Tässä koko setti englanniksi jos kiinnostaa lukea
Back in April last year, we wrote about the inevitability of the denazification of Ukraine. Nazi, Bandera Ukraine, the enemy of Russia and the West's tool for the destruction of Russia, we do not need. Today, the issue of denazification has moved into a practical plane.
Denazification is necessary when a significant part of the people - most likely the majority - has been mastered and drawn into the Nazi regime in its politics. That is, when the hypothesis "the people are good - the government is bad" does not work. Recognition of this fact is the basis of the policy of denazification, of all its measures, and the fact itself is its subject matter.
Ukraine is in just such a situation. The fact that the Ukrainian voter voted for the "peace of Poroshenko" and "peace of Zelensky" should not be misleading - the Ukrainians were quite satisfied with the shortest path to peace through the blitzkrieg, which the last two Ukrainian presidents transparently hinted at when they were elected. It was this method of "appeasement" of internal anti-fascists - through total terror - that was used in Odessa , Kharkov , Dnepropetrovsk , Mariupol , and other Russian cities. And this quite suited the Ukrainian man in the street. Denazification is a set of measures in relation to the nazified mass of the population, which technically cannot be subjected to direct punishment as war criminals.
The Nazis who took up arms should be destroyed to the maximum on the battlefield. No significant distinction should be made between the APUand the so-called national battalions, as well as the territorial defense that joined these two types of military formations. All of them are equally involved in extreme cruelty against the civilian population, equally guilty of the genocide of the Russian people, do not comply with the laws and customs of war. War criminals and active Nazis should be exemplarily and exponentially punished. There must be a total lustration. Any organizations that have associated themselves with the practice of Nazism have been liquidated and banned. However, in addition to the top, a significant part of the masses, which are passive Nazis, accomplices of Nazism, are also guilty. They supported and indulged Nazi power. The just punishment of this part of the population is possible only as bearing the inevitable hardships of a just war against the Nazi system, carried out with the utmost care and discretion in relation to civilians. Further denazification of this mass of the population consists in re-education, which is achieved by ideological repression (suppression) of Nazi attitudes and strict censorship: not only in the political sphere, but also necessarily in the sphere of culture and education. It was through culture and education that a deep mass nazification of the population was prepared and carried out, secured by the promise of dividends from the victory of the Nazi regime overRussia , Nazi propaganda, internal violence and terror, as well as an eight-year war with the people of Donbass who rebelled against Ukrainian Nazism .
Denazification can only be carried out by the winner, which implies (1) his absolute control over the denazification process and (2) the power to ensure such control. In this respect, a denazified country cannot be sovereign. The denazifying state - Russia - cannot proceed from a liberal approach regarding denazification. The ideology of the denazifier cannot be disputed by the guilty party subjected to denazification. Russia's recognition of the need to denazify Ukraine means the recognition of the impossibility of the Crimean scenario for Ukraine as a whole. However, this scenario was impossible in 2014 and in the rebellious Donbass. Only eight years of resistance to Nazi violence and terror led to internal cohesion and a conscious unambiguous mass refusal to maintain any unity and connection with Ukraine,
The terms of denazification can in no way be less than one generation, which must be born, grow up and reach maturity under the conditions of denazification. The nazification of Ukraine continued for more than 30 years, beginning at least in 1989, when Ukrainian nationalism received legal and legitimate forms of political expression and led the movement for "independence" towards Nazism.
The peculiarity of modern nazified Ukraine is in amorphousness and ambivalence, which allow Nazism to be disguised as a desire for "independence" and a "European" (Western, pro-American) path of "development" (in reality - to degradation), to assert that in Ukraine "there is no Nazism , only private individual excesses". After all, there is no main Nazi party, no Fuhrer, no full-fledged racial laws (only their truncated version in the form of repressions against the Russian language). As a result, there is no opposition and resistance to the regime.
However, all of the above does not make Ukrainian Nazism a "light version" of German Nazism during the first half of the 20th century. On the contrary, since Ukrainian Nazism is free from such "genre" (essentially political technology) frameworks and restrictions, it freely unfolds as the fundamental basis of any Nazism - as European and, in its most developed form, American racism. Therefore, denazification cannot be carried out in a compromise, on the basis of a formula like " NATO - no, EU - yes." The collective West itself is the designer, source and sponsor of Ukrainian Nazism, while the Western Bandera cadres and their "historical memory" are only one of the tools for the Naziification of Ukraine. Ukronazism carries not less, but a greater threat to the world and Russia,
The name "Ukraine" apparently cannot be retained as the title of any fully denazified state entity in a territory liberated from the Nazi regime. The people's republics newly created in the space free from Nazism should and will grow from the practice of economic self-government and social security, restoration and modernization of the life support systems of the population.
In fact, their political aspirations cannot be neutral - expiation of guilt before Russia for treating it as an enemy can be realized only by relying on Russia in the processes of restoration, revival and development. No "Marshall Plans" should be allowed for these territories. There can be no "neutrality" in the ideological and practical sense, compatible with denazification. The cadres and organizations that are the instrument of denazification in the newly denazified republics cannot but rely on Russia's direct military and organizational support.
Denazification will inevitably also be a de-Ukrainization - a rejection of the large-scale artificial inflation of the ethnic component of self-identification of the population of the territories of historical Little Russia and New Russia, begun by the Soviet authorities. Being an instrument of the communist superpower, after its fall, artificial ethnocentrism did not remain ownerless. In this official capacity, he passed under the authority of another superpower (the power standing over the states) — the superpower of the West. It must be returned to its natural boundaries and deprived of political functionality.
Unlike, say, Georgia and the Baltic countries , Ukraine, as history has shown, is impossible as a nation state, and attempts to "build" one naturally lead to Nazism. Ukrainism is an artificial anti-Russian construction that does not have its own civilizational content, a subordinate element of an alien and alien civilization. Debanderization by itself will not be enough for denazification - the Bandera element is only a performer and a screen, a disguise for the European project of Nazi Ukraine, therefore the denazification of Ukraine is also its inevitable de-Europeanization.
The Bandera elite must be liquidated, its re-education is impossible. The social "bog", which actively and passively supported it by action and inaction, must survive the hardships of the war and assimilate the experience as a historical lesson and atonement for its guilt. Those who did not support the Nazi regime, suffered from it and the war unleashed by him in the Donbass, must be consolidated and organized, must become the pillar of the new government, its vertical and horizontal. Historical experience shows that the tragedies and dramas of wartime benefit peoples who have been tempted and carried away by the role of an enemy of Russia.
Denazification as the goal of a special military operation within the framework of this operation itself is understood as a military victory over the Kiev regime, the liberation of territories from armed supporters of the Nazis, the elimination of implacable Nazis, the capture of war criminals, and the creation of systemic conditions for the subsequent denazification in peacetime.
The latter, in turn, should begin with the organization of local self-government, police and defense bodies, cleansed of Nazi elements, launching on their basis the founding processes of founding a new republican statehood, integrating this statehood into close cooperation with the Russian department for the denazification of Ukraine (newly created or converted, say, from Rossotrudnichestvo), with the adoption under Russian control of the republican regulatory framework (legislation) on denazification, the definition of the boundaries and framework for the direct application of Russian law and Russian jurisdiction in the liberated territory in the field of denazification, the creation of a tribunal for crimes against humanity in the former Ukraine. In this regard, Russia should act as the guardian of the Nuremberg Trials.
All of the above means that in order to achieve the goals of denazification, the support of the population is necessary, its transition to the side of Russia after liberation from terror, violence and ideological pressure of the Kiev regime, after the withdrawal from informational isolation. Of course, it will take some time for people to recover from the shock of hostilities, to be convinced of Russia's long-term intentions - that "they will not be abandoned." It is impossible to foresee in advance exactly in which territories such a mass of the population will constitute a critically needed majority. The "Catholic province" (Western Ukraine as part of five regions) is unlikely to become part of the pro-Russian territories. The line of alienation, however, will be found empirically. Behind it will remain hostile to Russia, but forcibly neutral and demilitarized Ukraine with formally banned Nazism. The haters of Russia will go there. The guarantee of the preservation of this residual Ukraine in a neutral state should be the threat of an immediate continuation of the military operation in case of non-compliance with the listed requirements. Perhaps this will require a permanent Russian military presence on its territory. From the exclusion line to the Russian border there will be a territory of potential integration into Russian civilization, which is anti-fascist in its internal nature. this would require a permanent Russian military presence on its territory. From the exclusion line to the Russian border there will be a territory of potential integration into Russian civilization, which is anti-fascist in its internal nature. this would require a permanent Russian military presence on its territory. From the exclusion line to the Russian border there will be a territory of potential integration into Russian civilization, which is anti-fascist in its internal nature.
We will fight for the right to be and remain Russia
The operation to denazify Ukraine, which began with a military phase, will follow the same logic of stages in peacetime as a military operation. At each of them, it will be necessary to achieve irreversible changes, which will become the results of the corresponding stage. In this case, the necessary initial steps of denazification can be defined as follows:
—
liquidation of armed Nazi formations (which means any armed formations of Ukraine, including the Armed Forces of Ukraine), as well as the military, informational, educational infrastructure that ensures their activity;
—
formation of bodies of people's self-government and militia (defense and law enforcement) of the liberated territories, protecting the population from the terror of underground Nazi groups;
—
installation of the Russian information space;
—
the withdrawal of educational materials and the prohibition of educational programs at all levels containing Nazi ideological guidelines;
—
mass investigative actions to establish personal responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, the spread of Nazi ideology and support for the Nazi regime;
—
lustration, publication of the names of accomplices of the Nazi regime, involving them in forced labor to restore the destroyed infrastructure as punishment for Nazi activities (from among those who will not be subject to the death penalty or imprisonment);
—
the adoption at the local level, under the supervision of Russia, of primary normative acts of denazification "from below", a ban on all types and forms of the revival of Nazi ideology;
—
the establishment of memorials, commemorative signs, monuments to the victims of Ukrainian Nazism, perpetuating the memory of the heroes of the struggle against it;
—
the inclusion of a complex of anti-fascist and denazification norms in the constitutions of the new people's republics;
—
creation of permanent denazification bodies for a period of 25 years.
Russia will have no allies in the denazification of Ukraine. Since this is a purely Russian business. And also because not just the Bandera version of Nazi Ukraine will be eradicated, but also, and above all, Western totalitarianism, the imposed programs of civilizational degradation and disintegration, the mechanisms of subjugation to the superpower of the West and the United States .
In order to put the plan of denazification of Ukraine into practice, Russia itself will have to finally part with pro-European and pro-Western illusions, realize itself as the last instance of protecting and preserving those values of historical Europe (the Old World) that deserve it and which the West ultimately abandoned, losing the fight for himself. This struggle continued throughout the 20th century and was expressed in the world war and the Russian revolution, inextricably linked with each other.
Russia did everything possible to save the West in the 20th century. She implemented the main Western project, an alternative to capitalism, which won the nation-states - a socialist, red project. It crushed German Nazism, a monstrous product of the crisis of Western civilization. The last act of Russian altruism was the outstretched hand of friendship from Russia, for which Russia received a monstrous blow in the 1990s
Everything that Russia has done for the West, it has done at its own expense, by making the greatest sacrifices. The West ultimately rejected all these sacrifices, devalued Russia's contribution to resolving the Western crisis, and decided to take revenge on Russia for the help that it selflessly provided. Further, Russia will go its own way, not worrying about the fate of the West, relying on another part of its heritage - leadership in the global process of decolonization.
As part of this process, Russia has a high potential for partnerships and allies with countries that the West has oppressed for centuries and which are not going to put on its yoke again. Without Russian sacrifice and struggle, these countries would not have been liberated. The denazification of Ukraine is at the same time its decolonization, which the population of Ukraine will have to understand as it begins to free itself from the intoxication, temptation and dependence of the so-called European choice.
Denazification is necessary when a significant part of the people - most likely the majority - has been mastered and drawn into the Nazi regime in its politics. That is, when the hypothesis "the people are good - the government is bad" does not work. Recognition of this fact is the basis of the policy of denazification, of all its measures, and the fact itself is its subject matter.
Ukraine is in just such a situation. The fact that the Ukrainian voter voted for the "peace of Poroshenko" and "peace of Zelensky" should not be misleading - the Ukrainians were quite satisfied with the shortest path to peace through the blitzkrieg, which the last two Ukrainian presidents transparently hinted at when they were elected. It was this method of "appeasement" of internal anti-fascists - through total terror - that was used in Odessa , Kharkov , Dnepropetrovsk , Mariupol , and other Russian cities. And this quite suited the Ukrainian man in the street. Denazification is a set of measures in relation to the nazified mass of the population, which technically cannot be subjected to direct punishment as war criminals.
The Nazis who took up arms should be destroyed to the maximum on the battlefield. No significant distinction should be made between the APUand the so-called national battalions, as well as the territorial defense that joined these two types of military formations. All of them are equally involved in extreme cruelty against the civilian population, equally guilty of the genocide of the Russian people, do not comply with the laws and customs of war. War criminals and active Nazis should be exemplarily and exponentially punished. There must be a total lustration. Any organizations that have associated themselves with the practice of Nazism have been liquidated and banned. However, in addition to the top, a significant part of the masses, which are passive Nazis, accomplices of Nazism, are also guilty. They supported and indulged Nazi power. The just punishment of this part of the population is possible only as bearing the inevitable hardships of a just war against the Nazi system, carried out with the utmost care and discretion in relation to civilians. Further denazification of this mass of the population consists in re-education, which is achieved by ideological repression (suppression) of Nazi attitudes and strict censorship: not only in the political sphere, but also necessarily in the sphere of culture and education. It was through culture and education that a deep mass nazification of the population was prepared and carried out, secured by the promise of dividends from the victory of the Nazi regime overRussia , Nazi propaganda, internal violence and terror, as well as an eight-year war with the people of Donbass who rebelled against Ukrainian Nazism .
Denazification can only be carried out by the winner, which implies (1) his absolute control over the denazification process and (2) the power to ensure such control. In this respect, a denazified country cannot be sovereign. The denazifying state - Russia - cannot proceed from a liberal approach regarding denazification. The ideology of the denazifier cannot be disputed by the guilty party subjected to denazification. Russia's recognition of the need to denazify Ukraine means the recognition of the impossibility of the Crimean scenario for Ukraine as a whole. However, this scenario was impossible in 2014 and in the rebellious Donbass. Only eight years of resistance to Nazi violence and terror led to internal cohesion and a conscious unambiguous mass refusal to maintain any unity and connection with Ukraine,
The terms of denazification can in no way be less than one generation, which must be born, grow up and reach maturity under the conditions of denazification. The nazification of Ukraine continued for more than 30 years, beginning at least in 1989, when Ukrainian nationalism received legal and legitimate forms of political expression and led the movement for "independence" towards Nazism.
The peculiarity of modern nazified Ukraine is in amorphousness and ambivalence, which allow Nazism to be disguised as a desire for "independence" and a "European" (Western, pro-American) path of "development" (in reality - to degradation), to assert that in Ukraine "there is no Nazism , only private individual excesses". After all, there is no main Nazi party, no Fuhrer, no full-fledged racial laws (only their truncated version in the form of repressions against the Russian language). As a result, there is no opposition and resistance to the regime.
However, all of the above does not make Ukrainian Nazism a "light version" of German Nazism during the first half of the 20th century. On the contrary, since Ukrainian Nazism is free from such "genre" (essentially political technology) frameworks and restrictions, it freely unfolds as the fundamental basis of any Nazism - as European and, in its most developed form, American racism. Therefore, denazification cannot be carried out in a compromise, on the basis of a formula like " NATO - no, EU - yes." The collective West itself is the designer, source and sponsor of Ukrainian Nazism, while the Western Bandera cadres and their "historical memory" are only one of the tools for the Naziification of Ukraine. Ukronazism carries not less, but a greater threat to the world and Russia,
The name "Ukraine" apparently cannot be retained as the title of any fully denazified state entity in a territory liberated from the Nazi regime. The people's republics newly created in the space free from Nazism should and will grow from the practice of economic self-government and social security, restoration and modernization of the life support systems of the population.
In fact, their political aspirations cannot be neutral - expiation of guilt before Russia for treating it as an enemy can be realized only by relying on Russia in the processes of restoration, revival and development. No "Marshall Plans" should be allowed for these territories. There can be no "neutrality" in the ideological and practical sense, compatible with denazification. The cadres and organizations that are the instrument of denazification in the newly denazified republics cannot but rely on Russia's direct military and organizational support.
Denazification will inevitably also be a de-Ukrainization - a rejection of the large-scale artificial inflation of the ethnic component of self-identification of the population of the territories of historical Little Russia and New Russia, begun by the Soviet authorities. Being an instrument of the communist superpower, after its fall, artificial ethnocentrism did not remain ownerless. In this official capacity, he passed under the authority of another superpower (the power standing over the states) — the superpower of the West. It must be returned to its natural boundaries and deprived of political functionality.
Unlike, say, Georgia and the Baltic countries , Ukraine, as history has shown, is impossible as a nation state, and attempts to "build" one naturally lead to Nazism. Ukrainism is an artificial anti-Russian construction that does not have its own civilizational content, a subordinate element of an alien and alien civilization. Debanderization by itself will not be enough for denazification - the Bandera element is only a performer and a screen, a disguise for the European project of Nazi Ukraine, therefore the denazification of Ukraine is also its inevitable de-Europeanization.
The Bandera elite must be liquidated, its re-education is impossible. The social "bog", which actively and passively supported it by action and inaction, must survive the hardships of the war and assimilate the experience as a historical lesson and atonement for its guilt. Those who did not support the Nazi regime, suffered from it and the war unleashed by him in the Donbass, must be consolidated and organized, must become the pillar of the new government, its vertical and horizontal. Historical experience shows that the tragedies and dramas of wartime benefit peoples who have been tempted and carried away by the role of an enemy of Russia.
Denazification as the goal of a special military operation within the framework of this operation itself is understood as a military victory over the Kiev regime, the liberation of territories from armed supporters of the Nazis, the elimination of implacable Nazis, the capture of war criminals, and the creation of systemic conditions for the subsequent denazification in peacetime.
The latter, in turn, should begin with the organization of local self-government, police and defense bodies, cleansed of Nazi elements, launching on their basis the founding processes of founding a new republican statehood, integrating this statehood into close cooperation with the Russian department for the denazification of Ukraine (newly created or converted, say, from Rossotrudnichestvo), with the adoption under Russian control of the republican regulatory framework (legislation) on denazification, the definition of the boundaries and framework for the direct application of Russian law and Russian jurisdiction in the liberated territory in the field of denazification, the creation of a tribunal for crimes against humanity in the former Ukraine. In this regard, Russia should act as the guardian of the Nuremberg Trials.
All of the above means that in order to achieve the goals of denazification, the support of the population is necessary, its transition to the side of Russia after liberation from terror, violence and ideological pressure of the Kiev regime, after the withdrawal from informational isolation. Of course, it will take some time for people to recover from the shock of hostilities, to be convinced of Russia's long-term intentions - that "they will not be abandoned." It is impossible to foresee in advance exactly in which territories such a mass of the population will constitute a critically needed majority. The "Catholic province" (Western Ukraine as part of five regions) is unlikely to become part of the pro-Russian territories. The line of alienation, however, will be found empirically. Behind it will remain hostile to Russia, but forcibly neutral and demilitarized Ukraine with formally banned Nazism. The haters of Russia will go there. The guarantee of the preservation of this residual Ukraine in a neutral state should be the threat of an immediate continuation of the military operation in case of non-compliance with the listed requirements. Perhaps this will require a permanent Russian military presence on its territory. From the exclusion line to the Russian border there will be a territory of potential integration into Russian civilization, which is anti-fascist in its internal nature. this would require a permanent Russian military presence on its territory. From the exclusion line to the Russian border there will be a territory of potential integration into Russian civilization, which is anti-fascist in its internal nature. this would require a permanent Russian military presence on its territory. From the exclusion line to the Russian border there will be a territory of potential integration into Russian civilization, which is anti-fascist in its internal nature.
We will fight for the right to be and remain Russia
The operation to denazify Ukraine, which began with a military phase, will follow the same logic of stages in peacetime as a military operation. At each of them, it will be necessary to achieve irreversible changes, which will become the results of the corresponding stage. In this case, the necessary initial steps of denazification can be defined as follows:
—
liquidation of armed Nazi formations (which means any armed formations of Ukraine, including the Armed Forces of Ukraine), as well as the military, informational, educational infrastructure that ensures their activity;
—
formation of bodies of people's self-government and militia (defense and law enforcement) of the liberated territories, protecting the population from the terror of underground Nazi groups;
—
installation of the Russian information space;
—
the withdrawal of educational materials and the prohibition of educational programs at all levels containing Nazi ideological guidelines;
—
mass investigative actions to establish personal responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, the spread of Nazi ideology and support for the Nazi regime;
—
lustration, publication of the names of accomplices of the Nazi regime, involving them in forced labor to restore the destroyed infrastructure as punishment for Nazi activities (from among those who will not be subject to the death penalty or imprisonment);
—
the adoption at the local level, under the supervision of Russia, of primary normative acts of denazification "from below", a ban on all types and forms of the revival of Nazi ideology;
—
the establishment of memorials, commemorative signs, monuments to the victims of Ukrainian Nazism, perpetuating the memory of the heroes of the struggle against it;
—
the inclusion of a complex of anti-fascist and denazification norms in the constitutions of the new people's republics;
—
creation of permanent denazification bodies for a period of 25 years.
Russia will have no allies in the denazification of Ukraine. Since this is a purely Russian business. And also because not just the Bandera version of Nazi Ukraine will be eradicated, but also, and above all, Western totalitarianism, the imposed programs of civilizational degradation and disintegration, the mechanisms of subjugation to the superpower of the West and the United States .
In order to put the plan of denazification of Ukraine into practice, Russia itself will have to finally part with pro-European and pro-Western illusions, realize itself as the last instance of protecting and preserving those values of historical Europe (the Old World) that deserve it and which the West ultimately abandoned, losing the fight for himself. This struggle continued throughout the 20th century and was expressed in the world war and the Russian revolution, inextricably linked with each other.
Russia did everything possible to save the West in the 20th century. She implemented the main Western project, an alternative to capitalism, which won the nation-states - a socialist, red project. It crushed German Nazism, a monstrous product of the crisis of Western civilization. The last act of Russian altruism was the outstretched hand of friendship from Russia, for which Russia received a monstrous blow in the 1990s
Everything that Russia has done for the West, it has done at its own expense, by making the greatest sacrifices. The West ultimately rejected all these sacrifices, devalued Russia's contribution to resolving the Western crisis, and decided to take revenge on Russia for the help that it selflessly provided. Further, Russia will go its own way, not worrying about the fate of the West, relying on another part of its heritage - leadership in the global process of decolonization.
As part of this process, Russia has a high potential for partnerships and allies with countries that the West has oppressed for centuries and which are not going to put on its yoke again. Without Russian sacrifice and struggle, these countries would not have been liberated. The denazification of Ukraine is at the same time its decolonization, which the population of Ukraine will have to understand as it begins to free itself from the intoxication, temptation and dependence of the so-called European choice.
Viimeksi muokattu:
tienvarsipummi
Kenraali
Kalvosinappi
Kersantti
Tämä on kyllä sakeinta tavaraa mitä olen koskaan lukenut, ja olen sentään lukenut jonkin verran venäläistä ajattelua. Siinä linjataan melko suoraan että kaikki ei-venäjämieliset ukrainalaiset on vihollisia jotka tulee likvidoida ja maa ja kansakunta nimeltä Ukraina täytyy tuhota.
Ei länsikään tällaista voi loputtomiin katsella vierestä ja huudella katsomosta kannustuksia. Tässä vedetään ihan samoilla linjoilla kuin kultaisella 30-luvulla.
ido59
Majuri
venäläistä ja kremlin maailmankuvaa Ukrainan tilanteessa ja maailmanpolitiikassa avaava haastattelu. haastattelijana portugalilainen ex-diplomaatti ja haastateltavana Sergey Karaganov, Yeltsinin ja putlerin entinen avustaja ja ulkopolitiikan vaikuttaja.
sergey kertoo mm, että venäjä ei voi hävitä tätä sotaa. jos näyttää siltä, silloin sodasta tulee venäjän näkökulmasta eksistentiaalinen. hän näkee lopputuloksena joko UA venäjämiehityksen tai jakamisen. vaihtoehtoa ei ole. muuten eskalaatio, jonka riski on muutenkin.
lähde: The New Statesman
A former adviser to the Kremlin explains how Russia views the war in Ukraine, fears over Nato and China, and the fate of liberalism.
sergey kertoo mm, että venäjä ei voi hävitä tätä sotaa. jos näyttää siltä, silloin sodasta tulee venäjän näkökulmasta eksistentiaalinen. hän näkee lopputuloksena joko UA venäjämiehityksen tai jakamisen. vaihtoehtoa ei ole. muuten eskalaatio, jonka riski on muutenkin.
lähde: The New Statesman
“Russia cannot afford to lose, so we need a kind of a victory”: Sergey Karaganov on what Putin wants
A former adviser to the Kremlin explains how Russia views the war in Ukraine, fears over Nato and China, and the fate of liberalism.
A former presidential adviser to both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, Sergey Karaganov is honorary chair of the Moscow think tank the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy. He is associated with a number of key ideas in Russian foreign policy, from the so-called Karaganov doctrine on the rights of ethnic Russians living abroad to the principle of “constructive destruction”, also known as the “Putin doctrine”. Karaganov is close to both Putin and his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, and he formulated many of the ideas that led to the war in Ukraine – though he has also expressed disagreement with the idea of a long-term occupation of the country.
Karaganov has promoted the concept of “Greater Eurasia” and has defended a closer partnership with China. He is known as a foreign-policy hawk, and has argued that the long reign of the West in world politics is now at an end. On 28 March the New Statesman columnist Bruno Maçães interviewed Karaganov about his views on the war – including controversial statements on Ukrainian nationhood and denazification that would be disputed by those outside Russia – and the future of the liberal international order.
Bruno Maçães Why did Russia invade Ukraine?
Sergey Karaganov For 25 years, people like myself have been saying that if Nato and Western alliances expand beyond certain red lines, especially into Ukraine, there will be a war. I envisioned that scenario as far back as 1997. In 2008 President Putin said that if Ukraine’s membership of the alliance became a possibility then there will be no Ukraine. He was not listened to. So the first objective is to end Nato’s expansion. Two other objectives have been added: one is the demilitarisation of Ukraine; the other is denazification, because there are people in the Russian government concerned with the rise of ultra-nationalism in Ukraine to the extent that they think it is beginning to resemble Germany in the 1930s. There is also an aim to free the Donbas republics of eight years of constant bombardment.
There was also a strong belief that war with Ukraine was inevitable – maybe three or four years from now – which could well have taken place on Russian territory itself. So probably the Kremlin decided that if you have to fight, let’s fight on somebody else’s territory, the territory of a neighbour and a brother country, once a part of the Russian Empire. But the real war is against the Western expansion.
BM On 25 February Putin called on the Ukrainian army to overthrow President Volodymyr Zelensky. More recently, however, the Kremlin seems to be suggesting that it is interested in negotiating with Zelensky. Has the Kremlin changed its mind? Does it accept that Zelensky is the president of Ukraine and will remain the president of Ukraine?
SK It is a war, and we’re in the fog of war, so opinions change, aims change. At the start, maybe some thought that the Ukrainian military would arrange some kind of a coup so we would have a real power in Kyiv with whom we could negotiate – recent presidents, and especially Zelensky, are considered puppets.
BM You personally do not consider President Zelensky a Nazi, do you?
SK Of course not.
BM What do you think would be the final goal for the Kremlin at this point? What would be considered a successful outcome for the invasion?
SK I don’t know what the outcome of this war will be, but I think it will involve the partition of Ukraine, one way or another. Hopefully there would still be something called Ukraine left at the end. But Russia cannot afford to “lose”, so we need a kind of a victory. And if there is a sense that we are losing the war, then I think there is a definite possibility of escalation. This war is a kind of proxy war between the West and the rest – Russia being, as it has been in history, the pinnacle of “the rest” – for a future world order. The stakes of the Russian elite are very high – for them it is an existential war.
BM You talked about demilitarisation of Ukraine, but it seems that such a goal would not be achieved if the West continues to provide Ukraine with weapons. Do you think Russia will be tempted to stop that flow of arms, and does this risk a direct clash between Nato and Russia?
SK Absolutely! There is a growing probability of a direct clash. And we don’t know what the outcome of this would be. Maybe the Poles would fight; they are always willing. I know as a historian that Article 5 of the Nato treaty is worthless. Under Article 5 – which allows a state to call for support from other members of the alliance – nobody is obliged to actually fight on behalf of others, but nobody can be absolutely sure that there would be no such escalation. I also know from the history of American nuclear strategy that the US is unlikely to defend Europe with nuclear weapons. But there is still a chance of escalation here, so it is an abysmal scenario and I hope that some kind of a peace agreement between us and the US, and between us and Ukraine, can be reached before we go further into this unbelievably dangerous world.
BM If Putin asks for your advice, would you tell him that Article 5 is to be taken seriously or not? I understand from your words that it is not to be taken seriously in your view.
SK It might be that Article 5 works, and countries rally to the defence of another. But against a nuclear country like Russia… I wonder? Put it this way: if the US intervenes against a nuclear country, then the American president making that decision is mad, because it wouldn’t be 1914 or 1939; this is something bigger. So I don’t think America could possibly intervene, but we are already in a much more dangerous situation than several weeks ago. And Article 5 does not presume automatic obligations.
On Ukraine’s right to exist
BM What was your reaction to President Biden’s comment that President Putin cannot stay in power?
SK Well, President Biden often makes all kind of comments. [Afterwards,] he was corrected by his colleagues, so nobody’s taking the statement seriously.
BM Putin has argued that Ukraine does not exist as a nation. I would imagine that the conclusion from the events of the past weeks is that Ukraine does exist as a nation, when you have the whole population, including civilians, willing to sacrifice their lives to preserve the sovereignty and independence of their country. Does Ukraine exist as a nation, or is Ukraine just a part of Russia?
SK I am not sure whether there is a massive civilian resistance as you suggest, rather than just young men joining the army. In any case, I don’t know whether Ukraine will survive, because it has a very limited, if any, history of statehood, and it doesn’t have a state-building elite. Maybe something will grow from below, but it’s an open question… We shall see… This war – or military operation; however you call it – will decide. Maybe the Ukrainian nation will be born: I will be happy if Ukrainians have an effective, viable government – unlike the situation during the last 30 years. They were the absolute losers after the Soviet Union, because of their lack of a state-building elite.
BM If there is a partition, would the Russia-controlled section of Ukraine preserve a nominal independence, or would it be absorbed by Russia?
SK If the operation is to turn Ukraine into a “friendly” state, then absorption is clearly not necessary. There might be some kind of absorption – which has happened, effectively – in the Donbas republics. Whether they will be independent or not – I think they might be. Certainly there are calls for referendums there, but how you could run referendums during a conflict I do not know. So my judgement would be that some of Ukraine will become a friendly state to Russia, other parts may be partitioned. Poland will gladly take back some of parts in the west, maybe Romanians and Hungarians will, too, because the Hungarian minority in Ukraine has been suppressed along with other minorities. But we are in a full-on war; it is too hard to predict. The war is an open-ended story.
BM One argument is that Russia will fall under Chinese control, and this war does not help – because by isolating Russia from the West, it turns Russia into easy prey for Chinese economic influence. Are you worried that this could be the beginning of a “Chinese century” for Russia?
SK There are two answers to your question. One is that China’s economic influence in Russia and over Russia will grow. China has most of the technologies we need, and it has a lot of capital, so there is no question about that. Whether Russia would become a kind of a satellite country, according to the Chinese tradition of their Middle Kingdom, I doubt it.
If you asked me how I would describe Russia in one word, it is “sovereignty”. We defeated those who sought to rule us, starting with the Mongols, and then Carl [Charles XII] of Sweden, then Napoleon and Hitler. Also, recently, we had years of Western domination here. It was almost overwhelming. And nevertheless, you see what has happened: Russia revolted against all that. So I am not afraid of Russia becoming a part of a great China. The other reason I’m not afraid is because Chinese civilisation is very different. We have our Asian traits in our genes, and we are in part an Asian country because of this. And Siberia is at the core of the Russian empire: without Siberia, Russia wouldn’t have become a great country. And the Tatar and Mongol yoke left many traits in our society. But culturally, we are different, so I don’t think it is possible that we will become a subsidiary country.
But I am very concerned about the overwhelming economic predominance of China over the next decade. People like me have been saying precisely [that] we have to solve the Ukraine problem, we have to solve the Nato problem, so that we can be in a strong position vis-à-vis China. Now it will be much more difficult for Russia to resist Chinese power.
On winners and losers
BM Do you think the US is benefiting from this war?
SK At this juncture, yes, because the big losers are, in addition to Ukraine, Europe, especially if it continues with this mysterious zest for independence from Russian energy. But China is clearly the victor of this whole affair… I think the biggest loser will be Ukraine; a loser will be Russia; a great loser will be Europe; the United States will lose somewhat, but still it could very well survive as a huge island over the ocean; and the big victor is China.
BM You have argued that in the future there could be some kind of alliance between Russia and Europe – or at least some European countries, if not others. Surely now you must think there is no possibility for Europe and Russia to come closer together.
SK If we could have solved the crisis peacefully there’s no question that parts of Europe would have orientated themselves not towards Russia itself but Greater Eurasia, of which Russia would be a key part. That scenario is now postponed, but Europe needs to develop a relationship with Greater Eurasia. We lived through world wars and cold wars, and then we rebuilt our relationship. I hope that we shall do that in ten years. I hope I shall see that before I pass.
BM Do you think this is a moment of supreme danger for Russia?
SK I would say yes, this is an existential war. If we do not win, somehow, then I think we will have all kinds of unforeseen political repercussions which are much worse than at the beginning of the 1990s. But I believe that we will avoid that, first, because Russia will win, whatever that victory means, and second, because we have a strong and tough regime, so in any event, or if the worst happens, it will not be the dissolution of the country or collapse. I think it will be closer to a harsh authoritarian regime than to the dissolution of the country. But still, defeat is unthinkable.
BM What would qualify as defeat?
SK I do not know. That is the question. We need victory. I don’t think that, even if we conquered all of Ukraine and all the military forces of Ukraine surrendered, it would be a victory, because then we will be left with the burden of a devastated country, one devastated by 30 years of inept elite rule, and then of course devastation from our military operation. So I think at one point we need a kind of a solution which would be called peace, and which would include de facto the creation of some kind of a viable, pro-Russian government on the territory of Ukraine, and real security for the Donbas republics.
BM If the current stalemate were to continue for years, would that be a defeat?
SK Stalemate means a huge military operation. No, I don’t think it is possible. I am afraid it would lead to escalation, because fighting endlessly on the territory of Ukraine – even now, is not viable.
BM It’s the second time you’ve mentioned that if there is no progress it would lead to an escalation. What does “escalation” mean in this context?
SK Well, escalation in this context means that in the face of an existential threat – and that means a non-victory, by the way, or an alleged defeat – Russia could escalate, and there are dozens of places in the world where it would have a direct confrontation with the United States.
BM So your suggestion is that, on the one hand, we could have an escalation towards the possible use of nuclear weapons – if there is an existential danger to Russia – and, on the other, an escalation towards conflict in other areas beyond Ukraine. Am I following you correctly?
SK I wouldn’t rule it out. We are living in absolutely a new strategic situation. Normal logic dictates what you have said.
BM How do you feel personally? Do you feel tormented by what is happening?
SK We all feel like we are part of a huge event in history, and it’s not just about war in Ukraine; it’s about the final crash of the international system that was created after the Second World War and then, in a different way, was recreated after the collapse of the Soviet Union. So, we are witnessing the collapse of an economic system – of the world economic system – globalisation in this form is finished. Whatever we have had in the past is gone. And out of this we have a build-up of many crises that, because of Covid-19, we pretended did not exist. For two years, the pandemic replaced decision-making. Covid was bad enough, but now everybody has forgotten about Covid and we can see that everything is collapsing. Personally, I’m tremendously saddened. I worked for the creation of a viable and fair system. But I am part of Russia, so I only wish that we win, whatever that means.
On the decline of European democracy
BM Do you sometimes fear this could be the rebirth of Western power and American power; that the Ukraine war could be a moment of renewal for the American empire?
SK I don’t think so. The problem is that during the last 500 years the foundation of Western power was the military preponderance of Europeans. This foundation started eroding from the 1950s and 1960s. Then the collapse of the Soviet Union made it seem for a while that Western predominance was back, but now it is done away with, because Russia will continue to be a major military power and China is becoming a first-class military power.
So the West will never recuperate, but it doesn’t matter if it dies: Western civilisation has brought all of us great benefits, but now people like myself and others are questioning the moral foundation of Western civilisation. I think geopolitically the West will experience ups and downs. Maybe the shocks we are experiencing could bring back the better qualities of Western civilisation, and we will again see people like Roosevelt, Churchill, Adenauer, de Gaulle and Brandt back in office. But continuous shocks will of course also mean that democracy in its present form in most European countries will not survive, because under circumstances of great tension, democracies always wither away or become autocratic. These changes are inevitable.
Karaganov has promoted the concept of “Greater Eurasia” and has defended a closer partnership with China. He is known as a foreign-policy hawk, and has argued that the long reign of the West in world politics is now at an end. On 28 March the New Statesman columnist Bruno Maçães interviewed Karaganov about his views on the war – including controversial statements on Ukrainian nationhood and denazification that would be disputed by those outside Russia – and the future of the liberal international order.
Bruno Maçães Why did Russia invade Ukraine?
Sergey Karaganov For 25 years, people like myself have been saying that if Nato and Western alliances expand beyond certain red lines, especially into Ukraine, there will be a war. I envisioned that scenario as far back as 1997. In 2008 President Putin said that if Ukraine’s membership of the alliance became a possibility then there will be no Ukraine. He was not listened to. So the first objective is to end Nato’s expansion. Two other objectives have been added: one is the demilitarisation of Ukraine; the other is denazification, because there are people in the Russian government concerned with the rise of ultra-nationalism in Ukraine to the extent that they think it is beginning to resemble Germany in the 1930s. There is also an aim to free the Donbas republics of eight years of constant bombardment.
There was also a strong belief that war with Ukraine was inevitable – maybe three or four years from now – which could well have taken place on Russian territory itself. So probably the Kremlin decided that if you have to fight, let’s fight on somebody else’s territory, the territory of a neighbour and a brother country, once a part of the Russian Empire. But the real war is against the Western expansion.
BM On 25 February Putin called on the Ukrainian army to overthrow President Volodymyr Zelensky. More recently, however, the Kremlin seems to be suggesting that it is interested in negotiating with Zelensky. Has the Kremlin changed its mind? Does it accept that Zelensky is the president of Ukraine and will remain the president of Ukraine?
SK It is a war, and we’re in the fog of war, so opinions change, aims change. At the start, maybe some thought that the Ukrainian military would arrange some kind of a coup so we would have a real power in Kyiv with whom we could negotiate – recent presidents, and especially Zelensky, are considered puppets.
BM You personally do not consider President Zelensky a Nazi, do you?
SK Of course not.
BM What do you think would be the final goal for the Kremlin at this point? What would be considered a successful outcome for the invasion?
SK I don’t know what the outcome of this war will be, but I think it will involve the partition of Ukraine, one way or another. Hopefully there would still be something called Ukraine left at the end. But Russia cannot afford to “lose”, so we need a kind of a victory. And if there is a sense that we are losing the war, then I think there is a definite possibility of escalation. This war is a kind of proxy war between the West and the rest – Russia being, as it has been in history, the pinnacle of “the rest” – for a future world order. The stakes of the Russian elite are very high – for them it is an existential war.
BM You talked about demilitarisation of Ukraine, but it seems that such a goal would not be achieved if the West continues to provide Ukraine with weapons. Do you think Russia will be tempted to stop that flow of arms, and does this risk a direct clash between Nato and Russia?
SK Absolutely! There is a growing probability of a direct clash. And we don’t know what the outcome of this would be. Maybe the Poles would fight; they are always willing. I know as a historian that Article 5 of the Nato treaty is worthless. Under Article 5 – which allows a state to call for support from other members of the alliance – nobody is obliged to actually fight on behalf of others, but nobody can be absolutely sure that there would be no such escalation. I also know from the history of American nuclear strategy that the US is unlikely to defend Europe with nuclear weapons. But there is still a chance of escalation here, so it is an abysmal scenario and I hope that some kind of a peace agreement between us and the US, and between us and Ukraine, can be reached before we go further into this unbelievably dangerous world.
BM If Putin asks for your advice, would you tell him that Article 5 is to be taken seriously or not? I understand from your words that it is not to be taken seriously in your view.
SK It might be that Article 5 works, and countries rally to the defence of another. But against a nuclear country like Russia… I wonder? Put it this way: if the US intervenes against a nuclear country, then the American president making that decision is mad, because it wouldn’t be 1914 or 1939; this is something bigger. So I don’t think America could possibly intervene, but we are already in a much more dangerous situation than several weeks ago. And Article 5 does not presume automatic obligations.
On Ukraine’s right to exist
BM What was your reaction to President Biden’s comment that President Putin cannot stay in power?
SK Well, President Biden often makes all kind of comments. [Afterwards,] he was corrected by his colleagues, so nobody’s taking the statement seriously.
BM Putin has argued that Ukraine does not exist as a nation. I would imagine that the conclusion from the events of the past weeks is that Ukraine does exist as a nation, when you have the whole population, including civilians, willing to sacrifice their lives to preserve the sovereignty and independence of their country. Does Ukraine exist as a nation, or is Ukraine just a part of Russia?
SK I am not sure whether there is a massive civilian resistance as you suggest, rather than just young men joining the army. In any case, I don’t know whether Ukraine will survive, because it has a very limited, if any, history of statehood, and it doesn’t have a state-building elite. Maybe something will grow from below, but it’s an open question… We shall see… This war – or military operation; however you call it – will decide. Maybe the Ukrainian nation will be born: I will be happy if Ukrainians have an effective, viable government – unlike the situation during the last 30 years. They were the absolute losers after the Soviet Union, because of their lack of a state-building elite.
BM If there is a partition, would the Russia-controlled section of Ukraine preserve a nominal independence, or would it be absorbed by Russia?
SK If the operation is to turn Ukraine into a “friendly” state, then absorption is clearly not necessary. There might be some kind of absorption – which has happened, effectively – in the Donbas republics. Whether they will be independent or not – I think they might be. Certainly there are calls for referendums there, but how you could run referendums during a conflict I do not know. So my judgement would be that some of Ukraine will become a friendly state to Russia, other parts may be partitioned. Poland will gladly take back some of parts in the west, maybe Romanians and Hungarians will, too, because the Hungarian minority in Ukraine has been suppressed along with other minorities. But we are in a full-on war; it is too hard to predict. The war is an open-ended story.
BM One argument is that Russia will fall under Chinese control, and this war does not help – because by isolating Russia from the West, it turns Russia into easy prey for Chinese economic influence. Are you worried that this could be the beginning of a “Chinese century” for Russia?
SK There are two answers to your question. One is that China’s economic influence in Russia and over Russia will grow. China has most of the technologies we need, and it has a lot of capital, so there is no question about that. Whether Russia would become a kind of a satellite country, according to the Chinese tradition of their Middle Kingdom, I doubt it.
If you asked me how I would describe Russia in one word, it is “sovereignty”. We defeated those who sought to rule us, starting with the Mongols, and then Carl [Charles XII] of Sweden, then Napoleon and Hitler. Also, recently, we had years of Western domination here. It was almost overwhelming. And nevertheless, you see what has happened: Russia revolted against all that. So I am not afraid of Russia becoming a part of a great China. The other reason I’m not afraid is because Chinese civilisation is very different. We have our Asian traits in our genes, and we are in part an Asian country because of this. And Siberia is at the core of the Russian empire: without Siberia, Russia wouldn’t have become a great country. And the Tatar and Mongol yoke left many traits in our society. But culturally, we are different, so I don’t think it is possible that we will become a subsidiary country.
But I am very concerned about the overwhelming economic predominance of China over the next decade. People like me have been saying precisely [that] we have to solve the Ukraine problem, we have to solve the Nato problem, so that we can be in a strong position vis-à-vis China. Now it will be much more difficult for Russia to resist Chinese power.
On winners and losers
BM Do you think the US is benefiting from this war?
SK At this juncture, yes, because the big losers are, in addition to Ukraine, Europe, especially if it continues with this mysterious zest for independence from Russian energy. But China is clearly the victor of this whole affair… I think the biggest loser will be Ukraine; a loser will be Russia; a great loser will be Europe; the United States will lose somewhat, but still it could very well survive as a huge island over the ocean; and the big victor is China.
BM You have argued that in the future there could be some kind of alliance between Russia and Europe – or at least some European countries, if not others. Surely now you must think there is no possibility for Europe and Russia to come closer together.
SK If we could have solved the crisis peacefully there’s no question that parts of Europe would have orientated themselves not towards Russia itself but Greater Eurasia, of which Russia would be a key part. That scenario is now postponed, but Europe needs to develop a relationship with Greater Eurasia. We lived through world wars and cold wars, and then we rebuilt our relationship. I hope that we shall do that in ten years. I hope I shall see that before I pass.
BM Do you think this is a moment of supreme danger for Russia?
SK I would say yes, this is an existential war. If we do not win, somehow, then I think we will have all kinds of unforeseen political repercussions which are much worse than at the beginning of the 1990s. But I believe that we will avoid that, first, because Russia will win, whatever that victory means, and second, because we have a strong and tough regime, so in any event, or if the worst happens, it will not be the dissolution of the country or collapse. I think it will be closer to a harsh authoritarian regime than to the dissolution of the country. But still, defeat is unthinkable.
BM What would qualify as defeat?
SK I do not know. That is the question. We need victory. I don’t think that, even if we conquered all of Ukraine and all the military forces of Ukraine surrendered, it would be a victory, because then we will be left with the burden of a devastated country, one devastated by 30 years of inept elite rule, and then of course devastation from our military operation. So I think at one point we need a kind of a solution which would be called peace, and which would include de facto the creation of some kind of a viable, pro-Russian government on the territory of Ukraine, and real security for the Donbas republics.
BM If the current stalemate were to continue for years, would that be a defeat?
SK Stalemate means a huge military operation. No, I don’t think it is possible. I am afraid it would lead to escalation, because fighting endlessly on the territory of Ukraine – even now, is not viable.
BM It’s the second time you’ve mentioned that if there is no progress it would lead to an escalation. What does “escalation” mean in this context?
SK Well, escalation in this context means that in the face of an existential threat – and that means a non-victory, by the way, or an alleged defeat – Russia could escalate, and there are dozens of places in the world where it would have a direct confrontation with the United States.
BM So your suggestion is that, on the one hand, we could have an escalation towards the possible use of nuclear weapons – if there is an existential danger to Russia – and, on the other, an escalation towards conflict in other areas beyond Ukraine. Am I following you correctly?
SK I wouldn’t rule it out. We are living in absolutely a new strategic situation. Normal logic dictates what you have said.
BM How do you feel personally? Do you feel tormented by what is happening?
SK We all feel like we are part of a huge event in history, and it’s not just about war in Ukraine; it’s about the final crash of the international system that was created after the Second World War and then, in a different way, was recreated after the collapse of the Soviet Union. So, we are witnessing the collapse of an economic system – of the world economic system – globalisation in this form is finished. Whatever we have had in the past is gone. And out of this we have a build-up of many crises that, because of Covid-19, we pretended did not exist. For two years, the pandemic replaced decision-making. Covid was bad enough, but now everybody has forgotten about Covid and we can see that everything is collapsing. Personally, I’m tremendously saddened. I worked for the creation of a viable and fair system. But I am part of Russia, so I only wish that we win, whatever that means.
On the decline of European democracy
BM Do you sometimes fear this could be the rebirth of Western power and American power; that the Ukraine war could be a moment of renewal for the American empire?
SK I don’t think so. The problem is that during the last 500 years the foundation of Western power was the military preponderance of Europeans. This foundation started eroding from the 1950s and 1960s. Then the collapse of the Soviet Union made it seem for a while that Western predominance was back, but now it is done away with, because Russia will continue to be a major military power and China is becoming a first-class military power.
So the West will never recuperate, but it doesn’t matter if it dies: Western civilisation has brought all of us great benefits, but now people like myself and others are questioning the moral foundation of Western civilisation. I think geopolitically the West will experience ups and downs. Maybe the shocks we are experiencing could bring back the better qualities of Western civilisation, and we will again see people like Roosevelt, Churchill, Adenauer, de Gaulle and Brandt back in office. But continuous shocks will of course also mean that democracy in its present form in most European countries will not survive, because under circumstances of great tension, democracies always wither away or become autocratic. These changes are inevitable.
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Olympiakasarmi
Kenraali
Uskaltaako Putin lähteä bunkkeristaan Moskovaan?
Google kertoo hiukan poikkeavaa tarinaa tästä aihealueesta:Venäjällä ei ole mitään moottori- tai vaihteistoöljyjen valmistusta. Kaikki ollut tuontitavaraa (Mobil, Castrol, Shell...).
Lähin tehdas on Romaniassa, mikä tietenkin on Nato-maa, joten kun ryssän varastot loppuu niin se on voi, voi...
http://www.lube-media.com/wp-content/uploads/Lube-WEB-ONLY-Articles-Dec19.pdf
Öljyjen lisäaineiden kanssa saattaa olla hankaluuksia, mutta tuskin voiteluöljytuotteet loppuvat kokonaan.
TeVu
Kapteeni
Sinänsä looginen suunnitelma, mutta kuinka paljon kärsimystä kerkeää Venäjän örkit tehdä ennen sitä pistettä.
Tuo Örkki on muuten hyvin kuvaava haukkumanimi venäläisille, nähnyt jo monessa twiitissä sen.
Ei nuo ole enää ihmisten tekoja, kun noita kidutus ja hävitysjuttuja näkee.
Alan olla myös nopean eskalaation kannalla, ei enää mitään armoa tuolle paskasakille.
Edelleen, tässä tarvitaan joku keino ilman rajatonta eskalaatiota. Sotarikokset eivät ole syy siihen, että mitään kompromisseja ei tule tehdä.
Taidan olla tällä foorumilla nyt maltillista siipeä. Ennen nykyistä sotaa olin varmaan jyrkemmästä päästä.
Buchan sotarikokset eivät erityisemmin yllätä eikä ne ole tosiaan mitään uutta. Samoja asioita löytyy 2. maailmansodasta nimellä Katyn ja lisäksi monilla muilla hakusanoilla. Tällaista se sota vain on. Uutta on hienot kamerat, joilla kuvat ja videot saadaan jaettua.
Kaikesta huolimatta toisen maailmansodan neuvostoliitto oli todennäköisesti julmempi kuin mitä Venäjä on nyt. Tietyssä voimapolitiikan pisteessä vain eteneminen loppuu ja muodostuu raja. Aikanaan se meni keskeltä Saksaa ja erikseen keskeltä Berliiniä.
Aika näyttää mihin raja muodostuu nyt.
Tasapainopisteen löytyminen ei tarkoita silti asioiden hyväksymistä tai painamista villaisella tai suhteiden palautumista. Mutta se tarkoittaa akuutin tappamisen loppumista ja rajan muodostumista jonnekin. Ja kyllä Venäjä noudattaa sopimuksia samoin kuin Neuvostoliittokin. Esimerkkinä vaikka Korean sota ja sen jälkeinen rauha. Siinä tosin hinta laskettiin miljoonissa.
Ne täällä, jotka kuvittelevat rajoittamattoman voimankäytön olevan ratkaisu tähän vihaan ovat valitettavasti väärässä. Siitä on seurauksena syvä viha molemmin puolin, josta ei olla vielä nähty alkuakaan.
Mitä pienemmällä hinnalla saadaan aikaan uusi pitävä pelon linja, sitä parempi.
Nyt kaatuneiden hinta lasketaan kymmenissä tuhansissa. Jos käy hyvin niin selvitään viisinumeroisilla luvuilla, mutta epäilen.
Jos selvitään edes sadoilla tuhansilla kaatuneilla niin tämä sota pysyy historiaan verrattuna hyvin rajattuna.
Valitettavasti tällä tavalla alkaneiden sotien hinta lasketaan usein kuitenkin miljoonissa
(Korea, Vietnam).
Sen lisäksi että ollaan valmiita rauhaan pitää tehdä kaksi asiaa.
1.) Meidän pitää lopettaa Venäjän sotakoneen rahoittaminen. On tehtävä oma vihreä siirtymä täydellä teholla ja autettava myös muita maita samassa. Siirtymäaikana taas on poltettava mielummin vaikka hiiltä ja turvetta neutraaleista maista hankittuna.
2.) Meidän pitää huolehtia siitä, että länsi ei pääse jäämään sotilaallisessa suorituskyvyssä alakynteen.
Ja sitten pitää toivoa ettei sitä täysimääräistä sotilaallista suorituskykyä tule ulosmitata koskaan.
Taidan olla tällä foorumilla nyt maltillista siipeä. Ennen nykyistä sotaa olin varmaan jyrkemmästä päästä.
Buchan sotarikokset eivät erityisemmin yllätä eikä ne ole tosiaan mitään uutta. Samoja asioita löytyy 2. maailmansodasta nimellä Katyn ja lisäksi monilla muilla hakusanoilla. Tällaista se sota vain on. Uutta on hienot kamerat, joilla kuvat ja videot saadaan jaettua.
Kaikesta huolimatta toisen maailmansodan neuvostoliitto oli todennäköisesti julmempi kuin mitä Venäjä on nyt. Tietyssä voimapolitiikan pisteessä vain eteneminen loppuu ja muodostuu raja. Aikanaan se meni keskeltä Saksaa ja erikseen keskeltä Berliiniä.
Aika näyttää mihin raja muodostuu nyt.
Tasapainopisteen löytyminen ei tarkoita silti asioiden hyväksymistä tai painamista villaisella tai suhteiden palautumista. Mutta se tarkoittaa akuutin tappamisen loppumista ja rajan muodostumista jonnekin. Ja kyllä Venäjä noudattaa sopimuksia samoin kuin Neuvostoliittokin. Esimerkkinä vaikka Korean sota ja sen jälkeinen rauha. Siinä tosin hinta laskettiin miljoonissa.
Ne täällä, jotka kuvittelevat rajoittamattoman voimankäytön olevan ratkaisu tähän vihaan ovat valitettavasti väärässä. Siitä on seurauksena syvä viha molemmin puolin, josta ei olla vielä nähty alkuakaan.
Mitä pienemmällä hinnalla saadaan aikaan uusi pitävä pelon linja, sitä parempi.
Nyt kaatuneiden hinta lasketaan kymmenissä tuhansissa. Jos käy hyvin niin selvitään viisinumeroisilla luvuilla, mutta epäilen.
Jos selvitään edes sadoilla tuhansilla kaatuneilla niin tämä sota pysyy historiaan verrattuna hyvin rajattuna.
Valitettavasti tällä tavalla alkaneiden sotien hinta lasketaan usein kuitenkin miljoonissa
(Korea, Vietnam).Sen lisäksi että ollaan valmiita rauhaan pitää tehdä kaksi asiaa.
1.) Meidän pitää lopettaa Venäjän sotakoneen rahoittaminen. On tehtävä oma vihreä siirtymä täydellä teholla ja autettava myös muita maita samassa. Siirtymäaikana taas on poltettava mielummin vaikka hiiltä ja turvetta neutraaleista maista hankittuna.
2.) Meidän pitää huolehtia siitä, että länsi ei pääse jäämään sotilaallisessa suorituskyvyssä alakynteen.
Ja sitten pitää toivoa ettei sitä täysimääräistä sotilaallista suorituskykyä tule ulosmitata koskaan.
Samaa mieltä mutta kakkoskohta on jo tosi ja paranee koko ajanEdelleen, tässä tarvitaan joku keino ilman rajatonta eskalaatiota. Sotarikokset eivät ole syy siihen, että mitään kompromisseja ei tule tehdä.
Taidan olla tällä foorumilla nyt maltillista siipeä. Ennen nykyistä sotaa olin varmaan jyrkemmästä päästä.
Buchan sotarikokset eivät erityisemmin yllätä eikä ne ole tosiaan mitään uutta. Samoja asioita löytyy 2. maailmansodasta nimellä Katyn ja lisäksi monilla muilla hakusanoilla. Tällaista se sota vain on. Uutta on hienot kamerat, joilla kuvat ja videot saadaan jaettua.
Kaikesta huolimatta toisen maailmansodan neuvostoliitto oli todennäköisesti julmempi kuin mitä Venäjä on nyt. Tietyssä voimapolitiikan pisteessä vain eteneminen loppuu ja muodostuu raja. Aikanaan se meni keskeltä Saksaa ja erikseen keskeltä Berliiniä.
Aika näyttää mihin raja muodostuu nyt.
Tasapainopisteen löytyminen ei tarkoita silti asioiden hyväksymistä tai painamista villaisella tai suhteiden palautumista. Mutta se tarkoittaa akuutin tappamisen loppumista ja rajan muodostumista jonnekin. Ja kyllä Venäjä noudattaa sopimuksia samoin kuin Neuvostoliittokin. Esimerkkinä vaikka Korean sota ja sen jälkeinen rauha. Siinä tosin hinta laskettiin miljoonissa.
Ne täällä, jotka kuvittelevat rajoittamattoman voimankäytön olevan ratkaisu tähän vihaan ovat valitettavasti väärässä. Siitä on seurauksena syvä viha molemmin puolin, josta ei olla vielä nähty alkuakaan.
Mitä pienemmällä hinnalla saadaan aikaan uusi pitävä pelon linja, sitä parempi.
Nyt kaatuneiden hinta lasketaan kymmenissä tuhansissa. Jos käy hyvin niin selvitään viisinumeroisilla luvuilla, mutta epäilen.
Jos selvitään edes sadoilla tuhansilla kaatuneilla niin tämä sota pysyy historiaan verrattuna hyvin rajattuna.
Valitettavasti tällä tavalla alkaneiden sotien hinta lasketaan usein kuitenkin miljoonissa
Sen lisäksi että ollaan valmiita rauhaan pitää tehdä kaksi asiaa.
1.) Meidän pitää lopettaa Venäjän sotakoneen rahoittaminen. On tehtävä oma vihreä siirtymä täydellä teholla ja autettava myös muita maita samassa. Siirtymäaikana taas on poltettava mielummin vaikka hiiltä ja turvetta neutraaleista maista hankittuna.
2.) Meidän pitää huolehtia siitä, että länsi ei pääse jäämään sotilaallisessa suorituskyvyssä alakynteen.
Ja sitten pitää toivoa ettei sitä täysimääräistä sotilaallista suorituskykyä tule ulosmitata koskaan.
Valitettavasti Venäjän sodanjohto myös tavoittelee tätä. Systemaattinen kansanmurha ja kuvottavat rikokset ovat järjestelmällisiä ja upseeriston sekä propagandan pohjustamia. Näin Putin pääsee tilanteeseen josta ei ole perääntymistä, soraäänet Venäjälläkin ymmärtävät kohtalonsa ja Venäjän on mentävä päätyyn asti.
Ylimatruusi
Kapteeni
Sori, taas kyselen Switchblade perään. Onko tietoja käytöstä? Entäs nuo tämän päivän meritorjuntaohjuksista ja käytetäänkö noita veneitä Nikolopol lähettyvillä? Siis missä käyttäisitte nykyisellä linjoilla ?
Mun mummo oli lähtösin Viipurista, siltä kaikkein kuvatummalta kadulta... Koskaan sotien jälkeen hän ei siellä halunnut käydä, vaikka se mahdolliseksikin tuli aikoinaan... Vesiportinkatu oli ihan kiva paikka varmaan.
sotajätkä
Majuri
Eikös nyt olisi hyvä hetki yrittää ajaa Venäjää alas kun niin paljon heikkoutta nähty ja rintama harvinaisen yhtenäinen?Edelleen, tässä tarvitaan joku keino ilman rajatonta eskalaatiota. Sotarikokset eivät ole syy siihen, että mitään kompromisseja ei tule tehdä.
Taidan olla tällä foorumilla nyt maltillista siipeä. Ennen nykyistä sotaa olin varmaan jyrkemmästä päästä.
Buchan sotarikokset eivät erityisemmin yllätä eikä ne ole tosiaan mitään uutta. Samoja asioita löytyy 2. maailmansodasta nimellä Katyn ja lisäksi monilla muilla hakusanoilla. Tällaista se sota vain on. Uutta on hienot kamerat, joilla kuvat ja videot saadaan jaettua.
Kaikesta huolimatta toisen maailmansodan neuvostoliitto oli todennäköisesti julmempi kuin mitä Venäjä on nyt. Tietyssä voimapolitiikan pisteessä vain eteneminen loppuu ja muodostuu raja. Aikanaan se meni keskeltä Saksaa ja erikseen keskeltä Berliiniä.
Aika näyttää mihin raja muodostuu nyt.
Tasapainopisteen löytyminen ei tarkoita silti asioiden hyväksymistä tai painamista villaisella tai suhteiden palautumista. Mutta se tarkoittaa akuutin tappamisen loppumista ja rajan muodostumista jonnekin. Ja kyllä Venäjä noudattaa sopimuksia samoin kuin Neuvostoliittokin. Esimerkkinä vaikka Korean sota ja sen jälkeinen rauha. Siinä tosin hinta laskettiin miljoonissa.
Ne täällä, jotka kuvittelevat rajoittamattoman voimankäytön olevan ratkaisu tähän vihaan ovat valitettavasti väärässä. Siitä on seurauksena syvä viha molemmin puolin, josta ei olla vielä nähty alkuakaan.
Mitä pienemmällä hinnalla saadaan aikaan uusi pitävä pelon linja, sitä parempi.
Nyt kaatuneiden hinta lasketaan kymmenissä tuhansissa. Jos käy hyvin niin selvitään viisinumeroisilla luvuilla, mutta epäilen.
Jos selvitään edes sadoilla tuhansilla kaatuneilla niin tämä sota pysyy historiaan verrattuna hyvin rajattuna.
Valitettavasti tällä tavalla alkaneiden sotien hinta lasketaan usein kuitenkin miljoonissa
Sen lisäksi että ollaan valmiita rauhaan pitää tehdä kaksi asiaa.
1.) Meidän pitää lopettaa Venäjän sotakoneen rahoittaminen. On tehtävä oma vihreä siirtymä täydellä teholla ja autettava myös muita maita samassa. Siirtymäaikana taas on poltettava mielummin vaikka hiiltä ja turvetta neutraaleista maista hankittuna.
2.) Meidän pitää huolehtia siitä, että länsi ei pääse jäämään sotilaallisessa suorituskyvyssä alakynteen.
Ja sitten pitää toivoa ettei sitä täysimääräistä sotilaallista suorituskykyä tule ulosmitata koskaan.