Ukrainan sodan havainnot ja opetukset
- Viestiketjun aloittaja Mustaruuti
- Aloitus PVM
Antares
Respected Leader
Kätevä ketju, jossa selitetään kuvien kera miten tunnistaa T-90A vaunujen eroavaisuudet. Tässä kuvaillaan T-90A obr 2004, T-90A obr 2006 sekä T-90A obr 2010.
En ole itse nähnyt tarpeelliseksi tehdä eroa näiden välille, mutta käytännössä ero on suuri: vanhemmissa vaunuissa ampujalla on Buran-M pimeänäkötähtäin kun taas uudemmissa on ESSA-lämpötähtäin.
Vaunujen valmistusmääristä ei ole yhdenmukaista tietoa, mutta perustan oman parhaan arvioni Vasily Fofanovin ja Steve Zalogan tietoihin: LÄHDE
HUOM: Zalogan mukaan T-90 perheen vaunuja olisi valmistettu suurempi määrä kuin tässä taulukossa, lainaan hänen kirjasta "T-90 standard tank: the first tank of the new Russia" (kirja julkaistu 20.2.2018)
At the beginning of 2012, Russia had about 490 T-90 tanks, including about 120 T-90, 25 T-90A (Obiekt 188A-1 Buran-M), 7 T-90AK (Buran-M), 287 T-90A (Obiekt 188A-2 ESSA) and 50 T-90AK (ESSA). There were plans to halt T-90 acquisition for the Russian Army in 2012. This was due to the advent of a follow-on tank, the T-14 Armata, as well as plans to modernize existing T-72B tanks into the T-72B3 configuration, which offered similar capabilities to the T-90 at lower cost.
Olen myös aina ihmetellyt, miksi yllä olevassa lainauksessa on niin suuret määrät T-90AK komentovaunuja. Huomattavan suuret määrät, jos vertaa "tavallisten vaunujen määriin". Ehkä tämä johtuu siitä että oli tarkoitus valmistaa T-90A vaunuja huomattavasti suurempi kokonaismäärä ja tästä syystä tehtiin komentovaunuja ns. etupeltoon? Tai ehkä oli tarkoitus että nämä komentovaunut jaetaan aktiivijoukkojen panssarivaunupataljooniin, jotta saadaan edes komentajille yhteensopivat viestivälineet?
En nyt äkkiseltään muista, mikä on ollut heidän tyylinsä näiden komentovaunujen osalta eli annetaan yksi tällainen jokaiselle pataljoonan komentajalle? Eli yksi tällainen johtaisi 30 kpl "tavallisia vaunuja"? Vai oliko ajatus että nämä työnnetään organisaatiossa alemmaksi myös eli yksi per komppania? Silloin komppaniassa olisi yksi tällainen + 9 kpl "tavallisia vaunuja". Pataljoonassa olisi tällöin 4 kpl T-90A vaunuja ja 27 kpl T-90A vaunuja (+1 T-90AK pataljoonan komentajalle). Prikaatissa on kolme pataljoonaa, joten sellaisessa olisi tällöin 13 kpl T-90AK vaunuja ja 81 kpl T-90A vaunuja (+1 T-90AK prikaatin komentajalle).
Ainakaan näin pyörittämällä Zalogan kertomia määriä ei saa täsmäämään:
25 T-90A (Obiekt 188A-1 Buran-M)
7 T-90AK (Buran-M)
287 T-90A (Obiekt 188A-2 ESSA)
50 T-90AK (ESSA)
Näistä voi laskea:
(7 + 50) / 13 = 4,3846
(25 + 287) / 81 = 3,85185
Toisaalta JOS oli tarkoitus että jokainen aktiivijoukkojen panssarivaunupataljoona olisi varustettu yhdellä T-90AK komentovaunulla niin tästä olisi varmasti kuultu julkisuudessa. Mikään näin näkyvä ei olisi pysynyt piilossa, varsinkin kun muistaa että viimeiset Venäjän armeijalle toimitetut T-90A vaunut valmistuivat vuonna 2010.
MUOKKAUS: tässä lisää T-90 vaunujen tähtäimistä jos kiinnostaa lukea (artikkeli julkaistu 16.11.2020): LÄHDE
En ole itse nähnyt tarpeelliseksi tehdä eroa näiden välille, mutta käytännössä ero on suuri: vanhemmissa vaunuissa ampujalla on Buran-M pimeänäkötähtäin kun taas uudemmissa on ESSA-lämpötähtäin.
Vaunujen valmistusmääristä ei ole yhdenmukaista tietoa, mutta perustan oman parhaan arvioni Vasily Fofanovin ja Steve Zalogan tietoihin: LÄHDE
HUOM: Zalogan mukaan T-90 perheen vaunuja olisi valmistettu suurempi määrä kuin tässä taulukossa, lainaan hänen kirjasta "T-90 standard tank: the first tank of the new Russia" (kirja julkaistu 20.2.2018)
At the beginning of 2012, Russia had about 490 T-90 tanks, including about 120 T-90, 25 T-90A (Obiekt 188A-1 Buran-M), 7 T-90AK (Buran-M), 287 T-90A (Obiekt 188A-2 ESSA) and 50 T-90AK (ESSA). There were plans to halt T-90 acquisition for the Russian Army in 2012. This was due to the advent of a follow-on tank, the T-14 Armata, as well as plans to modernize existing T-72B tanks into the T-72B3 configuration, which offered similar capabilities to the T-90 at lower cost.
Olen myös aina ihmetellyt, miksi yllä olevassa lainauksessa on niin suuret määrät T-90AK komentovaunuja. Huomattavan suuret määrät, jos vertaa "tavallisten vaunujen määriin". Ehkä tämä johtuu siitä että oli tarkoitus valmistaa T-90A vaunuja huomattavasti suurempi kokonaismäärä ja tästä syystä tehtiin komentovaunuja ns. etupeltoon? Tai ehkä oli tarkoitus että nämä komentovaunut jaetaan aktiivijoukkojen panssarivaunupataljooniin, jotta saadaan edes komentajille yhteensopivat viestivälineet?
En nyt äkkiseltään muista, mikä on ollut heidän tyylinsä näiden komentovaunujen osalta eli annetaan yksi tällainen jokaiselle pataljoonan komentajalle? Eli yksi tällainen johtaisi 30 kpl "tavallisia vaunuja"? Vai oliko ajatus että nämä työnnetään organisaatiossa alemmaksi myös eli yksi per komppania? Silloin komppaniassa olisi yksi tällainen + 9 kpl "tavallisia vaunuja". Pataljoonassa olisi tällöin 4 kpl T-90A vaunuja ja 27 kpl T-90A vaunuja (+1 T-90AK pataljoonan komentajalle). Prikaatissa on kolme pataljoonaa, joten sellaisessa olisi tällöin 13 kpl T-90AK vaunuja ja 81 kpl T-90A vaunuja (+1 T-90AK prikaatin komentajalle).
Ainakaan näin pyörittämällä Zalogan kertomia määriä ei saa täsmäämään:
25 T-90A (Obiekt 188A-1 Buran-M)
7 T-90AK (Buran-M)
287 T-90A (Obiekt 188A-2 ESSA)
50 T-90AK (ESSA)
Näistä voi laskea:
(7 + 50) / 13 = 4,3846
(25 + 287) / 81 = 3,85185
Toisaalta JOS oli tarkoitus että jokainen aktiivijoukkojen panssarivaunupataljoona olisi varustettu yhdellä T-90AK komentovaunulla niin tästä olisi varmasti kuultu julkisuudessa. Mikään näin näkyvä ei olisi pysynyt piilossa, varsinkin kun muistaa että viimeiset Venäjän armeijalle toimitetut T-90A vaunut valmistuivat vuonna 2010.
MUOKKAUS: tässä lisää T-90 vaunujen tähtäimistä jos kiinnostaa lukea (artikkeli julkaistu 16.11.2020): LÄHDE
https://crib-blog.blogspot.com/2020/11/t-90a-short-history-of-sights.html
- November 16, 2020
In 2004, the T-90A (Object 188A1) tank joined the Russian armed forces. It included many fire control system upgrades, a new welded turret, and improved mobility.
The T-90A Obr. 2004 tank was fitted with a T01-K05 Buran-M Obr. 2004 3rd generation night vision sight, which improved over the previous T01-K01 Buran-PA sight from the T-90 Obr. 1992.
--Picture of T-90A with Buran-M Obr. 2004--
In 2005, the tank received an upgrade for the sight, which became T01-K05 Buran-M Obr. 2005, with noticeable differences in the sight's housing.
--Picture of T-90A with Buran-M Obr. 2005--
--Picture of T-90A diagram with Buran-M Obr. 2005--
--Picture of two T-90As, one with Obr. 2004 and one with Obr. 2005 Buran-M sights--
Above: T-90A with Buran-M Obr. 2004 sight, and behind it, T-90A with Buran-M Obr. 2005 sight.
In 2006, the T-90A had to be brought to more modern standards, so the production of this model with new second-generation thermal imaging sight began. The sight was named ESSA, which was produced by the Belarussian company "Peleng" using Catherine-FC technology.
--Picture of Otvaga table--
--Picture of the 3 sights with names--
https://crib-blog.blogspot.com/2020/11/goog_367015419
Taken from: http://otvaga2004.ru/
T-90A - a short history of sights
- November 16, 2020
In 2004, the T-90A (Object 188A1) tank joined the Russian armed forces. It included many fire control system upgrades, a new welded turret, and improved mobility.
The T-90A Obr. 2004 tank was fitted with a T01-K05 Buran-M Obr. 2004 3rd generation night vision sight, which improved over the previous T01-K01 Buran-PA sight from the T-90 Obr. 1992.
--Picture of T-90A with Buran-M Obr. 2004--
In 2005, the tank received an upgrade for the sight, which became T01-K05 Buran-M Obr. 2005, with noticeable differences in the sight's housing.
--Picture of T-90A with Buran-M Obr. 2005--
--Picture of T-90A diagram with Buran-M Obr. 2005--
--Picture of two T-90As, one with Obr. 2004 and one with Obr. 2005 Buran-M sights--
Above: T-90A with Buran-M Obr. 2004 sight, and behind it, T-90A with Buran-M Obr. 2005 sight.
In 2006, the T-90A had to be brought to more modern standards, so the production of this model with new second-generation thermal imaging sight began. The sight was named ESSA, which was produced by the Belarussian company "Peleng" using Catherine-FC technology.
--Picture of Otvaga table--
--Picture of the 3 sights with names--
https://crib-blog.blogspot.com/2020/11/goog_367015419
Taken from: http://otvaga2004.ru/
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Hyvin mielenkiintoinen artikkeli tosiaan, lukusuositus myös minulta.
Kybersodasta: varmasti Yhdysvallat on auttanut, mutta Ukraina on joutunut elämään Venäjän vaikuttamisen kanssa vuodesta 2014 lähtien. He ovat varmasti joutuneet muuttamaan käytäntöjään tuona aikana ja olivat siten valmiita kun tuli vakavampi paikka (toki arvatenkin jenkeillä oli myös annettavaa, en kiistä tätä).
En voi olla miettimättä, mikä vaikutus Afganistanista vetäytymisellä oli siihen, että Ukraina sai Yhdysvaltain jakamattoman huomion (tai ainakin merkittävän osan heidän huomiosta). Vaikka Afganistanin sota ei ollut "sota" samalla tavalla kuin Venäjän hyökkäys Ukrainaan, niin varmasti huolenpito "omista" vaatii resurssinsa, jotka mahdollisesti olisivat olleet pois Ukrainasta.
Tätä on tietysti mahdotonta mitata, koska tapahtumien kulku ei mennyt toisella tavalla. Lähihistoriasta löytyy kuitenkin tapauksia, missä yksi kriisi alkaa, saa runsaasti huomiota, mutta jää pian pois seurannasta kun jokin toinen kriisi vetää huomion puoleensa. Toki nyt puhutaan ajasta ennen internetiä, joten tiedonvälitys oli lehtien ja tv-uutisten varassa. Samoin kylmän sodan aikaan oli enemmän ohjausta "resurssien käytössä" eli miten mistäkin tapahtumasta kerrotaan ja kuinka kauan. Internetin myötä tiedonvälityskanavia on enemmän kuin mitä ehtii seuraamaan, joten jokainen joutuu valikoimaan mihin aikansa käyttää. Voisin silti veikata, että moni iranilainen on harmissaan siitä, miten vähän huomiota heidän kamppailunsa saa - Ukrainan sodasta johtuen. Minä ainakaan en ole ehtinyt seuraamaan Iranin tapahtumia juuri alkuunkaan, vaikka voitaneen puhua vallankumouksellisesta liikehdinnästä. Se on iso juttu maassa missä pappisvalta on pitänyt nyörejä käsissään vuodesta 1979 lähtien.
Panssari Salama
Respected Leader
Hyvä väliraportti tämäkin, erityisesti miten nostaa tätä Lännen jahkailua esille.
Panssari Salama
Respected Leader
Lawrence Freedmanilta tullut taas uusi analyysi sodan vuosipäivän kunniaksi. En tiennyt hänestä mitään ennen sotaa, mutta nykyisin luen kyllä miehen uudet artikkelit aina samantien kuin ovat saatavilla.
Viileää analyysiä siis tarjolla taas kerran:
samf.substack.com
Viileää analyysiä siis tarjolla taas kerran:
One Step at a Time: The Stages of War
A woman mourns at the cemetery in Irpin, Ukraine, on the first anniversary of the war A natural part of the commentary surrounding the first anniversary of the start of the Russo-Ukraine War was speculation about whether it will have concluded by the time of the second or even third...
samf.substack.com
John Hilly
Ylipäällikkö
Asiantuntija: Väite Venäjän loputtomista reserveistä on myytti | Verkkouutiset
Uusien liikekannallepanokierrosten poliittinen hinta on yhä kovempi Kremlille.
www.verkkouutiset.fi
Mitä odotatte Venäjän kaatumisen myös tuovan päivän valoon?
Itse toivoisin valaistusta Smolenskin lentoturmasta jossa tarkoituksena oli murhata koko Puolan valtionjohto kerralla.
Artic Sea tapaus joka myös erittäin hämärä
Ryssän operaatio.
Ja tottakai Estonia, vaikka salailussa lienee mukana myös länsimaat syystä tai toisesta.
Itse toivoisin valaistusta Smolenskin lentoturmasta jossa tarkoituksena oli murhata koko Puolan valtionjohto kerralla.
Artic Sea tapaus joka myös erittäin hämärä
Ryssän operaatio.
Ja tottakai Estonia, vaikka salailussa lienee mukana myös länsimaat syystä tai toisesta.
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Pannaas tämä myös tähän ketjuun. Pekka Toverin tuore tilannekatsaus. Lisänä everstiluutnantti evp. Olli Dahl luennoi panssarivaunuista.
Antares
Respected Leader
Lainasin aikaisemmassa viestissä Tatarigami_UA twitter-tilin kirjoituksen Wagner-joukkojen käyttämästä hyökkäystaktiikasta (LINKKI). Tämä liittynee suoraan tai epäsuorasti tässä viestissä lainaamaani asiaan, ainakin aihe on sama eli puolustetun metsäkaistaleen valtaaminen rynnäköllä.
Tatarigami_UA kirjoitti viikko sitten ensimmäisen ketjun Venäjän rynnäkköjoukkojen muutoksista (julkaistu 26.2.2023): LÄHDE
Väitetysti tämä perustuu Venäjän joukoilta kaapatun manuaalin käännökseen (linkki manuaaliin alla olevassa viestissä):
Tatarigami_UA kirjoitti viikko sitten ensimmäisen ketjun Venäjän rynnäkköjoukkojen muutoksista (julkaistu 26.2.2023): LÄHDE
Väitetysti tämä perustuu Venäjän joukoilta kaapatun manuaalin käännökseen (linkki manuaaliin alla olevassa viestissä):
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1629722073487613953.html
Russian forces are revamping their assault tactics after experiencing failures with their current structure.
The Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) are getting replaced with a new unit called the "Assault Unit" or "Assault Detachment", which I will discuss in this thread.
Based on a captured russian manual, the Assault Unit (or Detachment) is a battalion-sized force designed to perform assaults in fortified tree lines and urban environments. It is essentially a reinforced battalion with a specific focus on assault operations.
The Assault Detachment is customizable to mission requirements and consists of 2-3 assault companies, a command unit, an artillery support unit, and other groups: recon, tank, EW, AD, fire support, UAV, Medevac, flamethrowing, assault engineering, reserve, equipment recovery
Assault unit armament:
- Three T-72 tanks
- Two Zu-23, and 3 MANDAPS
- 12 man-portable flamethrowers
- Six SPGs (2S9),
- Six Towed artillery guns (D30)
- Two AGS-17
- Two Kord HMGs,
- Two ATGMs
- Two sniper pairs.
- BREM-L
The main unit of the assault detachment is an assault company consisting of a command unit, a UAV team, assault platoons, an artillery support platoon, a tank group, a reserve section, artillery support platoons, medevac section.
Assault company armament:
- Four BMP or BMD-2
- One T-72
- Two AGS-17,
- Two Kord HMG
- Two ATGM
- Two sniper pairs
- Two mortars - either 82 or 120 mm mortar
- One D30 or 2S9
The primary component of the combat formation is the assault platoon, which may consist of an advance party, safeguard, command group, and fire support platoon strengthened by additional firepower: AGS, mortar, D-30 gun, armored group, and evacuation squad.
An assault platoon comprises 12-15 members, divided into tactical groups of 3 people, and equipped based on mission requirements. A reserve section can supplement the platoon with additional firepower - machine gunner, assistant machine gunner, riflemen.
Main assault provisions:
• The pause between the assault and artillery fire on fortified positions should be no longer than one minute
• Using UAVs for reconnaissance is advised, but it is not recommended to use them for battle monitoring to avoid the loss of the UAV.
• Occupying abandoned trenches is prohibited because they may have been booby-trapped or could have been prepared as targets for artillery strikes.
• Assaulters cannot evacuate the wounded themselves; they must relay the wounded's coordinates to the evacuation team.
• The platoon commander controls mortar fire.
• The platoon/company commander decides on artillery targets, but only the unit commander can provide the air support.
• A recommended firing method for the AGS-17 is indirect fire, with a preferred firing range of 600-1700 m
During the assault, the armored group can act as a whole or be divided between platoons. The artillery support platoon's mortars are distributed between assault platoons, while the artillery gun reports directly to the commander.
• During the treeline assault, the platoon should move in a diamond formation
• During an assault, it is prohibited for an assault company or platoon to move through open spaces and they should instead move solely within the treeline.
The russians are transitioning from larger structures, such as BTGs, to smaller, more agile assault units. However, they still rely heavily on artillery support. It is uncertain if they have enough scarce weapons like 2S9, mortars, AGS, and ammo to equip all units.
This decision seems to be influenced by Wagner's advances in the Bakhmut area and the decreased availability of vehicles and weaponry since February 2022. Unlike BTG, assault detachments doesn’t seem to have a logistics or MLRS units in their structure.
In the upcoming part, which I will be publishing next week, I plan to expand on this topic further and discuss urban tactics and recommendations. I invite you to follow me to stay updated, as social media algorithms may not prioritize war-related content
Russian forces are revamping their assault tactics after experiencing failures with their current structure.
The Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) are getting replaced with a new unit called the "Assault Unit" or "Assault Detachment", which I will discuss in this thread.
Based on a captured russian manual, the Assault Unit (or Detachment) is a battalion-sized force designed to perform assaults in fortified tree lines and urban environments. It is essentially a reinforced battalion with a specific focus on assault operations.
The Assault Detachment is customizable to mission requirements and consists of 2-3 assault companies, a command unit, an artillery support unit, and other groups: recon, tank, EW, AD, fire support, UAV, Medevac, flamethrowing, assault engineering, reserve, equipment recovery
Assault unit armament:
- Three T-72 tanks
- Two Zu-23, and 3 MANDAPS
- 12 man-portable flamethrowers
- Six SPGs (2S9),
- Six Towed artillery guns (D30)
- Two AGS-17
- Two Kord HMGs,
- Two ATGMs
- Two sniper pairs.
- BREM-L
The main unit of the assault detachment is an assault company consisting of a command unit, a UAV team, assault platoons, an artillery support platoon, a tank group, a reserve section, artillery support platoons, medevac section.
Assault company armament:
- Four BMP or BMD-2
- One T-72
- Two AGS-17,
- Two Kord HMG
- Two ATGM
- Two sniper pairs
- Two mortars - either 82 or 120 mm mortar
- One D30 or 2S9
The primary component of the combat formation is the assault platoon, which may consist of an advance party, safeguard, command group, and fire support platoon strengthened by additional firepower: AGS, mortar, D-30 gun, armored group, and evacuation squad.
An assault platoon comprises 12-15 members, divided into tactical groups of 3 people, and equipped based on mission requirements. A reserve section can supplement the platoon with additional firepower - machine gunner, assistant machine gunner, riflemen.
Main assault provisions:
• The pause between the assault and artillery fire on fortified positions should be no longer than one minute
• Using UAVs for reconnaissance is advised, but it is not recommended to use them for battle monitoring to avoid the loss of the UAV.
• Occupying abandoned trenches is prohibited because they may have been booby-trapped or could have been prepared as targets for artillery strikes.
• Assaulters cannot evacuate the wounded themselves; they must relay the wounded's coordinates to the evacuation team.
• The platoon commander controls mortar fire.
• The platoon/company commander decides on artillery targets, but only the unit commander can provide the air support.
• A recommended firing method for the AGS-17 is indirect fire, with a preferred firing range of 600-1700 m
During the assault, the armored group can act as a whole or be divided between platoons. The artillery support platoon's mortars are distributed between assault platoons, while the artillery gun reports directly to the commander.
• During the treeline assault, the platoon should move in a diamond formation
• During an assault, it is prohibited for an assault company or platoon to move through open spaces and they should instead move solely within the treeline.
The russians are transitioning from larger structures, such as BTGs, to smaller, more agile assault units. However, they still rely heavily on artillery support. It is uncertain if they have enough scarce weapons like 2S9, mortars, AGS, and ammo to equip all units.
This decision seems to be influenced by Wagner's advances in the Bakhmut area and the decreased availability of vehicles and weaponry since February 2022. Unlike BTG, assault detachments doesn’t seem to have a logistics or MLRS units in their structure.
In the upcoming part, which I will be publishing next week, I plan to expand on this topic further and discuss urban tactics and recommendations. I invite you to follow me to stay updated, as social media algorithms may not prioritize war-related content
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Tatarigami_UA twitter-tili kirjoitti viikko sitten ketjun Venäjän rynnäkköjoukkojen muutoksista, se löytyy edellisestä viestistäni. LINKKI
Väitetysti ko. kirjotuksen, kuten myös tässä viestissä jaetun tänään julkaistun toisen osan sisältö perustuu Venäjän joukoilta kaapatun manuaalin käännökseen, hän antoi linkin materiaaliin (HUOM: uutisen julkaisupäivä on 12.12.2022 eli tämä on kohta kolme kuukautta vanhaa asiaa):
Suora linkki artikkeliin, täältä löytyy alkuperäinen materiaali skannattuna sivu kerrallaan ilman että on tehty käännöstä tms. sen päälle:
https://censor.net/en/news/3386414/...operations_based_on_experience_of_war_against
Tatarigami_UA:n tänään julkaistu toinen osa painottuu asutuskeskustaisteluun ja rakennusten valtaamiseen, kyse siis venäläisten rynnäkköjoukkojen "uudet taktiikat" (julkaistu 5.3.2023). LÄHDE
Väitetysti ko. kirjotuksen, kuten myös tässä viestissä jaetun tänään julkaistun toisen osan sisältö perustuu Venäjän joukoilta kaapatun manuaalin käännökseen, hän antoi linkin materiaaliin (HUOM: uutisen julkaisupäivä on 12.12.2022 eli tämä on kohta kolme kuukautta vanhaa asiaa):
Ministry of Defense of Russia issued manual on assault operations based on experience of war against Ukraine. DOCUMENT
Suora linkki artikkeliin, täältä löytyy alkuperäinen materiaali skannattuna sivu kerrallaan ilman että on tehty käännöstä tms. sen päälle:
https://censor.net/en/news/3386414/...operations_based_on_experience_of_war_against
Tatarigami_UA:n tänään julkaistu toinen osa painottuu asutuskeskustaisteluun ja rakennusten valtaamiseen, kyse siis venäläisten rynnäkköjoukkojen "uudet taktiikat" (julkaistu 5.3.2023). LÄHDE
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1632337874912780294.html
This is part two of the "Assault Units" thread, which focuses on suggestions for russian assault units in urban combat, gleaned from captured documents.
The section provides general recommendations on tactics that assault units can employ in urban warfare scenarios.
Main provisions from the document regarding urban warfare:
- To ensure safe passage, holes should be made by tanks or explosives in fences and buildings.
- The route of movement of assault companies, if possible, should exclude movement along roads and straight streets
- Placing observation points on the roofs of buildings is prohibited in urban environment.
- As a military tactics, it is recommended to assign new names to streets and buildings in towns that are being assaulted. This is done to confuse defenders and exploit open coms channels. In the present case, the attackers named the streets Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev
- The assault begins with artillery fire on the front line of defense. The transfer of artillery fire to the next line is carried out by the commander
- If the multi-store building is well fortified and can't be easily assaulted, then the "Squeezing" method should be used: instead of blocking the building, the assaulters should take cover in nearby buildings.
- Meanwhile, artillery (or AGS) and firesupport teams should proceed with engaging the target. This way the enemy gets a chance to leave the building while taking losses from artillery, providing an opportunity for the assault team to advance
When an assault platoon tries to clear the multi-store or multi-entrance building, it is recommended to act in the following order:
-One person is set at the entrance, with the task of preventing an enemy attack from the basement or the street.
- The platoon begins to move along the staircase in small groups (3 people) to the upper floors, while soldiers cover each other.
- Clearing is carried out on an apartment basis on each floor, based on the number of rooms in the apartment (one-room, two-room, etc.).
- Three people are enough for a one-room apartment.
- When clearing common corridor on a floor, a cover group (1-2 people) is set with the task of preventing an enemy attack from an uncleaned apartment or stairs from the upper floors.
- The common corridors on the upper floors are mined to exclude the penetration of the enemy into the rear. The clearing of the rest of the building happens in the same method
- After securing all floors, the wall of the apartment on the second floor is broken with TNT or C-4 to get access to the rest of the building.
As the war progresses, russians aim to modernize and become more flexible by implementing changes. However, most instructions are still top-down and blindly applied across the battlefield based on a few successful examples, resembling a cargo cult.
Becoming proficient in urban warfare tactics requires extensive training and proper logistics, including training grounds, qualified instructors, and adequate communication equipment. Even with intensive training, it still takes time for a team to become effective
Does Russia have the necessary capabilities, including sufficient trained officers and NCOs with coms, leadership, teamwork skills to conduct such operations? In my third section, I'll address these questions and examine disparities between manuals and observed practices
I invite you to follow me to stay updated, as social media algorithms may not prioritize war-related content.
This is part two of the "Assault Units" thread, which focuses on suggestions for russian assault units in urban combat, gleaned from captured documents.
The section provides general recommendations on tactics that assault units can employ in urban warfare scenarios.
Main provisions from the document regarding urban warfare:
- To ensure safe passage, holes should be made by tanks or explosives in fences and buildings.
- The route of movement of assault companies, if possible, should exclude movement along roads and straight streets
- Placing observation points on the roofs of buildings is prohibited in urban environment.
- As a military tactics, it is recommended to assign new names to streets and buildings in towns that are being assaulted. This is done to confuse defenders and exploit open coms channels. In the present case, the attackers named the streets Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev
- The assault begins with artillery fire on the front line of defense. The transfer of artillery fire to the next line is carried out by the commander
- If the multi-store building is well fortified and can't be easily assaulted, then the "Squeezing" method should be used: instead of blocking the building, the assaulters should take cover in nearby buildings.
- Meanwhile, artillery (or AGS) and firesupport teams should proceed with engaging the target. This way the enemy gets a chance to leave the building while taking losses from artillery, providing an opportunity for the assault team to advance
When an assault platoon tries to clear the multi-store or multi-entrance building, it is recommended to act in the following order:
-One person is set at the entrance, with the task of preventing an enemy attack from the basement or the street.
- The platoon begins to move along the staircase in small groups (3 people) to the upper floors, while soldiers cover each other.
- Clearing is carried out on an apartment basis on each floor, based on the number of rooms in the apartment (one-room, two-room, etc.).
- Three people are enough for a one-room apartment.
- When clearing common corridor on a floor, a cover group (1-2 people) is set with the task of preventing an enemy attack from an uncleaned apartment or stairs from the upper floors.
- The common corridors on the upper floors are mined to exclude the penetration of the enemy into the rear. The clearing of the rest of the building happens in the same method
- After securing all floors, the wall of the apartment on the second floor is broken with TNT or C-4 to get access to the rest of the building.
As the war progresses, russians aim to modernize and become more flexible by implementing changes. However, most instructions are still top-down and blindly applied across the battlefield based on a few successful examples, resembling a cargo cult.
Becoming proficient in urban warfare tactics requires extensive training and proper logistics, including training grounds, qualified instructors, and adequate communication equipment. Even with intensive training, it still takes time for a team to become effective
Does Russia have the necessary capabilities, including sufficient trained officers and NCOs with coms, leadership, teamwork skills to conduct such operations? In my third section, I'll address these questions and examine disparities between manuals and observed practices
I invite you to follow me to stay updated, as social media algorithms may not prioritize war-related content.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Tatarigami_UA:n kirjoituksia hakiessa tuli vastaan tällainen kirjoitus, jossa on tehty havaintoja hänen kirjoittamastaan.
Kirjoittaja on nimeltään Sigismund the British, enkä muista lukeneeni hänen kirjoituksiaan aikaisemmin. Toisaalta hän on perustanut Twitter-tilinsä helmikuussa 2023 joten ei ihmekään jos ei ole näkynyt aikaisemmin. Linkki hänen tiliinsä:
https://twitter.com/Sigismund_UK
Lainaan koko ketjun alle: LÄHDE
Kirjoittaja on nimeltään Sigismund the British, enkä muista lukeneeni hänen kirjoituksiaan aikaisemmin. Toisaalta hän on perustanut Twitter-tilinsä helmikuussa 2023 joten ei ihmekään jos ei ole näkynyt aikaisemmin. Linkki hänen tiliinsä:
https://twitter.com/Sigismund_UK
Lainaan koko ketjun alle: LÄHDE
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1629946648066490371.html
Based on Tatarigami's excellent thread on the subject, below is an OOB of the Assault Unit/Detachment which has become the Russian's have been using in their recent offensive operations in Ukraine. #RussianUkrainianWar #Military
The lack of infantry, heavy losses in vehicles and reliance on artillery for firepower that have thus far characterised much of Russia's approach in Ukraine are on display for all to say.
However, there are others better qualified to discuss what this is likely to mean moving forwards into the rest of 2023.
So, I will try to stay in my lane, such as it is, and talk about aspects of this OOB that strike me and the lessons they can teach other armies, specifically although not only the British, moving forwards.
1. Infantrymen and leaders willing to press forwards an assault to its conclusion are priceless. This may seem like an obvious conclusion but sometimes the obvious is worth stating. Since its mobilisation, Russia likely has the manpower to field larger tactical units
if it were practical to do so. However, the assault detachment as a whole is quite small and the assault platoons themselves are the size of some NATO squads/sections. This could be due to a lack of officers and NCOs able to lead larger units, lack of personnel with the training and morale to accomplish the unit's task or some combination of the two. Given the Russian units we've seen at the forefront of assaults in Vuhledar and around Bakhmut have been drawn from a mix of Russia's premier formations (VDV, Naval Infantry etc.) and convict Wagner personnel who have no option but to do or die, I suspect it's principally an issue of finding personnel with the intangible qualities needed in assaulting troops.
All this is a very long-winded way of pointing out that infantry willing and able to press forwards an assault are not easily found or replaced. In an environment where cutbacks are the norm and we need to prioritise which pieces of our army to man, this is worth bearing in mind.
2. There is still a need for something to bridge the gap between artillery lifting and infantry closing into the assault. The British Army's practice of maintaining guns platoons is an oddity within NATO that finds its roots in the trenches of WW1.
However, these platoons served an important purpose which we are seeing in the Russian assault detachments being fulfilled by a mix of snipers, AGLs and HMGs, namely bringing to bear firepower that can bridge the gap between artillery lifting and the infantry closing in.
Now. This is not to say that every NATO force, or indeed the British Army, should go and form guns platoons in all of its battalions. However, it is evident that there is a need for something to bridge that gap that will always exist when artillery lifts to avoid killing its own infantry.
3. Availability of responsive indirect fire to platoon commanders is crucial. We see in the Russian assault detachment there is organic indirect firepower at both company and battalion, with the platoon commander effectively being a mortar fire controller.
For many years, the British Army used and got a great deal of use out of its 2in and later 60mm platoon mortars. These provided platoons with a rapid and always available indirect fire capability. This was eventually phased out due to concerns over the weight of the 60mm mortar and the overall weight infantrymen needed to carry.
Whilst it is absolutely true that infantrymen should not be loaded down with burdens so great they can't fight, the need for rapid and available indirect fire at platoon level has evidently not reduced in modern war.
So, even if the Hirtenberger 60mm is too heavy for what it brought to the table, we should be investigating other ways of meeting this requirement.
Based on Tatarigami's excellent thread on the subject, below is an OOB of the Assault Unit/Detachment which has become the Russian's have been using in their recent offensive operations in Ukraine. #RussianUkrainianWar #Military
The lack of infantry, heavy losses in vehicles and reliance on artillery for firepower that have thus far characterised much of Russia's approach in Ukraine are on display for all to say.
However, there are others better qualified to discuss what this is likely to mean moving forwards into the rest of 2023.
So, I will try to stay in my lane, such as it is, and talk about aspects of this OOB that strike me and the lessons they can teach other armies, specifically although not only the British, moving forwards.
1. Infantrymen and leaders willing to press forwards an assault to its conclusion are priceless. This may seem like an obvious conclusion but sometimes the obvious is worth stating. Since its mobilisation, Russia likely has the manpower to field larger tactical units
if it were practical to do so. However, the assault detachment as a whole is quite small and the assault platoons themselves are the size of some NATO squads/sections. This could be due to a lack of officers and NCOs able to lead larger units, lack of personnel with the training and morale to accomplish the unit's task or some combination of the two. Given the Russian units we've seen at the forefront of assaults in Vuhledar and around Bakhmut have been drawn from a mix of Russia's premier formations (VDV, Naval Infantry etc.) and convict Wagner personnel who have no option but to do or die, I suspect it's principally an issue of finding personnel with the intangible qualities needed in assaulting troops.
All this is a very long-winded way of pointing out that infantry willing and able to press forwards an assault are not easily found or replaced. In an environment where cutbacks are the norm and we need to prioritise which pieces of our army to man, this is worth bearing in mind.
2. There is still a need for something to bridge the gap between artillery lifting and infantry closing into the assault. The British Army's practice of maintaining guns platoons is an oddity within NATO that finds its roots in the trenches of WW1.
However, these platoons served an important purpose which we are seeing in the Russian assault detachments being fulfilled by a mix of snipers, AGLs and HMGs, namely bringing to bear firepower that can bridge the gap between artillery lifting and the infantry closing in.
Now. This is not to say that every NATO force, or indeed the British Army, should go and form guns platoons in all of its battalions. However, it is evident that there is a need for something to bridge that gap that will always exist when artillery lifts to avoid killing its own infantry.
3. Availability of responsive indirect fire to platoon commanders is crucial. We see in the Russian assault detachment there is organic indirect firepower at both company and battalion, with the platoon commander effectively being a mortar fire controller.
For many years, the British Army used and got a great deal of use out of its 2in and later 60mm platoon mortars. These provided platoons with a rapid and always available indirect fire capability. This was eventually phased out due to concerns over the weight of the 60mm mortar and the overall weight infantrymen needed to carry.
Whilst it is absolutely true that infantrymen should not be loaded down with burdens so great they can't fight, the need for rapid and available indirect fire at platoon level has evidently not reduced in modern war.
So, even if the Hirtenberger 60mm is too heavy for what it brought to the table, we should be investigating other ways of meeting this requirement.
Tatarigami_UA twitter-tili kirjoitti viikko sitten kaksi ketjua Venäjän rynnäkköjoukkojen muutoksista, näistä ensimmäinen oli edellisessä viestissä. LINKKI
Väitetysti molempien ketjujen sisältö perustuu Venäjän joukoilta kaapatun manuaalin käännökseen, tämä toinen osa painottuu asutuskeskustaisteluun ja rakennusten valtaamiseen (julkaistu 26.2.2023): LÄHDE
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1632337874912780294.html
This is part two of the "Assault Units" thread, which focuses on suggestions for russian assault units in urban combat, gleaned from captured documents.
The section provides general recommendations on tactics that assault units can employ in urban warfare scenarios.
Main provisions from the document regarding urban warfare:
- To ensure safe passage, holes should be made by tanks or explosives in fences and buildings.
- The route of movement of assault companies, if possible, should exclude movement along roads and straight streets
- Placing observation points on the roofs of buildings is prohibited in urban environment.
- As a military tactics, it is recommended to assign new names to streets and buildings in towns that are being assaulted. This is done to confuse defenders and exploit open coms channels. In the present case, the attackers named the streets Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev
- The assault begins with artillery fire on the front line of defense. The transfer of artillery fire to the next line is carried out by the commander
- If the multi-store building is well fortified and can't be easily assaulted, then the "Squeezing" method should be used: instead of blocking the building, the assaulters should take cover in nearby buildings.
- Meanwhile, artillery (or AGS) and firesupport teams should proceed with engaging the target. This way the enemy gets a chance to leave the building while taking losses from artillery, providing an opportunity for the assault team to advance
When an assault platoon tries to clear the multi-store or multi-entrance building, it is recommended to act in the following order:
-One person is set at the entrance, with the task of preventing an enemy attack from the basement or the street.
- The platoon begins to move along the staircase in small groups (3 people) to the upper floors, while soldiers cover each other.
- Clearing is carried out on an apartment basis on each floor, based on the number of rooms in the apartment (one-room, two-room, etc.).
- Three people are enough for a one-room apartment.
- When clearing common corridor on a floor, a cover group (1-2 people) is set with the task of preventing an enemy attack from an uncleaned apartment or stairs from the upper floors.
- The common corridors on the upper floors are mined to exclude the penetration of the enemy into the rear. The clearing of the rest of the building happens in the same method
Katso liite: 75000
- After securing all floors, the wall of the apartment on the second floor is broken with TNT or C-4 to get access to the rest of the building.
Katso liite: 75001
As the war progresses, russians aim to modernize and become more flexible by implementing changes. However, most instructions are still top-down and blindly applied across the battlefield based on a few successful examples, resembling a cargo cult.
Becoming proficient in urban warfare tactics requires extensive training and proper logistics, including training grounds, qualified instructors, and adequate communication equipment. Even with intensive training, it still takes time for a team to become effective
Does Russia have the necessary capabilities, including sufficient trained officers and NCOs with coms, leadership, teamwork skills to conduct such operations? In my third section, I'll address these questions and examine disparities between manuals and observed practices
I invite you to follow me to stay updated, as social media algorithms may not prioritize war-related content.
Tuota kun lukee, niin tulee mieleen että "kyllä tuolla tavalla pitäisi saada tuloksia aikaan!" Mutta sitten se käytäntö...
Antares
Respected Leader
Ylle lainaamani Tatarigami_UA tilin kirjoitus Venäjän rynnäkköjoukkojen taktiikan muutoksista sai myös Mick Ryanin kirjoittamaan ns. infiltraatiotaktiikoiden historiasta ja niiden haasteista (ketju julkaistu 27.2.2023): LÄHDE
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1630089568195313669.html
This is an another excellent thread from @Tatarigami_UA that explores Russian tactical adaptation in eastern #Ukraine. In particular, the shift to infiltration tactics is interesting.
A thread on tactical innovation and why it needs to be nested within operational plans.
These types of infiltration tactics are something that also emerged as a solution to a stalemate on the Western front in WW1. While generally the Germans are given credit for this (known as Stormtrooper tactics), this approach originated elsewhere.
French officer, Captain Andre Laffargue, was wounded in 1915 and during his convalescence wrote a pamphlet called "The Attack in Trench Warfare". You can read it here:
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/60197/60197-h/60197-h.htm
It was published in 1916 and described a system of infiltration by well trained volunteers using automatic weapons, mountain guns and other weapons to move swiftly through an enemy's defensive positions.
Not long after its publication, a copy of his pamphlet was discovered in a captured German trench. While it was translated into German and distributed widely, it is not referred to in later German tactical doctrine.
So, there are a lot of unknowns about the link between this first publication on infiltration tactics and the 1918 German stormtroopers tactics that appeared on the Western front. But, despite the effectiveness of these tactics, there was a major problem with them.
The new German tactics were not aligned with an operational approach that could exploit these new tactics. They could create gaps in an enemy defensive line, but could not then move an 'exploitation' force through these gaps deep into the enemy's rear.
Nor did their appear to be a desire to do so. As German commander Ludendorff told one of his Army Group Commanders, "I forbid myself to use the word 'strategy'. We chop a hole. The rest follows." Good tactics are wasted without operational art or good strategy.
As Gudmundsson writes in his book, "Stormtroopers Tactics": "In 1918, the German infantry could use stormtroopers tactics to tear gaps. As long as following formations relied on muscle power for mobility however, these holes could never be turned into war winning victories."
So there are a couple of challenges for the Russian Army if it is to start using these tactics in the east.
First, to use these tactics widely, the Russians will need to implement a wide scale retraining and re-equipping program in the middle of a war. This includes troops in theatre, and those that are being trained at home.
We should not under estimate the challenge of doing this in a system that is under great pressure and that has lost many of its middle and junior leaders. Do they have the institutional agility for this?
Second, and more importantly, the Russian military needs a plan to exploit the tactical gaps that might be created with such tactics. Once again, having good tactics won't win the war for Russia.
Just ask Germany. Good tactics in WW1 and WW2 did not help them win the wars they started. As Murray and Millett have written: “Mistakes in tactics can be corrected, but political and strategic mistakes live forever.”
Russian exploitation of these tactical 'gaps' created by new tactics would require strong, mobile reserves - based on armoured and mechanised forces - that have the leadership, authority and agility to penetrate deep into Ukrainian territory.
Such a operational penetration would aim to dislocate large parts of the Ukrainian defensive scheme of manoeuvre, while destroying HQ, logistics, reserve troops and longer-range artillery.
It is not clear that the Russian Army in #Ukraine now possesses the ability to create tactical 'break ins' and then conduct (and logistically support) operational exploitation. Their losses in personnel, leaders and equipment have been massive.
And even if the Russian were able to concentrate these mechanised reserves, it is highly probable that it would be detected and interdicted by Ukrainian long range fires. The Ukrainians are very good at this!
So while the Russians are demonstrating some evolution and learning with these new tactics, it is an incomplete adaption.
To quote Ludendorff, the Russians have just created a new way to 'chop a hole'. Without the full range of operational systems to exploit them it is just a more creative way of killing an entire generation of their young people.
Thanks again to @Tatarigami_UA for the ongoing and excellent assessments published here. Like many others, I find them superb. End.
Thank you to the following for the links and images used in this thread: Project Gutenberg MilitaryHistoryNow @Tatarigami_UA @Liberov @MaryanKushnir @Osinttechnical @UAWeapons
This is an another excellent thread from @Tatarigami_UA that explores Russian tactical adaptation in eastern #Ukraine. In particular, the shift to infiltration tactics is interesting.
A thread on tactical innovation and why it needs to be nested within operational plans.
These types of infiltration tactics are something that also emerged as a solution to a stalemate on the Western front in WW1. While generally the Germans are given credit for this (known as Stormtrooper tactics), this approach originated elsewhere.
French officer, Captain Andre Laffargue, was wounded in 1915 and during his convalescence wrote a pamphlet called "The Attack in Trench Warfare". You can read it here:
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/60197/60197-h/60197-h.htm
It was published in 1916 and described a system of infiltration by well trained volunteers using automatic weapons, mountain guns and other weapons to move swiftly through an enemy's defensive positions.
Not long after its publication, a copy of his pamphlet was discovered in a captured German trench. While it was translated into German and distributed widely, it is not referred to in later German tactical doctrine.
So, there are a lot of unknowns about the link between this first publication on infiltration tactics and the 1918 German stormtroopers tactics that appeared on the Western front. But, despite the effectiveness of these tactics, there was a major problem with them.
The new German tactics were not aligned with an operational approach that could exploit these new tactics. They could create gaps in an enemy defensive line, but could not then move an 'exploitation' force through these gaps deep into the enemy's rear.
Nor did their appear to be a desire to do so. As German commander Ludendorff told one of his Army Group Commanders, "I forbid myself to use the word 'strategy'. We chop a hole. The rest follows." Good tactics are wasted without operational art or good strategy.
As Gudmundsson writes in his book, "Stormtroopers Tactics": "In 1918, the German infantry could use stormtroopers tactics to tear gaps. As long as following formations relied on muscle power for mobility however, these holes could never be turned into war winning victories."
So there are a couple of challenges for the Russian Army if it is to start using these tactics in the east.
First, to use these tactics widely, the Russians will need to implement a wide scale retraining and re-equipping program in the middle of a war. This includes troops in theatre, and those that are being trained at home.
We should not under estimate the challenge of doing this in a system that is under great pressure and that has lost many of its middle and junior leaders. Do they have the institutional agility for this?
Second, and more importantly, the Russian military needs a plan to exploit the tactical gaps that might be created with such tactics. Once again, having good tactics won't win the war for Russia.
Just ask Germany. Good tactics in WW1 and WW2 did not help them win the wars they started. As Murray and Millett have written: “Mistakes in tactics can be corrected, but political and strategic mistakes live forever.”
Russian exploitation of these tactical 'gaps' created by new tactics would require strong, mobile reserves - based on armoured and mechanised forces - that have the leadership, authority and agility to penetrate deep into Ukrainian territory.
Such a operational penetration would aim to dislocate large parts of the Ukrainian defensive scheme of manoeuvre, while destroying HQ, logistics, reserve troops and longer-range artillery.
It is not clear that the Russian Army in #Ukraine now possesses the ability to create tactical 'break ins' and then conduct (and logistically support) operational exploitation. Their losses in personnel, leaders and equipment have been massive.
And even if the Russian were able to concentrate these mechanised reserves, it is highly probable that it would be detected and interdicted by Ukrainian long range fires. The Ukrainians are very good at this!
So while the Russians are demonstrating some evolution and learning with these new tactics, it is an incomplete adaption.
To quote Ludendorff, the Russians have just created a new way to 'chop a hole'. Without the full range of operational systems to exploit them it is just a more creative way of killing an entire generation of their young people.
Thanks again to @Tatarigami_UA for the ongoing and excellent assessments published here. Like many others, I find them superb. End.
Thank you to the following for the links and images used in this thread: Project Gutenberg MilitaryHistoryNow @Tatarigami_UA @Liberov @MaryanKushnir @Osinttechnical @UAWeapons
Antares
Respected Leader
Teorian vieminen käytäntöön JA teorian toimiminen käytännössä ovat tietysti ne suuret haasteet, kuten aina.
Jos katsotaan karttaa, ei käy kiistäminen etteikö tuloksia olisi tullut koska ovat saaneet vallattua alueita (tässä kartassa Bakhmutin ympäristö), tosin Puolan Jaroslaw Wolski kommentoi "menestystä" melko terävästi:
Astonishing RUS offensive (map by @SomeGumul) on average: 1-2km per month.
The first army of the Third World in action.
-
Voisi kuvitella että edellisissä viesteissä lainatut taktiikat ovat voineet olla käytössä ja siten selittää tätä etenemistä. Vaan sopii kysyä: mikä on ollut "menestyksen" hinta? Vuodenvaihteessa kirjoitettiin paljon siitä miten Venäjällä käydään uusi mobilisaatiokierros, tuloksena jopa 500 000 uutta sotilasta. Tällaista ei ole näkynyt tai sitten se on onnistuttu tekemään niin salassa ettei siitä ole vuotanut tietoa julkisuuteen (epäilen). Toki mobilisaatio ei varsinaisesti päättynyt missään vaiheessa, joten sitä tehtäneen kokoajan jotta saadaan paikattua tappioita.
Kesältä 2022 muistetaan Severodonetskin ja Lysitschanskin taistelut, missä Venäjä tuhlasi voimiaan niin paljon että Ukrainan vetäytymisen jälkeen ei enää nähty juurikaan uusia menestyksiä sen jälkeen (nähtiin toki Ukraina vastahyökkäys Kharkovan suunnalla sekä ryssän pakotus Dnieprin yli).
Toisaalta Bakhmutin tilanteesta näkyy myös kommentteja, joiden mukaan Ukraina kärsisi myös suuria tappioita, jopa 400-500 miestä per päivä. Ehkä totta, ehkä ei.
Osa on myös kommentoinut että Ukraina pitää kynsin ja hampain kiinni Bakhmutista, kun sen olisi järkevämpää vetäytyä kaupungista ja keskittyä sen länsipuolella sijaitsevien valmisteltujen puolustuslinjojen käyttöön.
Toisaalta osa arvailee että Ukraina pitää kiinni kaupungista, koska rospuuttokausi alkaisi tämän kuukauden lopussa eli maalis-huhtikuun vaihteessa. Jos saavat pidettyä kaupungin siihen asti, peltoja ja peltoautoteitä pitkin liikkuminen menee vaikeaksi ja on mahdollista, että eivät menetä Bakhmutia ollenkaan.
Otapa tästä sitten selvää.
Onko kyseessä Ukrainan tyhmä ja jääräpäinen takertuminen kaupungin raunioihin? Vai onko kyseessä Severodonetskin ja Lysichanskin taistelujen toisinto? Vai kulutetaanko tässä älykkäästi joustavaa puolustusta käyttäen vihollisen hyökkäysjoukkoja (varsinkin jos myöhemmin keväällä nähdään Ukrainan vastahyökkäys jossain muualla, ehkä huhtikuun loppupuolella)? Vai onko Venäjän hyökkäykseen koostama ryhmitys ja aseistus niin vahvaa ja ylivoima niin suurta että se pakottaa puolustajan perääntymään? Jos näin on, miksei Ukraina vahvista puolustusta? Eikö riitä joukkoja ja kalustoa VAI onko ne allokoitu muualle? "Tasajako ei ole taktiikkaa"?
Antares
Respected Leader
Menee ehkä vähän ohi ketjun aiheen, mutta en malta olla vastaamatta.
JOS Venäjän kaatuminen tarkoittaisi sitä että heidän arkistonsa avattaisiin tutkijoille, kuten kävi lyhyen aikaa Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen, niin silloin myös suomalaisten tutkijoiden tulisi olla hereillä. Tämä aikaikkuna ei pysy todennäköisesti auki pitkään, ehkä vain kymmenen vuotta. Putinin noustua valtaan alkoi tulla rajoituksia arkistoon pääsyn osalta - huom: en ole tutkija, tämä on se mielikuva joka minulle on tullut, joten voin olla myös väärässä. Ainakaan kaikki arkistot eivät ole auki, se lienee selvää.
Olen ahne, joten minua kiinnostaisi suuresti Neuvostoliiton aikana valmistettujen panssarivaunujen vuosituotantomäärät vaunutyypeittäin aikavälillä 1965-1991. Mieluummin myös tämän jälkeen.
Meillä on tilastoja ja numeroita, mutta ei sillä tarkkuudella kuin mitä toivoisin. Esim. kuinka monta T-72AK tai T-72B obr 1989 vaunua he valmistivat, mitkä määrät ja minä vuosina? Sama koskee myös T-64 ja T-80 perheitä, mutta T-72 on näistä hankalin, arvattavasta syystä. T-72 perheen vaunut muodostavat valtaosan heidän nykyisistä panssarijoukoistaan, joten haluavat varmasti pimittää tämän tarkemman tiedot - tai sitten en vain ole onnistunut löytämään sitä vielä.
Kaikenlainen Suomen historiaan ja Neuvostoliiton Suomessa tekemään vaikutustyöhön liittyvä tutkimus olisi myös tervetullutta, ehkä vihdoin NATO-jäsenyyden myötä Suomessa tullaan käymään rehellinen keskustelu meidän omasta lähihistoriasta, kaikkine synkkine vaiheineen ja piirteineen. En kaipaa noitavainoja, mutta oma pesä pitäisi pystyä tuulettamaan. Usein tämä tehdään vasta kun asianomaiset ovat kuolleet, mutta en pidä tästä, koska heillä ei ole silloin tilaisuutta puolustaa tekemiään valintoja (tai olla puolustamatta, sekin oikeus ihmiselle kuuluu demokratiassa).
Antares
Respected Leader
Ukrainan sodan havaintoja ja opetuksia: MT-LB pitää aseistaa keinolla millä hyvänsä. Mitä isompi tykki, sen parempi. Jos ei ole isoa tykkiä, pienempi käy. Pääasia että MT-LB aseistetaan kuten rynnäkkövaunun kuuluukin olla.
Ketju johon koottu yli vuoden jatkuneen sodan aikana nähtyjä virityksiä, molemmat osapuolet asialla:
Yksittäistapauksia varmaankin? Ei sovi yleistää?
Ketju johon koottu yli vuoden jatkuneen sodan aikana nähtyjä virityksiä, molemmat osapuolet asialla:
Yksittäistapauksia varmaankin? Ei sovi yleistää?
Viimeksi muokattu:
Ilmeisesti varsinaiset rynnäkkövaunut (mitä MTLB ei siis ole) on menetetty ja tarvitaan jotakin tilalle. Samalla kun saadaan puolivillainen ryntövaunu menetetään asiallinen kuljetuspanssari. Huono vaihtokauppa mutta varmaankin pakkorakoratkaisu ja tyypillinen kuilun partaalle ajautuneissa asevoimissa.
Antares
Respected Leader
Jep, täsmennän sen verran että MT-LB nimitys "rynnäkkövaunuksi" edellisessä viestissä oli vitsi.
Tätä kehitystä voinee pitää samana kuin erilaisia siviilistä otettuja kuorma-autoja ja pick-upeja, joihin on asennettu kaikenlaista aseistusta. Toki jos minun pitää valita että kannanko itse sen raskaan konekiväärin vai laitetaanko se auton kyytiin, niin valinta on selvä.
Toki tela-ajoneuvon kanssa asia on monimutkaisempi, niitä kun on vähemmän ja hyvä maastoliikkuvuus vaatisi että niitä käytetään järkevämmin kuin pelkkinä aselavetteina.
Täsmennän sen verran että minulla ei ole huumorintajua.
Kannattaa olla tyytyväinen kun vastapuolelle alkaa ilmestyä kuljetusvaunuja laivatykistöllä tai lentävän kaluston raketinheittimillä terästettynä. Silloin tietää että laarin pohjaa kaavitaan.
Tyytyväisyyden tasoon tietysti vaikuttaa sekin onko itsellä vielä alla se ryntövaunu vai onko tappioiden myötä siirrytty polkupyörille.