Afganistan

Pidempi juttu, alku alla: http://www.salon.com/2017/08/08/bla...pany-as-a-model-to-privatize-afghanistan-war/

Blackwater founder Erik Prince cites East India Company as a model to privatize Afghanistan war

President Donald Trump has grown increasingly frustrated with the 16-year long war in Afghanistan and is now weighing a plan to privatize much of the conflict by hiring Blackwater founder Erik Prince, the brother of the Secretary of Education, Betsy DeVos.

After he sold Blackwater, which then rebranded as Academi, Prince became the chairman of Hong Kong-based Frontier Services Group, a logistics and aviation company focused on Africa and South Asia that is backed by China’s state-owned CITIC Group.

Prince now wants to “restructure” the war in Afghanistan, which he described as “similar to a bankruptcy reorganization,” in a USA Today op-ed on Monday.

“By aligning U.S. efforts under a presidential envoy, all strategic decisions regarding humanitarian aid, military support and intelligence become laser-focused on creating a stable, self-supporting Afghanistan,” he argued.

In an interview with CNN’s Erin Burnett on Monday, Prince also insisted more air support was needed, meaning his private air force, something he has been described as having an “obsession” with in the past.

“So, they need government support, they need mentor support and they need air power, all attaching to the Afghan government which doesn’t meet — you guys like to throw the mercenary word around — they’re not mercenary,” Prince told Burnett. He also attended a meeting in the Seychelles with a Russian “fund manager,” but has repeatedly downplayed it.
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...
 
Osasto 31 kirjoitti:
Pidempi juttu, alku alla: http://www.salon.com/2017/08/08/bla...pany-as-a-model-to-privatize-afghanistan-war/
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...

Aika kunnianhimoinen ajatus yrittää aloittaa toiminta Afganistanissa joka ei mennyt briteilläkään ihan putkeen.

Afrikassa on ehkä maita joissa tällainen kolonisaatio yhden firman monopolin kautta olisi mahdollista, onko muualla niin epäilen.

Ja virallisesti kyseessä ei ole tosiaan kolonisaatio kuten hän itse sanoi, Intiakin oli alkuun kokoelma erilaisia valtioita joissa eri firmoilla oli monopolit, viralliset liitokset eurooppalaisiin emämaihin taphtuivat vasta lopussa.
 
Mitä tapahtui Amerikka Ensin systeemille? Onko tämä osa sitä?

US President Donald Trump is eyeing Afghanistan's mineral wealth to help pay for a 16-year war and reconstruction efforts that have already cost $117 billion. Investors who have studied the country, one of the world's most dangerous, say that is a pipe dream.

Ever since a United States Geological Survey study a decade ago identified deposits later estimated to have a potential value of as much as $1 trillion, both Afghan and foreign officials have trumpeted the reserves as a likely key to economic independence for Afghanistan.

As well as deposits of gold, silver and platinum, Afghanistan has significant quantities of iron ore, uranium, zinc, tantalum, bauxite, coal, natural gas and significant copper - a particular draw given the dearth of rich new copper mines globally.
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/w...-rebuilding-reconstruction-gold-a7904301.html
 
Analysis: Coalition and Afghan forces must target Taliban after overrunning bases

A recent Taliban attack on a remote Afghan Uniform Police base highlighted the tactical difficulties that Afghan forces and the Coalition face. On multiple fronts throughout Afghanistan, the Taliban has proven capable of massing in broad daylight, overrunning Afghan outposts, bases, and district centers, often at night, and celebrating their victories, all without fear of being targeted by Afghan and Coalition air forces.

A video released by the Taliban, entitled “Mansoor Goozar,” underscored the Taliban’s ability to take the fight to Afghan forces, often with little to stand in their way. In the video, a large Taliban force traveled in a convoy to an assembly area during daylight. The convoy was clearly identifiable as Taliban; the trucks were flying the Taliban’s white flag and the fighters were well armed.

Once they reached their destination, the fighters stopped to pray. Again, this occurred in broad daylight. The Taliban then assembled for their assault of the Afghan Uniform Police base. During the attack, which began after dark, the Taliban coordinated their actions using radios and set up support by fire position to aid in the assault.

The Taliban force appeared to have easily overrun the Afghan police outpost. After entering the base, the Taliban fighters organized all of the weapons, ammunition, vehicles (including US supplied HUMVEEs and Ford Ranger pickup trucks) to flaunt on social media. The Taliban then pulled out of the base during daylight taking their spoils.

The entire operation – from assault, to filming the war loot, to withdrawal – took about a day. Afghan ground forces did not respond to the attack, nor did Coalition or Afghan air assets target the Taliban before, during, or after the raid, despite the fact that the Taliban convoy moving into and out of the outpost was easily identifiable and moving over desert terrain where civilian casualties would have been highly unlikely.

The results depicted in “Mansoor Goozar” are all too common. FDD’s Long War Journal has documented numerous attacks like this one, and the outcomes are all similar.

If the Coalition and the Afghan government hope to halt the Taliban’s gains and chip away at territory under the jihadist group’s control, attacks such as this one have to be stopped. The Taliban not only replenished its supply of war materials, but also demoralized Afghan forces while gaining massive propaganda footage and delegitimizing the Afghan government.

Ideally, a Taliban convoy assembling and operating in broad daylight would be hit by air power before reaching their target. However, if the Taliban succeeds in overrunning a base or district center, Afghan or Coalition aircraft should consider hitting them as they celebrate victory and raise the Taliban flag, or as they exit the base with their war bounty.

This would require increased communication between Afghan and Coalition forces. It oftentimes seems as if the Taliban, shown in the video using radios, communicate better with each other and are more well prepared than the Afghan forces.

While air strikes may be viewed as defensive or punitive, if the Afghan government wants to halt Taliban gains, the Taliban must be forced to pay a heavy price for massing and striking outposts, bases, and district centers. Hitting Taliban forces as they travel in convoys or after they overrun bases will force its military commanders to reconsider their tactics, which have proven successful in all areas of Afghanistan.
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archi...st-target-taliban-after-overrunning-bases.php
 
Taliban hyökkäsi Afgaanien kolonnan kimppuun. Lähellä olleet USA:n helikopterit eivät puuttuneet asiaan.

Anatomy of a Taliban ambush
By Bill Roggio | September 1, 2017 | [email protected] | @billroggio
In a recently released propaganda video, the Taliban provided extensive footage of an ambush on an Afghan logistics convoy in the eastern province of Wardak. The daylight ambush destroyed multiple Afghan vehicles, and despite the fact that US helicopters were nearby, the Taliban do not appear to have been targeted during the fighting.

The video, which is titled ‘Caravan of Heroes 13’ and was published on August 28, was produced by Manba al Jihad Studio, the media arm of the Haqqani Network, the Taliban subgroup that is closely linked to al Qaeda. Manba al Jihad Studio is “an official media wing of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Commission for Cultural Affairs Audio and Visual Sector,” according to the accompanying statement announcing the release of the video.

The video opens with a lengthy discussion of ambush tactics between two masked Taliban fighters, one who is wearing a black tee-shirt with the words “Quick Attack Force – Special Forces” and a Taliban logo printed on the front.

The video then cuts to footage of an ambush that targeted an Afghan military logistics convoy on a road in Sayyadabad district in Wardak province. The date of the attack was not given, however it appears to have taken place in the late spring or summer months. Sayyadabad was the district where Taliban fighters shot down a US Chinook helicopter in Aug. 2011 and killed 31 US and seven Afghan special operations forces, including several members of the Naval Special Warfare Development Group, which is more commonly referred to as SEAL Team 6. FDD’s Long War Journal has assessed Sayyadabad as Taliban-controlled, and the video demonstrates why.

Dozens of Taliban fighters assemble near the village in broad daylight. The village is clearly Taliban controlled, and the group has ambushed military convoys in this very same spot in the past. As the Taliban fighters take up their ambush positions along a length of the road, the remains of what appears to be an oil tanker sits on the shoulder.

Before the ambush begins, the Taliban fighter who was recording the attack captures two US Blackhawk helicopters on video as they are flying over the convoy. The Taliban fighters, who are gathering in the open, are undeterred by the Blackhawks, and launch their ambush shortly afterward. At one point during the fighting, what appears to be a military attack aircraft is captured on film, but it does not open fire on the ambush team.

The Taliban ambush, while not very sophisticated, was effective. The fighters open fire on the convoy with machine guns and assault rifles from multiple positions. It does not appear that IEDs, RPGs, recoilless rifles or other heavy weapons were used to target the convoy. Although the Taliban was firing from locations that included buildings, the fighters did not appear to take advantage of rooftops and instead fired from ground level.

Yet the Taliban was able to successfully destroy multiple vehicles in the attack. First, the fighters hit a fuel tanker, then several military vehicles were hit. As the segment ends, multiple vehicles are ablaze along the a stretch of the road. At the end of the scene, the Taliban fighters casually walk away.

The video highlights a major problem that Afghan and Coalition forces face throughout the country: the Taliban has demonstrated that it can take the fight to Afghan forces with little fear of being targeted by air assets. The Taliban is often able to overrun military bases and district centers, and loiter in the area for nearly a day without taking fire.

Screen shots from the ambush in Wardak



Taliban fighters move to their ambush position:



The wreck of a previously destroyed tanker is seen on the same road the ambush took place:



One of two US Blackhawk helicopters that were flying over the convoy just before the ambush:



Taliban fighters survey the road:



A tanker is hit:



An Afghan military vehicle is hit:



Two vehicles are burning:




Taliban fighters engage the convoy from a field:



Multiple vehicles are aflame:



Taliban fighters walk away from the ambush:

Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/09/anatomy-of-a-taliban-ambush.php
 
Tässä hyvä artikkeli ranskalaisista A-stanissa:

http://www.breachbangclear.com/contributor-chris-hernandez-on-working-with-the-french-army/

Osiossa 2 on hauska juttu:

Many Americans have asked me, “Is it true the French served wine at dinner and had wine in their MREs?” The answer is yes and no. They not only served wine at dinner, they sometimes served it at lunch as well. The firebase I was on, which wasn’t that big, had three bars. The regular French Joes could have all the alcohol they wanted in their tents.

Osiossa 3:

Contrary to conventional American wisdom, the French liked to fight. I accompanied them when they, Afghan troops and a handful of Americans invaded a Taliban-held valley. Despite comments from people who have no actual experience with them, French troops don’t run from a contact. They like to advance toward the enemy and shoot. A lot.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Squatting on the floor, a brown shawl draped over his shoulders, the Taliban commander and his bodyguard swiped on their phones through attack footage edited to look like video games, with computerised crosshairs hovering over targets. “Allahu Akbar,” they said every time a government Humvee hit a landmine.

Mullah Abdul Saeed, who met the Guardian in the barren backcountry of Logar province where he leads 150 Taliban militants, has fought foreign soldiers and their Afghan allies since the US-led coalition invaded Afghanistan when he was 14. The Taliban now controls its largest territory since being forced from power, and seems to have no shortage of recruits.

By prolonging and expanding its military presence in Afghanistan, the US aims to coerce the Taliban to lay down arms, but risks hardening insurgents who have always demanded withdrawal of foreign troops before peace talks.

In interviews with rank-and-file Taliban fighters in Logar and another of Afghanistan’s embattled provinces, Wardak, the Guardian found a fragmented but resilient movement, united in resistance against foreign intervention.

Referring to Barack Obama’s surge, Saeed said: “150,000 Americans couldn’t beat us.” And an extra 4,000 US soldiers, as Donald Trump will deploy, “will not change the morale of our mujahideen,” he said. “The Americans were walking in our villages, and we pushed them out.” For the Taliban to consider peace, he said, “foreigners must leave, and the constitution must be changed to sharia.”
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...at-us-taliban-fighters-defiant-in-afghanistan

Though no group claimed responsibility for the attack, Saeed and Omari agreed the university posed a threat. “We should kill those teachers who change the minds of society,” Saeed said.

Currently, the Taliban seem capable of upholding a slow-burning war, with the help of outside benefactors. After recent US pressure on Pakistan to crack down on militant sanctuaries, some Taliban fighters consider opting for another regional neighbour, Omari said: “Many Taliban want to leave Pakistan for Iran. They don’t trust Pakistan anymore.”

Pakistan denies harbouring militants, but Saeed admitted receiving assistance from Pakistan, though he denied being under anyone’s thumb. “Having relations is one thing, taking orders is something else,” he said. “Every party, if they want to be stronger, need to talk to other countries. We should talk to Iran, and we should talk to Pakistan. Just like the Afghan government goes to India and China.”
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...
 

@CV9030FIN

Pistin CV90:n tähän ihan sen takia, että voi sanoa oman kommentin. Kanukit videolla on todella ammattimiehiä, radiota ei spämmätä eikä turhia huudella. Tulitusta kyllä lähtee. :D
 
Alkukommenttikin on kertova: "Great place to get ambushed.." :D No niin siinä kävi...mutta tiesivät, että näin voi käydä.
 
winsu kirjoitti:
Kyllä tuo suomalaisiltakin onnistui. Meillä oli vielä vähän isompiakin pyssyjä antavalla puolella.:uzi:
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...

Mua aina ottaa pattiin kun jenkit näissä jutuissa kirkuu kuin pikkutytöt koulun pihalla. Turpa kiinni ja metallia sitä toista osapuolta kohti. Sodat loppuu sotimalla ja taistelut taistelemalla.

Nää kakspuoleiset ampumaradat on hyvä esimerkki eri sotilaskulttuureista.
 
Sardaukar kirjoitti:
Mua aina ottaa pattiin kun jenkit näissä jutuissa kirkuu kuin pikkutytöt koulun pihalla. Turpa kiinni ja metallia sitä toista osapuolta kohti. Sodat loppuu sotimalla ja taistelut taistelemalla.

Nää kakspuoleiset ampumaradat on hyvä esimerkki eri sotilaskulttuureista.
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...
Mutta olisihan tuossa pitänyt antaa kranaattikiväärinkin vähintäinkin sanoa sanasensa.
 
Vahan eri meininki tulossa kayttoon, esim. pelkat palkannostajat perataan samalla tekniikalla kuin pakolaisleireissa tuplapakolaiset. Ja tuo rahantulon estaminen liittyy suoraan siihen askettaiseen, jareasti tuhottuun huumelabraan:
Nicholson said that the Taliban had given up on trying to seize provincial capitals and was now focused on guerilla warfare at the district level. He said that “represented a lowering of ambition by the enemy.”

“Increasingly, they are principally interested in making money” from the drug trade, Nicholson. “They are fighting to protect their revenue stream” and have essentially transformed from a jihadi movement into a “narco-terrorist” drug cartel, he said.

Coupled with the new U.S. strategy, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani with coalition backing has embarked on revamping the entire command structure of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces [ANDSF].


Ghani has replaced four of five corps commanders, Nicholson said, and next year will push 2,150 colonels and generals into retirement “with dignity” to allow a younger generation of officers to assume command.

To curb corruption in the Afghan forces, Nicholson said that the U.S. was initiating another round of identity verification to eliminate from the rolls so-called “ghost soldiers” — those who draw salaries but are absent from the ranks.
 
The U.S. military recently highlighted a series of air and artillery strikes against Taliban drug labs in Afghanistan as a visible indicator of America’s new strategy to defeat insurgents and terrorists in the country and elsewhere in the region. At the same time, though, the U.S. Air Force B-52 bombers and other aircraft has been conducting a less publicized and more grueling kind of air war to literally shape the terrain, blasting away mountain passes and potential cover to limit where and how militants can operate.

Reporting from Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Aviation Week’s Lara Seligman was the first to get a hint of these operations, noting that Air Force B-52s had flown “terrain denial” missions over Afghanistan loaded with dozens of 500-pound class Mk 82 “dumb bombs.” But in an Email to The War Zone, an U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) spokesperson explained that this part of the aerial campaign was far more widespread and complex, involving manned and unmanned aircraft and unguided and guided munitions
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...
. http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...in-afghanistan-to-literally-shape-the-terrain

In short, the sorties are a deliberate and coordinated effort to strip away actual terrain features – narrow mountainous paths, rock-topped ridgelines, and even buildings and other man-made structures – that militants might use to move without being seen or ambush friendly troops on the ground in the future. It also attempts to funnel the insurgents and terrorists into particular areas or operating habits, which might make them easier to observe, isolate, and neutralize.
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...
 
After fighting the longest war in its history, the US stands at the brink of defeat in Afghanistan. How could this be possible? How could the world’s sole superpower have battled continuously for more than 16 years – deploying more than 100,000 troops at the conflict’s peak, sacrificing the lives of nearly 2,300 soldiers, spending more than $1tn (£740bn) on its military operations, lavishing a record $100bn more on “nation-building”, helping fund and train an army of 350,000 Afghan allies – and still not be able to pacify one of the world’s most impoverished nations? So dismal is the prospect of stability in Afghanistan that, in 2016, the Obama White House cancelled a planned withdrawal of its forces, ordering more than 8,000 troops to remain in the country indefinitely.

In the American failure lies a paradox: Washington’s massive military juggernaut has been stopped in its steel tracks by a small pink flower – the opium poppy. Throughout its three decades in Afghanistan, Washington’s military operations have succeeded only when they fit reasonably comfortably into central Asia’s illicit traffic in opium – and suffered when they failed to complement it.
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...
Linkki
 
Sinun täytyy kirjautua vastataksesi.
Back
Top