Wanha mutta aika mielenkiintoinen artikkeli. Koskettaa myös Suomalaisia:
While serving in Afghanistan, Capt. Dan Wojciechowski of the Washington National Guard often returned to a page in the Army counterinsurgency manual. There, he found a chart with bullet points of the best and worst practices for waging war against insurgents.
"You could go down it line by line, and if it was a best practice, we probably weren't following it," Wojciechowski said. "It was just jaw-dropping to see how that book was completely disregarded."
They also complain that their efforts to follow advice in the counterinsurgency manual were hamstrung by senior commanders. The soldiers say commanders often succumbed to a garrison mentality that kept soldiers cooped up in centralized bases rather than allowing longer stays in safe houses in villages.
The National Guard soldiers took pride in civilian experiences that they felt bolstered their qualifications to work with Afghan police and other civilian institutions. But they said those skills often were discounted by active-duty commanders.
Bert said he and Finnish soldiers figured out that Afghan police and security chiefs were making about $25,000 a month selling a fuel allocation and another $25,000 by putting 300 "ghosts" on the payroll. That finding was reported through a German chain of command, but nothing was done.
Varmaan tuli liki puolet artikkelia, mutta siinäpähän on.As the year wore on, the soldiers picked up promising intelligence leads about Taliban activities in villages. They sought to embed with local police in those communities, but often found it difficult to gain approval. Attacks against coalition forces had increased across Afghanistan last year, and it was difficult to muster enough armored vehicles and soldiers.
"Everyone — the Germans, the Swedes — wanted to work together, but it seemed like at levels above us, we couldn't put it together, or when we did it was too restrictive," Wojciechowski said. "Everyone was afraid to get too involved."