The paper airplane complex - which is why the Swiss Army has such a difficult time procuring
The armaments malaise of recent years is closely linked to the failure of the Gripen fighter jet at the ballot box. With “Air 2030”, Switzerland has to prove that it can procure professionally and reliably.
(kuvateksti) Exit through the back door. Saab was only able to present the previous model of the Gripen E.
The paper plane never took off.
Federal Councilor Ueli Maurer failed on May 18, 2014 with the Swedish fighter jet Gripen E.
The people did not want to buy an airplane that only existed on paper.
The Gripen No shook a system that was already weakened by constant reforms, pressure to cut costs and political intrigues. To this day, the Department of Defense (DDPS), the army and the Armasuisse procurement authority have been grappling with the consequences of the Gripen no. The paper plane became a mortgage for other important businesses. Bodluv 2020, ADS 15, Mörser 16, Duro: In the public perception, the cryptic abbreviations of military systems are synonymous with debacles and delays.
What are the deeper causes of the malaise? Is there a malaise at all? What is going wrong, what is not? Do you need to restart the system?
The questions are of considerable urgency. Because in the next few months the DDPS has to prove that it is able to procure a new fighter aircraft including air defense over a long range without any excitement or surprises. “Air 2030”, the renewal of air defense funds, is the largest armaments business in Swiss history with a total of 8 billion. The public is skeptical about the project. In September 2020, the fighter jets only made it to the ballot box very thinly. The media, politicians and the Swiss Federal Audit Office feed doubts about the DDPS's ability to handle such a large box professionally and reliably for all partners.
The criticism is often unfair. But the federal paper airplane complex is deep.
It is not known who exactly coined the term. The plot of the drama is sober in the Federal Council's message on the 2012 armaments program:
«In 2008 the Gripen C / D was offered and tested. With the offer of November 6, 2009, Saab offered the further developed version E / F because procurement had been postponed from the 2010 armaments program to the 2012 armaments program. "
Against all warnings, the Federal Council decided in 2011 to procure 22 Swedish Gripen E fighter jets. An aircraft that had never flown at the time. Federal Councilor Ueli Maurer, then head of the Defense Department (VBS), tried to buy as much service as possible with a political prank with as little money as possible.
1. The long shadow of the Mirage affair
On September 11, 2013, the paper airplane found its way into the minutes of the federal councils. The then SP security politician and today's Bernese government councilor Evi Allemann brought the general unease about the business into a larger context:
“After the Mirage scandal, it was said: We will never again buy an aircraft that is not fully developed! We only buy armaments off the shelf, we don't want a paper airplane. That is exactly what we are discussing today: the Gripen is not fully developed. The Gripen is a paper airplane. It only exists on paper; that is a huge risk. "
Allemann's statement leads back to the origin of the Helvetic armaments malaise - to the Mirage affair, which lies like a long shadow over the military procurement system. She is the prototype of all further affairs.
In the middle of the Cold War, a small group of senior officers decided to procure 100 Mirage IIIs from France, at that time a top jet by international standards. The aircraft should be comprehensively "helvetized" - another stimulus word in the federal armaments industry. Instead of French, Switzerland wanted to install American electronics, among other things.
In fact, the federal government ordered a paper plane back then.
Because of massive cost overruns, the air force received only 57 mirages instead of 100. Politically, the affair brought about the first parliamentary commission of inquiry (PUK). She came to a sobering conclusion: "The message of 1961 was partly tendentious, partly careless and in some places downright misleading."
The basic distrust of large purchases has persisted to this day.
2. Loss of importance after the Cold War
As a result of the Mirage affair, the procurement system was fundamentally reformed. In 1968 the civilian armaments service group (GRD) was established. It consisted of the former war engineering department and the federal armaments factories, the arms, powder and ammunition factories and the aircraft factories. The GRD therefore also had the know-how in the development and production of weapon systems.
Not all projects went smoothly. The Panzer 68, an in-house development, was the subject of scorn and ridicule because of its initial malfunctions. After the teething problems had been resolved, the system was considered to be top in international comparison.
Then came the turning point in 1989 - and one army reform followed another: first in 1995 Army 95, then in 2004 Army XXI. The troop stocks dwindled, as did the military budget. In 1996 the GRD was split up and production outsourced. New Public Management flourished. The federal government began to play private business. In 2002, the Ruag was formed from the armaments factories. The procurement authority, the Federal Office for Armaments, was called Armasuisse from 2004.
As early as with Army 95, but even more so with Army XXI, the DDPS began to accept so-called skill gaps. Entire systems were decommissioned without replacement. The signs of the times were different. Only the renaissance of power politics in the past decade triggered a hesitant rethink.
At the same time, one job at a time was cut at Armasuisse. Knowledge and experience were lost. There was friction with the department and the army. Today's armaments chief Martin Sonderegger has succeeded in calming the situation.
An interim balance shows that Armasuisse has handled the majority of the projects smoothly since its inception, despite scarce resources and a difficult political environment.
In figures: With a volume of 14.762 billion armaments expenditure since 2003, two projects have failed completely (Gripen, Bodluv medium range), one does not fully meet the original requirements (IT project FIS Heer), and three (ADS 15, Mörser 16, Duro WE) are standing among other things because of delays in the public discussion, but did not cause any additional costs.
A total of around 25 million were lost in the two failed projects. By far the largest copy-off, 125 million, was caused by the command information system of the army (FIS Heer). It is used for networked leadership. To date, the system only works up to the unit level, but is used by practically all units of the army - in exercises, but also in real use (WEF).
The FIS Army is symptomatic of the tension between military planning and political reality. The federal government invested 702 million in the 2006 and 2007 armaments programs. Originally, the information should flow back and forth between the highest and the lowest level. For this, the FIS Army is dependent on powerful radio equipment for data exchange. The army wanted to procure this in 2010, but had to postpone the project until the 2020 armaments program because other capability gaps had to be closed.
Another area of tension is the different roles of planners and procurers.
Armasuisse's client is the army. The specifications for the systems that Armasuisse is supposed to procure come from the army staff. However, while the senior staff officer, who places the order as chief army planning officer, is promoted further after three or four years, the armaments chief and his project manager remain responsible. Armasuisse guarantees the long-term nature of the project process to frequently changing representatives of the armed forces.
The relationship between the army and Armasuisse is not always free of tension. Not everything that is desirable can actually be procured. This field of tension is mercilessly used by opponents of certain businesses to sow doubts - according to the principle: divide et impera.
This is useful for opponents of the army, even if they are often not at the beginning of a polemic.
3. Fierce resistance from the army abolitionists
Armament bills always become a debate about the fundamental question: for or against combat aircraft. For or against foreign assignments. For or against the army.
The group for a Switzerland without an army (GSoA) has cultivated the resistance. In its beginnings, it initiated a necessary discussion about the position of the army in Swiss society. On November 26, 1989, a few days after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 35.6 percent voted for the abolition of the Swiss Army. The GSoA did not succeed in “slaughtering the sacred cow”, as it had boldly called for in the referendum campaign. But she took the halo from her. This is what co-initiator Jo Lang said thirty years later on Swiss television.
The GSoA is still a strong player in the political business to this day. The army it wanted to abolish still exists, but it has long since lost the influence it once had. The skepticism against everything that only sounds military in the beginning permeates broad circles, especially the urban population. The GSoA serves this feeling with ever new concerns in a kind of permanent campaign. She proudly lists on her homepage how she first delayed the procurement of Gripen and then successfully prevented it together with the SP, the Greens and a liberal committee.
(kuvateksti) The GSoA recorded the postponement of the so-called Tiger Part Replacement (TTE) as a success - and kept the threat of new fighter jets upright.
The very first thoughts in 2007 about the renewal of the Air Force aroused resistance from the GSoA. The DDPS wanted to prepare the replacement of the outdated Tiger fleet for 8 million. Important gaps in the Air Force's capabilities should be closed. The GSoA immediately launched an initiative at its traditional conference location in the "Kreuz" in Solothurn with the text: "The federal government will not procure any new combat aircraft until December 31, 2019." The referendum came about, and in August 2009 the initiative was submitted with 107,828 valid signatures.
The GSoA called for a pause for thought - and implemented it.
A year later, the Federal Council decided to postpone the procurement of new combat aircraft. There was wild speculation in the media about the reasons. In the 2010 Army Report, a large exposition on the state of the Swiss Army, the then VBS boss Ueli Maurer argued with the wallet:
“On August 25, 2010, the Federal Council confirmed its fundamental decision that partial replacement was necessary for the 54 F-5s. However, due to the financial situation of the federal government and the general priorities, he postponed the time of procurement until 2015 at the latest. "
The GSoA recorded the postponement of the so-called tiger part replacement (TTE) as a success - and maintained the threat of new fighter jets, as the activists show the events in their online chronology:
“The GSoA General Assembly decides to withdraw the popular initiative against new fighter jets in order to avoid a 'ghost debate' about planes that are no longer up for discussion. At the same time, in the event that parliament disavows the Federal Council, it announces the launch of a referendum and ('if all else fails') an express initiative. "
In the course of the next few years, the state government actually adhered to the schedule set by the GSoA - with effects to this day.
In the 2012 armaments program, the Federal Council finally applied for 22 Gripen E to be purchased - apparently using the pause for reflection to order an improved version of the Gripen. VBS boss Maurer, contrary to the results of the evaluation, relied on an aircraft that was not yet fully developed. A game with strangers, as can also be read in the Parliament's message:
«The overall risk of the Gripen procurement is rated as small to medium. This takes into account the fact that the further development of the Gripen C / D to the Gripen E has not yet been completed. "
However, the risk was underestimated. The Gripen E has not yet been introduced, not even by the Swedish Air Force. Warner and the renowned aircraft engineer Georges Bridel already predicted in the referendum that it would take ten years rather than five, as the army predicted.
Either way, on the evening of May 18, 2014, Swiss security policy was in a huge mess. With the paper plane, not only the urgently needed renewal of the Air Force crashed, but also the planning for the next few years - with serious consequences that have not yet been overcome.
4. Quick procurements
There was no plan B for a no at the ballot box, but there was free funding.
The Federal Council therefore created an additional armaments program for 2015 for CHF 874 million. The GSoA spoke of “shameless money raffling”. In parliament, Maurer tried to explain the bigger picture.
"With this armaments program, we are submitting armaments to you that we had previously put on hold because we believed that the new fighter aircraft could be financed."
The «armaments program 15 plus» put the army planners and procurers under pressure. On the one hand, suitable projects had to be conjured up that were more or less ready for procurement, and on the other hand, Armasuisse, which was already thinned out in terms of staff, was overwhelmed with additional work. Possibly these are soft factors for the problems that arose after the Gripen No: Too many projects had to be completed too quickly with too few people.
The years since the Gripen actually leave the impression that army procurement is all about bankruptcies, bad luck and mishaps:
The three projects in public criticism:
* ADS 15 - six reconnaissance drones for mixed airspace
The project is well behind schedule. Critics complain that ADS 15 is a paper drone and has not reached procurement maturity. The army's requirements include the use of drones for the benefit of civil authorities. In order to avoid collisions in civil airspace, ADS 15 is equipped with a “Sense and Avoid” system. According to Armasuisse, the reasons for the delays are the difficult certification of the drone in civil airspace, the crash of a device on a test flight in Israel and the difficult conditions due to Corona.
* Duro WE - value retention of 2200 small trucks for troop transport
The high price of 558 million is criticized. The army could actually have procured new vehicles off the shelf somewhere, repeat the critics. Practically impossible, countered Armasuisse. The specifications of the army contained unique selling points that exactly distinguish the existing Duro - about a width of two meters. There is no such vehicle on the market. The project is on track with a delay.
* Mörser 16 - 32 guns on wheeled armored personnel carriers for fire support of combat units (tämä on se RUAGin palstalla naurettu kallis "scifi-Mjölner" krh)
The mortar is a Swiss in-house production that has been procured using the accelerated procedure. The project was saved in close cooperation with industry and the army. The prototype now meets the essential requirements. Mortar 16 is to be introduced to the troops with a three-year delay from 2023. The DDPS signed the series contract in February 2021.
If you switch from time-lapse to slow-motion, however, it becomes clear: to speak of an actual armaments malaise, despite all the grudges, is extremely pointed. Since the Gripen No, there have been delays or serious criticism in three projects - plus effective additional costs of 20 million for a project that was never commissioned.
The “Bodluv scandal” was the grossest bankruptcy after the crash of the paper plane. Ueli Maurer's successor in the DDPS, Federal Councilor Guy Parmelin, pressed the reset button. Following a request from the SRF political magazine “Rundschau”, he unceremoniously suspended the “Bodluv medium range” project. A quick shot, complained later the Business Audit Commission (GPK).
Perhaps Bodluv's stop was also the decisive game changer to calm the system, the shock moment to overcome the paper airplane complex. Parmelin left the pile of broken glass behind and started the renewal of the Air Force.
5. Crystallization point Bodluv
(Bodluv GR = extended-range ground-based air defence system)
In the analysis, the Bodluv scandal appears as the crystallization point of the hectic rush that arose after the Gripen no.
Immediately after the Gripen No, the DDPS only had a limited number of so-called “overhang projects” in order to trigger rapid payments. In addition, the scarce human resources were noticeable - both among the planners and the purchasers. Because Armasuisse had too few people to handle all the projects itself, the arms company Thales was commissioned as general contractor to support the preparatory work for the “Bodluv medium range” project.
The later administrative investigation under the direction of Kurt Grüter attests to all those involved that Bodluv 2020 has advanced within the framework of the specifications.
Nevertheless, there was a bang: The minutes of a meeting between the project supervision and Armasuisse in January 2016 were put in two different media. The army has opted for two systems with “mission-relevant no-gos” - the motto: “twice insufficient gives enough”, summarized a report in the “Rundschau” by SRF on March 23, 2016, the tenor of the air force representatives.
Grüter presents the situation more soberly: The all-weather suitability of one and the range of the other guided missile gave rise to discussions. According to the test report, no product contained a no-go, only performance restrictions. "This view was partially shared by representatives of the Air Force," writes Grüter.
So why the fuss? Was it just a conflict about the optimal solution?
The favored variant of “Bodluv medium range” could have covered six times less area than foreseen in the specifications. The scandal surrounding the missiles that have not been procured exemplifies the areas of tension in military procurement. At its core, it is always about the question of how much defense is possible within the financial framework.
Tensions in the military procurement system:
* The imperative of finances: Bodluv 2020 should, like ultimately all armaments in recent years, be procured according to the principle of “design to cost” - as much output as finances are available. In the end, someone is always dissatisfied. The peace dividend has been used up - and became a security deficit with the XXI Army Reform at the latest.
* Communication: Those who order may initially have different ideas than the procurers. There is a discrepancy between the specifications of the army and the possibilities on the market. In the past, there was probably a lack of trust among the actors for an honest exchange.
* Distribution struggle for resources: Grail guardians of the national defense mix in here as well as circles critical of the army - often with indiscretions to the media. The public is unsettled with partial information. To date, it is unclear with which agenda the Bodluv Protocols were leaked.
Has the DDPS overcome the paper plane complex in the meantime?
Today, military procurement is in an intermediate phase. Federal Councilor Viola Amherd had the processes checked. The consulting firm Deloitte gave Armasuisse surprisingly good marks. In addition, an advisory group has made recommendations for the future: Parliament should only say what the army must be able to do every four years via a “capability dialogue”. It should make strategic decisions, not, as before, about individual transactions. However, this path is controversial. The discussion about this is only just beginning.
But first the type decision for the new combat aircraft is imminent. At the end of March, Armasuisse will present the results of the evaluation to the DDPS - then it will be political.
After all, none of the four jets in the race is a paper airplane.
