Cyber-ketju: verkkovakoilu,kännyköiden ja wlanien seuranta, hakkerointi, virukset, DoS etc

Liittyykö tuo proof-of-concept jollain tavalla lohkoketjuteknologiaan ? Kuulostaa hurjalta.
Tuossa oli monta erillistä haavoittuvaisuutta. Muistaakseni meni jotenkin näin. Liikenne asiakasohjelmiston ja palvelimen välillä oli salaamatonta, joten liikennettä kaappaamalla ja muuttamalla saatiin vaihdettua salasanoja ja nostettua käyttöoikeuksia, johtuen huonosta sovellusarkkitehtuurista.

Palvelimesta saatiin myös etäyhteydellä suoraan pääsy tietokantoihin, koska pääkäyttäjäsalasana oli aina sama ja pystyttiin muuttamaan käytännössä kaikkia tietoja. Tämä mahdollisti sen, että hyökkääjä pystyi tekemään itselleen käyttätunnuksen ja antamaan sille oikeudet tehdä rahasiirtoja firman tileiltä, ja sen jälkeen poistaa kaikki tiedot tästä kirjanpidostsa.

Tämän lisäksi asiakasohjelmistosta pystyttiin saamaan yrityksen pankkien salausavaimet, joiden avulla saadaan täydet käyttöoikeudet yrityksen tileihin.

Sovelluskehittäjä ilmoitti aluksi että haavoittuvuuksia on mahdotonta paikata, jonka vuoksi viranomaiset päättivät olla pitää koko asian salassa. Pankkien kanssa käydyistä keskusteluista selvisi, että joillain pankeilla ei ole mitään tapaa mitätöidä salausavaimia tai edes tietoa mitä avaimia kellekin on jaettu. Tuossa sanottiin että koko maan maksuliikenne olisi pitänyt pistää kiinni vähintään viikoksi, jotta salausavaimet saataisiin tehtyä uudelleen, ja tämän takia oltiin jo varauduttu kutsumaan eduskunta koolle kesälomalta.

Hyökkääjä voisi siis käyttää tätä haavoittuvuutta paitsi rahan varastamiseen yrityksiltä, kuin myös käytännössä lamauttamaan koko maan rahaliikenteen joksikin aikaa. Suomen lisäksi tätä ohjelmistoa käytetään Baltian maissa sekä jonkun verran muissa pohjoismaissa.


An unsophisticated but effective botnet is targeting exposed cloud servers and racking up millions of infections.

A Linux-based DDoS botnet dubbed DemonBot has been found enslaving Hadoop frameworks, using a vulnerability in Hadoop’s resource management tool to infect cloud servers with the botnet malware.

Hadoop is a popular open-source framework, usually deployed in cloud environments, that organizations can use to create artificial intelligence or machine learning platforms for big-data analytics. It’s deployed on clusters of servers – virtual and physical – which are often connected to the internet. As such, it represents a ripe, and somewhat underutilized, attack surface.

Enter DemonBot, which is actively enslaving Hadoop clusters to carry out DDoS attacks based on UDP and TCP floods; the security team at Radware said that it has recorded more than 5 million server requests across the globe as of this week.


It’s October and the United Nations General Assembly and subsidiary committees have started their work in earnest. As expected, Russia tabled a draft resolution seeking the General Assembly’s endorsement of an “international code of conduct for international information security,” and a resumption of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) process next year. Somewhat less expected, however, is that the United States tabled a competing resolution, setting up a clash between Russia, China, and their largely autocratic friends on one side, and the United States, the European Union, Canada, Japan, and Australia on the other.

First, some background. Almost every year since 1998, Russia has sponsored a General Assembly resolution called “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.” It’s the mechanism through which UN member states express concern that malicious activity in cyberspace can undermine international peace and security. It’s also the resolution that created the GGEs on cybersecurity in 2004/5, 2009/10, 2012/13, 2014/15, and 2016/17. Three of those GGEs (2010, 2013, and 2015) led to consensus reports that recommended states abide by a set of norms—including the applicability of international law to cyberspace—, participate in confidence building measures, and support capacity building initiatives to reduce the risk that state actions in cyberspace threaten international peace and security.


An Interior Department watchdog recommended the U.S. Geological Survey ratchet up internet security protocols after discovering its networks had been infected with malware from pornography sites.

The agency’s inspector general traced the malicious software to a single unnamed USGS employee, who reportedly used a government-issued computer to visit some 9,000 adult video sites, according to a report published Oct. 17.

Many of the prohibited pages were linked to Russian websites containing malware, which was ultimately downloaded to the employee’s computer and used to infiltrate USGS networks, auditors found. The investigation found the employee saved much of the pornographic material on an unauthorized USB drive and personal Android cellphone, both of which were connected to their computer against agency protocols.

The employee’s cell phone was also infected with malware.

“Our digital forensic examination revealed that [the employee] had an extensive history of visiting adult pornography websites” that hosted malware, the IG wrote. “The malware was downloaded to [the employee’s] government laptop, which then exploited the USGS’ network.”

Kun minkkikuvat aiheuttavat ongelmia...


“The FBI assesses the cyberterrorism threat to the U.S. to be rapidly expanding,” said one law-enforcement official, testifying before Congress. “Terrorist groups will either develop or hire hackers, particularly for the purpose of complementing large physical attacks with cyber attacks.”

That assessment was made nearly 15 years ago. In the meantime, a generation of tech-savvy jihadists has exploited the internet to attract recruits, share bomb-making expertise, and incite violence. Yet they haven’t managed to pull off the devastating cyberattacks that experts have long feared.

With just days left before Americans go to the polls for midterm elections, it is worth considering: Why not?

“I’m as puzzled as you are,” said Michael Hayden, who served as CIA director from 2004 to 2008. “These folks are not cyberdumb.”

“They use the web and show a great deal of sophistication in how they use it, for many purposes,” he added. “But they have not yet used it to create either digital or physical destruction. Others have.”

Officials have never really stopped warning about the potential for destructive cyberattacks. As recently as last month, the U.S. government was warning that “foreign actors” including Russia, China, and Iran could try to meddle in the midterms—in a possible reprise of Russia’s internet-enabled attack on the 2016 presidential election.

With threats like those in mind, this fall the administration released what it billed as “the first fully articulated cyber strategy in 15 years.” But as more countries, and organizations, gain access to destructive online tools, the nightmare scenario of entire cities suddenly going dark, or rogue actors gaining control of weapons systems, doesn’t seem far-fetched. And the chaos and possible destruction that could result is just the sort of outcome a terrorist might seek to inflict.

Three main barriers are likely preventing this. For one, cyberattacks can lack the kind of drama and immediate physical carnage that terrorists seek. Identifying the specific perpetrator of a cyberattack can also be difficult, meaning terrorists might have trouble reaping the propaganda benefits of clear attribution. Finally, and most simply, it’s possible that they just can’t pull it off.

“Terrorists don’t want to just create random problems for the world. They want [to create] specific types of problems, that cause certain types of fear and terror, that garner certain media attention, that galvanize followers,” said Joshua Geltzer, who served as the senior director for counterterrorism on President Barack Obama’s National Security Council. “Some data being deleted or … ransomware locking the hospital out of its files, it’s not the same as those videos from 9/11.”

Then there is the question of attribution and propaganda value. When cyberweapons are deployed, proving who used them can be tough—and that can be unappealing from a terrorist’s perspective. Part of the point of a terrorist attack is the ability to credibly claim it, to spread fear by creating the impression of the ability to strike anywhere at any time. When attribution is murky, the psychological effect of a clear public claim is diminished.

The most powerful likely barrier, though, is also the simplest. For all the Islamic State’s much-vaunted technical sophistication, the skills needed to tweet and edit videos are a far cry from those needed to hack.

“ISIS and al-Qaeda, it’s hard to believe that they wouldn’t hit the send key” if they had the equivalent of a cyberweapon of mass destruction, “especially when they’re on the ropes like they are in some areas,” said David Petraeus, who served as CIA director from 2011 to 2012.

Indeed, Donald Trump’s administration has publicly warned that ISIS may find “virtual safe havens” as its physical territory shrinks. “Let’s remember that these are groups whose members are willing to blow themselves up to take us with them,” Petraeus said. “I don’t know how you deter an enemy like that from using whatever capability they might develop.”

The biggest cyberattacks so far attributed to ISIS have caused little real-world damage. In one instance in 2015, attackers calling themselves “CyberCaliphate” briefly took control of the Twitter and YouTube accounts of United States Central Command, which oversees U.S. military operations in the Middle East, posting threats and pro-ISIS messages. More serious was the 2015 case of Ardit Ferizi, a Kosovo citizen who pleaded guilty to stealing the personal information of more than 1,000 U.S. service members and federal employees and then providing them to an ISIS propagandist, who duly posted them on the internet with instructions to attack.

“It wasn’t as if they were staying away from this domain,” said Nicholas Rasmussen, who was the director of the National Counterterrorism Center until late 2017. “It’s just that it seemed their capability was limited to kind of the low-end stuff—what we thought of as harassment activity, as opposed to truly destructive activity.”

In this, they differ from state actors such as Russia—which in 2007 nearly crippled portions of Estonia’s digital infrastructure, including its biggest bank—or North Korea, which the U.S. has accused of stealing more than $80 million by hacking Bangladesh’s central bank.

“We drew a pretty sharp distinction when I was still in government between what state actors were capable of and what terrorist actors were capable of,” Rasmussen said. “And, speaking personally, it was just increasingly hard to understand why that divide hadn’t been crossed.”

Still, crippling critical infrastructure is difficult. One thing that protects an electrical grid, for example, is the complexity of the systems that comprise it, said Robert M. Lee, who founded and runs the industrial-cybersecurity company Dragos, and who helped investigate a 2015 Russian hack that shut down part of Ukraine’s power grid.

“When we think of a single power plant, it’s not that complex, and so having an effect on one power plant is entirely doable in a way that’s easier than people realize,” he said. “But when you talk about a portion of a grid, you’re talking about hundreds of utilities and power sites—now you’re talking about an overall complex system.”

With the near-disappearance of the Islamic State’s caliphate, Hayden and others have warned that terrorists will be looking to innovate and experiment, and no one knows what that will look like. Cybertools developed by sophisticated state actors can escape into the public realm—the WannaCry ransomware attack, which locked users out of computers around the world in 2017, is believed to have been carried out by North Korea with tools stolen from the NSA. Groups like Hezbollah—a proxy for Iran, which has sophisticated cybertools of its own—could receive support in the form of cyberweapons.

Officials may well warn about the possibility of a major cyberterror event for another 15 years with no incident. In congressional testimony this month, Kirstjen Nielsen, who heads the Department of Homeland Security, warned: “DHS was founded 15 years ago to prevent another 9/11, but I believe an attack of that magnitude today is now more likely to reach us online.”

Like Russia’s cyberattack on the 2016 U.S. elections, if—or when—the attack comes, it may ultimately take a form no one has predicted.


ELSO 3.0
Tietoturvayhtiö ThousandEyes selvitti, että Googlen palveluiden liikenne ohjattiin tuntemattomasta syystä Venäjälle, Nigeriaan sekä Kiinaan.

Venäjän ja Nigerian tapauksessa datavirta jatkoi sieltä matkaa eteenpäin, mutta Kiinaan päätyvä liikenne ohjautui valtion omistaman China Telecom -operaattorin käsiin ja katosi sinne.

ThousandEyesin mukaan tapahtuma ”minimissään aiheutti massiivisen palvelunestotulpan G Suiten ja Googlen hakukoneen käyttämiseen, ja ohjasi arvokasta Googlen liikennettä sellaisten maiden käsiin, joilla on pitkä historia internetvakoilussa”.


Wednesday, November 28, 2018
On the front lines in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine—an area known as the Joint Forces Operation, formerly the Anti-Terrorist Operation zone—ground combat operations are evolving and incorporating new features.

Previous installments of this column have examined information operations and electronic warfare in this context. But increasingly, cyber is also playing an impactful role, presenting a potential vision of future cyber-enabled conflict.

The use of cyber by Russian Spetsnaz (special forces) and their proxies in the Donbas may not be sexy. Bits and bytes still cannot take and hold territory. Cyber capabilities do not allow soldiers to avoid the cold, wet grind on a contact line with hundreds to thousands of daily cease-fire violations. Nor has the vision of a future conflict conducted at a computer terminal in a headquarters where the violence of warfare is somehow sanitized by strokes of a keyboard materialized. Instead, tactical cyber has devolved and intermingled with information operations and electronic warfare, becoming yet another daily part of the slog to maintain territory, the operational readiness of forces and the tactical viability of equipment.

In 2014, the U.S. Army released its first manual on cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA), defining them as “activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage over adversaries and enemies in both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously denying and degrading adversary and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system.” Since the publication of Field Manual 3-38, the U.S. has struggled to incorporate CEMA at the tactical level.

Meanwhile, Russia has been perfecting its tactics, using the conflict zone in Ukraine as a low-cost test environment to field new technologies. The continuous tactical testing of technologies against a dynamic and adaptive adversary enables Russian forces to improve integration and agility of technologies and to hone the tactics, techniques and procedures associated with employment of CEMA and information operations at the tactical level.

On the battlefields of Ukraine, Russian forces conduct information warfare (informatsionnaya voyna) meant to provide specific tactical advantages and further increase the fog of war on the front lines and beyond. Russian concepts of information warfare have long frustrated the discrete distinctions of cyber, electronic warfare and information operations used within U.S. doctrine.

In a draft of the 2014 concept of Russia’s Cyber Security Strategy, Russia subordinated the concept of cyber within the broader concept of information security. The strategy noted the impact information manipulation can have on individuals, the broader public consciousness, information infrastructures and information ecosystems.

Russian utilization of cyberspace at the tactical level is dynamic: It attacks an adversary’s capability to wage war at multiple points while simultaneously seeking to minimize risks. In Ukraine, this has meant frequent and sustained attempts to undermine the hardware, software and members of front line units.

In 2017, a team from the Army Cyber Institute at West Point traveled to Ukraine and met with members of regular and volunteer battalions who had fought along the Anti-Terrorist Operation zone from 2014 through 2017, members of the Information Assurance Directorate of the General Staff, representatives of the Security Service of Ukraine and researchers at Ukrainian universities.

Mobile Phone Attacks

The team documented the use of SS7 mobile phone infrastructure attacks conducted by Russian RP-377L signals intercept platforms to engage in distribution of malware to personal mobile devices of front line soldiers, as well as man-in-the-middle attacks in which Russians inserted themselves between unsuspecting Ukrainian forces communicating with one another. These attacks intercepted the voice and text communications of soldiers. In some cases, soldiers had malware delivered to their phones in the form of pictures of spouses or families sent via text message. The phones of Ukrainian soldiers were compromised with malware indicating their geolocation. Some spouses or parents received messages indicating their husbands or sons had been killed on the front lines, or imploring them to ask their husbands or sons to give up and return home. Ukrainian service members also received texts in the early phases of the conflict informing them their battalion staffs had retreated and that they were surrounded and should give up.

Beyond targeting front line soldiers, Russian signals and electronic warfare units also rapidly disabled Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) along the Anti-Terrorist Operation zone via electronic warfare and cyber means. Russian units also employed distributed denial-of-service attacks against Ukrainian hard-line secure voice and data communications between company and battalion levels. These attacks reduced confidence and communications capabilities and limited tactical coordination among units.

Android App Targeted

Even more brazen attacks by the cyberespionage group “Fancy Bear” are believed to have targeted an android application developed by Ukrainian artillery officer Yaroslav Sherstuk to aid in Ukrainian artillery targeting. While seemingly fanciful that a modern military would use an android application developed by one of its own artillery officers to aid in the targeting of enemy positions, the conflict in Ukraine has not followed a traditional weapons development and acquisition framework. Ultimately, this malware allowed the Russians to retrieve communication and locational data.

The extent of Russian cyber, electronic warfare and information operations in Ukraine highlights many of the future tactical challenges likely to arise in large-scale combat operations. The sustained tactical utilization of CEMA and information operations can provide the enemy tactical insights into American movements and communications, damage the effectiveness of “cybered” weapon systems (systems connected to networks), and target the psychological resilience of front line soldiers and their support networks at home. Some recommendations to mitigate this threat follow:

Training and Education. The Army must understand the threats and recognize the potential vulnerability of its systems. In 2008, a malware-laden flash drive inserted into a laptop at a base in the Middle East caused what was determined at the time to be “the most significant breach” of U.S. military computers ever. Likewise, blue-force tracker systems, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, UAVs, GPS and GPS-enabled weapons, and our command, control and communication systems are vulnerable to attack. Beyond simply education, training at combat training centers and other locations should include scenarios in which some of these systems are compromised. Soldiers, therefore, must know how to navigate without a GPS, manually fire artillery systems, or fire and maneuver without use of blue-force tracker capabilities and communication systems.

Resilience. Given that soldiers are unlikely to entirely disconnect from social media while deployed, soldiers and their families must be prepared for the enemy to use cyber-enabled information operations to degrade troop morale and popular support for the conflict. The Army must ensure that the families of soldiers are prepared in order to minimize the impact of these enemy efforts.

Techniques, tactics and procedures. The Army must continue to develop its offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. Cyber defense, unlike a piece of military hardware, is not something developed, fielded, then developed again over a multiyear cycle. It must be constantly developed as new vulnerabilities are identified.

The world is in the early phases of the digital era. The changes to come are likely to increasingly challenge the Army and the nation as the number of internet-connected devices grows from 17 billion today to more than 100 billion in the decade to come. A failure to continuously evolve and adapt effective means of addressing new technologies will leave soldiers and the nation vulnerable to the actions of potential adversaries in ways that exceed the experiences of Ukrainian soldiers today.

Aaron Brantly
Aaron Brantly is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Virginia Tech and an affiliated faculty member with Virginia Tech’s Hume Center for National Security and Technology, Washington, D.C. He is also cyber policy fellow for the Army Cyber Institute at West Point. He lived in Ukraine as a Peace Corps volunteer and has traveled extensively in the country over the past 10 years doing research and development work. He has a doctorate from the University of Georgia.
Col. Liam Collins
Col. Liam Collins is director of the Modern War Institute at West Point. He has traveled more than a dozen times to Ukraine over the past 18 months. A career Special Forces officer, he has conducted multiple combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as operational deployments to Bosnia, Africa and South America. He holds a master’s degree and a doctorate from Princeton University, N.J.