This CSIS report explores Russia’s evolving missile campaign against Ukraine from the opening days of the invasion to present day, the sources of Russian underperformance, and the specific missile systems Russia has deployed.
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Key Findings
▪ Russia’s long-range strike campaign of air and missile attacks has fallen short of producing the strategic
effects necessary to achieve a decisive victory.
▪ Key drivers of this failure have been the Ukrainian military’s extensive use of dispersion, mobility, and
deception and the comparative slowness of Russia’s over-the-horizon targeting cycle.
▪ At the war’s outset, Russia significantly underestimated the scale of effort required to accomplish its goals.
In its initial operation to gain air superiority, Russia failed to achieve mass and tried to attack too many
targets with too few missiles over too short a period to achieve its desired results.
▪ Russia’s strike campaign has also been undermined by frequent shifts in targeting priorities and the
irregular availability of precision-guided munitions.
▪ Ukrainian air defenses have deterred Russian Air Force aircraft from launching penetrating sorties against
strategic targets deep behind the front lines. This success has greatly shaped the course of the war,
limiting Russian striking power to diminishing numbers of stand-off missiles or uncrewed aerial systems.
▪ Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and industry have deepened Ukraine’s dependency
on the West. This dependency supports Russia’s goal of exhausting the West’s patience and compelling
Western capitals to pressure Ukraine to make concessions. This Russian theory of victory will also fail,
however, unless Western governments accommodate it.
▪ Russia has seen relatively greater operational success in its campaign to degrade the Ukrainian electrical
grid, though Ukraine has proven resilient to these hardships.
▪ Ukraine has seen increasing success in intercepting Russian cruise missiles, particularly since the influx of
Western air defenses systems in October and November 2022.
▪ Ukrainian air and missile defenses have not been leak-proof, however, highlighting the importance of
passive defense and maintaining the capacity to quickly reconstitute capabilities and infrastructure.
▪ Since the fall of 2022, Russia’s long-range missile attacks against Ukraine have become larger but less
frequent as Russia attempts to overcome the growing efficiency of Ukrainian air defenses.
▪ Russia is likely to struggle to maintain the frequency of attacks moving forward as its missile
stockpiles diminish and it becomes more reliant on newly produced or recently acquired projectiles
to fuel its attacks.
▪ Even with a diminished frequency, sustained air attacks against Ukraine’s electrical grid over the long
term risk exhausting Ukraine’s capacity to sustain repairs.
▪ In addition to degrading Ukraine’s electrical grid, the composition of Russian missile salvos since October
2022 suggests a secondary Russian goal of depleting Ukrainian air defense capacity.
▪ Diminished air defense capacity would not only put Ukraine at greater risk from Russian missile attack but
raise the prospects of the Russian Air Force resuming penetrating sorties into Ukrainian airspace.
▪ To the extent possible, replenishing Ukraine’s air defense capacity should remain a priority for Western
military aid for the foreseeable future.
▪ Ukraine has demonstrated throughout the war that Russian ballistic and cruise missiles are manageable
threats and can be countered effectively through active and passive defenses
