Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Putin Has Left the World No Other Option But Regime Change​

The Russian dictator’s deranged “annexation” speech should make it clear to the global community of nations that his staying in power won’t provide “stability.”

Vladimir Putin must go.

His demented Kremlin speech Friday, during a ceremony in which he feebly asserted Russia was annexing portions of Ukraine, made the strongest case for the necessity of regime change in Moscow that any world leader has yet to make.

But it has been clear the Russian dictator must be removed from office for a long time now.

It has been clear because Putin’s actions and rhetoric demonstrate day in and day out that Ukraine can never be secure as long as he remains in office. It has been clear because none of Russia’s neighbors can be secure with a megalomaniacal lunatic next door who speaks of Russian empire and constantly threatens to rewrite the borders of sovereign states.

It has been clear because the world can’t be stable as long as the man who controls the planet’s largest stockpile of nuclear weapons is one whose power is unchecked at home, who shows such contempt for both international law and human decency, and whose ambitions are so untethered to reality.

Justice also requires that Putin leave office. He is a serial war criminal, one of the worst the world has seen in the modern era. He has laid waste to a sovereign nation. He is responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands. He has embraced the language and practice of genocide. His armies have committed war crimes. Mass graves attest to his brutality. What is more, his crimes are not limited to the human suffering he has unleashed upon Ukraine. Other violations of fundamental laws and myriad atrocities can be traced to decisions he has made—from Russia’s leveling of Grozny in Chechnya to Russia’s active support for and participation in horrors in Syria; from the invasion of Georgia to Putin’s murderous campaign against dissidents within his own country.

Putin, for years, has provided evidence not only to international prosecutors but to every sentient being on the planet that he is not a legitimate leader. He does not deserve to be swathed in the protections normally accorded to foreign heads of state. He has no more claim on them than did past monsters—from Hitler to Saddam to Gadhafi, from Pol Pot to Milosevic.

The dead of Bucha and Melitipol or Izyum make that case with their absence. So do the victims of Russian torture, of bombed hospitals, schools and train stations, of mass kidnapping, and of unceasing terror being visited by Russian missiles, artillery and troops upon innocents—victims of the misfortune of living next door to one of history’s most repulsive miscreants.

No one could listen to Putin’s rambling Friday rant and draw any conclusion other than the fact that the longer Putin remains in office, the greater the damage he will do.

If the absurd spectacle of a “signing ceremony” asserting Russian control of Ukrainian territory featuring Kremlin stooges and nationalistic chants did not chill observers to the bone, then Putin’s belligerent language condemning “the enemy” in the West and his intimations that he might be within his rights to use nuclear weapons certainly should. He mocked international law. He condemned U.S. “satanism.” He called on Ukraine to negotiate but said that the fate of “Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson” was not on the table, that they would be parts of Russia “forever.”

When President Joe Biden said of Putin in May, “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power,” it was followed by a swift “clarification” from the White House that the president “was not discussing Putin’s power in Russia, or regime change.”

But as we have gradually come to learn, Biden’s seemingly spontaneous comments on crucial issues of international policy to which he has devoted decades of study—whether they concern Putin or Taiwan—are not gaffes. They instead are expressions of common sense, acknowledgements of reality that diplomats may wish were unspoken, that cannot be the “official” policy of the U.S., but that are signs that the president understands clearly the reality on the ground and U.S. interests.

That is good because tiptoeing around the threat posed by Putin, hoping that accommodating him would lead to moderation in his behavior certainly has not worked. Indeed with every respectful, restrained response to Putin’s aggression or abuses, we have only seen an escalation of his offenses.

The “measured” responses to his aggression of the Bush or the Obama years did not work. Nor did the slavering obsequiousness of former President Donald Trump. Indeed, the ostpolitik of Angela Merkel and the vacillations of French President Emmanuel Macron and other European leaders have actually aided and empowered Putin.

No doubt Putin’s allies—like the talking heads at Fox News, the leaders of the MAGA caucus on Capitol Hill, and Putinistas across Europe—will warn that to even speak of the need to remove Putin from office will provoke him, perhaps even lead him to unleash nuclear weapons in Ukraine or against the West. How do we know that? Because that was the response to Biden’s moment of public honesty and realism on this issue.

Many others, including some well-respected foreign policy experts, suggested we should not “corner” Putin with a public stance demanding his removal.

Some of those experts correctly observe that the U.S. has a checkered history seeking regime change. They argue that there are no good alternatives to Putin, and so getting rid of him might produce an even worse outcome, whether that is the chaos associated with a leadership void or a more dangerous leader.

But go back and listen to his Friday speech. It makes clear that we are well past the point where the dangers of his remaining in power are greater than the dangers that might be caused by his fall.

Further, removing the world’s autocrats and thug heads of state has actually not generally produced worse successors. That was certainly true in the cases of Hitler, Mussolini, Milosevic, Pol Pot, and many others.

Next, acknowledging that Putin must go is not the same as making regime change a matter of public policy. For governments it can (and largely should) remain an unexpressed goal.

That said, certain sanctions imposed on Russia should remain in place until Russia changes key policies and positions that are indelibly associated with Putin, which in effect will mean until Putin is gone. Certain defensive postures of the west should remain in place until the threat from Russia has abated. We can do more than we currently are to help covertly support Russia’s opposition, especially those whose values align with ours.

Perhaps most importantly, we can ensure that any sort of lasting Russian victory in Ukraine is not an option and that Putin’s terms will never be met, his aggression never rewarded.

With such policies, we can actively encourage the people of Russia to recognize that their country will not have a future as long as Putin remains in power. Putin is assisting on this front. By undertaking a massive military conscription campaign, one that may call up as many as 1 million troops, who will then be under-equipped, under-trained, and likely victims of a war they did not seek against neighbors who are not in any ways their enemies, he has already lit the fuse on a potential national backlash. Millions and millions of Russians will increasingly feel the pain and loss associated with Putin’s war in ways that they did not before, in ways that Russian propaganda cannot hide or dress up.

Protests in Russia are already growing bolder.

Celebrities and business leaders are speaking out more clearly. How long will it be before the security services that surround and protect Putin begin to see the fact that he is a threat to their well-being, to their lives, to the futures of their families?

Accepting the reality that Putin must go is just common sense at this point. Recognizing that reality, we should embrace policies that encourage the conditions that will make it come to pass. We should also prepare for the consequences of such a change and make sure to send Moscow the message that Russia’s neighbors and the community of nations welcome a more responsible Russia—while also making clear that we are ready to defend ourselves against one that makes the mistake of continuing (or making worse) Putin’s policies.

As for making the case to the Russian people that they must act, we need not do that. Putin, with speeches like Friday’s and self-inflicted catastrophes like Ukraine, is already doing that far more persuasively than we could hope to do.

Nythän pahalla ja uhkaavalla NATO:lla olisi loistava tilaisuus ajaa "helposti" Paskovaan asti ja vaihtaa valta, kun matkalla ei juuri olisi örkkejä pysäyttämässä. Miksi NATO ei tee niin, jos kerta se aikoo tuhota Kaalimaan?
 
Pikku laskuharjoituksia korkoa korolle - laskurilla, vermeitä ostetaan 500 €:lla:

Tai sanotaan että vermeitä ostetaan tonnilla:

Lainasumma 1 000 €, laina-aika 180 vrk, korko 1% / päivä -> lainapääoma 5 996 € laina-ajan lopussa
tai
Lainasumma 1 000 €, laina-aika 360 vrk, korko 1% / päivä -> lainapääoma 35 949 € laina-ajan lopussa

Melkoinen työ koota riittävästi vessanpönttöjä ja pesukoneita takaisinmaksua varten 🙃

Ainahan sitä voi ryssä yrittää myydä munaisensa tai sarveiskalvonsa jos ne eivät ole viinasta ja muusta moskasta niin vaurioituneet tai ole mitään hepatiittia tai muuta tautia joka estää kaupat. Jos innostuu molemmista silmistään myymään sarveiskalvot, niin voisi kuvitella että rintamallakaan ei tarvi enää lähteä kun vähän on huono sotilas jopa ryssäarmeijaan täysin sokea sotilas.

Kenkiä ja monenlaista muuta ryysyä myös vapautuu niiltä rintamalle kuolleilta ryssäsotilailta. Muutama luodin- tai kranaatinsirpaleen reikä jos on housuissa tai palttoossa, niin ilma vaihtuu vain paremmin eikä ryssällä tule niin kuuma rintamalla vaikka muuten on kuumat paikat.
 
Nythän pahalla ja uhkaavalla NATO:lla olisi loistava tilaisuus ajaa "helposti" Paskovaan asti ja vaihtaa valta, kun matkalla ei juuri olisi örkkejä pysäyttämässä. Miksi NATO ei tee niin, jos kerta se aikoo tuhota Kaalimaan?
Kuka haluaa vaivoikseen örkkimaan asukkaat? Sen laatuista paskaa, että ei sitä kukaan halua rahoittaa. Eikä kannettu vesi pysy kaivossa, sen on osoittaneet mm Afganistan ja Irak. Neukkulan kaatumisen jälkeen venäjää on hyysätty ja ymmäretty 30 vuotta. Jo riittää imperialistien tukeminen. Katellaan sitten uudestaan, kun ruski mir on unohdettu käsite.
 
Katsoin pätkän Bäckmanin uusinta liveä. Toi Janus on vissiin ruvennut tinttaamaan ihan huolella votkaa? Äijä on rupsahtanut vuodessa todella paljon ja esim. hiustyyli on mennyt aiemman huolitellusta malliin "pultsari".

Äijä on ollut ikänsä pelle ja nykyinen ryssän marionetti, mutta aiemmin perusolemus on ollut uskottava. Kai se stressaa, kun tietää että sota menee päin helvettiä ja on häviäjän puolella, Venäjälle ei Luhanskin passilla pääse ja Ukrainassa -jonka alueella asuu- on etsintäkuulutettu rikollinen. Samaan aikaan pitää muutaman ruplan takia tuutata paskaa nettiin koko valveillaoloaika. Vähemmästäkin sitä alkoholisoituu.
Varmasti se kuupan päälle ottaa, kun Ukraina etenee keskimäärin kymmeniä kilometrejä viikossa ja ainoan "maan", joka on hänelle suostunut passin myöntämään, pääkaupunki sijaitsee enää sadan kilometrin päässä rintamasta. Ei liene enää pitkä aika, että rintamatykistön jyly kuuluu jo kaupunkiin asti.

Maanpettureilla tuskin on Venäjälle mitään arvoa, oli se maa sitten mikä hyvänsä. Kun osa-aikainen hyödyllisen idiootin työ kansantasavallassa päättyy näillä näkymin hyvinkin lähitulevaisuudessa, miehen viimeinen palvelus suurelle isänmaalle todennäköisesti tulee olemaan se, että hänelle lyödään käteen kivääri jonka lukossa kasvaa korallia ja käsketään juosta suoraan ukrainalaisten sarjatuleen.
 
Kiitos tästä.
Itse yrittänyt Twitterissä ja tubessa pitää Ukrainan puolia.
Telegram on itselle ihan tuntematon.
Saako siellä kuka tahansa kommentoida?
Mitä käy jos tuollaisella z kanavalla menee Slava Ukrainia kommentoimaan?
Moderoidaanko ryhmästä ulos vai mitä?
Ei pääse kommentoimaan ellei kirjaudu sisälle ja kanavalla ole kommentointi enabloituna. Ryssän Z-kanavilla kommentointia ei lähestulkoon koskaan ole, korkeintaan emoji-reagointi.
 
Ian Matveev laittanut ennustajan hatun päähän ja pohtii, mitä voisi tapahtua seuraavaksi Kharkovan suunnalla.

Pitkähkö ketju joten laitan sen kuvineen spoilerin taakse (otin tähän vain karttojen kuvat, linkitin ketjun ne viestit missä oli muita hyviä kuvia ja videoita jos haluaa katsoa mitä tarkoittaa):

Liman is released, what's next? The offensive of Ukrainian troops in the north continues right now. Today I will try to figure out how far they can go and what goals they can achieve. Thread

IanMaleev 1.jpg

There have already been confirmations that the Armed Forces of Ukraine occupied Torskoye and Zarechnoye. And also go to the boundaries of Kremennaya. And this means that the defense of Putin's units along the Zherebets river failed. Further only Rubizhne and Severodonetsk with Lisichansk.

The next stage of the offensive will be a general movement to the north with the expansion of the front and advance towards Svatovo. Kremennaya may be taken already at this stage. But Rubezhnoye is unlikely. In the agglomeration of Severodonetsk, significant forces have probably been gathered there, you can hold on for a long time.

IanMaleev 2.jpg

At the same time, an offensive is underway from Kupyansk right now. Also towards Svatovo. Converging attack is a very effective offensive tactic. Therefore, we should expect that the result of the first stage of the offensive will be a successful exit to the lines of Svatovo.

Ideally, a quick Ukrainian offensive might look like this. By attacking Kremennaya, they will cut off the main grouping from the northern flank and through Svatovo and Starobelsk they will break through deep into the Lugansk region, freeing up a significant territory.

IanMaleev 3.jpg

This is possible if the Russian defense crumbles. But it seems to me that now it is too optimistic to count on this for several reasons.

1. Geography
2. Weather
3. Slow advance
4. Mobilization in Russia

Geographically, the northern part of the Lugansk region is not very convenient for an offensive, it is cut at once by several rivers with swampy banks and wide floodplains. Yes, there are many fields, but also many ravines. And most importantly - there are relatively few settlements and normal roads.

Here, for example, is the largest of the roads that goes from Svatovo to Starobelsk. If it's a highway, what do the rest look like? That's right - not very good. Here in the second photo is the road in the Novonikanorovka area, this is south of Svatovo. She is sandy. LINKKI viestiin, näkee kuvan

Meanwhile, the weather continues to deteriorate. If you go to the forecast site, then rain is promised almost everywhere and regularly. I checked, a year ago specifically in Svatovo there was practically no rainfall in October. But now regular rains are predicted.

IanMaleev 4.jpg

Fresh videos and photos constantly show broken roads, dirt and moisture. Here is a video from the liberated Sheikovka today. Look, the ground is noticeably wet and every next tank and truck will break it more and more. LINKKI viestiin, siinä on video

Both geography and weather directly affect the speed of advance. Here is a simple example. In the summer, when you ford the river, theoretically you can not dry your pants - they will dry out in the sun. In the autumn it won’t work like that, you’ll rather freeze and get sick. So you need to stop and dry.

20 minutes of drying at a campfire or stove is -20 minutes from the time to attack. You can’t sleep under the open sky - set up camp, another hour or two. There is less daylight, and even the absence of foliage and grass interferes. All these little things add up and really reduce the “working time” of a soldier.

Again, in the fall, it is much more important to eat hot food, rather than snacking on the go. Yes, you can spit on all this, but then you will quickly get an incapacitated army, tired and sick. This is not the way of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, they take care of the soldiers.

This is also why their offensive has now slowed down - Liman was released carefully and gradually. Why would they change tactics and throw meat at Russian machine guns? Only the complete destruction of the growth of defense or a super-successful breakthrough will allow developing a really swift attack. LINKKI, viestissä on video joka näyttää etenemisen kartalla

Mobilization in Russia can also have an impact, albeit not much. The point is that having a potential "reserve" in the rear, Russian generals can bring to the front all those reserves that could still remain. I think they are extremely limited, of course, but this possibility should not be ruled out.

Ideally, for themselves, the Russian army can build a defense along the Krasna river. The river itself does not represent a significant barrier, but along it there are several large settlements and many small ones. They can become the nodes of defense of Putin's units.

IanMaleev 5.jpg

KETJUN KÄÄNNÖS JATKUU SEURAAVASSA VIESTISSÄ - KUVARAJOITUS TULI VASTAAN JA HÄNELLÄ ON LISÄÄ KARTTOJEN KUVIA

 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Ian Matveev laittanut ennustajan hatun päähän ja pohtii, mitä voisi tapahtua seuraavaksi Kharkovan suunnalla. Ketjun käännös jatkuu tässä:

But the confusion, the weakness of the command and the lack of combat-ready reserves cast doubt on such a plan. After all, the long siege of Liman gave the Russian army a lot of time, but they could not make any intelligible defensive line.

It is quite possible that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be able to take Svatovo relatively quickly and begin to break through further - along the road. This eliminates the difficulties with geography and weather, which I wrote about above. The advancing growth units acted similarly in the spring.

Then, in early March, Russian troops encountered in this part of the Lugansk region with weak resistance. Now the situation has turned the other way around - the Armed Forces of Ukraine are moving forward, they are in the majority, better equipped and motivated.

If there is a breakthrough in Svatovo, the situation could develop like this. Advancing along the main roads, the Armed Forces of Ukraine can cut the territory into two parts. In the north, the troops will be pushed back to the border, and in the south - to the stronghold in Severodonetsk and the original line of contact.

IanMaleev 6.jpg

Of course, this is a rather optimistic forecast, and before winter everything can end at the first stage. The Ukrainians will besiege Kremennaya and Rubizhne, as well as Svatovo, and liberate the remnants of the Kharkov region. Before the severe deterioration of the weather, they had at most a month, or even less.

IanMaleev 7.jpg

But I would not underestimate the weakness of the Russian army. It literally crumbles, both materially and mentally. Poor command, lack of decent weapons and, in general, any weapons in the right quantity, poor supply and communications, misunderstanding of wars goals and objectives at this stage are only the main problems. Now the same supply problems are becoming more critical. Internal conflicts are brewing. After all, they are not only at the level of generals and commanders, but even lower. When the army loses, everyone fights with everyone. Plus fatigue.

Soldiers who are forced to retreat all the time under the attacks of a superior enemy develop a sense of doom. It does not help fight better. And there is simply no one to replace the defeated. Putin does not have any full-fledged reserve units, entire regiments or brigades.

The whole thread is my speculation and should be treated the same way. While I was writing it, the Armed Forces of Ukraine launched a powerful attack in the Kherson region, perhaps the vector of activity will shift there. One thing is clear for sure - now the Russian army is forced to defend itself and wait for the next strike of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Initiative Lost.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Venäjä lähettää tällä hetkellä sotilaansa suoraan "lihamyllyyn" Ukrainassa, tanskalainen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan asiantuntija Jacob Kaarsbo arvioi.

Tanskan TV2-kanavalle kommentoinut Kaarsbo arvioi Venäjän menettävän joka päivä 500 sotilasta.

– Armeijan slangissa tätä kutsutaan lihamyllyksi, hän toteaa.

Viidentoista vuoden uran Tanskan asevoimien tiedusteluvirastossa tehnyt Kaarsbo kertoo yllättyneensä, että Venäjä ei onnistunut pitämään otettaan Lymanin kaupungista, jonka Ukrainan joukot vapauttivat viikonloppuna. Kaupungin menetys kertoo tanskalaisasiantuntijan mukaan selvää kieltä.

– Venäläisillä ei ole riittävää kapasiteettia. Heillä on pulaa panssarivaunuista, panssaroiduista ajoneuvoista ja heidän huoltolinjansa, joita ukrainalaiset ovat yhä voimakkaammin moukaroineet, ovat erittäin haavoittuvassa asemassa, hän sanoo.

Kaarsbo uskoo, että venäläisjoukot ovat uupuneita ja heillä on puutetta varusteista. Hänen mukaansa venäläisillä ei tällä hetkellä ole kykyä kääntää tilannetta edukseen. Etenkin, kun Ukraina on saanut länsimailta ja Natolta modernia sotakalustoa.

– Momemtum on nyt ukrainalaisille, ja näyttää siltä, että venäläiset eivät voi sitä pysäyttää, hän sanoo.
 
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