The situation in the Pokrovsky direction is critically difficult, which immediately requires systematic and balanced decisions by the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
Over the past seven days, the enemy advanced 6 km in the direction of Mirnograd-Pokrovsk. On a narrow front, the flanks were shot through, but advanced.
The city of Myrnograd is 14 km away. A total of 14. Mirnograd in the zone of long-range artillery fire. If the enemy is allowed to enter Mirnohrad, they get a zone of concentration and accumulation, and will be able to attack Pokrovsk itself. The Pokrovsk-Myrnograd agglomeration is the last area of defense before the Dnipropetrovsk region. The enemy is very close, the situation is critical, as the pace of the enemy's advance is alarming.
According to the commanders and soldiers who defend the Pokrovsk-Myrnograd region, the main problem in the conditions of intensive operations is primarily the management and organization of our actions.
The Russian command attacks primarily those brigades that have the weakest management and organization, weak control and coordination.
That is, the enemy is not looking for and pushing through the most vulnerable lines of defense, but the most vulnerable units and formations.
When a weakly led brigade is attacked, it cannot hold even a narrow line.
Therefore, all marching replenishment and reserves go to strengthen weak units that bear the greatest losses.
This does not allow for the creation of significant tactical reserves, which would have time for additional training, could more often carry out rotations of fighters at zero, and equip the second and third lines of defense.
The absence of prepared positions for defense, reliable fortifications occupied by the troops, does not allow stopping the enemy at any border.
Virtually non-stop counter-battle, encapsulation during the offensive continues.
The Russians advance in a patterned and predictable manner. The Russians carry out frontal attacks of small groups of infantry with great losses, the enemy's advance is very difficult, they also send everyone they can into battle, their companies are exhausted to the last man. The main axis of attack is along the railway track. It is convenient to dig in there and disguise yourself in landings. Everyone understands this, but engineering means have yet to turn this route into an impassable one.
A critical problem is the lack of single, competent leadership for all drone forces and EW assets, which continue to be deployed in a scattered and uncoordinated manner. Our own EW destroys a significant number of our own drones. Drone units are assigned tasks without regard to tactical and technical capabilities.
I cannot say that the Ukrainian command does not see and does not understand the criticality of the situation. A lot is being done, none of the commanders sit idly by. Commander-in-Chief O.Syrsky pays personal attention.
But we are obviously late in reacting, although the enemy's plans are obvious, well known to us, and intelligence gives a good idea of the next steps.
The direction lacks coordinated brigade headquarters, the logic of the use of troops and ammunition. Assigning tasks to weak staffs of poorly organized brigades is ignoring the real combat capability of the troops, this practice is sharply criticized in the troops. Brigade headquarters are a key element of combat capability.
Attempts to pull a bunch of subdivisions on some area does not produce an effect if there is no single clear logic of application.
The situation requires focusing on the direction of at least one brigade with a high-quality headquarters that will be able to establish combat management of disparate units in the area of the breakthrough and reserve support for the brigades holding the flanks of the enemy's breakthrough to Myrnograd.
Why do inexperienced brigade commanders and weak brigade staffs continue to rule at a time when the command of the ground forces keeps in reserve dozens of experienced commanders with reputations earned in hard battles of 22-23 years? How to explain it? Why is the personnel problem not solved, although everyone sees that it is the main problem, and although we have experienced personnel?
We need systemic solutions, we need to stop deceiving ourselves, we need those measures that will be favorably supported by competent commanders of brigades and battalions in the given area, and the chain of command needs to be urgently strengthened.
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