet ja haavoittuneet) + non-battle (kadonneet ja sotavangit) kokonaistappioissa.
Päätyy 544000 rysyn lukemiin battle (kaatuneet ja haavoittuneet) + non-battle (kadonneet ja sotavangit) kokonaistappioissa.
Antares
Respected Leader
Valko-Venäjä tuonut ilmatorjuntakalustoa uuteen paikkaan:
#Belarus setup a new AD regiment in Luninets. Reportedly the footage is from there.
Luninets sijainti kartalla:
Kun kirjoittaa Googlen hakupalveluun "Luninets" niin se tarjoaa yhtenä vaihtoehtona "Luninets air base", seuraava lainaus on wikipediasta:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luninets_(air_base) - koordinaatit: 52°16′30″N 026°46′30″E
Luninets is a reserve air base of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces of the Republic of Belarus located in Luninets, Brest Region.
The airfield was a fighter-bomber training area during the Cold War. It was home to the 1169th BRAT (1169th Aviation Equipment Reserve Base) flying Mil Mi-8 and Mil Mi-24 helicopters.
During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine the 18th Guards Assault Aviation Regiment was deployed here using Sukhoi Su-25s from Chernigovka (air base).[2][3][4][5] These were supported by the 266th Assault Aviation Regiment with their Sukhoi Su-25's from Step (air base).[6]
In early October it was reported that Russia had deployed approximately 20 Shahed-136 drones to the base.[7]
#Belarus setup a new AD regiment in Luninets. Reportedly the footage is from there.
Luninets sijainti kartalla:
Kun kirjoittaa Googlen hakupalveluun "Luninets" niin se tarjoaa yhtenä vaihtoehtona "Luninets air base", seuraava lainaus on wikipediasta:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luninets_(air_base) - koordinaatit: 52°16′30″N 026°46′30″E
Luninets is a reserve air base of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces of the Republic of Belarus located in Luninets, Brest Region.
The airfield was a fighter-bomber training area during the Cold War. It was home to the 1169th BRAT (1169th Aviation Equipment Reserve Base) flying Mil Mi-8 and Mil Mi-24 helicopters.
During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine the 18th Guards Assault Aviation Regiment was deployed here using Sukhoi Su-25s from Chernigovka (air base).[2][3][4][5] These were supported by the 266th Assault Aviation Regiment with their Sukhoi Su-25's from Step (air base).[6]
In early October it was reported that Russia had deployed approximately 20 Shahed-136 drones to the base.[7]
Antares
Respected Leader
Selasin hieman Volya Median telegram-kanavaa, siellä oli mielenkiintoinen kirjoitus joka on julkaistu 18.3.2023 (minulla ei ole Telegram-tunnuksia enkä osaa linkittää yksittäiseen viestiin, tämä palvelu toimii hieman eri tavalla kuin Twitter): LINKKI
Volya
The ninth anniversary of the “return to the native harbor” may be the last for Crimea within the Russian Federation
Despite the statements of the head of the Crimea, Sergei Aksenov and President Putin accused of war crimes, the peninsula is poorly protected and it will be almost impossible to keep it in the event of an attack by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Since the fall, the RF Armed Forces have zealously undertaken to strengthen the Crimea and the Isthmus from a possible invasion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The positions of the Russian troops were located to the north of the peninsula, later defense lines were added to them in the area of Armyansk and Ishun. According to Russian officers, trenches, lines of gouges, anti-tank barriers and ditches cut through the isthmus. Concrete boxes of fortified firing points grew along the roads. But the peninsula's defense scheme has several weaknesses that negate its potential effectiveness.
Fortifications are poorly connected with each other and are not a single system of defensive structures.
The quality of concrete and other materials is so low that bunkers can be seriously damaged by fire from heavy machine guns or 120mm mortars, that is, with the active use of artillery and missiles by the Ukrainian army, Russian firing points will turn into a shooting range for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Crimea is poorly covered from the air. Since January, all available air defense systems have been concentrated there, often exposing other sectors of the front and the nearest rear, but this, according to the military stationed in Crimea, is not enough, because the personnel are badly trained, and the air defense systems are unsuccessfully placed. “They often cover not military, but administrative facilities, besides, we have a lot of air defense at parades and in words in Moscow. In fact, in the ending here on the spot, there are four to five dozen installations of various types scattered throughout the peninsula. In the event of serious raids, there will be nothing to repel them,” says a Russian officer stationed in Crimea.
The Ukrainian Air Force not only survived, but also increased in size since the beginning of the war. In the event of an attack on Crimea, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will use not only attack aircraft, but also attack helicopters, and before that, sabotage groups, drones and artillerymen will work with Russian air defense systems and crews.
And here we move on to the main point that devalues the entire fortification activity of the RF Armed Forces on the peninsula. If the Armed Forces of Ukraine occupy settlements to the north and northwest of the isthmus, for example, Skadovsk and others, then the entire peninsula will be in the zone of fire damage by HIMARS and other long-range artillery systems. Considering that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will have no problems with adjusting the fire (due to the large number of supporters in the Crimea and the DRG), the Russian troops from Armyansk to Yalta will be sitting ducks.
“Our strategists are preparing for a repeat of 41-42 years. But the Ukrainian partners are unlikely to trample on us with tank columns. They will kick them out of Genichesk and Skadovsk, throw them back to Armyansk or Ishun, cut off the Crimean bridge, and then they will methodically knock out air defense, equipment, warehouses, people and ships with which they will try to supply the group from the mainland. A month or two and we will be left without Crimea and without a fleet, ”says a Russian officer of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
@Volyamedia
Volya
The ninth anniversary of the “return to the native harbor” may be the last for Crimea within the Russian Federation
Despite the statements of the head of the Crimea, Sergei Aksenov and President Putin accused of war crimes, the peninsula is poorly protected and it will be almost impossible to keep it in the event of an attack by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Since the fall, the RF Armed Forces have zealously undertaken to strengthen the Crimea and the Isthmus from a possible invasion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The positions of the Russian troops were located to the north of the peninsula, later defense lines were added to them in the area of Armyansk and Ishun. According to Russian officers, trenches, lines of gouges, anti-tank barriers and ditches cut through the isthmus. Concrete boxes of fortified firing points grew along the roads. But the peninsula's defense scheme has several weaknesses that negate its potential effectiveness.
Fortifications are poorly connected with each other and are not a single system of defensive structures.
The quality of concrete and other materials is so low that bunkers can be seriously damaged by fire from heavy machine guns or 120mm mortars, that is, with the active use of artillery and missiles by the Ukrainian army, Russian firing points will turn into a shooting range for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Crimea is poorly covered from the air. Since January, all available air defense systems have been concentrated there, often exposing other sectors of the front and the nearest rear, but this, according to the military stationed in Crimea, is not enough, because the personnel are badly trained, and the air defense systems are unsuccessfully placed. “They often cover not military, but administrative facilities, besides, we have a lot of air defense at parades and in words in Moscow. In fact, in the ending here on the spot, there are four to five dozen installations of various types scattered throughout the peninsula. In the event of serious raids, there will be nothing to repel them,” says a Russian officer stationed in Crimea.
The Ukrainian Air Force not only survived, but also increased in size since the beginning of the war. In the event of an attack on Crimea, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will use not only attack aircraft, but also attack helicopters, and before that, sabotage groups, drones and artillerymen will work with Russian air defense systems and crews.
And here we move on to the main point that devalues the entire fortification activity of the RF Armed Forces on the peninsula. If the Armed Forces of Ukraine occupy settlements to the north and northwest of the isthmus, for example, Skadovsk and others, then the entire peninsula will be in the zone of fire damage by HIMARS and other long-range artillery systems. Considering that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will have no problems with adjusting the fire (due to the large number of supporters in the Crimea and the DRG), the Russian troops from Armyansk to Yalta will be sitting ducks.
“Our strategists are preparing for a repeat of 41-42 years. But the Ukrainian partners are unlikely to trample on us with tank columns. They will kick them out of Genichesk and Skadovsk, throw them back to Armyansk or Ishun, cut off the Crimean bridge, and then they will methodically knock out air defense, equipment, warehouses, people and ships with which they will try to supply the group from the mainland. A month or two and we will be left without Crimea and without a fleet, ”says a Russian officer of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
@Volyamedia
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Jos kiinnostaa lukea Venäjän salaiseksi julistamia ohjeita, tässä yksi:
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Valko-Venäjällä ei ole nähtävissä ydinaseiden varastointiin sopivien uusien varastojen rakennustöitä. Ehkä joku olemassaoleva varasto muutetaan sellaiseksi eikä rakenneta kokonaan uutta? Putin taisi sanoa että "valmista pitäisi tulla 1.6.2023 mennessä".
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Mielenkiintoista, tämän mukaan 111. varastotukikohdasta ei olisi otettu T-54/T-55 vaunuja (satelliittikuvien perusteella) mutta arvioi että 27 kpl T-62 vaunuja olisi lähtenyt. HUOM: tarkastelun aikaväli helmikuun puolivälistä "early March" joten vaunut mahdollisesti otettu myöhemmin maaliskuussa. T-54/T-55 osalta mainittiin kaksi varastotukikohtaa, 111. ja 1295.:
Between mid-Feb and early March, Russians probably withdrew around 27 T-62s from the 111th Central Tank Reserve Base northwest of Komsomolsk-on-Amur. No changes in the number of T-54s/55s at the site were noted.
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Valko-Venäjällä ei ole nähtävissä ydinaseiden varastointiin sopivien uusien varastojen rakennustöitä. Ehkä joku olemassaoleva varasto muutetaan sellaiseksi eikä rakenneta kokonaan uutta? Putin taisi sanoa että "valmista pitäisi tulla 1.6.2023 mennessä".
-
Mielenkiintoista, tämän mukaan 111. varastotukikohdasta ei olisi otettu T-54/T-55 vaunuja (satelliittikuvien perusteella) mutta arvioi että 27 kpl T-62 vaunuja olisi lähtenyt. HUOM: tarkastelun aikaväli helmikuun puolivälistä "early March" joten vaunut mahdollisesti otettu myöhemmin maaliskuussa. T-54/T-55 osalta mainittiin kaksi varastotukikohtaa, 111. ja 1295.:
Between mid-Feb and early March, Russians probably withdrew around 27 T-62s from the 111th Central Tank Reserve Base northwest of Komsomolsk-on-Amur. No changes in the number of T-54s/55s at the site were noted.
suora linkki https://t.me/volyamedia/591
arix
Respected Leader
Hmm, jos noita toimitetaan VV:lle niin paljonkohan maksaisi jos muutama jatkaisikin matkaa Vuosaaren satamaan...
Näin Ukrainan sota eteni 21.4.–19.5. – IS seurasi hetki hetkeltä
IS seuraa tässä artikkelissa tilannetta Ukrainan sodassa.
www.is.fi
Oho... Nyt vuorostaan Patrushevin papalta näitä uhkailuja. Aistittavissa jo melkoista hermostuneisuutta "hovissa", ettei vaan ala olla fiilis siellä sitä luokkaa, että kohta lentää paska tuulettimeen ja kunnolla
Yhteiskunnan parhaita viedään. Näitä tunnettuja urheilijoita mennyt jo lukuisia.
RKSTAK
Ylipäällikkö
Kova kiima on auttaa miehittäjää! Toivottavasti tuokin akka istuu sen 15v!
@SBU
SBU pidätti Lvivissä vihollisen tiedottajan, joka uudelleensijoitetun henkilön varjolla keräsi tietoja asevoimista
Tekijäksi osoittautui Mykolaivin alueen asukas, joka on SBU:n äskettäin pidättämän toisen isänmaan petturin sisar.
Hän oli etänä yhteistyössä viime vuoden lokakuussa.
Turvallisuuspalvelun vastatiedusteluviranomaiset dokumentoivat, että epäilty keräsi tiedustelutietoja puolustusvoimien tukikohdista ja liikkeistä Lvivissä.
Naamioidakseen tiedustelutoimintansa nainen esitti olevansa siirtolainen Etelä-Ukrainan etulinjan alueilta.
Tutkinnan mukaan informantti vieraili usein alueella, joka on lähellä sotilasjoukkojen sijoituspaikkoja ja teki merkintöjä sähköisiin karttoihin. Myöhemmin hän yritti siirtää kerätyt tiedot Venäjän federaatioon messengerin kautta.
SBU:n vastatiedusteluagentit kuitenkin työskentelivät etuajassa - paljastivat ajoissa tekijän, dokumentoivat rikolliset toimet ja pidättivät hänet yrittäessään välittää tiedustelutietoja hyökkääjälle.
Etsinnässä pidätetyltä takavarikoitiin tietokonelaitteita ja seitsemän matkapuhelinta. Yhdessä heistä oli todisteita rikollisesta toiminnasta.
Turvallisuuspalvelun tutkijat ilmoittivat hänelle epäilystä.
Tuomioistuin valitsi ennalta ehkäiseväksi toimenpiteeksi säilöönoton. Esitutkinta on kesken rikoksen kaikkien olosuhteiden selvittämiseksi.
Toimenpiteet toteuttivat Lvivin alueen SBU:n vastatiedusteluviranomaiset ja tutkijat syyttäjänviraston menettelyohjeiden mukaisesti.
@SBU SBU pidätti Lvivissä vihollisen tiedottajan, joka uudelleensijoitetun henkilön varjolla keräsi tietoja asevoimista
Tekijäksi osoittautui Mykolaivin alueen asukas, joka on SBU:n äskettäin pidättämän toisen isänmaan petturin sisar.
Hän oli etänä yhteistyössä viime vuoden lokakuussa.
Turvallisuuspalvelun vastatiedusteluviranomaiset dokumentoivat, että epäilty keräsi tiedustelutietoja puolustusvoimien tukikohdista ja liikkeistä Lvivissä.
Naamioidakseen tiedustelutoimintansa nainen esitti olevansa siirtolainen Etelä-Ukrainan etulinjan alueilta.
Tutkinnan mukaan informantti vieraili usein alueella, joka on lähellä sotilasjoukkojen sijoituspaikkoja ja teki merkintöjä sähköisiin karttoihin. Myöhemmin hän yritti siirtää kerätyt tiedot Venäjän federaatioon messengerin kautta.
SBU:n vastatiedusteluagentit kuitenkin työskentelivät etuajassa - paljastivat ajoissa tekijän, dokumentoivat rikolliset toimet ja pidättivät hänet yrittäessään välittää tiedustelutietoja hyökkääjälle.
Etsinnässä pidätetyltä takavarikoitiin tietokonelaitteita ja seitsemän matkapuhelinta. Yhdessä heistä oli todisteita rikollisesta toiminnasta.
Turvallisuuspalvelun tutkijat ilmoittivat hänelle epäilystä.
Tuomioistuin valitsi ennalta ehkäiseväksi toimenpiteeksi säilöönoton. Esitutkinta on kesken rikoksen kaikkien olosuhteiden selvittämiseksi.
Toimenpiteet toteuttivat Lvivin alueen SBU:n vastatiedusteluviranomaiset ja tutkijat syyttäjänviraston menettelyohjeiden mukaisesti.