Towed artillery
*Probably, this is how many artillery systems were cannibalized, but we cannot say this for sure due to the quality of the picture. Therefore, we conservatively consider these systems as "available", because there may be an error in the assessment, or according to another criterion, under certain possibilities (supply of barrels), this unit may be restored, even if it is currently without a barrel.
1. It is worth noting that the picture of the largest storage place of the Shuchye towed artillery is dated December 2023, so the real number as of now may be even less.
2. Towed artillery is the main type of artillery for compensation of losses and saturation with equipment of new artillery units. Of the 14,111 units that were accounted for in 2021, as of mid-2024, 5,453 units remained, or 5,139 identified as "barreled," which is about 1/3 of the stock available at the start of the large-scale encroachment of the park.
The difference between 2023 and 2024 was 1,333 units. removed from storage and 314 units. cannibalized with removed barrels.
3. Small and medium-sized arsenals undergo critical depletion "to zero": yes, the most suitable artillery was removed from the large 94 arsenal. Also, storage facilities for the towed artillery "Karabash" and the arsenal of the "37th Separate Railway Brigade" were also severely depleted. Very close to exhaustion are 216 and 209 arsenals and 7021 storage bases.
4. There are 4 main bases where towed artillery is stored: Shuchye, 80-arsenal, "Forest Town" and 120 arsenal - these bases store 90% of all towed artillery. More than a dozen small and medium-sized bases are completely exhausted, or close to it already in 2024.
5. At Arsenal 120 and Lesny Gorodka, the towed artillery is not so much removed from storage to replace losses or fill new units, as it is disassembled on the spot, probably to ensure field repairs and barrel replacement.
These are the trains that take something (probably barrels and spare parts) out of the bases - not uncommon
6. Despite the fact that only 36-38% of the stocks of towed artillery available in 2021 remain in Russia - this is still a lot, which will allow replenishing losses and restoring the resource of artillery already available in regular units. But for a better understanding of the situation, it is worth referring to "quality": of the 5,139 units remaining with barrels, about 2,000 are artillery of the late 1930s and 1950s (M-30 and D-1 and others).
7. Taking into account the risk of supplying barrels and artillery from Iran or the DPRK, it makes no sense to predict the timing of the exhaustion of the resource of towed artillery. But Iran and North Korea are unlikely to transfer the "newest models" of towed towed artillery, let alone self-propelled. Therefore, if the risk of the transfer of artillery from the "axis of evil" does materialize, then, most likely, it will be the same old modifications of howitzers from 1930-50. Therefore, it is better to focus on trends: in 2022-2023, the degradation of the artillery component took place , when losses were replaced not by self-propelled, but by towed artillery. As of the end of 2023, various researchers, including us, agree that 70% of the artillery in the formation units of the occupying forces is currently towed, and 30% is self-propelled, which is a mirror image of the state of affairs before a full-scale invasion. And in 2024-2025, there should be a degradation of already towed artillery as part of the occupying forces, when newer, higher-quality samples, such as "Msta-B", "Hyacinth-B", D-30/20 will be replaced by M-30 and D-1. The problem of supplying ammunition for the M-30 seems to have been solved thanks to the supply from the DPRK.
Therefore, we are unlikely to see the deployment of "trebuchets" in Russian artillery units - but their artillery will be much less mobile, accurate, with higher costs of ammunition to hit a unit of the target, with a lower resource of the barrels due to their age, with a shorter service life and a longer recovery period . All this will affect the ability of the occupying forces to conduct counter-battery combat, which, with the appropriate number of the latest mobile weapons in the armed forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, should give a higher percentage of success in counter-battery duels and a better ability to suppress enemy means of cover on specific sections of the front if necessary.
Reactive salvo fire systems (RSZV)
*"
Motovylykhinsky plants" is the main enterprise for the restoration of anti-aircraft missiles and the modernization of BM-21 "Grad" to "Tornado-G". As of January 2024, there were 230 disassembled BM-21s in the sump on the territory of the enterprise, which we did not include in the main table, because as part of the study of RSZV, we did not include machines with clear signs of cannibalization (most often - removal of guides (pipes). "
** Novoozerne has no recent images, but it is unlikely that MSWs appeared there after this base was exhausted in 2023.
*** Regarding 744, the database relies on old Covert Сabal calculations; we don't know if he assessed for Hurricanes and have no new images as of 2024. As of mid-2023, 16 units remained at this base. BM-21. It is likely that by 2024, if the trend is taken into account, they will be exhausted on this basis - or very close to it.
According to Military Balance, Russia should have 1,500 units BM-21 "Grad" and 550 units BM-27 "Hurricane" in reserve. Since we have identified 433 units of "Hurricanes" thanks to satellite images for 2021, the difference from MB of 100 units can be attributed to storage in closed rooms, lack of coverage (a few units) of BM-27 at small bases, or simply that MB data is often not taken into account "historical cannibalization" of machines.
But where exactly at Military Balance storage bases were counted 1,500 units BM-21 "Grad" - remained a mystery for us. Having covered both large and small bases, the main production, modernization and repair plants, as of 2021 we have identified 889 units. BM-21, of which more than 200 units - this is purely a chassis from the former BM-21 "Grad". We do not know where another 600+ units went. Even if we assume the storage of a certain number of machines at smaller bases or in covered hangars - this figure was still clearly overestimated compared to the actual one, and the storage of simple BM-21s in precious places in covered hangars as of 2024 is unlikely, since mass cannibalization of machines that have been in the open air for decades without signs of maintenance.
The numbers on the scoreboard - more precisely, in the table. The mass disappearance and cannibalization of SALW in storage facilities is due to several factors:
1. MLRS, especially the BM-21 "Grad" is a fairly simple design, and therefore they could be quickly restored to make up for the significant losses incurred in 2022. Also, due to the difficulty of restoring self-propelled guns, the newly created units were equipped with rocket launchers and towed artillery in order to have the appropriate artillery component in case it was impossible to provide self-propelled artillery in accordance with the staff list.
2. Many units of MLRS, especially "Grads", are cannibalized for spare parts "for the future", when the available resource of "Grads", which are already in the army, will be exhausted. Probably, a large number of removed guides (pipes) were transferred to storage in more suitable places (hangars/warehouses). The chassis themselves do not represent much value, so they continue to be in the "garden of rusty Soviet cans".
3. "Grads", which were in storage in the best condition, were handed over for modernization to "Tornado-G". Actually, similarly, until February 24, 2022, Tornado-G entered the Russian army not by production "from scratch", but by modernization by the method "from 3 make 1". This may explain the difference in our BM-21 calculations with the Military Balance calculations, which seem to have had too high expectations for the number of units of this type of MLRS in storage.
Although in fact the volumes of MLRS available in storage are approaching exhaustion, 17.7% of the initial stocks of "Grads" and 31% of the initial stocks of "Uragans" is still quite a significant number - accordingly, the presence of these systems in warehouses does not mean the depletion of the reactive component of artillery. Due to the range of the Uragan system, its damage is not a frequent phenomenon: during 2.5 years of full-scale war, according to Oryx, the destruction of 85 units was visually confirmed (which allows you to round the number of actually lost MLRS of this type to a hundred). The second aspect is Russia's ability to maintain the operational aspects of these machines for a long time. Part of the "Hurricanes" was cannibalized for the needs of future restoration, and the launch/guide tubes themselves are not a very complex "product". In a critical case, Russia will be able to try to discreetly purchase and transport the guide elements from the DPRK.
Quantity is another matter. At the current rate of destruction, 100+ "Hurricanes" in reserve may be enough to compensate for losses in 12-18 months - but this is without taking into account that losses in war are non-linear and can occur both a sharp increase in the intensity of their destruction and vice versa. Therefore, such forecasts in numbers are quite "floating".
The same applies to BM-21. These are simple designs, components for which are quite enough due to cannibalization. The remnants of BM-21 are a reserve of spare parts for those units of MLRS systems that are already in service with the enemy's army. It is possible that a certain amount is still saved for upgrading to the Tornado-G modification, the losses of which are recorded from time to time in the state of the enemy.
What about the production of artillery in Moscow?
We come to a very interesting topic, namely the answer to the question: "Why the main potential of the artillery component of Moscow is modernization and restoration through cannibalization", and not production "from scratch". Very often, the enemy media reports on the production of equipment "from scratch", which is actually the deconservation or modernization of artillery units already in storage.
1. Where and what are the artillery factories in Moscow?
In Moscow, barrel artillery is produced at Uraltransmash, MLRS systems at Motovylykhinsky Plant, towed artillery and mortars also at Motovylykhinsky Plant. In addition, there were plans to supply components to the Grad anti-aircraft missile system from Belarus (from subcontractor Volatavto), which were not implemented. Nevertheless, Moscow will receive components produced by subcontractors who do not have the appropriate licenses.
Theoretically, Moscow can count on the potential for the production of Polonez-M MLRS missiles in Belarus, but the decision to supply them to Russia has not been made - nevertheless, this possibility should not be discounted, although it is complicated by the need to grant permission to China for export and the application of these systems, since these MLRS use Chinese technology.
2. What artillery does Muscovy produce "from scratch" and how big is the potential for setting up/expanding artillery production?
Muscovy produces from scratch both self-propelled guns ("Coalition-SV", "Malva", "Phlox") and MLRS missiles ("Tornado-S", "Zemledeliye", "TOS-1", "TOS-2", "Uragan" -1M"). The expansion of the production of self-propelled guns rests both on the barrels (the "Coalition" and "Malva" are armed with the same 2A88 gun) and on the base ("The Coalition" is produced on the basis of the T-90, the stocks of which in storage have been exhausted (according to the study Covert Cabal and High_marsed). Instead, the rate of production of new bodies is limited. Therefore, most of the barrel artillery - both self-propelled and towed - is reactivated by cannibalization (for example, removing the barrel from the 2C1 "Carnation" and installing it on the carriage of the towed howitzer D-20, as well as reactivation of D-30).
As for the RSZV, on the one hand, it is easier with them, since they do not require complex technologies for the production of guides (launch tubes), and are generally based on a wheel base (at the NGO "Splav", according to the Russians, they are manufactured as modernized "Grad ", as well as "Tornado-G", however, the last notification about their delivery is dated November 16, 2022). On the other hand, TOS-1 is based on the T-72 tank, the stock of retrievable tanks is rapidly dwindling (although, most likely, this issue is solved by the transition to the production of TOS-2 on a wheeled base). The biggest problem in the production of barrel artillery is not even the limitation of production sites and equipment (radial forging machines produced by GFM Steyr), but the insufficient
production of specialized steel that could withstand the pressure of shots.
3. What are the peculiarities of artillery restoration/production?
It is rather difficult to estimate the pace of recovery of self-propelled guns and towed artillery. The key indicator is the production of new artillery barrels, which is estimated at 50-80 units per year (
according to Pavel Luzin). In general, we are talking about restoration rather than the production of new equipment as such, while the restoration of towed equipment can take place even in the field, or as we have confirmed, directly at storage bases. Instead, the restoration and modernization of self-propelled artillery takes place at limited production sites, the overloading of which led to the fact that damaged and destroyed self-propelled artillery began to be dragged not to factories, but to the workshops of storage bases.
4. Where and how many barrels does Muscovy produce for the already existing artillery or for the production of new ones?
Artillery barrels are produced at the Motovylikha (Perm) and Titan-Barricade (Volgograd) plants, tank barrels are produced at Plant No. 9 (Yekaterinburg) - but, according to estimates, in rather small quantities. Pavlo Luzin in a private comment said that, in his opinion, production is limited to 50-80 artillery barrels (for rifled guns) and several dozen tank barrels
(on the other hand, the material of The Economist , also referring to Mr. Luzin, claims that the upper the limit of production of large-caliber artillery barrels can reach 200 units - which, however, does not change the general situation in a fundamental way, taking into account the rates of "burning" of barrels). At the same time, "Titan-Barricades", at best, performs an auxiliary role, since, despite the presence in the structure of the artillery design bureau, the plant itself has been part of the structure of "Roscosmos" for more than 10 years. Therefore, the status and condition of artillery production in Volgograd raises, if not doubts, then questions about the scale.
According to the estimates of various researchers, Russia is unable to produce and does not mass-produce large-caliber artillery barrels. Moreover, even such a limited production of artillery barrels has an extremely narrow place. And this bottleneck is not even the Austrian company GFM Steyr, on which all the equipment, maintenance and modernization of barrel production machines actually depends, but specialized "pure" metallurgy and alloy production technology, which was recognized as "dead" in Moscow itself.
But even with the GFM Steyr behind them, to maintain the level of combat capability of artillery units, the Russians must rely primarily on:
1) De-preservation and cannibalization of increasingly old artillery from storage bases;
2) Increasing the share of MLRS in the artillery component, since it can be quickly put on wheels and used;
3) Work on the prospect of supplying artillery barrels and systems from the DPRK and Iran.
Artillery in the DPRK and Iran.
"Will North Korea and Iran go to supply artillery to the Russians?" is an open and debatable question. In order to work out the most negative options for us - in order to prepare for them - we suggest that in the future the DPRK and Iran will take such a step. Of course, if the state of Russian artillery reaches absolutely critical indicators and, as a result, Moscow will be ready to pay a lot (it's not just about money).
As for what kind of artillery Iran and North Korea will be willing to supply to the Russians, there are two limitations here, which, without a doubt, are positive for us:
1. That the DPRK and Iran are not countries in which modern artillery is rapidly developing and available in commercial quantities. The North Koreans are probably the closest in the world to the Russians in terms of the number of artillery
- but clearly not in terms of quality . Most of the artillery in North Korea are systems produced in the 1940s and 50s and even from the First World War.
2. North Korea and Iran have their reasons for keeping the ratio of military power with their neighbors at least at the current level, so this will have an impact both on the decision "to provide or not to provide artillery to Russia" and on exactly how much and of what quality artillery can be provided.
Artillery is one of the main components of the North Korean military and probably one of the most difficult to evaluate, especially after the start of supplying artillery ammunition to Russia.
The Soviet legacy, Chinese and local production allowed the DPRK to accumulate an extremely large amount of artillery, which in terms of volume will catch up with the Russian army in service as of the beginning of 2022. There are different estimates of this number: CovertCabal without reference to any source gives a figure of 14 thousand units of artillery (towed artillery, self-propelled guns, anti-aircraft guns). Military Balance 2024 gives a figure of 21,600 units of artillery of all types, including mortars. Such an extremely large discrepancy in the number of artillery can be explained by the fact that Military Balance added mortars to its calculations.
One of the key reasons for the difficulty of the assessment is the landscape and the North Korean military's approach to deploying its equipment. Most of the territory of North Korea is one way or another covered by mountains - which the DPRK actually uses, building entire systems of underground storage bases, production, as well as firing points that could be used for a possible war with South Korea. About 2/3 of the artillery is stored in such underground facilities, which have a completely autonomous infrastructure, with logistics, firing positions, ventilation, power plants, headquarters, etc.
In addition, there are at least 17 factories for the production of firearms and artillery in the DPRK, according to information posted on North Korean forums (there are even such).
However, the main goal of the study is to determine what Russia can gain from all this. Most of the artillery that the DPRK has is old Soviet artillery from the Second World War.
8,600 towed artillery/self-propelled guns:
122mm: M-1977; M-1981; M-1985; M-1991;
130mm: M1975; M-1981; M-1991;
152mm: M-1974; M-1977; M-2018;
170mm: M-1978; M-1989
Towed artillery:
122mm: D-30; D-74; M-1931/37;
130mm: M-46;
152mm M-1937; M-1938; M-1943
5,500 RSZV :
107mm Type-63; VTT-323 107mm;
122mm: BM-11; M-1977 (BM-21); M-1985; M-1992; M-1993; VTT-323 122mm;
200mm: BMD-20;
240mm: BM-24; M-1985; M-1989; M-1991;
300mm: a certain amount of M-2015 (KN-SS-X-09) (tests are in progress);
600mm: a certain amount of M-2019 (tests are in progress)
7,500 units mortars in calibers from 82 to 160 mm.
Which of these can theoretically fall into the hands of the Russians? It is necessary to understand that potentially any of these systems can fall into the hands of Russia. It is impossible to objectively assess artillery stocks and their condition, and North Korean propaganda is not a very reliable source for assessment. Added to this is the ability of the DPRK to produce new artillery. Of course, with the help of China, they can produce it, moreover, we can be sure that they produce it, because the 170mm self-propelled guns ("Koksans" in the people) is exactly the artillery that was produced directly in the DPRK.
However, there may be some questions about the quality of this artillery, since the production of barrels requires a certain technological level so that this barrel does not burst after firing (this applies to new systems). Regarding the old systems, which make up the majority, there are still issues of restoration and provision of the resource.
We already know that the quality of ammunition supplied to Russia from the DPRK is unsatisfactory, or at least has a number of problems. Artillerymen of the occupying forces complain about the poor accuracy of shells and their quality. Therefore, obviously, there are questions about the state of the systems in service with North Korea.
But what exactly can the DPRK convey to the Russians? First of all, Russia needs to replace the barrels for its artillery - this can be solved either by providing the barrels directly from the assembly line, or by transferring the barrels removed from the artillery to the DPRK (or together with the gun installations). Of all the systems listed, Russia will be primarily interested in the barrels for the D-20/30 guns, as these are one of the main systems they use.
There is currently no need to transfer barrels to the M-46, the Russians still have enough systems of this type and the need to replace barrels has not yet increased, since 130mm is not the main caliber for the Russian military, although shipments of 130mm rounds have been seen from Iran and North Korea . Other systems are either too old for the Russians to use, or use other projectiles, like the D-1, which uses single-belt 152.4mm projectiles that are not produced by Russia directly - otherwise we would see more widespread use of the D-1.
The issue of the supply of self-propelled guns is also debatable. New weapons samples are too valuable for Pyongyang due to their limited number, and the expediency of supplying old preserved models for restoration is questionable. Another factor is that Russia still has its own large reserves of self-propelled guns, but due to the overload of its own production capabilities, technical condition and rate of losses, it relies primarily on replacing the fire component at the expense of towed artillery and MLRS, which could be quickly reactivated.
As for the RSZV, of all the listed equipment, the Russians can use only the M-1977, which is an analogue of the BM-21. However, the Russians still have enough systems of this type for at least the next year and a half. Plus, this type of weaponry would hardly be the main factor in Russia's attempts to gain access to North Korean stockpiles.
Most likely, the Russians will get by only with supplies of ammunition, the need for which is constant. As for systems of other calibers, none of them are used by Russia.
Also, as we can see, the situation with artillery in the DPRK is extremely uncertain. We know that there is a lot of it, but it is outdated, even in relation to the fact that the occupying forces are now forced to use it. There is also a question about the condition of this artillery in storage, because it is unlikely that such a zoo of equipment can be kept in a suitable condition with a military
budget of $2-3 billion and the need to feed an army of $1.2 million.
The potential of Iran's artillery
Unlike the DPRK and Russia, Iran relies much less on its artillery component. The climatic conditions of Iran, namely the dry air and hot climate, allow us to assume that the condition of the artillery in Iran may be slightly better than that of the DPRK or the Russians - provided that this artillery is stored in the open sky.
The peculiarity of the artillery in service with Iran is that it consists of samples of both Western and Soviet artillery. In total, more than 6,798 units are in service with Iran. artillery (according to Military Balance 2024) - but less than 300 of them are self-propelled.
292+ units SAU:
122 mm: 60 units. 2C1 "Carnation"; Raad-1 (Iranian version of 2C1);
155 mm: 150 units. M109A1; Raad-2 (Iranian version of M109);
170 mm: 30 units. M-1978;
175 mm: 22 units. M-107;
203 mm: 30 units. M110;
2,030+ units towed artillery:
105 mm: 130 units. M101A1; 20 units M-56;
122 mm: 540 units. D-30; 100 units of Type-54 (M-30);
130 mm: 985 units. M-46;
152 mm: 30 units. D-20;
155 mm: 120 units. GHN-45; 70 M114; 15 units Type-88 WAC-21;
203 mm: 20 units. M11
1,476 units .
RSV:
107 mm: 700 units. Type-63; 600 units HASEB Fadjr 1;
122 mm: 7 units. BM-11; 100 units BM-21 "Grad"; 50 units Arash/Hadid/Noor;
240 mm: 19+: ε10 Fadjr 3; 9 M-1985;
330mm: Fadjr 5.
*Note: 700 units. Type-63 and 600 units. HASEB Fadjr 1 is unlikely to be used by Russia under any circumstances, given the antiquity of this weapon, tactical-tactical characteristics and caliber of ammunition.
3,000 mortars in calibers from 81 to 120 mm.
Iran has far fewer Soviet systems to share with Russia than North Korea. Instead, Iran is engaged in far more active proxy conflicts, for which it is forced to have the necessary arsenal of supplies both to protect its borders and to support its terrorist organizations.
The only thing that Russia could realistically turn to Iran for in order to compensate for the needs, and most importantly, what Iran could hypothetically agree to is the barrels for the D-30. Hypothetically, in the future, Russia could buy some part of the M-46 guns, if the shortage of 130mm shells is solved.
So, if we draw conclusions based on the state of the artillery of Iran and the DPRK, it can be assumed that Russia can first of all turn to these countries in order to compensate for the lack of barrels for the systems that are actively used (we are talking about Soviet calibers). However, despite the total amount of artillery on paper in these two countries from the "axis of evil", the number of precisely these systems in Iran, in the DPRK is limited, and hardly such that could cover long-term needs.
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