Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Pahoittelut jos on jo ollut. Muutaman päivän takainen juttu Uralvagonzavodin tankkiongelmista.


Taitaa olla tuo The Econimist -artikkeli useammankin eri kirjoituksen lähteenä, mukaanlukien Verkkouutisten kirjoitus (julkaistu 1.4.2023):

https://www.verkkouutiset.fi/a/t-54...-venajan-korjauskapasiteetti-loppuu/#606b0776

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Meinasin kommentoida sitä tuoreeltaan, kun se linkitettiin tähän ketjuun mutta unohtui. Siinä oli pari kohtaa, jotka särähtivät korvaan:

Ensimmäinen vaihtoehto olisi 103. Panssarikorjaamolaitos Tšitassa, Baikaljärven itäpuolella 200 kilometrin päässä Mongolian rajasta. Siellä peruskorjataan jo varastoista otettuja T-62-vaunuja seitsemän vaunun kuukausivauhtia suunnitellun 22–23 vaunun sijasta. Lokakuussa laitos teki kolmivuotisen sopimuksen 800 T-62-vaunusta, mutta määrää on jo leikattu, koska laitoksen kapasiteetti jäi vajaaksi.

Tämä on mielenkiintoinen yksityiskohta, joka on mennyt minulta ohi. Tuosta 800 kpl kolmen vuoden aikana kirjoitettiin paljon ja laajasti viime syksynä, mutta tämän mukaan määrä on jo leikattu. Pitää metsästää tälle lähde, koska en muista nähneeni tuosta kirjoituksia aikaisemmin.

Tämä artikkelin kohta särähtää hieman:

Neljäs tuotantolinja on Pietarissa sijaitseva 61. Panssarivaunutehdas, joka on erikoistunut T-72- ja T-80-vaunuihin. Se on korjannut joskus myös T-62- vaunuja ja rakentanut palontorjuntakalustoa T-54/55-alustalle.

БТРЗ № 61 eli "61st armored repair plant", toki siellä on "tuotantolinja" mutta en välttämättä käyttäisi nimeä "panssarivaunutehdas". He tekevät pääasiassa vanhojen varastovaunujen peruskorjausta, tosin ehkä mahdollisesti samalla tehdään pienimuotoista modernisointia. Pääpaino on kuitenkin ollut korjauksessa, ei modernisoinnissa. Hieman hämäävä nimi siis valittu artikkeliin, ainakin minun mielestä.

Toinen silmään pistänyt kohta:

Kolmas vaihtoehto on Uralilla Nižni Tagilissa sijaitseva Uralvagonzavod eli UVZ, joka valmistaa kaikki Venäjän uudet T-90M-taistelupanssarivaunut, joita on aiemmin valmistunut noin 20 vaunun kuukausivauhtia. Siellä valmistetaan myös T-14 Armata -vaunuja.

Tässä sanotaan että T-90M vaunuja on aikaisemmin valmistunut 20 vaunua per kuukausi (mikä tarkoittaisi 240 kpl per vuosi). Oletan että tässä on lainattu The Economist -artikkelin numeroa suoraan, tosin kirjoituksessa se on kääntynyt muotoon "T-90M", tässä suora lainaus artikkelista (sen teksti löytyy mm. tästä viestistä: LINKKI):

Russia has only one tank factory left: UralVagonZavod, a huge complex built in the 1930s. But financial mismanagement and huge debts have slowed modernisation. Workers joke that they assemble tanks by hand. Novaya Gazeta, a liberal Russian newspaper, reports that the plant makes just 20 per month. One Western official tells The Economist that, in total, the Russian armed forces’ demand for tanks is outstripping production by a factor of ten.

Mitä tarkoittaa "plant makes just 20 per month"?

Kirjoitin linkittämässäni viestissä näin: oletan että tässä tarkoitetaan paitsi T-90S / T-90A / T-90M uustuotantoa niin myös varastovaunujen modernisointia T-72B3 ja T-72B3 obr 2016 sekä T-90M standardeihin.
Sanoisin että tuo on looginen päätelmä, koska tuo on sama määrä jonka Venäjän kotimainen panssarivaunuteollisuus on kyennyt valmistamaan ja modernisoimaan sotaa edeltävinä vuosina. JOS tekemäni oletus on oikein, niin silloin tuolla ei tarkoiteta pelkästään T-90M vaunuja vaan kaikkia näitä moderneimpia vaunutyyppejä yhteensä.

Oletan että The Econimist -artikkelin alkuperäinen lähde olisi tämä Novota Gazeta artikkeli (julkaistu 2.11.2022):

The barren barrels

Russia’s military industry has all sorts of problems: there are barely any details for tanks, aircraft electronics and newest missiles are in short supply

12:19 PM, 2 November 2022

Georgy Aleksandrov, exclusively for Novaya Gazeta. Europe

The barren barrels

Russia’s military industry has all sorts of problems: there are barely any details for tanks, aircraft electronics and newest missiles are in short supply

12:19 PM, 2 November 2022

Georgy Aleksandrov, exclusively for Novaya Gazeta. Europe


Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s former president and currently the deputy chairman of the Security Council inspected Uralvagonzavod, one of Russia’s leading military production facilities, on 25 October. As Medvedev said himself, he was inspecting the tank production situation in particular. On his Telegram channel, he wrote about the objectives that were set up during an offsite meeting: acceleration of the equipment supplies to Russia’s troops in Ukraine, strict execution of the state defence order in all its key parameters, and preventing supplies disruption. Medvedev’s main message after visiting the complex, however, was for the foreign readers of his channel: “One more thing. Reading the enemy’s analytics, I have come across multiple claims that Russia will soon be out of military equipment and essential weaponry. They say we’ve wasted all of it. Don’t hold your breath. Our production of weaponry and special equipment is increasing many-fold in all domains: from tanks and artillery to high-precision missiles and drones. Just wait for it!” Almost 5 trillion rubles (€81.3 billion) invested into Russia’s defence budget for 2023 are at stake here.

Novaya Gazeta Europe has analysed whether Medvedev’s words regarding the “many-fold” increase in the production of tanks and other military vehicles can be put into practice. Military experts and employees within Russia’s military industry have helped us in doing so. Since such a co-operation would put them at risk, triggering “fake news” and “army discreditation” charges in the best possible scenario, we’re forced to cite the sources still based in Russia on the condition of anonymity.

Unprepared for war​


“The people who started the ‘special military operation’ have been trampling down Russia’s defence sector for many years,” a source within the Russian military industry tells Novaya-Europe. “When Putin came to power, a redivision of the market started. The old top brass was eliminated and replaced by the new ‘efficient management.’ Those factories that had some of their manufacture exported to other countries managed to keep their affairs afloat. In fact, exports are the only thing that kept the military industry alive. The factories that lacked exports potential were either destroyed or sold off. Some of the buildings have been turned into shopping malls, others were simply abandoned.

The profit margin is minimal when it comes to state defence order, Novaya-Europe’s source says. This is Soviet legacy: back in the day, the product price was calculated as the prime cost plus a minor revenue mark-up, say, 5 to 15%. If a tank was sold to a different country for 2.5-3 million dollars, Russia’s Defence Ministry would only return 1 million to the factory’s budget on a good day. These circumstances meant that it was unprofitable for the factories to work with the state and the state defence order. Our source recalls Kurganmashzavod (a vehicle plant based in Kurgan, Russia, known for producing BMP infantry fighting vehicles — translator’s note) failing to comply with the state defence order for several years straight but in the meantime dutifully selling its BMP-3 fighting vehicles to the UAE and Malaysia.

[IMG alt="The Kurgan Vehicle Plant a.k.a Kurganmashzavod. Photo: kmz.ru
"]https://novayagazeta.eu/static/records/fb7cd63e9a8f466889d6259167a300e8.jpeg[/IMG]
The Kurgan Vehicle Plant a.k.a Kurganmashzavod. Photo: kmz.ru

Some factories, specifically those manufacturing commercially viable products for exports, took out loans to buy equipment from banks in the West. However, after the Crimea annexation and the Western sanctions that followed it, they were forced to switch to Russian banks, falling into debt bondage. Some factories were on the verge of bankruptcy. The matter is being addressed these days, and a debt restructuring programme at the expense of the state budget is a possible option.

Military research, development and engineering also lacked state financing in Russia, as the source says.

“It is common practice in the US when their Defence Ministry pays money to the factories, expecting prototypes of certain products in return,” an employee within the Russian military industry says. “This might as well be a competition, and two companies would be working on one order at the same time. They both would then receive money from the Defence Ministry. The latter would test both and start serial production of the better one. It works the other way around here, they say: guys, go work at your own expense! Those few lucky ones who receive financing anyway are interested in wasting time deliberately, putting off the final result as long as they can to keep getting the money. Therefore, Russia’s factories find it beneficial to keep manufacturing old but tried and tested produce, using the Soviet stocks and avoiding major production risks.”

There is no innovative, science-driven produce in Russia these days, and it should not be expected to appear anytime soon, the expert believes.

“It is obvious that Russia’s army is in catastrophically short supply of almost all types of equipment,” an employee for Rostec, a state-owned defence conglomerate, says. “This is why the government orders the factories all over the country receive are so urgent. It seems as if the new priority now is all about quantity, not quality. In simpler words, it’s unimportant which tanks are being sent to the frontlines: the newest T-90M models or the recommissioned T-62 ones.”

The Rostec employee says Uralvagonzavod received a state order of 400 tanks shortly after the Ukraine War started. As per the factory’s public relations office, the tanks production line there has a full load of work up until 2024. However, after Russia started massively losing its equipment on the frontlines, the deadlines must have been seriously tightened up.

[IMG alt="A partially destroyed T-72BA Russian tank captured by Ukraine’s army on an exhibition in Gdańsk, August 2022. Photo: Artur Widak / NurPhoto / Getty Images
"]https://novayagazeta.eu/static/records/76d5258cc24646e08a04437ffb45b039.jpeg[/IMG]
A partially destroyed T-72BA Russian tank captured by Ukraine’s army on an exhibition in Gdańsk, August 2022. Photo: Artur Widak / NurPhoto / Getty Images

However, even in the tank industry, the instructions from the highest management cannot be executed immediately.

“Everyone was unprepared for a war. Launching any sort of production requires time. First and foremost, all suppliers, selectors and allied manufacturers should be dealt with,” the Rostec employee says.

“Producing tanks requires metal, guns, engines, electronics, communication devices and all sorts of other complex mechanisms and integral units. All those things were purchased based on the actual contracts and cannot be acquired in a snap of a finger. There were no stocks, too; we have a lean manufacturing policy.

Handmade tanks​


Our source working for one of the state corporations in Russia estimates the current Uralvagonzavod’s production capacity at 200–250 tanks a year. The footage of Medvedev’s visit indicates that the new tanks are being assembled manually, and the old ones are being modernised on the stocks. Notably, the old Soviet assembly line provided an annual capacity of thousands of tanks each year. The workers at the factory make jokes that their tanks are handmade as they speak to the Novaya-Europe reporter unofficially.

Stepping up production requires production space expansions. However, those tens of billions of rubles allocated to build state-of-the-art workshops capable of automatically assembling Armata tanks have been “used up” already. Uralvagonzavod pursues its contractors in court, and not a single square metre of new workspaces has been constructed. The purchased equipment and the expensive imported machines lie rotting in crates for years. This is why no mass production of Armata tanks is to be expected in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, Alexander Potapov, Director General at Uralvagonzavod, has not been held accountable for scuttling one of the most ambitious projects of Russia’s military industry.

As a result, Armatas are being assembled in the same section of the factory as T-90s and T-72, fundamentally heavier and bigger models, although there is no relevant equipment for that. It is unknown how many Armatas are in operation now, it’s safe to assume that about a dozen of them used for military displays at the Red Square, plus a few vehicles, were provided to certain units for training. For instance, an Armata tank was seen in Kazan’s Higher Tank Command School.

[IMG alt="Tank production line at Uralvagonzavod. Screenshot from a YouTube video
"]https://novayagazeta.eu/static/records/164325fa4a7b40a38c760258dc42fe60.jpeg[/IMG]
Tank production line at Uralvagonzavod. Screenshot from a YouTube video

Uralvagonzavod lacks trained assembling specialists to set up a new production line within the existing workspaces. To step up production, the factory would need to hire more people. These days, the factory’s schedule is three shifts, seven days a week, same as most military industry facilities.

Uralvagonzavod used to deliver tanks in dozens but handing in a batch of 5 or 10 tanks to the army is somewhat common these days. The factory is now focused on producing T-72B3M tanks, although a set of modern T-90M appeared on the Internet recently. Ukraine’s servicemen have already captured some of those. It’s difficult to make up a worse marketing campaign than the newest Russian tanks getting put out of action using old rocket launchers and anti-tank missiles.

Russia’s Defence Ministry might be in possession of up to eight thousand tanks of different models, from T-62 to T-80, preserved in storage, as per Volya, a Telegram channel. Volya tried to figure out how many tanks are in Russia’s use, and found out that up to 90% of the depreserved vehicles require mandatory modernisation. According to the channel’s calculations, Russia’s tank industry is currently capable of producing up to 250 new vehicles and modernising up to 600 old ones each year.

Terminators under repair​


Ukraine is outweighing Russia more and more on the frontlines in terms of firepower owing to the NATO-supplied long-range gun systems capable of delivering fire at a distance of 30-40 km. The 2S19 Msta, Russia’s most advanced self-propelled howitzer, is only capable of firing a projectile at the distance of 24 km. Such a small distance (by today’s terms) was designed because old projectiles were supposed to be used, and Russia had those galore. Therefore, the potential increase in shooting distance is limited by the weapon’s ballistics. There is another one: the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV is the newest Russian howitzer, capable of hitting a target of up to 70 km away from its location. Russia started designing it in the late 1990s, and it also has an autonomous turret with increased fire rate. However, UralTransMash has only produced several prototypes so far, and there are no such vehicles on the front lines.

A 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV during the rehearsal of the Victory Day parade, Alabino near Moscow, 11 April 2016. Photo: Wikimedia

A 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV during the rehearsal of the Victory Day parade, Alabino near Moscow, 11 April 2016. Photo: Wikimedia

Novaya-Europe’s source in Rostec says that the Armata and the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV share the same problem regarding the gun system: Russia does not produce the required type of gun steel. Only two factories in Russia produce blanks for parts of the receiver group: the Motovilikha Plants in Perm and Barrikady, a machine manufacturing plant in Volgograd.

“Russia’s metal industry is dead,” our source says. “When a competition for barrel blanks was announced, all the samples put up for it turned out to be defective. The special thing about the new barrels is that they must withstand greater pressure, that is, be more durable. This requires special alloys and melting modes, as well as small-sized furnaces. The thing is: Russia’s metallurgy is focused on large volumes and mass grades of steel.

Back in the day, some of the managers within the industry considered that the open-hearth smelting process had become inefficient, and all open-hearth furnaces were extinguished in the country. However, only those furnaces could produce high-quality steel, including the one used to produce artillery.

Another much-touted product of Uralvagonzavod is the Terminator tank support combat vehicle sold to Algeria in commercial quantities. Four of those vehicles were seen in Ukraine, which pleased Russia’s patriotic public. However, in the next video, posted about a month later, the vehicles were filmed undergoing repair.

Iskanders not laughing anymore​


It is generally believed that Russia has a strategic stockpile of Iskanders, Kalibrs and other modern missiles.

“Russia’s Defence Ministry does not provide any data on the number of equipment produced, used in the theatre of operations or lost there,” Pavel Aksyonov of BBC explains to Novaya Gazeta Europe. “For instance, we can only estimate how many missiles are manufactured in Russia by indirect signs: by the number of missiles launched and by the selection of missiles. During the massive missile attacks on Ukraine which followed the blowing up of the Crimean bridge, Tornado S, S-300, Kh-101, Kh-55, Kalibr and Iskander missiles were used, as well as UAVs, and so on. At the same time, there is still no data on the number of missiles of each type that were taken down or hit targets in Ukraine.

A contact for Novaya-Europe who works in the development of missiles reports that many types of missiles, such as Kalibr, are being immediately sent from the production lines to the launch points.
Russia’s Defence Ministry reported that a total of 99 missiles had been launched on targets in Syria between 7 October 2015 and 3 November 2017.

“An ordinary US destroyer ship carries over 90 cruise missiles. And they have dozens of those,” our source says. “Russia has nothing of this kind. They use corvettes and frigates, which only have 8 or 16 launchers. In a year’s time, the nuclear cruiser Admiral Nakhimov (former Kalinin), which has been under modernisation since 1999, is expected to return to combat duty. It will be converted to launch modern missiles.”

Another reason to doubt the sufficiency of Russia’s high-precision missiles is the use of S-300 anti-aircraft systems against ground targets. Such missiles are guided quite imprecisely when used in the ground-to-ground mode. Moreover, a powerful fragmentation warhead leads to numerous casualties among the unprotected civilian population when it hits a residential area.

The Kinzhal missile system, which Putin used to scare the West with, is the same Iskander model attached to a MiG-31 fighter-interceptor jet. Russia has very few such missiles, our sources say, same as MiG-31 jets modified to carry those: there are only several planes, to be specific.

“Also, the Kh-22 anti-ship missile with a homing head was used during the attacks on Ukraine,” a rocket engineer says. “Simply put, it is able to tell a block of metal in the form of an aircraft carrier from the flat sea. It cannot, however, pick the right building out of many in an urban landscape. In this case, it flies using the pre-determined navigation route and arrives somewhere in the vicinity of the target, quite imprecisely, in fact. The possible deviation in this case is hundreds of meters at best.”

According to our contact, Russia does not have the production capacity to manufacture the missiles to replace those already used. Back in 2018, the crew at the Dubna Machine Building Plant protested against the management methods of AFK Sistema which owned the enterprise. Russia hauled away the equipment from Ukraine’s Dnipro in the early 2000s and placed it at the plant in Dubna, where the production of the Kh-series missiles was launched. According to our source, Almaz-Antey, which produces Kalibr, S-300 and S-400, has issues with the imported machines that have stopped working due to the sanctions.

Corruption is the cause​


Since the Soviet times, Russia’s aviation design bureaus have had a surplus of fundamental research in aerodynamics. For instance, Russia’s latest aircraft, the Su-57, have an excellent glider. But Russia’s electronics are larger and less reliable, which increases the weight of the aircraft. The characteristics of radar stations, as well as communication systems, are significantly inferior to their Western counterparts. Russia’s radars have a smaller detection range, they can track fewer targets, they have worse target recognition quality, and so on. The domestic engines are also weaker in terms of technical characteristics than the Western ones. At the same time, the sources of Novaya Gazeta Europe in the military industry say that only a few of these newest Su-57 fighters can be assembled each year.

A Su-57 during a demonstration flight at the MAKS-2011 air show. Photo: Wikimedia

A Su-57 during a demonstration flight at the MAKS-2011 air show. Photo: Wikimedia

The situation with the helicopters is no better. America’s modern rotorcraft are one and a half times smaller and much more efficient in terms of load and weapons. In terms of their weight, size, and operational characteristics, they leave the Russian ones far behind. Russia’s helicopters consume more fuel, not to mention the fact that the engines for most models were manufactured in Ukraine. Notably, Vyacheslav Boguslaev, the head and co-owner of Ukraine’s Motor Sich PJSC, was arrested for supplying engines and spare parts for Russian attack helicopters. Russia has failed to set up their own production, and it is likely that in the foreseeable future, combat helicopters in Russia will simply cease to be produced.

Our sources say that the production of drones is a new way of stealing lots of money from Russia’s defence industry.

“The command is very poorly versed in this area,” says the Rostec expert. “The entire experience of the effective use of UAVs came exclusively from below until recently. This is how it worked: a quadcopter bought with sponsors’ money or fundraising fees appeared at the units, and the troops learned how to use it, mastered strategy, tactics, piloting combat techniques and methods of effective use. The Defence Ministry does not have a separate department that would collect, systematise, and analyse these practices. When the need arose, the military officials were more concerned about how to steal and launder money rather than how to ensure combat effectiveness.

As our source says, a lot of small firms appeared several years ago, pretending to be developing UAVs. Often, the development would mean nothing but assembly of “a flying machine” based on a Chinese drone, which was then lobbied through people in the army command as the latest domestic development. Russia literally does not produce any low-power aircraft engines, be it reciprocating or jet ones. Such engines have a special thing about them: a certain ratio of dead weight to useful power is required. Electric motors, like those that the Chinese put on copters, are also not produced in Russia. But the top brass was thrown dust into their eyes, which eventually forced them to buy drones off Iran and to import large blocks and parts from China for their own promising models.

All our sources agree upon the point that Russia started the war with an industry that had failed to modernise. The money allocated on this modernisation was spent inefficiently. The Western sanctions leave zero chance for Russia to produce new developments.

“On the other hand, the T-62 is a tank that is easy to use, and it is much simpler for a mobilised person to learn how to operate it than with modern vehicles,” says our source from Rostec. “If Russia runs out of those, the T-34 can be taken from pedestals, there are many of those all across the country.”

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Lainaus ko. artikkelista:

Uralvagonzavod used to deliver tanks in dozens but handing in a batch of 5 or 10 tanks to the army is somewhat common these days. The factory is now focused on producing T-72B3M tanks, although a set of modern T-90M appeared on the Internet recently. Ukraine’s servicemen have already captured some of those. It’s difficult to make up a worse marketing campaign than the newest Russian tanks getting put out of action using old rocket launchers and anti-tank missiles.

Russia’s Defence Ministry might be in possession of up to eight thousand tanks of different models, from T-62 to T-80, preserved in storage, as per Volya, a Telegram channel. Volya tried to figure out how many tanks are in Russia’s use, and found out that up to 90% of the depreserved vehicles require mandatory modernisation. According to the channel’s calculations, Russia’s tank industry is currently capable of producing up to 250 new vehicles and modernising up to 600 old ones each year.


Edelleen kysymys kuuluu: mitä tarkoittaa "producing up to 250 new vehicles and modernising up to 600 old ones each year". Onko T-72B3 obr 2016 "uusi ajoneuvo"? Entä peruskorjauksessa käynyt T-72B tai T-80BV? Lasketaanko nämä tuohon "modernising up to 600 old ones"? Venäjä lähettää myös tietyn osan Ukrainassa vaurioituneista panssarivaunuista peruskorjattavaksi eri pajoille. Millaisen osuuden kokonaisuudesta nämä muodostavat, vaikea sanoa (olisi toki loogisempaa pyrkiä tekemään pienemmät korjaustyöt lähempänä rintamaa - arvatenkin juuri tästä syystä toinen "uusista armored repair plant" pajoista avattiin Ukrainan lähiseudulle, mutta missä ajassa se pääsee vauhtiin ja millaiseen vauhtiin?).

Minä olen edelleen sitä mieltä että heillä on kyky valmistaa uusia panssarivaunuja ja tehdä merkittävä modernisointi yhteensä 240 kpl per vuosi JA varastovaunuja kyetään aktivoimaan (lisäksi ehkä kevyt modernisointi) tuo 600 kpl per vuosi - olettaen molemmissa tapauksissa että ei nähdä ongelmia esim. komponenttien hankinnassa (mistä on kuultu huhuja jo pidemmän aikaa).

Laskin aikaisemmassa viestissä, millä tempuilla voisivat saada ylimmän johdon määräämän 1 500 - 1 600 panssarivaunua vuoden 2023 aikana. Se oli pelkkä ajatusleikki, jossa pohdittiin, mitä vaunutyyppejä tämä määrä voisi sisältää. Todellisuus lienee kuitenkin se, että kyettäisiin enintään puoleen tuosta määrästä - jos siihenkään.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Ukrainan sotilastiedustelupalvelu GUR:n sotilaan haastatelu.

"Rock and roll" in Moschun: an interview with a subversive scout of the GUR MOU

On the eve of the anniversary of the liberation of Kyiv Oblast from the Russian occupation army, we spoke with a soldier of the "Shaman" subversive and reconnaissance group of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, which won a combat victory during operations in Gostomel, Moschun, Irpen and Buch.

The special forces officer, who destroyed Russian equipment and personnel with his group in the vanguard of the Defense Forces of Ukraine or behind enemy lines, is currently continuing his rehabilitation after being wounded in March 2022, and also serves as an instructor for recruits of the combat units of the GUR of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

His personal experience, approaches to tasks and stories told from the battlefield now make it possible to more fully understand the scale of the threat hanging over Kyiv, as well as the secrets of the difficult but victorious battle for the Ukrainian capital.

In civilian sneakers

Before the large-scale war, he served in the military intelligence of Ukraine, took part in hostilities in Donbas within the ATO/OOS, then retired to the reserve.

He returned to the ranks of the GUR of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The day before, we already had information about a possible Russian invasion, so we agreed on the time and place of the meeting. They gathered at a designated place in Kyiv, and from there they already advanced in a column to Gostomel.

The first battles were in civilian sneakers, a jacket, and a cap. This is directly on February 24 — Gostomel airport. After that, we already moved, and it was Moschun, Bucha, Irpin.

My group gathered - people who once served and returned. They entered the battle immediately. Of course, there was no reconciliation. Weapons were checked during smoke breaks between battles. It was fun.

From "Pokemon" to Ka-52

Enemy helicopters came in large numbers. Previously, I could see this only in the movies, and even then, it was probably not so widespread.

They started working as nurses. Worked generally on objects. It was a bit illogical in my opinion. But, of course, it had its psychological impact. This affected the further progress and actions of our forces directly at the airport.

"Vertushki" came in with fire, and we tried to work on them. I worked directly from the machine gun, but from the Ka-52 the bullets just flew away like seeds.

When the order "Leave the airport" came, I thought: why are we leaving? That is, I personally did not understand this decision.

I wanted to be closer to the airstrip where the Russians were landing. Then later we saw these videos of them landing. I wanted to be there specifically and meet them with machine gun fire.

My personal opinion, through the eyes of a fighter. That is, I did not have a complete picture for objective judgments, but morally and psychologically I wanted it.

Moschunsky "rock and roll"

After the battles in Gostomel, we moved closer to Kyiv and expected that perhaps the column would go directly to Kyiv via the Starogostomel bridge.

We took up the defense, dug in. There was such a position - we called it "Myachyk": a key intersection on the side of Gostomel and Pushcha. They were waiting for the enemy there, but after a few days they realized that the front line was, in fact, somewhat further away.

They started making trips, contacted advanced units - this is the 72nd brigade. They found interaction and have already started helping them.

First trip to Moschun. There they told the infantry how to meet.

On February 27, a Russian convoy - more than 30 units of equipment - crossed the Irpin River, just opposite Moschun. I don't understand what their task was. Maybe they got lost. We rode Moschun for half an hour and returned back on the same road and the same bridge.

The enemy then realized that there could be a potential place to create a bridgehead on the other side of the river for a further offensive. Then it led to what, in fact, Moschun became: to be honest, they were met there weakly. They later began to carry out active actions on this bridgehead.

There we have already started to beat and destroy their groups. Accordingly, all enemy artillery and aviation focused on occupying Moschun, which had turned into a hellish place.

"Rock and roll" continued in Moschun until the moment of liberation. This is plus or minus on March 20. I was there until March 13. That day, he was wounded during a shooting battle. Specifically, we had five such battles in Moschun. The distance is from 20 to 70 meters.

Evacuated by car, everything is fine.

Wild field

There was chaos, of course. Firstly, there was no mobile communication in Moschun. This immediately made management difficult. Each division had its own radio stations and frequencies. There was a certain collapse of management.

Communication is coordination within groups, with your headquarters, with adjacent troops. We already tried to deal with such a situation there: we used, for example, civilian radio stations.

72nd brigade? They fought as hard as they could, but I think there was a missed opportunity. To some extent, we provoked the enemy by entering Moschun in those first days, on February 27. If at that moment they were given a good kick in the teeth, then this idea, let's say, would have died in the bud.

The character of the enemy's actions at that time was reduced to the fact that they moved in columns. The only place to cross the river was a bridge, which, let's say, could be prepared and stop their attempt at once.

However, the boys from 72 fought. They did not abandon their positions to the last, although they actually suffered significant losses from artillery.

We were in the vanguard of the 72nd. Observation points, certain secrets, ambushes on the enemy were made in front of their positions.

Our great advantage was the presence of UAVs in groups. We had Mavic, we had Autel — that is, we could see both during the day and at night.

The Russians had UAVs, these "Orlans", actually flying in colossal numbers, but they worked in the interests of headquarters and brigades. The information received was either not transmitted to their advanced forces, or it was not transmitted promptly.

I raised the "bird" in specific situations and understood where the enemy is and how I can build a route to him, how I can sting him.

There is strength in unity

Many civilians remained in the cities. The most telling incident with civilians happened when we were returning to Gostomel. Our task was to occupy five key intersections. These are Gostomel and Bucha. Having established ourselves there, we would be able to control these settlements.

The two points are specifically in the direction of the airport, where the enemy forces are concentrated. One is Vorzel. And two more on Buchi.

We pushed forward to Gostomelsk "glass" (Gostomel glass factory. - Ed.), our first car arrived. We acted in such a way that from the side it seemed quite clever. They arrived there, having made a preliminary reconnaissance with a UAV, and found that there was no one on the "glass". The route to the "glass" is also empty. When we arrived, people began to stare at us, saying, who are you - ours or not ours?

Realizing that the Ukrainians had returned, because the forces had actually left there for a few days, people began to demolish everything: from the "glass" trucks drove out to deliver concrete blocks, someone ran out with shovels to dig trenches, someone brought us food, and we they said "we don't need it, leave it alone", someone felled trees on the road with chainsaws, someone dragged all kinds of benches - they created barricades. Half an hour - and the position was already ready.

It was very revealing then. It was encouraging. At such moments, you understand what you are doing here. It's a little... No, it's not a little, but it was very different from Donbas, from our experience in 2014.

It was an incredible union. And in unity there is strength.

Everything happened very quickly and harmoniously. In reality - half an hour, and we have already taken the intersection. A large group of people approached, more than 20. And literally two days later, the battle on the "glass" took place, which we know about, when the enemy column decided to simply march through this checkpoint, with soldiers on armor, without trying, for example, to walk down the street on the right There, of course, we gave them hell.

If I'm not mistaken, we discovered this enemy column on March 3 with a UAV. I was at a position in Buch, and our scouts, with the help of a drone, saw a column that began to line up right in the direction of the glassworks factory.

And again — connection. It was not between my position and the position on the "glass". We went there, warned the boys. And then the three of them advanced a kilometer closer to the airport and set up a joint venture there. They tried to call in artillery from the 72nd. Just then the enemy column started moving. She was met at the "glass".

Their attempt failed. In general, the same should have happened in Moschun on February 27. This is my personal opinion.

Read the second part of the special agent's memoirs on our website tomorrow.
 
Vielä löytyy jotain venäläisiltäkin mitä heittää tuleen Bahmutissa.
Tuo video näyttää siltä, että joko sinne tuli yks kaks lämmintä ja kaikki lumet sulivat tai se on ennen lumisadetta kuvattu.

Bakhmutissa on ollut perjantaista alkaen sellainen 8-10 astetta lämmintä, jos tätä säätiedotusta https://www.timeanddate.com/weather/@712959/historic Tuo iso lumimyräkkä oli tiistai-keskiviikkoyönä ja sen jälkeen on ollut hyvin aikaa sulaa ja tuota myräkkää ennen oli myös sellainen keli, että kaikki lumet olivat hyvin ehtineet sulaa.
 
JR2 julkaisi eilen yhden venäläisen lähteen arvion Venäjän panssarivaunujen määristä. Näitä arvioita on aina mielenkiintoista lukea, mutta ei sovi unohtaa ketjun viimeistä lausetta:

Disclaimer: the numbers come from several Russian forums (old and fresh topics) with angered Russian comments (… why can’t Russia defeat Ukraine…).

Lainaan silti numerot alle:

Source: Russian
#Russian tank inventory & production levels.

These data from 2007-2012 (period when Gen. N. Makarov was the predecessor of V. Gerasimov).

- 22 000 tanks (T-55/62/64/72/80/90)
- incl. 9 000+ T-72s & 6500 T-80s
- out of 22 000 MBTs, 15 000 were mothballed

- remaining 7k MBTs:

- 2000-2300 in active service
- 300 in training units
- remaining numbers according to gen. Makarov were to be transferred to mothballed units/bases/depots

current production capabilities:

- UVZ: at least 250 MBTs per year, maximum 500-600 (optimistic, only if three shifts introduced)
- 1985 (Soviet era) levels: 1552 T-72 produced
- post Soviet era (Russia) maximum level reached was 300
- average levels in 1990s: 120


1680515745613.png

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Current numbers of MBTs in depots:

- 8000 T-72s
- 5000 T-80s, incl. about 3000 to be modernized to BVM variant
- 2000 T-62M (modernization plan: 800 in 3 years)


1680515810233.png

FsvThBDXoAMqCL0


Disclaimer: the numbers come from several Russian forums (old and fresh topics) with angered Russian comments (… why can’t Russia defeat Ukraine…).

 
Zelenskyn sanotaan vierailevan Puolan Varsovassa 5.4.2023 eli ylihuomenna:

On April 5, an official visit of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky is expected in Warsaw.


-

Samaan aikaan Puola on jo (väitetysti) toimittanut ensimmäiset MiG-29 koneet Ukrainalle:

Several Polish MiG-29s have reportedly already been transferred to Ukraine.


-

Väitetysti Kharkovan oblastin alueelta löytynyt / pudotettu venäläisten käyttämä Mavic 2 Pro drone jossa on kiinni "anti-drone gun":

Kharkiv Oblast, Ukrainian forces from the DPSU downed a Russian Mavic 2 Pro with an anti-drone gun.

 
Hyvä muistutus siitä, miten vaikeaa Venäjän olisi löytää korvaava ostaja Länteen myytävälle öljylle ja kaasulle:

Probably one of the greatest ironies of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine is that Putin was so hellbent to have Nordstream2 finished that he completely disregarded any long-term strategy for Asia. Almost all pipelines go to the West and it is impossible for this to change in this decade.

Putin, the "master strategist", completely relied on that he will win in Ukraine and that the entire world will go along with it.

It also proves that revanchist fascism as Russkyi Mir is that it never does any good to the people. Russia could have thrived if it had relinquished all imperial ambition. Industry would thrive, the very life could thrive, but all what they have is now a broken society with stupid WW2 fetishism where Soliviki and Ozero-Oligarchs sit in their palaces from Gelendzhik to Sotchi.

And if this is the worst what can happen to Russia then you haven't see everything. With each day this war goes on the more Russia will lose. Like I said, the irony...


FsxxXahXwAEx7Bp



Hyvä muistaa että Lännen ja Neuvostoliiton välinen öljy- ja kaasuputkien rakentaminen alkoi vuonna 1970. Lännen riippuvuus idän öljystä ja kaasusta paheni koko kylmän sodan ajan eikä tilanne ole parantunut sen jälkeen viimeisenä kolmena vuosikymmenenä.

TOISAALTA Venäjä on yhtä riippuvainen tästä putkiverkosta eikä ole nähnyt tarvetta kasvattaa esim. Kiinaan tehtävää vienti (merkittävissä määrin). LNG-terminaaleja on jokunen, mutta merirahti ei voi koskaan korvata kaasuputken kapasiteettia (paitsi tapauksissa joissa kaasuputken vetäminen olisi hyvin kallista tai jopa mahdotonta).
 
DeepStaten päivitys Bakhmutista 🇺🇦. 🇺🇦 Joukot nähtävästi vetäytyneet kaupungin länsilaidalle.

🇷🇺 "Wagner" sotilaspoliisin terroristit Bakhmut RDA:n tiloissa

▶️ Kirjoitimme aiemmin, että taistelut ovat käynnissä kaupungin keskustassa ja teemme muutoksia pääasiassa visuaalisen vahvistuksen perusteella. Jos joku luulee, että tilanne keskustassa oli ennallaan kuukauden ajan, hän on väärässä.

▶️ Edes keskustan menetys ei tarkoita Bakhmutin menetystä. Suurin asuinalue sijaitsee aivan kaupungin länsiosassa.

▶️ Kaupungin keskustan puolustaminen on vaikea tehtävä, koska paine tulee kolmelta suunnalta. Patoa ei räjäytetty ja joki oli helppo kaataa. Tämä aiheutti lisäongelmia puolustuksessa. Jopa militanttien johtaja meni lukioon nro 5 joen toisella puolella - lyhyempää reittiä.

▶️ Muuten, vihollinen ei ole vieläkään vallannut Marinkaa, vaikka suurin osa kaupungista on heidän hallinnassaan.

IMG_20230403_125632_184.jpg
 
Venäjä alkanut linnoittaa viimein myös Donetksin aluetta saman tyylisesti kuin muu miehitetty Ukraina jo linnoitettuna, eli AT-kaivanto, hampaat ja jalkaväen juoksuhaudat. Tähän mennessä Donetskin alue ollut vahvasti linnoitettuna vain jalkaväkijuoksuhautojen osalta.

Oranssilla AT-juoksuhaudat jotka näkyvät Sentinelin kuvissa. Punaisella AT-juoksuhaudat jotka näkyvät kaupallisessa mutteivät vielä Sentinelissä. Vihreä laatikko Sentinel-kuvan closeuppialue.
Teki tuohon minimäppiin mieli saada Donetskin kaupunki näkyviin niin katsoja osannee sijoittaa rakennustyöt paremmin kartalle.

2023-03-24-00 00_2023-03-24-23 59_Sentinel-2_L2A_True_color.jpg
 
DeepStaten päivitys Bakhmutista 🇺🇦. 🇺🇦 Joukot nähtävästi vetäytyneet kaupungin länsilaidalle.

🇷🇺 "Wagner" sotilaspoliisin terroristit Bakhmut RDA:n tiloissa

▶️ Kirjoitimme aiemmin, että taistelut ovat käynnissä kaupungin keskustassa ja teemme muutoksia pääasiassa visuaalisen vahvistuksen perusteella. Jos joku luulee, että tilanne keskustassa oli ennallaan kuukauden ajan, hän on väärässä.

▶️ Edes keskustan menetys ei tarkoita Bakhmutin menetystä. Suurin asuinalue sijaitsee aivan kaupungin länsiosassa.

▶️ Kaupungin keskustan puolustaminen on vaikea tehtävä, koska paine tulee kolmelta suunnalta. Patoa ei räjäytetty ja joki oli helppo kaataa. Tämä aiheutti lisäongelmia puolustuksessa. Jopa militanttien johtaja meni lukioon nro 5 joen toisella puolella - lyhyempää reittiä.

▶️ Muuten, vihollinen ei ole vieläkään vallannut Marinkaa, vaikka suurin osa kaupungista on heidän hallinnassaan.

Tässä kohtaan jotenkin toivoisi jotain Tomoe Nage manevööriä ukrainalaisilta. Prigorzinkin jo leventeli hallintorakennuksen haltuunotolla... :unsure:
 
Näinkö bemariilla syöksytään vesistön ylitykseen? 😁 Näyttää vähän vaaralliselta
.
Pakko sanoa, että aika pienellä varomarginaalilla mennään kun katsoo miten vähän kilogrammoja jää pinnan yläpuolelle.

Bakhmut alkaa sitten olla menetetty. Tässä näkee kuinka propaganda pelaa myös lännen puolella kun tästäkin on kokoajan uutisoitu kuinka Venäjän hyökkäys hyytyy ja pari viikkoa sitten oli mukamas joku käänne. Totuus kuitenkin on, että tasasen tappavaan tahtiin on kartoissa venäjä syönyt kaupunkialuetta. Onneksi toki merkittävin tappioin.
 
Samaan aikaan Puola on jo (väitetysti) toimittanut ensimmäiset MiG-29 koneet Ukrainalle:

Several Polish MiG-29s have reportedly already been transferred to Ukraine.

Kyllä ne ovat menneet ihan perille saakka, ei väitetysti.

11:47 03.04.2023

Poland hands over first promised MiG aircraft to Ukraine​


Poland has completed the transfer of the first batch of previously promised MiG-29 fighters to Ukraine, Head of the President's Office for International Affairs Marcin Przydacz said on RMF FM.

"According to my information, this process has already been completed, i.e. the transfer of this first part. Of course, there will be talk about possible further support," Przydacz said on Monday morning.
 
Pakko sanoa, että aika pienellä varomarginaalilla mennään kun katsoo miten vähän kilogrammoja jää pinnan yläpuolelle.

Bakhmut alkaa sitten olla menetetty. Tässä näkee kuinka propaganda pelaa myös lännen puolella kun tästäkin on kokoajan uutisoitu kuinka Venäjän hyökkäys hyytyy ja pari viikkoa sitten oli mukamas joku käänne. Totuus kuitenkin on, että tasasen tappavaan tahtiin on kartoissa venäjä syönyt kaupunkialuetta. Onneksi toki merkittävin tappioin.

Ryssä varmaan kierrätti joukkoja, tästä olettamus hyytymisestä. Pitää muistaa että ryssällä on koulutuksessa ollut mobikkeja ja näitähän tullaan käyttämään. Tappioiden tuottaminen on Ukrainan tavoite Bakhmutin alueella, mutta ottaako Ukrainan sodanjohto huomioon kuinka paljon ryssä saa värvättyä uutta tykinruokaa?
 
Kyllä ne ovat menneet ihan perille saakka, ei väitetysti.

11:47 03.04.2023

Poland hands over first promised MiG aircraft to Ukraine​


Poland has completed the transfer of the first batch of previously promised MiG-29 fighters to Ukraine, Head of the President's Office for International Affairs Marcin Przydacz said on RMF FM.

"According to my information, this process has already been completed, i.e. the transfer of this first part. Of course, there will be talk about possible further support," Przydacz said on Monday morning.
Varmaan risteilyohjuksien torjuntaan Migejä myös käytetään sekä toki myös roiskimaan Harm ohjuksia pinnoista. Muuta en keksi näille.
 
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