Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Andrew Perpetua jakaa yhden ryssän kokemuksia:

Here is a story apparently written by a Russian about the Ukrainian attack on a Russian position.

You can read original text here.

https://t.me/brussinf/6240

Kommenteissa häneltä kysyttiin, missä tämä on tapahtunut, tässä hänen vastaus:

Presumably the Ukrainian attack south from Novodanylivka toward Robotyne.

Tarina tekstimuodossa:

"Well, in short, on the 5th the Khohols started to attack us, generally hard. Tanks and bikes came into our landings, I don't know how they got through. The officer was with me and
the tank was the first one to hit him - he ran right over and turned on him a few more times.

We had heavy battles there from the 5th to the 9th. We were knocked out, then we went in again, then we were knocked out again. There were losses... I have never seen anything like that myself. Not even in Bakhmut. Fucking psychologist is still working with me, I have a cuckoo... in general, the flask is whistling hard.

On the 9th we took the landing, again went into it, they started to fuck with us, gun artillery, khokhly with tanks. There were holes in diameter of perhaps two meters, deep as
a man's height, I do not know what the f...rili, direct heavy. There were a lot of people in these dugouts, we could hardly dig people out.

We began to fall back along the landing, to the outskirts, and everything - both the right and the left field from the landing was clear. Behind the field 500 meters and on the edge
of the landing, the outermost dugout, it had two exits. This dugout in the middle falls down, patsaks from there we forged, and I understand that we are up to ... me there -
about 20 people in 10 square meters. We're about to get fucked. So I give the command: "Pull back!"

I was concussed a few times, I was just screaming my head off, I don't know why - I was just screaming like a fucking idiot. I was told, "Go ahead, go first." I said: "No, let me go
last, you all go first." In short, everyone had time to retreat, 500 meters on an open field and we were the last 3 people left, they were being covered, me and two more boys.

And I hear the voices of the Khohols already on the other side of the dugout. And I understand that that is it, we are already on the edge of the forest belt, they squeeze us to
the field. And we started shooting back, crawling, crawling on our stomachs with our backs to the ground, shooting back. I don't know how we didn't hit anything, the bullets were
just whizzing by. I'm there sometimes just pressed to the ground and the bullets so pew-pew past me.

About 150-200 meters we crept away, we were out of ammo. 200 meters is a decent distance, if you are quick in stride, running over, they might not hit. I just jumped up, and
there was this spectacular tank shot. I do not even know how to describe it. I can't hear the shot, only coming in with such a characteristic screeching, as if it were some kind of jet.

It just comes in about 15 meters away from me. And that was it. And the next thing I remember, I flew upside down, my leg was broken by shrapnel, and my left leg was
hanging down above my knee, just hanging on its side by the...fuck. I'm lying there, bleeding. These two have my back. I don't know how I didn't fuck off right away. I gave
myself first aid, I put a tourniquet on, I injected some nefopam, threw off my armour, and the guys pulled me out of the field. I got out alive, I don't know how. I got to a tow truck,
and the fuckin' truck broke down on the way out. It only took them four times to boot it up. I really thought that was it, I'll be 200th, they wouldn't take me. They barely got me
back, right on time.

Vadim, the author of the letter, is now in the hospital, his leg is amputated below the knee. And now he needs not even material but human support.

 
Epämääräinen laukaisu lienee mahdotonta kun laukaisukoodit edelleen ryssän ei perunamiehen hallussa...
Julkisuuteen ei ole kerrottu, minkälaisia taktisia putte on pottumiehelle lähettämässä. Silti rohkenen epäillä, että niiden käyttämiseen tarvittaisiin mitään elokuvista tuttuja koodeja. Eihän ryssä osaa edes paskoa posliinipyttyyn, miten se osaisi tehdä ammuksista sellaisia, että ne ovat käyttökelvottomia ilman jotain Kremlin bunkkerista sähkötettyä koodia?

Toki ryssän YA-doktriinin mukaan päätös Y-aseiden käytöstä tapahtuu komentoketjussa aina presidentin toimesta, oli kyse strategisista tai taktisista latingeista. Ja isoissa, mannertenvälisissä varmasti on erilaisia varmistusprotokollia ennen laukaisua, samoin kaikkien kohdalla komentoketjun eheys ja käskyn oikeellisuus ehkä/toivottavasti varmistetaan jollain tavoin.

Mutta ei tuhansissa pienemmissä paukuissa ole muuta varmistusta kuin luotto komentoketjuun. Ja jos se, jonka hallussa aseet ovat, päättää rikkoa komentoketjun, on ase käytettävissä. Siksi itse pidän todennäköisempänä, että koko tarina on monikerroksista maskirovkaa, millä putte kuvittelee saavansa yliotteen sekä liittolaisistaan että vihollisistaan.
 
Andrei Tarasenko tulkitsee Shoigun vierailua Omsktransmashin tehtaalla ja käytyjä keskusteluja:

From what can be understood from the conversation in Omsk, they plan to modernize 153 T-80BVs this year, of which 15 are ready for shipment.

Compared to 2021 - 80 T-80BVM units - this is an increase of almost 2 times.



-

Toteutuessaan 153 kpl modernisoituja T-80BVM vaunuja olisi hyvin suuri määrä kun vertaa tämän modernisoinnin aikaisempiin vuosiin. Toisaalta T-80BVM obr 2022 on ns. budjettiversio alkuperäisestä T-80BVM modernisoinnista, joten ei voi vertailla ihan suoraan. Lisäksi sota-aikana on suurempi määrä rahaa käytettävänä, joten senkin voisi kuvitella näkyvän (oletuksella ettei ole pulaa aihioista, varaosista, kapasiteetista yms.)

Kirjoitin aikaisemmin toisessa ketjussa T-80BVM modernisointien määristä per vuosi (LINKKI), tässä julkisiin lähteisiin perustuva arvioni:

2017: 10 (esisarja testeihin)
2018: 0
2019: 31
2020: 30
2021: 31

Tosin vuoden 2021 osalta on kirjoitettu "Russian plans to receive about" 80 T-80BVM", joten saatan olla liian rajua arviossani. Lisäksi se että vaunua olisi luovutettu noin 80 kpl ei vielä tarkoita että ne oli hajautettu eri joukko-osastoille vuoden loppuun mennessä, tämä prosessi vie aikansa.

Jaroslaw Wolski kommentoi aikaisemmin: LÄHDE

Omsk / Omsktransmash as a repair shop - 62 T-80BVM per year, etc.

JR2 puolestaan kirjoitti vuodesta 2022 näin (twitter-ketju julkaistu 4.4.2023): LÄHDE

OmskTransMash in late 2022 delivered a battalion of T-80BVM/2022

Venäläisessä panssarivaunupataljoonassa on joko 31 tai 40 panssarivaunua, tosin useimmiten 31 kpl. JOS JR2 tiedot ovat oikeassa ja JOS tuossa olivat ainoat vuonna 2022 modernisoidut T-80BVM perheen vaunut, niin vaikea nähdä miten he yhtäkkiä kykenisivät modernisoimaan 153 kpl.

Edelleen, tämä ei ole mahdotonta ja saatan myös tulkita lähteitä väärin.

Tässä toinen tulkinta: vuonna 2021 he todella luovuttivat noin 80 kpl T-80BVM vaunuja ja JR2 kirjoitus puolestaan jättää mainitsematta joko T-80BVM vaunut tai käsittelee ainoastaan loppuvuotta 2022, jättäen alkuvuoden pois laskuista. JOS Omsktransmash olisi kyennyt modernisoimaan esim. pataljoonan vaunuja per kvartaali, silloin koko vuoden määrä olisi 4 x 31 = 124 kpl. Tämä edustaisi 1,5-kertaa suurempaa määrää edelliseen vuoteen 2021 verrattuna, mikä ei ole mahdoton ajatus JOS tuotannolle ei ole tullut esteitä. Tällöin ei olekaan niin hurja vaatimus valmistaa 153 kpl vuonna 2023, joka tarkoittaisi 1,234-kertaista määrää edelliseen vuoteen 2022 verrattuna. Toisaalta nyt ollaan vuoden puolivälissä, mikä tarkoittaisi että heidän olisi pitänyt kyetä modernisoimaan vähintään kahden pataljoonan verran vaunuja tähän mennessä.

Tällöin numerot voisivat olla näin:

2017: 10 (esisarja testeihin)
2018: 0
2019: 31
2020: 30
2021: 80 ("about to receive")
2022: 124 (paljon spekulointia / arvailua - hyvin huteralla pohjalla siis)
2023: 153 (julki lausuttu tavoite)

T-80BVM obr 2022 vaunuja on nähty Ukrainassa, mutta ei valtavan suurta määrää. Toki tässäkin voi olla julkisista lähteistä johtuvaa harhaa: kaikkia vaunuja ei tietysti valokuvata ja jaeta nettiin.

Toisaalta numeroita voi tarkastella näinkin: JOS kykenevät modernisoimaan 153 kpl vuoden 2023 aikana, se tarkoittaisi keskiarvoisesti 12,75 kpl per kuukausi. Tässäkö on se resepti joka tuo voiton sodassa?

Omsk on toki pieni tekijä panssarivaunujen näkökulmasta, on huomattavasti tärkeämpää mihin Nizhnyt Tagilin UVZ kykenee - samoin ne useat armored repair plant -pajat joille kuljetetaan varastovaunuja peruskorjattavaksi / aktivoitavaksi. Aikaisemmin Putin ja Medvedev kuuluttivat että Venäjä tulee "valmistamaan" 1 500 - 1 600 panssarivaunua vuoden 2023 aikana. Tämä huomioituna nähdään että Omskin modernisoitavien määrä vastaisi noin 10% vuoden kokonaistavoitteesta (joka on hyvin kunnianhimoinen, ehkä liiankin - mikä voisi kertoa siitä että se olisi liian kunnianhimoinen myös Omskin kapasiteetin osalta).
Hyvä teksti, kiitos siitä. Ihmettelen sitä, että kyllähän noita tankkeja voidaan valmistaa vaikka tuhat kuukaudessa, mutta mistä kokenut miehistö? Ei ryssän motivaatiolla opita nopeasti käyttämään kunnollisesti vaunua. Se on laukaus ja moro. Menee resurssit täysin hukkaan, parhaimmillaan ryssä varustaa Ukrainalaisen komppanian T-80 vaunuilla.
 
New York Times artikkeli Nova Kakhovkan padon räjäytyksestä (artikkeli julkaistu 16.6.2023): LINKKI

An Inside Job​

A dam in Ukraine was designed to withstand almost any attack imaginable — from the outside. The evidence suggests Russia blew it up from within.

By James Glanz, Marc Santora, Pablo Robles, Haley Willis, Lauren Leatherby, Christoph Koettl and Dmitriy Khavin

June 16, 2023

Moments after a major dam in a Ukrainian war zone gave way, wild torrents cascaded over the jagged remains of the top. But the real problem most likely lay elsewhere, cloaked deep beneath the surface of the raging waters.

Deep inside the dam was an Achilles’ heel. And because the dam was built during Soviet times, Moscow had every page of the engineering drawings and knew where it was.

1687018109733.png

The dam was built with an enormous concrete block at its base. A small passageway runs through it, reachable from the dam's machine room. It was in this passageway, the evidence suggests, that an explosive charge detonated and destroyed the dam.

At 2:35 a.m and 2:54 a.m. on June 6, seismic sensors in Ukraine and Romania detected the telltale signs of large explosions. Witnesses in the area heard large blasts between roughly 2:15 a.m. and 3 a.m. And just before the dam gave way, American intelligence satellites captured infrared heat signals that also indicated an explosion.

1687018179814.png

After the first section of the dam was breached, videos suggest that the power of the rushing water tore a larger and larger gash into the dam.

As the water levels further dropped this week, they fell below the top of the concrete foundation. The section that collapsed was not visible above the water line — strong evidence that the foundation had suffered structural damage, engineers said.

In the chaotic aftermath, with each side blaming the other for the collapse, multiple explanations are theoretically possible. But the evidence clearly suggests the dam was crippled by an explosion set off by the side that controls it: Russia.

-

Even in a war that has razed entire cities, the destruction of the Kakhovka hydroelectric dam in southern Ukraine stands out.

Thousands of people were displaced by flooding from one of the world’s largest reservoirs, which was vital for irrigating farmland considered the breadbasket of Europe. The disaster puts global food supplies for millions at risk and could threaten fragile ecosystems for decades.

The dam was visibly scarred by fighting in the months before the breach. Ukrainian strikes had damaged one part of the roadway over the dam, and retreating Russian troops later blew up another. Last month, satellite images showed water flowing uncontrolled over some of the gates.

This has led to suggestions that the dam may have merely fallen victim to the accumulated damage, which Russia has seized on to deny responsibility.

But multiple lines of evidence reviewed by The New York Times, from original engineering plans to interviews with engineers who study dam failures, support a different explanation: that the collapse of the dam was no accident. The catastrophic failure of its underlying concrete foundation was very unlikely to occur on its own.

Given the satellite and seismic detections of explosions in the area, by far the most likely cause of the collapse was an explosive charge placed in the maintenance passageway, or gallery, that runs through the concrete heart of the structure, according to two American engineers, an expert in explosives and a Ukrainian engineer with extensive experience with the dam’s operations.

“If your objective is to destroy the dam itself, a large explosion would be required,” said Michael W. West, a geotechnical engineer and expert in dam safety and failure analysis, who is a retired principal at the engineering firm Wiss, Janney, Elstner. “The gallery is an ideal place to put that explosive charge.”

2023_06_03-airbus-1050.jpg

A satellite image showing the dam three days before its destruction. Pléiades Neo Airbus DS 2023

Engineers cautioned that only a full examination of the dam after the water drains from the reservoir can determine the precise sequence of events leading to the destruction. Erosion from water cascading through the gates could have led to a failure if the dam were poorly designed, or the concrete was substandard, but engineers called that unlikely.
Ihor Strelets, an engineer who served as the deputy head of water resources for the Dnipro River from 2005 until 2018, said that as a Cold War construction project, the dam’s foundation was designed to withstand almost any kind of external attack. Mr. Strelets said he, too, had concluded that an explosion within the gallery destroyed part of the concrete structure, and that other sections then were torn away by the force of the water.

“I do not want my theory to be correct,” Mr. Strelets said. A large explosion in the gallery might mean the total loss of the dam. “But that is the only explanation,” he said.

Waking to Water

In the predawn hours of June 6, residents living close to the dam in both Russian-controlled and Ukrainian-controlled territory heard explosions and strange rumblings, they said later.

They were no strangers to the sounds of fighting. For months, the two armies had traded artillery volleys across the Dnipro River. But this time seemed different — and soon it was clear why.

For those closest to the dam, built in the 1950s by the Soviet state, the rush of water was almost immediate. It took longer for the floods to make their way farther downriver, but when they did, they came fast and then did not begin to subside for more than a week.

“We live on the fourth floor so it didn’t reach our apartment, but the first floor was completely flooded,” said Vasyl, 64, who lives in the Russian-occupied east bank town of Hola Prystan, about 60 miles from the dam, and was reached by phone.

2023_06_09-ukraine-dam-1050.jpg

A flooded residential area in the Russian-occupied town of Hola Prystan. Alexander Ermochenko/Reuters

Neighbors and relatives have sought refuge in his apartment. “My sister’s house is completely washed out,” Vasyl said. “It’s just the walls now, nothing inside, no furniture, no appliances.”

Most younger people in the town fled the Russian occupation long ago, he said, leaving behind mostly elderly people, including many with disabilities. “Many of them drowned, as they couldn’t leave their houses or climb to the roofs,” he said. The death toll from the flooding remains unknown; officials say the numbers are likely to rise as the waters recede.

A Prime Target

The relatively spindly sluice gates and cranes and the ribbon of roadway above the water line seemed to offer an easy target for an attack aimed at destroying the Kakhovka dam.
But most of the dam’s enormous mass was hidden below the surface of the water, according to diagrams of the structure obtained by The Times and detailed descriptions by Mr. Strelets, who said he has spent months at the Kakhovka dam and around the reservoir.

cross-section-960.png

Passageway

That mass consisted of a rounded tower of nearly solid concrete some 20 meters high and as much as 40 meters thick at the bottom, Mr. Strelets said. Built in sections, that colossal barrier ran between earthen embankments on either side of the channel and did much of the work of holding back the waters of the reservoir.

The sluice gates sat atop that barrier, opening and closing to adjust the water level. Visual evidence assembled by The Times shows clear damage to the roadway and to a few of the sluice gates on one side of the channel in the months before the breach of the dam.

Despite that damage and a whitewater cascade tumbling from the vicinity of those gates, engineers said the foundering of an entire section of the dam was more likely to be related to the blasts picked up by seismic sensors and to an infrared signal that U.S. officials said was picked up by a satellite, indicating the heat of an explosion.

The seismic signals were picked up on two sensors, one in Romania and one in Ukraine, and occurred at 2:35 a.m. and 2:54 a.m. Ukraine time, said Ben Dando, a seismologist at Norsar, a Norwegian organization that specializes in seismology and seismic monitoring. The signals were both consistent with an explosion, Dr. Dando said — and not, say, the collapse of the dam on its own.

He said that the network could determine the time of an explosion to within a couple of seconds, but that the location of the blasts was less certain. For example, Norsar could locate the 2:54 a.m. signal to have originated within a zone 20 or 30 kilometers across that included the dam.

A specific time stamp for the infrared signal was not available, but a senior U.S. military official said that it was picked up shortly before the dam collapsed.

A senior American military official said that the United States had ruled out an external attack on the dam, like a missile, bomb or some other projectile, and now assesses that the explosion came from one or more charges set inside it, most likely by Russian operatives.

2023_06_10-ukraine-dam-1050.jpg

Floodwaters reached the rooftops of houses in Kherson, about 40 miles downstream from the dam. Daniel Berehulak/The New York Times

Gregory B. Baecher, an engineering professor at the University of Maryland and a member of the National Academy of Engineers, also said the scale of the breach indicated that the underlying concrete barrier had failed, suggesting that charges had been set deep in the structure.

“If they put explosives in the gallery, that would explain a lot,” Professor Baecher said. A large explosion there, he said, “would just rip up all the concrete structure.”

Nick Glumac, an engineering professor and explosives expert at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, said the size of the necessary charge could vary widely depending on the exact way in which the explosives were set and the precise objective.

“It’s worth remembering that you don’t have to pulverize the dam section, just break it enough such that the water pressure is enough to tear it away,” Professor Glumac said.

Still, Professor Glumac said that based on diagrams of the dam and the latest imagery of the destroyed foundation, “It’s hard for me to see how anything other than an internal explosion in the passageway could account for the damage.” He added, “That’s a massive amount of concrete to move.”

Using the gallery might have another advantage for anyone seeking to hide their tracks. According to Mr. Strelets, the gallery had only two entrances, including one inside the machine room located in a building to one side of the dam.

Dr. West, who is also a former Army combat engineer officer, noted that would allow the dam to be rigged out of sight of spy satellites, drones or witnesses on the ground. Early morning drone footage showed that the initial breach in the dam occurred not far from the machine room.

satellite.jpg

A satellite image showing the dam a day after its collapse. Maxar Technologies

Professor Baecher said it was possible, though unlikely, that water flow from the damaged gates somehow undermined the concrete structure where it sat on the riverbed. But he said an examination of the drawings indicated that the design had protected against that possibility with standard measures. One of those is a so-called “apron” of concrete on top of the riverbed to the downstream side of the dam.

“This appears to be a well-engineered dam of modern design,” he said.

For its part, the company that operated the dam said in a statement to The Times on June 16 that “Russian forces made an internal explosion which resulted in destroying the dam.” That explosion, the company said, “brought about uncontrolled release of water from the reservoir and disastrous increase of water level in the downstream.”

A Dam in the Cross Hairs

The ravages of the dam since the Russians invaded Ukraine have been captured again and again from overhead and on the ground.

As Russian troops were retreating across the Dnipro River in November 2022, they blew up the roadway atop the structure’s northern end. A surveillance camera captured the powerful nighttime explosion. Satellite images show that the force of the blast destroyed the roadway, but that the dam’s foundation and the walls of the gates at that section of the dam were unaffected. They remain standing today.

The Times obtained very high-resolution satellite imagery that also shows damage to another section of the roadway in the days and weeks before the dam’s collapse. On June 1, or early on June 2, part of the road that runs along the dam collapsed. Ukrainian HIMARS rocket strikes in August 2022 damaged that part of the road but did not hit the dam.
On April 23, a small part of a wall connected to the power plant collapsed — possible evidence of erosion near the dam.


damage_triptych-Artboard_1.jpg

Sources: Supernova+ via Telegram, Maxar Technologies, Pléiades Neo Airbus DS 2023.

Additionally, the cranes that control the release of water through the dam had not been moved since mid-November, allowing water to flow unchecked out of the same gates over a period of several months. This lack of regulation led the water level of the reservoir to reach its lowest point in decades in February, then hit a 30-year high in May, just weeks before the dam’s destruction.

Neither this previous damage, nor the pressure caused by the high water level or the static position of the cranes is likely to have caused the collapse of the dam’s concrete foundation, experts said, unless the concrete was of low quality and already prone to deteriorate. The large flows would also be insufficient to undermine the dam’s foundation unless, for some reason, the concrete apron — the downstream cover placed over the river bottom — contained flaws or the soil was much softer than accounted for in the design.

A video that emerged this week, after water levels had dropped, provides clear evidence of the catastrophic failure. It shows that the top of the concrete foundation, not just the gates, was destroyed.

Mr. Strelets, the engineer, called the gallery the Achilles’ heel of the Kakhovka dam. He said he hoped a charge had not been put there, because the damage would be irreparable.

“I walked along this dam many times,” he said. “I was proud of it. It is the property of my country. I never even imagined that someone would attempt to destroy it.”

-

Robin Stein, Aleksandra Koroleva, Julian E. Barnes, Christiaan Triebert, Agnes Chang and Anna Lukinova contributed reporting.

 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Julkisuuteen ei ole kerrottu, minkälaisia taktisia putte on pottumiehelle lähettämässä. Silti rohkenen epäillä, että niiden käyttämiseen tarvittaisiin mitään elokuvista tuttuja koodeja. Eihän ryssä osaa edes paskoa posliinipyttyyn, miten se osaisi tehdä ammuksista sellaisia, että ne ovat käyttökelvottomia ilman jotain Kremlin bunkkerista sähkötettyä koodia?

Toki ryssän YA-doktriinin mukaan päätös Y-aseiden käytöstä tapahtuu komentoketjussa aina presidentin toimesta, oli kyse strategisista tai taktisista latingeista. Ja isoissa, mannertenvälisissä varmasti on erilaisia varmistusprotokollia ennen laukaisua, samoin kaikkien kohdalla komentoketjun eheys ja käskyn oikeellisuus ehkä/toivottavasti varmistetaan jollain tavoin.

Mutta ei tuhansissa pienemmissä paukuissa ole muuta varmistusta kuin luotto komentoketjuun. Ja jos se, jonka hallussa aseet ovat, päättää rikkoa komentoketjun, on ase käytettävissä. Siksi itse pidän todennäköisempänä, että koko tarina on monikerroksista maskirovkaa, millä putte kuvittelee saavansa yliotteen sekä liittolaisistaan että vihollisistaan.
Ydinaseiden toimittaminen valkovenäjälle on vain yksi askel eskalointipelissä ja panosten korottamisessa. Yhtenä askeleena tulee olemaan ydinaseiden toimittaminen Iranille.
 
Ehkä, tosin mietin, ajoivatko vaunut ensin miinaan ja nämä tykistön iskut tulivat vasta sen jälkeen? Ei voida tietää, tosin Krasnopol-kranaattien käyttöä on nähty melko harvakseltaan tämän sodan aikana (ainakin minä en muista nähneeni videoita usein). Se vaatii tietysti laseryksikön ohjaamaan kranaatti perille, tämä yksikkö on jalkaväen käytössä. Tietyissä järjestelmissä (modernimmat) on ainakin mainostettu että laserosoitin voisi olla UAV:n kyydissä, mutta en muista että Venäjällä olisi tällaisia käytössä.

JOS tykistöllä oli suuri, jopa ratkaiseva rooli tämän hyökkäyksen pysäytyksessä, se selittää osaltaan miksi Ukraina on metsästänyt ryssän tykistöä jo useamman kuukauden ajan (selvästi ennen vastahyökkäyksen alkua).
Tykistöllä on vaikea vaikuttaa panssaroituihin ajoneuvoihin niin kauan, kun ne ovat liikkeessä. Sulute pysäyttää liikkeen. Sulutetta valvotaan sekä suoralla tulella että tulenjohtajalla. On erittäin uskottavaa, että pysähtyneet ajoneuvot ovat krasnopolin väärtejä maaleja.
 
Pienimuotoista etenemistä tapahtunut Tokmakin pohjoispuolella. Ei merkittävää läpimurtoa, mutta vapautettu kylä joka ollut ryssän hallinnassa huhtikuusta 2022 lähtien:

Zaporizhzhia Front Map (June 17th)

Ukrainian Forces have liberated the settlement of Lobkove located near the Dnipro River in Zaporizhzhia

Lobkove’s neighboring settlement, Pyatykhatky, is currently contested. Both settlements have been under Russian control since April 2022

1687018608441.png


 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Ydinaseiden toimittaminen valkovenäjälle on vain yksi askel eskalointipelissä ja panosten korottamisessa. Yhtenä askeleena tulee olemaan ydinaseiden toimittaminen Iranille.

Tähän en jaksa uskoa. Ensinnäkin en usko että rysyt tulee ytimiä käyttämään, pelkkää pelottelua. Toisekseen jos rysyt rupeaisivat näitä ajatollaheille kaupittelemaan, iipot tulee vastaamaan ja se sekä näkyy että kuuluu…
 
Tähän en jaksa uskoa. Ensinnäkin en usko että rysyt tulee ytimiä käyttämään, pelkkää pelottelua. Toisekseen jos rysyt rupeaisivat näitä ajatollaheille kaupittelemaan, iipot tulee vastaamaan ja se sekö näkyy ja kuuluu…
Ytimillä käytävä politiikka tapahtuu kulisseissa. Ei siinä paljon bunkkerirotta keuli, kun sille kerrotaan miten maailma makaa ja mitkä seuraukset asioilla on. Iran ymmärtää varmasti kauhun tasapainon eikä kaiva verta nenästä jonkun kääpiöryssän takia.
 
Täytyy kyllä ihailla sitä miten hyvin UA:n opsec pitää! Satoja tuhansia miehiä rintamalla muokkaamassa meidän kaikkien tulevaisuutta ja rintamilta ei tule tällä hetkellä juuri mitään infoa.

Nyt vaan sormet ja varpaat ristiin että sankarit saavat ajettua rotat takaisin omiin koloihinsa!
 
Back
Top