1. Putin doesn’t need to continue major offensives to declare a victory he can sell to domestic audience
Putin can claim that he has
- demilitarized UKR (by destroying a lot of equipment and military-industrial infrastructure)
- “denazified” it (destroyed Azov battalion in Mariupol)
- protected “our people” in Donbas and Crimea by enlarging territory and creating a land corridor
Witt full control of Russian domestic propagandist media, selling such a win to domestic audience would be a piece of cake for Putin
The truth never needs to stand in the way of a good story the pliable Russian public would be happy to consume
Putin declaring victory does not mean Russian forces would leave or would even stop fighting. Recall that he has declared victory in Syria on multiple occasions and yet operations continue there to this day
But Putin could end major offensive operations (which he can’t sustain past the fight for the Donbas anyway) and switch to defensive tactics to protect most of his gains against Ukrainian counterattacks
Defending Kherson could be tough but if the Russians abandon it, cross the Dnieper and blow the bridges, they could make it really tough for Ukrainians to retake the rest of the Donetsk to Crimea land corridor
Putin could continue to terrorize Ukrainian cities with occasional strikes and enforce the Black Sea blockade, which is strangling the Ukrainian economy, with subs (Ukraine has no ASW), coastal batteries in Crimea and surface ships (but far off the coast to avoid more Moskvas)
2. Declaring full mobilization is very fraught politically for Putin. As
@KofmanMichael pointed out on our last podcast, declaring mobilization also means enlarging current limited war aims and risking suffering a devastating loss he wouldn’t be able to explain away
Declaring mobilization just to help retake Donbas makes no sense from risk vs benefit trade off and is a de facto admission of defeat after feeding the domestic audience a steady stream of Russian supposed victories there and operation going “according to plan”
So if Putin declares mobilization, it would be to have another go at Kyiv and/or Odesa and establishing a pro-Russian puppet regime there. But he would be foolish to think that Shoigu and Gerasimov could succeed where they had already failed once
More untrained manpower doesn’t solve bad tactics, logistics and training - in fact, it makes it all much worse - all the things that had doomed Russia’s first assault on Kyiv
And mobilization would take many months. So his current offensive, if it fails, would stall regardless
More importantly, Putin has now seen how difficult it is to control occupied areas even without significant organized resistance (Kherson) and how challenging it is to take cities that resist (Mariupol) and the destruction it would cause (which he would be stuck rebuilding)
He has surely lost faith by now in what FSB has been telling him about Russian agents in Ukraine that could quickly run the occupied country, so even if he were somehow to take Kyiv, establishing a puppet government that would actually run the country would be near impossible now
Finally, the political risks of mobilization are substantial. Putin knows it and that’s why he has repeatedly declared (falsely) that conscripts don’t fight in Ukraine. His popularity is high now and he would be risking it, especially if he fails
Russian public currently supports the fake version of the war they are seeing on their TV screens. Most families don’t know anyone who is fighting and dying (many soldiers are from poor villages and ethnic minorities). A huge mobilization would change all that and is very risky
Putin has certainly gambled big on this war but so far he has not gambled his hold on power, which remains quite secure. Calling for a full mobilization could put that at risk for little benefit
Lastly, he could hope to force concessions from Zelensky even without major new offensives
If Putin keeps Ukraine from taking back most of occupied territory, continues to terrorize population with air raids (although depleting missile stockpiles will be an issue) and strangles Ukraine’s export-driven economy with a blockade, he might believe he could get concessions
I am not saying he would necessarily succeed at all if these objectives - war is highly contingent as
@KofmanMichael likes to say - but it would certainly not be crazy for Putin to think that he would
Putin could be right or wrong on Zelensky making any concessions and pushing the West to drop Russian sanctions as part of the deal, but the odds are much better for him with this course of action than mobilization and another huge offensive
This is why I don’t think it’s likely that Putin declares full mobilization
But he could easily call for more patriotic volunteers, increase contract signup payments, etc. That I don’t rule out at all. Though, it won’t make a substantial difference for the Russian military
If I am proven wrong on this call, it will be most likely because Putin has been completely isolated from reality and has no idea what is truly happening in this war since no one is telling him the truth. The degree to which this is the case is impossible to currently know.
️Assault on Azovstal by occupiers: Ukrainian soldiers, with whom they lost contact earlier, restored it, media report
but… 
