Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Hyvä muistutus: Venäjä ei pelkästään vetäytynyt / paennut Kharkovan seudulta vaan kärsi myös merkittäviä tappioita (sekä miesten että kaluston määrässä mitattuna).


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Girkin avautunut uusista eri suunnilla muodostetuista joukoista, sanoo ettei Venäjä ehdi reagoimaan niiden uhkaan:


Tämä on pari päivää vanha ja tainnut olla jo täällä, mutta ei voi olla pohtimatta miten se liittyy tuohon Girkinin purkaukseen:


Ukraina on saanut paljon kevyesti panssaroituja pyöräajoneuvoja, erilaisia MRAP:in kaltaisia näkynyt paljon. Toki heillä on erilaisia tela-ajoneuvoja myös, mutta minulle tulee tällaisista nopeista syvistä iskuista mieleen pyöräajoneuvoilla liikkuvat joukot. Toki läpimurron voisi kuvitella tapahtuneet vahvemmin panssaroitujen ajoneuvojen voimalla, mutta läpimurron hyödyntäminen voisi sopia hyvin nopeammille ja pienemmän logistisen hännän vaativille.

Näitä yksityiskohtia ei tietysti tiedetä varmaksi.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Sir Hugo Swire, previously a minister of state for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and who served in the Grenadier Guards during the 1980s has suggested this morning that Russian President Vladimir Putler was misguided in his thinking about how the world would react to his invasion of Ukraine, and how well prepared the Russian military was for the campaign. He told viewers of Sky News in the UK:

I think a lot of his equipment just looks great on parades in Moscow, but actually in the field is proven to be not very effective, and the terrible logistical problems and so forth.

The reaction of the world? I don’t know. Did he really think he could go into Ukraine in a sort of Blitzkrieg operation and it would all be over in a matter of days and then the world would settle down and deal with him on a an equal level? I think we can now see the how wrong he was.
:cool:
Pavlo Kyrylenko, Ukraine’s governor of Donetsk, has repeated his refrain that people should evacuate where possible from areas that remain under the control of pro-Russia forces or are being targeted by Russian strikes. Posting images to Telegram of what he claims are recent attacks by Russia on Kramatorsk, Kyrylenko says:

The rocket fell right in the middle of a residential quarter and partially damaged at least three private houses; the garage burned down as a result of the fire that broke out. The Russians are deliberately terrorising the local population. Under such conditions, the only correct way out for civilians is to evacuate to safer regions of Ukraine. Don’t become a target for Russian terrorist forces. Evacuate!
On Sky News in the UK, Moscow correspondent Diana Magnay has said that she does not see the Russian president, Vladimir Putin “ending this anytime soon and withdrawing his troops”. She told viewers:

Ukraine does seem to be on the advantage now. And the Russian forces, on a long and overstretched frontline which clearly has weaknesses in it that the Ukrainians have identified, are going to be suffering from pretty poor morale. I think that is the main problem that Russia is facing.

The Kremlin has been pretty tight-lipped about the counteroffensive. But what has been very interesting here [inMoscow] is to watch the kind of comments and criticism from not the liberal camp, but pro-war nationalist bloggers, especially on Telegram, and some military analysts who want Russia to be doing better. They are very angry that they are suffering the kind of setbacks that we are now seeing.

We heard yesterday from the leader of the Communist party saying that Russia should just turn around and call a war a war, and declare full mobilisation. And we’ve heard certain calls from various parties that Russia needs to do that. The Kremlin are understandably very hesitant about mobilising the entire country. It will be politically extremely risky. It would show that this special military operation is not going according to plan.
Russian oil and gas revenues have fallen to their lowest for almost a year, despite a big rise in prices, according to a report.

Bloomberg has reported that the Kremlin’s gains from its fossil fuel resources, which account for more than a third of nation’s budget, fell to 671.9bn roubles ($11.1bn) in August, the lowest since June 2021, using calculations based on Russian finance ministry data.

The figure is down 13% from July and is a 3.4% decline from 12 months ago.
myös
This morning Reuters is touting that it has an exclusive that Vladimir Putin’s chief envoy on Ukraine told the Russian leader as the war began that he had struck a provisional deal with Kyiv that would satisfy Russia’s demand that Ukraine stay out of Nato, but Putin rejected it and pressed ahead with his military campaign.

It reports that, according to three people close to the Russian leadership, the Ukrainian-born envoy Dmitry Kozak told Putin that he believed the deal he had hammered out removed the need for Russia to pursue a large-scale occupation of Ukraine.

Kozak’s recommendation to Putin to adopt the deal is being reported by Reuters for the first time.

Putin had repeatedly asserted prior to the war that Nato and its military infrastructure were creeping closer to Russia’s borders by accepting new members from eastern Europe, and that the alliance was nowpreparing to bring Ukraine into its orbit too. Putin publicly said that represented an existential threat to Russia, forcing him to react.

But, despite earlier backing the negotiations, Putin made it clear when presented with Kozak’s deal that the concessions negotiated by his aide did not go far enough and that he had expanded his objectives to include annexing swathes of Ukrainian territory, the sources said. The deal was dropped, and on 24 February Russia invaded.

Asked for a comment about Reuters’ findings, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said: “That has absolutely no relation to reality. No such thing ever happened. It is absolutely incorrect information.”

It should be noted that in November 2021 Peskov described accusations that Russia was preparing to invade Ukraine as a “hollow and unfounded” invention of the western media.
Eli tämä on putlerin sota, koska hänelle tarjottiin diiliä joka olisi taannut rauhan, mutta putler halusi sodan.
 

En ole ihan varma noista vapaututeista ihmisistä. Rivien välissä näyttää että ongelmia on ja jotkut kaipaa UAn sisällä ryssien imperiumia.

Suurimmat kollaboraattorit ovat luultavasti karanneet Venäjälle... Toki siellä on paikallisia bjekmanneja ja putkineniä, kun niitä on meilläkin. Riittää, kun selaa suomea, niin... Niiden määrä tuskin on kuitenkaan merkittävä enää.
 
"We provided that advice, and then the Ukrainians internalised that and made their own decision.”

Melkein kuulostaa siltä että on sanottu jotain ihan muuta, mutta Ukrainalaiset on todenneet että vitut tästä dieselit lämpimiksi ja hööki päälle maximum attack fuck yeah! Ja sitten maailma yllättyi kun Ukraina onnistui taas kerran. Enään ei pitäisi yllättyä.

1. Ukraina pysäytti Venäjän federaation parhaiden joukkojen massiivisen invaasion.

2. Ukraina käynnisti onnistuneen Blitzkrieg vastahyökkäyksen.

3. Krim vai vai Kreml?

Krimillä on lämpimämpää.
 
Tässä ketjussa vihjaillaan hieman samaan suuntaan, viitataan Illia Ponomarenkon ja Mykola Bielieskovin tuoreisiin kirjoituksiin:





Ukrainian Balakliya-Kupyansk Offensive: Sequence of Events, Mechanics and Consequences​

By: Mykola Bielieskov

September 13, 2022 07:32 PM Age: 12 seconds

Ukrainian forces’ Balakliya-Kupyansk offensive operation (September 6–12) could likely be treated as the turning point in the all-out Ukrainian-Russian war—when Ukraine gained the initiative. In approximately one week, Ukraine liberated more than 6,000 square kilometers (km) of its sovereign territory in Kharkiv region—much more than Russia has managed to occupy since mid-April 2022 (President.gov.ua, September 12). Although an unexpected turn of events for the majority of observers, the offensive was not a miracle but rather a simultaneous demonstration of Russian forces’ growing degradation and Ukrainian formations’ improved professionality and exceptional staff work, as successful counteroffensives are some of the most challenging maneuvers.

The Balakliya-Kupyansk offensive followed a template of classic World War II operations. It consisted of two distinct phases: penetration of the enemy’s tactical defense in depth and exploitation of penetration with a follow-on echelon. During the penetration phase (September 6–7), Ukrainian forces managed to breach the Russian front line to the north and northeast of Balakliya—near Verbivka and Volokhiv Yar (Nv.ua, September 7). Through this hole in Russia’s defenses, an exploitation echelon of Ukrainian forces was directed toward the Shevchenkove-Kupyansk axis through the critical P07 roadway (Institute for the Study of War, September 8).

On September 9, forward Ukrainian units reached Kupyansk—a major railway and road hub that Russian forces in Izium extensively depended on (Nv.ua, September 9). As Ukrainian forces were reaching Kupyansk, separate formations moved to the southeast along the Oskil Reservoir, liberating crossings (Senkove and Horokhovatka) that were considered passages the Russian Izium grouping might use for an orderly withdrawal (Institute for the Study of War, September 9). As a result, Russians in Izium fled the scene on September 10, leaving the majority of their heavy weaponry and ammunition intact as spoils of war for Ukrainian forces (Pradva.com.ua, September 10;Bbc.com/ukrainian, September 13). Next, Ukrainian forces turned northward and liberated Velykyi Burluk and Vovchansk near the border with Russia by September 12 (Zaxid.net, September 12).

A number of outcomes in the Balakliya-Kupyansk offensive operation are especially noteworthy. First, the speed with which Ukrainian forces managed to penetrate Russia’s tactical defense in depth was quite impressive. This might be explained by the fact that Russians lack proper manpower to create so-called “defense in depth.” The front line was thinly manned with Special Rapid Response (SOBR) units (falling under Rosgvardia), which were primarily created to combat organized crime and terrorism and definitively not for high-intensity interstate warfare (EurAsia Daily, September 9). Meanwhile, Ukraine created a preponderance of forces at sectors of prospective front-line penetration.

Second, the agility of Ukrainian forces’ advances during the exploitation phase was another masterful success. This can be largely explained by Moscow’s significant lack of ready reserves—with many of the Russian forces directed to southern Ukraine anticipating an offensive there. At the same time, Russian forces in Izium were pinned down by Ukrainian frontal assaults (near Lyman), which prevented the grouping from being redeployed toward Kupyansk (UNIAN, September 10).

Third, Ukrainian forces during the exploitation phase emphasized swiftness of movement along major roads to quickly reach Kupyansk, rather than liberate settlements along the way; as such, Balakliya was fully secured by September 8 (Ukrinform, September 8). Through expeditious maneuvers, Ukrainian units managed to isolate the zone of operation and sever major ground lines of communication (GLOCs) for orderly withdrawal, creating panic among Russia’s rear forces and causing them to flee without heavy weaponry and ammunition.

Finally, the direction of Ukraine’s major flanking strike was chosen quite wisely. Through the strike to the north-northeast of Balakliya toward Kupyansk, Ukraine threatened the Izium salient to the southeast of Balakliya and, by this single stroke, unhinged the entire Russian front line in Kharkiv region. Meanwhile, owing to the fact that the Oskil Reservoir limited Ukrainian advances and protected offensive forces from hypothetical Russian countermeasures, as well as limited options for Russian units’ organized withdrawal from Izium. In other words, Ukrainian military command managed to exploit geography features and front-line configurations to its advantage.

With the Balakliya-Kupyansk offensive, Ukrainian forces demonstrated the advantages of maneuver warfare (bewegungskrieg). Swiftness of action along major lines of communications—Ukrainian forces covered 75 km toward Kupyansk in three days—led to the complete collapse of the Russian front line and unorganized withdrawal of units. The offensive’s accomplishments are especially impressive in light of the fact that Ukrainian forces are still grappling with a deficit of critical artillery and armor and lack air superiority, which is considered an essential requirement for any successful offensive operation.

Moreover, the Balakliya-Kupyansk offensive stands in stark contrast to Russian attempts to advance in Donbas since April 2022. Despite a preponderance of firepower and numerical advantage in armor, Russian units failed to quickly penetrate Ukraine’s tactical defense in depth in numerous places, and the exploitation echelon was unable to encircle and destroy major Ukrainian groupings or cause them to flee. In truth, all Russian forces managed to do is slowly push Ukrainian forces from Popasna, Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.

In its offensive operation, the Ukrainian side recovered most of the lost territories in Kharkiv region. At the same time, the threat of a Slovyansk envelopment was removed as the Izium salient hovering over this city has been reduced to zero. Ukrainian forces proved to be masters of maneuver warfare and operational art despite such objective constraints as lack of artillery, armor and piloted aviation. Most of all, the Balakliya-Kupyansk offensive was a major strategic coup for Kyiv, as successful actions on the ground debunked the consensus that the Ukrainian-Russian war will be a protracted stalemate in which neither side is able to attain key political objectives by major offensive operations (The Bell, August 26). Kyiv is quickly demonstrating that it is increasingly possible for Ukrainian forces to recover all the briefly occupied territories and win this war.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Until one short week ago, the geopolitical balance in Ukraine could be likened to Zugzwang – the delicate point in a board game when any move will probably disadvantage a player.

For the west, as it prepared to gather with other world leaders at the UN general assembly in New York, there seemed to be no good option, apart from hanging on. It could hardly retreat in its support for Ukraine – too much of the liberal democratic order had been declared to be at stake, too much Ukrainian blood spent, too much western treasure expended, including $5bn (£4.27bn) a month just to finance the Ukrainian state. The US alone has spent $15.5bn since the start of the war.

Yet if the west continued with its plan to squeeze Russia economically, an increasingly desperate Putin was certain to turn off all the gas coming from Russia, not just that coming via the Nord Stream 1 line, but all pipelines. Given the refusal of oil producers, from Saudi Arabia to Iran, to come to Europe’s rescue and increase oil production, millions of European consumers are at risk of freezing or going bankrupt this winter.
Instead of offering only a costly grinding stalemate, in which – in Vladimir Putin’s words – European prosperity is thrown into the furnace of sanctions, western leaders can now talk of the de-occupation of Ukraine, and sound plausible. “This counteroffensive shows that we can win,” said Ukraine’s ambassador to the US, Oksana Markarova. The French ambassador to Ukraine, Étienne de Poncins, even speculated somewhat prematurely that autumn could be “the season of victory”. If so, minds will have to turn to what brutal, even nuclear, methods Putin might employ in order to prevent collapse.
eli politiikoilla on tiukat ajat kun ne ajattelee ydinpötköjä, kun pitävät pään kylmänä ja avustajat kanssa pitävät todellisuuden pöydällä niin kyllä tästä selvitään.
Ukraine’s advance will also unnerve Beijing, since it promised Russia a friendship without limits. As Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, points out: “It was China’s purpose to divide the west, but its alignment with Russia has done the opposite.”

Moreover, if China is to remain an effective counter to the US, one that attracts non-aligned states, it badly needs Russia to succeed in eastern Ukraine. The biggest loser from a Russian defeat in Donetsk, in terms of prestige at the UN, might be China’s president, Xi Jinping.

But even now western leaders will look anxiously out from their chandeliered offices for signs of whether Europe will buckle or stand firm. The pressure is not yet off.
Kiinalla on omat ongelmansa ja en usko että kaikille UN politiikoille on ymmärrystä mitä siellä on käynnissä kun uutisointi on ainakin osittain sensuurin alla.
Moscow’s disinformation units of course like to project a Europe in a state of revolt against rising prices and its uncaring elites. The evidence for a populist revival so far is patchy.
Trollien suhteen joudutaan olemaan varpailla pitkän aikaa tulevaisuuteen. Ainoa tapa hajoittaa se on naapurin hajoaminen pienempiin valtiohin ja sen seurauksena trollitehtaiden alasajo.
Overall, a Eurobaromoter poll conducted in June and July found 68% of Europeans supported providing arms to Ukraine, while 78% supported economic sanctions imposed by the EU on the Russian government, companies and individuals. More recent German polls for ZDF showed 70% support for sanctions against Russia, and an extraordinary 90% support among German Green supporters. The first attempt by German leftists to start “a hot autumn” ended in failure with few answering the call to take to the streets in Cologne. The reputations of individual politicians, such as Robert Habeck, have taken a hit, but not the war they advocate.
 
Major setbacks for Moscow’s forces in Ukraine will further test the “limitless partnership” between China and Russia when their leaders meet this week for the first time since the invasion, analysts have said.

The meeting of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, scheduled for Thursday at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, is likely to involve jostling for influence in central Asia, where the two global powers have long waged a “quiet rivalry”.

The SCO summit, an annual meeting of Eurasian leaders on regional politics, economics and security, occurs at a crucial time when a rising China and weakening Russia could shift the central Asia power balance in Beijing’s favour.
Both leaders have also scheduled stops in Kazakhstan, where Xi first launched his trademark “belt and road” foreign investment initiative in 2013. Underscoring the importance of the region, Xi’s visit will be his first international trip since the pandemic began and comes just a month before a crucial Communist party meeting expected to cement his precedent-breaking third term as leader.

Central Asia was “at the heart of Xi’s strategies”, said Therese Fallon, director of the Centre for Russia Europe Asia Studies. “If we think about China’s grand strategy … it’s pretty clear they’ve been pushing westward.”
The strength of the global response to the invasion and Russia’s recent losses have raised difficult questions for Xi about his foreign policy acumen in aligning with Putin, but he will probably remain supportive, said Prof Elizabeth Wishnick, a senior research scientist and the Center for Naval Analyses, on leave from Montclair State University.

“With Russia under pressure on the battlefield, Xi might feel compelled to express some greater rhetorical support for Russia, or at least to provide some additional criticism of Nato and the US,” said Wishnick.

Analysts have suggested that as Russia’s strength wanes, Beijing can gain ground on key issues of trade routes and the defence of its Xinjiang regime.

Niva Yau, a senior researcher at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, said China had a long-term goal to shift global trade from being sea-based to land-based, especially for energy trade routes “which can cushion sanctions on China if it ever comes to a military takeover of Taiwan”. She said trade and transport agreements, or rebranded “belt and road” investments could be announced at the summit.

Russia had similar goals to China, Yau said, but with diminishing power Putin would probably focus on ensuring Russia was not excluded from its regional interests by China’s plans.
Another key factor for China will be to ensure regional support for its push back against global condemnation of its human rights abuses in Xinjiang, which borders Kazakhstan and is a Muslim-majority country. “Kazakhstan is arguably the most important country to get on board,” said Yau.
 
Toisinkuin Venäjä, USA oikeasti pystyy massiiviseen konventionaaliseen vastaukseen mikäli ryssä nukea Ukrainassa käyttää. Kerran USAn näin väitetään ilmoittaneen että toimisi.

1994 USA antoi Budapestissa Ukrainalle turvatakuut vastineeksi luopumisesta ydinaseista (Kuten Venäjäkin! SIC! ) Jos Venäjä käyttää ydinaseita Ukrainaa kohtaan, niin USA:lla on ihan täysi peruste kurmuuttaa vanjaa. Muuten USA:n uskottavuus on aika mennyttä. Toivottavasti Venäjällä ymmärretään tämä?
 
6000 neliökilometriä viidessä päivässä. Pitää olla jonkinlainen saavutus historiankirjoissa. :salut:

1663146823261.png


Saksa valloitti Ranskan kuudessa viikossa eli 12.500 km2/vrk vaikka vastassa oli todellinen sotilasmahti.

Norja voitettiin kahdessa kuukaudessa, 6.400 km2/vrk

Kreikka voitettiin 24 päivässä 5.500 km2/vrk

Belgia voitettiin 17 päivässä, 1.700 km2/vrk

Alankomaat kaatuivat viikossa, vaikka vastassa oli kolminkertainen ylivoima, 6.000 km2/vrk

Jugoslavia voitettiin 12 päivässä kaksinkertaista ylivoimaa vastaan, 21.000 km2/vrk


🇫🇮Jatkosodan hyökkäysvaiheessa Suomi valloitti n. 90.000 km2 alueen 25.6-19.9 eli n. 1.000 km2/vrk mikä vastaa Ukrainan etenemistahtia.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Vatsaa on tullut. Ihan itsekseen kuten Ismon komedia esityksessä.
Nyt hyvä aika karistaa ylimääräisiä kiloja ja ottaa tavoite talvivaateet käyttöön kaapin perukoilta.

Väljemmät spr:n kautta ukrainan kansalaisten hyväksi erityisesti miesten vaatteita kaipaavat.
Käsitykseni mukaan osa menee suoraan Ukrainaan ja osa jää tänne sotaa karkuun paenneille.

Maastopuvun alle käy myös siviili villapaita.

Siinä tämän iltapäivän puuhastelut...
 
Suomalainen Talvisota-narratiivi vähättelee saadun avun määrää. Lisäksi kun otetaan huomioon yleinen tilanne niin saadun avun määrää voidaan pitää järkyttävän suurena. Tosin tässäkin pitää sanoa että Saksa on paska maa kun esti esim. Italialaisen avun kuljettamisen sen läpi Suomeen.

Saksa oli paska maa myös siksi, että työnsi Suomen "Venäjän etupiiriin" 23.8.1939 ja auttoi Stalinia hyökkäämään.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Kooste Arestovichin tuoreimmasta, lainaan ketjun tekstin alle spoilerin taakse:

RU sources complain UA continues storming Lyman, has new advances in the Siversk direction; the springboard near Borova, north of Slov’ansk and north-east of Izyum, has expanded and endangers Svatove.

Svatove is a railway junction and the supply line to Sieverodonetsk and Starobilsk. RU fears UA will attack Zarichne and Kreminna once Lyman falls. Danger of another front collapse is looming. No confirmation from official UA sources on any of these speculations.

Near Siversk, UA took many prisoners; new reserves from the so-called LPR are trying to stabilize the situation.

Bakhmut:

RU claims it entered Bakhmut; UA General Staff denies it. This is the only 20 km in the 1390-km of the front line where RU attempts to advance.

Zaporizhzhie and Kherson:

Armed Forces of Ukraine have accumulated large reserves in Zaporizhzhie, according to RU sources. In the Kherson direction, the Armed Forces of Ukraine moved closer to Kherson from Posad Pokrovske along Highway M-14.

Aviation, artillery, HIMARS strikes on the RU positions on the right bank of the Dnieper. Intercepted calls reveal heavy losses, no rotation, low morale.

Forbes’ summary The counter-offensive operation continues.

Forbes refers to UA General Staff in its summary report on UA counter-offensive for Sept 6-11:

– 2850 RU invaders destroyed
– 590 pieces of equipment destroyed (worth over $670 mln)
– 129 pieces of equipment captured (worth $104 mln)

The numbers above is what has been confirmed. In reality, Arestovych estimates UA captured at least 2 brigades worth of equipment: one tank brigade and one mechanised infantry brigade.

- Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict

The Azeri side is accomplishing goals from setback in 2020.

The Armenian leadership requested help from Putin but unlikely to receive any. RU is not interested in confrontation with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

The main destabilizing factor in the Caucases is the Russian Federation, which trades simultaneously with Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey.

- Western weapons

President Zelensky has asked Washington to supply the necessary weapons to counter Russian terrorist attacks.

Sholtz called Putin to criticize RU strikes on civil infrastructure, referendum attempts and to emphasize the urgency of total withdrawal of RU armed forces from UA territory. Germany will continue to supply arms to UA. The US announced its next tranche of $600 mln this week.

The Commander-in-Chief of the AF of Ukraine, Zaluzhny, is guided by the parity logic when requesting specific arms: UA must be able to deliver retaliatory strikes on the infrastructure of the Russian Federation if RU continues to strike UA even after RU troops withdraw from all Ukrainian territory. This parity will ensure RU stops its hostile activities.

- Security Treaty

The Russians requested negotiations after the defeat in the Kharkov direction, but the Ukrainian side refused.

Zelensky insists the only condition to resume talks is complete withdrawal of RU troops, including from Crimea and Donbass.

Arestovych commented on the goals of the new fundamental document being drafted by the Yermak-Rasmussen Committee.

This document is called “The Kyiv Security Treaty” and provides framework for security guarantees to Ukraine. The framework completely changes the security system of Eastern Europe, Europe as a whole, and the entire world.

Main points:

1. Ukraine’s accession to NATO. The Security Treaty is in effect until the accession and states this as its main goal.

2. The main security guarantee of UA is its ability to defend itself: strong army, strong defenses to deter any planned hostilities.

When under attack, within 24 hours UA receives military, political, financial, informational aid. The document can potentially be used as a draft for other countries in similar situations: Moldova, Georgia, etc.

- War crimes in deoccupied Kharkiv region

No Russian teachers were found in the de-occupied areas, but about 100 local teachers had gone through RU training and were teaching using RU curriculum. Ukrainian collaborators will be prosecuted.

This sends a strong message to teachers in other occupied regions. In newly de-occupied areas, evidence of torture and dozens of victims of targeted killings of Ukrainian citizens by the Russian military as part of systemic terror has already been found.

It’s too early to make victim estimates at this time. The de-occupation measures continue.

 
Jos tämä näkövinkkeli saa laajempaa kannatusta Duumassa, niin kuinka nopeasti otetaan puheenaiheeksi Venäjän rikoslain luku 34. artikla 353 mukainen hyökkäyssota, ja sen laittomuus? Tämähän on ollut ainakin aiemmin este niin liikekannallepanolle, varusmiesten käyttämiselle taisteluissa kuin sodasta puhumiselle?
Lakia sovelletaan ja muutetaan Putinille sopivaksi, tämä pykälä ei ole ongelma... toki jos valta vaihtuu niin se on uudelle johdolle näppärä työkalu, jos halutaan vaikka vanha johto sen pohjalta tuomita.
 
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