Ukrainan sodan havainnot ja opetukset
- Viestiketjun aloittaja Mustaruuti
- Aloitus PVM
Antares
Respected Leader
Ukrainalaisten katettu ja naamioitu kranaatinheittimen asema. Katto asennettu rullien päälle ja rullat kiskojen päälle, joten katon liu'uttaminen syrjään pois tieltä onnistuu kätevästi.
Concealed Ukrainian mortar position with a movable roof that allows for quick camouflage.
Concealed Ukrainian mortar position with a movable roof that allows for quick camouflage.
Entisestään vahvistuu ajatus, että ne vanhat totuudet eivät ole kadonneet mihinkään.
Ilmatilan hallinta - Dronet hoitaa tuota tässä sodassa, mutta jatkossa niille ilmestyy vasta-ase, kuten aina on käynyt. Kuitenkin tilannetta voi mielestäni verrata aika hyvin ensimmäiseen maailmansotaan ja lentokoneisiin. Niiden päätarkoitushan oli tiedustella tykistölle maaleja. Ne suurelle yleisölle tunnetuimmat hävittäjät oli tarkoitettu vain tuhoamaan vihollisen tiedustelukoneet ja suojaamaan omia tiedustelukoneita. Punaiset paronit sun muut olivat vain oheistuotteita, eivät tavoite. Nyt dronet tiedustelevat ja tuhoavat, mutta tuo ensin mainittu lienee tärkeämpi kyky, vaikka tuhovoima onkin suurelle yleisölle myyvempää ja näyttävämpää.
(Paikallinen) ylivoima - Kolminkertaista ylivoimaahan sitä meilläkin 1995-96 aina toitotettiin. Ryssä pääsi etenemään, kun alussa sai luotua ylivoiman, mutta sitten on ollutkin vähän hiljaisempaa. Valitettavasti sama päteen Ukrainaan. Ilman ylivoimaa ei pääse eteenpäin. Ylivoima ei kuitenkaan tarkoita pelkkää mies- tai kalustomäärää, vaan joukkojen yhteenlaskettua kyvykkyyttä.
Aselajien yhteistyö - Kun noita videoita isommista hyökkäyksistä katsoo, mieleen tulee sitaatti Talvisota-elokuvasta "Jesus, pojaat tuallaasesta mitään tule."
Tulivoima tappaa - Epäreilulla pystyy listimään vihollisen omia tappioita kärsimättä, mutta tämän olisivat voineet suomalaiset kertoa jo kesän 1944 kokemuksilla sekä ottavana että antavana osapuolena.
Ja tietysti valitettavasti se Napoleonin vanha teesi, eli että sodankäyntiin tarvittavista resursseista kolme tärkeintä ovat: 1) Raha, 2) Raha ja 3) Raha.
Ilmatilan hallinta - Dronet hoitaa tuota tässä sodassa, mutta jatkossa niille ilmestyy vasta-ase, kuten aina on käynyt. Kuitenkin tilannetta voi mielestäni verrata aika hyvin ensimmäiseen maailmansotaan ja lentokoneisiin. Niiden päätarkoitushan oli tiedustella tykistölle maaleja. Ne suurelle yleisölle tunnetuimmat hävittäjät oli tarkoitettu vain tuhoamaan vihollisen tiedustelukoneet ja suojaamaan omia tiedustelukoneita. Punaiset paronit sun muut olivat vain oheistuotteita, eivät tavoite. Nyt dronet tiedustelevat ja tuhoavat, mutta tuo ensin mainittu lienee tärkeämpi kyky, vaikka tuhovoima onkin suurelle yleisölle myyvempää ja näyttävämpää.
(Paikallinen) ylivoima - Kolminkertaista ylivoimaahan sitä meilläkin 1995-96 aina toitotettiin. Ryssä pääsi etenemään, kun alussa sai luotua ylivoiman, mutta sitten on ollutkin vähän hiljaisempaa. Valitettavasti sama päteen Ukrainaan. Ilman ylivoimaa ei pääse eteenpäin. Ylivoima ei kuitenkaan tarkoita pelkkää mies- tai kalustomäärää, vaan joukkojen yhteenlaskettua kyvykkyyttä.
Aselajien yhteistyö - Kun noita videoita isommista hyökkäyksistä katsoo, mieleen tulee sitaatti Talvisota-elokuvasta "Jesus, pojaat tuallaasesta mitään tule."
Tulivoima tappaa - Epäreilulla pystyy listimään vihollisen omia tappioita kärsimättä, mutta tämän olisivat voineet suomalaiset kertoa jo kesän 1944 kokemuksilla sekä ottavana että antavana osapuolena.
Ja tietysti valitettavasti se Napoleonin vanha teesi, eli että sodankäyntiin tarvittavista resursseista kolme tärkeintä ovat: 1) Raha, 2) Raha ja 3) Raha.
Vonka
Supreme Leader
Napoleon varmaan lisäisi tähän teknologian, jos vielä kykenisi puhumaan. Robert Fulton esitteli höyrylaivaprojektiaan hänelle ennnen englantilaisia ja amerikkalaisia, mutta ei Napoleon uskonut ja investoinut siihen.
Väitetään, että kun häntä vietiin St. Helenan saarelle purjealuksella, höyrylaiva sivuutti heidät. Kaskun mukaan Napoleon sanoi, että "siellä menee keisarikruununi". Ehkä se nyt ei kuitenkaan ihan näin mennyt, mutta tarina on hyvä.
Ei.Napoleon varmaan lisäisi tähän teknologian, jos vielä kykenisi puhumaan. Robert Fulton esitteli höyrylaivaprojektiaan hänelle ennnen englantilaisia ja amerikkalaisia, mutta ei Napoleon uskonut ja investoinut siihen.
Väitetään, että kun häntä vietiin St. Helenan saarelle purjealuksella, höyrylaiva sivuutti heidät. Kaskun mukaan Napoleon sanoi, että "siellä menee keisarikruununi". Ehkä se nyt ei kuitenkaan ihan näin mennyt, mutta tarina on hyvä.
Sillä myös se teknologia vaatii rahaa.
moikkari
Luutnantti
Droneissa on vielä paljon kehittämisen varaa. Luultavasti yksikään droneswarmi Ukrainassa ei osaa kommunikoida keskenään, siitä saatava hyöty voisi olla aika iso.
Usealla samanaikasesti ilmassa olevalla dronella pitäisi pystyä muodostamaan aika hyvä kuva ympärillä olevasta alueesta, kun ne pystyisi mm. paikallistamaan vihollisen tulta, radiosignaaleja yms. pelkstään kolmiomittaamalla tarkasti saamaansa radiosignaaleja ja äänidataa.
Voisiko jopa vastatykistötutkankin korvata parilla kymmenellä dronella jotka on sijotettu kauemmaksi toisistaan?
Jos dronet osaisi kommunikoida ja jatkolähettää toistensa signaaleja ne pystyisi paremmin estämään jammauksen, mm. lähettämällä ylempänä oleville droneille signaalin joka siirtää sen selustaan. Tällästäkään ei taida olla missään Ukrainassa olevassa dronessa.
Ukrainan budjetilla tosin halvat "tyhmät" dronet on kannattavampia, mutta kun isot länsimaiset puolustusfirmat alkavat kehittämään niin alkaa tapahtua. Toistaseksi tosin tarvittaisiin markkinat siihen että alkaisi tapahtua.
Usealla samanaikasesti ilmassa olevalla dronella pitäisi pystyä muodostamaan aika hyvä kuva ympärillä olevasta alueesta, kun ne pystyisi mm. paikallistamaan vihollisen tulta, radiosignaaleja yms. pelkstään kolmiomittaamalla tarkasti saamaansa radiosignaaleja ja äänidataa.
Voisiko jopa vastatykistötutkankin korvata parilla kymmenellä dronella jotka on sijotettu kauemmaksi toisistaan?
Jos dronet osaisi kommunikoida ja jatkolähettää toistensa signaaleja ne pystyisi paremmin estämään jammauksen, mm. lähettämällä ylempänä oleville droneille signaalin joka siirtää sen selustaan. Tällästäkään ei taida olla missään Ukrainassa olevassa dronessa.
Ukrainan budjetilla tosin halvat "tyhmät" dronet on kannattavampia, mutta kun isot länsimaiset puolustusfirmat alkavat kehittämään niin alkaa tapahtua. Toistaseksi tosin tarvittaisiin markkinat siihen että alkaisi tapahtua.
John Hilly
Ylipäällikkö
Monet vapaaehtoisryhmät ovat hankkineet lahjoitusvaroilla kuluttajatason drooneja Ukrainan asevoimille. Kiinan päättämien vientirajoitusten pelätään vaikeuttavan tätä toimintaa jatkossa, kertoo BBC.
Lontoossa toimivan RUSI-ajatuspajan mukaan Ukraina menettää tällä hetkellä noin 10 000 lennokkia joka kuukausi. Korvaavia laitteita tarvittaisiin suuria määriä.
Lontoossa toimivan RUSI-ajatuspajan mukaan Ukraina menettää tällä hetkellä noin 10 000 lennokkia joka kuukausi. Korvaavia laitteita tarvittaisiin suuria määriä.
Ukraina menettää taisteluissa 10000 lennokkia kuukaudessa | Verkkouutiset
Kiinan asettamien vientirajoitusten pelätään vaikeuttavan laitteiden hankintaa rintamalle.
www.verkkouutiset.fi
Suomen PV oli tuossa kohdin vielä Käteisen hallituksen ajaman tiukan säästökuurin alla. Sipilän hallitus sitten antoi jotakin mutta lähinnä roposia kirstuun ja paperille miesvahvuutta joka tosiasiallisesti oli jo olemassa.
Iso näkyvä muutos olivat varmaan maavoimien valmiusyksiköt.
John Hilly
Ylipäällikkö
– Ydinaseuhkauksilla on ollut vain rajallista menestystä. Ne eivät ole saaneet Ukrainaa antautumaan, ja vaikka ne ovat hidastaneet länsimaiden päätöksiä asetoimituksista, ne eivät ole pysäyttäneet asevirtaa, Yhdysvaltain Kiovan-suurlähettiläänä 1998–2000 toiminut Pifer sanoo Brookings-ajatushautomon julkaisemassa artikkelissa.
– Venäjän puheenvuorojen kakofonia on tuottanut ydinasesignaaleja, jotka ovat sekavia, ristiriitaisia ja joita pidetään yhä useammin bluffina. Tämän ei pitäisi miellyttää Kremliä eikä myöskään länttä, hän toteaa.
– Venäjän puheenvuorojen kakofonia on tuottanut ydinasesignaaleja, jotka ovat sekavia, ristiriitaisia ja joita pidetään yhä useammin bluffina. Tämän ei pitäisi miellyttää Kremliä eikä myöskään länttä, hän toteaa.
Kreml viestii ydinsodasta, aseita virtaa Ukrainaan | Verkkouutiset
Ristiriitaisen ydinretoriikan seuraukset saattavat olla Steven Pfizerin mukaan jopa katastrofaalisia.
www.verkkouutiset.fi
ultimateidiot
Kapteeni
MHV:n video raivausvaunuista Ukrainassa. Sinänsä videolla ei käsitellä sitä suurinta ongelmaa, eli uuden ja laajalle levinneen sensorikaluston (dronet, satelliitit, jne) asettamia haasteita raivauskaluston ja murtopaikan suojauksessa.
John Hilly
Ylipäällikkö
Maan ilmapuolustusta vahvistetaan New York Times -lehden mukaan ”hirviöaseilla” eli niin kutsutulla FrankenSAM-hankkeella. Leikkimielinen termi viittaa kokonaisuuteen, jossa modernit länsimaiset ohjusjärjestelmät yhdistetään neuvostoaikaisiin laukaisujärjestelmiin tai tutkiin, joita Ukrainan asevoimilla on jo runsaasti kalustossaan.
Kuin Frankensteinin hirviö - nämä aseet suojaavat pian Ukrainan taivasta | Verkkouutiset
Yhdysvalloissa on kokeiltu neuvostoaikaisten järjestelmien yhdistämistä länsimaiseen kalustoon.
www.verkkouutiset.fi
Varmaan sopii tännekin.
Linkissä dokumentti Zaluznyin ajatuksista, aiheena nykyaikainen sodankäynti ja miten voittaa sota.
Linkissä dokumentti Zaluznyin ajatuksista, aiheena nykyaikainen sodankäynti ja miten voittaa sota.
John Hilly
Ylipäällikkö
Tammikuussa 2023 Ukrainan puolustusministeriön julkaiseman tiedon mukaan vuonna 2022 Venäjä tuotti noin 50–60 pitkän matkan ohjusta kuukaudessa.
Ukrainan asevoimien esikunnan viimeisimmän arvion mukaan Venäjä on kuluvana vuonna lisännyt tuotantoaan 100 ohjukseen kuukaudessa. Lisäksi Venäjällä on yhä noin 120 neuvostoliittolaista H-120-ohjusta ja satoja lyhyemmän kantaman ohjuksia.
Ukrainan asevoimien esikunnan viimeisimmän arvion mukaan Venäjä on kuluvana vuonna lisännyt tuotantoaan 100 ohjukseen kuukaudessa. Lisäksi Venäjällä on yhä noin 120 neuvostoliittolaista H-120-ohjusta ja satoja lyhyemmän kantaman ohjuksia.
Kreml vauhditti ohjustuotantoa - miten Ukrainan tärkeitä kohteita suojataan? | Verkkouutiset
Venäjä on ilmeisesti säästänyt ohjuksia talvea ja Ukrainan energiainfrastruktuurin uutta tuhoamisyritystä varten.
www.verkkouutiset.fi
Antares
Respected Leader
Ajatuksia herättänyt tapaus, jonka kaikkia taustatekijöitä (jos sellaisia on) ei tiedetä varmaksi:
Commander of 128th Mountain Assault Brigade, Col. Dmytro Lysyuk, was late for the award ceremony. The event was scheduled for 9:00, but postponed to 9:30. Soldiers were line up on his order, and waiting. Russian strike occurred at ~10:10, and he arrived a few minutes after.
source:
https://hromadske.ua/posts/kombrig-...gorodzhennya-poki-jogo-chekali-stavsya-prilit
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Mitäpä tähän sanomaan, nyt kävi näin? Jos oletetaan että komentajan viipyminen ei ollut tahallista vaan vahinko ja ryssä onnistui hyödyntämään havaitsemaansa tilaisuutta (toki reaktioajan on täytynyt olla nopea), niin hyvin ikävä tapaus.
Sotaa käyty nyt 620 päivää ja voisi kuvitella että tällaisia suuria virheitä ei sattuisi, ei ainakaan lähellä rintamaa. Yksittäistapaus tietysti, näitä ei satu joka päivä ja tuskin edes kerran kuukaudessa, mutta silti ikävää.
Minulle tuli heti mieleen oman asepalveluksen aikaiset "kiiruhda odottamaan" tapaukset, toki silloin ei oltu sodassa vaan ainoastaan ulkona muodossa odottamassa. Vaikea sellaisesta toiminnasta on ketään syyttää, olen itsekin luonteeltani "mieluummin hieman liian aikaisin kuin liian myöhään" -tyyppinen, mikä johtaa tietysti siihen että ollaan aina hieman etuajassa. Silti luulisi että sota-aikana tiedostettaisiin paremmin, millaisia riskejä tietynlainen toiminta sisältää. Varsinkin etulinjan lähellä JA tällaisessa sodassa, jossa molemmat osapuolet tiedustelevat kokoajan droneilla.
Commander of 128th Mountain Assault Brigade, Col. Dmytro Lysyuk, was late for the award ceremony. The event was scheduled for 9:00, but postponed to 9:30. Soldiers were line up on his order, and waiting. Russian strike occurred at ~10:10, and he arrived a few minutes after.
source:
https://hromadske.ua/posts/kombrig-...gorodzhennya-poki-jogo-chekali-stavsya-prilit
The brigade commander of the 128th brigade was late for the awards. While they were waiting for him, the flight arrived
Markiyan Klymkovetskyi
06 November 2023 13:30
Brigadier Dmytro Lysyuk
128 OGSHBr
The commander of the 128th separate Transcarpathian mountain assault brigade, Dmytro Lysyuk, was late for the event for the Day of Missile Troops and Artillery, which was organized near the front line in Zaporozhye. The servicemen waited for the combrig for more than half an hour, and then the flight arrived, as a result of which there are dead and wounded.
This was reported by hromadske sources from the 128th brigade.
One of our interlocutors noted that the awards ceremony was initially scheduled for 9:00 a.m., but was postponed to 9:30 a.m. At this time, the military was already lined up and waiting for the commander. At about 10:10 a.m., a Russian strike occurred.
The combrig arrived literally 2 minutes after its arrival.
Hromadske's source noted that the Russians were following the fighters of the 128th brigade from a drone, adjusting the missile strike. However, the invaders made a mistake and hit the building behind the soldiers, closer to the road.
"And it turns out that all those who stood closer to the road, all 200 of them (died - ed.). And the personnel who were specifically to be awarded (gun commanders, gunners, gunners) were slightly covered by the wall of the building that was hit by the Iskander. Due to this, the number of victims is a little less ," says one of our sources.
At the same time, many soldiers were injured by debris, the interlocutor added.
What is known about the death of the soldiers of the 128th brigade?
On November 3, the occupiers struck a gathering of soldiers of the 128th OGSHBr, when they, according to hromadske sources in the Armed Forces, gathered for an award ceremony in honor of Artillery Day in the front-line zone of the Zaporizhzhia region. The Center for Strategic Communications of the Armed Forces reported that the Russians struck with an "Iskander-M" missile.
The 128th brigade confirmed the death of 19 of its soldiers as a result of a rocket attack. It was reported there that all the circumstances of the tragedy are now being checked.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyi expressed his condolences to the families of the fallen fighters and said that this tragedy could have been avoided. Defense Minister Rustem Umyerov promised that all the circumstances of what happened will be clarified. He instructed the Chief Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense to carry out a full investigation of the tragedy.
The State Bureau of Investigation began to investigate the circumstances of the death of servicemen of the 128th Brigade and initiated an official investigation into the actions of military officials who organized the event for the Day of Missile Troops and Artillery.
Markiyan Klymkovetskyi
06 November 2023 13:30
Brigadier Dmytro Lysyuk
128 OGSHBr
The commander of the 128th separate Transcarpathian mountain assault brigade, Dmytro Lysyuk, was late for the event for the Day of Missile Troops and Artillery, which was organized near the front line in Zaporozhye. The servicemen waited for the combrig for more than half an hour, and then the flight arrived, as a result of which there are dead and wounded.
This was reported by hromadske sources from the 128th brigade.
One of our interlocutors noted that the awards ceremony was initially scheduled for 9:00 a.m., but was postponed to 9:30 a.m. At this time, the military was already lined up and waiting for the commander. At about 10:10 a.m., a Russian strike occurred.
The combrig arrived literally 2 minutes after its arrival.
Hromadske's source noted that the Russians were following the fighters of the 128th brigade from a drone, adjusting the missile strike. However, the invaders made a mistake and hit the building behind the soldiers, closer to the road.
"And it turns out that all those who stood closer to the road, all 200 of them (died - ed.). And the personnel who were specifically to be awarded (gun commanders, gunners, gunners) were slightly covered by the wall of the building that was hit by the Iskander. Due to this, the number of victims is a little less ," says one of our sources.
At the same time, many soldiers were injured by debris, the interlocutor added.
What is known about the death of the soldiers of the 128th brigade?
On November 3, the occupiers struck a gathering of soldiers of the 128th OGSHBr, when they, according to hromadske sources in the Armed Forces, gathered for an award ceremony in honor of Artillery Day in the front-line zone of the Zaporizhzhia region. The Center for Strategic Communications of the Armed Forces reported that the Russians struck with an "Iskander-M" missile.
The 128th brigade confirmed the death of 19 of its soldiers as a result of a rocket attack. It was reported there that all the circumstances of the tragedy are now being checked.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyi expressed his condolences to the families of the fallen fighters and said that this tragedy could have been avoided. Defense Minister Rustem Umyerov promised that all the circumstances of what happened will be clarified. He instructed the Chief Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense to carry out a full investigation of the tragedy.
The State Bureau of Investigation began to investigate the circumstances of the death of servicemen of the 128th Brigade and initiated an official investigation into the actions of military officials who organized the event for the Day of Missile Troops and Artillery.
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Mitäpä tähän sanomaan, nyt kävi näin? Jos oletetaan että komentajan viipyminen ei ollut tahallista vaan vahinko ja ryssä onnistui hyödyntämään havaitsemaansa tilaisuutta (toki reaktioajan on täytynyt olla nopea), niin hyvin ikävä tapaus.
Sotaa käyty nyt 620 päivää ja voisi kuvitella että tällaisia suuria virheitä ei sattuisi, ei ainakaan lähellä rintamaa. Yksittäistapaus tietysti, näitä ei satu joka päivä ja tuskin edes kerran kuukaudessa, mutta silti ikävää.
Minulle tuli heti mieleen oman asepalveluksen aikaiset "kiiruhda odottamaan" tapaukset, toki silloin ei oltu sodassa vaan ainoastaan ulkona muodossa odottamassa. Vaikea sellaisesta toiminnasta on ketään syyttää, olen itsekin luonteeltani "mieluummin hieman liian aikaisin kuin liian myöhään" -tyyppinen, mikä johtaa tietysti siihen että ollaan aina hieman etuajassa. Silti luulisi että sota-aikana tiedostettaisiin paremmin, millaisia riskejä tietynlainen toiminta sisältää. Varsinkin etulinjan lähellä JA tällaisessa sodassa, jossa molemmat osapuolet tiedustelevat kokoajan droneilla.
Antares
Respected Leader
Ryssän tyhmä FAB-250 rautapommi johon asennettu liitokitti (ФАБ+УМПК joka kääntyy muotoon FAB + UMPK). Tämä ei räjähtänyt vaan jäi valtaosaksi ehjäksi, hyvät kuvat laitoksesta:
Images of a modified Russian FAB-250 glide bomb that failed to detonate.
In 2023, the Russians adapted FAB-250 bombs and equipped them with planning and correction modules. The FAB-250 itself is a "dumb bomb" originally designed in the Soviet Union. Just to clarify.
Images of a modified Russian FAB-250 glide bomb that failed to detonate.
In 2023, the Russians adapted FAB-250 bombs and equipped them with planning and correction modules. The FAB-250 itself is a "dumb bomb" originally designed in the Soviet Union. Just to clarify.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Venäläinen arvio Ukrainan sodan opetuksista ja vaikutuksista, lainaan ketjun tekstin spoilerin taakse:
QUICK THREAD on the Russian perceptions and analysis of weapons and systems that most influenced the course of war in Ukraine, and for other global conflicts going forward. The points are from a Russian Telegram channel, so usual caveats apply.
https://t.me/UAVDEV/4403
QUICK THREAD on the Russian perceptions and analysis of weapons and systems that most influenced the course of war in Ukraine, and for other global conflicts going forward. The points are from a Russian Telegram channel, so usual caveats apply.
https://t.me/UAVDEV/4403
"First, kamikaze drones - Lancet, Switchblade, FPV, bombers, drone (signal) repeaters - they changed the course of war - it's stupid to deny it. One unit with a Mavic drone can take out up to 300 (enemy) fighters per month. 99% of these drone products are private - either completely private, or developed by private owners and implemented with government participation."
"Next, uncrewed surface boats have changed the behavior of the naval fleet. It is (USV) a completely private development. There are no countermeasures against them yet, other than a sailor with a machine gun."
"3D printing: it allowed not only to create entire lines of ammunition, but also to mass-produce serial ammunition. For example, to make adapters for the batteries of the PTM-3 and MVE-72 mines so that they can work, or to making adapters for walkie-talkies and other equipment."
"Next, Starlink: one can argue how private it really is, but officially it is private. Our official answer - it is a space pager."
"Trench electronic warfare/radio-electronic reconnaissance – before the war in Ukraine, no one knew what that really was. Who would have thought to install electronic warfare in every trench?! Including tank electronic warfare!"
"Next, communications: there is no point in mentioning manufacturers of (domestic) stillborn communications tech at the level of the early 90s. Today's "homing" artillery (let's call it that) is a gun on the move, which can itself determine its coordinates and elevation angle, and by itself, with the help of drones, aim at the target, automatically fire the ammunition and leave - I'm talking about FH77BW L52 "Archer" system."
"That’s exactly it - to do this on its own and quickly - why? Because it will get the info from a drone or a UAV. We can manufacture the "Archer" equivalents using our tech base and our Glonass system. Yes, we have "Koalitsiya" system but it all weighs 48 tons. Or you can put the D-30 system on a Kamaz truck or on a Grad system, and on similar weapons - it is not difficult."
"Next, "Pantsir" is perhaps the only Russian government development on this list. It surprised not only with its successful concept, but also with its ability to shoot and guide a missile on the move. It is the "Pantsir" that will determine how other air defenses will measure up in the coming years."
"Next, "Himars" - everyone knew about it very well, they (Russian defense) made a Tornado-C (equivalent) - we just didn't have enough time to do (enough of) it. UMPK was used by Americans since 1996. This is also not news - they made it to Ukraine, quickly brought it to mass production, and applied it in combat."
"Next, "Krasnopol" - a successful application, in conjunction with a UAV, but again not a new thing. Although "Excalibur" made it possible to deliver several important strikes, in general, it did not particularly stand out from the rest of the high-precision munition."
"Next, KA-52 is a very good helicopter, but it didn’t bring anything new to the war and at first, even got shot down from a Stugna. If the enemy has developed air defense, the survival of Ka-52 is doubtful (as tested by Wagner). Actually, using it they way it was used was not because of "a good life", everyone understands it."
"Next, the naval fleet in general: one joy is that we also have all the means to fight the adversary fleet, it’s just that the enemy does not have a fleet to begin with. If he had existed (in Ukraine), it too would have suffered casualties."
"Next, a large wheeled electronic warfare/electronic recon system that had a lot of hope placed on it is detected from a drone and is taken out by the first drone or artillery strike. Therefore, all the “motorized EW” are located in the rear, and the accuracy of the electronic recon is therefore reduced due to the distance from the signal sources."
"Next, towed artillery - I don’t know what needs to be explained here... If there is enough enemy FPVs (to target it), it turns into a mass grave. Trenches as defensive structures: in the absence of electronic warfare against drones, it’s just an enemy shooting range."
"Next, vehicle-mounted ATGMs: with the development of countermeasures based on tanks and other vehicles, the ATGM crew is the first goal to target. The Stugna concept is currently the only working one for ATGMs. But we also need our own “fire and forget” missiles."
"Moreover, your favorite tanks: suddenly it became clear that the MBT needed to be protected all around. During the war, the layout of the tank protection completely changed, CUAS cope cages have appeared, and tank-based electronic warfare also appeared. Also, heavy munitions scattered by large drones make a tank without trawls disposable."
Finally, there are still few effective drones, they can take out only a percentage of targets. Yes, now tanks and artillery are being taken out. But in 5 years the picture will change and drones will already be fully functional army products, with a wide range of frequency control, with homing and target recognition, and they will hit the tank in the back of the turret like Leopards now."
"But in 5 years will there be enough protected T-90 or Abrams tanks? Will there be canopies at airfields? Will there be nets over the trenches? Drones, as a form of evolution of guided weapons, have changed everything. Armored vehicles should now be built on the fact that the enemy can always see them and can hit them from any angle."
"And the fact that the war in Ukraine is still going on according to the old rules is a consequence of inertia and nothing more. And we have not yet even encountered the entire NATO arsenal."
"Next, uncrewed surface boats have changed the behavior of the naval fleet. It is (USV) a completely private development. There are no countermeasures against them yet, other than a sailor with a machine gun."
"3D printing: it allowed not only to create entire lines of ammunition, but also to mass-produce serial ammunition. For example, to make adapters for the batteries of the PTM-3 and MVE-72 mines so that they can work, or to making adapters for walkie-talkies and other equipment."
"Next, Starlink: one can argue how private it really is, but officially it is private. Our official answer - it is a space pager."
"Trench electronic warfare/radio-electronic reconnaissance – before the war in Ukraine, no one knew what that really was. Who would have thought to install electronic warfare in every trench?! Including tank electronic warfare!"
"Next, communications: there is no point in mentioning manufacturers of (domestic) stillborn communications tech at the level of the early 90s. Today's "homing" artillery (let's call it that) is a gun on the move, which can itself determine its coordinates and elevation angle, and by itself, with the help of drones, aim at the target, automatically fire the ammunition and leave - I'm talking about FH77BW L52 "Archer" system."
"That’s exactly it - to do this on its own and quickly - why? Because it will get the info from a drone or a UAV. We can manufacture the "Archer" equivalents using our tech base and our Glonass system. Yes, we have "Koalitsiya" system but it all weighs 48 tons. Or you can put the D-30 system on a Kamaz truck or on a Grad system, and on similar weapons - it is not difficult."
"Next, "Pantsir" is perhaps the only Russian government development on this list. It surprised not only with its successful concept, but also with its ability to shoot and guide a missile on the move. It is the "Pantsir" that will determine how other air defenses will measure up in the coming years."
"Next, "Himars" - everyone knew about it very well, they (Russian defense) made a Tornado-C (equivalent) - we just didn't have enough time to do (enough of) it. UMPK was used by Americans since 1996. This is also not news - they made it to Ukraine, quickly brought it to mass production, and applied it in combat."
"Next, "Krasnopol" - a successful application, in conjunction with a UAV, but again not a new thing. Although "Excalibur" made it possible to deliver several important strikes, in general, it did not particularly stand out from the rest of the high-precision munition."
"Next, KA-52 is a very good helicopter, but it didn’t bring anything new to the war and at first, even got shot down from a Stugna. If the enemy has developed air defense, the survival of Ka-52 is doubtful (as tested by Wagner). Actually, using it they way it was used was not because of "a good life", everyone understands it."
"Next, the naval fleet in general: one joy is that we also have all the means to fight the adversary fleet, it’s just that the enemy does not have a fleet to begin with. If he had existed (in Ukraine), it too would have suffered casualties."
"Next, a large wheeled electronic warfare/electronic recon system that had a lot of hope placed on it is detected from a drone and is taken out by the first drone or artillery strike. Therefore, all the “motorized EW” are located in the rear, and the accuracy of the electronic recon is therefore reduced due to the distance from the signal sources."
"Next, towed artillery - I don’t know what needs to be explained here... If there is enough enemy FPVs (to target it), it turns into a mass grave. Trenches as defensive structures: in the absence of electronic warfare against drones, it’s just an enemy shooting range."
"Next, vehicle-mounted ATGMs: with the development of countermeasures based on tanks and other vehicles, the ATGM crew is the first goal to target. The Stugna concept is currently the only working one for ATGMs. But we also need our own “fire and forget” missiles."
"Moreover, your favorite tanks: suddenly it became clear that the MBT needed to be protected all around. During the war, the layout of the tank protection completely changed, CUAS cope cages have appeared, and tank-based electronic warfare also appeared. Also, heavy munitions scattered by large drones make a tank without trawls disposable."
Finally, there are still few effective drones, they can take out only a percentage of targets. Yes, now tanks and artillery are being taken out. But in 5 years the picture will change and drones will already be fully functional army products, with a wide range of frequency control, with homing and target recognition, and they will hit the tank in the back of the turret like Leopards now."
"But in 5 years will there be enough protected T-90 or Abrams tanks? Will there be canopies at airfields? Will there be nets over the trenches? Drones, as a form of evolution of guided weapons, have changed everything. Armored vehicles should now be built on the fact that the enemy can always see them and can hit them from any angle."
"And the fact that the war in Ukraine is still going on according to the old rules is a consequence of inertia and nothing more. And we have not yet even encountered the entire NATO arsenal."
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Spekulaatiota videosta, jossa näyttää siltä että Lancet-drone räjähtää selvästi ennen kohteeseen osumista:
Alkuperäisen viestin tekstin käännös:
The Russians are introducing modified " Lancet " drones into the battlefield.
In the video, the modified drone hit the "Bradley" infantry fighting vehicle (location unknown).
The new Lancet has received additional cameras that ensure the operation of the so-called LIDAR, a system for obtaining data about distant objects by reflecting light and scattering it in transparent and translucent environments.
Thanks to this technology, the Lancet's warhead detonates at a certain distance from the target.
After the warhead explodes, the cumulative jet reaches the target. Interestingly, these few meters do not reduce the penetrating properties of such a cumulative jet due to the new design of the Lancet head .
Comment:
If this modification gains momentum, equipping the Ukrainian Armed Forces with protective nets may be ineffective.
This is what LIDAR looks like on the new Lancet modification.
-
Jaroslaw Wolskin viestin käännös:
Here, as an anti-tank guy, let me add something to the colonel's entry @Maciej_Korowaj - as I understand it, the first part is simply a translation from runets and that is why it is much more optimistic (for RUS) than it should be.
The distance always significantly reduces the effectiveness of the cumulative head (insert opening angle below 140 degrees). Typically, a distance of over 26 diameters of the charge from the target means that the shaped charge jet is unable to penetrate a shield thicker than the diameter of the charge from which it was formed. This happens due to the spacing of the elongated stream.
Therefore, the so-called "focal length of the charge", i.e. the optimal initiation distance of the head in relation to the target, is extremely important. It is usually about 6-8 calibers of insert. In other words, if the Lancet has a 120 mm cumulative cartridge (actually there are three serial versions of it with different diameters), a distance of about 4 m should protect most vehicles. That is, if a stream forms at this distance. The optimal distance of charge initiation to the target is approximately 80cm-1m.
Where was the problem?
Well, quite flexible nets that "catched" and slowed down the Lancet so that its fuze did not work or worked when the lancet was hanging on the net and aiming at the sky/earth.
Therefore, RUS introduced a rather simple laser proximity fuze. There is probably no full lidar/ladar, just a simple system measuring the distance to the target and an accelerometer - when it detects the missile "decelerating" in front of the target (and the distance is measured), it detonates the charge.
What's the point?
First, the Lancet will ALWAYS explode anyway.
Second - do you remember those 4 m for the Lancet to penetrate less than 120 mm of steel? Well, there's still a lot. Crab tower, IFV, Rosomak - here we are still talking about less than 50mm of steel (calculated).
Therefore, even a "classic" warhead detonated far beyond the optimum focal length can do serious damage to the target - because it can penetrate the armor. This is the main "gain" from changing the Lancet.
As for the use of "slow stretching jet" or EFP heads - I have not seen any evidence of the existence of the former in Russia or of the use of the latter in the Lancet series. And theoretically, EFP would solve most of the Lancet's problems BUT here the pierceability is 0.8 of the insert diameter for most technical solutions in inserts (except in the USA, where 1.6 diameters have already been extruded).
And as for the effectiveness of the RUS analogue of Spike NLOS (because that's what Lancet is), I will comment in the context of the entry
The Russians are introducing modified " Lancet " drones into the battlefield.
In the video, the modified drone hit the "Bradley" infantry fighting vehicle (location unknown).
The new Lancet has received additional cameras that ensure the operation of the so-called LIDAR, a system for obtaining data about distant objects by reflecting light and scattering it in transparent and translucent environments.
Thanks to this technology, the Lancet's warhead detonates at a certain distance from the target.
After the warhead explodes, the cumulative jet reaches the target. Interestingly, these few meters do not reduce the penetrating properties of such a cumulative jet due to the new design of the Lancet head .
Comment:
If this modification gains momentum, equipping the Ukrainian Armed Forces with protective nets may be ineffective.
This is what LIDAR looks like on the new Lancet modification.
-
Jaroslaw Wolskin viestin käännös:
Here, as an anti-tank guy, let me add something to the colonel's entry @Maciej_Korowaj - as I understand it, the first part is simply a translation from runets and that is why it is much more optimistic (for RUS) than it should be.
The distance always significantly reduces the effectiveness of the cumulative head (insert opening angle below 140 degrees). Typically, a distance of over 26 diameters of the charge from the target means that the shaped charge jet is unable to penetrate a shield thicker than the diameter of the charge from which it was formed. This happens due to the spacing of the elongated stream.
Therefore, the so-called "focal length of the charge", i.e. the optimal initiation distance of the head in relation to the target, is extremely important. It is usually about 6-8 calibers of insert. In other words, if the Lancet has a 120 mm cumulative cartridge (actually there are three serial versions of it with different diameters), a distance of about 4 m should protect most vehicles. That is, if a stream forms at this distance. The optimal distance of charge initiation to the target is approximately 80cm-1m.
Where was the problem?
Well, quite flexible nets that "catched" and slowed down the Lancet so that its fuze did not work or worked when the lancet was hanging on the net and aiming at the sky/earth.
Therefore, RUS introduced a rather simple laser proximity fuze. There is probably no full lidar/ladar, just a simple system measuring the distance to the target and an accelerometer - when it detects the missile "decelerating" in front of the target (and the distance is measured), it detonates the charge.
What's the point?
First, the Lancet will ALWAYS explode anyway.
Second - do you remember those 4 m for the Lancet to penetrate less than 120 mm of steel? Well, there's still a lot. Crab tower, IFV, Rosomak - here we are still talking about less than 50mm of steel (calculated).
Therefore, even a "classic" warhead detonated far beyond the optimum focal length can do serious damage to the target - because it can penetrate the armor. This is the main "gain" from changing the Lancet.
As for the use of "slow stretching jet" or EFP heads - I have not seen any evidence of the existence of the former in Russia or of the use of the latter in the Lancet series. And theoretically, EFP would solve most of the Lancet's problems BUT here the pierceability is 0.8 of the insert diameter for most technical solutions in inserts (except in the USA, where 1.6 diameters have already been extruded).
And as for the effectiveness of the RUS analogue of Spike NLOS (because that's what Lancet is), I will comment in the context of the entry
Antares
Respected Leader
Venäläinen kirjoittaa tytärammusten tehosta ja vaikutuksesta (kirjoitus julkaistu 14.11.2023 - spoilerin takana tekstin käännös):
Russian instructor of Storm Z penal units explains the impact that Ukrainian cluster munitions are having on the Russian infantry, not only killing and wounding them, but also disrupting logistics of evacuation, and overfilling the hospitals. He says that wounded Russian servicemen are returned to battle with shrapnel still stuck in their bodies.
https://t.me/philologist_zov/688
Russian instructor of Storm Z penal units explains the impact that Ukrainian cluster munitions are having on the Russian infantry, not only killing and wounding them, but also disrupting logistics of evacuation, and overfilling the hospitals. He says that wounded Russian servicemen are returned to battle with shrapnel still stuck in their bodies.
https://t.me/philologist_zov/688
Philologist in the gray zone
Returning to the issue of cluster shells . Am I using the term "game changer" too boldly?
Some people find this characterization stretched. It is quite possible that someone will still decide that I am using the term too freely. Well, let’s assume that I’m an artist, that’s how I see it .
And I see the following.
Here we have a certain Wunderwaffe, which, for all its effectiveness, does not improve the situation at the front due to its limited or even targeted use.
Let's say we have a wonderful "Smerch" system, which in fact does not affect the general state of affairs at the front.
These MLRS deliver targeted strikes, but they are simply not enough to provide a full barrage of fire for the advancing infantry. It needs to be scaled up, then there will be a really tangible effect on the ground, and not just separate cases for the plots of TV programs (alkuperäinen teksti: the program “Visiting a War Tale.”)
And there are also military-technological means that are not only used with a high degree of efficiency, but are also presented in commercial quantities, as a result of which the contours of direct combat operations, rear infrastructure and military logistics literally break down.
Here, in terms of the specific means of destruction available to the enemy, I would highlight three elements that radically complicate the situation: HIMARS, kamikaze drones, and the cluster shells.
It is cluster shells that are now knocking out a huge mass of our infantry with the layering of a number of negative factors.
The infantry suffers heavy excess losses directly on the battlefield, as a result of which the execution of combat missions is disrupted, and in addition to this there is an overstrain of evacuation logistics and an overload of the military medical infrastructure.
The rapid depletion of infantry units, coupled with the overload of hospitals, leads to the fact that people are massively returned to the battle, primary undertreated and often with small damaging elements in the soft tissues not removed.
In addition, as I said above, cluster shells have a very favorable ratio of the quantity used to the quality of fire damage inflicted on infantry.
The general situation at the front, of course, consists of a whole complex of various factors, but weapons like these also have a significant influence on it.
It would seem logical to ask the question: well, where is the “game change”? After all, there are no radical shifts in the front line, much less breakthroughs from the enemy! However, there are not any on our side either! And there is a price. Very high and sad price.
Exhausting and bleeding the enemy on the defensive, and then collapsing the front with powerful counterattacks would be an excellent plan if implemented. But in fact, along the way, we ourselves were pretty exhausted and bled dry. Here is a “game change” in which cluster shells have already played and continue to play their role.
t.me/philologist_zov/688
45.1Kviews
Nov 14 at 02:11
Returning to the issue of cluster shells . Am I using the term "game changer" too boldly?
Some people find this characterization stretched. It is quite possible that someone will still decide that I am using the term too freely. Well, let’s assume that I’m an artist, that’s how I see it .
And I see the following.
Here we have a certain Wunderwaffe, which, for all its effectiveness, does not improve the situation at the front due to its limited or even targeted use.
Let's say we have a wonderful "Smerch" system, which in fact does not affect the general state of affairs at the front.
These MLRS deliver targeted strikes, but they are simply not enough to provide a full barrage of fire for the advancing infantry. It needs to be scaled up, then there will be a really tangible effect on the ground, and not just separate cases for the plots of TV programs (alkuperäinen teksti: the program “Visiting a War Tale.”)
And there are also military-technological means that are not only used with a high degree of efficiency, but are also presented in commercial quantities, as a result of which the contours of direct combat operations, rear infrastructure and military logistics literally break down.
Here, in terms of the specific means of destruction available to the enemy, I would highlight three elements that radically complicate the situation: HIMARS, kamikaze drones, and the cluster shells.
It is cluster shells that are now knocking out a huge mass of our infantry with the layering of a number of negative factors.
The infantry suffers heavy excess losses directly on the battlefield, as a result of which the execution of combat missions is disrupted, and in addition to this there is an overstrain of evacuation logistics and an overload of the military medical infrastructure.
The rapid depletion of infantry units, coupled with the overload of hospitals, leads to the fact that people are massively returned to the battle, primary undertreated and often with small damaging elements in the soft tissues not removed.
In addition, as I said above, cluster shells have a very favorable ratio of the quantity used to the quality of fire damage inflicted on infantry.
The general situation at the front, of course, consists of a whole complex of various factors, but weapons like these also have a significant influence on it.
It would seem logical to ask the question: well, where is the “game change”? After all, there are no radical shifts in the front line, much less breakthroughs from the enemy! However, there are not any on our side either! And there is a price. Very high and sad price.
Exhausting and bleeding the enemy on the defensive, and then collapsing the front with powerful counterattacks would be an excellent plan if implemented. But in fact, along the way, we ourselves were pretty exhausted and bled dry. Here is a “game change” in which cluster shells have already played and continue to play their role.
t.me/philologist_zov/688
45.1Kviews
Nov 14 at 02:11