hyvis
Eversti
No kyllä se varmaan pistää harmittamaan, jos tuo on totta, ettei epäsuoraa ole pyynnöstä huolimatta tullut ja omien ilmailukin on jäänyt vastuulohkolla vähiin.
Ukrainan konflikti/sota
FSB kidnappailee omia sotilaitaan jotka kapinoivat (?)Veit sanat suustani. Vaikka hyvää työtä tekeekin karttansa kanssa, olen tullut siihen tulokseen, että henkilönä kyseessä on opportunistinen poliittinen pyrkyri ja tulemme varmasti näkemään hänet eduskuntavaaleissa ehdokkaana.
Antares
Respected Leader
Taas koneita matalalla, tämän mukaan olisivat ukrainalaisia. Jos jotain niin tämä sota korostanut tarvetta kyetä lentämään matalalla / hyvin matalalla:
Presumably on their return form a sortee. Weapon mounts in purple circle appear empty, and thus already fired. Green circle appears to be fuel tank. Happy to be corrected by an expert though!
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Savua nousee Trudovskyn suunnalla / Трудовских
In the direction of the Trudovsky
Трудовских kartalla, tosin näitä voi olla useita kuten aina Ukrainan tapauksessa. Google Maps antaa tämän ensimmäisenä hakutuloksena:
Presumably on their return form a sortee. Weapon mounts in purple circle appear empty, and thus already fired. Green circle appears to be fuel tank. Happy to be corrected by an expert though!
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Savua nousee Trudovskyn suunnalla / Трудовских
In the direction of the Trudovsky
Трудовских kartalla, tosin näitä voi olla useita kuten aina Ukrainan tapauksessa. Google Maps antaa tämän ensimmäisenä hakutuloksena:
Siinähän se on mukava odotella lossijonossa Tuonelan lautturia
Minusta toi on hyvä merkki. Ukrainalla menee paremmin ja Venäjällä heikommin. Venäjä pelkää että Ukraina tosiaan valtaa loput alueensa takaisin ennenkuin neuvotellaan. Siksi nyt olisi tarvetta neuvotella. Sodat loppuu sotimalla mutta loppupeleissä sopimus rauhasta pitää tehdä jossain vaiheessa. Paitsi Koreassa
Kyllä tämä, samaten kuin se aiemminkin postattu kauempaa kuvatu video, näyttävät siltä kuin nuo räjähdykset tapahtuisivat ylhäällä sillankannen päällä, eikä sillä vierellä kulkevalla (puolivalmiilla) ponttoonisillalla.
Ilmeisesti sitä pommitetaan aina sitä mukaa kun ryssä sitä yrittää korjata.
Nestehukka
Kapteeni
Kyseisellä lautturilla on kuulemma kiirettä pitänyt mutta eiköhän tuo ehti kuhan kotvan oottelevat.Siinähän se on mukava odotella lossijonossa Tuonelan lautturia
Ovat alkaneet tajuta, että orkesteri soittaa lisäätyvällä volyymilla vanhaa kappaletta "Kusessa ollaan"...
Tässä muuten tiivistelmä siitä miten homma heillä meni reilu vuosisata sitten:
Russia in World War I
World War I had a profound impact on Russia, which lacked the industrial economy or social cohesion to sustain years of total war.
alphahistory.com
Hämmästyttävän tarkasti koko touhu on ollut aiemman toistoa, eli mitään eivät ole oppineet.
Antares
Respected Leader
Michael Kofman kirjoittanut ajatuksia Khersonin hyökkäyksestä, lainaan ketjun spoilerin alle. Poimin hänen ketjun lopusta muutaman ajatuksen, hän on varovainen arvioissaan kuten tavallista:
On managing expectations - one thing to consider is that the better military commanders of the 20th century would have struggled to keep up with social media expectations, and a media glare that often seeks to magnify minor tactical events into major strategic indicators.
Overall, the geography is favorable to UA, and in this area they can establish relative advantage if not in forces then in fires and logistics. Russian forces have been reinforced over the summer, but many BTGs are likely at half strength, with strained supply lines.
That said, I have strong priors on this, having seen the right river bank of Kherson as the area where Russia's position is the most vulnerable, and the region overall as of greater strategic significance relative to others.
In addition, taking back territory is not a singular objective. Sustainability and force preservation matters. One of the challenges for UA will be to keep relative costs low so as to be better positioned for future operations, and subsequent phases over the long term.
Hän on myös osallistunut "War on the rocks" -podcastiin ja jutelleet siinä Khersonin vastahyökkäyksestä, tosin tämä on muutaman päivän vanha. En ole kuunnellut sitä vielä, joten en voi tiivistää siitä yhteenvetoa:
https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/into-the-breach-ukraines-counter-offensive-begins/
On managing expectations - one thing to consider is that the better military commanders of the 20th century would have struggled to keep up with social media expectations, and a media glare that often seeks to magnify minor tactical events into major strategic indicators.
Overall, the geography is favorable to UA, and in this area they can establish relative advantage if not in forces then in fires and logistics. Russian forces have been reinforced over the summer, but many BTGs are likely at half strength, with strained supply lines.
That said, I have strong priors on this, having seen the right river bank of Kherson as the area where Russia's position is the most vulnerable, and the region overall as of greater strategic significance relative to others.
In addition, taking back territory is not a singular objective. Sustainability and force preservation matters. One of the challenges for UA will be to keep relative costs low so as to be better positioned for future operations, and subsequent phases over the long term.
A few brief thoughts on the UA offensive. First, its best to manage expectations, these types of operations take weeks or months to play out. In my view its very early, there is limited information available, and far too soon to issue judgments.
My best guess on UA approach is to steadily press Russian forces towards the Dnipro river. Perhaps splitting the main Russian group of forces between those defending the city Kherson and those holding territory east of the Inhulets river.
As Russian forces are pressed to choose between retreat and envelopment, over time they will likely withdraw to secondary defensive lines, steadily compressing the battlespace. If successful, UA may begin to isolate these groupings into several large pockets.
With supply lines strained, given regular strikes against bridges & relatively weak capacity of ferries, this could place Russian forces in an untenable position, eventually forcing a retreat across the river. UA will probably have more success pushing the northern pocket.
I doubt UA seeks a fight for the city of Kherson itself, which would be costly and could destroy much of it. Instead, to steadily compress the pocket around it, make reinforcement impossible, and force a Russian withdrawal (ala Snake Island).
My impression is that there are at least three axes of advance in Kherson, but it’s difficult to tell the composition of UA forces. I'm making an educated guess here - this map is very notional.
So far, there are visible signs of UA gains, with breaks through the first line of Russian defenses. That said, Russian forces will retreat to secondary lines. As friction increases, the pace of the advance could slow down. As I often suggest, outcomes are contingent.
Having used HARM to suppress Russian air defense, and likely EW, UA may have pockets of localized air superiority (enough for TB2 to operate on parts of the front), but it will require sustained suppression against Russian ADS which could regenerate.
To place the offensive in context, much of the front has become active with UA forces launching localized counter attacks around Kharkiv and Donbas. These local initiatives are probably designed to take advantage of lost Russian momentum.
On managing expectations - one thing to consider is that the better military commanders of the 20th century would have struggled to keep up with social media expectations, and a media glare that often seeks to magnify minor tactical events into major strategic indicators.
Overall, the geography is favorable to UA, and in this area they can establish relative advantage if not in forces then in fires and logistics. Russian forces have been reinforced over the summer, but many BTGs are likely at half strength, with strained supply lines.
That said, I have strong priors on this, having seen the right river bank of Kherson as the area where Russia's position is the most vulnerable, and the region overall as of greater strategic significance relative to others.
In addition, taking back territory is not a singular objective. Sustainability and force preservation matters. One of the challenges for UA will be to keep relative costs low so as to be better positioned for future operations, and subsequent phases over the long term.
I said much of this earlier on the WOTR podcast. Also, Rob had a good thread https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1565771980720279554… and Jack Watling's article is very helpful in thinking more about the long term and understanding the context for this offensive, views I tend to share. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukrainian-offensive-must-come-stages
My best guess on UA approach is to steadily press Russian forces towards the Dnipro river. Perhaps splitting the main Russian group of forces between those defending the city Kherson and those holding territory east of the Inhulets river.
As Russian forces are pressed to choose between retreat and envelopment, over time they will likely withdraw to secondary defensive lines, steadily compressing the battlespace. If successful, UA may begin to isolate these groupings into several large pockets.
With supply lines strained, given regular strikes against bridges & relatively weak capacity of ferries, this could place Russian forces in an untenable position, eventually forcing a retreat across the river. UA will probably have more success pushing the northern pocket.
I doubt UA seeks a fight for the city of Kherson itself, which would be costly and could destroy much of it. Instead, to steadily compress the pocket around it, make reinforcement impossible, and force a Russian withdrawal (ala Snake Island).
My impression is that there are at least three axes of advance in Kherson, but it’s difficult to tell the composition of UA forces. I'm making an educated guess here - this map is very notional.
So far, there are visible signs of UA gains, with breaks through the first line of Russian defenses. That said, Russian forces will retreat to secondary lines. As friction increases, the pace of the advance could slow down. As I often suggest, outcomes are contingent.
Having used HARM to suppress Russian air defense, and likely EW, UA may have pockets of localized air superiority (enough for TB2 to operate on parts of the front), but it will require sustained suppression against Russian ADS which could regenerate.
To place the offensive in context, much of the front has become active with UA forces launching localized counter attacks around Kharkiv and Donbas. These local initiatives are probably designed to take advantage of lost Russian momentum.
On managing expectations - one thing to consider is that the better military commanders of the 20th century would have struggled to keep up with social media expectations, and a media glare that often seeks to magnify minor tactical events into major strategic indicators.
Overall, the geography is favorable to UA, and in this area they can establish relative advantage if not in forces then in fires and logistics. Russian forces have been reinforced over the summer, but many BTGs are likely at half strength, with strained supply lines.
That said, I have strong priors on this, having seen the right river bank of Kherson as the area where Russia's position is the most vulnerable, and the region overall as of greater strategic significance relative to others.
In addition, taking back territory is not a singular objective. Sustainability and force preservation matters. One of the challenges for UA will be to keep relative costs low so as to be better positioned for future operations, and subsequent phases over the long term.
I said much of this earlier on the WOTR podcast. Also, Rob had a good thread https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1565771980720279554… and Jack Watling's article is very helpful in thinking more about the long term and understanding the context for this offensive, views I tend to share. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukrainian-offensive-must-come-stages
Hän on myös osallistunut "War on the rocks" -podcastiin ja jutelleet siinä Khersonin vastahyökkäyksestä, tosin tämä on muutaman päivän vanha. En ole kuunnellut sitä vielä, joten en voi tiivistää siitä yhteenvetoa:
https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/into-the-breach-ukraines-counter-offensive-begins/
Vääpeli
Greatest Leader
Se iso ero Mariupolilla on noihin muihin kaupunkeihin. Se on rantakaupunki mistä ei ole ollut mitään mahdollisuutta päästä karkuun mihinkään suuntaan.
Antares
Respected Leader
Väitetysti videopätkä "etelän taisteluista":
South Front. The beginning of the assault of Sukhyi Stavok right after the Ingulca crossing. A movie from a few days ago.
Interestingly, the attack is supported by the aviation of Ukraine. Apparently, the Ukr Su-24 bombed Rus positions just before the assault. Previously, the MiG-29 with HARM caught up with the Rus S-300.
South Front. The beginning of the assault of Sukhyi Stavok right after the Ingulca crossing. A movie from a few days ago.
Interestingly, the attack is supported by the aviation of Ukraine. Apparently, the Ukr Su-24 bombed Rus positions just before the assault. Previously, the MiG-29 with HARM caught up with the Rus S-300.
PekoniSoturi
Kapteeni
Ukrainalaiset tuhosivat venäläisen lentokoneen tutkan avulla
Google mapsin satelliittikuvissa näkyy, että peltoa kulotettaisiin tuolla päin:
