Ukrainan sodan havainnot ja opetukset

Katsoin että tätä pari viikkoa vanhaa viestiä ei olisi laitettu tänne. Väitetysti tyyli jolla Wagnet ja sitä tukevat joukot hyökkäsivät Bakhmutin seudulla (Soledarin pohjoispuolella). Saavuttivat menestystä, tosin väitetysti kovin tappioin:

Hän on ottanut viestiinsä pari kuva alkuperäisen tekstin käännöksestä, tässä spoilerin takana koko tekstin käännös (lihavointi minun lukemisen helpottamiseksi):

https://t.me/Tsaplienko/24186

CAPLIENKO_UKRAINE FIGHTS


☝️ "Unpacking" the tactics of the Wagnerites north of Soledar through the eyes of a very competent Ukrainian officer, one of the participants in the defense.

Details of tactics:
🔺 At first, the first group, usually of 8 people, is put forward to the finish line. The whole group is maximally loaded with BC (Perpetuan mukaan BC = ammo mutta oletan että voisi tarkoittaa luotien ja lippaiden lisäksi käsikranaatteja yms. Kirjoitan silti jatkossa tämän jälkeen "BC = ammo"), each has a "Bumblebee" flamethrower. Their task is to get to the point and get a foothold. They are almost suicidal. Their BC (BC = ammo) in case of failure is intended for the following groups.

🔺 The group gets as close as possible to the Ukrainians and digs in as quickly as possible. A white cloth or other sign is left on the tree so that the next group can navigate in the event of the death of their predecessors and find where shelters have already been dug and where there are weapons from BC (BC = ammo).

🔺 During the fire contact, the "Wagners" detect Ukrainian firing positions and transfer them to their artillery. As a rule, 120-mm and 82-mm mortars work in them. Up to 10 mortars simultaneously begin to suppress the discovered Ukrainian position. Artillery training can last several hours in a row.

🔺 During this time, 500 meters from the first group, the second group concentrates. She has lighter equipment. And under the cover of artillery, this group begins an assault on the Ukrainian position. If the second group fails to take a position, it is followed by the third and even the fourth. That is, four waves of eight people for one Ukrainian position.

🔺 One of the groups has a UAV operator. He coordinates artillery fire directly from the battlefield.

🔺 If they manage to suppress the Ukrainian position, they "clear" it, using a drone, grenades, small arms.

How to fight effectively:

🔷 Have light "armor" at a distance of short jumps. As soon as the drone operators notice the movement of the occupiers towards the positions, they inform the "armor". But quickly suppresses the attack of the "Wagnerians" even with machine guns. If there is no "armor", then it is difficult to restrain such assault actions.

🔺 Fighters should be prepared for shooting battles at a short distance.

🔷 The main reason for the success of the Russians and the defeat of the Ukrainians in such small assault operations may be the lack of counter-battery combat. Artillery begins to shell the attackers instead of suppressing the enemy's artillery. Without the cover of the same mortars, the assaults of the "Wagnerians" simply suffocate.

🔷 And for effective counter-battery combat, a larger number of drones and their operators are needed in positions.

I hope these tips will be useful for our fighters.

I repeat, the conclusions are not mine, but those of one of the officers who is now holding the defense in Soledar. And I'm keeping my fingers crossed that our guys hold an important city.

t.me/Tsaplienko/24186

135.8K views

edited Jan 9 at 21:47

Suomennan alle osuuden jossa käsitellään "kuinka taistella tällaista vastaan" (kirjoittaja painottaa että nämä opit eivät ole hänen keksimiään vaan hän siteeraa alueella taistelevaa upseeria):

- pitäisi olla kevyitä panssarijoukkoja lyhyen etäisyyden päässä linjasta. Heti kun drone-operaattori havaitsee tällaisen hyökkäyksen, se antaa hälytyksen näille panssarijoukoille jotka ajavat torjumaan hyökkäyksen. Jopa konekiväärituli (oletan silti että tarkka ja runsas) riittää pysäyttämään (käyttää sanaa suppress joka ei suoraan tarkoita tappamista) hyökkäyksen MUTTA jos tällaisia panssarijoukkoja ei ole, tällaisen hyökkäyksen torjunta on vaikeaa (oletan että asemia puolustavan jalkaväen tulivoima ei riitä JA runsas, kohtuu tarkka kranaatinheitintuli on iso ongelma vaikka olisikin juoksuhaudassa tai poteroissa)

- taistelijoiden tulisi olla valmiit tulitaisteluihin lyhyillä etäisyyksillä

- yksi syy tällaisten taktiikoiden onnistumiseen voi olla Ukrainan rajallinen vastatykistötuli tällä alueella. Ukrainan tykistö iskee hyökkäävää joukkoa vastaan, kun pitäisi (kirjoituksen mukaan) iskeä omia puolustusasemia vastaan hyökkääviä heittimiä vastaan. Jos hyökkääjä ei saa heittimiltä tukea, wagnerilaisten hyökkäys tukehtuu.

- tehokasta vastatykistötoimintaa varten täytyy olla suuri määrä droneja ja niiden lennättäjiä (minun kommentit: tässäkin minun mielestä korostuvat lyhyet taisteluetäisyydet sekä heitinten käyttö: dronella tuskin nähdään 10-12 km tai kauempaa ampuvaa tykistöä mutta 82mm ja 120mm heittimet voidaan nähdä ja paikallistaa. Oletan että maasto ja koordinaatit ovat selvillä joten dronen lennättäjä kykenisi melko nopeasti ohjaamaan omien heittimien ja tykistön tulen vihollisen asemiin. Tässä tapauksessa siis kun puhutaan "vastatykistötulesta" niin ei tarkoiteta vastatykistötutkia yms. vaan yksinkertaisempia menetelmiä (tutkista varmasti olisi hyötyä, en kiistä sitä).

Tulee mieleen tuosta kirjoituksesta saksalaisten sturmtruppen taktiikat ensimmäisen maailmansodan aikaan, niissäkin kärsivät suuria tappioita.

Aikaisemmassa viestissä oli ukrainalaisten näkemys wagnerilaisten hyökkäystaktiikasta sekä kuvaus menetelmistä, joilla se torjuntaan.

Tässä viestissä on kuvailtu wagnerilaisten taktiikkaa, mutta nyt lähde on venäläinen kanava.


Lainaan alle koko ketjun tekstin:

The Wagner Group's 'human wave' attacks, which have left the area around Bakhmut and Soledar strewn with the bodies of dead Wagner fighters, have been described in detail by a Russian source. It explains the brutal calculations behind Wagner's seemingly suicidal tactics.

The 'Russian Criminal' website, which is linked to the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel, reports what a source – likely within Wagner – has told it about the mercenary group's approach to using recruited convicts to attack Soledar, sustaining huge casualties along the way.

"The most experienced and well-prepared group of stormtroopers comes first, with excellent equipment. It's comprised of eight men, each with a 'Bumblebee' [possibly meaning an RPO-A Shmel thermobaric rocket launcher, effective against fortified positions].

"Whatever happens, the group must reach the firing line. "Whatever happens" is not a turn of phrase, but a task, the failure to complete which will end in execution [by Wagner], regardless of any [mitigating] factors.

"Once fire contact has been made [with the enemy], the group digs into positions. Digging in is taught as meticulously as combat operations, so by military standards, digging in is almost instantaneous and very effective.

"The area the group has reached is marked (a rag on a tree or something similar). Even if the group is demolished to zero, the next one already realises where the previous one has reached. The main task is to make contact, dig in and transfer positional data to the artillery.

"Artillery can fire from an hour to several hours. And here is the first cause of conflict with the [Russian] army: if there are not enough shells, instead of a successful attack you get hopeless meat from the stormtroopers.

"The first group is followed by the second, also eight men, but with much lighter equipment. Their task is to jump into the positions as soon as the artillery shells finish their work.

"Sometimes there is an order not to wait for the shelling to end – the 'Musicians' are so disciplined that they will go anyway, because they stand a fighting chance of surviving.

"Nowadays there are not enough shells and because of that the first groups hardly survive – the main blow is coming at them and even training does not solve all the problems there.

"Even before, losses in the first group were inevitable, but now the survivability of groups as a whole has fallen to critical values. And to replace them with just anyone increases costs even more, and the influx of people has now collapsed.

"Groups of 8 people go in waves - usually 4 waves are prepared for the attack. But there have been cases in Soledar where it took 14 waves to take one area. Of course there were survivors, but the casualties were a hundred or more. That's for one section.

"Groups have drone operators to lead the whole group into position to clear the area. At the same time, the lightly wounded do not slouch and do not lie down – for that, they could shoot you in the legs and leave behind.

"This tactic is the only possible way to achieve results and advance in such conditions. The line of defense in Soledar has been cleverly constructed for years, the army command has neither the possibility nor the desire to advance there.

"That's basically why the task was handed to Wagner.

From the outside, it may look unreasonable to take such a high casualty rate deliberately, but try to look at it in a different way: even 4 waves of 8 men – that is 32 men killed at the worst.

"Throw in even a regiment – they will lose much more and even they will fail to cope with the task. In percentage terms they will lose less, but in absolute numbers, more. Therefore losses of over 50% for an attack are not bad, if there is a result.

"There is much less manpower for assault groups now, shells are also in short supply. And if the artillery is suppressed, then no one will call the stormtroopers back anyway, they just mop up without cover.

"If there are more groups in reserve, you can send in 5, and 6, and 7 waves, just to finish the result. This is not an army, here it is better to have more initiative than to underdo it.

"The 'Musicians' have their own training – with a crazy intensity, if you are without experience – but they teach a very narrow range of tasks.

"And the newcomers from the penal colonies are very well disciplined: first they are shown video executions, then very soon they encounter their first real examples, and then they get used to such discipline completely.

"Another plus from this [in contrast to the Russian army] is that it is not the practice in Wagner to reassign those [qualified as] artillery gunners to the stormtroopers, unless as punishment. Good gunners are also worth their weight in gold.

"The army will not be able to replace Wagner in hot areas, this is not even considered. In modern warfare, the number of soldiers is not an indicator at all. But, again, the question remains open – what to do about the shortage of shells (120 and 80 mm)?

"There is a concept of "efficiency relative to the situation", and so this efficiency can be high, but if the situation is deadlocked, then the main issue is still not resolved.

"Exchanging people for territory is beneficial when the territory is small and people in reserve are plentiful. If, on the other hand, you have to chop for every metre and people have become scarce, problems begin to arise.

"As a result, losses are growing and progress slows down. The recruitment of convicts at first gave a full-flowing river of people, now they are gone. At the beginning of the war there was talk of Syrian mercenaries, some even came. But they are not fit for this war.

"Among the 'Musicians' they say aloud that "we're about to put the squeeze on and take everything here." But among themselves, everyone expects that we will be removed from the assault on a number of directions.

"And even if a large mobilisation begins right tomorrow, it will not be possible to immediately recruit refuseniks in the required numbers, but they still need to be run in, brought to the desired condition, …

"because otherwise it will not even be possible to spend them effectively. It takes time, it takes a lot of shells. And we have neither one nor the other."

Source: https://rucriminal.info/ru/material/idushhie-na-smert
 
Twiitin käännös:

How are commercial drones used by the military, what is the average life expectancy of a copter on the front line, and can they be replaced in the event of a critical shortage in the market?


Suora linkki viitattuun artikkeliin: LINKKI

"We would fight now for the Dnipro, not for Bakhmut." How "wedding drones" help the Defense Forces​

How are commercial drones used by the military, what is the average life expectancy of a quadcopter on the front line, and can they be replaced in the event of a critical shortage in the market?

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2023, 1:30 P.M. -IHOR PYLYPOV

At the end of 2022, the Minister of Defense Oleksiy Reznikov stated that civilian drones are not adapted to work in combat conditions, and the command calls them "wedding", mocking their main pre-war purpose.

"I (in the Ministry of Defense - EP ) do not have "maviks" in the procurement, so you understand. The military does not accept them, our generals call them wedding drones.

The fact that our unique creative guys use them to conduct, let's say, a little trench warfare and destroy, including enemies, this - our creativity and ingenuity - is applauded," the minister said.

These words of Reznikov caused a sharp reaction in society. The military, volunteers, and citizens involved in aerial reconnaissance evaluated the minister's words with skepticism.

"Together with Starlink, drones provide a tandem that allows us not to lose when the enemy has a clear superiority in weapons. Without them, we would spend many times more ammunition to hit many times fewer targets and we would be fighting for the Dnipro, not for Bakhmut," says the founder Vitaly Deinega "Return Alive" Foundation .

Volunteers, together with society, are trying to independently cover the army's needs for such drones, but the demand for them is only increasing. What is the special feature of commercial drones, what is the duration of their use in war and is it possible to replace them with something in case of a critical shortage in the market?

What is the role of commercial drones in warfare

During the war, in conditions of shortage of military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for close reconnaissance, they are quite effectively replaced by commercial devices. Most often, we are talking about quadcopters from DJI and Autel.

On the frontline, commercial drones are the eyes of the military. They allow monitoring the situation at a distance of up to 10 km. Advancing enemy forces, adjusting their artillery, adjusting fire - all this is the work of "wedding" drones.

"The Matrice 300 or Matrice 30 (drone models of the DJI company - EP ) thanks to the camera with 200x zoom are ideal for correcting fire at a distance of five to ten kilometers. So far, the records I know are 26 kilometers for detection and correction," says the instructor Serhiy Ristenko UAV of Aerorozvidka NGO.

"Orlans" here are like bees, they are our main enemy." Yaroslav Honchar, co-founder of "Aero-reconnaissance" on the war of drones

The range of capabilities of commercial drones is expanding due to their modification. For example, the reset systems, which are attached to a regular quadcopter, turn it into an effective means of defeating manpower and Russian tanks .

Drones are usually converted by the military themselves. They manufacture explosive devices (30-40 mm fragmentation grenades) and think of ways to drop them on Russian positions. However, there are also private developments of reset systems.

Katso liite: 73541
The demand for drones and weapons for them has given rise to the offer of grenade-dropping systems by private individuals
PHOTO BY OLX.UA

In social networks, there are constant discussions about the feasibility of such use of drones, because the probability of their loss due to such conversions or damage to the operator from an explosive device is quite high.

However, Ristenko assures that in skillful hands the technology shows itself well: commercial drones are increasingly striking the enemy. The main thing is that the quadrocopter destroys equipment that is hundreds or even thousands of times more expensive than it.

During the year of the great war, the use of commercial drones as means of destruction in the Ukrainian army grew from an amateur to a professional direction. There are crews that destroyed enemy soldiers and equipment during operations using the Mavic 3.

Katso liite: 73542
Mavic 3 is most popular among the military
SOURCE: SECURE.UA

What is the duration of the "life" of the drone at the front

The Minister of Defense is sure that the time of use of drones at the front is minimal.

"Mavik" "lives" for a day or two at most, if it is used seriously. Let's have no illusions: this drone will not change the situation on the battlefield. We need a drone that carries a load of not 300 grams, but 30 kilograms. Well, at least three, you know? Which flies not 5 kilometers, but at least 50," said the minister.

The period of use of the drone in combat depends on the level of knowledge and skills of the crew and the enemy's resistance. The use of civilian UAVs requires special skills from the operator, which can even save his life.

"It is not enough to simply learn how to fly a drone, you also need, at a minimum, to understand the basic rules of flying when the enemy uses electronic warfare equipment," Ristenko explains.

Three rules of victory. How drone schools prepare operators for the front

Pilots are trained by volunteer organizations, because they provide military drones. When giving an expensive device, they should be sure that it will be managed by professionals. The only way to verify this is with a certificate.

"First, we are giving people access to the course "Using Technology in War Conditions". This is a unique educational product created as part of the Victory Drones volunteer project. Access to it is closed and is only available to military, rescuers, police and special services.

First, people go through theory online, take tests, and get a certificate. The course lasts four to five days. Next - practice at the training ground: work with walkie-talkies, drones, starlinks, software.

We teach how to use the entire ecosystem of technologies. 26,000 people are registered for the theory course. 7,000 military personnel went through the training," says Maria Berlinska, head of the Air Intelligence Support Center.

They "land" 99% of drones: the story of the creation of the Ukrainian anti-drone gun

Enemy radio-electronic warfare is one of the main reasons for the loss of copters, even by experienced pilots. The Russians are putting a lot of effort into preventing the use of drones along the entire front line.

Most often, they use jamming and GPS spoofing.

Jamming is aimed at the drone's loss of GPS navigation. Accordingly, the operator cannot track the location of the UAV on the map and is forced to fly manually. In this mode, the quadcopter is blown away by the wind, and the operator must constantly monitor that the device does not drift towards the enemy.

GPS spoofing is a more complex variant of electronic warfare. The drone begins to receive a simulated GPS signal that changes its geolocation. The device may think that it is too high, descend and hit the ground.

Katso liite: 73543
Ukrainian military monitors a quadcopter on a tablet in Bakhmut, January 27, 2023
GETTY IMAGES

Chinese DJI drones have the technical ability to receive the geolocation of the operator by third parties using AeroScope complexes . The Russians used them especially often at the beginning of the great war.

Special firmwares allow blocking the option, but they are not ideal.

Chinese drones at the service of the aggressor: how the manufacturer of quadcopters DJI can help the Russian Federation in the war

"There is also bad news: drones with new firmware are already being brought to the front, which cannot be hacked or changed normally. But we wouldn't be Ukrainians if we didn't figure out how to "fix" this problem.

People who transport and transfer drones to our military must check whether they are anonymized," Ristenko advises.

How many commercial drones are in the Armed Forces

Due to constant losses, it is impossible to determine the number of commercial drones in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In addition, these devices do not formally exist for the Ministry of Defense. "I don't have Maviks in my purchase, so you understand," Reznikov noted.

Drones are delivered, repaired and maintained by volunteers. Only the three largest funds in 2022 handed over 10,000 copters to the Ukrainian army.

However, this is clearly not enough. "Now the front needs at least 10,000 drones. Also, at least 30 drones are lost every day, which should be replenished. The volunteers themselves cannot meet these needs," says Berlinska.

Katso liite: 73544
Kuvatekstin Google Lens -käännös:

Katso liite: 73545

Alimman rivin teksti menee hieman sumpuksi, joten tässä se tekstimuodossa, artikkelin teksti jatkuu lainauksen jälkeen:

Armament
Not available
Anti-tank missiles and
aerial bombs
A came:
| Explosive charge,
MAM intelligent munitions
(long-range high-explosive
and
thermobaric anti-tank
missiles /UMTAS;
Roketsan Cirit missiles,
laser-guided rockets,
bombs;
modular munitions
equivalent to a 40-mm
grenade, for
the destruction of
light armored
vehicles and personnel
|Anti-tank
warhead or
anti-tank missile |
FGM-148 Javelin
| Not available


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Due to high demand, it is impossible to buy "maviks" in Ukraine or neighboring countries.

According to Berlinska, in the summer of 2022, the DJI company placed people in its European representative offices who create obstacles if they find out that drones are being bought for Ukraine. The expert calls the State Export Control Service the main obstacle on the part of Ukraine.

Although on January 4, the government simplified the rules for importing UAVs, canceling the requirement to provide end-user warranty letters, on January 17, the State Export Control Service announced the suspension of the conclusion regarding the classification of the DJI Mavic 3 as dual-use goods. That is, their import into the country is complicated by the need to obtain a permit from this service.

"The problem is that Ukraine does not produce high-precision technologies for the development of military unmanned technologies. Chips, optics, communication modules - we are dependent on everything. We only have UAV bodies. The same applies to land and water drones," he emphasizes Berlin

Are there alternatives to "maviks"

There is no direct alternative, competitor drones are inferior to DJI products. Both military and charitable foundations prefer the devices of this company. DJI Mavic 3 became the most popular in its class. The ratio of price and quality makes it irreplaceable for the Ukrainian army.

"Looking for drones around the world, we tried different options: American Skydio, French Parrot. They are an order of magnitude worse and more expensive. You pay five times more for an "American" or "French" and get a much worse drone in terms of technical characteristics." - explains Berlinska.

The Russians recognized the advantages of the Maviks. As one of the UAV pilots in the Armed Forces notes, the Russians are actively mastering these drones, constantly increasing their number. Ukrainian developers are starting to create drones to order, but it is impossible to compete in the niche of "maviks" without the appropriate resources and technologies.

FPV drones became one of the forms of adaptation to the demands of war. Their feature is that the operator does not use a tablet for control, but video glasses.

FPV drones are small, made mainly by artisanal methods. The price is about 500 dollars. Ukrainian engineers assemble them in military units. These drones are maneuverable, the speed reaches 200 km/h. They are suitable for chasing targets. They are difficult to detect and even more difficult to intercept. However, they are not suitable for observing and adjusting fire due to their short range and weak camera.


Commercial drones have become an integral part of warfare. They conduct reconnaissance, adjust artillery and destroy the enemy, so it is difficult to overestimate their effectiveness. If the state for certain reasons cannot purchase them on its own, then at least it can help volunteers.

Ukrainalaisen artikkelin kaveriksi sopii hyvin venäläisten näkemys "commercial drone" laitteesta eli väitetysti Lancet-itsemurhadronen sisuskaluista:


Elektroniikka ja mikrosirut eivät ole minun alaa, joten jätän arvailut muille. Poimin alle spoilerin taakse tämän viestin vastauksista "vakuuttavalta kuulostavat arvaukset", jos niistä olisi apua tunnistuksen kanssa:

Don't know about the chips but the battery is an industry standard 21700 cell you can purchase everywhere LÄHDE

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ohh, I thought its a 18650 battery LÄHDE

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Analog devices, NXP Semi, and Silicon Labs, so two Texas firms and one from the Netherlands. LÄHDE

Vastaus tähän: all can be bought by the drum in Shenzhen.

Johon alkuperäinen kirjoittaja vastasi: While you’re not wrong, they should still be sanctioned.

Vastaus: Technically they are but if you've been to places like Shenzhen you'd know why that's not possible.

Johon alkuperäinen kirjoittaja vastasi: Sure, but promise of no new contracts is a hefty weight. You might be able to make something, but you won’t be able to keep making it without some hefty capital.

Vastaus tähän: oh dude, I could walk into a building find a supplier and be out with a drum in under 30 minutes. I used to do it all the time when I taught there.

Johon alkuperäinen kirjoittaja vastasi: I can imagine. Each of these components would have been well traced in their production and test. The mechanisms are there is all I’m saying.

Vastaus tähän: You might trace it back to the factory but after that it'll change hands probably 20 times. The electronic market is about the size of the Las vegas strip filled with 30 story buildings. Each building and floor filled with different suppliers.

Johon alkuperäinen kirjoittaja vastasi: I think it’ll be a bit smaller in a couple decades.

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XE1205I074 UHF Transceiver from Semtech Corporation, a US company. LÄHDE

Looks like all parts from fairly common consumer-grade parts. Nothing super fancy. LÄHDE

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This looks like the comms board of the drone

The top two are XE1205I074's (obsolete RF transceivers by Semtech)

Bottom left is an ADM 3315E serial interface (by Analog Devices)

Bottom right is a Avago ALM 31122, a linear amplifier

LÄHDE

The second picture is the motor driver stage. It has a bunch of IRFH7085TRPBF mosfets.

Third picture has the main processor, a LPC2364FBD100 by NXP.

LÄHDE

Toisen kirjoittajan vastaus tähän: LÄHDE

Yup. In other words, like most drones - Extremely generic (for the most part) - Extremely cheap - Extremely easy to acquire in quantities ~1000 with pretty much no questions asked to a PO box in Tajikistan, drive over border to pick up, done.

1675428092890.png

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Alla olevan arvion lähde: LÄHDE

1675428173499.png

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Pic one is the transceiver board based 2XE1205I074TRLF and an Analog Devices 3315E serial converter. Both are simple and can be made by China. Pic 2 is just a MOSFET board for charging/discharging/balancing. Third is MM8803 GPS module. All drone stuff, nice looking boards too LÄHDE

Johon toinen vastasi: 1st & 3rd photo are the Flight Controller, just flipped upside down.

Toinen vastaus: Honestly I do not think it's the same board flipped. Look at the Pin positions, this would not work and the PCB seems also different.

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Kiinalaisen vastaus: The front of Figure 3 is the NXP CPU, and the entire surface is the smallest system of a single-chip microcomputer.

Figure 1 is the back of the same PCB.

The lower left corner is the serial port communication (can be changed to a simpler solution), and there are two identical UHF transmitters on it. .

Figure 2 is Infineon's MOS, which is used to drive the motor. The source of the analysis is the up master of bilibili @唐老师说电竞 LÄHDE

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Eri vastaus: I can’t find any evidence that Semtech or Analog Devices are fabricating chips in China. Do you know or was it an assumption? I wonder about NXP’s ARM microcontroller on the 3rd pic though. LÄHDE

Viestin vastauksissa oli lisää arvauksia, joten sieltä lukemaan.
 
Itse tätä sotaa katsellessani on tullut mieleen se että ehkä Venäjää vastaan perinteisemmät kiinteämmät linnoitteet valmisteltuine tykistön tuliasemineen yms. Vaalimaan ja Helsingin välillä voivat olla hyvä ratkaisu. Kattavan drone ilmatorjunnan kanssa, toki. Ryssät hidastetaan tykistöllä tuhottavaksi. Mannerheim-linja part 2?

Ryssän kyky käyttää ilmavoimiaan ja ilmasta laukaistavia täsmäaseita tuhoamaan linnoitteita ja tykistöä vaikuttaa heikolta. Varsinkin jos vastassa on meidän Hornetit/F-35:t ja ihan kohtalainen IT kyky.
No enpä tiedä, ehkä mieluummin kouluttaisi ukrainalaisille suomalaista liikkuvaa taistelutapaa ja syvää puolustusta. Nyt tiedetään varmuudella se mitä on ajateltukin eli, että venäläiset eivät edelleenkään kykene huoltamaan syvyyteen. Tuo linnoiteisiin jääminen ei tunnu hyvältä tavalta, johtaa vaan nyt nähtyyn sodankäyntitapaan jossa tulee valtavasti tappioita myös puolustajalle.

Tuliasemat on epäilemättä valmiiksi suunniteltu, ehkäpä jossain kriittisessä kohdassa myös valmisteltu ja myös linnoittamista joillain paikoilla on ainakin mietitty.Tästä oli juttua kesällä lehdissä. Meillä kuitenkin on tarkka tieto mihin hyökkäys pysäytetään ja tähän on valmistelevat toimenpiteet kyllä tehtynä. .
 
Ei millään pahalla, mutta nyt haiskahtaa taas "tiedämme mp.netissä kaiken paremmin". Sitkeä linnoitetuissa asemissa taistelu on toiminut ukrainalaisilla hyvin, miksi sitä tapaa pitäisi muuttaa. Se on huomattavasti fiksumpaa, kun alkaa siirtelemään joukkoja dronejen valvomalla arolla. Kaiken lisäksi tietäen, mitä ryssät tekevät valloittamillaan alueilla, kynnys ylimääräisesti luovuttaa alueita on ymmärrettävästi suuri. Kaikki kuitenkin pitää vielä valloittaa takaisin.

Toinen täydellinen idiotismi, mitä täälä saa aina lukea on arvostelu, kun tykistö ei vaihda asemia tarpeeksi. Varmaan ukrainalaisilla on jokin käsitys, miksi tykit ovat olleet joissain videoissa samoissa asemissa. Äkkiseltään ajateltuna kapeiden metsäkaistaleiden halkomalla peltomaisemalla talvella jokaisesta siirtymisestä jää jäljet maastoon, mikä helpottaa droneilla tehtävää tiedustelua todella paljon. Joskus yksinkertaisesti aseman vaihtaminen useasti ei ole fiksuinta.

Kolmas teesi tuntuu olevan se, että rintamalla tapahtuu vain se mitä videoissa näkyy. Videot useimmiten tulevat ns. toisen luokan joukoilta. Jos jostain asejärjestelmästä ei tule videoita, on järjestelmä turha. Joku pari päivää sitten analysoi hyvin brimstone ohjuksia ja ryssien tutkaheijastimia. Eipä näistä ole tullut liiemmin videoita, mutta jonkin takia noita tutkaheijastimia on laitettu.
 
Aikaisemmassa viestissä oli ukrainalaisten näkemys wagnerilaisten hyökkäystaktiikasta sekä kuvaus menetelmistä, joilla se torjuntaan.

Tässä viestissä on kuvailtu wagnerilaisten taktiikkaa, mutta nyt lähde on venäläinen kanava.


Lainaan alle koko ketjun tekstin:

The Wagner Group's 'human wave' attacks, which have left the area around Bakhmut and Soledar strewn with the bodies of dead Wagner fighters, have been described in detail by a Russian source. It explains the brutal calculations behind Wagner's seemingly suicidal tactics.

The 'Russian Criminal' website, which is linked to the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel, reports what a source – likely within Wagner – has told it about the mercenary group's approach to using recruited convicts to attack Soledar, sustaining huge casualties along the way.

"The most experienced and well-prepared group of stormtroopers comes first, with excellent equipment. It's comprised of eight men, each with a 'Bumblebee' [possibly meaning an RPO-A Shmel thermobaric rocket launcher, effective against fortified positions].

"Whatever happens, the group must reach the firing line. "Whatever happens" is not a turn of phrase, but a task, the failure to complete which will end in execution [by Wagner], regardless of any [mitigating] factors.

"Once fire contact has been made [with the enemy], the group digs into positions. Digging in is taught as meticulously as combat operations, so by military standards, digging in is almost instantaneous and very effective.

"The area the group has reached is marked (a rag on a tree or something similar). Even if the group is demolished to zero, the next one already realises where the previous one has reached. The main task is to make contact, dig in and transfer positional data to the artillery.

"Artillery can fire from an hour to several hours. And here is the first cause of conflict with the [Russian] army: if there are not enough shells, instead of a successful attack you get hopeless meat from the stormtroopers.

"The first group is followed by the second, also eight men, but with much lighter equipment. Their task is to jump into the positions as soon as the artillery shells finish their work.

"Sometimes there is an order not to wait for the shelling to end – the 'Musicians' are so disciplined that they will go anyway, because they stand a fighting chance of surviving.

"Nowadays there are not enough shells and because of that the first groups hardly survive – the main blow is coming at them and even training does not solve all the problems there.

"Even before, losses in the first group were inevitable, but now the survivability of groups as a whole has fallen to critical values. And to replace them with just anyone increases costs even more, and the influx of people has now collapsed.

"Groups of 8 people go in waves - usually 4 waves are prepared for the attack. But there have been cases in Soledar where it took 14 waves to take one area. Of course there were survivors, but the casualties were a hundred or more. That's for one section.

"Groups have drone operators to lead the whole group into position to clear the area. At the same time, the lightly wounded do not slouch and do not lie down – for that, they could shoot you in the legs and leave behind.

"This tactic is the only possible way to achieve results and advance in such conditions. The line of defense in Soledar has been cleverly constructed for years, the army command has neither the possibility nor the desire to advance there.

"That's basically why the task was handed to Wagner.

From the outside, it may look unreasonable to take such a high casualty rate deliberately, but try to look at it in a different way: even 4 waves of 8 men – that is 32 men killed at the worst.

"Throw in even a regiment – they will lose much more and even they will fail to cope with the task. In percentage terms they will lose less, but in absolute numbers, more. Therefore losses of over 50% for an attack are not bad, if there is a result.

"There is much less manpower for assault groups now, shells are also in short supply. And if the artillery is suppressed, then no one will call the stormtroopers back anyway, they just mop up without cover.

"If there are more groups in reserve, you can send in 5, and 6, and 7 waves, just to finish the result. This is not an army, here it is better to have more initiative than to underdo it.

"The 'Musicians' have their own training – with a crazy intensity, if you are without experience – but they teach a very narrow range of tasks.

"And the newcomers from the penal colonies are very well disciplined: first they are shown video executions, then very soon they encounter their first real examples, and then they get used to such discipline completely.

"Another plus from this [in contrast to the Russian army] is that it is not the practice in Wagner to reassign those [qualified as] artillery gunners to the stormtroopers, unless as punishment. Good gunners are also worth their weight in gold.

"The army will not be able to replace Wagner in hot areas, this is not even considered. In modern warfare, the number of soldiers is not an indicator at all. But, again, the question remains open – what to do about the shortage of shells (120 and 80 mm)?

"There is a concept of "efficiency relative to the situation", and so this efficiency can be high, but if the situation is deadlocked, then the main issue is still not resolved.

"Exchanging people for territory is beneficial when the territory is small and people in reserve are plentiful. If, on the other hand, you have to chop for every metre and people have become scarce, problems begin to arise.

"As a result, losses are growing and progress slows down. The recruitment of convicts at first gave a full-flowing river of people, now they are gone. At the beginning of the war there was talk of Syrian mercenaries, some even came. But they are not fit for this war.

"Among the 'Musicians' they say aloud that "we're about to put the squeeze on and take everything here." But among themselves, everyone expects that we will be removed from the assault on a number of directions.

"And even if a large mobilisation begins right tomorrow, it will not be possible to immediately recruit refuseniks in the required numbers, but they still need to be run in, brought to the desired condition, …

"because otherwise it will not even be possible to spend them effectively. It takes time, it takes a lot of shells. And we have neither one nor the other."

Source: https://rucriminal.info/ru/material/idushhie-na-smert
Järjetöntä menoa. Tuon selostuksen perusteella venäläisten moninkertaiset tappioluvut Bakhmutissa on aivan todennäköisiä. Lisänä vielä Wagnerin takaportaassa ampumat omat miehet.

Onko nojatuoleissa ajatuksia miten vastata Wagnerin taktiikkaan? Vetäytyminen pois krh/tykistötulen alta ja panssaroitu vastahyökkäys ei kai ole aina vaihtoehtona.

Vastatykistötutkat ja ampuvien aseiden määrätietoinen metsästys vastatykistöllä ja drooneilla saattaisi sekin toimia.
 
Ei millään pahalla, mutta nyt haiskahtaa taas "tiedämme mp.netissä kaiken paremmin". Sitkeä linnoitetuissa asemissa taistelu on toiminut ukrainalaisilla hyvin, miksi sitä tapaa pitäisi muuttaa. Se on huomattavasti fiksumpaa, kun alkaa siirtelemään joukkoja dronejen valvomalla arolla. Kaiken lisäksi tietäen, mitä ryssät tekevät valloittamillaan alueilla, kynnys ylimääräisesti luovuttaa alueita on ymmärrettävästi suuri. Kaikki kuitenkin pitää vielä valloittaa takaisin.

Toinen täydellinen idiotismi, mitä täälä saa aina lukea on arvostelu, kun tykistö ei vaihda asemia tarpeeksi. Varmaan ukrainalaisilla on jokin käsitys, miksi tykit ovat olleet joissain videoissa samoissa asemissa. Äkkiseltään ajateltuna kapeiden metsäkaistaleiden halkomalla peltomaisemalla talvella jokaisesta siirtymisestä jää jäljet maastoon, mikä helpottaa droneilla tehtävää tiedustelua todella paljon. Joskus yksinkertaisesti aseman vaihtaminen useasti ei ole fiksuinta.

Kolmas teesi tuntuu olevan se, että rintamalla tapahtuu vain se mitä videoissa näkyy. Videot useimmiten tulevat ns. toisen luokan joukoilta. Jos jostain asejärjestelmästä ei tule videoita, on järjestelmä turha. Joku pari päivää sitten analysoi hyvin brimstone ohjuksia ja ryssien tutkaheijastimia. Eipä näistä ole tullut liiemmin videoita, mutta jonkin takia noita tutkaheijastimia on laitettu.
Mehän emme tiedä onko tuo jäykkä puolustus Ukrainan ainoa vaihtoehto ja kuinka paljon tappioita se tuottaa heille.
 
Järjetöntä menoa. Tuon selostuksen perusteella venäläisten moninkertaiset tappioluvut Bakhmutissa on aivan todennäköisiä. Lisänä vielä Wagnerin takaportaassa ampumat omat miehet.

Onko nojatuoleissa ajatuksia miten vastata Wagnerin taktiikkaan? Vetäytyminen pois krh/tykistötulen alta ja panssaroitu vastahyökkäys ei kai ole aina vaihtoehtona.

Vastatykistötutkat ja ampuvien aseiden määrätietoinen metsästys vastatykistöllä ja drooneilla saattaisi sekin toimia.

Lainasin omassa viestissäni (tarkoitan sitä johon viittasit viestissäsi) aikaisempaa viestiäni, jossa ukrainalaiset kertoivat tästä wagnerilaisten taktiikasta. Siinä oli myös heidän näkemyksensä siitä, mikä toimii tätä vastaan. Lainaan sen suomennoksen alle, tämä on siitä aikaisemmasta viestistäni. Käännös on minun joten sen englanninkielisen version voi lukea linkin takaa, alla olevassa suomennoksessa on lisäksi minun silloisia kommentteja ja ajatuksia mitä nämä opit herättivät: LINKKI

Suomennan alle osuuden jossa käsitellään "kuinka taistella tällaista vastaan" (kirjoittaja painottaa että nämä opit eivät ole hänen keksimiään vaan hän siteeraa alueella taistelevaa upseeria):

- pitäisi olla kevyitä panssarijoukkoja lyhyen etäisyyden päässä linjasta. Heti kun drone-operaattori havaitsee tällaisen hyökkäyksen, se antaa hälytyksen näille panssarijoukoille jotka ajavat torjumaan hyökkäyksen. Jopa konekiväärituli (oletan silti että tarkka ja runsas) riittää pysäyttämään (käyttää sanaa suppress joka ei suoraan tarkoita tappamista) hyökkäyksen MUTTA jos tällaisia panssarijoukkoja ei ole, tällaisen hyökkäyksen torjunta on vaikeaa (oletan että asemia puolustavan jalkaväen tulivoima ei riitä JA runsas, kohtuu tarkka kranaatinheitintuli on iso ongelma vaikka olisikin juoksuhaudassa tai poteroissa)

- taistelijoiden tulisi olla valmiit tulitaisteluihin lyhyillä etäisyyksillä

- yksi syy tällaisten taktiikoiden onnistumiseen voi olla Ukrainan rajallinen vastatykistötuli tällä alueella. Ukrainan tykistö iskee hyökkäävää joukkoa vastaan, kun pitäisi (kirjoituksen mukaan) iskeä omia puolustusasemia vastaan hyökkääviä heittimiä vastaan. Jos hyökkääjä ei saa heittimiltä tukea, wagnerilaisten hyökkäys tukehtuu.

- tehokasta vastatykistötoimintaa varten täytyy olla suuri määrä droneja ja niiden lennättäjiä (minun kommentit: tässäkin minun mielestä korostuvat lyhyet taisteluetäisyydet sekä heitinten käyttö: dronella tuskin nähdään 10-12 km tai kauempaa ampuvaa tykistöä mutta 82mm ja 120mm heittimet voidaan nähdä ja paikallistaa. Oletan että maasto ja koordinaatit ovat selvillä joten dronen lennättäjä kykenisi melko nopeasti ohjaamaan omien heittimien ja tykistön tulen vihollisen asemiin. Tässä tapauksessa siis kun puhutaan "vastatykistötulesta" niin ei tarkoiteta vastatykistötutkia yms. vaan yksinkertaisempia menetelmiä (tutkista varmasti olisi hyötyä, en kiistä sitä).

-


Kuten näkyy, melkolailla samoja ajatuksia kuten sinullakin. Pitäisi iskeä hyökkääjää tukevia kranaatinheittimiä vastaan, mikä vaatii droneja jotta ne voidaan paikallistaa nopeasti. Sen lisäksi nopeasti panssaroituja ajoneuvoja tukemaan puolustajia. Tässä kelpaa jopa kevyemmin panssaroitu ja aseistettu vaunu, ilmeisesti wagnerilaisilla ei ole kummoisia pst-aseita mukana kun hyökkäävät. Kun hyökkäystä tukevat kranaatinheittimet on hiljennetty, ei ole kuin pienissä ryhmissä hyökkäävä kevyt jalkaväki jäljellä. Tämä pitää nitistää runsaalla tulenkäytöllä JA omien joukkojen pitää varautua siihen että tulitaistelut käydään hyvin lyhyillä etäisyyksillä.

MUOKKAUS: ukrainalaisilta on kuulunut että ovat käyttäneet jopa M113 vaunuja konekivääreillä aseistettuina tällaisten hyökkäysten torjunnassa. Yhdellä videolla jota Pekka Toverikin lainasi oli tällaisen vaunun ja T-64 tai T-72 panssarivaunun parina suorittama vastahyökkäys. Oletan että jopa M113 konekiväärillä puree hyvin tällaiseen wagnerilaisten hyökkäykseen, koska heillä ei ole pst-aseita mukanaan ja M113 vaunun panssarointi suojaa luodeilta ja kevyiltä sirpaleilta (tosin ehkä ei 120mm kranaatin suoralta osumalta?). Vaunun miehistö on siis melko hyvin suojattu, vaikka wagnerilaisia tukevat heittimet yrittäisivät tuhota vaunua (samalla kun puolustajan heittimet iskevät vihollisen heittimiä vastaan).
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Tähänkin löytyy varmasti lääkkeitä ystäviltämme. Ehkä nyt hetken vielä koetamme tulla toimeen, vastaiskun paikka on myöhemmin. Pietarin lentokentät ovat kuitenkin sen verran lähellä, että sinne asti varmasti voimme vaikuttaa. Ja Viron puolelta myös.
Duoda duoda... epäilempä, ettei Suomalainen moraali ei anna myöden. Emme lähde kilpalaulantaan ryssien kanssa! Itse asiassa tämän case:n tutkinta yms. antaa viitteitä siitä. Ongelman aiheuttajanhan tietävät kaikki, niin viranomaiset kuin rahvaskin. MUTTA virallisesti syypäätä ei ole julkaistu.... vaietaan...
 
BMPT-vaunuista on kuultu ja nähty yllättävän vähän materiaalia. Tässä väitetysti Kreminnan suunnalta, tosin näinköhän ampuu oikeita kohteita vai onko ainoastaan kuvattu mainosvideo:

RUS tank support vehicle Terminator (BMPT) on a tank chassis in the Kreminna district. Contrary to the popular internet opinion suggesting 'lack of success and disappearance', BMPTs are used in combat groups together with tanks.


Näiden hyödyllisyydestä on väitelty ensimmäisten rakentamisesta asti. Väitetysti kehitettiin toimimaan erityisesti kaupungeissa ja idea perustui Tsetsenian sodista saatuihin kokemuksiin. Jalkaväen tulitukivaunu, hieman sama ajatus näkyy jenkkien uudessa "kevyessä panssarivaunussa" MPF tosin se on suurempi ja siinä on 105mm tykki.

Aina kun nämä tulevat puheeksi, ei voi olla muistelematta Panzer IV alkuperäistä käyttötarkoitusta eli pieni haupitsi jolla tuhottiin konekivääripesäkkeitä, bunkkereita sekä muuta jalkaväen hyökkäyksen tukena. Toisaalta samaan hengenvetoon ei voi olla mainitsematta että nämä vaunut jäivät pikkuhiljaa syrjään, kun kävi selväksi että jokaisen vaunun tulisi kyetä toimimaan panssarivaunuja vastaan. Panzer IV jatkoi toki uraansa koko toisen maailmansodan ajan, mutta tykki vaihtui pidempään (suurempi lähtönopeus jotta puree paremmin panssarivaunuihin).

Sanoisin että tällainen tarve ei ole missään nimessä poistunut ja jos lukee edellisen viestin kuvauksen, niin ukrainalaisten kertomana puolustuksessa tarvitaan myös nopeasti avuksi saapuvia vaunuja - tosin heidän mukaansa Wagnerin jalkaväkihyökkäyksiä vastaan riittää vaunu konekiväärillä.

Mistä päästään takaisin alkuperäiseen aiheeseen eli BMPT: miksi rakentaa tällaista vaunua JOS voi samaan aikaan rakentaa IFV-vaunun? Siitä tulee tietysti tilavuudeltaan suurempi, mutta kyky kuljettaa jalkaväkeä panssarikuoren sisällä olisi plussaa. Toisaalta IFV-vaunun käyttö lähipuolustukseen tuntuu tällaisen vaunun tuhlaukselta: sen pitäisi olla osana mekanisoitua pumppua operoimassa vihollisen vastaavia joukkoja vastaan tai hakemassa läpimurtoa.

BMPT tapauksessa on tietysti selvää että ryssällä oli T-72 aihioita varastossa runsaat määrät joten vaihdetaan tornin tilalle tällainen viritys, niin saadaan halvahkosti tulitukivaunu aikaiseksi. Toisaalta hekään eivät (minun muistelun mukaan) ole tilanneet näitä suuria määriä enkä edes muista miten nämä on sijoitettu osaksi organisaatiota. Toimivatko suunnitelman mukaan yhdessä panssarivaunujen kanssa vai miten näitä oli tarkoitus käyttää?
Nostin uudestaan vanhan viestin, johon jo aiemmin yritin vastata. Uusimmassa (julkisessa) Armor Magazinessa on artikkeli BMPTn ajatellusta käytöstä venäjän armeijassa. Artikkeli vahvisti käsitystä siitä, että BMPT on nimenomaan panssarivaunuyksiköiden tukivaunu. BMPTn (vähäistä) käyttöä Ukrainassa käsitellään lyhyesti. Lehti löytyy googlaamalla "Armor Magazine, current issue" (Fall 2022)
 
Aikaisemmassa viestissä oli ukrainalaisten näkemys wagnerilaisten hyökkäystaktiikasta sekä kuvaus menetelmistä, joilla se torjuntaan.

Tässä viestissä on kuvailtu wagnerilaisten taktiikkaa, mutta nyt lähde on venäläinen kanava.


Lainaan alle koko ketjun tekstin:

The Wagner Group's 'human wave' attacks, which have left the area around Bakhmut and Soledar strewn with the bodies of dead Wagner fighters, have been described in detail by a Russian source. It explains the brutal calculations behind Wagner's seemingly suicidal tactics.

The 'Russian Criminal' website, which is linked to the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel, reports what a source – likely within Wagner – has told it about the mercenary group's approach to using recruited convicts to attack Soledar, sustaining huge casualties along the way.

"The most experienced and well-prepared group of stormtroopers comes first, with excellent equipment. It's comprised of eight men, each with a 'Bumblebee' [possibly meaning an RPO-A Shmel thermobaric rocket launcher, effective against fortified positions].

"Whatever happens, the group must reach the firing line. "Whatever happens" is not a turn of phrase, but a task, the failure to complete which will end in execution [by Wagner], regardless of any [mitigating] factors.

"Once fire contact has been made [with the enemy], the group digs into positions. Digging in is taught as meticulously as combat operations, so by military standards, digging in is almost instantaneous and very effective.

"The area the group has reached is marked (a rag on a tree or something similar). Even if the group is demolished to zero, the next one already realises where the previous one has reached. The main task is to make contact, dig in and transfer positional data to the artillery.

"Artillery can fire from an hour to several hours. And here is the first cause of conflict with the [Russian] army: if there are not enough shells, instead of a successful attack you get hopeless meat from the stormtroopers.

"The first group is followed by the second, also eight men, but with much lighter equipment. Their task is to jump into the positions as soon as the artillery shells finish their work.

"Sometimes there is an order not to wait for the shelling to end – the 'Musicians' are so disciplined that they will go anyway, because they stand a fighting chance of surviving.

"Nowadays there are not enough shells and because of that the first groups hardly survive – the main blow is coming at them and even training does not solve all the problems there.

"Even before, losses in the first group were inevitable, but now the survivability of groups as a whole has fallen to critical values. And to replace them with just anyone increases costs even more, and the influx of people has now collapsed.

"Groups of 8 people go in waves - usually 4 waves are prepared for the attack. But there have been cases in Soledar where it took 14 waves to take one area. Of course there were survivors, but the casualties were a hundred or more. That's for one section.

"Groups have drone operators to lead the whole group into position to clear the area. At the same time, the lightly wounded do not slouch and do not lie down – for that, they could shoot you in the legs and leave behind.

"This tactic is the only possible way to achieve results and advance in such conditions. The line of defense in Soledar has been cleverly constructed for years, the army command has neither the possibility nor the desire to advance there.

"That's basically why the task was handed to Wagner.

From the outside, it may look unreasonable to take such a high casualty rate deliberately, but try to look at it in a different way: even 4 waves of 8 men – that is 32 men killed at the worst.

"Throw in even a regiment – they will lose much more and even they will fail to cope with the task. In percentage terms they will lose less, but in absolute numbers, more. Therefore losses of over 50% for an attack are not bad, if there is a result.

"There is much less manpower for assault groups now, shells are also in short supply. And if the artillery is suppressed, then no one will call the stormtroopers back anyway, they just mop up without cover.

"If there are more groups in reserve, you can send in 5, and 6, and 7 waves, just to finish the result. This is not an army, here it is better to have more initiative than to underdo it.

"The 'Musicians' have their own training – with a crazy intensity, if you are without experience – but they teach a very narrow range of tasks.

"And the newcomers from the penal colonies are very well disciplined: first they are shown video executions, then very soon they encounter their first real examples, and then they get used to such discipline completely.

"Another plus from this [in contrast to the Russian army] is that it is not the practice in Wagner to reassign those [qualified as] artillery gunners to the stormtroopers, unless as punishment. Good gunners are also worth their weight in gold.

"The army will not be able to replace Wagner in hot areas, this is not even considered. In modern warfare, the number of soldiers is not an indicator at all. But, again, the question remains open – what to do about the shortage of shells (120 and 80 mm)?

"There is a concept of "efficiency relative to the situation", and so this efficiency can be high, but if the situation is deadlocked, then the main issue is still not resolved.

"Exchanging people for territory is beneficial when the territory is small and people in reserve are plentiful. If, on the other hand, you have to chop for every metre and people have become scarce, problems begin to arise.

"As a result, losses are growing and progress slows down. The recruitment of convicts at first gave a full-flowing river of people, now they are gone. At the beginning of the war there was talk of Syrian mercenaries, some even came. But they are not fit for this war.

"Among the 'Musicians' they say aloud that "we're about to put the squeeze on and take everything here." But among themselves, everyone expects that we will be removed from the assault on a number of directions.

"And even if a large mobilisation begins right tomorrow, it will not be possible to immediately recruit refuseniks in the required numbers, but they still need to be run in, brought to the desired condition, …

"because otherwise it will not even be possible to spend them effectively. It takes time, it takes a lot of shells. And we have neither one nor the other."

Source: https://rucriminal.info/ru/material/idushhie-na-smert
Mielenkiintoista. Sinänsä konseptissa ei ole mitään uutta, vaan jo vanha kunnon Saksan armeija toteutti tätä onnistuneesti ensimmäisessä maailmansodassa. Eniten huomiota herättää tuo kaavamaisuus ja "jauhaminen", eli tuon mukaan ei juurikaan reagoida tilanteeseen, vaan ainoastaan syötetään noin 8-miehisiä iskuryhmiä niin kauan, että saadaan maastovoitto aikaiseksi. Ei jumalauta. Tylyä ja typerää, etenkin nuo itsemurhatehtävät, mutta ryssällä on varaa noihin tappioihin. Paitsi tietysti yhtenä isona ongelmana on, että ne parhaiten koulutetut ja varustetut sekä motivoituneimmat yksilöt ja yksiköt kuluvat nopeasti noissa kärkiosastoissa.

Jälleen kerran tulee ajatelleeksi, että olisipa Ukrainalla riittävästi epäreilun kranaatteja käytössään.

Muoks.
Poistetaan Wehrmacht lähdöstä toimimattomana.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Talteen tämäkin, mielenkiintoinen kirjoitus "palkkasotilaiden" paluusta kylvämään tuhoa, ryöstöjä. murhia, raiskauksia. Nostona näiden suuri määrä ja huomio että näitä on monella oligarkilla ja mafiosolla mitä ovatkaan varalla, jos valtataistelu puhkeaa Venäjällä.

Itäinen naapurimme on kyllä potentiaalisesti kohta sellainen roistovaltio, että toivottavasti ne raja-aidat saadaan nopeasti pystyyn...


 
Kas, Lawrence Freedmanilta myös tuore artikkeli, pohdintaa miten tulevat offensiivit pelimerkkeineen voisivat tapahtua. Lukusuositus tällekin kokonaisuudessaan, ilman sen kummempia nostoja.

 
Väitetysti Ukrainan käyttämistä etämiinoitteista:



The post also says that UR-77 are not that effective and there are instances when they don't detonate properly. He says mine rollers are most effective, but that tankers don't like using them and that there were abandoned rollers on most streets in Popasna over the summer. 4/

It also says that Rustam Muradov is stopping soldiers from wearing multicam uniforms but hasn't learned any lessons from the costly storming of Pavlivka in November. 5/

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UR-77 on siis tämä laite, jossa ammutaan raketillä "räjähdenauha" joka sitten räjäyttää jonkinlaisen "aukon":

1676128431610.png

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Rob Lee viittaa tässä Necro Mancer -nimiseen tiliin, tässä sen postittamien kuvien tekstin käännökset:

1676128194184.png

1676128215458.png

1676128236252.png

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Necro Mancerilta kysyttiin viestin kommenteissa: Where to read them?

Hänen vastaus tähän: LÄHDE

https://lostarmour.info/svo

https://lostarmour.info/map

there are other sections there, but now I usually screenshot from these
 
Pitkä ja perusteellinen artikkeli Venäjän hyökkäyksestä ja sen epäonnistumisista ja siitä mitä ovat ottaneet opiksi. Ei ollut ainakaan itselläni maksumuurin takana.


Ei näytä olevan maksumuurin takana (ainakaan toistaiseksi) mutta otan tekstin varalta talteen, tässä ensimmäinen puolikas: LÄHDE

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukra...rong-moscow-failures-in-ukraine-dara-massicot

What Russia Got Wrong​

Can Moscow Learn From Its Failures in Ukraine?​

By Dara Massicot

March/April 2023

Three months before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, CIA Director William Burns and U.S. Ambassador to Russia John Sullivan met in Moscow with Nikolai Patrushev, an ultra-hawkish adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Burns and Sullivan informed Patrushev that they knew of Russia’s invasion plans and that the West would respond with severe consequences if Russia proceeded. According to Burns, Patrushev said nothing about the invasion. Instead, he looked them in the eye, conveying what Burns took as a message: the Russian military could achieve what it wanted.

Once home, the two Americans informed U.S. President Joe Biden that Moscow had made up its mind. Not long after, Washington began publicly warning the world that Russia would attack Ukraine. Three months ahead of the invasion, the Kremlin knew that the United States had discovered its war plans and that the world would be primed for an assault—yet Putin decided to deny his intentions to Russia’s own troops and most of its senior leaders. They did not learn of the invasion until several days or even hours before it began. The secrecy was a mistake. By orchestrating the attack with just a small group of advisers, Putin undercut many of the advantages his country should have had.

These strengths were substantial. Before the invasion, Russia’s military was larger and better equipped than Ukraine’s. Its forces had more combat experience than did Kyiv’s, even though both had fought in Ukraine’s eastern territories. Most Western analysts therefore assumed that if Russian forces used their advantages wisely, the Ukrainians could not withstand the attack for long.

Why Russia did not prevail—why it was instead stopped in its tracks, routed outside major cities, and put on the defensive—has become one of the most important questions in both U.S. foreign policy and international security more broadly. The answer has many components. The excessive internal secrecy gave troops and commanders little time to prepare, leading to heavy losses. Russia created an invasion plan that was riddled with faulty assumptions, arbitrary political guidance, and planning errors that departed from key Russian military principles. The initial invasion called for multiple lines of attack with no follow-on force, tethering the military to operational objectives that were overly ambitious for the size of its forces. And the Kremlin erroneously believed that its war plans were sound, that Ukraine would not put up much resistance, and that the West’s support would not be strong enough to make a difference. As a result, Russia was shocked when its troops ran into a determined Ukraine backed by Western intelligence and weapons. Russian forces were then repeatedly beaten.

But as the war drags on into its second year, analysts must not focus only on Russia’s failures. The story of Russia’s military performance is far more nuanced than many early narratives about the war have suggested. The Russian armed forces are not wholly incompetent or incapable of learning. They can execute some types of complex operations—such as mass strikes that disable Ukraine’s critical infrastructure—which they had eschewed during the first part of the invasion, when Moscow hoped to capture the Ukrainian state largely intact. The Russian military has learned from its mistakes and made big adjustments, such as downsizing its objectives and mobilizing new personnel, as well as tactical ones, such as using electronic warfare tools that jam Ukrainian military communications without affecting its own. Russian forces can also sustain higher combat intensity than most other militaries; as of December, they were firing an impressive 20,000 rounds of artillery per day or more (although, according to CNN, in early 2023, that figure had dropped to 5,000). And they have been operating with more consistency and stability since shifting to the defensive in late 2022, making it harder for Ukrainian troops to advance.

Russia has still not been able to break Ukraine’s will to fight or impede the West’s materiel and intelligence support. It is unlikely to achieve its initial goal of turning Ukraine into a puppet state. But it could continue to adjust its strategy and solidify its occupied holdings in the south and east, eventually snatching a diminished variant of victory from the jaws of defeat.

TOO MUCH AND NOT ENOUGH​

Before the war in Ukraine began, the Russian military had several known structural problems, each of which undermined its ability to conduct a large invasion. Over a decade ago, Moscow deliberately dismantled its army and turned it into a smaller force designed for rapid response operations. The transformation required massive changes. After World War II, the Soviet Union maintained an enormous force designed to wage protracted, vast conflicts in Europe by conscripting millions of soldiers and creating a huge defense industry to menace NATO and enforce communist rule in allied states. The Soviet military suffered from endemic corruption, and it struggled to produce equipment on par with the West’s. But its size and sprawling footprint made it a formidable Cold War challenge.

When the Soviet regime collapsed, Russian leaders could not manage or justify such a large military. The prospect of a land battle with NATO was fading into the past. In response, starting in the early 1990s, Russia’s leaders began a reform and modernization process. The goal was to create a military that would be smaller but more professional and nimble, ready to quickly suppress flare-ups on Russia’s periphery.

This process continued, on and off, into the new millennium. In 2008, the Russian military announced a comprehensive reform program called “New Look” that intended to restructure the force by disbanding units, retiring officers, overhauling training programs and military education, and allocating more funds—including to expand the ranks of professional enlisted soldiers and to acquire newer weapons. As part of this process, Russia replaced sizable Soviet divisions designed to fight major land wars with less-cumbersome brigades and battalion tactical groups (BTGs). Moscow also worked to reduce its dependence on conscripts.

By 2020, it seemed as if the military had met many of its benchmarks. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu declared that 70 percent of his country’s equipment was new or had been modernized. The country had a growing arsenal of conventional precision munitions, and the military possessed more professional enlisted personnel than conscripts. Russia had conducted two successful operations, one in Syria—to prop up the regime of Bashar al-Assad—and another to take territory in eastern Ukraine.

But the 2022 wholesale invasion of Ukraine exposed these reforms as insufficient. The modernization effort neglected, for example, the mobilization system. Russia’s attempts to build better weapons and improve training did not translate into increased proficiency on the battlefield. Some of the ostensibly new gear that left Russian factories is seriously flawed. Russia’s missile failure rates are high, and many of its tanks lack proper self-defense equipment, making them highly vulnerable to antitank weapons. Meanwhile, there is little evidence that Russia modified its training programs ahead of its February 2022 invasion to prepare troops for the tasks they would later face in Ukraine. In fact, the steps Russia did take to prepare made proper training more difficult. By deploying many units near the Ukrainian border almost a year before the war and keeping equipment in the field, the Russian military deprived its soldiers of the ability to practice appropriate skills and conduct required equipment maintenance.

Russia’s modernization efforts also failed to root out corruption, which still afflicts multiple aspects of Russian military life. The country’s armed forces frequently inflated the number of prewar personnel in individual units to meet recruiting quotas, allowing some commanders to steal surplus funds. The military is plagued by missing supplies. It generally has unreliable and opaque reporting up and down the command chain, which possibly led Russia’s leadership to believe its forces were better, quantitatively and qualitatively, than they really were at the start of the invasion.


A destroyed Russian tank outside Kherson, Ukraine, November 2022

A destroyed Russian tank outside Kherson, Ukraine, November 2022
Valentyn Ogirenko / Reuters


Modernization may have helped Russia in its smaller, 2014 invasion of Ukraine and its air campaigns in Syria. But it does not appear to have learned from its operational experience in either conflict. In both, for instance, Russia had many ground-based special forces teams to guide incoming strikes, something it has lacked in the current war. Russia also had a unified operational command, which it did not create for the current invasion until several months after it began.

In at least one case, the modernization effort was actively incompatible with high-intensity warfare. As part of its scheme to cultivate trust with the Russian population after its wars in Chechnya, the Kremlin largely prohibited new conscripts from serving in war zones. This meant that Russia pulled professional soldiers from most units across the country and deployed them as BTGs to staff its Ukraine invasion. The move was itself a questionable decision: even a fully staffed and equipped BTG is not capable of protracted, intense combat along an extended frontline, as many experts, including U.S. Army analysts Charles Bartles and Lester Grau, have noted. On top of that, according to documents recovered from the invasion by the Ukrainian military, plenty of these units were understaffed when they invaded Ukraine. Personnel shortages also meant that Russia’s technically more modern and capable equipment did not perform at its full potential, as many pieces were only partly crewed. And the country did not have enough dismounted infantry or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance forces to effectively clear routes and avoid ambushes.

The resulting failures may have surprised much of the world. But they did not come as a shock to many of the experts who watch the Russian military. They knew from assessing the country’s force structure that it was ill suited to send a force of 190,000 personnel into a large neighboring state across multiple lines of advance. They were therefore astonished as the Kremlin commanded the military to do exactly that.

GREAT EXPECTATIONS​

To understand how Russia’s bad planning undermined its performance and advantages, it is helpful to imagine how the invasion of Ukraine would have started if Moscow had followed its prescribed military strategy. According to Russian doctrine, an interstate war such as this one should begin with weeks of air and missile attacks against an enemy’s military and critical infrastructure during what strategists call “the initial period of war.” Russia’s planners consider this the decisive period of warfare, with air force operations and missile strikes, lasting between four and six weeks, designed to erode the opposing country’s military capabilities and capacity to resist. According to Russia’s theory, ground forces are typically deployed to secure objectives only after air forces and missile attacks have achieved many of their objectives.

The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) did conduct strikes against Ukrainian positions at the war’s beginning. But it did not systematically attack critical infrastructure, possibly because the Russians believed they would need to quickly administer Ukraine and wanted to keep its leadership facilities intact, its power grid online, and the Ukrainian population apathetic. Fatefully, the Russian military committed its ground troops on day one rather than waiting until it had managed to clear roads and suppress Ukrainian units. The result was catastrophic. Russian forces, rushing to meet what they believed were orders to arrive in certain areas by set times, overran their logistics and found themselves hemmed in to specific routes by Ukrainian units. They were then relentlessly bombarded by artillery and antiarmor weapons.

Moscow also decided to commit nearly all its professional ground and airborne forces to one multiaxis attack, counter to the Russian military’s tradition of keeping forces from Siberia and the Russian Far East as a second echelon or a strategic reserve. This decision made little military sense. By attempting to seize several parts of Ukraine simultaneously, Russia stretched its logistics and support systems to the breaking point. Had Russia launched air and missile strikes days or weeks before committing ground forces, attacked along a smaller frontline, and maintained a large reserve force, its invasion might have looked different. In this case, Russia would have had simpler logistics, concentrated fires, and reduced exposure for its advancing units. It might even have overwhelmed local groups of Ukrainian air defenses.

It is difficult to know exactly why Russia deviated so wildly from its military doctrine (and from common sense). But one reason seems clear: the Kremlin’s political interference. According to information obtained by reporters from The Washington Post, the war was planned only by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his closest confidants in the intelligence services, the armed forces, and the Kremlin. Based on these accounts, this team advocated for a rapid invasion on multiple fronts, a mad dash to Kyiv to neutralize Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky through assassination or kidnapping, and the installation of a network of collaborators who would administer a new government—steps that a broader, more experienced collection of planners might have explained would not work.

The Kremlin’s ideas were obviously ineffective. Yet it delayed important course corrections, likely because it believed they would be politically unpopular at home. For example, the Kremlin tried to entice ad hoc volunteers in the early summer to plug holes created by severe battlefield losses, but this effort attracted far too few personnel. Only after the September collapse of the military’s front in Kharkiv did Moscow order a mobilization. Later, the Kremlin did not allow a retreat from the city of Kherson until months after their positions became untenable, risking thousands of troops.

HOW RUSSIA PLAYED ITSELF​

Before and during wars, countries rely on operational security, or OPSEC, to keep crucial aspects of their plans secret and to reduce vulnerabilities for their own forces. In some cases, that entails deception. In World War II, for instance, the Allies stationed troops and decoys on a range of beaches in the southern United Kingdom to confuse the Nazis as to which location would be used to launch an attack. In other instances, OPSEC involves limiting the internal dissemination of war plans to lower the risk that they will go public. For example, in preparation for Operation Desert Storm, U.S. pilots who would later be assigned to eliminate Iraqi air defenses trained for months to conduct such strikes but were not told about their specific targets until days before the attack began.

The Kremlin’s war plans, of course, were made public months before the war. As a number of news outlets have reported, including The New York Times and The Washington Post, U.S. intelligence agencies uncovered detailed and accurate outlines of Russia’s plans and then shared them with the media, as well as with allies and partners. Rather than abort the invasion, the Kremlin insisted to journalists and diplomats that the large contingents of troops massed on Ukraine’s borders were there for training and that it had no intention of attacking its neighbor. These claims did not fool the West, but they did fool most Russians—including those in the armed forces. The Kremlin withheld its war plans from military stakeholders at many levels, from individual soldiers and pilots to general officers, and many troops and officials were surprised when they received orders to invade. A recent report by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a British defense and security think tank, which was based on extensive fieldwork and interviews with Ukrainian officials, found that even senior members of the Russian General Staff were kept in the dark about the invasion plans until shortly before it started.


In front of a Russian antiaircraft missile system in the Luhansk region, Ukraine, January 2023

In front of a Russian antiaircraft missile system in the Luhansk region, Ukraine, January 2023
Alexander Ermochenko / Reuters


Because most military leaders were not brought into the planning effort until the last minute, they could not correct major mistakes. The government did not appear to undergo what is referred to in Russian strategy as a “special period”—a time of categorizing, stockpiling, and organizing resources for a major war—because its planners did not know they needed to get ready for one. The excessive secrecy also meant that Moscow missed several key opportunities to prepare the defense industry to produce and store essential ammunition. Even after they were stationed near Ukraine, Russian units were not staffed or supplied at appropriate levels, likely because planners believed the troops were conducting training exercises. And because the military did not have time to coordinate its electronic warfare systems, when Russian forces attempted to jam Ukraine’s communications, they also jammed their own.

Prewar secrecy led to problems that were especially pronounced in the air. Before the invasion, Russian pilots had experience fighting in Syria, but operations there had taken place over uncontested territory, most often in the desert. The pilots had virtually no experience fighting over a larger, forested country, let alone against an adversary capable of hitting their jets with layers of air defenses. They were given little to no training in such tactics before the invasion. That inexperience is partly why, despite sometimes flying hundreds of missions per day, Russia has been unable to dismantle Ukraine’s air force or air defenses. Another factor was how Russia decided to employ its forces. Because Russia’s ground troops were in grave danger within days, the VKS was quickly reassigned from suppressing Ukrainian air defenses to providing close air support, according to RUSI analysis. This adjustment helped prevent Russia from establishing air supremacy, and it forced the Russians to fly at low altitudes, within reach of Ukraine’s Stinger missiles. As a result, they lost many helicopters and fighter jets.

Prewar secrecy and lies were not the only ways that the Kremlin played itself. Once troops began rushing toward Kyiv, Moscow could no longer deny the fact of its invasion. But for months, it continued to obscure the conflict or delay important decisions in ways that hurt its own operations. At a basic level, Russia has refused to classify the invasion as a war, instead calling it a “special military operation.” This decision, made either to mollify the Russian population or because the Kremlin assumed the conflict would end quickly, prevented the country from implementing administrative rules that would have allowed it to gain quick access to the legal, economic, and material resources it needed to support the invasion. For at least the first six months, the false classification also made it easy for soldiers to resign or refuse to fight without facing desertion charges.

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PAY NO HEED​

The Russian government appears to have assumed that the Ukrainians would not resist, that the Ukrainian army would fade away, and that the West would not be able to help Kyiv in time. These conclusions were not entirely unsupported. According to The Washington Post, the Russian intelligence services had their own prewar covert polling suggesting that only 48 percent of the population was “ready to defend” Ukraine. Zelensky’s approval rating was less than 30 percent on the eve of the war. Russia’s intelligence agencies had an extensive spy network inside Ukraine to set up a collaborationist government. (Ukraine later arrested and charged 651 people for treason and collaboration, including several officials in its security services.) Russian planners may also have assumed that Ukraine’s forces would not be ready because the Ukrainian government did not move to a war footing until a few weeks before the invasion. They likely thought that Ukraine’s artillery munitions would quickly run out. Based on the West’s response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its relatively small arms provisions during the run-up to the war in 2022, Moscow might reasonably have assumed that the United States and Europe would not provide major support for Ukraine, or at least not in time.

But the Kremlin was evaluating data points that simply allowed it to see what it wished to see. The same intelligence services poll, for instance, suggested that 84 percent of Ukrainian respondents would consider Russian forces to be occupiers, not liberators. The United States and its allies broadcast Russia’s plans and various attempts to generate a pretext for invasion, and they warned Russia privately and publicly that the country would face enormous repercussions if it started a war. Yet apparently, no one in Putin’s inner circle convinced him that he should revise Russia’s approach and prepare for a different, harder type of conflict: one in which Ukrainians fought back and received substantial Western assistance.

Such a conflict is exactly what happened. The Ukrainians rallied to defend their sovereignty, enlisting in the military and creating territorial defense units that have resisted the Russians. Zelensky, domestically unpopular before the invasion, saw his approval ratings skyrocket and became a globally recognized wartime leader. And the Ukrainian government succeeded in getting historic amounts of aid from the West. As of late January 2023, the United States has provided $26.8 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion, and European states have contributed billions more. The Ukrainians have been stocked with body armor, air defense systems, helicopters, M777 artillery, and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). They are receiving Western tanks. The massive and diverse weapons provisions enabled Ukrainian forces to gain a qualitative edge over Moscow’s troops in terms of battlefield awareness during Russia’s initial push to Kyiv, and it allowed Ukraine to conduct precision strikes on Russian logistics depots and command centers in its eastern regions.

Washington also began providing a stream of what U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks described as “vital” and “high-end” intelligence to Kyiv. The director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency claimed that intelligence sharing with Ukraine has been “revolutionary” in nature, and the director of the National Security Administration and U.S. Cyber Command testified that he had never seen a better example of intelligence sharing in his 35 years of government service. (According to the Pentagon, the United States does not provide intelligence on senior leader locations or participate in Ukrainian targeting decisions.)

This intelligence sharing has mattered at several pivotal points in the war. In congressional testimony, CIA director Burns said he informed Zelensky about the attack on Kyiv before the war, and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned Zelensky about Russian threats to him personally. These alerts gave Ukraine time to prepare a defense that was essential to protecting both the capital and Zelensky. According to senior defense officials, the United States also provided planning and war-gaming support for Ukraine’s September counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson, both of which ended with tremendous success.

THE BEAR IS LEARNING​

Ukraine’s supporters have had many reasons to celebrate in 2022, and joyful scenes have emerged from recently liberated Ukrainian land. But difficult scenes followed. Ukrainian and international investigators have uncovered evidence of war crimes in recently liberated cities such as Bucha, Izyum, and Kherson. And despite hopes to the contrary, it is too soon to say that Russia’s campaign will collapse. Putin is certainly digging in for the long haul, and although wounded, the Russian military is still capable of complex operations, adaptive learning, and withstanding a level of combat that few militaries in the world can. Sustained high-intensity, high-attrition combined-arms warfare is extraordinarily difficult, and Russia and Ukraine now have more recent experience with it than any other country in the world.

Take, for example, the VKS. Although its pilots have failed to suppress Ukraine’s air defenses, analysts must remember that such missions are notoriously time-consuming and difficult, as U.S. pilots have noted. The VKS is learning, and rather than continuing to waste aircraft by flying more-conservative and less-effective missions, it is trying to wear down Ukrainian air defenses by using empty Soviet-era missiles and Shaheed drones purchased from Iran.

The Russian military also appears to be getting better at performing one of the most dangerous army maneuvers of all: crossing rivers under fire. Such operations require planned withdrawals, discipline, force protection plans, and tight sequencing that few others demand. When these operations are executed poorly, many soldiers can die; in May 2022, the Ukrainian military destroyed a Russian BTG as it attempted to cross the Donets River. But the military’s November withdrawal across the Dnieper River was comparatively smooth, partly because it was better planned. Despite coming under artillery fire, thousands of Russian forces successfully retreated east.


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Russia has learned to correct for past mistakes in other areas, as well. In late spring, Russian forces finally succeeded in jamming Ukrainian communications without jamming their own. During September, the Kremlin declared a partial mobilization to compensate for personnel shortages, pulling 300,000 draftees into the armed forces. The process was chaotic, and these new soldiers have not received good training. But now, these new forces are inside eastern Ukraine, where they have shored up defensive positions and helped depleted units with basic but important tasks. The government is also incrementally putting the Russian economy on a wartime footing, helping the state get ready for a long conflict.

These modifications are starting to show results. Russia’s defense industrial base may be straining under sanctions and import restrictions, but its factories are intact and working around the clock to try to keep up with demand. Although Russia is running low on missiles, it has expanded its inventory by repurposing antiship cruise missiles and air-defense missiles. The Russian military has not yet improved its battle damage assessment process or its ability to strike moving targets, but it is now hitting Ukraine’s electrical grid with precision. As of January 2023, Russian strikes have damaged roughly 40 percent of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, at one point knocking out power for more than 10 million people.

The Ukrainians’ learning curve has also been steep, and through experimentation, they have been able to keep Russian forces off balance. The military has shown creativity in its planning, and it has hit Russian air bases and the Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine’s pilots and soldiers, like Russia’s, have garnered remarkable and unique combat experience. Ukraine has benefited more from external support than has Russia.

But Russian forces have successfully adapted and experimented as they have assumed a defensive posture. After weeks of devastating HIMARS attacks during the summer of 2022, Russia moved its command sites and many logistics depots out of range. Russian forces have shown more competence on the defensive than on the offensive, particularly in the south, where they created layered defenses that were difficult for Ukrainian forces to fight through. General Sergey Surovikin, who was named Russia’s overall commander in October, was previously the commander of the southern operational group, and he brought this experience to other regions that Russia partly occupies. Troops have dug extensive trenches and created other defensive positions.

Notably, Russia withdrew from the city of Kherson and transitioned to defense only after Surovikin was appointed as the war’s commander. Putin also began admitting that the conflict will be challenging once Surovikin assumed charge. These changes suggest that Putin may have received more realistic appraisals of the situation in Ukraine under Surovikin’s tenure.

Yet in January 2023, Surovikin was demoted in favor of General Valeriy Gerasimov. Although the reasons for this command change are unclear, palace intrigue and cronyism may be behind it rather than any specific failure of Surovikin’s leadership. And no Russian commander has been able to break Ukraine’s will to fight even though Russia continues to launch missiles that inflict suffering on the Ukrainian people. But the bombings and entrenchment may well degrade Ukraine’s capacity, making it harder for the country to reclaim more of its land.

KNOWN UNKNOWNS​

The Kremlin, however, aspires to do more than just hold the land it has already taken. Putin has made it clear that he wants all four provinces that Moscow illegally annexed in September—Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia—and in a televised meeting last December, he indicated that he is prepared to undergo “a long process” to get them. Putin’s downsized objectives and sudden candor about the campaign’s length show that the Kremlin can adapt to its weakened position and condition its population for a long war. Russia, then, is either evolving or buying time until it can regenerate its forces. The question is whether its changes will be enough.

There are reasons to think the shifts will not salvage the war for Russia, partly because so many things need to change; no single factor explains why the war has gone so poorly for Russia thus far. The explanations include problems that are not easy to address because they are intractable parts of the Russian system, such as the self-defeating deceit illustrated by the Kremlin’s decision to prioritize secrecy and domestic stability over adequate planning. And Moscow has, if anything, doubled down on silencing frank discussion of the conflict, even going so far as to criminalize assessments of combat deaths and forecasts about how the war might unfold. Although officials can safely talk about some problems—for example, Russian military leaders have called for an expansion of the armed forces—others remain decidedly off-limits, including the larger issues of incompetence and the poor command climate that has led to the military’s horrific problems inside Ukraine. This censorship makes it hard for the Kremlin to get good information on what is going wrong in the war, complicating efforts to correct course.

Some of the major issues for Russia are largely beyond Moscow’s control. Ukrainian resolve has hardened against Russia, something the Russian military, for all its brutality, cannot undo. Russia has also been unable or unwilling to interdict Western weapons flows or intelligence to Ukraine. As long as these two factors—Ukrainian resolve and Western support—remain in place, the Kremlin cannot turn Ukraine into a puppet state, as it originally sought to do.

The Russian military has, however, corrected certain important problems. To overcome a bad plan, it fixed its command structure and changed many of its tactics. It has consolidated its positions in Ukraine after heavy losses while adding more personnel, which will make Ukrainian counteroffensives more costly. Russian military leaders announced their intention to bring back many of the larger divisions from before the 2008 reforms to partly correct for force structure problems. As the Russian economy mobilizes, the defense base could better produce more equipment to make up for wartime losses. Western defense industries, meanwhile, are straining under the demands of replenishing Ukraine. Russia may calculate that it can shore up its position while biding time until Western supplies are exhausted or the world moves on.

But analysts should be careful about forecasting outcomes. The classic adage still holds: in war, the first reports are often wrong or fragmentary. Only time will tell whether Russia can salvage its invasion or whether Ukrainian forces will prevail. The conflict has already followed an unpredictable course, and so the West should avoid making hasty judgments about what went wrong with Russia’s campaign, lest it learn the wrong lessons, devise incorrect strategies, or acquire the wrong types of weapons. Just as the West overestimated Russia’s capabilities before the invasion, it could now underestimate them. And it could overestimate a similarly closed system, such as the Chinese military. It takes time for analysts to learn how a combatant adapts and changes its tactics.

Experts should not, however, toss out the tools they now use to evaluate military power. Many standard metrics—such as the way a force is structured, the technical specifications of its weapons, and the quality of its training programs—are still valid. But although these factors, along with a military’s doctrine and previous operations, are important, they are not necessarily predictive. As this war and other recent conflicts have shown, analysts need better ways to measure the intangible elements of military capability—such as the military’s culture, its ability to learn, its level of corruption, and its will to fight—if they want to accurately forecast power and plan for future conflicts.

Unfortunately, analysts will likely have plenty of time to develop and hone such metrics. Because for all the uncertainty, this much is clear: as Russia continues to mobilize and Kyiv and its supporters dig in, the war is poised to continue.


  • DARA MASSICOT is a Senior Policy Researcher at the RAND Corporation. Before joining RAND, she served as a senior analyst for Russian military capabilities at the Department of Defense.
 
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