Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Ryssän ilmavoimien näkymättömyys tässä sodassa on kyllä erikoinen juttu. Luulisi, että jos Bahmutissa kerran haluttaisiin sota ratkaista, niin hyökkäystä tuettaisiin kaikilla käytettävissä olevilla lentojoukoilla (ja ohjuksilla myös). Onko varovaisuuden taustalla tappioiden pelko ja tieto siitä, että menetettyä kalustoa olisi lähes mahdotonta korvata millään järkevällä aikavälillä? Toisaalta, mitä ilmavoimilla tekee, jos ei niitä uskalla sodassa käyttää? Paperilla Venäjän ilmavoimien olisi tietysti pitänyt saavuttaa täydellinen ilmaherruus heti sodan alkuvaiheessa, mutta niinpä vain sekin ennakko-oletus meni täysin metsään monen muun lailla.
 
Venäjän taktiikasta (ei sinänsä yllätä, mitäpä muutakaan voisi yrittää):

#Russia prepares a major force or plays info war with numbers.

Objective 1 to stop Ukrainian offensive.
Objective 2 to counterattack after Ukrainian army is exhausted.


Lainaan kuvan tekstin käännöksen spoilerin taakse:

28 March 2023 19:45
Alexander Sharkovsky, Special Correspondent

The summer campaign, apparently, will become unprecedentedly bloody and will be especially noted for fierce battles.

Europe is thoroughly preparing the Armed Forces of Ukraine for summer hostilities and is clearly pushing Zelensky to commit a suicidal offensive for the Ukrainian armed forces. The first batch of promised tanks has already arrived in Ukraine, the European Union encourages its member countries to increase the production of ammunition, primarily shells. Russia is also preparing for the summer campaign, guns and military equipment are being removed from storage, all this is undergoing maintenance and sent to the front. Enterprises of the defense industry complex of the Russian Federation have increased the production of modern types of weapons, ammunition and combat vehicles.

European countries and the United States are boosting military supplies to Ukraine. Already transferred to Kiev: 18 Leopard 2A6 tanks from Germany, spare parts and ammunition for them, 3 Pioneerpanzer 2 Dax armored engineering vehicles, 70 MG-3 machine guns and more. Most likely, along with the Leopards, Berlin also provided field tank workshops. In addition, the German authorities promise to supply Zelensky with 80 more modernized Leopard 1 tanks by the end of this year and 20 of the same vehicles next year and an unnamed number of Marder infantry fighting vehicles.

Norway sent Kyiv 8 Leopard 2A4 tanks, 4 ARVs and one mobile counter-battery radar. America is not yet ready to transfer the Abrams M1 tanks, but soon Kiev will receive seven M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (then more than 40 of the same vehicles), a batch of ammunition and spare parts for them, rockets for the Hymars MLRS and anti-radar missiles "Kharm ", as well as portable anti-tank systems. Britain provides Ukraine with 18 Challenger 2 tanks, ammunition for them, including those with depleted uranium cores. In addition, London is sending 32 A5-90 self-propelled howitzers with ammunition and spare parts to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The aid package also includes Coguar armored personnel carriers (American-made). North Macedonia is sending 4 Su-25 attack aircraft to Kyiv, Slovakia is sending 4 front-line MiG-29 fighters, Poland will give Ukraine the same number of MiG-29s. Ten Leopard 2A4 tanks, eight 155-mm Archer self-propelled guns and one RBS-97 air defense system will soon arrive from Sweden in Nezalezhnaya. Belgium will send 80 Iveco armored vehicles and 150 trucks to Ukraine. France has already transferred its AMIx 10MS light wheeled tanks to Kyiv and will soon supply it with a SAMP/T SAM battery. Paris is preparing to give up the Armed Forces of Ukraine and its aircraft <<Mirage>>. Bulgaria will continue to supply ammunition to Ukraine. This time, the focus will be on providing Kyiv with artillery shells and small arms cartridges.

In addition, Kyiv receives 1.8 billion euros from the EU every month. Brussels initiated a program of deliveries from EU countries to Kyiv of 1 million shells per year. The IMF, in turn, will transfer about $15.6 billion to the Zelensky administration. New weapons and equipment are intended to equip the brigades that are part of the strategic reserve of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, intended for the offensive, which is scheduled for the summer period of this year.

From Slovakia, a message was received from eyewitnesses about what was on the road. Leading from Trhovishte to Pozdishovce, at least ten heavy cargo areas were seen carrying heavy armored vehicles covered with tents. It also became known that this convoy was heading to Michalovce and then to Uzhgorod. There is an assumption that self-propelled 155-mm howitzers AC-90 are hidden under the awnings.

According to various sources, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have practically prepared a reserve of 150,000 to 200,000 infantry. These forces are mainly equipped with Western-style equipment and weapons. Data are coming from NATO countries on the completion of the training of the first stage of tank crews and calculations of artillery pieces and anti-aircraft systems.

HUOM: JR2 oli korostanut artikkelista seuraavan osuuden twiitissään:

The Russian military department is also not sitting idly by. A large amount of military equipment is removed from storage. Increased production of new equipment and weapons. Eyewitnesses are uploading videos showing that a large amount of artillery is being sent to the front line: howitzers D20, D30, guns "Hyacinth". 85-mm anti-aircraft rapid-fire guns KS18 (which are effective in combating armored vehicles) and so on. It also became known that Russian ammunition manufacturers have significantly increased the production of shells, for some positions by 7-8 times. At various levels, it is stated that Russia possesses an unnamed powerful weapon capable of crushing the Armed Forces of Ukraine in a short time.

Earlier it was reported about the increase in the production of high-precision long-range missiles, perhaps we are talking about including about hypersonic weapons.

In addition, from fragmentary information from the RF Ministry of Defense, it can be concluded that the preparation of the operational reserve, formed from a significant part of the personnel called up during partial mobilization, is nearing completion. At present, the Military Commissariats are carrying out activities for the recruitment of contract soldiers in the RF Armed Forces with a total number of 400,000 people. Probably, this contingent will be trained for the autumn offensive of the Russian troops. Apparently, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation plans to inflict sensitive damage on the enemy, wear him out and bleed him, while repelling the counter-offensive campaign of the Armed Forces of Ukraine announced by Kiev in the coming summer. And thus (to create conditions for going on the offensive, in the future.

 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Ryssän ilmavoimien näkymättömyys tässä sodassa on kyllä erikoinen juttu. Luulisi, että jos Bahmutissa kerran haluttaisiin sota ratkaista, niin hyökkäystä tuettaisiin kaikilla käytettävissä olevilla lentojoukoilla (ja ohjuksilla myös). Onko varovaisuuden taustalla tappioiden pelko ja tieto siitä, että menetettyä kalustoa olisi lähes mahdotonta korvata millään järkevällä aikavälillä? Toisaalta, mitä ilmavoimilla tekee, jos ei niitä uskalla sodassa käyttää? Paperilla Venäjän ilmavoimien olisi tietysti pitänyt saavuttaa täydellinen ilmaherruus heti sodan alkuvaiheessa, mutta niinpä vain sekin ennakko-oletus meni täysin metsään monen muun lailla.

Useampi kommentaattori on sanonut, että ilmavoimien näkymättömyys perustuu osaksi harhaan: niiden toimintaa ei pysty havaitsemaan eri OSINT-menetelmin yhtä helposti kuin jalkaväkeä, panssarijoukkoja yms.

Tästä syystä niiden toiminnasta kirjoitetaan vähemmän, mikä puolestaan ruokkii mielikuvaa että eivät tekisi juuri mitään.

Michael Kofman on puhunut mm. tästä sen jälkeen kun vieraili Ukrainassa (mukaanlukien Bakhmutissa).

Toki se on kaikille selvää että Venäjän ilmavoimat ei ole kyennyt missään vaiheessa saavuttamaan ilmaherruutta eikä tuhoamaan Ukrainan ilmavoimia tai ilmatorjuntaa. Kofmanin mukaan edes Neuvostoliiton ilmavoimat eivät osanneet ja harjoitelleet SEAD / DEAD operaatioita, joten Venäjän ilmavoimilla ei ole siihen alkuunkaan riittäviä kykyjä. Liian vähän tarpeeseen sopivia aseita, hävittäjäkoneita sekä koulutettuja lentäjiä. Olen viime päivinä kuunnellut useita analyysejä, joten en muista tarkkaan, millä videolla hän jutteli näistä. Tässä pari arvausta lähteestä: LINKKI 1 ja LINKKI 2

Kofmanin viesti oli kuitenkin se, että julkisten lähteiden perusteella on vaikea arvioida ilmavoimien toimintaa tämän sodan aikana. Hän nimesi myös toisen hyvin hämärässä pysyneen toimijan: Venäjän tiedustelupalveluiden toiminta sodan aikana, varsinkin sodan alkupäivinä. Hänen mukaansa FSB yritti aidosti toteuttaa heille asetetut tehtävät, mutta eivät onnistuneet siinä. Sotasuunnitelma nojasi osaltaan siihen että FSB on "valmistellut maaston".
 
Covert Cabal -youtube-kanavan tuore video (julkaistu 25.3.2023):

So How Many Ancient T-54s Does Russia Still Have?​



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Tämä sama kanava laski viime vuonna Venäjän varastotukikohtien panssarivaunujen määriä (laskenta perustui satelliittikuviin), teki tästä kaksi videota.

Nyt hän pyrki arvioimaan, missä varastotukikohdissa on T-54/T-55 vaunuja ja mikä määrä. Hän on hyvin avoin laskennan vaikeuksista, resoluutio on sellainen että on vaikea erottaa yhtä vaunutyyppiä toisesta. Hän penkoi eri tukikohdista löytyviä valokuvia ja muuta materiaalia, tosin näitä on rajallinen määrä ja datapisteiden aikaväli voi olla vuosia.

Kaikesta huolimatta hänen laskentansa tulokset (asia alkaa videon aikavälillä 2:38, varsinainen laskenta aikavälillä 3:40-4:55 - merkitsin parin tukikohdan osalta sulkuihin hänen kommenttinsa):

22. varastotukikohta = none
103. varastotukikohta = none
227. varastotukikohta = none
349. varastotukikohta = none
2544. varastotukikohta = none
1311. varastotukikohta = hard to tell, at first it seemed none but after looking for a long time - there does seem to be a few, at most maybe 20
111. varastotukikohta = between 222 and 317 as of September 2022 (big base, approximately 1 000 tanks here - of all types)
1295. varastotukikohta = between 79 and 142 back in June 2022 (there are a lot of T-62s here, it did have T-54s back in 2010 that were in decent shape but a ton of them have been destroyed in the meantime)

300-500 T-54/55 tanks remaining in storage (I could have missed some)


Jos halutaan olla tarkkoja, alarajaksi saadaan:

222 + 79 = 301

Yläraja:

20 + 317 + 142 = 479

Aikaisemmin nähtiin uutisointia jonka mukaan T-54/T-55 kalustoa olisi aktivoitu 111. ja 1295. varastotukikohdista, mikä täsmää tämän selvityksen kanssa (muissa tarkastelluissa varastotukikohdissa ei ole T-54/T-55 vaunuja, tosin hän ei tarkastellut "ihan jokaista").

Lisäksi muistetaan aikaisempi uutisointi, jossa lainattiin nimetöntä "Venäjän MoD lähdettä", jonka mukaan näitä vaunuja voidaan aktivoida 250 kpl, suora lainaus: LÄHDE

According to the expert, the Russian Armed Forces have few T-54/55s left because they have been actively recycled since the late 80s.

"According to my data there were not many T-54/55 left. There were tens of thousands of them. But since the late 80's they were heavily recycled. It seems that even for the museum to get them in more or less complete form is a problem. Though it is quite possible that there are still several hundreds of them in storage somewhere," said the expert.

Sources in the Defense Ministry say that there are not more than 250 tanks of these types in the storage.


Tuo toki herättää lisäkysymyksiä: tarkoitetaanko että 250 kpl kyetään aktivoimaan nyt ja loput ehkä myöhemmin (jos varaosatilanne yms. tekijät sallivat sen)? Vai ovatko loput niin huonossa kunnossa ettei niitä kyetä aktivoimaan tämän sodan aikana (jos koskaan)? Ehkä puolet vaunuista toimi elintenluovuttajina, jotta saadaan aktivoitua tämä 250 kpl?

Joka tapauksessa vaikuttaa siltä että T-54/T-55 vaunut eivät muodosta pohjatonta resurssia. Mikä ei myöskään tarkoita etteikö näillä voisi olla mitään vaikutusta Ukrainan sotaan.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Lukashenko aikaa pitää puheen parlamentille ja kansalleen ylihuomenna eli perjantaina 31.3.2023:

#Lukashenko to address the nation & parliament on 31 March.

Viestiä kommentoitu näin:

He will probably talk about the deployment of nuclear weapons


Arvaisin että todennäköisesti juttelee näistä ydinaseista. En usko että mitään rajumpaa (yleinen liikekannallepano, liittyminen sotaan Venäjän rinnalle tms.)

Oletan että Puola saa kuulla kunniansa: Lukashenkolla on syvä epäluuloisuus heitä kohtaan ja uskoo salaliittoon että Puola pyrkisi valtaamaan Valko-Venäjän.

Arvatenkin länsimaat saavat osansa myös (pakotteiden takia).

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Yksi hattu vaihtoon taas, tällä kertaa Rosgvardia (tosin heidän "Naval Directorate" - mitä lie tarkoittaakaan, kansalliskaartin merisotaosasta?):

The head of Rosgvardya HQ Naval Directorate S. Volkov detained due to low quality arms deliveries.

Info by Russian Duma member A. Khinshtein (Chairman of the Committee on Information Policy, Information Technologies and Communications.



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Korkeajännitetöitä venäläiseen tyyliin (joku voi ihmetellä, miksi Venäjällä palaa niin tiuhaan - tässä osaselitys):

110kV in Chelyabinsk, #Russia crane touched the electric line.

The head of Rosgvardya HQ Naval Directorate S. Volkov detained due to low quality arms deliveries.

(jostain syystä upotus näkyy vain linkkinä)
 
Ei käytetylle tavaralle ole yksiselitteistä oikeaa hintaa. Ei 7,5 vs 6,3 ole mikään skandaali. Ihan oikeilla jäljillä on oltu.
 
Uskon vasta kun ryssän lentotukikohdissa olevat tupolevit on tulessa. Jos ois tuhansia niin olisi kiusaus tullut jo yrittää, ehkä puhutaan muutamista?
Toisaalta, Neuvostoliiton aikaan Ukraina oli ryssälän insinööritoimisto jossa toteutettiin raketit ja rakettimoottorit. Osaamista on kyllä varmasti. Ja lännestä on saatu rajoittamaton tuki jotta Ukraina saa rakennettua omat pitkänkantaman vaikuttamiskyvyt jolloin ryssä ei voi kiukutella eskaloimisesta.
 
Tiedä sitten voiko tuo 3tkm toimintasäde pitää paikkansa mutta tämän mukaan on Sokil 300 mallista joku longrange versio olemassa / kehitelty
Kun tota googlettaa niin löytyy paljonkin tietoa että tällaista on kehitteillä. Jo viime kesältä on jotain uutista kun nopeasti vilkaisin.

Tässä jotai isompaa esittelyä:

Kuinkahan paljon turkilla on näppinsä pelissä tässä?
 
Uskon vasta kun ryssän lentotukikohdissa olevat tupolevit on tulessa. Jos ois tuhansia niin olisi kiusaus tullut jo yrittää, ehkä puhutaan muutamista?

Voi olla maskirovkaa vahvasti mukana, mutta ehkä näitäkin on säästetty (ja kerätty) tulevaa vastahyökkäystä odottamaan.

Voimakas isku yhtäaikaa kaikilla asejärjestelmillä, mukaanluettuna kauas yltävillä jotta vihollinen saadaan paniikkiin (joka puolelta tulee tietoa iskuista, yhteydet katkeilevat, tutkia rikotaan, Kerchin silta mereen yms.).

Tuo oli se mihin Venäjä pyrki sodan ensipäivinä kaikilla niillä risteilyohjuksilla yms.

JOS Ukrainalla on monenlaista dronea ja ohjusta, niin voivat yrittää samaa (vastahyökkäyksen alkamisen hetkellä, tai miksei jopa ennen sitä).

Saapi nähdä miten tässä käy, seuraavat pari kuukautta tulevat olemaan hyvin mielenkiintoisia (keli tietysti määrää, mitä kannattaa yrittää ja milloin - mutakausi on vielä kesken).
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
16:16 29.03.2023

Reznikov: We completing formation of counterattack corps; time, direction of our strikes to be determined by General Staff​


Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov said Ukraine is completing the formation of counterattack corps, in his opinion, there may be several strikes, but their time and direction will be determined by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

In an interview with the Polish edition of Gazeta Wyborcza, when asked if he still believes that Ukraine will go on the offensive and even end the war by the end of the year, Reznikov said: "Absolutely nothing has changed. I am an optimist by nature, but also a professional lawyer, therefore, I do not make my judgments on the basis of what is desired, but on facts."

"But the facts are as follows: firstly, we are just completing the formation of counterattack corps. Secondly, our partners quite consciously support the idea of a counteroffensive not only at the political, but also at the military level. NATO army generals are aware of our plans and believe that their implementation is real," the minister said.

The minister also said "the war is going on our land, and our military knows all the nuances and conditions of the terrain, they know where to strike."

"The creativity of the Ukrainian military makes it possible to effectively use Soviet and modern Western weapons in parallel. We also know the model of the operation and the tactics of the Russians," the defense minister said.

At the same time, he said, in turn, the invaders do not know what to expect from the Ukrainian forces.

"In my opinion, there will be several of our strikes, but their direction, intensity and time will be determined by the General Staff. Now the spring earth will become soggy, wheeled vehicles will not pass. That is why you must wait. The motivation to liberate the territories is strong," he said.

According to Reznikov, the Russians are afraid of Ukraine's counter-offensive and are already preparing fortifications and defense lines, in particular, in Crimea they have already "formed three rings of defense of the peninsula, building fortifications on the southern beaches."

"This means that they are dissipating their defense resources, their society sees that the so-called 'special operation' is not going according to plan. Their morale is falling, they are already accepting defeat," Reznikov said.
 
Mihin hyökätään seuraavaksi

Kommenteissa on mielestäni hyvä kirjoitus venäjällä asuvalta nimimerkiltä. Toki monta noista pointeista on ollu täälläkin keskustelussa esillä. Kansa joka pelkää vapautta, oikeuksia ja vastuuta.

Dmitriy Sergeevich
3 hours ago

Dear foreign friends! I have already communicated in the comments, and I consider it important to write separately, as a person living in Russia, what is happening here. I was engaged in the analysis of the situation, daily views of various sources, lecturers, polls and studies on the topic of the war, and therefore I consider my experience quite unbiased (although it is not easy even for me to write scientifically and without emotions from what is happening here in 1984). So, the majority of Russians living in Russia really say that Putin is doing well and doing everything right (about 90% of the population). But this cannot be interpreted one-sidedly. Firstly, most people do it out of inertia and unwillingness/impossibility to study politics, which is normal, because it is unusual for people to be interested in politics if it does not concern them. Most Russians believe that politics does not concern them, because incomes, as a rule, do not fall (sanctions really do not work for ordinary people, since most of the population does not travel abroad, does not use foreign services, does not study science and does not read foreign sources). Almost the entire country, however, believes that there really are no independent courts in Russia, that everything around is bought. Therefore, Russians rarely go to court, do not fight for any rights (even for their own), are afraid of conflicts over poor public transport, unreasonably high rents, and so on. But at the same time, they believe that officials and the city administration are to blame. But not Putin! This is truly terrible. Most Russians say that war is bad, but they say that we had no choice, and the US and Ukrainians hate us. In general, this is already pleasing, if only because people do not approve of murders as such. There is a huge generational gap in Putin's approval. The generation of 20-30 years old as a whole will say that Putin is well done, but they will not particularly answer further questions, since they admit that they do not understand the topic. But in the 40+ generation, something terrible begins. They perceive Putin as a religious figure, on the level of their parents, believing that he is never wrong. They are desperately trying to justify his actions with the most stupid arguments. This is due to the Stockholm syndrome experienced in the nineties. They believe that democracy does not work, and the United States and the West allegedly did not help us and wanted us to be poor. Almost all films in Russia showed the nineties as a time of poverty and devastation. They are afraid of freedom, because it was at the beginning of the 2000s that huge economic growth began under Putin due to the increase in oil sales (obviously, Putin did not contribute to this, but they believe that it was him). It can be seen that these people have a neurosis, and they really believe that everyone wants to kill them, because the president said so. The scariest thing is that most of the people 40+ really think that beating their people to death with batons is the right thing to do. What to plant and poison the opposition - that's right. That directing a nuclear bomb at the United States is right. And the older the generation, the crazier their speeches become, and the level of aggression reaches the desire to kill the whole world. But! Not everyone is like that, but only a large part of the population. And this majority really does not want any rights either for themselves or for others. Therefore, it is worth understanding that even the Russians themselves suffer from them, and not just the Ukrainians. And that, therefore, you should not generalize to all Russians, because, generalizing, you do exactly the same thing, considering all people to be bad because of the majority (moreover, the middle-aged majority, which probably won’t even go to your countries). Secondly, there are many people who understand that Putin is insane. But it is these people who have critical thinking, they read the opposition media. And, as a rule, it is they who can find a good job, know foreign languages and emigrate. Therefore, it is impossible to calculate the exact number of Russians who are against the war. There is not even open data and an unambiguous opportunity to interpret the number of people who left. Russians are generally not inclined to be interested in politics. Political videos on YouTube get very little views, and it's obvious that people really think they can't change anything. Russians don't like to read the opposition media, because they show all the bad things that are happening here. Their mood deteriorates, and they prefer to sit in the echo chamber, which says that everything is not so bad in Russia, that the West has its own propaganda, and we have our own. That not everything is so simple, and Ukraine also dressed up. All oppositionists are convinced that democracy will be brought on a silver platter. That the regime will weaken, the elites will want democracy, and this is where we will act (and they themselves do not know how they will act). Russians cannot unite in almost anything because of the totalitarian past and the authoritarian present. The opposition itself quarrels among themselves, and it is not clear how it can even come to power. So overall it's really bad. But if you consider all Russians as fascists, it will be even worse. Autocracy and the Soviet Union turns people into beasts, not vice versa. Therefore, fight for democracy in your countries, fight against right-wing populists who want to make the country great. What makes a country great is cooperation with others and respect for all people. Perhaps my generation (I'm 24) will also come to this if Putin's regime is replaced by something softer. But there is little hope for this, and hope is the only thing we have left among the zombie older generation who want to send us to the Middle Ages.
 
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