Ukrainan konflikti/sota
RFU:ssa Pokrovskin taisteluista, Ukrainalla kohtuullista menestystä. Kotlynen teollisuusalueella ryssät motissa ja tärkeä Shevchenko kylä pääosin Ukrainan hallussa.
Kuten aikaisemmin nähty mm. Vovchanskin taisteluissa tällaiset teollisuuslaitokset voivat jatkaa taisteluita viikkoja vielä täyden motin jälkeen, koskapa droneilla saadaan täydennyksiä. Vovchanskissa oli myös jotain spesiaalinatseja pitämässä kuria eli siellä kuoltiin viimeiseen örkkiin. Ukraina ei tällaisia väkisin yritä ottaa turhilla tappioilla vaan hoitaa homman ajan kanssa.
Kuten aikaisemmin nähty mm. Vovchanskin taisteluissa tällaiset teollisuuslaitokset voivat jatkaa taisteluita viikkoja vielä täyden motin jälkeen, koskapa droneilla saadaan täydennyksiä. Vovchanskissa oli myös jotain spesiaalinatseja pitämässä kuria eli siellä kuoltiin viimeiseen örkkiin. Ukraina ei tällaisia väkisin yritä ottaa turhilla tappioilla vaan hoitaa homman ajan kanssa.
teknohippi
Ylipäällikkö
Tästä kyllä voi antaa papukaijamerkin lilliputtelille, onnistui kääntämään EU:n talousveturin ja ääripasifistisen Saksan aloittelevaksi asetehtaaksi. Jopa oikeasta omasta armeijastakin jo keskusteltu, aihe joka on ollut täysi poliittinen tabu tuolla viimeiset 30 vuotta. Menee samaan luokkaan kuin Suomen Nato jäsenyys. Melkoisia vaikutuksia yhdellä Ukrainan sodalla.
Saako Ukraina vihdoin Tauruksia? Friedrich Merz vihjasi Krimin siltaan | Verkkouutiset
Saako Ukraina vihdoin Tauruksia? Friedrich Merz vihjasi Krimin siltaan | Verkkouutisetwww.verkkouutiset.fi
taantumu
Ylipäällikkö
Neuvostoajat tekevät vahvaa paluuta Venäjälle sillä Sahalinilla tuomittiin alikersantti 15-vuoden vankeuteen antautumisesta "sotilaallisessa erikoisoperaatiossa".
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/76576.../instory/f7236109-c44d-5dc7-8811-8f78b3387914
Santala
Kersantti
Ei pidä paikkaansa. Armenia osti ryssiltä uusia hävittäjiä vuosia sitten ja sotien aikana ne olikin sitten tiukasti hangaarissa. Niihin kun ei oltu aseistusta ostettu laisinkaan.
Antares
Respected Leader
Tämä näyttää ennemminkin "ohjeistukselle" kuin "ohjaukselle", veikkaan että yhteyden viive olisi liian suuri ohjaukseen.
Silti selvää että tällaiset ovat sotilaskohteita.
RIA Novosti shows how Russian operators control drones in Ukraine from an office in Moscow.
According to the rules of war, this office is a legitimate military target.
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MUOKKAUS: ehkä olin väärässä, koska Samuel Bendett mukaan tässä olisi juurikin kyse testistä jossa dronea ohjattiin 1000km etäisyydeltä:
A Russian state media report on the use of Ovod FPV drone in Chasiv Yar that was piloted 1000km away from Moscow.
The developers tested a new computer mouse interface that allegedly makes piloting the drone easier, and tested their long-range comms.
Ovod manufactures claim this concept, enabled by "Orbita" communications systems, will allow piloting their drones from anywhere around the world.
Critics blamed the video for revealing that Moscow City complex in downtown Moscow was the command and control site.
https://t.me/urallive/30438
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Yksi arvio sijainnille: LÄHDE
Russian drone operators at work from inside a high rise building in 'Moscow City' a business district with a lot of tall buildings.
Assesment: 55.747255, 37.538481
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Koordinaatit kartalla:
Silti selvää että tällaiset ovat sotilaskohteita.
RIA Novosti shows how Russian operators control drones in Ukraine from an office in Moscow.
According to the rules of war, this office is a legitimate military target.
-
MUOKKAUS: ehkä olin väärässä, koska Samuel Bendett mukaan tässä olisi juurikin kyse testistä jossa dronea ohjattiin 1000km etäisyydeltä:
A Russian state media report on the use of Ovod FPV drone in Chasiv Yar that was piloted 1000km away from Moscow.
The developers tested a new computer mouse interface that allegedly makes piloting the drone easier, and tested their long-range comms.
Ovod manufactures claim this concept, enabled by "Orbita" communications systems, will allow piloting their drones from anywhere around the world.
Critics blamed the video for revealing that Moscow City complex in downtown Moscow was the command and control site.
https://t.me/urallive/30438
-
Yksi arvio sijainnille: LÄHDE
Russian drone operators at work from inside a high rise building in 'Moscow City' a business district with a lot of tall buildings.
Assesment: 55.747255, 37.538481
-
Koordinaatit kartalla:
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Poikkeuksia varmasti löytyy, mutta jos ostaja on järkevä toimija jonka tarkoituksena on maan (tai oman valta-aseman) puolustaminen niin silloin ostetaan laajempi paketti.
Antares
Respected Leader
Kiel Institute on päivittänyt Ukrainan avun seurantataulukkonsa, tässä yksi pylväs vastaa kolmen kuukauden aikaikkunaa:
Ukraine Support Tracker by the Kiel Institute was updated today, with the figures of Western aid to Ukraine.
Effectively, US suspended aid to Ukraine, based on these figures for Jan-Feb 2025:
-
Again, Europe (including EU institutions, EU member states, UK and Norway combined) has provided more aid to Ukraine than US - and intends to provide more (see the bar for "aid to be allocated"):
https://ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/
Ukraine Support Tracker by the Kiel Institute was updated today, with the figures of Western aid to Ukraine.
Effectively, US suspended aid to Ukraine, based on these figures for Jan-Feb 2025:
-
Again, Europe (including EU institutions, EU member states, UK and Norway combined) has provided more aid to Ukraine than US - and intends to provide more (see the bar for "aid to be allocated"):
https://ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/
Antares
Respected Leader
Droneista muutama numero:
Since the beginning of 2025, 420.000 drones have been delivered to the front.
Also, 1.52 million UAVs have already been contracted this year,
— Defense Procurement Agency
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Nyt on eletty tasan 3,5 kuukautta tätä vuotta, joten voidaan laskea että tähän mennessä olisi toimitettu keskiarvoisesti 120 000 kpl per kuukausi.
Jos sama tahti jatkuisi koko vuoden ajan, kokonaismääräksi tulisi 1,44 miljoonaa eli hieman vähemmän kuin tilattu 1,52 miljoonaa. Tarkoitus ei tietysti ole että pidetään tahti vakiona vaan uustuotannon halutaan kasvavan.
HUOM: tähän mennessä on "tilattu" 1,52 miljoonaa dronea tuon uutisen mukaan mutta mikään ei tietysti estä tilaamasta enempää - se on sitten eri asia, mikä määrä kyetään valmistamaan ja toimittamaan.
Since the beginning of 2025, 420.000 drones have been delivered to the front.
Also, 1.52 million UAVs have already been contracted this year,
— Defense Procurement Agency
-
Nyt on eletty tasan 3,5 kuukautta tätä vuotta, joten voidaan laskea että tähän mennessä olisi toimitettu keskiarvoisesti 120 000 kpl per kuukausi.
Jos sama tahti jatkuisi koko vuoden ajan, kokonaismääräksi tulisi 1,44 miljoonaa eli hieman vähemmän kuin tilattu 1,52 miljoonaa. Tarkoitus ei tietysti ole että pidetään tahti vakiona vaan uustuotannon halutaan kasvavan.
HUOM: tähän mennessä on "tilattu" 1,52 miljoonaa dronea tuon uutisen mukaan mutta mikään ei tietysti estä tilaamasta enempää - se on sitten eri asia, mikä määrä kyetään valmistamaan ja toimittamaan.
Antares
Respected Leader
Tuore RUSI raportti ryssän ilmatorjunnasta, kirjoittajina Justin Bronk ja Jack Watling:
New RUSI report, 'Rebalancing European Joint Fires to Deter Russia' by @Justin_Br0nk and @Jack_Watling is out now!
In the context of increasingly strained transatlantic relations and US prioritisation of the Indo-Pacific, European NATO members need to demonstrate that they can deter conventional aggression by Russian forces.
NATO land forces are overwhelmingly dependent on air power for fires, but without large-scale US assistance, European air forces would currently struggle to roll back dense and integrated air defence systems (IADS) such as those protecting Russian forces.
Accelerating the degradation of the Russian IADS in any conflict is therefore critical to enabling the defeat of Russian ground forces. The solution will need to be Joint by design, with land forces equipped, trained and deployed to support Air.
Our new paper considers the challenges and necessary adaptations for NATO, particularly European forces, to effectively counter sophisticated air defence systems where reliance on traditional air superiority might be limited. Head over to our website to learn more.
-
LÄHDE: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-re...rebalancing-european-joint-fires-deter-russia
SUORA LINKKI RAPORTTIIN (avaa pdf-tiedoston): https://static.rusi.org/rebalancing-european-joint-fires-to-deter-russia.pdf
New RUSI report, 'Rebalancing European Joint Fires to Deter Russia' by @Justin_Br0nk and @Jack_Watling is out now!
In the context of increasingly strained transatlantic relations and US prioritisation of the Indo-Pacific, European NATO members need to demonstrate that they can deter conventional aggression by Russian forces.
NATO land forces are overwhelmingly dependent on air power for fires, but without large-scale US assistance, European air forces would currently struggle to roll back dense and integrated air defence systems (IADS) such as those protecting Russian forces.
Accelerating the degradation of the Russian IADS in any conflict is therefore critical to enabling the defeat of Russian ground forces. The solution will need to be Joint by design, with land forces equipped, trained and deployed to support Air.
Our new paper considers the challenges and necessary adaptations for NATO, particularly European forces, to effectively counter sophisticated air defence systems where reliance on traditional air superiority might be limited. Head over to our website to learn more.
-
LÄHDE: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-re...rebalancing-european-joint-fires-deter-russia
SUORA LINKKI RAPORTTIIN (avaa pdf-tiedoston): https://static.rusi.org/rebalancing-european-joint-fires-to-deter-russia.pdf
Antares
Respected Leader
Pidempi kirjoitus jossa pohdiskellaan ryssän Shahed-136 / Geran-2 / "niiden kaltaisten dronejen" käytön muutoksia (tästä on kuultu jo aikaisemmin että lentäisivät aikaisempaa korkeammalla jotta ns. mobile fire group -torjuntaryhmät olisivat vähemmän hyödyllisiä):
Russia has changed its tactics for “kamikaze” drone attacks on Ukraine – low-flying flights no longer work.
Recently, there have been systematic changes in the tactics of using terror weapons by Russian occupiers, such as Shahed-136 kamikaze drones. In this regard, it is necessary to pay attention to the need to expand the means of countering this threat, since mobile fire groups sometimes prove ineffective.
First of all, it is worth paying attention to the changes that have been observed on the part of the Russian Armed Forces in terms of increasing the lethality and "survivability" of the Shahed-136.
Starting in February-March 2025, the Russian occupation forces began to use the "shaheeds" no longer in the Lowpass mode (i.e. at the lowest possible altitudes), but at altitudes averaging 1,500 meters above the mainland of Ukraine, and from the sea — at 2,000-2,500 meters.
At these altitudes, targets are detected by radar systems earlier than in the case of very low flights, but a dilemma arises: should we use missiles that can reach such targets - which are fewer in number than drones and expensive - or rely on luck?
In addition, Russian forces have also changed tactics in terms of the method of attack itself. If previously drones fell from a height of 1.5-2.5 km at speeds of about 90 m/s, they now use a cycle of descent to a height of 1 km, stabilization of gliding flight, and only then diving. This is due to the fact that accuracy increases then, and from a height of 1 km provides a deviation considered acceptable by the Russian Armed Forces.
The stabilization process takes a short time, during which mobile groups with, for example, DShK or Browning M2 rifles are not able to effectively destroy such a drone. Even having MANPADS is not a panacea in the face of this tactic.
It is worth recalling that an effective response to these means of terror may be multi-layered short-range air defense, artillery and missile systems, as well as "medium" and electronic warfare (REB) systems, and means that are often talked about, but little is heard about the need for them. But let's take it in turn.
Anti-aircraft missile sets
Ukraine's partners have a large number of means at their disposal to shoot down Russian kamikaze drones before they reach their target, or in situations where other means are ineffective.
Not only iconic anti-drone systems such as Gepard can be effective, but also ZSU-23-4 "Shylka", ZU-23-2 or 2S6 "Tunguska". In the short-range category, we can mention the modernized Soviet systems S-125, Strela-10, OSA, as well as Western systems such as Crotale, Alvis Stormer, or L3Harris VAMPIRE.
The problem, however, is that many other systems of this type around the world are known to exist — but there is no information about their transfer to Ukraine or even about requests for proposals.
For example, Ukraine received Skyguard/Aspide systems with a range of 35 km, an altitude of 4 km and a speed of Mach 4, which are very effective against cruise missiles. But in the fight against kamikaze drones... yes, they have a high percentage of effectiveness, but the cost of the missile is very high. An important factor is the price-effectiveness ratio and the available quantity.
It must be understood that destroying Shahed-136 drones with an expensive missile is justified only when there is no other choice and the potential consequences of being hit by a drone can be catastrophic.
- ( article http://war.obozrevatel.com )
Recently, there have been systematic changes in the tactics of using terror weapons by Russian occupiers, such as Shahed-136 kamikaze drones. In this regard, it is necessary to pay attention to the need to expand the means of countering this threat, since mobile fire groups sometimes prove ineffective.
First of all, it is worth paying attention to the changes that have been observed on the part of the Russian Armed Forces in terms of increasing the lethality and "survivability" of the Shahed-136.
Starting in February-March 2025, the Russian occupation forces began to use the "shaheeds" no longer in the Lowpass mode (i.e. at the lowest possible altitudes), but at altitudes averaging 1,500 meters above the mainland of Ukraine, and from the sea — at 2,000-2,500 meters.
At these altitudes, targets are detected by radar systems earlier than in the case of very low flights, but a dilemma arises: should we use missiles that can reach such targets - which are fewer in number than drones and expensive - or rely on luck?
In addition, Russian forces have also changed tactics in terms of the method of attack itself. If previously drones fell from a height of 1.5-2.5 km at speeds of about 90 m/s, they now use a cycle of descent to a height of 1 km, stabilization of gliding flight, and only then diving. This is due to the fact that accuracy increases then, and from a height of 1 km provides a deviation considered acceptable by the Russian Armed Forces.
The stabilization process takes a short time, during which mobile groups with, for example, DShK or Browning M2 rifles are not able to effectively destroy such a drone. Even having MANPADS is not a panacea in the face of this tactic.
It is worth recalling that an effective response to these means of terror may be multi-layered short-range air defense, artillery and missile systems, as well as "medium" and electronic warfare (REB) systems, and means that are often talked about, but little is heard about the need for them. But let's take it in turn.
Anti-aircraft missile sets
Ukraine's partners have a large number of means at their disposal to shoot down Russian kamikaze drones before they reach their target, or in situations where other means are ineffective.
Not only iconic anti-drone systems such as Gepard can be effective, but also ZSU-23-4 "Shylka", ZU-23-2 or 2S6 "Tunguska". In the short-range category, we can mention the modernized Soviet systems S-125, Strela-10, OSA, as well as Western systems such as Crotale, Alvis Stormer, or L3Harris VAMPIRE.
The problem, however, is that many other systems of this type around the world are known to exist — but there is no information about their transfer to Ukraine or even about requests for proposals.
For example, Ukraine received Skyguard/Aspide systems with a range of 35 km, an altitude of 4 km and a speed of Mach 4, which are very effective against cruise missiles. But in the fight against kamikaze drones... yes, they have a high percentage of effectiveness, but the cost of the missile is very high. An important factor is the price-effectiveness ratio and the available quantity.
It must be understood that destroying Shahed-136 drones with an expensive missile is justified only when there is no other choice and the potential consequences of being hit by a drone can be catastrophic.
- ( article http://war.obozrevatel.com )
John Hilly
Respected Leader
Drooni väisti kaksi ohjusta - ohjuspatteriin suora osuma | Verkkouutiset
Drooni väisti kaksi ohjusta - ohjuspatteriin suora osuma | Verkkouutiset
www.verkkouutiset.fi
Operatiivinen tilannetiedote 15.04.2025 klo 08.00: Venäjän hyökkäys
t.me
UKRAINAN KANSALLISKAARTIN 1. ARMEIJAKUNTA “AZOV” ON PERUSTETTU
t.me
Edit: video vaihdettu englanniksi tekstitettyyn.
Генеральний штаб ЗСУ
Оперативна інформація станом на 08.00 15.04.2025 щодо російського вторгнення Слава Україні! Розпочалася 1147-ма доба широкомасштабної збройної агресії російської федерації проти України. Загалом, протягом минулої доби зафіксовано 99 бойових зіткнень. Вчора загарбники завдали по території...
t.me
UKRAINAN KANSALLISKAARTIN 1. ARMEIJAKUNTA “AZOV” ON PERUSTETTUPuolustusvoimien hallintouudistuksen puitteissa on 12. erikoisprikaati “Azovin” pohjalta perustettu uusi operatiivis-taktinen joukko-osasto osaksi kansalliskaartia.
1. Armeijakuntaan “Azov” kuuluvat:
1. presidentillinen operatiivinen prikaati “Burevii”;
Videolla esiintyvät Ukrainan kansalliskaartin 1. armeijakunnan komentaja, eversti Denys “Redis” Prokopenko, sekä armeijakuntaan kuuluvien prikaatien komentajat.
1-й корпус НГУ «Азов»
❗СТВОРЕНО 1-Й КОРПУС НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ ГВАРДІЇ УКРАЇНИ «АЗОВ» В рамках реформи управління Сил оборони, на основі 12-ої бригади спеціального призначення «Азов» було створено нове оперативно-тактичне з'єднання у складі НГУ. До складу 1-го корпусу «Азов» увійшли: ▪️1-а президентська бригада...
t.me
Edit: video vaihdettu englanniksi tekstitettyyn.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Tuore Reuters artikkeli käsittelee Pohjois-Korean antamaa apua:
"The Open Source Centre, or OSC, an independent UK-based research organization focused on security, tracked 64 shipments over 20 months carrying nearly 16,000 containers and millions of artillery rounds for use against Ukraine, including a shipment as recent as March 17.
The military partnership between North Korea and Russia came to light in 2023. It took on new importance in recent weeks, when North Korean troops, weapons systems and ammunition bolstered Russian firepower to evict the remnants of Ukraine’s incursion in Russia’s Kursk region just as the Trump administration was pulling support for Ukraine.
Ukrainian officials, including the military intelligence chief, have said North Korea is supplying half the munitions Russia needs at the front — a quantity consistent with the findings by both OSC and Reuters. One expert in the Ukrainian military told Reuters that the North Korean contribution was as high as 70%, and Reuters found that at times Russian artillery units were almost wholly reliant upon North Korean munitions.
...
It’s not possible to verify the ammunition inside each shipping container, but OSC estimated what it called a conservative range of 4-6 million artillery rounds alone, based on Ukraine’s assessment of their prevalence and probable packing patterns.
....
By the start of 2025, North Korea had supplied Russia with 148 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles, GUR told Reuters."
-
Interesting piece:
https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/NORTHKOREA-RUSSIA/lgvdxqjwbvo/
By Tom Balmforth and Mariano Zafra
Published April 15, 2025 09:00 BST
The Reuters investigation shows the extent of Russia’s reliance upon North Korean shells on the battlefield, which helped it pursue a war of attrition that Ukraine has struggled to match. At times over the past year, the vast majority of shells fired by some Russian units were from North Korea, Reuters found.
An analysis of sea and land shipments by the Open Source Centre in conjunction with Reuters was confirmed by Russian artillery reports intercepted by Kyiv, satellite imagery and verified social media videos, as well as three senior Ukrainian government and military sources.
North Korea has also dispatched ballistic missiles as well as long-range artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems. Its deliveries represent the most significant direct military aid to Russia’s war effort, which has also benefited from Iranian long-range drone technology and close economic support from China.
A map showing the sanctioned Russian ship Angara loading North Korean munitions in Rajin, North Korea, and unloading in Vostochny, Russia.
The Open Source Centre, or OSC, an independent UK-based research organization focused on security, tracked 64 shipments over 20 months carrying nearly 16,000 containers and millions of artillery rounds for use against Ukraine, including a shipment as recent as March 17.
The military partnership between North Korea and Russia came to light in 2023. It took on new importance in recent weeks, when North Korean troops, weapons systems and ammunition bolstered Russian firepower to evict the remnants of Ukraine’s incursion in Russia’s Kursk region just as the Trump administration was pulling support for Ukraine.
Ukrainian officials, including the military intelligence chief, have said North Korea is supplying half the munitions Russia needs at the front — a quantity consistent with the findings by both OSC and Reuters. One expert in the Ukrainian military told Reuters that the North Korean contribution was as high as 70%, and Reuters found that at times Russian artillery units were almost wholly reliant upon North Korean munitions.
“North Korea’s contribution has been strategically vital,” said Hugh Griffiths, who from 2014 to 2019 was coordinator of the U.N. panel of experts that monitored sanctions on North Korea. “Without Chairman Kim Jong Un’s support, President Vladimir Putin wouldn’t really be able to prosecute his war in Ukraine.”
(tässä oli 64 kpl satelliittikuvia, poistin ne mutta ne näkee alkuperäisestä artikkelista linkin takaa)
Though Western military support for Ukraine has kept it in the war since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, including a Czech initiative to supply 1.6 million rounds of ammunition, that aid has been inconsistent and of late appears increasingly uncertain.
At no point has any Ukrainian ally offered up its own soldiers to fight.
By January, around 4,000 North Korean soldiers had been killed or wounded fighting against Ukrainian forces since they first arrived in Kursk in late autumn, according to a South Korean security source. North Korea sent 3,000 more men by mid-February – and the reinforcements were better prepared, said Oleh Shyriaiev, commander of Ukraine’s 225th Separate Assault Regiment, which has been fighting in Kursk.
“They adapted to modern combat conditions,” Shyriaiev recalled.
Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, Kyrylo Budanov, said in late February that North Korea also supplied 120 long-range self-propelled artillery systems and 120 multiple launch rocket systems to Russia beginning in late 2024, including some filmed by Ukrainian drones in Kursk.
Russia’s recent victories in Kursk come at a crucial time. U.S. President Donald Trump says he wants a quick end to the war, and Ukraine had hoped that holding Russian territory would strengthen its hand in negotiations.
But now only a tiny pocket of Kursk remains under Ukrainian control.
North Korea’s delegations at the United Nations in New York and Geneva, and its embassy in London, did not respond to detailed questions about Reuters’ findings, nor did Russia’s Defense Ministry or South Korea’s National Intelligence Service and Ministry of National Defense.
A map showing Ukrainian-held territory in Kursk, Russia, and how that has diminished between September 2024 and March 2025.
Kim Il Sung, who fought in the Soviet Red Army during the Second World War, became North Korea’s first leader and received Soviet support during the Korean War and beyond. He ruled until his death in 1994, starting the dynasty that remains in power.
In 1959, the countries commissioned a “Friendship Bridge” for trains crossing the Tumen River, which marks the border they share, a stone’s throw from the Chinese frontier. Relations cooled after the Soviet Union’s collapse.
The two countries’ ties warmed again as Russia found itself increasingly politically and economically isolated over the war in Ukraine.
Ukraine’s first counteroffensive in late 2022 forced Russia into retreat from vast swathes of Ukrainian land. Russia spent the next six months digging trenches, laying mines and erecting defensive structures. That combination stalled Ukraine’s second counteroffensive in summer 2023, and the war became one of attrition in which both sides have tried to outgun and outkill each other.
Since the war’s beginning, Russia has had more soldiers and firepower than Ukraine, in addition to its enormous military industrial capacity. Putin has not backed down in his goals, claiming a vast portion of Ukraine’s internationally recognized territory is, in fact, Russia.
But by 2023, in a throwback to the trench warfare of the First World War, artillery and mortar fire became the keys to holding territory and prising the enemy from defensive positions. Whoever had the most shells would have a major advantage.
A map showing the many lines of Russian trenches and fortifications along the eastern front of Ukraine.
Sources: Brady Africk (Russian Fortifications), Institute for the Study of War with American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project (Russian-occupied territory data as of April 4).
At that point, military experts estimated that both Russia and Ukraine were at times firing 10,000 artillery rounds a day, exhausting their supplies.
Ukraine’s allies in Europe, the United States and Asia continued to scour the world and their own stocks for shells, helping a much smaller army compete with Russia.
Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu travelled to Pyongyang in July 2023 to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice. He and Kim discussed closer military cooperation.
Already in September 2023, ships started carrying hundreds of containers from the North Korean port of Rajin to the eastern Russian ports of Dunai and Vostochny, according to the OSC, which monitors daily satellite images of the ships.
The United States has said the containers held armaments that were loaded onto trains for transport thousands of kilometers away to weapons depots in western Russia. At the end of 2023, a Ukrainian government assessment seen by Reuters found that the Cold War-era Friendship Bridge was being used, along with much bigger deliveries by ship.
A map showing the transport route of North Korean munitions travelling first by ship from North Korea to eastern Russian ports, then by train across central Russia, finally to be offloaded in ammunition depots in western Russia, near Ukraine.
First reported by the London-based Royal United Services Institute think tank in October 2023, the shipments expanded rapidly over the following months and the OSC has tracked them since their inception. Deliveries peaked in January 2024, with seven shipments crossing into Russia, before dropping to a monthly average of around three through March 2025.
A graphic showing how the Open Source Centre estimated the munitions sent from North Korea to Russia through visual analysis, 3D modeling, and satellite imagery.
The North Korean munitions were introduced methodically. The Russian military compiles “firing tables” for artillery units based on testing performed at the Luzhsky Artillery Range, the expert in the Ukrainian military told Reuters, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters.
Reuters reviewed four firing tables, including a 60-page technical document with guidelines for using the North Korean shells with Russia’s M-46, a towed field gun first developed in Josef Stalin’s Soviet Union. One section, for example, warns against keeping a particular North Korean munition in a hot barrel for more than 3 minutes. It also offers specific firing angles for given distances.
Reuters reviewed Russian military documents, including this one from a unit detailing how it uses North Korean shells in Ukraine’s southeastern Zaporizhzhia region.
With testing and specifications complete, the North Korean shells bombarded the Ukrainian frontlines. Reuters reviewed nine Russian military documents containing tables in which artillery units reported up the chain of command about munitions usage and stocks.
Six of the nine reports, which are daily snapshots of weapons usage, showed North Korean munitions were prevalent. Two from this year showed units using 100% North Korean munitions on one day and 75% on another. Last summer, a unit on the southeastern Zaporizhzhia front reported nearly 50% of the shells fired by its D-20 howitzers were North Korean 152 mm shells, while 100% of its 122 mm rockets were North Korean. Two of the reports describe extensive North Korean stocks, without specifying percentages. Three reports don’t specify North Korean ordnance.
“Without help from the DPRK, the Russian army shelling of Ukrainian defensive positions would have been cut in half,” Ukraine’s military intelligence directorate, known as GUR, wrote in response to questions from Reuters, using the acronym for North Korea.
It was around autumn 2023 that Ukraine saw its own supplies of artillery shells dwindle, forcing batteries across the frontlines to limit fire.
Republicans in Washington in late 2023 suspended a $61 billion military aid package for Ukraine. The knock-on effect was quickly felt despite Europe’s efforts to make up shortfalls. By April 2024, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy told PBS in an interview that for every Ukrainian shell, Russia was firing 10 back.
An increasing portion of those were North Korean.
In all, OSC found that the same four ships – all of them under international sanctions – have made a total of 64 trips from North Korea to Russia, loading containers in Rajin and offloading them at the two Russian ports.
Four satellite images of Russian vessels in the North Korean port of Rajin: the Lady-R on Feb. 1, 2025; the Maria, Jan. 1, 2025; the Angara, Nov. 24, 2024; and the Maia-1, Jan. 24, 2024.
A U.N. report as well as a 16-page Ukrainian government document seen by Reuters also lists the four ships making North Korean deliveries to its ally. The pace has remained steady for the past year, including four deliveries in February 2025 and two in March 2025, according to satellite data gathered by OSC.
The group counted containers being loaded onto each vessel using satellite imagery and detailed modelling. It has observed hundreds of containers of similar size and coloring arriving by rail at arms depots in western Russia.
The Ukrainian government document identifies railway deliveries to Russian military units at six locations between April 16 and May 9, 2024. It details hundreds of rail platforms and rail cars. Reuters and OSC identified those and another three depots where satellite imagery shows contours consistent with storage areas.
It’s not possible to verify the ammunition inside each shipping container, but OSC estimated what it called a conservative range of 4-6 million artillery rounds alone, based on Ukraine’s assessment of their prevalence and probable packing patterns. Either way, North Korean deliveries would be a sizable addition to Russia’s production, estimated by Ukrainian and Western officials at 2-2.3 million artillery shells in 2024. U.S. Army General Christopher Cavoli, the top U.S. general in Europe, told American lawmakers on April 3 that he anticipated Russia’s yearly production to be 3 million artillery shells, without specifying when that could happen.
GUR told Reuters that North Korea had provided 4 million artillery shells alone since the middle of 2023, more than three-quarters of them the 122mm and 152mm caliber rounds that are at the heart of Russia’s ground weaponry. GUR said North Korea provided mortar rounds as well, but did not include them in that figure.
Konrad Muzyka, a military analyst who runs Rochan Consulting, an independent security consultancy based in Poland, said Russia maintained an intensity of assaults beginning in late 2023 thanks to North Korea’s help.
“It allowed the Russians to maintain an offensive posture and constant pressure on Ukrainian forces throughout most of 2024 into 2025,” he said.
One of the main destinations for North Korean armaments was Tikhoretsk, a supply hub for Russia’s military fighting in Ukraine about 100 kilometers south of Rostov-on-Don.
A satellite image from Sept. 18, 2024, showing the Tikhoretsk munition depot. Military cargo and munitions crates in the image are highlighted.
Source: Maxar Technologies, Open Source Centre
Expansion started at the facility in late summer 2023 as North Korean ammunition was about to arrive in force, according to a Reuters analysis of high-definition satellite imagery. Just over a year later, on September 21, 2024, the facility was bombed in a strike claimed by the Ukrainian military.
OSC estimated that the strike destroyed about 90% of the facility’s capacity, including a major delivery from North Korea just days before.
Footage distributed on social media and verified by Reuters shows the attack on the Tikhorestsk ammunition depot.
A satellite image of the Tikhorestsk ammunition depot taken after the attack on it, showing 205 (the majority) of munition pits were destroyed.
Source: Footage distributed on social media and verified by Reuters shows the attack on the Tikhorestsk ammunition depot. Telegram. Open Source Centre. Satellite image: Maxar Technologies
That left an opening that Ukraine exploited – to the surprise of both its own allies and Russia. In August 2024, Ukrainian forces launched an audacious incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, taking hundreds of square kilometers.
With the addition of the North Korean troops in early November, Ukrainians estimated a force of at least 60,000 soldiers in all arrayed against them in Kursk. Reuters could not verify the troop numbers. A few weeks later Ukrainian military intelligence intercepted two radio messages involving the North Korean troops and shared them with Reuters.
A North Korean soldier who defected to South Korea listened to the shared recordings at the request of Reuters, to better understand the circumstances and military jargon scattered throughout the conversations.
In the longer of the two, intercepted on December 9, what appears to be a commander and subordinate discuss how soldiers could safely collect food. The key was to avoid detection.
“Make sure they never gather together,” said the commander, who is not identified. It was not clear where in Kursk either conversation took place.
They also speak about a wounded soldier and his military identification, suggesting that language barriers made it difficult for them to discern whether he was Russian or Ukrainian.
“Currently, the Russian UAV (drone) platoon will evacuate and then interrogate him. Over,” the soldier tells his superior.
Russian troops walk along a street in Kursk on March 14, 2025, after regaining the territory. Russian Defence Ministry/Handout via REUTERS
On January 4, Zelenskiy said that Russian and North Korean troops had suffered heavy casualties in Kursk and a week later he announced that two North Korean soldiers had been captured.
Reuters reviewed a Ukrainian intelligence document detailing their questioning.
Both prisoners initially exhibited “suicidal tendencies” upon capture, the document said. The Ukrainian military has described how at least one North Korean soldier blew himself up to avoid being taken prisoner.
The intelligence document identified one of the men as a senior soldier who had served since May 2021. The second was a junior sergeant from Pyongyang who had served since August 2016. Reuters is not identifying the men because they and their families could face retribution in North Korea.
The two men told interrogators they sailed from North Korea to Russia with around 100 other soldiers, arriving in Russia in November 2024 and undergoing exercises at training grounds.
They said they were only told they were going to Russia for exercises and that they left their military registration documents in North Korea.
After arriving in Russia, they were given a Russian-style “military card” written in Russian Cyrillic with no photo.
The senior soldier had a fractured left leg and the junior sergeant took a gunshot wound to the face, requiring his lower jaw to be removed. His interrogation was conducted in writing. They were captured on January 3 during their first battle, the document said.
The sergeant said the North Korean soldiers despised the Russians because they refused to go on assault operations like North Korean soldiers did.
Shyriaiev, the Ukrainian officer who fought against North Koreans in Kursk, agreed with that assessment.
“They continue to be used as assault units that advance, storm. And behind them are units of the Russian Federation, which consolidate and hold positions. That is, Koreans are used as assault troops.”
Cavoli, the U.S. commander, told lawmakers that in return for supplies of shells, missiles and weapons systems, “Russia is almost certainly transferring missile technology to Pyongyang.” Reuters could not verify his statement. He added that in the last year, North Korea had sent more than 13,000 containers of supplies to Russia.
Both countries deny arms transfers and do not publicly acknowledge the deployment of North Korean troops in Kursk. When challenged about the deployment, Russia has questioned why allies could not help its war effort given Western countries’ support for Ukraine.
North Korea has one of the world’s largest armies and has been stockpiling massive amounts of ammunition for decades in preparation for a potential war with South Korea, and while some of it is of questionable quality, much of it still works and gave Russia crucial superiority, said Yang Uk, a military expert at Seoul’s Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
“Since the Russian way of war is based upon fire superiority, it takes tons of ammunition. And the only country that can provide that kind of volume, besides Russia, is North Korea,” he said.
Russia, meanwhile, has depleted its stockpiles since the war’s beginning. Using North Korea’s shells could let Russia start resume stockpiling its new production of higher quality munitions, said Muzyka, the military analyst.
But North Korea has reaped rewards valued by any military commander. Elite army units have leapt from exercises at home into real-life combat. They have proven themselves capable of adapting.
Just as important has been North Korea’s ability to solve problems with the accuracy and consistency of its artillery munitions and ballistic missiles in wartime conditions, Ukrainian officials have said.
Russia began striking Ukraine with North Korean ballistic missiles at the end of 2023. Armed with warheads up to one ton – larger than the Russian equivalent – they initially proved to be inaccurate and unreliable, according to Ukrainian military analysis.
A Reuters journalist who arrived shortly after one fell in central Kharkiv on January 2, 2024, said the aftermath was unlike any he’d seen before. The missile debris was different, with intact chunks of engine and larger fragments made of a metal that seemed heavier and of lesser quality than others he’d viewed.
A Ukrainian official shows missile fragments as evidence Russia fired a North Korean missile at Kharkiv.
A Ukrainian official shows missile fragments as evidence Russia fired a North Korean missile at Kharkiv. REUTERS
Ukraine and the United Nations later confirmed the weapon was from North Korea.
A readout from Ukraine’s military came two months later: In weeks of North Korean ballistic missile bombings, they had only hit two military targets out of 24 strikes.
A fragment of a North Korean missile that struck Kharkiv on January 6, 2024. REUTERS/Vyacheslav Madiyevskyy
By the start of 2025, North Korea had supplied Russia with 148 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles, GUR told Reuters.
In February, two senior Ukrainian sources told Reuters that newer North Korean missiles had become significantly more precise since their first use in Ukraine more than a year before.
One of the sources, a senior military official, said the latest versions were accurate to within 50-100 meters of their target. Budanov, the head of Ukrainian military intelligence, later confirmed the improved accuracy in an interview with South Korean media.
Over the course of 2024 and into this year, drones have taken ascendancy over artillery on the battlefields of Ukraine. Guided remotely by pilots wearing electronic visors, thousands of the aircraft buzz over the frontline each day, posing a mortal danger to individual soldiers and heavy machinery.
But North Korean soldiers and munitions continue to play a crucial role, as the recent sea shipments attest. And there may soon be an easier way to move men and equipment between the countries.
Russia’s ambassador to Pyongyang recently announced a new road bridge over the Tumen River to be built near the decades-old Friendship Bridge. He said there were no concerns about renewed contacts between Russia and the United States, describing the alliance with Pyongyang as “a fraternal friendship between the Korean and Russian peoples, which were cemented by the blood that was spilled together.”
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Tässä konttien määräksi kerrotaan "enemmän kuin 15 800 konttia viimeisen 18 kuukauden aikana" kun taas yllä lainatussa artikkelissa määrä oli "lähes 16 000 konttia viimeisen 20 kuukauden aikana", tosin aikamääre on myös eri suuruinen (edellinen havaittu toimitus oli 17.3.2025 eli melkein kuukausi sitten):
Over the past 18 months, North Korea has sent Russia more than 15,800 containers of ammunition, — Newsweek
At least 64 shipments from North Korea to the Russia from August 2023 to March 2025. Russian army received approximately 4.2 to 5.8 million ammunition.
"The Open Source Centre, or OSC, an independent UK-based research organization focused on security, tracked 64 shipments over 20 months carrying nearly 16,000 containers and millions of artillery rounds for use against Ukraine, including a shipment as recent as March 17.
The military partnership between North Korea and Russia came to light in 2023. It took on new importance in recent weeks, when North Korean troops, weapons systems and ammunition bolstered Russian firepower to evict the remnants of Ukraine’s incursion in Russia’s Kursk region just as the Trump administration was pulling support for Ukraine.
Ukrainian officials, including the military intelligence chief, have said North Korea is supplying half the munitions Russia needs at the front — a quantity consistent with the findings by both OSC and Reuters. One expert in the Ukrainian military told Reuters that the North Korean contribution was as high as 70%, and Reuters found that at times Russian artillery units were almost wholly reliant upon North Korean munitions.
...
It’s not possible to verify the ammunition inside each shipping container, but OSC estimated what it called a conservative range of 4-6 million artillery rounds alone, based on Ukraine’s assessment of their prevalence and probable packing patterns.
....
By the start of 2025, North Korea had supplied Russia with 148 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles, GUR told Reuters."
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Interesting piece:
https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/NORTHKOREA-RUSSIA/lgvdxqjwbvo/
Thousands of troops, millions of shells
Inside North Korea’s vast operation to help Russia’s war on UkraineBy Tom Balmforth and Mariano Zafra
Published April 15, 2025 09:00 BST
The Reuters investigation shows the extent of Russia’s reliance upon North Korean shells on the battlefield, which helped it pursue a war of attrition that Ukraine has struggled to match. At times over the past year, the vast majority of shells fired by some Russian units were from North Korea, Reuters found.
An analysis of sea and land shipments by the Open Source Centre in conjunction with Reuters was confirmed by Russian artillery reports intercepted by Kyiv, satellite imagery and verified social media videos, as well as three senior Ukrainian government and military sources.
North Korea has also dispatched ballistic missiles as well as long-range artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems. Its deliveries represent the most significant direct military aid to Russia’s war effort, which has also benefited from Iranian long-range drone technology and close economic support from China.
A map showing the sanctioned Russian ship Angara loading North Korean munitions in Rajin, North Korea, and unloading in Vostochny, Russia.
The Open Source Centre, or OSC, an independent UK-based research organization focused on security, tracked 64 shipments over 20 months carrying nearly 16,000 containers and millions of artillery rounds for use against Ukraine, including a shipment as recent as March 17.
The military partnership between North Korea and Russia came to light in 2023. It took on new importance in recent weeks, when North Korean troops, weapons systems and ammunition bolstered Russian firepower to evict the remnants of Ukraine’s incursion in Russia’s Kursk region just as the Trump administration was pulling support for Ukraine.
Ukrainian officials, including the military intelligence chief, have said North Korea is supplying half the munitions Russia needs at the front — a quantity consistent with the findings by both OSC and Reuters. One expert in the Ukrainian military told Reuters that the North Korean contribution was as high as 70%, and Reuters found that at times Russian artillery units were almost wholly reliant upon North Korean munitions.
“North Korea’s contribution has been strategically vital,” said Hugh Griffiths, who from 2014 to 2019 was coordinator of the U.N. panel of experts that monitored sanctions on North Korea. “Without Chairman Kim Jong Un’s support, President Vladimir Putin wouldn’t really be able to prosecute his war in Ukraine.”
64 shipments transporting millions of North Korean munitions
OSC tracked 64 trips to the North Korean port Rajin between September 2023 and March 2025, made by four Russian-flagged container ships: the Angara, Maria, Maia-1 and Lady R. The ships transported North Korean artillery and mortar shells from Rajin to the Russian ports of Vostochny and Dunai before they were transported by train to ammunition depots near Ukraine.(tässä oli 64 kpl satelliittikuvia, poistin ne mutta ne näkee alkuperäisestä artikkelista linkin takaa)
Though Western military support for Ukraine has kept it in the war since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, including a Czech initiative to supply 1.6 million rounds of ammunition, that aid has been inconsistent and of late appears increasingly uncertain.
At no point has any Ukrainian ally offered up its own soldiers to fight.
By January, around 4,000 North Korean soldiers had been killed or wounded fighting against Ukrainian forces since they first arrived in Kursk in late autumn, according to a South Korean security source. North Korea sent 3,000 more men by mid-February – and the reinforcements were better prepared, said Oleh Shyriaiev, commander of Ukraine’s 225th Separate Assault Regiment, which has been fighting in Kursk.
“They adapted to modern combat conditions,” Shyriaiev recalled.
Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, Kyrylo Budanov, said in late February that North Korea also supplied 120 long-range self-propelled artillery systems and 120 multiple launch rocket systems to Russia beginning in late 2024, including some filmed by Ukrainian drones in Kursk.
Russia’s recent victories in Kursk come at a crucial time. U.S. President Donald Trump says he wants a quick end to the war, and Ukraine had hoped that holding Russian territory would strengthen its hand in negotiations.
But now only a tiny pocket of Kursk remains under Ukrainian control.
North Korea’s delegations at the United Nations in New York and Geneva, and its embassy in London, did not respond to detailed questions about Reuters’ findings, nor did Russia’s Defense Ministry or South Korea’s National Intelligence Service and Ministry of National Defense.
A map showing Ukrainian-held territory in Kursk, Russia, and how that has diminished between September 2024 and March 2025.
Shared border, shared history
Russia and North Korea share a short border and a history.Kim Il Sung, who fought in the Soviet Red Army during the Second World War, became North Korea’s first leader and received Soviet support during the Korean War and beyond. He ruled until his death in 1994, starting the dynasty that remains in power.
In 1959, the countries commissioned a “Friendship Bridge” for trains crossing the Tumen River, which marks the border they share, a stone’s throw from the Chinese frontier. Relations cooled after the Soviet Union’s collapse.
The two countries’ ties warmed again as Russia found itself increasingly politically and economically isolated over the war in Ukraine.
Ukraine’s first counteroffensive in late 2022 forced Russia into retreat from vast swathes of Ukrainian land. Russia spent the next six months digging trenches, laying mines and erecting defensive structures. That combination stalled Ukraine’s second counteroffensive in summer 2023, and the war became one of attrition in which both sides have tried to outgun and outkill each other.
Since the war’s beginning, Russia has had more soldiers and firepower than Ukraine, in addition to its enormous military industrial capacity. Putin has not backed down in his goals, claiming a vast portion of Ukraine’s internationally recognized territory is, in fact, Russia.
But by 2023, in a throwback to the trench warfare of the First World War, artillery and mortar fire became the keys to holding territory and prising the enemy from defensive positions. Whoever had the most shells would have a major advantage.
A map showing the many lines of Russian trenches and fortifications along the eastern front of Ukraine.
Sources: Brady Africk (Russian Fortifications), Institute for the Study of War with American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project (Russian-occupied territory data as of April 4).
At that point, military experts estimated that both Russia and Ukraine were at times firing 10,000 artillery rounds a day, exhausting their supplies.
Ukraine’s allies in Europe, the United States and Asia continued to scour the world and their own stocks for shells, helping a much smaller army compete with Russia.
Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu travelled to Pyongyang in July 2023 to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice. He and Kim discussed closer military cooperation.
Already in September 2023, ships started carrying hundreds of containers from the North Korean port of Rajin to the eastern Russian ports of Dunai and Vostochny, according to the OSC, which monitors daily satellite images of the ships.
The United States has said the containers held armaments that were loaded onto trains for transport thousands of kilometers away to weapons depots in western Russia. At the end of 2023, a Ukrainian government assessment seen by Reuters found that the Cold War-era Friendship Bridge was being used, along with much bigger deliveries by ship.
A map showing the transport route of North Korean munitions travelling first by ship from North Korea to eastern Russian ports, then by train across central Russia, finally to be offloaded in ammunition depots in western Russia, near Ukraine.
First reported by the London-based Royal United Services Institute think tank in October 2023, the shipments expanded rapidly over the following months and the OSC has tracked them since their inception. Deliveries peaked in January 2024, with seven shipments crossing into Russia, before dropping to a monthly average of around three through March 2025.
How OSC estimated the amount of munitions North Korea sent to Russia
A graphic showing how the Open Source Centre estimated the munitions sent from North Korea to Russia through visual analysis, 3D modeling, and satellite imagery.
The North Korean munitions were introduced methodically. The Russian military compiles “firing tables” for artillery units based on testing performed at the Luzhsky Artillery Range, the expert in the Ukrainian military told Reuters, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters.
Reuters reviewed four firing tables, including a 60-page technical document with guidelines for using the North Korean shells with Russia’s M-46, a towed field gun first developed in Josef Stalin’s Soviet Union. One section, for example, warns against keeping a particular North Korean munition in a hot barrel for more than 3 minutes. It also offers specific firing angles for given distances.
Reuters reviewed Russian military documents, including this one from a unit detailing how it uses North Korean shells in Ukraine’s southeastern Zaporizhzhia region.
With testing and specifications complete, the North Korean shells bombarded the Ukrainian frontlines. Reuters reviewed nine Russian military documents containing tables in which artillery units reported up the chain of command about munitions usage and stocks.
Six of the nine reports, which are daily snapshots of weapons usage, showed North Korean munitions were prevalent. Two from this year showed units using 100% North Korean munitions on one day and 75% on another. Last summer, a unit on the southeastern Zaporizhzhia front reported nearly 50% of the shells fired by its D-20 howitzers were North Korean 152 mm shells, while 100% of its 122 mm rockets were North Korean. Two of the reports describe extensive North Korean stocks, without specifying percentages. Three reports don’t specify North Korean ordnance.
“Without help from the DPRK, the Russian army shelling of Ukrainian defensive positions would have been cut in half,” Ukraine’s military intelligence directorate, known as GUR, wrote in response to questions from Reuters, using the acronym for North Korea.
It was around autumn 2023 that Ukraine saw its own supplies of artillery shells dwindle, forcing batteries across the frontlines to limit fire.
Republicans in Washington in late 2023 suspended a $61 billion military aid package for Ukraine. The knock-on effect was quickly felt despite Europe’s efforts to make up shortfalls. By April 2024, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy told PBS in an interview that for every Ukrainian shell, Russia was firing 10 back.
An increasing portion of those were North Korean.
In all, OSC found that the same four ships – all of them under international sanctions – have made a total of 64 trips from North Korea to Russia, loading containers in Rajin and offloading them at the two Russian ports.
Russian vessels spotted at the North Korean port of Rajin
Four satellite images of Russian vessels in the North Korean port of Rajin: the Lady-R on Feb. 1, 2025; the Maria, Jan. 1, 2025; the Angara, Nov. 24, 2024; and the Maia-1, Jan. 24, 2024.
A U.N. report as well as a 16-page Ukrainian government document seen by Reuters also lists the four ships making North Korean deliveries to its ally. The pace has remained steady for the past year, including four deliveries in February 2025 and two in March 2025, according to satellite data gathered by OSC.
The group counted containers being loaded onto each vessel using satellite imagery and detailed modelling. It has observed hundreds of containers of similar size and coloring arriving by rail at arms depots in western Russia.
The Ukrainian government document identifies railway deliveries to Russian military units at six locations between April 16 and May 9, 2024. It details hundreds of rail platforms and rail cars. Reuters and OSC identified those and another three depots where satellite imagery shows contours consistent with storage areas.
It’s not possible to verify the ammunition inside each shipping container, but OSC estimated what it called a conservative range of 4-6 million artillery rounds alone, based on Ukraine’s assessment of their prevalence and probable packing patterns. Either way, North Korean deliveries would be a sizable addition to Russia’s production, estimated by Ukrainian and Western officials at 2-2.3 million artillery shells in 2024. U.S. Army General Christopher Cavoli, the top U.S. general in Europe, told American lawmakers on April 3 that he anticipated Russia’s yearly production to be 3 million artillery shells, without specifying when that could happen.
GUR told Reuters that North Korea had provided 4 million artillery shells alone since the middle of 2023, more than three-quarters of them the 122mm and 152mm caliber rounds that are at the heart of Russia’s ground weaponry. GUR said North Korea provided mortar rounds as well, but did not include them in that figure.
Konrad Muzyka, a military analyst who runs Rochan Consulting, an independent security consultancy based in Poland, said Russia maintained an intensity of assaults beginning in late 2023 thanks to North Korea’s help.
“It allowed the Russians to maintain an offensive posture and constant pressure on Ukrainian forces throughout most of 2024 into 2025,” he said.
One of the main destinations for North Korean armaments was Tikhoretsk, a supply hub for Russia’s military fighting in Ukraine about 100 kilometers south of Rostov-on-Don.
A satellite image from Sept. 18, 2024, showing the Tikhoretsk munition depot. Military cargo and munitions crates in the image are highlighted.
Source: Maxar Technologies, Open Source Centre
Expansion started at the facility in late summer 2023 as North Korean ammunition was about to arrive in force, according to a Reuters analysis of high-definition satellite imagery. Just over a year later, on September 21, 2024, the facility was bombed in a strike claimed by the Ukrainian military.
OSC estimated that the strike destroyed about 90% of the facility’s capacity, including a major delivery from North Korea just days before.
Footage distributed on social media and verified by Reuters shows the attack on the Tikhorestsk ammunition depot.
A satellite image of the Tikhorestsk ammunition depot taken after the attack on it, showing 205 (the majority) of munition pits were destroyed.
Source: Footage distributed on social media and verified by Reuters shows the attack on the Tikhorestsk ammunition depot. Telegram. Open Source Centre. Satellite image: Maxar Technologies
Kursk
With superior troop numbers and newly replenished ammunition, Russia made slow but steady territorial gains in mid-2024 by concentrating in eastern Ukraine.That left an opening that Ukraine exploited – to the surprise of both its own allies and Russia. In August 2024, Ukrainian forces launched an audacious incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, taking hundreds of square kilometers.
With the addition of the North Korean troops in early November, Ukrainians estimated a force of at least 60,000 soldiers in all arrayed against them in Kursk. Reuters could not verify the troop numbers. A few weeks later Ukrainian military intelligence intercepted two radio messages involving the North Korean troops and shared them with Reuters.
A North Korean soldier who defected to South Korea listened to the shared recordings at the request of Reuters, to better understand the circumstances and military jargon scattered throughout the conversations.
In the longer of the two, intercepted on December 9, what appears to be a commander and subordinate discuss how soldiers could safely collect food. The key was to avoid detection.
“Make sure they never gather together,” said the commander, who is not identified. It was not clear where in Kursk either conversation took place.
They also speak about a wounded soldier and his military identification, suggesting that language barriers made it difficult for them to discern whether he was Russian or Ukrainian.
“Currently, the Russian UAV (drone) platoon will evacuate and then interrogate him. Over,” the soldier tells his superior.
Russian troops walk along a street in Kursk on March 14, 2025, after regaining the territory. Russian Defence Ministry/Handout via REUTERS
On January 4, Zelenskiy said that Russian and North Korean troops had suffered heavy casualties in Kursk and a week later he announced that two North Korean soldiers had been captured.
Reuters reviewed a Ukrainian intelligence document detailing their questioning.
Both prisoners initially exhibited “suicidal tendencies” upon capture, the document said. The Ukrainian military has described how at least one North Korean soldier blew himself up to avoid being taken prisoner.
The intelligence document identified one of the men as a senior soldier who had served since May 2021. The second was a junior sergeant from Pyongyang who had served since August 2016. Reuters is not identifying the men because they and their families could face retribution in North Korea.
The two men told interrogators they sailed from North Korea to Russia with around 100 other soldiers, arriving in Russia in November 2024 and undergoing exercises at training grounds.
They said they were only told they were going to Russia for exercises and that they left their military registration documents in North Korea.
After arriving in Russia, they were given a Russian-style “military card” written in Russian Cyrillic with no photo.
The senior soldier had a fractured left leg and the junior sergeant took a gunshot wound to the face, requiring his lower jaw to be removed. His interrogation was conducted in writing. They were captured on January 3 during their first battle, the document said.
The sergeant said the North Korean soldiers despised the Russians because they refused to go on assault operations like North Korean soldiers did.
Shyriaiev, the Ukrainian officer who fought against North Koreans in Kursk, agreed with that assessment.
“They continue to be used as assault units that advance, storm. And behind them are units of the Russian Federation, which consolidate and hold positions. That is, Koreans are used as assault troops.”
Battle hardened
North Korea’s involvement in Ukraine has alarmed not only European capitals but also South Korea and its allies in Asia, who fear that lessons learned from war could be unleashed on them one day.Cavoli, the U.S. commander, told lawmakers that in return for supplies of shells, missiles and weapons systems, “Russia is almost certainly transferring missile technology to Pyongyang.” Reuters could not verify his statement. He added that in the last year, North Korea had sent more than 13,000 containers of supplies to Russia.
Both countries deny arms transfers and do not publicly acknowledge the deployment of North Korean troops in Kursk. When challenged about the deployment, Russia has questioned why allies could not help its war effort given Western countries’ support for Ukraine.
North Korea has one of the world’s largest armies and has been stockpiling massive amounts of ammunition for decades in preparation for a potential war with South Korea, and while some of it is of questionable quality, much of it still works and gave Russia crucial superiority, said Yang Uk, a military expert at Seoul’s Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
“Since the Russian way of war is based upon fire superiority, it takes tons of ammunition. And the only country that can provide that kind of volume, besides Russia, is North Korea,” he said.
Russia, meanwhile, has depleted its stockpiles since the war’s beginning. Using North Korea’s shells could let Russia start resume stockpiling its new production of higher quality munitions, said Muzyka, the military analyst.
But North Korea has reaped rewards valued by any military commander. Elite army units have leapt from exercises at home into real-life combat. They have proven themselves capable of adapting.
Just as important has been North Korea’s ability to solve problems with the accuracy and consistency of its artillery munitions and ballistic missiles in wartime conditions, Ukrainian officials have said.
Russia began striking Ukraine with North Korean ballistic missiles at the end of 2023. Armed with warheads up to one ton – larger than the Russian equivalent – they initially proved to be inaccurate and unreliable, according to Ukrainian military analysis.
A Reuters journalist who arrived shortly after one fell in central Kharkiv on January 2, 2024, said the aftermath was unlike any he’d seen before. The missile debris was different, with intact chunks of engine and larger fragments made of a metal that seemed heavier and of lesser quality than others he’d viewed.
A Ukrainian official shows missile fragments as evidence Russia fired a North Korean missile at Kharkiv.
A Ukrainian official shows missile fragments as evidence Russia fired a North Korean missile at Kharkiv. REUTERS
Ukraine and the United Nations later confirmed the weapon was from North Korea.
A readout from Ukraine’s military came two months later: In weeks of North Korean ballistic missile bombings, they had only hit two military targets out of 24 strikes.
A fragment of a North Korean missile that struck Kharkiv on January 6, 2024. REUTERS/Vyacheslav Madiyevskyy
By the start of 2025, North Korea had supplied Russia with 148 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles, GUR told Reuters.
In February, two senior Ukrainian sources told Reuters that newer North Korean missiles had become significantly more precise since their first use in Ukraine more than a year before.
One of the sources, a senior military official, said the latest versions were accurate to within 50-100 meters of their target. Budanov, the head of Ukrainian military intelligence, later confirmed the improved accuracy in an interview with South Korean media.
Over the course of 2024 and into this year, drones have taken ascendancy over artillery on the battlefields of Ukraine. Guided remotely by pilots wearing electronic visors, thousands of the aircraft buzz over the frontline each day, posing a mortal danger to individual soldiers and heavy machinery.
But North Korean soldiers and munitions continue to play a crucial role, as the recent sea shipments attest. And there may soon be an easier way to move men and equipment between the countries.
Russia’s ambassador to Pyongyang recently announced a new road bridge over the Tumen River to be built near the decades-old Friendship Bridge. He said there were no concerns about renewed contacts between Russia and the United States, describing the alliance with Pyongyang as “a fraternal friendship between the Korean and Russian peoples, which were cemented by the blood that was spilled together.”
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Tässä konttien määräksi kerrotaan "enemmän kuin 15 800 konttia viimeisen 18 kuukauden aikana" kun taas yllä lainatussa artikkelissa määrä oli "lähes 16 000 konttia viimeisen 20 kuukauden aikana", tosin aikamääre on myös eri suuruinen (edellinen havaittu toimitus oli 17.3.2025 eli melkein kuukausi sitten):
Over the past 18 months, North Korea has sent Russia more than 15,800 containers of ammunition, — Newsweek
At least 64 shipments from North Korea to the Russia from August 2023 to March 2025. Russian army received approximately 4.2 to 5.8 million ammunition.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Ryssäläinen telegram-kanava jakaa yhden Pokrovskin seudulla taistelevan sotilaan kommentteja droneista:
Russian sources complain that they face a "systemic and extremely acute" situation with the supply and capability of drones on the front lines in Ukraine. They say they are still using off-the-shelf Mavics, while the Ukrainians have rapidly advanced their own capabilities.
The 'Philologist in ambush' Telegram channel publishes "a signal from the ground from a comrade from an ordinary Russian people's (motorised) rifle regiment":
"I have a few thoughts on our Pokrovsk direction. I don't know about other units, but it's as if we've stopped at the situation from a year ago, when we were mastering the [DJI] Mavics and the FPV [drones].
Firstly, all our optics [reconnaissance drones - HUOM: lue tätä käännöstä koskeva kommentti alempaa] go only through humanitarian aid and personal channels, this is a drop in the ocean.
Secondly, it feels like the enemy has moved to a qualitatively different level of the FPV: aerial repeaters, shock pairs and trios, remote detonation, a distance of 20 km is not a problem for them at all.
And we're still in the same place as a year ago. And no one gives a damn, they want to win the war with Mavics. We urgently need to catch up with them, urgently. Otherwise we're gonna fuck up the flash [screw up].
P.S. The issue is not really in the Pokrovsk direction as such. The problem is basically systemic and extremely acute. We are critically lagging behind."
Source: https://t.me/philologist_zov/2313
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Tässä terävä kommentti: LÄHDE
Optics = fiberoptic unjammable drones
Not recon at all, but the one major tech advancement the russians beat Ukraine to implementing - this guy is saying it is all crowdfunded and quite rare, with the government just supplying stock Mavics for recon
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Tämä on tietysti vain yhden sotilaan havaintoja ja kuvitelmia, joten ei voi tietää kuinka totta ne ovat.
Toisaalta Venäjän armeija on aina ollut äärimmäisen hierarkinen ja ylhäältä johdettu eli helppo uskoa että moni nopeaa ja notkeaa toiminta vaativa asia onnistuisi vain jos se tehdään virallisen komentoketjun ulkopuolella (eli vapaaehtoisten voimin).
Russian sources complain that they face a "systemic and extremely acute" situation with the supply and capability of drones on the front lines in Ukraine. They say they are still using off-the-shelf Mavics, while the Ukrainians have rapidly advanced their own capabilities.
The 'Philologist in ambush' Telegram channel publishes "a signal from the ground from a comrade from an ordinary Russian people's (motorised) rifle regiment":
"I have a few thoughts on our Pokrovsk direction. I don't know about other units, but it's as if we've stopped at the situation from a year ago, when we were mastering the [DJI] Mavics and the FPV [drones].
Firstly, all our optics [reconnaissance drones - HUOM: lue tätä käännöstä koskeva kommentti alempaa] go only through humanitarian aid and personal channels, this is a drop in the ocean.
Secondly, it feels like the enemy has moved to a qualitatively different level of the FPV: aerial repeaters, shock pairs and trios, remote detonation, a distance of 20 km is not a problem for them at all.
And we're still in the same place as a year ago. And no one gives a damn, they want to win the war with Mavics. We urgently need to catch up with them, urgently. Otherwise we're gonna fuck up the flash [screw up].
P.S. The issue is not really in the Pokrovsk direction as such. The problem is basically systemic and extremely acute. We are critically lagging behind."
Source: https://t.me/philologist_zov/2313
-
Tässä terävä kommentti: LÄHDE
Optics = fiberoptic unjammable drones
Not recon at all, but the one major tech advancement the russians beat Ukraine to implementing - this guy is saying it is all crowdfunded and quite rare, with the government just supplying stock Mavics for recon
-
Tämä on tietysti vain yhden sotilaan havaintoja ja kuvitelmia, joten ei voi tietää kuinka totta ne ovat.
Toisaalta Venäjän armeija on aina ollut äärimmäisen hierarkinen ja ylhäältä johdettu eli helppo uskoa että moni nopeaa ja notkeaa toiminta vaativa asia onnistuisi vain jos se tehdään virallisen komentoketjun ulkopuolella (eli vapaaehtoisten voimin).
Zelensky antoi kenkää Sumyn aluejohodolle. Syystäkin, jos väite palkintotilaisuudesta piti paikkaansa.Tässä tämä. Eli Sumyn kuvernööri Konotopin pormestarin mukaan järjesti palkitsemistilaisuuden Sumyssa eilen.
Sumy governor organized military award ceremony on day of deadly Russian attack, official claims
The event, allegedly planned by Sumy Oblast Governor Volodymyr Artiukh, posed undue risk to civilians and military personnel, Konotop Mayor Artem Semenikhin claimed.kyivindependent.com
Zelensky fires Sumy governor amid scrutiny over military award ceremony on day of Russian strike — Meduza
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has dismissed Volodymyr Artyukh, the head of the Sumy Regional Military Administration, according to the Ukrainian public broadcaster Suspilne.
Antares
Respected Leader
Tuore Reuters artikkeli Pohjois-Korean toimittamista merikonteista (LINKKI) herätti mielenkiinnon, joten vilkaisin mitä näistä määristä on kerrottu aikaisemmin, tässä 18.10.2024 julkaistu viestini: LÄHDE
Eli tuorein arvio on yli 13000 kontillista ja niissä"mahdollisesti" enemmän kuin 8 miljoonaa 122mm ja 152mm tykistön laukausta.
Eipä ihmekään jos uustuotannon kaksinkertaistamiselle alkaa olemaan pian tarvetta, ei Pohjois-Koreallakaan ole määräänsä enempää varastoissa.
Lainaus tiedotteesta:
On this day, the National Intelligence Service assessed that North Korea had provided Russia with weapons capable of killing people, including shells, missiles, and anti-tank rockets, amounting to over 13,000 containers (Attached Files 6 and 7) on approximately 70 occasions since August of last year.
According to the verification of North Korean weapons collected from the battlefield by the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Agency, the weapons that North Korea provided to Russia included 122mm and 152mm shells, Bulsae-4 anti-tank missiles (Appendix 8), short-range ballistic missiles such as the KN-23 (Appendix 9), and RPG anti-tank rockets (Appendix 10).
Eli konttien toimitusten aikaväli on "since August" (elokuusta lähtien) - 18.10.2024.
Eivät sano tarkkaa ensimmäisen toimituksen päivää, mutta sanovat että toimituksia olisi tehty suunnilleen 70 erässä.
Miten tuon aloituksen haluaakin tulkita, niin puhutaan 13,5 tai 14,5 kuukaudesta. Tässä ajassa olisivat siis toimittaneet 13 000 kontillista materiaalia, joten tuon voi karkeasti keskiarvoistaan 1 000 konttia per kuukausi tahdiksi.
JOS oletetaan että toimitukset olisivat alkaneet elokuun 2023 alussa, niin silloin aikaväli on pisin eli noin 14,5 kuukautta ja tällöin keskiarvoinen kuukauden määrä olisi noin 900 konttia per kuukausi.
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Kaksi eri lähdettä numeroille, tarkoittaa että ne tuskin ovat vertailukelpoisia.
Etelä-Korean tiedustelupalvelun kertoman mukaan toimitettuja kontteja oli yli 13 000 kpl jo 18.10.2024 eli kuusi kuukautta sitten. Laskin heidän kertomien aikojen perusteella että toimitusten keskiarvo olisi noin 1000 konttia per kuukausi. JOS tämä tahti jatkuisi samansuuruisena, konttien määrän pitäisi olla nyt yli 19 000 kpl.
Tuossa tuoreessa Reuters artikkelissa kirjoitetaan näin: LÄHDE
"The Open Source Centre, or OSC, an independent UK-based research organization focused on security, tracked 64 shipments over 20 months carrying nearly 16,000 containers and millions of artillery rounds for use against Ukraine, including a shipment as recent as March 17."
Viimeinen havaittu toimitus oli 17.3.2025 eli noin kuukausi sitten. Tämä huomioiden ero on silti merkittävä tuohon Etelä-Korean tiedustelupalvelun numeroista laskettuun verrattuna: 2000 kpl.
Toki on mahdollista että konttien toimitus olisi hidastunut ja määrät pienentyneet, mikä selittäisi pienemmän kokonaismäärän. Oletan silti että numerot eivät ole vertailukelpoisia, koska näistä on nähty useita eri arvioita eri aikoina ja niissä on ollut aina jonkin verran eroa.
HUOM: muista viime vuoden lopulla liikkuneen huhun / väitteen, jonka mukaan Pohjois-Korean omat ammusvarastot olisivat käymässä vähiin - mistä syystä he yrittivät kiivaasti kasvattaa laukausten uustuotantoa. Yhden huhun mukaan varastojen tyhjennystä voisi jatkaa tammikuun 2025 loppuun mutta sen jälkeen olisivat uustuotannon varassa.
Kenties nuo olivat vain perättömiä huhuja? Se on selvää tämän tuoreen artikkelin perusteella, että merikonttien toimitukset ovat jatkuneet alkuvuonna 2025.
Eli tuorein arvio on yli 13000 kontillista ja niissä"mahdollisesti" enemmän kuin 8 miljoonaa 122mm ja 152mm tykistön laukausta.
Eipä ihmekään jos uustuotannon kaksinkertaistamiselle alkaa olemaan pian tarvetta, ei Pohjois-Koreallakaan ole määräänsä enempää varastoissa.
Lainaus tiedotteesta:
On this day, the National Intelligence Service assessed that North Korea had provided Russia with weapons capable of killing people, including shells, missiles, and anti-tank rockets, amounting to over 13,000 containers (Attached Files 6 and 7) on approximately 70 occasions since August of last year.
According to the verification of North Korean weapons collected from the battlefield by the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Agency, the weapons that North Korea provided to Russia included 122mm and 152mm shells, Bulsae-4 anti-tank missiles (Appendix 8), short-range ballistic missiles such as the KN-23 (Appendix 9), and RPG anti-tank rockets (Appendix 10).
Eli konttien toimitusten aikaväli on "since August" (elokuusta lähtien) - 18.10.2024.
Eivät sano tarkkaa ensimmäisen toimituksen päivää, mutta sanovat että toimituksia olisi tehty suunnilleen 70 erässä.
Miten tuon aloituksen haluaakin tulkita, niin puhutaan 13,5 tai 14,5 kuukaudesta. Tässä ajassa olisivat siis toimittaneet 13 000 kontillista materiaalia, joten tuon voi karkeasti keskiarvoistaan 1 000 konttia per kuukausi tahdiksi.
JOS oletetaan että toimitukset olisivat alkaneet elokuun 2023 alussa, niin silloin aikaväli on pisin eli noin 14,5 kuukautta ja tällöin keskiarvoinen kuukauden määrä olisi noin 900 konttia per kuukausi.
-
Kaksi eri lähdettä numeroille, tarkoittaa että ne tuskin ovat vertailukelpoisia.
Etelä-Korean tiedustelupalvelun kertoman mukaan toimitettuja kontteja oli yli 13 000 kpl jo 18.10.2024 eli kuusi kuukautta sitten. Laskin heidän kertomien aikojen perusteella että toimitusten keskiarvo olisi noin 1000 konttia per kuukausi. JOS tämä tahti jatkuisi samansuuruisena, konttien määrän pitäisi olla nyt yli 19 000 kpl.
Tuossa tuoreessa Reuters artikkelissa kirjoitetaan näin: LÄHDE
"The Open Source Centre, or OSC, an independent UK-based research organization focused on security, tracked 64 shipments over 20 months carrying nearly 16,000 containers and millions of artillery rounds for use against Ukraine, including a shipment as recent as March 17."
Viimeinen havaittu toimitus oli 17.3.2025 eli noin kuukausi sitten. Tämä huomioiden ero on silti merkittävä tuohon Etelä-Korean tiedustelupalvelun numeroista laskettuun verrattuna: 2000 kpl.
Toki on mahdollista että konttien toimitus olisi hidastunut ja määrät pienentyneet, mikä selittäisi pienemmän kokonaismäärän. Oletan silti että numerot eivät ole vertailukelpoisia, koska näistä on nähty useita eri arvioita eri aikoina ja niissä on ollut aina jonkin verran eroa.
HUOM: muista viime vuoden lopulla liikkuneen huhun / väitteen, jonka mukaan Pohjois-Korean omat ammusvarastot olisivat käymässä vähiin - mistä syystä he yrittivät kiivaasti kasvattaa laukausten uustuotantoa. Yhden huhun mukaan varastojen tyhjennystä voisi jatkaa tammikuun 2025 loppuun mutta sen jälkeen olisivat uustuotannon varassa.
Kenties nuo olivat vain perättömiä huhuja? Se on selvää tämän tuoreen artikkelin perusteella, että merikonttien toimitukset ovat jatkuneet alkuvuonna 2025.
Ukrainan puolustusvoimat iskivät Venäjän armeijan 448. ohjusprikaatin pysyvään tukikohtaan Kurskin alueella. Kyseinen prikaati oli Palmusunnuntaina tehnyt ohjusiskun Sumin kaupunkiin.
Ukrainan asevoimien erikoisoperaatiojoukkojen, miehittämättömien järjestelmien joukkojen ja turvallisuuspalvelun yksiköt hyökkäsivät yhteistyössä muiden puolustusvoimien osastojen kanssa useisiin kohteisiin Kurskin alueella. Kohteet liittyivät sotarikollisiin, jotka ovat osallisina 13. huhtikuuta 2025 toteutettuun ohjusiskuun Sumissa sekä muihin rikoksiin Ukrainan kansaa vastaan.
Erityisesti tuhottiin venäläisten miehittäjien 448. ohjusprikaatin pysyvä tukikohta, ja iskusta aiheutui toissijaisia räjähdyksiä. Iskun seurauksia täsmennetään parhaillaan.
Jokainen venäläinen sotilasyksikkö ja heidän sotilaansa, jotka suorittavat hyökkäyksiä rauhanomaisia kaupunkeja ja siviilejä vastaan Ukrainassa, tunnistetaan ja saavat väistämättä rangaistuksensa.
Tarkoin kohdennetut ja järjestelmälliset iskut venäläisten miehittäjien tärkeisiin sotilaskohteisiin jatkuvat, kunnes Venäjän aseellinen aggressio maatamme vastaan päättyy.
Jatkoa seuraa…
Kunnia Ukrainalle!
t.me
Ukrainan asevoimien erikoisoperaatiojoukkojen, miehittämättömien järjestelmien joukkojen ja turvallisuuspalvelun yksiköt hyökkäsivät yhteistyössä muiden puolustusvoimien osastojen kanssa useisiin kohteisiin Kurskin alueella. Kohteet liittyivät sotarikollisiin, jotka ovat osallisina 13. huhtikuuta 2025 toteutettuun ohjusiskuun Sumissa sekä muihin rikoksiin Ukrainan kansaa vastaan.
Erityisesti tuhottiin venäläisten miehittäjien 448. ohjusprikaatin pysyvä tukikohta, ja iskusta aiheutui toissijaisia räjähdyksiä. Iskun seurauksia täsmennetään parhaillaan.
Jokainen venäläinen sotilasyksikkö ja heidän sotilaansa, jotka suorittavat hyökkäyksiä rauhanomaisia kaupunkeja ja siviilejä vastaan Ukrainassa, tunnistetaan ja saavat väistämättä rangaistuksensa.
Tarkoin kohdennetut ja järjestelmälliset iskut venäläisten miehittäjien tärkeisiin sotilaskohteisiin jatkuvat, kunnes Venäjän aseellinen aggressio maatamme vastaan päättyy.
Jatkoa seuraa…
Kunnia Ukrainalle!
Генеральний штаб ЗСУ
Сили оборони України уразили ППД 448-ї ракетної бригади армії рф на Курщині, яка у Вербну неділю завдала ракетного удару по місту Суми. Підрозділи Сил безпілотних систем, Сил спеціальних операцій ЗС України, Служби безпеки України, у взаємодії з іншими складовими Сил оборони України...
t.me
WardLittell
Majuri
Tunteet sisälläni vaihtuvat vihasta ja häpeään... Miten vitussa Yhdysvallat voi "toimia" näin!
Lehti: USA esti G7-maiden julkilausuman, jossa olisi tuomittu Venäjän isku Sumyn kaupunkiin
"Yhdysvallat on sanonut muille G7-maille, ettei se tue lausuntoa, jossa tuomittaisiin Venäjän tuhoisa isku Sumyyn, Bloomberg uutisoi. Presidentti Donald Trumpin hallinto sanoi liittolaisille, ettei se voisi allekirjoittaa lausuntoa, sillä Yhdysvallat ”pyrkii säilyttämään tilan neuvotella rauhasta”.
Iskussa kuoli ainakin 35 ihmistä ja loukkaantui 119, Ukrainan presidentti Volodymyr Zelenskyi on sanonut.
Kanada, joka toimii G7:n puheenjohtajamaana tänä vuonna, sanoi liittolaisille, että ilman Yhdysvaltojen tukea julkilausumaa ei voida antaa.
Aiemmin tänä vuonna sodan vuosipäivän aikaan Yhdysvallat ei suostunut tukemaan julkilausumia, joissa tuomittiin Venäjä sodan aloittaneena osapuolena."
15.04.2025 klo 16.07
IS
Ina Kauppinen
Lehti: USA esti G7-maiden julkilausuman, jossa olisi tuomittu Venäjän isku Sumyn kaupunkiin
"Yhdysvallat on sanonut muille G7-maille, ettei se tue lausuntoa, jossa tuomittaisiin Venäjän tuhoisa isku Sumyyn, Bloomberg uutisoi. Presidentti Donald Trumpin hallinto sanoi liittolaisille, ettei se voisi allekirjoittaa lausuntoa, sillä Yhdysvallat ”pyrkii säilyttämään tilan neuvotella rauhasta”.
Iskussa kuoli ainakin 35 ihmistä ja loukkaantui 119, Ukrainan presidentti Volodymyr Zelenskyi on sanonut.
Kanada, joka toimii G7:n puheenjohtajamaana tänä vuonna, sanoi liittolaisille, että ilman Yhdysvaltojen tukea julkilausumaa ei voida antaa.
Aiemmin tänä vuonna sodan vuosipäivän aikaan Yhdysvallat ei suostunut tukemaan julkilausumia, joissa tuomittiin Venäjä sodan aloittaneena osapuolena."
15.04.2025 klo 16.07
IS
Ina Kauppinen