Hyvin mielenkiintoisia numeroita nämäkin, tosin sodan aikana on nähty arvioita joka suuntaan. Kuten ketjun kommenteissa sanotaan, virolaisen tiedustelueverstin arvio oli selvästi suurempi:
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"We estimate that Russia had about 17 million rounds of ammunition before the war started, 10 million of which have been used up," he said. "At the end of the summer, their ammunition usage was very high - there were days when between 20,000 and 60,000 [artillery] rounds were being fired, which is a huge amount."
Grosberg pointed out, that while prior to the war, Russia's artillery remanufacturing capacity was around 1.7 million units per year, along with the introduction of mobilization, factories which produce arms have increased their operations significantly, in order to increase arms production.
"No matter how much they are able to increase ammunition production levels, simple math tells us that they still have about 10 million (rounds) in stock. They could produce around 3.4 million more in a year, meaning they would have enough ammunition for at least another year, if not longer, of war," the colonel said.
Precision ammunition, which is currently being used to attack Ukrainian civilian infrastructure is also being depleted. However, along with the various missiles Russia has, these stocks will also be enough to last for at least the next nine months, Grosberg added.
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Meidän Pekka Toveri kirjoitti Venäjän tykistöstön ammustilanteesta 18.12.2022:
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Venäjän sotateollisuus pystyi tuottamaan ennen hyökkäystä noin 1,5 miljoonaa ammusta vuosittain, mikä on painona noin 100.000 tonnia. Tämän hetken kulutus on noin 20.000 laukausta päivässä, mikä merkitsee noin 0,6 miljoonaa kpl kuukaudessa.
Eli jos venäläisillä on jäljellä noin 7 miljoonaa ammusta, tuolla kulutuksella ja uustuotannolla ammukset loppuvat ensi vuoden lopussa. Jos venäjä kykenee menemään kolmivuorotyöhön ammustuotannossa, ammuksia riittää kesään 2024. Kyky tähän on kuitenkin kyseenalainen.
Kyseessä on hyvin karkea julkisiin lähteisiin perustuva arvio, joka on kuitenkin linjassa brittien tiedustelun arvion kanssa jonka mukaan venäjän tykistön ammukset alkavat olla lopussa ensi vuoden lopulla. Valko-Venäjältä saadut 65.000 tonnia ammuksia kestävät vain 6 viikkoa.
Edellä mainittu on siis arvio. Ammuksia voi olla vähemmänkin jäljellä, tn ei paljoakaan enempää. Venäjän sotateollisuuden kyky mennä komivuorotyöhön on tosiaan kyseenalainen ja uusien tuotantolaitosten perustaminen kestäisi vuosia.
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Muistan myös tällaisen haastattelun:
Hyvin mielenkiintoinen arvio, lainaan siitä tykistön kranaatteja koskevan osuuden:
- My assessment is that the lion's share has been spent, and soon the artillery will have problems. If you continue to shoot at the pace that they use artillery, then by the end of the year there will be a shortage of shells. There are no bottomless Soviet warehouses - what was, either fell into disrepair over the years, or was already used up in two Chechen wars.
Production capacity is also very limited. Since 2014, a recovery program has begun, and old shells fired in the late Soviet and post-Soviet times have been changed. It is difficult to calculate them, but it can be estimated as follows: approximately 570 thousand shells of various types and calibers were restored per year, and about a million new ones were produced.
The Russian army on the eve of the attack on Ukraine had about 15 million shells, and now they have used up six to seven million, if we take the numbers that they voice for faith.
If we continue to shell at this pace, there will be an acute shortage by the end of the year.
I do not think that Russia has the opportunity to receive military assistance from some other countries. From which - Iran, North Korea? It doesn't look like they have a good military industry. Russia is trying, of course, to scrape together something there, to raise this topic in negotiations. But what will this give the countries themselves, what is their interest? China, in turn, is playing on two fields at the same time. For him, Russia is primarily fuel, which he burns to buy time to prepare for a possible conflict with the United States over Taiwan or with his other neighbors over territories, for example, waters in the South China Sea. But if China supplies at least one drone to Russia and this is recorded on the battlefield, this will dramatically change the political situation of China, it does not need such a reduction in freedom of maneuver.
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Tiedäpä näistä, ehkä ryssän bloggarien valitus "shell hunger" ilmiöstä on maskirovkaa? Tai ehkä ne ovat aitoja epätoivon parahduksia?
Ehkä tykistön laukausten punaraja tulee vastaan keväällä 2023 tai ehkä näitä riittää helposti koko 2023 vuoden ajaksi, ehkä pitkälle vuoteen 2024?
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