Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Ollut tosiaan "hiljainen uutispäivä" ja DefMonin tilannekatsaus kielii samaa, ei paljoa raportoitavaa eri suunnista. Poimin tästä yhden mikä osui silmään, tämä on Kreminnan / Lysitsanskin / Severodonetskin suunnalta:

Reports states it's very loud around Pryvillya, it's possible there is some AFU advances in that area.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1578437588561850368

Ei nuolaista ennen kuin tipahtaa: "äänekkyys" tarkoittanee tykistöä, heittimiä ja muita paukuttimia. Toisaalta se yleensä enteilee myös jalkaväen kokeilua, vähintään tiedustelijoiden ja muiden hiipparien toimesta. Kirjoittaa "loud around" eli ympärillä paukkuu? Kreminnassa arvatenkin, mutta tämä Pryvillya herätti mielenkiinnon.

Mikä tuossa kiinnostaa?

Pryvillya sijaitsee Donets-joen eteläpuolella, kun taas Kreminna, Rubizne ja Severodonetsk sijaitsevat joen toisella puolella. Alla Google Mapsista lähikuva seudusta, koska useimmissa kartoissa joet eivät näy riittävän selvästi:

Pryvillya lähikuva.jpg

Jos katsoo karttaa hieman kauempaa niin Donets-joen etelärantaa seuraillen asutuskeskukset ovat länsi-itä -suunnassa: Serebryanka - Bilohorivka - Shypylivka - Pryvillya.

Joki tekee tuollaisen jyrkän mutkan tässä kohdassa ja Pryvillya sijaitsee tämän mutkan pohjukassa. Kuten kuvasta näkee, Donets-joki kääntyy tämän jälkeen etelään. Kaksi tai kolme kilometriä Pryvillyan eteläpuolella on Novodruzhes'k ja siitä pari kolme kilometriä etelämmäs on Lysitsansk.

Ei ehkä kannata lukea yhden twiitin takia liikaa tästä, mutta on mahdollista että Ukraina hivuttautuisi Kreminnan tuntumaan myös etelän suunnasta. Kuten nähdään, Rubizne on joen itäpuolella ja Severodonetsk sen eteläpuolella aavistuksen kuvan rajauksen ulkopuolella.

Tällä seudulla on näitä asutuskeskuksia hyvin tiuhassa. Sopisi hyvin hiipivälle jalkaväelle. HUOM: tästä ei ole kirjoitetu missään, kunhan vain innostuin tutkimaan maastoa tarkemmin ja tämä kiinnitti huomion.
 
Tykinruokaa kirjoitti:
Se oli jälki suomettumisen aikaa. Vaikea arvioida miksi siihen linjaan lopulta päädyttiin
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...
No ei ole.

Me ite nostettiin vanhat - eli edelleen toimessaan olevat - Stasin ja KGB:n agentit valtaan. Lipponen, Halonen, Tuomioja kärkenä. Toimivat (huomaa, että preesens ja imperfekti ovat sama) varmaan osin pakotettuina, suurelta osin ideologiana piiskaamana. Kepu ei sen parempi.
 
Epämääräinen viesti ja vieläpä tunnin vanha:

South of Davydiv Brid events are unfolding.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1578469286481301504

Ehkä tältä suunnalta hyökkäävä kärki olisi päässyt taas hieman eteenpäin? Oletan että hyökkää T2207 tietä pitkin, kohti Beryslavia minne tie johtaa.

-

Koetaan tarpeelliseksi vahvistaa Luhanskin kaupungin puolustusta??

https://twitter.com/x/status/1578486123109969921

-

Hyvä muistaa tämä tällaisena "hiljaisena uutispäivänä":

https://twitter.com/x/status/1578441592129474560
 
Jos nyt ei muuta tänään, niin lohdutan teitä: kyllä sota koukuttaa muitakin.

Meanwhile, in Oklahoma:

Each day at 5 p.m., retired drywaller Gerald Wayne Spavinaw conducts a daily briefing on the Russo-Ukrainian War for his family. Attendance is mandatory, even for Scooter, his tick hound. His wife Ruby Ann is bewildered by the sudden change in her husband, and his two grandsons, Gerald III and Bobby Lee, are just pissed.
..
Spavinaw briefs his family over advances the Ukrainian Army has made that day, breaks down the reported losses of personnel and equipment by the Russians, and after his forecast for the outcome of the next day’s battles, opens the floor for questions.


https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa1921156-8297-4d03-b56d-125bc1085709_2048x1477.jpeg


www.duffelblog.com

Local family tired of dad's daily Ukraine war briefings

They keep pushing back dinner time.
www.duffelblog.com www.duffelblog.com
 
saftamil kirjoitti:
En tiedä mikä on traktorisertifikaatti, mutta sellaisen on likasanko antanut kääpiölle synttärilahjaksi. Herkkähipiäisempi voisi tulkita avoimeksi vittuiluksi 😉

https://twitter.com/x/status/1578358737437220864
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...


Läntiset valtiot voisivat ilmoittaa yhdellä suulla, että kun kääpiö tulee järkiinsä, niin hänelle tullaan lahjoittamaan tarvittava määrä traktoreita, että voi viedä romunsa vittuun Ukrainassa 😂
 
Putinin synttärit on hyvä lopetella tähän muutama päivä ennen 24.2 hyökkäystä tehtyyn biisiin (on ollu aiemminkin ketjussa)

Translated lyrics:
It’s hot in the middle of the winter in capital
The city of luck and failure
We left our small towns to discover who we are
Mum, I’m sorry
Chasing the dreams, we loved but those times have passed
And we have new rituals now
Get our arms ready in case of the war
Pull the trigger - I’m your bullet
Do it again
- I bring peace
I’ll be with you
- I’m your weapon
Victory is our only aim
I'm dreaming about a
Kyiv Podil stroll at summer day
But that damn winter brings the war year-by-year
I dream about going to our seaside in Crimea
But damn executioners are taking over our homes
So get ready for a fight
Get your arms ready
- it’s our land
Pull the trigger
- I’m your bullet
Do it again
- I bring peace
I’ll be with you
- I’m your weapon
Victory is our only aim
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...
 
Heinrich kirjoitti:
Jos nyt ei muuta tänään, niin lohdutan teitä: kyllä sota koukuttaa muitakin.

Meanwhile, in Oklahoma:

Each day at 5 p.m., retired drywaller Gerald Wayne Spavinaw conducts a daily briefing on the Russo-Ukrainian War for his family. Attendance is mandatory, even for Scooter, his tick hound. His wife Ruby Ann is bewildered by the sudden change in her husband, and his two grandsons, Gerald III and Bobby Lee, are just pissed.
..
Spavinaw briefs his family over advances the Ukrainian Army has made that day, breaks down the reported losses of personnel and equipment by the Russians, and after his forecast for the outcome of the next day’s battles, opens the floor for questions.


https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa1921156-8297-4d03-b56d-125bc1085709_2048x1477.jpeg


www.duffelblog.com

Local family tired of dad's daily Ukraine war briefings

They keep pushing back dinner time.
www.duffelblog.com www.duffelblog.com
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...
On todettava, että tässä syksyn aikana atomiuhkailun kiihdyttää on meidänkin taloudessa tullut peilattua tabletin näyttöä telkkariin ja tilanteesta on keskusteltu - sanoisin ihan merkittäväksi kiinnostukseksi kun huushollin vähemmän karvainen yksilö kuitenkin lukee uutisia kaks kertaa viikkoon…
 
Lukemisen arvoinen lyhyt kirjoitus Venäjän ei-strategisten ydinaseiden varastoinnista ja niiden käyttöönotosta: LÄHDE

Non-strategic weapons storage and deployment procedures in Russia​


Non-strategic weapons storage and deployment procedures in Russia​


1665178747567.png

Russia has a wide range of nuclear-capable non-strategic delivery systems. This note focuses on air-delivered weapons and on ground-launched road-mobile missiles (whether ballistic or cruise missiles). The key principles of operations, however, remain the same across all nuclear delivery systems. They also appear to apply to weapons assigned to nominally strategic heavy bombers - Tu-95MS and Tu-160.

The description of nuclear weapon storage and deployment procedures is based primarily on the "Lock Them Up: Zero-Deployed Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe" report (see an update in this post), the semi-official history of the 12th Main Directorate, Рожденные атомной эрой, and OKSNAR - Fully Assembled State - Soviet Nuclear Weapons in Hungary 1961-1991.

Russia has repeatedly stated that in peacetime all its non-strategic nuclear weapons are "concentrated at centralized storage bases." There are two kinds of facilities that fit that definition---twelve large national-level storage sites and about 35 base-level storage facilities (see the map here). Base-level facilities could contain weapons that are assigned to delivery systems at the base they are collocated with or at other bases in the region. For example, a storage facility known as Kolosovka can store nuclear weapons for all nuclear-capable delivery systems in the Kaliningrad region. Each base-level facility has a "parent" national-level storage site that stores nuclear weapons assigned to the respective base or region. The "parent" national-level storage facility can be separate from the base-level facility by a considerable distance. The Kolosovka site is located more than 1000 km away from its "parent," Vologda-20. In many cases, however, the distance between the sites is smaller.

All weapons that are not mated to their delivery systems are handled by the troops of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (12 GUMO).

If nuclear weapons are stored at the base-level facility, the standard weapon deployment procedure appears to include several steps that depend on the specific delivery system and the weapon type. In Russia's practice, weapons are stored separately from their delivery vehicles.

The image above shows the arrangements at the Soltsy air base, a base of Tu-22M3 bombers (Image source: Google Earth). The rectangular security perimeter surrounding the nuclear weapon storage facility is seen in the upper left corner of the image. A storage facility on the right side of the image, which is used to store non-nuclear armaments, does not have a similar security perimeter around it.

If the weapons in question are warheads of ballistic or cruise missiles, each of them is stored in a specialized container, only to be mated with the missile as part of the deployment procedure. Gravity bombs are stored in their containers assembled.

Once the units receive an order to bring nuclear delivery systems to a higher state of readiness, the 12 GUMO units must take the weapons, still in containers, out of storage and load them on specialized trucks. When this procedure is completed, the trucks deliver the containers to a designated point, where weapons are removed from containers so they can be mated with their delivery systems.

In the case of air-delivered weapons, such as bombs or ALCMs, this point is normally a designated area of an airbase where the 12 GUMO troops carry out the final assembly of a weapon, if necessary, and prepare it for loading on the delivery aircraft. Fully assembled weapons at the airbase remain in the custody of the 12 GUMO troops until the very moment they are loaded on an aircraft that is ready to take off, at which point the custody is transferred to the aircraft crew.

Warheads of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles could probably be delivered to the missile base. However, the standard procedure appears to involve transporting the warheads to a designated rendezvous point away from the base where they would be mated with missiles and then loaded on launchers. The 12 GUMO troops apparently have the necessary equipment to conduct these operations in the field.

It appears that the 12 GUMO troops can keep nuclear weapons outside of the storage facility for some time, probably days and maybe even weeks. However, at some point the weapons must be returned to the base-level facility that provides conditions for long-term storage.

[Arms control] [October 7, 2022] [#]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1578425524741079046

Samalta sivulta toinen artikkeli: LÄHDE

Where the weapons are - Nuclear weapon storage facilities in Russia​


Where the weapons are - Nuclear weapon storage facilities in Russia​


This map above shows the structure of nuclear weapon storage sites in Russia. Or, more correctly, it shows units of the 12th Main Directorate that maintain nuclear weapon storage facilities. What was once a very large infrastructure now appears to include 12 national-level facilities (large red dots) and an estimated 35 base-level facilities. (This map can be difficult to read. Here is a larger one.)

More details about the facilities are in the UNIDIR research report "Lock them Up: Zero-deployed Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe", which was completed earlier this year. (UPDATE: For an important update regarding weapon handling procedures, see this note, "Non-strategic weapons storage and deployment procedures in Russia") The report also lists locations of NATO bases in Europe that host U.S. weapons. The idea of the research project that produced the report was to look into a possibility of an arrangement that would transfer all non-strategic nuclear weapons to central storage facilities (those big red dots). Russia, in fact, has long maintained that it has done just that, although it never specified that it's the national-level facilities that it considers "central." We have found that the "zero-deployed" arrangement is entirely feasible. Its key element is that we would only verify the absence of nuclear weapons at specified sites and never have to have access to weapons. This would make verification much easier than counting the number of non-strategic weapons in storage, as most proposals advocate. Please read the report for a more detailed discussion.

Back to the Russian storage sites. Until 2009, the base-level facilities were assigned to individual services, but now all of them are in the 12th Main Directorate. However, they still bear marks of their former affiliation. Badges of individual units were very helpful in the process. Also, with a few exceptions, it is relatively easy to identify the units that a storage facility is supposed to service.

There are a couple of outliers, though - the site in Shaykovka, located near a long-range aviation airbase, appears to be subordinated to the Strategic Rocket Forces. There are two "engineering units" - Khabarovsk-41, located near the Khabarovsk-47/Korfovsky national-level site, and Chita-46, co-located with the Gornyy base-level storage. The mission of Gornyy is not entirely clear - it is technically assigned to the air force, but there is no air base there. It used to be a Strategic Rocket Forces site, but that was quite some time ago.

Storage facilities are fairly easy to identify in most cases, although not always - for some units we can only be certain of the location of the headquarters. I got some flack for putting all this information together, but that was a conscious decision to do so. Yes, security of these sites is important. But those who are entrusted with protecting these sites should never ever assume that their facilities are invisible. Because they are out there in the open.

I must also admit that the list of storage sites in the report is incomplete. We just missed the Borovsk-1 facility that stores nuclear weapons for interceptors of the Moscow missile defense. This does not change any conclusions in our report, but for the sake of completeness, here is the site:

1665178680626.png

I've been told that we may have missed one or two more. I think it is unlikely, but it is possible. Leave a comment or send me a note if you know what is missing.

UPDATE: I should note that the idea of removing non-strategic nuclear weapons to central storage is, of course, not new. It's been discussed ever since Russiadeclared that all its weapons are withdrawn to central storage sites. The idea was discussed by a number of authors. For example, Rose Gottemoeller wrote about it in her "Eliminating Short-Range Nuclear Weapons Designed to Be Forward Deployed," in Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons: Complete Report of 2007 Hoover Institution Conference, ed. George P. Shultz et al. (Hoover Press, 2013). Alexey Arbatov had a very detailed discussion of the proposal in this chapter "A Russian Perspective on the Challenge of U.S., NATO, and Russian Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons," inReducing Nuclear Risks in Europe: A Framework for Action, ed. Steve Andreasen and Isabelle Williams (NTI, 2011).
 
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