Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Hyviä pointteja. Jos pieni syrjähyppy sallitaan, niin ryssän surkeat näytöt Ukrainassa panevat kyllä miettimään olisiko punakoneesta ollut mihinkään NATO:a vastaan sanotaan nyt vaikka 1980-luvun Keski-Euroopassa ? Toki massaa sillä olisi ollut heittää tuleen niin maan helvetisti, mutta oikeasti millä tasolla osaaminen olisi ollut ? Ja nyt on käynyt selväksi, että varsinkin Venäjän maavoimat ovat pelkkä varjo neuvostoarmeijasta. Vaikuttaa olevan ihan silkkaa paskaa taidoiltaan ja osaamiseltaan jos verrataan länsiarmeijoihin. Ja Putlerilla ei enää ole edes sitä massaa millä punakone olisi myllyttänyt ja jauhanut.
Muutama pointti:

1. Vuonna 1980 NL:n BKT oli noin puolet USAn luvusta. Nyt se on alle 1/10.
2. NL oli pannut usean vuosikymmenen ihan käsittämättömän määrän rahaa aseisiin tuossa vaiheessa, noin 15% BKT:stä. Nämä kaksi huomioiden USAn ja NL:n sotilasmenot olivat melkein yhtä suuret. Nyt prosenttiosuus on melkein sama molemmissa ja talouksien kokoero on se, mikä on, joten USA on täysin ylivoimainen.
3. Kaikki Itä-Euroopan maat olisivat olleet NL:n puolella.
4. Teknologinen ero lännen ja idän välillä on syntynyt ennen kaikkea tietojen käsittelyssä. Tämä puoli sotimista oli paljon pienemmässä roolissa 1980-luvulla kuin on nyt.
5. NL oli valmistautunut ennen kaikkea suursotaan Euroopassa. Siksi Afganistan meni siltä niin käteen, koska se sota ei soveltunut asevelvollisilla). Nyky-Venäjän armeija taas sopii paremmin johonkin Tshethsenian kaltaiseen sotaan kuin ns. "Near peer" vastustajaan tavanomaisessa suursodassa. LKP-systeemit oli silloin ihan kunnossa toisin kuin nyt.

Todennäköisesti NL (+Varsovanliitto) olisi silti saanut turpiin NATOlta, mutta paljon tiukempi matsi se olisi ollut kuin mitä tällä hetkellä voimasuhteista voi päätellä.
 
Luovuttamalla aseensa putlerille Valkopaskavenäjä demonstroi sen minkä koko maailma tietää: länsi ei koskaan hyökkää itään. Vaikka lukapaska on itse paholaisen paras kaveri ja osallistuu ukrainalaisten murhaamiseen siinä missä pääpersekin, hän tietää ettei Nato tule häntä kaatamaan. Mikä on harmi.
Ei lukaa tarvitse kaataa. Se menee itsekseen nurin ihan kohta. Kansalaisiaan käy kyllä sääliksi, kun ovat joutuneet näin monta vuotta äijän perseilyitä seuraamaan aitiopaikalta.
 
USA on ostanut Starlink-firmalta ja lahjoittanut Ukrainalle...

However, the inference that SpaceX's "donation" to Ukraine was paid for entirely by the U.S. government is not accurate.


Suurin osa kuluista salaisia.
 
Suurin meriitti Putinin kakkosmieheksi taisi olla pituus kun on jopa Putinia lyhyem

Kiva elää diplomaattisen ratkaisun harhassa, Nurnberg II on ainoa ratkaisu..

Kiva elää diplomaattisen ratkaisun harhassa, Nurnberg II on ainoa ratkaisu..
Se, että örkit ovat avoimia diplomatialle merkitsee, että he ovat kusessa.
Puhuvapää haluaa neuvotella = örkit häviämässä ja haluavat jäädyttää tilanteen.
Onkohan mitään perää? Jos olisi totta niin se on ns. lämmintä. Nyt puhuu kuitenkin aseet.
 
However, the inference that SpaceX's "donation" to Ukraine was paid for entirely by the U.S. government is not accurate.


Suurin osa kuluista salaisia.
80M/5000 = 16000 per liittymä.
Tämän päivän korotetuillakin kuluttajahinnoilla tuolla saa terminaalin ja maksaa kuukausimaksut 11 vuodeksi 8 kuukaudeksi.
Pientä Lapin lisää tuntuu siis olevan.

Mutta Hersonissakin tapahtuu jotain.

 
Puhuvapää haluaa neuvotella = örkit häviämässä ja haluavat jäädyttää tilanteen.

Ei halua, pelkkää sisäpoliittista perseilyä. Ja tässäkin toimii se sääntö, että kun tämä apina sanoo jotain, tarkoittaa se juuri päinvastaista. Sama pätee tietysti kaikkiin kremlin kusipäihin.
Aivan hyvin ovat tietoisia, ettei länsi tai USA neuvottele terroristien kanssa. Eivätkä he itsekään halua kenenkään kanssa neuvotella. Ja mistähän ryssä edes neuvottelisi USA:n kanssa? Neuvotella pitäisi kai Ukrainen kanssa.
Syy miksi tällaista tuubaa kerrotaan on tietysti siinä, että voidaan kansalle kertoa, kuinka länsi ja Ukraina on haluton rauhaan ja haluaa ainoastaan eskaloida ja tuhota venäjän.
 
Tässä mainio tili niille jotka seuraavat innolla rautatielogistiikkaa ja siihen liittyviä iskuja (ymmärtääkseni tämän takana samat tyypit jotka ylläpitävät Russian bridges go boom -karttapalvelua):


Tässä pari päivää vanha kirjoitus Venäjän sisäisistä kuohuista, tällä kertaa käsitellään tiedustelupalveluita:

https://www.economist.com/europe/20...-has-battered-the-reputation-of-russian-spies

I have a new piece on the state of the Russian intelligence services. Pockets of excellence, shot through with corruption. It's not just that they bungled Ukraine. The war, & mass expulsion of SVR officers, is forcing illegals & others to take bigger risks

John Sawers, ex-chief of MI6, told me Russian services retain "deep tradition of intelligence professionalism” and "world-class" skills. But corruption "like gangrene on top". Over 30 years, "standards of probity & professionalism...have declined markedly”

I learnt (before the war, and after) of a number of cases, across all three services, in which Russian intelligence officers were skimming off salaries for agents. In one GRU unit as much as 80% of the funds earmarked for salaries were being embezzled.

I was also told that illegals are being identified not just because of outdated tradecraft, but also because they're taking bigger risks. Exposure has a meaningful impact: SVR is thought to have approximately 50 to 100 deployed illegals, GRU only 10 to 20.

There's a general sense that Russian intel services have not adapted to the digital age, & its counterintelligence possibilities, as quickly as Western counterparts. They struggle w/ building robust cover, communicating w/ agents & paying them. A symptom:

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-...-fake-passports-to-its-operatives-in-ukraine/

Bellingcat Russia fake passports.jpg

Europe | Not-so-special services

The war in Ukraine has battered the reputation of Russian spies

As they take greater risks, they are getting caught

Oct 9th 2022
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Viktor Muller Ferreira was a young Brazilian with impressive credentials and a big break. Fresh from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, an incubator of talent for America’s national security elite, he had secured an internship at the International Criminal Court (icc) in The Hague. But when he landed in Amsterdam in April, he was quickly deported to Brazil. Mr Ferreira was, in fact, Sergey Vladimirovich Cherkasov, an intelligence officer working for the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service.

Mr Cherkasov was a so-called illegal, of the sort depicted in the popular television series “The Americans”—an officer dispatched abroad under an elaborate foreign identity, often for life. In a four-page document obtained by Dutch intelligence, an aide-memoire of sorts, his cover story was laid out in painstaking detail, down to childhood crushes and favoured restaurants. Mr Cherkasov is now languishing in a Brazilian prison, sentenced to 15 years.

When the Soviet KGB was dissolved in 1991, it reappeared as the FSB, a domestic security service, and the SVR, a foreign intelligence agency. The GRU has endured in one form or another since 1918. These “special services” bask in the fearsome reputation of their tsarist and Soviet forebears. But they emerge from the war in Ukraine with that reputation, and their networks, in tatters. The explosion which damaged the Kerch bridge on October 8th was only the latest security foul-up; Ukrainian operatives are also suspected of having orchestrated a car bombing in Moscow in August which killed the daughter of a prominent Russian ultra-nationalist ideologue, according to the New York Times.

Intelligence failure lies at the heart of the war. The FSB, the lead agency for protecting Russian secrets and spying in Ukraine, bungled both tasks in spectacular fashion. It failed to stop America from obtaining, and then publicising, Russian war plans for Ukraine—the most dramatic deployment of intelligence since America’s exposure of Soviet missiles on Cuba in 1962. Worse still, it was the FSB’s own conspicuous preparations for war—including plans to kill dissidents and install a puppet government—that helped convince American and British officials that the Russian military build-up was not a bluff.

Vladimir Putin’s decision to go to war in the first place also owed much to the FSB’s bungling. The agency’s Fifth Service, responsible for ex-Soviet countries, expanded its Ukraine team dramatically in July 2021, according to a report by the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank in London. Yet its officers largely spoke to those Ukrainians who were sympathetic to Russia and exaggerated the scale of their agent networks in the country, giving the Kremlin the false impression that the Ukrainian government would quickly collapse.

Confirmation bias was only part of the problem. Intelligence agencies, like armies, reflect the societies they come from. At their best, Russian spies can be bold and resourceful. “We’ve consistently been surprised by the cleverness and relentlessness of some of the things that they do,” says John Sipher, who served as the CIA’s station chief in Moscow and later ran its Russia operations. “They have really, really smart people.”

But that talent co-exists with venality and dysfunction. Intelligence is embellished at each stage as it rises up the chain, with bad news stripped out before it reaches the Kremlin. A Western official describes how, in one GRU unit, officers are thought to have skimmed off 30% of the salaries of the agents they recruited. That figure rose to 50% as the officers gradually had to spend more time padding out reports with information culled from the internet.

The great strength of Russian intelligence is its sheer scale. Yet only a fraction of its personnel do useful spywork. It was FSB officers who poisoned Alexei Navalny, an opposition leader, with Novichok, a nerve agent, in Siberia in 2020. Nothing encapsulates the dual ethos of repression and larceny better than the fact that the FSB’s most sought-after position is the chief of the Fourth Service, a division responsible for “economic security”. Its officers are placed in key companies, giving them ample opportunity to enrich themselves.

Infighting within the agencies, and with other government departments, is rife. “The FSB is like the Game of Thrones,” says Maxim (not his real name), a former FSB counterintelligence officer. “You have different clans inside with different political and financial interests.”

The SVR, a descendant of the First Chief Directorate, the KGS’s flagship foreign intelligence arm, considers itself more urbane and polished than its Russian sister services. “Our view was that the SVR was far more effective and sophisticated than the GRU,” recalls Mr Sipher. But the war has left it battered. Western countries have expelled over 400 suspected Russian intelligence officers since the spring, mostly SVR officers, eliminating nearly half of those operating under diplomatic cover in Europe. Those remaining face heightened scrutiny by local security services.

A recent report by SUPO, Finland’s intelligence service, notes that Russian intelligence officers there have mostly been “severed” from their networks. It warns that Russian spies are resorting to alternative means. One is cyber-espionage. Another is the recruitment of foreigners within Russia. A third, which SUPO does not mention, is to lean more heavily on illegals like Mr Cherkasov. But that comes at a cost. The pressure on illegals is driving them to take greater risks than usual, according to European intelligence officials.

In March, for instance, Poland arrested Pablo González, a Spanish-Russian journalist also known as Pavel Rubtsov, on suspicion of working for the GRU. A Ukrainian source says he was attempting to enter Ukraine to access a cyber unit in one of the country’s intelligence agencies (Mr Rubtsov denies the charges). Mr Cherkasov might have targeted the ICC because it had opened an investigation into war crimes in Ukraine. Their exposure will be keenly felt. Illegals are hugely expensive to train and deploy. The SVR is thought to have 50 to 100 deployed illegals, and the GRU only 10 to 20, according to sources familiar with those programmes.

In many ways, Russian spies face the same professional challenges as their Western counterparts. It is becoming increasingly difficult to cross borders under multiple names, given the ubiquity of biometric controls, or build a digital backstory that stands up to scrutiny. Paying and communicating with agents is another challenge. But whereas Western spies have learnt how to blend into the noise, Russian ones have been slow to adapt. Illegals still use the dated technique of appropriating the identity of a dead baby (familiar to readers of “The Day of the Jackal”, a novel published in 1971.) Sloppiness abounds. Data leaked from a Russian food-delivery service in March exposed the names of FSB and GRU officers having food delivered to their respective headquarters.

That would not matter so much if Russian intelligence were not under intense scrutiny. Ever since the GRU’s attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal, a former officer, in Salisbury, an English city, in 2018, Western allies have shared increasing amounts of intelligence on Russian spooks. Though it was Dutch intelligence that exposed Mr Ferreira, the operation was a joint endeavour that relied on America, Ireland and others.

There has been little accountability for all this bungling. Western officials say they cannot confirm rumours that Sergei Beseda, the head of the FSB’s Fifth Service, was arrested in Russia in March. There are no proven job losses at senior level. That reflects the privileged status of the siloviki—securocrats—in the Russian state. Mr Putin does not trust his spies—he is said to be bypassing Alexander Bortnikov, the FSB’s chief, and talking to department heads—but it would be unwise to pick a fight with them just as his regime is experiencing an upswell of popular discontent over the drafting of hundreds of thousands of young Russian men to fight in Ukraine. On October 8th Mr Putin even placed the FSB in charge of security for the Kerch bridge.

The result is likely to be more of the same. “You have a deep tradition of intelligence professionalism,” says Sir John Sawers, a former chief of MI6, “and like a gangrene on top of it is this growing corruption.” Maxim, the former FSB officer, agrees. “Back in the 1990s and 2000s there was a KGB touch to it. We stayed under the radar,” he says. The breaking point for him was when new graduates of the FSB academy were spotted driving a luxury Mercedes around Moscow. Ukraine is an opportunity to rebuild, he says. “They need to substitute this money world with something bigger. I’m not sure how they are going to do it.”


Tähän twitter-ketjuun oli tullut mielenkiintoinen vastaus, viitataan Mark Geleottin lyhyeen kirjoitukseen vuodelta 2016:

https://ecfr.eu/publication/putins_hydra_inside_russias_intelligence_services/

Putin’s hydra: Inside Russia’s intelligence services

Far from being an all-powerful “spookocracy” that controls the Kremlin, Russia’s intelligence services are internally divided

Mark Galeotti
ECFR Alumni · Former Visiting Fellow
Publication
11 May 2016

Far from being an all-powerful “spookocracy” that controls the Kremlin, Russia’s intelligence services are internally divided, distracted by bureaucratic turf wars, and often produce poor quality intelligence – ultimately threatening the interests of Vladimir Putin himself.

Drawing on extensive interviews with former and current intelligence officials, “Putin’s hydra: Inside Russia’s intelligence services” explains how the spy agencies really work, and argues that Europe’s view of them is patchy and based on outdated caricatures.

The paper punctures the myth that the agencies are the power behind the throne in Russia. They are firmly subordinated to the Kremlin, and Putin plays them off against one another. They are not a united bloc but a disparate group, whose solidarity disappears as soon as there is an opportunity to make money or avoid blame.

Russia intelligence architecture 2016 - by Mark Galeotti.jpg

The agencies often replicate each others’ work, engaging in bloody competition rather than sharing intelligence. The need to please the Kremlin and deliver quick results leads to shoddy information gathering and analysis. Intelligence chiefs must shape and sugarcoat the facts to suit the president – or risk their jobs.

Fighting for territory, and locked in a Cold-War mindset where “If the West loses, we gain”, Russia’s spy agencies take extreme measures abroad – even assassinations. Their actions in the West may seem tactically effective but are strategically disastrous, painting Russia as an unpredictable threat.

European governments can moderate the agencies’ actions in their countries by adopting a tougher approach. This means investing not just in in counterintelligence but also addressing the governance weaknesses that facilitate the Kremlin’s campaigns, including placing tougher controls on their sources of dirty money.

Author Mark Galeotti said:

“The Russians are engaging in massive and voracious intelligence-gathering campaigns, fuelled by still-substantial budgets and a Kremlin culture that sees deceit and secret agendas even where none exist.”

“The wars between the agencies have raged on-and-off since 2004. The blurring of boundaries between them encourages regular turf wars – not just over the usual bureaucratic prizes of responsibilities, funding, and access to the leadership but also business opportunities for officers, and sometimes outright survival.”

“Putin has the intelligence and security community he wanted: a powerful, feral, multi-headed, and obedient hydra. But it is Putin himself, and his dreams of Russia as a great power, that is the real victim of this badly managed beast. The agencies reinforce his assumptions and play to his fantasies rather than informing and challenging his worldview.”

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.

 
Ei halua, pelkkää sisäpoliittista perseilyä. Ja tässäkin toimii se sääntö, että kun tämä apina sanoo jotain, tarkoittaa se juuri päinvastaista. Sama pätee tietysti kaikkiin kremlin kusipäihin.
Aivan hyvin ovat tietoisia, ettei länsi tai USA neuvottele terroristien kanssa. Eivätkä he itsekään halua kenenkään kanssa neuvotella. Ja mistähän ryssä edes neuvottelisi USA:n kanssa? Neuvotella pitäisi kai Ukrainen kanssa.
Syy miksi tällaista tuubaa kerrotaan on tietysti siinä, että voidaan kansalle kertoa, kuinka länsi ja Ukraina on haluton rauhaan ja haluaa ainoastaan eskaloida ja tuhota venäjän.
Uskon että ryssässä halu neuvottelupöytään on jo todella kova, mutta ei vielä niin pakottavaa tarvetta tunnustaa sitä että se voidaan tuodaan esiin vain kuvailemanasi uhriutumistemppuna mikä uppoaa niin kotiyleisöön kuin ulkomaiden Turtiaisiin.

Liero. Lierompi. Lavrov.
 
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