Follow along with the video below to see how to install our site as a web app on your home screen.
Note: This feature may not be available in some browsers.
The BMP-1AM Basurmanin as unveiled at the Army international military-technical forum in August 2018 that was held in Kubinka near Moscow. Citing information published by the Russian press agency TASS, the first batch of Basurmanin BMP-1AM tracked armored IFV (Infantry Fighting Vehicles) were supplied to the Russian army in February 2022.
The BMP-1AM is a modernized version of the BMP-1, a Soviet-made tracked armored IFV that was unveiled in November 1967 during a military parade in Moscow. Production of the BMP-1 IFV was completed in Russia some years ago, but quantities of these continue to be exported from various countries.
The BMP-1AM is based on the BMP-1 tracked chassis but the old turret is removed and replaced by a new remotely operated weapon station armed with one 2A72 30 mm automatic cannon, a Kalashnikov PKTM 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun. The turret can be also armed with one ready-to-use Metis-family ATGM (Anti-Tank Guided Missile), probably, the 9M115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn) or 9M131 Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn-2) missile.
The weapon station of the BMP-1AM integrates a fire-control system including a TKN-4GA-01 day-night sight It also features a dual-axis stabilizer of the main weapon.
The BMP-1AM is powered by a UTD-20S1 diesel engine with a maximum power output of 300 hp. It can run at a maximum road speed of 65 km/h with a maximum cruising range of 600 km.
Recent conflicts have demonstrated how drones can be used with devastating effects to find and then destroy key assets. Ground-based air defence (GBAD) systems have proven to be particularly vulnerable due to their high-power transmission, as loitering munition or tactical UAVs are able to detect and immediately attack any source of power transmission.
To enable end-users to secure their territory against these attacks from hostile missiles and aircraft, whether manned or unmanned, Hensoldt has combined its TRML-4D air defence system (active radar) with its world-leading Twinvis passive radar to form the unique TwinSens solution.
By exchanging sensor data between these two systems, TwinSens provides an air picture initially created without RF transmissions and consequently, without the risk of GBAD systems being detected by enemy forces. It improves situational awareness even for targets with an extremely small RCS and also increases resistance to modern jammers thus enhancing the performance of the overall solution compared to standalone sensors.
According to information provided by the Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby during an interview on May 9, 2022, Ukraine is specifically asked for self-propelled howitzers like the M109 because they don't provide them with more mobility on the battlefield and a level of ballistic protection that you won't get on an M777 155mm towed howitzer. The Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy have all agreed to either send over the M-109s themselves or the German PzH 2000 SP howitzer to Ukraine.
Kannattaako ukrainalaisten väkisin lähteä pungertamaan Siverski Donetskin yli? Siivoaa Harkovan pohjoispuolelta rajan siistiksi länsirantaan asti. Sitten kyrväyttää rautatiesillan Vovchanskin lähellä, ja pitää sen kyrväytetyssä tilassa. Sitten eteläpuolelta kiilaa Kupianskia kohti. Silloin eteläpuolella Iziumin ympärillä olevat vinkkelitossut alkaa motittua Oskil-joen länsipuolelle.Hyvin näyttää Ukraina puhdistavan Severski Donetsin länsirannan, Militarylandin mukaan muutama kilsa ja pohjoisessa ollaan rajalla.
Katso liite: 61444
..siellä olisi tuo Kupianskin risteyskohtaan menevä junarata kuin tarjottimella ja kun tiedetään, että venäläisellä sotaväellä on paha rautatieaddiktio, niin epäilen tuon olevan järkevä kohde.
Luoteessa Kozacha Lopanissa venäläiset ryhmittyvät puolustukseen lännen suuntaan, minkä logiikkaa en ymmärrä; ukrainalaisilla ei ole kuin muutaman kilometrin matka heidän selustaansa ja tykistö yltää sinne jo mennen tullen. Seurataapa uutista, miten näiden kanssa käy!
Saapa muuten nähdä, kuinka tiukka vastus on sitten Siverski Donetsin itärannalla, joka tulee pataan ottaneelle venäläiselle avuksi. Siverski on pääosin 30-70 ja jopa 100-200 metriä leveä, joten ihan pikku ponttoonisillalla siitä ei yli mennä. Tai ainakin melko verinen ja veemäinen homma tiedossa, jos puolustaja osaa asiansa.
MUOKS. Jos olisin venäläinen rintamakomentaja, niin vetäisin koko sakin tuolta Harkovan pohjoispuolelta tuonne Siverski Donetsin taakse. Saisi osan jengiä lepoon ja reserviin tai jopa etelään Iziumiin suuntaan, missä Venäjän pihtiliike on totaalijumissa..
Alkaa selkäpuolelle vilkuili listalle päässeille/joutuneille.US offers $15m for help catching Conti ransomware gang
The State Department notice comes in wake of the cybercrims’ attack on Costa Rican governmentwww.theregister.com
kymmenen miljoonaa GRU upseereista, viisitoista valtiollisesta toimijasta
Paljonko se osaman potti oli lopussa?Alkaa selkäpuolelle vilkuili listalle päässeille/joutuneille.
As the war in Ukraine drags into its third month, the United States is trying to figure out the best way — and pace — to train troops there on how to use the Western arms flooding into the besieged nation.
Hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers have either completed or are undergoing training on how to operate artillery, air defense radar systems, loitering drones armed with explosives and armored personnel carriers, Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby said during a Friday briefing.
But on Monday, Kirby noted the importance of not “overload[ing] their system” in the midst of an active fight by delivering more new weapons than their troops can handle.
“It’s a balance,” Kirby said during a briefing. “You want to make sure that they can use the materiel, that they can keep it up and maintain it. But you don’t want to put such an onerous requirement on them that it distracts them too much from the fight at hand.”
To strike that balance, Kirby said the Pentagon is in touch with Oleksii Reznikov, Ukraine’s defense minister, to keep tabs on the nation’s needs and capacities.
Hakee suurmies-vaikutelmaa.Putinin sylissä viltti Voitonpäivän parastissa:
Katso liite: 61443
Jos olette tarkkaan katsoneet viime aikoina, niin Putinin jalat ovat muuttuneet tikuiksi. Tuon viltin tarkoitus ei ollut lämmittää, vaan peittää.
Lockheed Martin aims to nearly double production for Javelin anti-tank missiles from 2,100 to 4,000 per year, but it needs the supply chain to “crank up,” according to its chief executive.
As the U.S. sends Javelins from its own military stockpiles to Ukraine’s fight against Russia, Lockheed is boosting Javelin production ― but getting to its goal could take as long as a couple of years, Jim Taiclet said Sunday on CBS’s “Face the Nation.”
“We’re endeavoring to take that up to 4,000 per year, and that will take a number of months, maybe even a couple of years to get there because we have to get our supply chain to also crank up,” Taiclet said. “We think we can almost double the capacity in a reasonable amount of time.”
Koneisto köhii hieman mutta on vauhdissa ja lisää on tulossa.“We’re planning for the long run, and not just in the Javelin, because ... the Ukrainian conflict has highlighted ... that we need to have superior systems in large enough numbers,” Taiclet said
The DPA allows the president to order private companies to prioritize orders from the federal government if it is in the interest of national defense. To make this happen, the president is able to offer certain financial incentives or issue anti-trust waivers that allow different companies to work together.
As to the quantity of Javelins that have already been supplied to Ukraine, this now numbers around 5,000 missiles, or approximately one-third of the U.S. stockpiles. The number of Stingers is rather less, at around 1,400, which is equivalent to around a quarter of U.S. stockpiles.
Some details of current Javelin production numbers are provided in the latest budget request, which notes that the U.S. Army had previously only been looking to buy 582 Javelins in Fiscal Year 2023, and that the Minimum Sustainment Rate (MSR) for the production line was 850 per year.
The same FY23 budget documents state that the maximum production rate as it stands now is 6,480 per year, although reaching that point would take some time. The Economical Production Rate, defined as the most efficient production rate for each budget year at which the item can be produced with existing or planned plant capacity and tooling, and using normal eight-hour shifts, is 3,960 per year.
Although the Pentagon has said it’s “actively negotiating” a new Stinger contract, manufacturer Raytheon has admitted that shortages of parts and materials could mean that it’s not able to actually produce these new missiles until 2023 or later. The DoD hasn't bought new Stingers in many years and is now looking to replace it with a new missile, but that doesn't help in the near term with diminishing stockpiles.
25 milj.$ + 2 milj.$ lentäjien ammattiliitolta.Paljonko se osaman potti oli lopussa?
The Russian invasion of Ukraine (called by the Russian the ‘Special Military Operation’) represents the first large scale, high-intensity warfare since the ‘First Gulf War’ of 1991, when a large nation-state army confronted a coalition of armies on a large scale, on land, at sea, and in the air.
Most of the conflicts fought since 1991, excluding ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ of 2003 and the three-week war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Nagorno Karabakh region, were low-intensity conflicts (LIC).
These mainly were defined as low-intensity conflicts or ‘hybrid wars.’ The war between Russia and Ukraine tested many new concepts developed in the East and West since the late 20th century. Some of the most modern unmanned systems technologies currently under development are among these.
We assess this land aspect of this war in several clearly defined phases and focus areas
How could the Ukrainian reserve forces defeat the Russian attack on the crack VDV? According to some sources, the CIA provided indications of the Russian plans, which may have helped the Ukrainian’s swift response. Real-time intelligence was also instrumental later in the war; the Ukraine intelligence helped locate and target senior Russian officers and kill high-ranking leaders with sniper, artillery, or drone attacks.
Ukrainian forces also hunted down Russian special forces that infiltrated in disguise into the capital and other cities to help in the quick takeover move Moscow prepared. As the Ukrainian forces adopted a defense-in-depth strategy, they gradually gave-up terrain to the advancing Russians, causing extensive attrition to the invading force. Such operations relied on mobility constraints caused by the terrain. They assisted with battlefield shaping actions, including mining, demolition of bridges and roads, and obstacles laid out on the roads to channel the invading forces into kill zones. Since the Russians restricted their movements to the roads, combat engineering elements were often absent from the lead elements and could not be used to overcome the obstacles. Before they reached their objectives, these actions managed to slow down the Russians to a complete halt.
As Ukraine relied on the same equipment as the Russian forces, they were overmatched by the Russian numerical superiority in artillery. After two months of activity and the systematic destruction of Ukraine’s ammunition manufacturing plants, Ukraine is running low on Eastern standard ammunition (152mm, 122mm, rockets). That is why obtaining long-range artillery from the West was the #1 priority for Ukraine. Among the artillery pieces recently supplied or promised to Ukraine were M198 and M777 towed howitzers from the USA and Australia, Archer self-propelled howitzers from Sweden, and Ceasar SP howitzers from France. Once Ukraine deploys western 155mm artillery on their front line, obtaining supplies of suitable ammunition from neighboring NATO countries would be easier and more available.
Ukraine received significant ammunition loads, including Excalibur GPS-guided rounds that can strike targets within less than 10 meters of a target from a distance of 40 km; however, this is less accurate than the Ukraine-made laser-guided rounds Ukraine is using now. Unlike the laser homing munitions, Excalibur does not require laser designation in the firing loop. Another advantage of the Archer and Ceasar is their autonomy and quick reaction. Unlike towed artillery, truck-mobile guns can enter a position and start firing within a few minutes and scoot to a hideout before the enemy locates and direct counter-battery fire against these guns.
Ukraine’s other new weapons are M270 MLRS and M142 HIMARS multiple-rocket launcher systems. When equipped with GMLRS 227mm rockets, these weapon systems can strike targets up to 70 km. Both can also employ the ATACMS tactical missile that can carry a warhead of 230 kg to a range of 300 km.