Twiitissä lainatun Le Monde -artikkelin tekstin käännös (se osuus joka näkyy lainatussa kuvassa):
Production of battle tanks at the Uralvagonzavod and Omsktransmash factories is expected to reach 600 units for the year 2023, held back only by the production of the guns, while problems with electronic components have been resolved. Almost equivalent to the number of tanks supplied to kyiv during the same period by its Western allies.
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Wolskin viestin käännös:
In Abrams we trust.
Yesterday, there was a discussion about what she posted in Le Monde @AleksanderOlech. The article mentions 600 tanks A YEAR in UVZ (T-72/90 family) and Omsk (T-80). And yes, it is possible. But not as the production of new machines, but as the production of new ones, the restoration of old ones and the renovation of shot machines recovered from the battlefield.
After the collapse of the USSR at peace, in the best years UVZ could produce about 250 - 300 T-90S/T-90A tanks, where the main limit was the availability of W92 and W92S2, then - here there was a limit of about 250 tanks per year, and in 2A46M5 barrels with a bayonet connector which they are incompatible with older guns
Omsk built about 60 T-80BVM per year. Is it possible to double production on a war footing? In theory, in practice it didn't work out very well for the Russians. Otherwise, we would be talking about 1k+ machines delivered this year to MO FR together with renovated vehicles. And so we write "only" about the delivery of 600 tanks in 2023, including refurbished vehicles. Of course, La Monde forgot about Chita and other factories where the T-62M is currently manufactured using components from North Korea. It was planned to deliver 260-280 vehicles this year, but production, or rather reconstruction at the factory, is to be completed by about 130 tanks, and the target capacity will be achieved next year.
As a result, we are talking about the fact that the Russian Armed Forces will receive about 700 tanks this year - new tanks, restored from warehouses and renovated after evacuation from the battlefield.
The Russians have so far lost about 2,500 tanks in the war, and as you can see, within a year they managed to regain about 25-27% of the loss they suffered. This does not mean that they will be able to make up for all the losses by 2026 - for example, the process of restoring machines from warehouses is non-linear - in 2024 there will be a peak in capacity and then the pool of machines (capable of doing so) will begin to run out. Therefore, RUS is trying to expand the production of UVZ and Omsk because they know that from 2025 they will have to rely mainly on new tanks in the process of reproducing combat losses of armored weapons. Personally, I estimate that in 2024, the RUS will be able to incorporate about 1,000-1,200 tanks of all categories into the Russian Armed Forces (new, recovered from warehouses, repaired after evacuation from the battlefield).
Well, what does it look like in Ukraine? Ukrainians repair about 30 tanks a month recovered from the battlefield OUTSIDE Ukraine. Which is approximately 360 recovered machines per year. From T-64BV, for which there are no components, through T-72M1 to Leopard 2. Deliveries of new machines in 2023 and those contracted until the end of the year (including Leopard 2 and Abrams) will make up for the irretrievable losses from this year, including those from the unsuccessful offensive. Perhaps even slightly positive at the end of the year. Of course, this is only possible because Poland has donated over 350 machines to the UA in less than two years. And we can give another hundred (PT-91).
But so far, the cars renovated in Ukraine + delivered by the West this year give a value approximately equal to the Russian 600-700 cars
Yes, you read that right. Please make a note of this. However, we have an elephant in the room here, which I have been writing about since November 2022 - the pool of Western machines that can be delivered is a finite value, and this year is only "saved" by surprisingly low UA irreversible losses. Unfortunately, the year 2024 will see an almost double increase in the reconstruction capacity of RUS and a significant decrease in the reconstruction capacity of UA (by over 1/3, how much more - it is debatable).
However, what does the ANNUAL production capacity look like in the "West"?
South Korea: 40 to 80 K2 (confirmed closer to 40) Israel: up to 100 Merkavs and Namers (approximately) Germany: 25-30 Leopard 2A7V USA: 180 in one shift in LIMA
Yes, the US production capacity is about the same what the rest put together. The above data is OSINT ofc - just read parliamentary interpellations, congressional reports, state senators', annual reports of companies, open statements of presidents and directors of companies, etc. Of course, the above-mentioned may be increased: Lima produces 15 Abrmas per month and 5 Strykers, there is an option production of 20 M1 m/c (240 per year) and when the second shift is launched: 33 vehicles per month (396 per year!). South Korea's capabilities are difficult to estimate, and KMW personally estimates it at double what it already has - although deliveries to Hungary and Norway indicate that there will be around 25 tanks per year there. What's the moral in this for us? 1) In Abrams we trust because only GDLS has the appropriate production capacity 2) Licensed production of either M1A2SEPv3PL or K2PL should be launched in Poland, but care should be taken to ensure that it becomes the basis for a mobilization plan for renovations and distributed production based on components already produced in peacetime . And most importantly: I challenge the author of the fall of the Panzerwaffe (article) @WojenneH because Norbert wrote several epic articles about what happened to the Panzerwaffe in 1943 and 1944, that it collapsed. What matters is not how much you produce/renovate, but how much you lose during this time and... whether your production base can be effectively attacked by aviation and production interrupted and disrupted. And at the end of this long entry, one more issue:
In the event of a NATO vs. Russia conflict, the UWZ and Omsk would not stand in one piece for too long
And the need to disperse production and hide it underground would quickly reach the scale of the needs of the Third Reich in Russia in 1944 . Unfortunately, Ukraine has no room for maneuver here and we are seeing a material war in its worst form.
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JR2 kommentoi Wolskin viestiä näin:
The assessment from Ukraine looks like this: in Russia, there are still +/- 800 T-80 tank hulls left in arms storage warehouses. And it is warehouses, not the arms industry, that power UralVagonZavod.
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