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Oikein!
Subutai (Classical Mongolian: Sübügätäi or Sübü'ätäi; Tuvan: Сүбэдэй, [sybɛˈdɛj]; Modern Mongolian: Subotai script.jpgСүбээдэй, Sübeedei. [sʊbeːˈdɛ]; Chinese: 速不台 1175–1248) was a Mongolian general and the primary military strategist of Genghis Khan and Ögedei Khan. He directed more than 20 campaigns and won 65 pitched battles, during which he conquered or overran more territory than any other commander in history as part of the expansion of the Mongol Empire.[1] He often gained victory by means of imaginative and sophisticated strategies and routinely coordinated movements of armies that operated hundreds of kilometers apart from each other. Subutai is well known for the geographical diversity and success of his expeditions, which took him from central Asia to the Russian steppe and into Europe.


"No Mongol general played a greater role than Subotei Ba'atur in establishing and maintaining the early Mongol Empire. Trusted commander and retainer of Cinggis, later highly respected servant of Ogodei and Guyuk, Subotei served with great distinction in every phase of Mongolian national development during the first four decades of empire. When he first entered the service of Temujin, the later Cinggis Qan, the realm of that minor Mongol chieftain comprised only a few families. In his old age, Subotei saw a mighty dominion stretching from the borders of Hungary to the Sea of Japan, from the outskirts of Novgorod to the Persian Gulf and the Yangtze River. He had no small part in creating it."
— Paul Buell[57]

In a unique historical anomaly, the strategic and operational innovations of Genghis Khan and Subutai became lost in history, and others were forced to rediscover them 600 and 700 years later. Even though Subutai had devastated the armies of Russia, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Latin Constantinople in a series of one-sided campaigns, Western military leaders, historians, and theorists completely ignored him until the 20th century.[58] The Mongols did not operate as one distinct mass, but instead moved along 3–5 axes of approach, often 500–1000 km apart, and threatened numerous objectives simultaneously. Like Napoleon, Subutai (and Genghis Khan) would disperse their forces along a wide frontage and rapidly coalesce at decisive points to defeat the enemy in detail. Their methods were aligned to completely crush the enemy state's will to fight.[59] Subutai has been credited as the first general to operate campaigns using the modern organizational methods of command and control.[60]

Though unknown to the west for many centuries, Subutai's exploits were featured by the British military theorist B. H. Liddell Hart in his book Great Captains Unveiled after World War I. Liddell Hart used the example of the Mongols under Genghis and Subutai to demonstrate how a mechanized army could fight using the principles of mobility, dispersion and surprise. In particular, Erwin Rommel and George Patton were avid students of Mongol campaigns.[61]

'Deep Battle' theory
Main article: Deep Battle

Russia derived the most use out of a careful study of the Mongol campaigns. Their closer proximity to the steppe gave them greater interest and access to the Mongolian campaigns, first analyzed by the Russian General Mikhail Ivanin in the 19th century, which became a recommended text in the Russian military academies up until the mid 20th century.[62] Ivanin's work became used in the Deep Battle doctrine developed by Soviet Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Frunze, and G. S. Isserson. Deep Battle doctrine bore a heavy resemblance to Mongol strategic methods, substituting tanks, motorized troop carriers, artillery, and airplanes for Mongol horse archers, lancers, and field artillery. The Red Army even went so far as to copy Subutai's use of smokescreens on the battlefield to cover troop movements.[63] Later in the 20th century, American military theorist John Boyd and some of his followers used Genghis Khan and Subutai's campaigns as examples of maneuver warfare.[64]





This book tells the story of Subotai the Valiant, one of the greatest generals in military history, surely the equal of Hannibal and Scipio in tactical brilliance and ranking right along with both Alexander and Caesar as a strategist. Subotai commanded armies whose size, scale, and scope of operations surpassed all of the commanders of the ancient world. Under his direction and command, Mongol armies moved faster, over greater distances, and with a greater scope of maneuver than any army had ever done before. His legacy lives to the present day, for much of the theory and practice of modern military operations was first used by Subotai. The modern emphasis on speed, maneuver, surprise, envelopment, the rear battle, the deep battle, concentration of firepower, and the battle of annihilation all emerged as tactical skills first practiced by this great Mongol general.

Subotai died at age 73, by which time he had conquered 32 nations and won 65 pitched battles, as the Muslim historians tell us. For 60 of those years, Subotai lived as Mongol soldier, first as a lowly private who kept the tent door of Genghis himself, rising to be the most brilliant and trusted of Genghis Khan's generals. When Genghis died, Subotai continued to be the moving force of the Mongol army under his successors. It was Subotai who planned and participated in the Mongol victories against Korea, China, Persia, and Russia. It was Subotai's conquest of Hungary that destroyed every major army between the Mongols and the threshold of Europe. Had the great Khan not died, it is likely that Subotai would have destroyed Europe itself.



 
Oikein!
Subutai (Classical Mongolian: Sübügätäi or Sübü'ätäi; Tuvan: Сүбэдэй, [sybɛˈdɛj]; Modern Mongolian: Subotai script.jpgСүбээдэй, Sübeedei. [sʊbeːˈdɛ]; Chinese: 速不台 1175–1248) was a Mongolian general and the primary military strategist of Genghis Khan and Ögedei Khan. He directed more than 20 campaigns and won 65 pitched battles, during which he conquered or overran more territory than any other commander in history as part of the expansion of the Mongol Empire.[1] He often gained victory by means of imaginative and sophisticated strategies and routinely coordinated movements of armies that operated hundreds of kilometers apart from each other. Subutai is well known for the geographical diversity and success of his expeditions, which took him from central Asia to the Russian steppe and into Europe.




In a unique historical anomaly, the strategic and operational innovations of Genghis Khan and Subutai became lost in history, and others were forced to rediscover them 600 and 700 years later. Even though Subutai had devastated the armies of Russia, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Latin Constantinople in a series of one-sided campaigns, Western military leaders, historians, and theorists completely ignored him until the 20th century.[58] The Mongols did not operate as one distinct mass, but instead moved along 3–5 axes of approach, often 500–1000 km apart, and threatened numerous objectives simultaneously. Like Napoleon, Subutai (and Genghis Khan) would disperse their forces along a wide frontage and rapidly coalesce at decisive points to defeat the enemy in detail. Their methods were aligned to completely crush the enemy state's will to fight.[59] Subutai has been credited as the first general to operate campaigns using the modern organizational methods of command and control.[60]

Though unknown to the west for many centuries, Subutai's exploits were featured by the British military theorist B. H. Liddell Hart in his book Great Captains Unveiled after World War I. Liddell Hart used the example of the Mongols under Genghis and Subutai to demonstrate how a mechanized army could fight using the principles of mobility, dispersion and surprise. In particular, Erwin Rommel and George Patton were avid students of Mongol campaigns.[61]

'Deep Battle' theory
Main article: Deep Battle

Russia derived the most use out of a careful study of the Mongol campaigns. Their closer proximity to the steppe gave them greater interest and access to the Mongolian campaigns, first analyzed by the Russian General Mikhail Ivanin in the 19th century, which became a recommended text in the Russian military academies up until the mid 20th century.[62] Ivanin's work became used in the Deep Battle doctrine developed by Soviet Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Frunze, and G. S. Isserson. Deep Battle doctrine bore a heavy resemblance to Mongol strategic methods, substituting tanks, motorized troop carriers, artillery, and airplanes for Mongol horse archers, lancers, and field artillery. The Red Army even went so far as to copy Subutai's use of smokescreens on the battlefield to cover troop movements.[63] Later in the 20th century, American military theorist John Boyd and some of his followers used Genghis Khan and Subutai's campaigns as examples of maneuver warfare.[64]





This book tells the story of Subotai the Valiant, one of the greatest generals in military history, surely the equal of Hannibal and Scipio in tactical brilliance and ranking right along with both Alexander and Caesar as a strategist. Subotai commanded armies whose size, scale, and scope of operations surpassed all of the commanders of the ancient world. Under his direction and command, Mongol armies moved faster, over greater distances, and with a greater scope of maneuver than any army had ever done before. His legacy lives to the present day, for much of the theory and practice of modern military operations was first used by Subotai. The modern emphasis on speed, maneuver, surprise, envelopment, the rear battle, the deep battle, concentration of firepower, and the battle of annihilation all emerged as tactical skills first practiced by this great Mongol general.

Subotai died at age 73, by which time he had conquered 32 nations and won 65 pitched battles, as the Muslim historians tell us. For 60 of those years, Subotai lived as Mongol soldier, first as a lowly private who kept the tent door of Genghis himself, rising to be the most brilliant and trusted of Genghis Khan's generals. When Genghis died, Subotai continued to be the moving force of the Mongol army under his successors. It was Subotai who planned and participated in the Mongol victories against Korea, China, Persia, and Russia. It was Subotai's conquest of Hungary that destroyed every major army between the Mongols and the threshold of Europe. Had the great Khan not died, it is likely that Subotai would have destroyed Europe itself.



Yksi suuria, mutta myös unohdettuja, kuten foorumin vastauksistakin saattaa päätellä. En itsekään muistanut kuin selvitystyön jälkeen.
Itse kuitenkin pidän tällaisista louhintakysymyksistä (y). On mielenkiintoista sukellella läpi historian vinkkien perusteella.
 
Suomen laivastoon liittyvä moottoritorpedovene yritti upottaa tosimielessä Suomen laivastoon liittyvän tykkiveneen, joka vastusti hyökkäystä ampumalla tosimielessä takaisin. Mistä on kyse?
 
Lisää vihjeitä.
Näissä tulevassa ja entisessä Suomen laivaston aluksessa ei ollut tapahtumahetkellä suomalaista miehistöä.
Aikaisemmalla urallaan toinen näistä aluksista on todennäköisesti ollut yrittämässä upottaa ranskalaisia hävittäjiä. Tosin ranskikset eivät ilmeisesti edes yritystä havainneet.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Ketään ei haluta edes arvailla näemmä, vaikka moottoritorpedoveneitä nyt ei hirveästi valinnanvaraa ole.
Viimeinen vihje, tapahtumat sijoittuvat järvelle.
 
Ketään ei haluta edes arvailla näemmä, vaikka moottoritorpedoveneitä nyt ei hirveästi valinnanvaraa ole.
Viimeinen vihje, tapahtumat sijoittuvat järvelle.

Liittynee varmaankin jollain tavalla 1942 Laatokalla operoineisiin Italian laivaston torpedoveneisiin. :unsure:

Veikataan tätä:


ja tätä:


Olisivatko kohdanneet Laatokalla Suhosaaren operaation yhteydessä.
 
Liittynee varmaankin jollain tavalla 1942 Laatokalla operoineisiin Italian laivaston torpedoveneisiin. :unsure:

Veikataan tätä:


ja tätä:


Olisivatko kohdanneet Laatokalla Suhosaaren operaation yhteydessä.
Kylliksi lähellä, sait vastausvuoron.
Kyse oli todellakin Laatokan taisteluista. Jokin aika sitten minulle selvisi, että Laatokalla oli sodissamme vilkastakin toimintaa, etenkin Jatkosodassa mutta myös Talvisodassa.
Talvisodan laivaston yksiköt oli pakko luovuttaa vihollisille, jotka sitten niitä käyttivät Jatkosodassa.
Tarkkaan ottaen tarkoitin kelirikkoalus Aallokasta.
Minusta oli hauska havainto, että tuleva Suomen laivaston mtv hyökkäsi entistä laivaston alusta vastaan.

https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kelirikkoalus_Aallokas
aluksesta tuli tykkivene ja se liitettiin Neuvostoliiton Laatokan-laivastoon nimellä Šeksna 3. elokuuta 1941. Elokuussa Šeksna oli muiden Laatokan-laivaston tykkiveneiden kanssa suojaamassa Hiitolan seudulla saarroksissa olevia 142. tarkka-ampujadivisioonaa ja 198. moottoridivisoonaa ja joukkojen evakointia. Šeksna kuljetti vuoden 1941 lopulla muiden Laatokan-laivaston alusten tavoin rahtia piiritettyyn Leningradiin, mutta aluksen polttoaineen puute jarrutti pian kuljetuksia.
Vuonna 1942 Šeksna jatkoi kuljetuslaivana toimimista ja kuljetuslaivojen suojaamista. 28. elokuuta 1942 kuljetuslaivasto, johon Šeksna kuului joutui kahden italialaisen torpedoveneen hyökkäyksen kohteeksi, mutta hyökkäys torjuttiin Šeksnan avulla. Laiva kuului marraskuussa 1942 perustettuun erikoisosastoon, jonka ansiosta purjehduskausi kesti pidempään kuin edellisenä vuonna.

Pannaanpa vielä merkille, että yksi tuon muinaisen laivaston edustaja oli vielä ihan äsken olemassa!
https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suomen_Laatokan-laivasto

640px-SSKiviniemi.jpg
 
Kiitän. Laitetaanpa toinen laivastoaiheinen kyssäri.

Kuka saksalainen amiraali sotavangiksi jouduttuaan kieltäytyi kaikesta yhteistyöstä vangitsijoidensa kanssa ? Samassa yhteydessä tämä ilmoitti ettei enää tulisi puhumaan lainkaan saksaa. Oli omien sanojensa mukaan "unohtanut" koko kielen. Huom. kyssärissä tarkoituksella erehdyttämismielessä pieni tekninen virhe.
 
Olisiko Jozef Unrug?

Wikipedia

Kyllä vaan. Saksalaissyntyinen ammattisotilas joka ekan maailmansodan jälkeen siirtyi vastaitsenäistyneen Puolan palvelukseen. Unrug puolalaistui täysin vaikka tietenkin puhui saksaa äidinkielenään. Johti tarmokkaasti syksyn 1939 puolustustoimia. Joutui natsi-Saksan sotavangiksi jonka alkuvaiheessa vangitsijat koettivat houkutella Unrugin siirtymään takaisin Reichin helmaan. Tämä kieltäytyi ehdottomasti minkäänlaisesta yhteistyöstä ja kieltäytyi täysin puhumasta saksaa vankeusaikanaan.
 
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